

# CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

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## FINAL RECORD OF THE FOUR HUNDRED AND EIGHTY-SIXTH PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,  
on Tuesday, 14 February 1989, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. Aldo Pugliese (Italy)

The PRESIDENT: I declare open the 486th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

At the outset, I should like to extend a warm welcome among us to the Minister of State for External Affairs of India, His Excellency Mr. K. Natwar-Singh, who is addressing the Conference today as first speaker. The Minister of State has been very active in the field of disarmament, and in that connection I should like to recall his outstanding role as President of the Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development. He has also addressed this Conference on previous occasions, presenting very ably the views of his Government on a number of critical issues of disarmament. I am sure that the members of the Conference will listen to his statement with particular interest.

May I also extend a warm welcome to our new colleague, the representative of Czechoslovakia, Ambassador Vratislav Vajnar, who used to work in the predecessor of the CD? I am looking forward to co-operating with him in his new functions.

In accordance with its programme of work, the Conference will listen to statements in plenary meetings and consider the establishment of subsidiary bodies on agenda items and other organizational questions. In accordance with rule 30 of its rules of procedure, nevertheless, any member wishing to do so may raise any subject relevant to the work of the Conference.

In addition to previous requests from non-members to participate in the work of the Conference, I wish to inform you that new requests have been received from Chile and Viet Nam. They have been circulated in the delegations' pigeon-holes for the information of the members of the Conference.

I have on my list of speakers for today the representatives of India, Brazil and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. I now give the floor to the Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of India, His Excellency Mr. K. Natwar-Singh.

Mr. NATWAR-SINGH (India): I thank you for your warm words of welcome, Mr. President, and would like to take this opportunity to convey my felicitations to you on assuming the presidency for the opening month of the 1989 session of the Conference on Disarmament. I am confident that under your guidance the Conference will be able to make some progress in discharging its mandate. May I also express my best wishes to the Secretary-General, Ambassador Komatina, and the Deputy Secretary-General, Ambassador Berasategui?

Almost a year has gone by since I last had the privilege of addressing this Conference. The past year has been a significant one in the field of disarmament as we all know. The ongoing bilateral negotiations between the United States of America and the USSR on strategic arms reductions are progressing, even if it has not been possible to resolve all outstanding issues and finalize the treaty. The Paris Conference on the prohibition of chemical weapons was noteworthy and useful in that it recorded the unequivocal commitment of States to rid the world of the scourge of chemical weapons and called upon this forum to redouble its efforts to conclude the negotiations on the chemical weapons convention at the earliest date. Shortly thereafter came

(Mr. Natwar-Singh, India)

positive signals from Vienna, where one of the most significant accords in the history of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe was signed. Although the CSCE process is limited to the European States, it is an encouraging development for the rest of the world community. An important breakthrough in the new agreement relates to the mandate for negotiations on the reduction of conventional forces in Europe. It is to be hoped that this momentum will not dissipate and that these negotiations will be more successful than the ill-fated negotiations on mutual and balanced force reductions, which had produced no results since 1973.

The third special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament took place in June 1988. Although a consensus text did not emerge at the session, SSOD-III helped in focusing world attention on the major disarmament issues of our time and proved to be an important vehicle for giving expression to the universal concern at the nuclear arms race. The Conference also succeeded in mobilizing public opinion in favour of disarmament. A series of proposals and new ideas on disarmament were presented to the special session. India tabled an "Action plan for ushering in a nuclear-weapon-free and non-violent world order" which was later introduced in the CD as document CD/859.

The action plan contains a package of measures that structurally link the entire range of issues at present on the world disarmament agenda. The action plan, in essence, represents a continuation of India's position and initiatives on nuclear disarmament. The most essential feature of the action plan is achievement of the objective of the complete elimination of nuclear weapons by the year 2010. The nuclear arms race has threatened the very survival of mankind for a considerable period of time. This race, therefore, must be halted and reversed. The INF Treaty has provided a good opening. This must be seized upon and the process taken to its logical conclusion. These are the considerations which prompted us to present the action plan. We considered that the time was opportune for the international community to initiate measures for achieving the objectives laid down in our action plan: to completely eliminate nuclear weapons; to discard the doctrine of deterrence and simultaneously to put in place an international security system that can sustain a nuclear-weapon-free world.

India's action plan is predicated on the hypothesis that genuine nuclear disarmament cannot be achieved without the nuclear-weapon States undertaking a commitment to give up both the doctrine of deterrence and the nuclear weapons that go with it. So long as nuclear-weapon States have nuclear weapons in their arsenals, and so long as their security policies remain contingent upon the possible use of such weapons, a gradual process of reduction of nuclear arms will hardly make the world any safer than it is today.

Our action plan is based on the premise that the process of disarmament cannot be confined to the United States of America and the USSR. There should be a binding commitment by all nations to eliminate nuclear weapons. All nuclear-weapon States must join the process without delay. Those States which are capable of crossing the nuclear threshold should also assume corresponding obligations. The plan calls for negotiation of a new treaty to give legal effect to binding commitments by the entire international community to eliminate all nuclear weapons by the year 2010.

(Mr. Natwar-Singh, India)

The action plan provides for a series of collateral measures during its three stages which will have the effect of building confidence, facilitating the implementation of agreed measures and negotiations on new measures, and reducing the fear of nuclear war. During the first stage, the conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty and a convention to outlaw the use of nuclear weapons, pending their elimination, is proposed. The plan also provides for the elimination of other weapons of mass destruction and drastic reductions in conventional weapons. The plan also calls for the conclusion of a comprehensive international convention banning chemical weapons.

While we regard the action plan as a comprehensive basis for multilateral negotiations, it is not based on an all-or-nothing approach. Nor is it intended that the sequence of measures included in the plan should be rigidly adhered to. What is essential is that the objective of eliminating nuclear weapons within a time-bound framework must be accepted.

My delegation is convinced that all nations, nuclear and non-nuclear alike, have a vital interest in nuclear disarmament. We have been consistently of the view that multilateral negotiations on nuclear disarmament are long overdue and, therefore, there should be no delay in commencing these negotiations. That is why my delegation has always attached the highest priority to the first three items on the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament that cover nuclear disarmament. The role of the CD in this area therefore, needs to be strengthened. Multilateral negotiations will serve in support and accelerate the pace of bilateral efforts, thereby helping to bring us closer to the vision of a nuclear-weapon-free world briefly glimpsed at Reykjavik.

Pending the realization of the goal of the complete elimination of nuclear weapons, the most practical and useful interim measure would be a convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons. Since 1982, we have presented a draft convention on this subject at the General Assembly, a proposal that has been consistently endorsed by an overwhelming majority every year. The resolution calls upon the CD to undertake negotiations on this item on a priority basis. It is universally acknowledged that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought. The forswearing of the use of nuclear weapons will help in averting the danger of nuclear war and giving credence to the commitment of the nuclear-weapon States to nuclear disarmament. It would be a demonstration of our common desire to curb the nuclear arms race, delegitimize nuclear weapons as a currency of power and provide momentum to the disarmament process.

The history of disarmament negotiations is often said to be a history of missed opportunities. Nowhere is this more true than with the proposal to prohibit all nuclear weapon test explosions for all time. Thirty-five years ago Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru called for a cessation of nuclear testing. Following this call, a conference of seismic experts produced a report in 1958 declaring that detection of nuclear explosions was feasible; in 1962-1963, the only outstanding issue was the number of on-site inspections; in 1980, the trilateral negotiations had nearly concluded the verification provisions when negotiations were suspended.

(Mr. Natwar-Singh, India)

Since then, a number of technical arguments have been brought up by those who see a comprehensive test-ban treaty only as a long-term objective. Each of these had been proven false. In the Mexico Declaration, circulated here as CD/723 in 1986, the leaders of the Six-Nation Initiative offered to monitor a test ban in co-operation with the United States and the USSR. Further, the political difficulties related to on-site inspection today seem capable of resolution. The most recent of the so-called technical arguments relates to testing for maintaining the credibility of stockpiles. Here too, scientists working in defence laboratories have testified that stockpile reliability is not a major consideration in arguing against a test ban. It is evident that these arguments disguise the real issues at stake. A mere non-negotiating mandate can only keep the Ad hoc Committee busy with these non-issues. That is why we have been against a non-negotiating mandate. However, we should all be prepared to adopt a flexible approach in this regard too if there is a commitment to move ahead with purposive action with the objective of achieving agreement on a CTBT.

At the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, it was agreed that along with the quantitative aspect, the qualitative aspect of the arms race also deserved attention. More than a decade has passed since the 1978 consensus. During this period, most bilateral and multilateral disarmament efforts have focused primarily on the quantitative expansion of arsenals. The issue of the qualitative arms race has not received the attention it deserves. Today the world stands on the threshold of a new arms race.

The cumulative impact of developments taking place in the field of micro-electronics, computers, miniaturization, fuel technology systems, guidance systems, materials, directed energy weapons and many others will transform the future security environment. Decision-making will become increasingly dependent on artificial intelligence, and the response times will be reduced to seconds. Many of these developments can only be dimly perceived at present. Moreover, most of them would not fit into existing security doctrines. However, the incontrovertible momentum of their development will throw up new strategic doctrines to justify the expenditure incurred and create new areas for investment in military budgets. It is the technological momentum of the arms race which has made science and technology the masters of war rather than the servants of peace. Far from gaining security, nations will lose control of the instruments of warfare. Historically, this is the appropriate time to ensure that mankind does not become hostage to the monsters it creates.

At SSOD-III, we put forward a detailed proposal aimed at curbing the qualitative arms race. It is a complex task to distinguish the various aspects of scientific and technological developments and to ensure that they are used only for peaceful purposes. A prerequisite for this is greater access to information. The relationship between the major military States has often suffered because of worst-case-scenario assessments and imaginary "bomber gaps" and "missile gaps", which are perceived really as "technological gaps". Greater transparency and availability of reliable information will be an important confidence-building measure, and also help promote greater international co-operation in these areas. It was with this

(Mr. Natwar-Singh, India)

end in view that we suggested the establishment of a panel of experts for monitoring, assessing and forecasting technologies which have potential military applications. We pursued this proposal at the last session of the General Assembly, where a resolution on this subject was adopted. We believe that the creation of consultative machinery to serve as a mechanism for assessment and forecasting of military applications of future developments in science and technology is necessary today. The General Assembly resolution takes the first step towards such an objective. We hope that the deliberations of the Secretary-General's panel will lay the foundation for action on a continuing basis.

The international community has unanimously recognized outer space as the common preserve of mankind. To expand international co-operation in the peaceful uses of outer space, it is essential that it be kept free of all types of weapons. During the last few years, the CD has done valuable work in examining and identifying issues relevant to the prevention of an arms race in outer space. It is an encouraging sign to note that almost 20 proposals have been tabled by delegations, some relating to specific aspects such as banning ASAT weapons or providing immunity to satellites, as well as other more comprehensive proposals, such as amending the 1967 outer space Treaty or adding a protocol to it or replacing it with a more comprehensive treaty.

It is accepted that the existing legal régime relating to outer space needs to be strengthened and reinforced. In view of technological developments taking place, its limitations have become strikingly evident. New legal instruments need to be developed which would reflect both the new political reality and these technological developments. The existing corpus of international law, in the form of both bilateral and multilateral agreements, indicates the direction in which we have to move.

Verification of compliance is a difficult task, and one often made more complex by lack of pertinent data. Today, the registration Convention cannot be described as an effective source of pertinent data. It needs to be strengthened. It would be useful to have an expert group associated with the Ad hoc Committee which could, as a first task, work on the development of criteria necessary for building up a relevant data base.

Satellite technology has reached a stage where it can be used as an important aid in economic planning and development. Communications, remote sensing, navigation and meteorology are among the fields where developing countries could greatly benefit from the use of satellite technology. We therefore view with great concern the development of anti-satellite weapons systems. Priority must be accorded to a ban on the development of anti-satellite weapons, coupled with the dismantling of the existing systems. It is an encouraging sign, though, that in the two States with the most significant space capabilities, restraint with regard to anti-satellite weapon development is currently being observed. What is needed now are multilateral negotiations to convert this voluntary restraint into a universally binding commitment. The proposal for an expert group would also help in resolving the definitional problems so relevant in considering an ASAT ban. We are also concerned about the ongoing research on new types of anti-ballistic-missile weapons systems. The limits prescribed by the ABM Treaty should not be

(Mr. Natwar-Singh, India)

transgressed, and negotiations should begin on a new legal instrument to ensure that outer space is kept free from the incursion of new weapon systems operated either from ground or from space. It is a matter of regret that the Ad hoc Committee functioning since 1985 has not succeeded in coming to grips with the real issues under this item.

Let me now turn to a somewhat more positive aspect of the work of the CD, where considerable progress has been made during the last year. I refer to the negotiations relating to a chemical weapons convention. A comprehensive, universal and effective prohibition on chemical weapons would lead to an enhancement of security for all nations by removing an entire class of weapons of mass destruction.

The Final Declaration of the recently concluded Paris Conference, in which I participated, reflects clearly the urgency of concluding "at an early date, a convention on the prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of all chemical weapons, and on their destruction". We share the sense of urgency reflected in the Final Declaration, and would urge the Conference on Disarmament to set itself a time frame within which to conclude its negotiations on a chemical weapons convention. We are happily close enough to see the light at the end of the tunnel. Any slow-down at this critical stage would be a serious setback to our efforts, as has happened in other areas of disarmament negotiations in the past. At the same time we also need to refrain from actions which may complicate or frustrate the momentum of the negotiations.

The time has come for us to reflect on how the convention will enter into force with the least possible delay. In our view, an open-ended preparatory commission would need to be set up once the convention is opened for signature. In this interim period till the convention enters into force after the requisite number of instruments of ratification are received, the preparatory commission will have to prepare for the first general conference of the States parties, and also enter into procedural and technical details with the host country and States parties. At present, we observe that far too much time in the Ad hoc Committee is devoted to technical details which divert attention from the political issues that still remain to be resolved. Such details could be identified and resolved by the preparatory commission. The time has come for us to look forward and move with vigour and decisiveness. A clear approach would in itself provide a positive thrust to negotiations in the CD.

If I have been frank in expressing some disappointment with the pace of negotiations in this Conference, it is because India looks upon the CD as a unique institution with immense potentialities. What we need is a commitment to make the CD equal to the challenge of our times. Let us remember something that happened on this planet once before. There was a time when the Earth was dominated by monsters which tried to protect themselves by ever more cumbersome armour, until they were walking fortresses. They never noticed, as they blundered through the forest and swamp, the little creatures that skipped out of their way: the first mammals, our ancestors. It was intelligence, not armour, which prevailed and inherited the Earth. The accumulated arsenals which weigh us down are a self-imposed burden. From our collective wisdom, we

(Mr. Natwar-Singh, India)

need to find resources to free ourselves from this burden so that the true creative potential of humankind may be released. According to an ancient Indian aphorism, it is the mind that binds and the mind that liberates. New beginnings made in recent years give us confidence that we have taken the road of wisdom, and that the decisive turn may already have been taken. May the Conference on Disarmament take us speedily on this path.

The PRESIDENT: I thank His Excellency the Minister of State of India for his important statement, and also for the kind words he addressed to me. I now give the floor to the representative of Brazil, Ambassador Azambuja.

Mr. AZAMBUJA (Brazil): May I say a word of profound regret over the untimely death of Miss Aida Levin? She was, in a very real sense, part of our collective memory and part of our collective conscience.

Mr. President, my very warm congratulations and best wishes go to you, Sir, on your assumption of a very arduous task. My delegation would also like to welcome some new faces to this Conference. We are delighted to have with us Ambassador Houlliez of Belgium, Ambassador Dietze of the German Democratic Republic, Ambassador Hyltenius of Sweden, Ambassador Reese of Australia, Ambassador Kamal of Pakistan and Ambassador Bullut of Kenya. I am sure that I shall have with them the same excellent relations that I was fortunate to have with their distinguished predecessors. Last, but not least, I must thank the Minister of State for External Affairs of India, His Excellency Mr. K. Natwar-Singh, for the honour he confers on our Conference by his presence here today and for the timeliness of the words he has just addressed to us.

This spring session of 1989 begins under very good auspices. On 11 January the Paris Conference of States Parties to the 1925 Geneva Protocol and other interested States adopted an important Final Declaration, which my delegation expects will give further impetus to the work of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons and take us nearer a universal and non-discriminatory convention banning forever those terrible means of warfare.

I cannot let pass this opportunity to thank the French Government warmly for the kind hospitality and excellent conference services they provided, which undoubtedly were instrumental in facilitating the outcome of our collective endeavour. Ambassador Pierre Morel must be specially thanked for his untiring efforts in the preparations for the Paris Conference. This augurs well for his chairmanship of the Ad hoc Committee, a nomination that has pleased my delegation not only for very personal reasons, but also for the hopes it brings of a renewed impulse to the chemical negotiations during his tenure.

The Paris Conference helped to heal some of the wounds recent experience in multilateral conferences on matters of disarmament had inflicted on the international community. Consensus was reached, and this is surely something to be hailed. My delegation, however, regrets that consensus seems now possible only in certain specific areas of the disarmament agenda, those that



(Mr. Azambuja, Brazil)

appear to have been designated jointly by the two major Powers as being ready for universal negotiations. In other equally vital areas, things proceed as if it were necessary to be heavily armed as a preliminary step to be able to have a word to say on subsequent disarmament negotiations.

The Final Declaration adopted in Paris has six paragraphs, which very clearly spell out the concerns and expectations of the 149 nations that endorsed it. The first one states unequivocally their commitment not to use chemical weapons. In this light, Brazil hopes sincerely that those States which have made reservations to the Geneva Protocol will seriously examine the possibility of withdrawing such reservations. This would be a positive step towards bringing the international regulations in force prior to the adoption of the new convention into line with the situation which will come into being after the goal of the complete and universal prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of all chemical weapons is reached.

The second paragraph reaffirms the validity of the Geneva Protocol of 1925, which was indeed one of the main objectives of the convening of the Paris Conference. Let me also welcome another development directly related to that gathering, the important number of new accessions to the Protocol.

The third paragraph - for my delegation the real hub of the entire text - is the emphatic appeal to the Conference on Disarmament "to redouble its efforts, as a matter of urgency, to resolve expeditiously the remaining issues and to conclude the convention at the earliest date". My delegation, as well as the other members of the Group of 21, considered that this very clear language, adopted by all participating States, meant the same to all of us. As we have seen in the negotiations on the question of the mandate to be adopted for the re-established Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, we were wrong, and the mandate could not be brought entirely into line with the letter and the spirit of the Final Declaration of the Paris meeting.

The fourth paragraph gives the Geneva negotiations a very well-defined framework, as it emphasizes that the only answer to the vertical and horizontal dimensions of the spread of chemical weapons is the conclusion and entry into force of a universal and non-discriminatory convention.

The fifth paragraph, regarding the role of the United Nations, reiterates language already widely accepted and gives further impetus to the work of the Group of Experts established under resolution 43/74 A, now meeting in this very building.

The sixth and last paragraph takes up the subject with which I began my appreciation of the successful outcome of the Paris Conference. The consensus around chemical disarmament and the hopes that our work here at the Conference on Disarmament arouse around the world should not let us forget the priorities enshrined in the Final Document of the first special session of the United Nations General Assembly. In spite of the real progress made with the Washington Treaty, the so-called INF agreement, we are still a far cry from approaching in nuclear disarmament the levels that would quiet and comfort mankind's deep and well-founded anxieties.

(Mr. Azambuja, Brazil)

In this regard, I would like to recall the words pronounced by Mr. Roberto de Abreu Sodré, Minister of External Relations of Brazil, at the Paris Conference:

"Concern regarding recourse to chemical weapons must be inscribed in the wider frame of the interdiction of use and threat of use of any weapon, be it conventional or nuclear, for the solution of conflicts - a rule of international law incorporated in the Charter of the United Nations. The engagement through which we try to realize the goal of disarmament in the field of chemical weapons must have its counterpart in other realms, specifically in the nuclear one."

As I said before, 1989 begins with good winds filling our sails. After the Paris Conference, we are all solemnly committed to conclude at the earliest date the convention on the comprehensive prohibition of chemical weapons. We know there is no other way, no parallel track. The Brazilian delegation hopes to see this new engagement of the international community reflected in the work of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons.

The work carried out during the inter-sessional period already furnished proof that things are moving. Under the chairmanship of Ambassador Sujka of Poland, the three working group chairmen made us advance in some relevant points of our agenda. We would like to single out the work done in Group C, under the co-ordination of Mr. Numata of the Japanese delegation, especially taking into account the sensitivity of the main item tackled therein - "Guidelines for the conduct of challenge inspections". While my delegation agrees that these guidelines should be seen in the light of the principles of on-site inspection on challenge still contained in appendix II, it should be recognized that the discussions were enriching and that the different and diverging points of view expressed were very even-handedly reflected in the text finally included in appendix I.

Many important parts of our "rolling text" could not be addressed, for obvious reasons, in the short period between sessions. They should be dealt with in the coming weeks. At this juncture, I would like to underline that my delegation considers that the time has come to address more forcefully the issue of economic and technological development, which is the core of article XI of our draft, still in appendix II. Some resistance to the basic concept of the article seems to be withering away. This would be a most welcome development, for this article, as well as article X, constitutes a key to the universality of our future convention. We think that economic and technological co-operation, besides its intrinsic merits, can serve also as a significant confidence-building measure. As stated in the "Guidelines for confidence-building measures" adopted by the United Nations Disarmament Commission at its 1988 session, and endorsed in resolution 43/78 H, "since confidence relates to a wide spectrum of activities in the interaction among States, a comprehensive approach is indispensable and confidence-building is necessary in the political, military, economic, social, humanitarian and cultural fields" (paragraph 1.3.2.2). The document goes on to state (paragraph 2.3.1) that "confidence in international relations is based on the belief in the co-operative disposition of other States. Confidence will increase to the extent that the conduct of States, over time, indicates their willingness to practise non-aggressive and co-operative behaviour".

(Mr. Azambuja, Brazil)

What better setting and what better model for co-operation than a disarmament agreement such as the one we are in the process of negotiating? What better reason to have confidence and engage in a free flow of scientific knowledge in chemistry than the formal and verifiable obligation of other States parties not to develop, produce, stockpile or use chemical weapons? And in return, what better way to be confident that the activities of other parties are really geared to purposes not forbidden by the convention than to share with them information, knowledge and a general co-operative approach?

By the same token, we hold in great esteem the idea and the implementation of national trial inspections. I can announce today to this Conference that Brazil conducted such an inspection on 6 December 1988, at a facility in Camaçari, Bahia. My delegation will circulate the report of this inspection later in the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons and present its conclusions in the presence of one of the experts that participated in it. This trial inspection is one more proof of the readiness of my Government to successfully complete our negotiations on a chemical weapons ban. We hope more delegations will conclude trial inspections and report their findings to the Conference.

I have concentrated my attention today on the Paris Conference, on the future work of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, under the able and stimulating new chairmanship of Ambassador Morel, and finally on the national trial inspection conducted by Brazilian experts. I reserve for another occasion my observations on other relevant points of our agenda.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Brazil for his statement, and also for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Ambassador Nazarkin.

Mr. NAZARKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): Permit me first of all to congratulate you as President of the Conference for this month and express my best wishes for successful work in this responsible post. For my part I should like to assure you that the Soviet delegation will lend you its full support in carrying out your tasks, which are far from simple. I should also like to express my gratitude to your predecessor, the Ambassador of Iran, Mr. Ardekani, for his effective and skilful guidance of the work of the Conference in the previous period.

I should like most warmly to welcome to this meeting of the Conference His Excellency the Minister of State for External Affairs of the friendly nation of India, Mr. Natwar Singh, whose important statement we heard with great interest. We welcome our new colleagues as representatives of the member States of the Conference on Disarmament, Ambassador Sharma of India, Ambassador Houlliez of Belgium, Ambassador Dietze of the German Democratic Republic, Ambassador Hyltenius of Sweden, Ambassador Reece of Australia, Ambassador Kamal of Pakistan and Ambassador Bullutt of Kenya. I should also like to welcome Ambassador Vajnar, the new representative of Czechoslovakia who has just arrived in Geneva and is participating in today's meeting; I had the pleasure to co-operate closely with him in the 1960s and 1970s when he was a member of the Czechoslovak delegation to the Committee on Disarmament and when he worked in the United Nations Secretariat on disarmament matters. To

(Mr. Nazarkin, USSR)

their predecessors who have left Geneva we wish further success in their future posts. The Soviet delegation would like to express deepest condolences on the untimely death of Aida Levin of the Conference secretariat.

At the beginning of this session it is quite natural to take a look at the problems to be discussed in the broad context of the present state of international affairs as a whole. Both you, Mr. President, in your statement, at the opening of the session and a number of representatives have already presented their assessment in this regard. I too would like to begin by setting out some of our ideas of a general nature.

International tension has diminished, and the world has become a quieter and safer place. The "cold war" is on the way out and real prerequisites are being created for humanity to enter a peaceful era in its history. The Soviet-American Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles is being implemented. Prospects are fair for reaching agreement between the Soviet Union and the United States on the reduction of strategic offensive arms. The agreement in Vienna on a significant Final Document, along with the mandate for negotiations on conventional armed forces in Europe, are indicators of the effectiveness of the new, realistic approaches to international affairs. There are grounds to expect a successful outcome at the negotiations on the complete prohibition of chemical weapons (I shall be referring to this issue in greater detail later on). There is a shift towards putting an end to regional conflicts. These first real steps in improving the international situation in the field of disarmament have become possible because understanding of the need for a period of peace is gaining momentum and is becoming the dominant trend. To consolidate this sound trend it is necessary to promote all the positive achievements of the past few years, to develop and intensify political dialogue, aiming at the search for solutions to problems rather than confrontation, the exchange of constructive ideas rather than recriminations.

Today's realities are such that this dialogue requires continuing and active participation by all countries and all regions of the world. The internationalization of the dialogue and the negotiating process is necessary to bring harmony to international relations and put them on a more stable basis. To us the above-mentioned ideas are not just abstract notions. The Soviet delegation to the Conference on Disarmament draws its inspiration from these ideas and will continue to do so, both at the negotiations on a chemical weapons ban and in discussing other agenda items.

The new approach to ensuring security - not through the build-up of arms, as has nearly always been the case, but rather, on the contrary, through their reduction on a basis of compromise - is no abstract notion for us either. The achievements in the field of disarmament I referred to above as evidence in our view, of a discernible shift in the present-day world from over-armament to the principle of reasonable sufficiency for defence. This principle underlies the new military doctrine adopted by the States parties to the Warsaw Treaty. This doctrine is currently being endowed with concrete content. Solid confirmation of the above is to be found in the unilateral reductions by the Soviet Union (as well as by some members of the Warsaw Treaty Organization) in armed forces and armaments. In this connection I would like to draw your attention to document CD/882, which contains excerpts

(Mr. Nazarkin, USSR)

from the statement made by M.S. Gorbachev at the United Nations on 7 December 1988 relating to disarmament problems, and in particular quoting the principal details of our unilateral reductions.

During 1989-1990 the Soviet Union will effect a considerable reduction in its armed forces - 500,000 men, that is 12 per cent of their total strength, including 240,000 in the European part of the country, 200,000 in the eastern part and 60,000 in the southern part. Of 10,000 tanks to be cut in Europe, 5,000 will be physically destroyed while the others will be converted to tractors for civilian purposes and to training vehicles. Five thousand three hundred tanks out of the 10,000 to be reduced are the most modern ones. Eight thousand five hundred artillery systems and 800 combat aircraft will be taken out of service. By agreement with the Governments of the German Democratic Republic, Czechoslovakia and Hungary, six Soviet tank divisions temporarily deployed on their territories will be withdrawn and disbanded by 1991. Let me emphasize that the formations are being withdrawn with all their standard weapons, including tactical nuclear systems. Thus this is also a measure of unilateral nuclear disarmament. In addition, assault landing formations and units and a number of others, including assault crossing support units with their armaments and combat equipment, will be withdrawn from the Soviet forces stationed in these three countries. By 1 January 1991 this entire grouping will be exclusively defensive in nature. Altogether the Soviet forces stationed in these countries will be reduced by 50,000 men and 5,300 tanks.

Taking into account the unilateral measures announced by the People's Republic of Bulgaria, the Hungarian People's Republic, the Polish People's Republic, the German Democratic Republic and the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, the total strength of the Soviet armed forces in Europe and of the armies of other Warsaw Treaty States will be reduced by 296,000 men, the number of tanks by 12,000 and the number of combat aircraft by 930. By agreement with the Mongolian Government, Soviet troops temporarily stationed in Mongolia will be reduced by 75 per cent. The Soviet military budget will be reduced by 14.2 per cent, and the production of arms and military equipment by 19.5 per cent. We believe that major unilateral steps to reduce arms and armed forces can have a considerable positive influence on disarmament talks and stimulate agreement on far-reaching multilateral measures. At the same time, of course, there is also an objective limit for unilateral measures beyond which reductions and limitations must be multilateral in nature.

Before I turn to the state of affairs at the negotiations on a chemical weapons ban, I would like to dwell upon the importance the Paris Conference on the prohibition of chemical weapons has for these negotiations. The Paris Conference occupies a prominent place in the 1989 chronicle, which has just begun to be written. This is demonstrated by the number of its participants - 149 - by the record time by world standards required for its organization, and by the preparedness of the world community manifested at the Conference to reach agreement on complex military/political issues. In fact the Conference became a world assembly on the prohibition of chemical weapons.

Without belittling the importance of the other provisions of the Paris Final Act, I would especially point out the call for the early conclusion of a comprehensive convention on the complete prohibition and destruction of

(Mr. Nazarkin, USSR)

chemical weapons. In essence, the States participating in the Conference in Paris declared their intention of working towards the complete prohibition and elimination of chemical weapons.

We listened with keen interest to the statement made at the meeting on 7 February by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of France, Mr. R. Dumas, who officially introduced the Paris Final Act and set out interesting ideas about ways to step up negotiations on the convention. Whilst giving due credit to the considerable contribution made by the initiators and organizers of the Paris Conference, I would nevertheless venture to express the view that the success in Paris would have been impossible without the progress achieved in the past few years at the Geneva negotiations on chemical weapons. It was not only a refusal to accept chemical weapons, but also the understanding that the issue of their complete prohibition was ripe for a final solution, and that nearly all the basic elements of the future convention have already been worked out, which made it possible to draft the provisions on the early conclusion of the convention that appeared in the Paris Declaration. Thus, by building upon the progress already achieved and giving a power impetus to further efforts, the Paris Conference became a major event marking the entry of the negotiations into their decisive stage.

We believe that now it is extremely important, without losing momentum, to translate the Paris Declaration into the language of the Geneva negotiations, to transform the political provisions agreed therein into concrete positions. We regard this document as a direct instruction to urgently redouble our efforts to resolve expeditiously the remaining issues and to conclude the convention at the earliest date. This objective is based on a realistic assessment of the situation. In actual fact relatively few unresolved issues remain. Furthermore, work on these issues is now well advanced, with greater or lesser progress having been made on each in the form of a greater or lesser degree of agreement on political or technical problems.

The Soviet Union has done everything in its power to eliminate difficulties with the future convention. In particular, during the last inter-sessional period we developed our position as regards permitted production of schedule [1] chemicals. The Soviet side has agreed to laboratory synthesis of small amounts of such chemicals (up to 100 grams) for research and medical purposes provided the convention ensures the strict prohibition of the development of chemical weapons everywhere. We have also expressed our readiness to include provisions in the convention under which it would be possible in each individual case to give consideration to production of schedule [1] chemicals outside a small-scale facility in amounts exceeding 100 grams for pharmaceutical purposes, with a specific amount laid down for each chemical depending on its characteristics and specific uses, naturally under effective international controls. As you know, these steps of ours have already made it possible to move towards agreement on article VI. According to the assessment made by the distinguished representative of Sweden, Mrs. M.-B. Theorin, in her statement here in the Conference on 7 February 1989, they "demonstrate a constructive and flexible approach to the negotiations and could serve as a basis for agreement". Yet, the solution of the remaining problems does not depend only on us. The elaboration of the convention is a multilateral process in which forward movement can be assured

(Mr. Nazarkin, USSR)

only through joint efforts. Specifically, there is another State possessing a chemical weapons stockpile which is as considerable as ours, and we cannot expect a successful outcome without its positive contribution to the negotiations. We have, of course, duly noted the statements in favour of a chemical weapons ban made during the election campaign by the newly elected President of the United States, G. Bush. We hope that it will not be too long before we see these statements materialize into specific positions on the part of the United States delegation at the negotiations. We also welcome the positive changes in the French position which were announced by President Mitterrand at the United Nations and which were referred to here in Geneva by Minister Dumas.

Now a few words about our approach to the main tasks facing the negotiations. They include in the first place the issue of undiminished security of participants in the convention during the first 10-year period after entry into force. The solution to this issue should be based on a complete cessation of development and production of chemical weapons, strict verification of stockpiles of these weapons and facilities for their production, assymetric reductions leading to a levelling out at a certain point after the entry of the convention into force, and the creation of machinery for co-operation in the field of protection from chemical weapons. Another important factor that should not be ignored, in our view, is confidence-building not only during the initial period after the convention enters into force but also prior to its entry into force, as well as the need to ensure universal accession to the future convention as soon as possible. The Paris Conference provides an impetus to solving this problem as well, by calling upon all States to become parties to the convention as soon as it is concluded. In fact the preparations for the convention's entry into force have already begun. This is being facilitated in particular by the national verification experiments being conducted in a number of States. Judging from our experience, they may prove useful not only from the standpoint of elaborating inspection procedures, but also in enabling States to gain initial experience in their practical application.

Soviet specialists are getting ready for the entry into operation of the chemical weapons destruction facility in Chapaevsk, so as to proceed immediately to the destruction of the chemical weapon stockpile as soon as the facility is ready, even before the convention enters into force. In this connection, special attention is being paid to security and ecological aspects of the problem of destruction.

It is important to finalize agreement on the issue of verification. First and foremost, I am thinking of challenge inspections. Work carried out during the past two years provides a sound basis for that. Agreement also has yet to be reached on verification under article VI of the draft convention, including verification in respect of laboratory synthesis of schedule [1] chemicals and the production of super-toxic lethal chemicals which are not chemical warfare agents. We believe that in order to finalize the verification system we can use the existing potential in the form of ideas which have been advanced. What I mean is the possibility for the international inspectorate to conduct on-site inspections on its own

(Mr. Nazarkin, USSR)

initiative if, in carrying out its verification activities of a systematic nature, the need arises to clarify any ambiguous situations. Last year, ideas to this effect were advanced by the Federal Republic of Germany and the United Kingdom and before that by Australia. We hope that the authors of the idea of ad hoc inspections will make their proposals more specific.

National trial inspections can play a significant role in the elaboration of the verification system as a whole. We concluded such an experiment last December at the chemical plant in Dzerzhinsk, at the facility producing N,N-dialkylaminoethanols, i.e., a key precursor considered in the context of schedule [2]. Both an initial visit involving the preparation of a facility attachment, and a routine inspection, were carried out. In preparing for and conducting the experiment considerable use was made of the recommendations drawn up in September 1988 at the multilateral consultations under the guidance of the Swedish delegation. In our opinion, as early as this spring session it is necessary to analyse thoroughly the results of national experiments and map out the programme for future work in this field. It is also evident that the problem of verification of non-production of chemical weapons cannot be adequately solved without parallel progress on other aspects of article VI. Therefore, we deem it important to continue efforts to secure agreement on the provisions relating to the schedules of chemicals and a procedure for including in the schedules, when necessary, new chemicals posing a risk for the convention.

In this context, it is very important to block off all possible avenues for developing new types of chemical weapons. In this connection, I think we should give more substantive consideration to the proposal to set up a scientific council within the framework of the organs of the convention. We are looking forward to receiving the document on that subject which Minister R. Dumas of France promised to submit to the Conference in the near future. Other aspects of the machinery of the future convention also remain to be finalized, including the issue of the composition of the Executive Council.

Finally, efforts should be continued to draft the final clauses of the convention and to resolve other legal issues. The new stage the negotiations have entered requires a new approach to the organizational aspect as well. It is clear that we currently face a situation in which many outstanding issues run through all our work, and that their solution requires an integrated approach to various articles of the convention, annexes and other parts of the "rolling text". We therefore lend our support to the efforts of the representative of France, Ambassador P. Morel, to change the structure of work of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons in order to create additional "administrative opportunities" for redoubling our efforts at the negotiations. Naturally, in so doing our main attention should continue to be directed towards reaching agreement on the text of the convention. The results of the Paris Conference impose a great responsibility on the Conference on Disarmament. We believe that the first response should be the adoption of an improved mandate for the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons taking those results into account and guiding the participants in the negotiations towards their early successful conclusion.



(Mr. Nazarkin, USSR)

We note with satisfaction, that responding to the call by the Paris Conference, a number of countries have for the first time submitted requests to participate in the chemical weapons negotiations as observers. Bringing new participants into the negotiations, in our opinion, proves on the one hand that the negotiations have entered a decisive phase, and on the other should contribute to the elaboration of a truly global convention. We agree with those who believe that it is necessary to concentrate the efforts of the Conference now on finalizing the elaboration of the convention on chemical weapons. This, however, should not justify marking time in other areas of the Conference's work. The fact that the Conference on Disarmament has so far been unable to begin practical work on banning nuclear tests is absolutely inadmissible. I would like to recall that the United Nations General Assembly has called upon the Conference on Disarmament to begin substantive work on all aspects of such a treaty at this year's session. In our opinion the basis for such work is contained in the "Basic provisions of a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear weapon tests", advanced jointly by the USSR and other socialist countries in June 1987. The Soviet delegation believes that it would be possible at the present stage to focus on verification issues and put into practice the proposal made by the USSR Minister for Foreign Affairs, E.A. Shevardnadze, for the establishment of a special group of scientific experts to prepare as soon as possible practical proposals on a system of monitoring the non-conduct of nuclear tests. We favour the early drawing up of a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of tests, and believe that under the present circumstances, a step-by-step approach to resolving this problem is justifiable as well. In our opinion, the Soviet-American talks on nuclear testing, which are based on such a step-by-step approach, do not replace multilateral efforts in this field. These two processes should be mutually complementary and lead to a single final result.

In conclusion, a few words about another priority disarmament problem, the prevention of an arms race in outer space. For some years now this debate has been moving around in circles, as it were. We hope that the Ad hoc Committee on outer space will be re-established in the very near future and that it will prove capable of moving forward from academic discussions to the genuine search for areas of agreement. There is quite enough material for serious work. It includes the specific proposals made by the Soviet Union, in particular to ban anti-satellite systems, to create a system of verification of the non-deployment of weapons in outer space, and to establish an international satellite monitoring agency. The Soviet delegation will, of course, be prepared to participate constructively in the search for ways and means of achieving progress on the other items of the agenda of the Conference as well. Today, we are at the beginning of the road. But only those who move forward will reach their destination.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the Chair. I have no other speakers on my list for today. Does any other delegation wish to take the floor?

(The President)

I had hoped today to be able also to re-establish the ad hoc committees on chemical weapons and on the prevention of an arms race in outer space, but unfortunately consultations have not yet produced results. However, I know that members are consulting actively, and it is my hope that we will succeed soon, so that the Conference might adopt the relevant decision at the plenary meeting next Thursday. I shall be happy if we are able to do so, as the secretariat is processing draft decisions on the participation of non-members in both ad hoc committees, under items 4 and 5, and I am sure that you will all agree with me that invitations to them to participate in our work should be extended at the earliest possible date.

I should like to inform you that, at our next plenary meeting on Thursday, the Vice-Chancellor and Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany, His Excellency Mr. Hans-Dietrich Genscher, and the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Italy, His Excellency Mr. Giulio Andreotti, will be addressing the Conference. In view of arrangements relating to the arrival of the ministers, we shall start the plenary meeting at 10.30 a.m.

I have no other business for today. I now intend to adjourn this plenary meeting. The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on Thursday, 16 February, at 10.30 a.m.

The meeting rose at 11.25 a.m.