



President: Mr. Jorge E. ILLUECA (Panama).

AGENDA ITEM 34

**The situation in the Middle East: reports of
the Secretary-General (*continued*)**

1. Mr. MOHAMMED (Nigeria): As this is the first time I have spoken at the current session of the General Assembly, I should like to congratulate you most heartily, Sir, on your unanimous election as President of the thirty-eighth session of the Assembly. We are confident that, given your well-known diplomatic skills and dedication to the United Nations, the session will be led to a successful conclusion.

2. Once again, as in previous years, the United Nations is preoccupied with the situation in the Middle East. The issue of Palestine, which is the core of the Middle East problem, has so far defied a just, equitable and comprehensive solution. Consequently, the situation in the Middle East remains as volatile as ever and continues to constitute a singular threat to international peace and security, in spite of the numerous resolutions, decisions and recommendations of the Security Council and the General Assembly.

3. Recent developments in the region, particularly the sporadic military conflict, have attracted the serious attention of my country. My delegation views with serious concern the continued Israeli aggression against the Palestinians in the occupied Arab territories. It is time for Israel and its powerful allies to realize that the solution of the Middle East question can only be achieved through a negotiated settlement, and not by force of arms. Aggression by Israel will only serve to exacerbate tensions in the region. The 1982 invasion of Lebanon by Israel clearly shows the futility of attempting to find a military solution to the Middle East problem. We are obliged to condemn such recourse to force for the same reasons that the whole world deplored the Holocaust suffered by the Jews under the Nazis.

4. As a direct consequence of the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon, we now have a new and dangerous phenomenon in the Middle East problem, that is, the direct injection of the super-Powers. The introduction of the so-called multinational force has brought more tragedy to the Middle East and has escalated the tension there today. We deplore the presence of this force and call for its withdrawal. We also call for the restoration of the legitimate role of UNIFIL.

5. The recent fratricidal Palestinian conflict in Tripoli, Lebanon, is deeply regrettable and totally undermines the Palestinians' just struggle. However, we reiterate our continued support for the legitimate struggle of the Palestinians for their homeland. We call on all Palestinians to solve their internal problems by peaceful and democratic means. It is clear from the outcome of the recent tragedy that such fratricidal fighting can only play into

the hands of Israel and its supporters by giving them further pretexts for escalating the tension in the Middle East, as they are currently doing.

6. The outcome of the internal Palestinian squabbles is that Mr. Arafat is now being forced to evacuate his forces and himself from Lebanon. The United Nations offer of assistance is right and commendable for the protection of the Palestinians, but we note with regret and condemnation the apparent determination of the Israeli Government to prevent the granting to the Palestine Liberation Organization [PLO] of safe conduct out of Lebanon. The United Nations and the international community should prevail upon Israel and its supporters to guarantee the safe passage of Arafat and his men out of Lebanon.

7. My delegation equally condemns the escalation of tension in Lebanon through the recent series of aerial bombings there, ostensibly as retaliatory strikes. There is no wisdom in the threat of, or the use of, such military retaliation. The projection of, and the use of, military force is not the answer to the Middle East problem. We also view with grave concern the conclusion of the so-called strategic alliance between the United States and Israel. Such an unholy alliance will only serve to make Israel more arrogant and intransigent on the Middle East question.

8. The time has come to consider an alternative to the super-Power approach and to impose a solution in the Middle East. The time has also come to do away with the military option, as force is not the answer. The time has come for the challenge of peace—a just, equitable, lasting and comprehensive peace achieved under the auspices of the United Nations. In this connection, it is with great satisfaction and hope that my delegation takes note of the outcome of the International Conference on the Question of Palestine, held at Geneva from 29 August to 7 September 1983. Among the things that the report of the Conference calls for is the convening of a United Nations international peace conference on the Middle East.¹ Participants in such a conference should include the Palestinians themselves, the other interested parties and the two super-Powers—the United States and the Soviet Union.

9. It is the view of my delegation that for such an international conference to succeed, it would have to be based on the following framework: first, the implementation of all the resolutions, decisions and recommendations of the United Nations; secondly, the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Lebanon; thirdly, total withdrawal by Israel from all Palestinian and Arab territories occupied since 1967; fourthly, the sovereign exercise by the Palestinian people of its inalienable rights, including the right to self-determination, the right to return to its homeland and the right to establish an independent State in Palestine; fifthly, the right of the PLO, the legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, to participate on an equal footing in the international conference aimed at finding a just and lasting solution to the Middle East problem; and, sixthly, the recognition of and respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity and

political independence of all States in the region and their right to live in peace within recognized frontiers.

10. I should like to conclude by calling on the United Nations to set in motion, as soon as possible, the process of convening this international peace conference on the Middle East. My delegation also calls on all those concerned, particularly Israel and the super-Powers, to respond positively to this challenge. Enough injustice has been done. Peace can only be achieved through the negotiation of a just, equitable and comprehensive agreement under the auspices of the United Nations. The opportunity is within reach and the United Nations and the international community must not let it slip away.

11. Mr. RAJAIE-KHORASSANI (Islamic Republic of Iran): I should like to begin my statement by reading a few verses from the Holy Koran, which I should like to dedicate to the great and luminous souls of the Muslim combatants who are defending their faith and integrity in the Middle East, particularly in Lebanon.

“O ye who believe! Whoso of you becometh a renegade from his religion, (know that in his stead) Allah will bring a people whom He loveth and who love Him, humble toward believers, stern toward disbelievers, striving in the way of Allah, and fearing not the blame of any blamer. Such is the grace of Allah which He giveth unto whom He will. Allah is All-Embracing, All-Knowing.

“Your friend can be only Allah; and His messenger and those who believe, who establish worship and pay the poor due, while they bow down (in prayer).

“And whoso taketh as friends Allah and His messenger and those who believe (will know that), lo! the divine party of Allah, they are the victorious!” [Surah V: 54-56.]

12. A debate on the agenda item entitled “The situation in the Middle East” seems to be most appropriate and apt under the present circumstances because the situation has now reached its most crucial stage yet. The American and French forces, under the guise of peace-keeping, have been engaged in combat activities against the local Muslim militia and against the Syrian forces who have been stationed in Lebanon under the League of Arab States agreement. The multinational forces, or at least the greater part of them, have therefore exposed their true, aggressive natures. No one, not even the American officials, can claim that their fleets or naval forces are there to play a peace-keeping role.

13. According to the news media, the British, who in such cases always demonstrated a more intelligent diplomacy than the United States, have debated extensively the presence of their own contingent forces and have apparently decided to recall their troops from Lebanon. Whether or not such a decision will be implemented in the coming days remains to be seen. The fact remains, however, that France and the United States are the only two Governments which are fully involved in the escalation of the situation in Lebanon. They are particularly in favour of the Israeli aggressor and have therefore lost the basis of whatever claim they could have for the maintenance of peace and order in the country.

14. The United States has, *inter alia*, made two major mistakes. First, in support of the corrupt Zionist usurpers of Palestine, the United States pressurized the new Lebanese Government to make peaceful gestures and, finally, to submit to a proposed United States peace treaty with the Zionist base of imperialism. This cost the Government of Lebanon, which already had enough trouble, the opposition of at least the Muslim population of the country. Consequently, the Government of Lebanon, having lost

the residue of popular support it could claim before having signed a peace treaty with the Zionist enemy, has had to rely for its survival upon the so-called presence of the so-called United States peace-keeping forces.

15. The United States is, therefore, facing a paradox. Its allies, such as the United Kingdom, are letting it down. Some members of the British Parliament have commented on the recent American role in Lebanon as stupid. The American public is losing its patience with government policy regarding Lebanon, as it has been counting the increasing numbers of American soldiers killed in Lebanon. The House of Representatives and the Senate, while trying to be very tolerant and patient under the circumstances, embarrass the President and occasionally make unfriendly remarks, which may prove very disturbing to a President who wishes to be returned cheerfully to the White House after the coming presidential election. But to withdraw from Lebanon would be tantamount to bringing about the fall of President Gemayel's régime, to the support of whom the United States wants to be honestly committed, and without whom nothing would remain of the famous peace treaty with the Zionist enemy.

16. However, remaining in Lebanon in order to keep the President in power sharply increases the distrust by the Lebanese masses of the present régime, and adds to its insecurity. Hence, withdrawal would be detrimental to the intended objectives which brought President Gemayel to power.

17. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Spanish*): I call upon the representative of Lebanon on a point of order.

18. Mr. FAKHOURY (Lebanon) (*interpretation from Arabic*): I would like to draw the attention of the representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the fact that he cannot refer to a legitimate President in this way.

19. Mr. RAJAIE-KHORASSANI (Islamic Republic of Iran): Now, to remain or not to remain in Lebanon is the basic problem. If we were engaged in scientific research and encountered a contradictory situation such as this, then I think the scientists would go back to the presuppositions, the axioms and the fundamental idea on the basis of which the whole research started, in order to find out what was wrong from the very beginning. If some honest, scientifically minded people wanted to adopt the same procedure here, they would then go back to the basic presumptions and assumptions on the basis of which the troops were deployed in Lebanon. There must have been something wrong there, otherwise we could not have come to the question of whether to remain or not, only to find both courses wrong and impractical.

20. The second great mistake of American foreign policy in Lebanon was the direct military involvement of its forces. The United States forces, like the Zionist aggressor's forces and in collaboration with them, have bombarded not only military bases but civilians. In the early days of its presence, United States planes bombarded the villages of Aliea and Behamduon, and recently they bombarded the Syrian forces that were stationed in Lebanon upon the recommendations of the League of Arab States. The United States is, therefore, openly a party to the conflict, and its insistence upon the restoration of stability to the situation in Lebanon is entirely irrelevant. It must prepare itself—as officials of the United States themselves have said on television—for further punishment from the Lebanese Muslim masses and, consequently, for further retaliations against innocent people—a vicious circle. The alleged peace-keeping role of the United States naval forces and fleets is therefore not very much different from that of the so-called Soviet contingency forces in

Afghanistan, who claim similarly to be there at the invitation of another "legitimate" régime which cannot survive without the presence of foreign forces. So much for the role of the United States as part of a multinational force in Lebanon.

21. The recent alliance concluded between the Zionist base of imperialism and the United States is another factor contributing to the exacerbation of the situation in Lebanon. Members are aware of the delegation which travelled from the occupied territories to the United States late in November. It was headed by an Irish-born Zionist who was accompanied by a Polish-born ex-leader of a Zionist terrorist organization, both of whom had emigrated to occupied Palestine. The former has been given recognition by United States officials as President and the latter as Prime Minister of the fabricated political non-entity called Israel. The Irish gentleman even addressed the General Assembly in the same disguise as President of the base of imperialism.

22. Actually, he is not the only professional terrorist who has found it easy to enter the international club of the United Nations. A famous Iranian terrorist, who is stationed in Paris, also sent his brother to New York to organize an anti-Iranian demonstration in front of the gates of the United Nations. He, too, easily entered United Nations Headquarters and engaged in a lot of lobbying in order to engineer the submission of a resolution against the Islamic Republic of Iran in the Third Committee.

23. Last year, another counter-revolutionary Iranian managed to creep into the General Assembly, grab my Foreign Minister's speech and tear it to pieces. This year's terrorists, however, entered the United Nations after having years ago carried out certain procedures to gain recognition—and as soon as someone gains recognition there is no problem. If those two Iranian fellows had observed certain procedural trivialities, no doubt they, too, would have gained the necessary recognition and would probably have been able to "take the places reserved for them at the side of the Chamber". In our glossary, those terrorists that have supersonic aircraft, modern tanks and surface-to-surface missiles in order to terrorize other nations are still terrorists.

24. In any case, the two Zionists who came to the United States in November also possess many tanks and supersonic aircraft. They can even make them. There are rumours that they even have the ability to manufacture nuclear bombs. However, they have been murdering and occupying for the past 40 years. They are ex-members of professional national or international terrorist organizations, and the quality or quantity of the property in their possession does not change their ugly mode of life as terrorists.

25. In order to project the events which were taking place or were about to take place in the United States as something different from a conspiracy against the Muslim people of the Middle East to be carried out by the Zionist agents of imperialism, a face-saving device, a new alliance, was necessary and one was therefore concluded between the United States and an illegitimate Government in a model country called Israel. As shown on television programmes, the two agents convinced the United States that it should shoulder a fairer share of the heavy expenditures usually incurred in the course of that base's defence of United States interests and assume more direct participation and immediate involvement in the actual military undertakings in the area. This alliance has had splendid political consequences and colossal malicious military outcomes.

26. Politically, it has revealed the real nature of the United States Administration and its foreign policies

and also its ties to its dirty Zionist base in the Middle East. Consequently, even those most uninformed in the area have learned much that they could hardly have learned in years of study of political literature concerning the area. The educative aspect of that alliance is far beyond estimation. Militarily, it has put more deadly weapons and military hardware and more material supplies at the disposal of a bunch of terrorists who have been bringing insecurity and murder to our area. However, on the whole our political gains are more, and more important, than the military losses. It is not something insignificant for many people in the area really to get to know the nature of imperialism; and only through such alliances can it be known. Therefore, the alliance has been very revealing and informative, but the situation in the Middle East, for the Assembly's information, has also been drastically changed.

27. The calm and friendly people of Lebanon, thanks to such developments as the recent alliance, no longer hesitate to challenge seriously the arrogant oppressors who have developed the bad habit of pointing their guns at their opponent when inviting him to the negotiation table. The entire population of Lebanon numbers less than the addicts in New York City. The professional beggars of New York, who collect their scanty food from the garbage bins, number about 200,000. Even the concept of 200,000 does not seem to be as expressive and revealing as the actual observation of the men and women who search for anything edible in the garbage bins on Third Avenue every day. Nevertheless, a rich, powerful, big country like the United States claims that tiny Lebanon is a threat to international peace and security. Therefore, the Government of the rich, powerful United States has decided to send troops to that tiny country in order to restore international peace and security.

28. What is the population of Grenada? Let us suppose that all the allegations that the mother base of imperialism produces against Grenada or Nicaragua are absolutely right. Let us accept for the sake of argument that whatever they claim is correct. Let us suppose that Nicaragua is a dreadful threat to the "legitimate, democratically elected régime of Honduras". Let us also suppose that Nicaragua pleads guilty to sending a few Soviet-made guns—a few Kalashnikovs, for instance—to El Salvador. Let us also assume that the "legitimate democratic régime" of El Salvador has simply extended a friendly invitation to the friendly country of the United States to send some of its military advisers to play golf with their Salvadorian counterparts. Let us suppose that Grenada bought weapons from the Soviet Union, even through Cuba. Let us also suppose that the current régime of Lebanon is the sole, legitimate representative of the people of Lebanon and can therefore subsist without the presence of the multinational forces.

29. And let us suppose that the people of Lebanon are wrong in not wanting that régime. Now, please tell us who is more dangerous to international peace and security? Who is more of a threat to the entire world—the United States Government or the sum total of Lebanon, Grenada, Nicaragua and Cuba, all together? Who is more dangerous now? Please be honest with yourselves and tell the true message of your conscience to the rest of the General Assembly: Who is more dangerous, the sum total of Lebanon, Grenada, Nicaragua and Cuba, or the United States Administration? Some people must feel ashamed of themselves.

30. I would appreciate it if representatives would kindly formulate the same argument with regard to the other super-Power. That is, let us agree to all the allegations that the other super-Power produces and then let us ask

the same question. Let us assume for the sake of argument that the Afghan Mujahidin receive military support from the imperialist agents. Let us also agree that Pakistan intervenes in the internal affairs of Afghanistan. Let us take it for granted that the Solidarity labour union is indeed dancing to the American guitarist and is fully organized and supported by some agents paid by the West—let us just suppose, for the sake of argument; we do not want any discussion on the substance of these issues. Who now is more dangerous—the KGB or the sum total of the Afghan Mujahidin, President Zia's régime and the entire Solidarity labour union?

31. True, in the context of political debates in the United Nations everybody may produce arguments against everybody, but there must be a moment of honesty in the life of each of us in which we speak nothing but the truth. It is that moment of honesty that must permeate throughout the entire life of the Administrations of the super-Powers. Please, super-Powers, come back to honesty, sincerity, modesty and humility. Please give up arrogance, treachery and fraud. In the eyes of God, you are as small as anybody else. Do not be deceived by your armies, planes and naval forces—you, by virtue of being human beings, are as vulnerable as anyone else. You allow yourselves to cheat because you have taken it for granted that the small nations need to rely on the law more than you do and because you think that your decisions can bend the law. You think you are the law. You think you can cheat and get away with it because other people are not lawless or are not lawless enough to do whatever they can against you. Remember, even in your fraud you still count on the honesty of others. Please let others count on your honesty and you will see that our world would be a happy one even without your Committee on Disarmament.

32. You bring our enemy, who has occupied our Holy Land and our sanctuaries, into your country and with him you bring agreements of military and technical co-operation and joint military manoeuvres, and you still expect the Palestinians, the Lebanese and the survivors of Sabra and Shatila just to stand idly and watch you? You think you can simply go to Lebanon and in the name of Israel kill and destroy and occupy and then, under the guise of multinational peace-keeping forces, enter Lebanon across another frontier, from another direction, to support your legitimate régime of so-and-so; do you think you can give the signal to your so-called Israeli troops to proclaim their readiness to withdraw from Lebanon provided that others leave Lebanon? This game is already played out. It has been played far too long to work any longer. We know you very well.

33. The Arab ambassadors, who you think do not know, know you very well too. They understand all your divisive, fraudulent games, the games that your media play on us. They all understand your meaning of the words "Shiite fundamentalist" and your intentions behind your repetition of that term. They all understand the comments of the Zionist humanist who, immediately after the famous film *The Day After*, said, "What happens if the atomic bomb falls into the hands of someone like Khomeini?" Everybody understood what he meant. All those people, and even your own people, who you think you have been able to keep ignorant, do understand some of the sinister intentions behind such insipid, taunting jokes. The supercilious Powers had better know that the best guarantee of their security is meticulous concern for the security of other people. Maintain other people's security and your own security is guaranteed.

34. The entire universe, the entire world, is based on order, on honest order. That is why we have universities

and sciences, and social and political relations cannot be an exception to the rule. You must return to honesty if you ever dream of happiness for yourselves and for the rest of the world. Do not manipulate political issues. You must come back to honesty. The United States must evacuate its Zionist agents from Palestine peacefully. Then you will see that there will be no problem in the area. They must evacuate their agents in the same way that the Soviet Union must withdraw its troops from Afghanistan.

35. Prior to the Zionist invasion of Lebanon, Mr. Brzezinski, the mastermind of United States foreign policy, said on television that the United States must make every effort to prevent the unification of the Palestinian and the Islamic revolutions. He was wrong. His statement was not a factual, descriptive statement. It was a hypothetical, prescriptive sentence, and you understand the difference. A few months after that television programme, the United States officials decided to launch a sort of spider-man programme to prevent the unification of the two revolutions. The Zionists were given the green light to invade Lebanon, to burn and murder, to expel thousands of the Palestinians from Lebanon and, finally, to build the slaughterhouses of Sabra and Shatila in order to ensure absolutely that the prevention of that feared unification was achieved. But those very criminal preventive measures actually motivated, reinforced and hastened the unification.

36. The Holy Koran tells us how the Pharaoh decided to kill all the pregnant women of the family of Israel in order to prevent the realization of a vision that a son would be born to that family who would topple him, the Pharaoh, from the throne. He just did not know that his very preventive plan of killing the pregnant women became a part of the divine plan to bring Moses, may peace be upon him, to the palace of the Pharaoh, where he would be brought up by the Pharaoh's sister. How do you know that your preventive measures are going to serve the purpose you are after? They will do that only if there is no God and everything is under your control, but there is a God, thanks be, a very powerful God. When you send your multinational forces to Lebanon, you just do not know how you are participating in the formation of the unification that you are trying to prevent. The Holy Koran says: "They plan and plot, and God also plans and plots, but Allah is the best of the planners" [*Surah VIII: 30*].

37. The struggle which is nowadays going on in Lebanon is the perennial permanent struggle between faith in God, on the one hand, and faith in self-deified, self-centred, godless man, on the other. As a matter of fact, it is a struggle between men of God and men of Satan. All struggles are ultimately brought down to the same basic struggle: the one between the man of God and the man of Satan. It is the internal struggle of every individual as well. It is the struggle between Abel and Cain, the very old struggle which is still going on.

38. Nature, nature in the raw, including all it contains, is a faithful nature; it is obedient to the Commandments of God and follows the law accordingly. This obedient nature, just by functioning according to the natural laws inherent in the nature of events, is automatically obeying God. But man may withstand the Commandments of God. The Holy Koran says:

"Have you not seen that unto Allah pray in adoration whosoever is in the heavens and whosoever is in the earth, and the sun, and the moon, and the stars, and the hills, and the trees, and the beasts, and many of mankind"—not all of them—"while there are many unto whom the doom is just due. He whom Allah

scorneth, there is none to give him honour. Lo! Allah doeth what He will.

“These twain”—which means the believers and the disbelievers—“are two opponents who contend concerning their Lord. But as for those who disbelieve, garments of fire will be cut out for them; boiling fluid will be poured down onto their heads.” [Surah XXII: 18 and 19.]

39. The Middle East is conducting this struggle. The Middle East is trying to be honest, an honest worshipper obedient to the command of God. And it is conducting that struggle very well. It is actively returning to its spiritual life, a life which does not compromise nor does it surrender.

40. The Holy Koran says:

“Therefore let those who fight in the way of Allah, who sell this world’s life for the hereafter; and whoever fights in the way of Allah, then be he slain or be he victorious, we shall grant him a mighty reward.

“And what reason have you that you should not fight in the war of Allah and of the weak among men and women and children, those who say: Our Lord! cause us to go forth from this town, whose people are oppressed, and give us from Thee a guardian and give us from Thee a helper.” [Surah IV: 74 and 75.]

Now this message is very important. It says:

“Those who believe fight in the way of Allah, and those who disbelieve fight in the way of Satan”—this is the situation in the Middle East—“Fight therefore against the friends of Satan; surely the strategy of Satan is weak.” [Ibid.: 76.]

41. The solution to the problem is basically to end the oppression and the oppressive policies. For, as the verse I have just quoted says, Muslims have to struggle against oppression. In this struggle, there are two opposing forces. The major differences between the two opposing forces in Lebanon are very clear. One group believes in God, believes in decent human relations, believes in an honest approach to problems, does not have any army, yet has no choice but to defend itself. The other group does not believe in God—or, even if it does, that belief is irrelevant so far as daily life is concerned; decency in human relations, if appreciated at all, is appreciated only to the extent that it does not touch its material interest; it makes use of its gunpower to compensate for the invalidity of its arguments. The former takes the divine texts as the model for its behaviour; the divine texts for the latter are irrelevant to daily life. The former has an entirely different epistemological view. It believes: “Fear God and He will teach you and will grant you knowledge” [Surah II: 282]. It also believes that knowledge is a light that God sheds, which penetrates the heart of anyone He chooses. This group therefore seeks knowledge from God and follows His orders without denying the scientific epistemology. The other group believes only in its pragmatic, scientific epistemology and has no regard for the divine light.

42. There are many other social and political differences to which we do not need to refer at this stage. But the two fronts are well known and their positions are quite clear. Under such circumstances, there is land and water, there is oil as well as other raw materials; there is cheap labour, there is a rich market. Therefore, there are multinational companies, Zionist hordes, fleets and naval forces belonging to the materialist aggressor and puppet régimes—all of them against the defenceless, innocent people who have been exploited culturally, materially, physically, psychologically, socially and politically and who desire to liberate themselves. That is the situation in Lebanon and in the Middle East as a whole.

43. All these factors are at work in the complex situation of the Middle East. From our point of view, the good thing about it is that the motives and the plans are no longer unknown. Everybody knows the truth. The people have learned the crux of the matter. From the viewpoint of the enemy, the bad thing about it is that the motives and the plans are no longer unknown and that the people have learned the crux of the matter. That is the situation in the Middle East.

44. Our proposed solution to the situation is as follows. Those who have brought their forces and their bases of imperialism to our area are part—in fact the main part—of the problem; they are not part of the solution, and they should not make the mistake of thinking they are part of the solution. They have to leave us alone. To say that if one of them goes out the other enemy will come in is not a valid argument. It does not justify intervention, occupation and murder. The Middle East does not belong to any super-Power. Both must go. The land of Palestine belongs only to the Palestinians. The aggressors must redefine their foreign policies regarding the area and give up their oppressive and exploitative intentions, and then there will be no problem in the Middle East. We say this to you super-Powers: Please do not, either of you, defend us against the other. Please do not defend the people of Lebanon, for God’s sake; give them a chance to decide for themselves. We in the Middle East do not interfere in your internal problems. We do not want to know what you do to your own people in Washington or in Moscow. We expect the same degree of independence in return. But if you wish to impose your repressive policies and preserve your Zionist base of imperialism in our area, you are in trouble because we are in trouble.

45. The Koran tells us: “Verily God loves those who fight in his cause in battle array as if they are a solid armoured structure” [Surah LXI: 4]. The Koran also tells us:

“Make ready for them whatever forces and strings of horses you can, to terrify the enemy of God and your enemy and others besides them that you know not. God knows them and whatever you expend in the way of Allah shall be repaid you in full; you will not be wronged.” [Surah VIII: 60.]

46. That is the only choice left to the people of the Middle East. That is the situation in the Middle East.

47. Mr. FAKHOURY (Lebanon) (*interpretation from Arabic*): The delegation of Lebanon has read the report of the Secretary-General on agenda item 34, entitled “The situation in the Middle East” [A/38/458]. It gives me great pleasure to extend to him our thanks for the interest he is taking in the situation and the efforts he is making to alleviate the suffering caused by the tragic crisis in Lebanon. We do, however, have one comment to make about the report. It is dated 30 September 1983. Hence, it was prepared before the Security Council meeting of 18 October 1983 and it was not possible to include in it a reference to Council resolution 538 (1983), under which the mandate of UNIFIL was extended for six months, until 19 April 1984. We merely wished to point that fact out.

48. For nine years, Lebanon has been the arena for wars between many parties with different ambitions and interests. During those nine years, when the country ran with the blood of the innocent, many events, many tragedies, occurred and many great sacrifices were made. The international community’s ignorance of the importance and priority of the crisis, as well as its failure to respond to the calls of Lebanese officials and other friends and brothers, enabled the occupiers to seize Lebanese territory and settle there as if their occupation were to be eternal,

knowing no limits of space or time. This also enabled the occupiers to behave as if they had an absolute right, unlimited by the legitimacy that is deeply rooted in the hearts and institutions of the Lebanese, and undeterred by moral or humanitarian values, international agreements, laws and norms. Thus the crisis became exacerbated over time and developed into a very complex question.

49. Many speakers have said at this session of the Assembly that the question has overshadowed the most complex issues in the Middle East. The Secretary-General says in his report that "preoccupation with the events in Lebanon has tended to overshadow the consideration of major aspects of the Middle East problem" [*ibid.*, para. 39]. But if the events in Lebanon had not been major events in themselves, they would not have been able to overshadow major aspects of the Middle East problem. The correct evaluation of the situation necessitates reformulating that statement as follows: "Preoccupation with the events in Lebanon has tended to overshadow consideration of the other major aspects of the Middle East problem". We believe that that is what the Secretary-General meant.

50. On Lebanon's Independence Day, a little more than two weeks ago, President Amin Gemayel made a statement in which he pointed out the way to overcome the crisis. The following sentences from his statement sum up the Government's practical policy for solving the crisis:

"I can attribute all the ramifications and complications to the one most important issue—the occupation of our territory and the shrinking of the authority and the security forces of the State. We can hope for a solution or a cure only on the basis of a rescue effort crystallized around three direct objectives: first, and most important, mobilizing the national will around the priority of termination of the occupation; secondly, it is important to work in co-operation with friendly major Powers to secure total Israeli withdrawal; thirdly, reaching an understanding with the Syrian Arab Republic so as to set a timetable for the withdrawal of its forces from Lebanon."

Mr. Bhatt (Nepal), Vice-President, took the Chair.

51. There is indeed a national consensus and a national determination to terminate the occupation. There is indeed serious work going on continuously to secure total Israeli withdrawal. There are indeed contacts and efforts being made to reach an understanding with the Syrian Arab Republic so as to set a timetable for the withdrawal of its forces from Lebanon. In the mean time, the international community and influential major Powers have a historic responsibility to support the Lebanese Government in helping it achieve the goals for which it is striving, which would secure the restoration of its sovereignty over its national soil inside internationally recognized boundaries. This support is essential in order to avoid more tragedies, more moral and physical pain, more destruction of cities and villages and more deterioration of the financial and economic sectors in Lebanon. It is indispensable for the maintenance of the peace and security of Lebanon, of the region and of the world, and for an effective contribution to a final radical solution to the crisis.

52. Lebanon has not submitted any draft resolution of its own at this session, because the Security Council is still seized of the question of Lebanon. We officially submitted our demands to the Council, in an integrated, complete draft resolution, on 19 September this year.² We leave it to the President of the Security Council to act when he believes the circumstances have become favourable for those demands to be incorporated in a draft resolution of the Council. The demands are an

indivisible whole, because they are the result of a considered, free Lebanese decision and of a strong Lebanese conviction about their legitimacy and validity. The adoption of any partial resolution would gravely harm those demands and weaken the solution.

53. I feel duty-bound to reaffirm here once again the basic principles of the Lebanese position, so as to avoid any misinterpretation or wrong impression. First, Lebanon is determined to safeguard the unity of its people and territory and to maintain its independence and freedom of decision, as well as to restore its full sovereignty over every inch of its national soil. Secondly, Lebanon is determined to secure the complete and total withdrawal of Israeli forces to the internationally recognized boundaries. Lebanon condemns all military acts undertaken by Israel; it strongly demands the cessation of its practices in occupied southern Lebanon and the measures on the Awali River by which it subjects officials and ordinary citizens to a thorough search when they travel to or from the south and forces them to carry passes and obtain authorizations, thus hampering freedom of movement and the transfer of goods. The continued imposition of these restrictions by Israel could lead to the separation of southern Lebanon from the motherland. The use of security requirements to justify those acts is as ill-founded as the Israeli presence in Lebanon is unjustified and illegal. Thirdly, Lebanon is also determined to make sure that all unauthorized forces, without exception, are withdrawn from its territory, because their presence is illegal; their presence is the direct cause of what has been happening in Lebanon—fighting, bloodshed and destruction—for which Lebanon alone is paying the price. Fourthly, UNIFIL and the Truce Supervision Observer Group of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization in Palestine both have a role and a mandate in accordance with Security Council resolutions 426 (1978), 516 (1982) and others. Facilitating that role and mandate is vital to achieving the general goals for which they were sent there. Fifthly, the multinational force is present in Lebanon at the request of the Lebanese Government. Their presence there is a purely Lebanese matter. Regrettably, it seems that some speakers here still continue to ignore the freely taken Lebanese decision, while there exist on the territories of some of their countries foreign forces invited by their Governments and as a result of the freely taken decision of those Governments. Sixthly, Lebanon has never interfered in the affairs of others, nor has it ever spoken on anybody's behalf. Therefore, it does not allow anybody to speak on its behalf or decide for it what to accept and what to reject. Some hide behind the words "Lebanese people" to say what they want to say, not what the Lebanese people want to say, but that is a transparent ploy. The Lebanese people has never given them authority to speak on its behalf, nor has it made them the custodians of its destiny. There is a legitimate Government emanating from that people, representing it and making decisions and speaking on its behalf. A people such as the Lebanese people, which has suffered severely and whose sons are committed to accept sacrifices, deserves life and survival and must be able to surmount crises and reconstruct its country without custodians or guardians.

54. The delegation of Lebanon pays a tribute to all international and multinational forces for standing by the Government and for their sympathy with the people in their difficult days. The delegation of Lebanon solemnly pays homage to the victims of those forces who have joined the scores of thousands of innocent Lebanese victims who died so that Lebanon would survive as a haven of peace and brotherhood.

55. The PRESIDENT: In accordance with General Assembly resolution 477 (V), of 1 November 1950, I call on the Observer of the League of Arab States.

56. Mr. MAKSOUUD (League of Arab States) (*interpretation from Arabic*): Among the most important issues facing the international community today is the current crisis in the Middle East region. This is because in the Middle East there is a political conflict resulting from the establishment of Israel, a conquering, aggressive, racist State which persists in expansionism, is contemptuous of the United Nations and its resolutions, and hampers international efforts to deal with the Palestinian problem by leading the world into labyrinthian dilemmas with the aim of obstructing attempts to find fundamental solutions that will ensure a comprehensive, just peace in the Middle East region.

57. The Israeli determination to defy the international will and cause it to lose its credibility is obstructing stability in the region and making the situation dangerously explosive. It is making the region a source of international concern over the fate of peace in the Middle East and, indeed, throughout the world.

58. The tragedies, confusion and deterioration in security in a highly sensitive area that we are witnessing today are the result of the implementation of the Zionist design irrespective of costs and consequences. It is a design that is allied organically with the strategy of confrontation of the United States, which has made its arms race with the other super-Power the sole criterion for its policies and actions in various regions of the world; a design that flouts the objectives, priorities, rights, interests and legitimate aspirations of the people of those regions.

59. The Zionist design is creeping forward by means of settlements—as in the West Bank and Gaza, where it is accompanied by repressive measures such as the closure of schools and universities, arbitrary arrests and the demolition of houses, making their inhabitants homeless; by means of invasion—as in Lebanon, where it has been accompanied by savage attacks on cities and villages, especially in the capital, Beirut, and the refugee camps; by a policy of annexation—as in the Golan Heights and Jerusalem; by the systematic uprooting and terrorizing of the Arab population that accompanies those measures; and, finally, by means of aggression—as in the attack against the Baghdad nuclear reactor.

60. All these policies are coupled with practices characterized by disregard of the conscience of mankind, United Nations resolutions and the basic norms of civilized, orderly behaviour, as well as with resort to campaigns of denigration of anything that might contribute to peace, justice, security and stability in the region and the world.

61. The Zionist design coincides with what the United States Administration considers to be its absolute priority, that is, the strategy of confrontation with the Soviet Union on the global level. Since confrontation between the two super-Powers predominates over all other considerations, United States policy ignores the existing realities of the region and the real causes and motives of the core issue, which is the Arab-Israeli conflict. Thus, every act or policy and all behaviour of the parties are judged *a priori* by the logic of the cold war and the imperatives of confrontation. The United States no longer cares about the incremental results of its bilateral relations with various Arab States. It has become similar to Israel in its disregard of the just demands and the legitimate rights of the Arabs in general and the Palestinian people in particular. In such a situation, the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people and the right of the Arab countries to regain their sovereignty over their lands occupied by Israel since 1967 are neglected, disregarded and overlooked by the United States Administration.

62. From this perspective, we find that all the deliberations and all the resolutions adopted here collide head-on with this attitude of deliberate disregard on the part of the United States and Israel. This disregard has paved the way for and facilitated the strategic co-operation formula of the two countries. This formula of strategic co-operation in turn facilitates the pursuit of their objectives in the region, which are usually co-ordinated but intermittently at odds. This co-ordination becomes stricter when it comes to what takes place in the United Nations and other international organizations; its purpose is to prevent the adoption of any resolution by the Security Council, to deprive any such resolution of meaning, and to oppose any initiative by international groups, such as the European and non-aligned initiatives. These initiatives are opposed because they might impair unilateral United States control of crisis management in the Middle East.

63. What has been the result of the increased co-ordination which culminated in the recent agreement on strategic co-operation reached during Shamir's visit to Washington last month? The United States Administration seeks to reassure us that this is merely the reaffirmation of a consistent and well-known United States policy towards Israel, that what happened was no more than the institutionalization and codification of that policy and that there are no new or enhanced relations with Israel. The United States Administration wants the Arabs to believe that this strategic co-operation would limit Israel's ambitions within its borders, not be a licence for its persistence in expansion and aggression. But, if this interpretation is correct, is it not time for the Reagan Administration to announce its recognition of the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination? That right was exercised by the American people themselves and it has supported the recognition of that right in the interest of many other peoples. Why then would it deny that right to the Palestinian people? The American Administration also wishes to make the Arabs believe that this strategic co-operation between it and Israel would be conducive to the fulfilment of the latent desires of what it calls "moderates".

64. It seems that the United States Administration wants to create illusions that it would like to believe itself, but when these illusions clash with the realities of the organic links that bind the Arabs and Arab nationalism—as was the case during Secretary Shultz's visit to Tunisia and Morocco—it accuses the "moderates" of not doing what they could have done to help the United States implement its plans and policies in the Middle East. In such a situation, the United States Administration becomes more responsive to the Zionist theory that Israel is the sole reliable instrument of a policy of confrontation with the Soviet Union. From such a perspective, the Arabs are only "verbally" opposing this American-Israeli "strategic co-operation" while in reality they "secretly appreciate" its "benefits to their interests". In other words, what Zionism would like to see become an Arab reality becomes the illusory reality with which the United States Administration wants to deal.

65. Arab differences do exist. They are mainly related to the attempt of the Arab countries to answer this crucial question: Can the United States be persuaded of the need to adopt a balanced, objective and even-handed policy in the Arab-Israeli conflict, or is that impossible? The inter-Arab dialogue on this issue is the core of Arab differences. It is true that other social, economic and political factors contribute to these differences but these factors are part of the process which precedes any transition from one historical stage to another. Although these differences may become sharper at times, they remain within the realm of a difference as to means, not as to

objectives. It seems that the United States Administration is unable to recognize this reality, while Zionism uses its influence, especially during a presidential election year, to persuade the United States Administration to ignore this fact and negate it.

66. Thus, in view of the reaffirmation and upgrading of the substance of United States-Israeli strategic co-operation, the danger to Arab national security becomes clearer and the ambiguities that caused contrasting evaluations and differences over means begin to disappear. The same objectives, then, would impose a unity of methods and reactions. Differences would diminish and organic and national bonds would carry more weight. In such a situation, the Arabs would react to the impending danger as a nation with one destiny, because the matter would no longer be related to differing or opposing viewpoints but to the need to face the new challenges and dimensions that strategic co-operation would introduce.

67. The reactions that we have seen so far may be no more than symptoms of the potential reaction inherent in the Arab national response. In any case, these symptoms point to the depth of our unity and to the fact that the bonds of such a unity ultimately determine the course of authentic Arab reaction.

68. If the interval between the preliminary reaction and the entry into force gives a further opportunity to the United States seriously to reconsider its strategic co-operation with Israel, then and only then will it be possible for the international community to move back from the edge of the abyss that we have reached because of this strategic agreement. It would then be possible for the international community to play a constructive role by co-operating with the United States rather than confronting it, in finding the just and comprehensive solution which we and the United Nations are seeking to reach.

69. During this interval to which I have referred, a process of review and analysis has actually begun among some opinion-makers and some policy-makers which, if it takes account of Arab reactions, may lead to the success of our efforts to persuade the United States Administration to abandon its strategic co-operation agreements with Israel and resume its role as an honest broker and a partner in the international efforts to establish peace and security in the region. I shall not mention all of the many articles and analyses appearing in the American press in the past two days. It is sufficient to draw attention to the headline of two major articles which appeared in *The Washington Post* on 11 December 1983: "We're underestimating the Arabs once again", and to a third article in the same issue by a diplomatic commentator, Philip Geylen, with the headline: "He [Reagan] has a policy. It has nothing to do with reality", and to another article in *The New York Times* by Professor Robert Newman, who, in 1981, on behalf of the then President-elect Reagan, supervised the process of turning the State Department over to the Republicans, with the headline "Myopic policy".

70. We are not accustomed to seeing such clear and precise headlines, particularly with respect to the Middle East and especially in the American press. There is a great need to urge the Administration urgently to reconsider what may be regarded as United States recklessness in championing and supporting expansionist and aggressive Israeli objectives in the guise of strategic co-operation.

71. This reassessment by opinion-makers confirms our Arab diagnosis of the dangers inherent in this development of the strategic co-ordination agreement. This, however, does not mean that we can expect any rapid change or review by the United States Administration and we must be careful not to allow wishful thinking to replace

analysis. Contemporary history has taught us many times that optimism based on logic is bound to clash with the reality of the special relationship between the United States and Israel.

72. We, in the Arab nation, are on the receiving end of United States policy, and it is the policy as implemented that we deal with. In the mean time, during the process of policy-making, we are attempting through means of information and communications to express the Arab desire and willingness to continue the dialogue, to improve our relations and to urge the United States to act as a universal and responsible super-Power rather than to adopt a policy of open bias in favour of Israel's objectives. In the wake of the invasion of Lebanon, we think that many truths have been made clear to American public opinion about the nature of Israel, its policies of aggression, its expansionist ambitions and its resort to a policy of "the end justifies the means". We also think that what is known as the "Reagan plan",³ as a result of his speech on 1 September 1982, constituted the development of a new United States conviction that it should distance itself from Israel. American commitment to the security and existence of Israel does not mean underwriting the objectives of Israel and its hegemony over the region together with its total disregard of ethical imperatives and international law.

73. We, the Arabs, did have a few reservations on some aspects of the Reagan plan which we transmitted to the United States Administration and to President Reagan himself, but there were also some points of convergence with a number of the items and ideas contained in the resolutions adopted on 9 September 1982 at the Twelfth Arab Summit Conference, held at Fez.⁴ We viewed the Reagan plan as one of the working papers which might help to find a solution to the crisis in the Middle East. We saw in some of its features possibilities for a comprehensive solution. On the other hand, Israel rejected the Reagan plan outright in its entirety. Moreover, it responded to President Reagan's request to freeze the policy of settlements in a dramatic way by announcing the next day the building of five new settlements in the West Bank.

74. What was the result? Logic dictated that President Reagan, concerned for the reputation and credibility of his policies and commitments, should have penalized Israel for its blunt defiance of his initiative and his request. Those should have been the dictates of logic. But what really happened? The Reagan Administration began to penalize the Arabs for their serious and constructive position. It ended in its penalizing of the Arabs through this "strategic co-operation" agreement with Israel, which had rejected the plan and considered it null and void. When we asked United States officials at all levels about it, their answer was that the United States must be patient with Zionist intransigence and rejection by Israel because Israel was "very sensitive" and the temper of its rulers must be taken into consideration. And how would that be done? By increasing military assistance, economic and financial grants and political and diplomatic protection. When we confronted those United States officials with this puzzling paradox, their answer was even more puzzling, that "the more Israel feels sure of the unconditional continuation of our assistance, the more it will soften its intransigent position and the more it will become responsive to our intervention and mediation".

75. This is not the forum in which to expatiate on what these American answers mean but, when they are accompanied by a campaign of defamation from the United States Administration against Arab positions, we must

then look into the background of this serious strategic co-operation between the United States and Israel. The defamation takes several forms and ranges from classifying Arabs as anything from "moderates" to "extremists". The underlying idea is to exploit differences of opinion or ideology to illustrate or negate Arab national affinity and to suggest that their unity of destiny is near impossible, by seeking to pit them against each other, as though it were possible to start a civil war amongst the Arabs. This campaign to create a sense of despair has been the means used by Zionism to convince us that our destiny is not the same for all of us. It attempts to find differences in historical conditions which result from the fact that we were faced with different forms of colonialism in the past, as proof of the non-existence of the unity of the Arab destiny and affinity. Zionism recognized that any success achieved in this respect would strengthen its claims as an entity that originated in the region instead of being an intruder. It makes Israeli hegemony over the region a growth symptom rather than the tumour which spreads through the region after each act of aggression and expansion. The problem, however, is that Zionist ambitions become undisputable facts to some members of the United States Administration and Congress and to some opinion-makers who use their forums to induce the United States to endorse current and future Israeli objectives.

76. Some argue that "moderate" Arabs have been unable to impose their convictions and policies on the "radicals" and have thus let slip the opportunity of enabling the United States to become more objective in its stand and conduct on the Middle East crisis. Our reply is that the consensus reached at the Twelfth Arab Summit Conference, at Fez, is clear evidence of the Arab ability to take a decisive national stand in favour of a just peace when the opportunities for such a peace are available. What happened after the Arabs adopted the peace plan at the Fez summit? All sectors of the international community welcomed it. The United States, however, remained hesitant, not due to any thorough evaluation or profound examination of its content, although evaluation and examination have undoubtedly been made, but because of the fact that the plan, having emanated from an Arab organization, the League of Arab States, *per se*, makes endorsement, even if favoured by the Administration, an irritating matter to Israel and thus hampers the ability of the United States to influence Israel. We Arabs are required to submit a peace plan so that we can be termed positive in attitude. When we succeed in this task, as we did at Fez, the very fact that the proposers of the plan are Arabs becomes grounds for American hesitation in accepting it or even for accepting most of its content. If, however, the Arabs had not submitted a plan, it would have been termed a lack of realistic or constructive thinking and persistence in negativism, which makes dealing with them an extremely hard task.

77. In fact, we are bewildered by this American attitude towards us. While Arab consensus denies the logic of classification, Arab differences seem to justify the logic of ignoring the Arabs. This reality is due to the infiltration of Zionist influence and the infiltration in many ways of Zionist ideas into the core of the decision-making process, particularly the Congress and some major news media.

78. What does the United States Administration do when we confront it with our bewilderment? A number of the officials responsible for providing an answer take cover behind the statement that the "Reagan plan" is the only game in town. In other words, the Arabs have to accept the whole plan so that they can embarrass Israel

by this Arab acceptance. When we point out that the sponsor of the plan himself, President Reagan, indicated that what he proposed was subject to discussion and consequently was merely a starting-point in the search for a basis for peace and not the end of the road, and when we explain that the Israeli position in this regard may make of our total acceptance another pretext for Israel's rejection, those officials reply that Israel has great influence on Congress. Instead of decreasing, our bewilderment increases and at times we become more despondent.

79. The United States boasts that it alone is capable of finding ways of finding solutions to the Middle East crisis. I intentionally use the word "solutions" in the plural, because the United States policy follows a pattern of dealing with the Middle East question that substitutes partial solutions for the required comprehensive solution demanded by the international community. Experience has proved that this course creates more problems and conflicts, and provides Israel with more time to achieve its ambitions of expansion, annexation and hegemony. Thus, we see how the United States insists on making its special relations with Israel a means of working in favour of what we have called the management of the Middle East problem. The agreements that the United States was so eager to reach were being interpreted by Israel as traps imposed by virtue of its occupation and by internal American political factors that do not relate in any way to the essence of the issues. In fact, they enable Israel to continue its blackmailing. This is accompanied by such American leniency towards Israel as to lead it to believe that it can violate declared American commitments with total impunity and without any American sanctions. How else can we interpret the repeated declaration by the United States that Israeli settlements in the occupied Arab territories are obstacles to the peace process, while at the same time it provides Israel with the military, financial and political ability to enable the Zionist entity to increase these settlements which are designed to eliminate the national presence of the Palestinian people?

80. Following this American leniency, Israel confronts us and the international community with a *fait accompli*. After Israel has established its occupation and consolidated its policies of annexation, the United States arrives on the scene to offer us a choice between further acceptance of the *fait accompli* forcefully imposed by Israel or becoming hostage to the will of the United States, which wants us, in fact, to suffer more blows in the form of occupation, annexation and the establishment of settlements, either as friend or foe, as if the realization of Israel's goals and ambitions were inevitable, to be accepted in their entirety or in parts. It is as though the United States, especially since its strategic co-operation with Israel, were telling us that the Zionist blows are inevitably coming and that we must suffer them, whether hard or gentle.

81. Thus, the United States wants to ease the effects of these blows rather than help us to avoid them. How else can we explain the United States position when Secretary Shultz says that the Arabs are aware of the United States relationship with Israel? Certainly, we are aware of this favourable and partial relationship, and we stated on 30 November in Washington:

"The Arabs have always been able to live with a United States tilt towards Israel. Although many Arab States with friendly bilateral relationships with the United States expected that the incremental result of their friendship might lead the United States to adopt a more even-handed policy, they were frequently disappointed if not disillusioned. This strategic understanding shatters the lingering expectations and, some

will say, illusions about United States consideration for its Arab friends' sensitivities, interests and legitimate rights."

82. The Arab nation, in all its dimensions, finding itself in conflict with the Zionist entity manifest in Israel, realizes its historical responsibility and that the conflict is in its essence a conflict of values, in addition to being a struggle to regain usurped rights and stolen territories. The values to which we adhere and which we represent, values emanating from the convergence of our civilization with our aspirations, make it incumbent upon us to regard Judaism as part of our spiritual entity and total heritage. Therefore, we will not permit its association with zionism or the association of our position towards zionism with our adherence to common human values.

83. The PRESIDENT: I now call on the representative of India to introduce draft resolutions A/38/L.43 to L.46.

84. Mr. KRISHNAN (India): I have the honour, on behalf of the sponsors, to introduce for consideration by the General Assembly the draft resolutions on the situation in the Middle East. Like similar draft resolutions in previous years, these draft resolutions contain the basic principles for a comprehensive, just and lasting solution to the conflict in the Middle East—principles already established and approved earlier by the General Assembly, the Security Council and the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries.

85. Draft resolution A/38/L.43 condemns Israel for its failure to comply with the relevant Security Council and General Assembly resolutions and declares its occupation of the Syrian Golan Heights an act of aggression under the provisions of Article 39 of the Charter of the United Nations and of General Assembly resolution 3314 (XXIX). It also declares Israel's decision to impose its laws, jurisdiction and administration on the occupied Syrian Golan Heights null and void and without legal validity, and emphasizes that this decision must be rescinded. While calling upon Member States to apply certain measures with a view to isolating Israel, the draft resolution reaffirms the necessity for the total and unconditional withdrawal by Israel from all Palestinian and Arab territories occupied since 1967, including Jerusalem, as an essential prerequisite for the establishment of a comprehensive and just peace in the Middle East.

86. Draft resolution A/38/L.44, while recalling the relevant provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Constitution of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization and all other relevant international instruments concerning the right to cultural identity, calls upon the Government of Israel to make full restitution, through UNESCO, of all the cultural properties belonging to Palestinian institutions arbitrarily seized by Israeli forces.

Mr. Illueca (Panama) resumed the Chair.

87. Draft resolution A/38/L.45 deals with the status of the Holy City of Jerusalem.

88. Draft resolution A/38/L.46 is a comprehensive resolution on the situation in the Middle East. While welcoming the world-wide support extended to the just cause of the Palestinian people and the Arab countries in their struggle against Israeli aggression and occupation, it calls for a comprehensive, just and lasting solution of the Middle East problem. It reaffirms its conviction that the question of Palestine is the core of the conflict in the Middle East and that no comprehensive, just and lasting peace will be achieved without the full exercise by the Palestinian people of its inalienable national rights and the immediate, unconditional and total withdrawal of Israel from all Palestinian and other territories occupied

since June 1967. The draft resolution recognizes the great importance of the time factor in the solution of the conflict and reaffirms the call for the convening of an international peace conference on the Middle East, under the auspices of the United Nations and on the basis of relevant resolutions of the United Nations, as specified in paragraph 5 of the Geneva Declaration on Palestine, adopted by the International Conference on the Question of Palestine.

89. I have briefly described the contents of the draft resolutions before us. I do not believe that there is any need to dwell at length on each one of these texts since they all are self-explanatory.

90. I submit draft resolutions A/38/L.43 to L.46 to the General Assembly for consideration and adoption at its meeting on Friday, 16 December. I sincerely hope and trust that they will command the overwhelming support of the Assembly.

AGENDA ITEM 33

Question of Palestine (concluded):*

- (a) Report of the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People;
- (b) Report of the International Conference on the Question of Palestine;
- (c) Reports of the Secretary-General

91. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Spanish*): The Assembly has before it draft resolutions A/38/L.36 to L.40. I shall now call on those representatives who wish to explain their votes before the voting on any or all of these five draft resolutions. Representatives will also have an opportunity to explain their votes after all the voting has taken place.

92. I remind the Assembly that, under rule 88 of the rules of procedure, the President shall not permit the proposer of a proposal or of an amendment to explain his vote on his own proposal or amendment.

93. Mr. ALBORNOZ (Ecuador) (*interpretation from Spanish*): Ecuador has invariably supported draft resolutions on the question of Palestine because this problem involves fundamental principles that shape its foreign policies, such as those concerning the non-use of force in international relations, non-intervention, the self-determination of peoples and the peaceful settlement of disputes. In keeping with these principles, we have always condemned all violations of law in any part of the world, as well as the use of force as a means of acquiring territories or imposing solutions.

94. The worsening of the situation in Palestine, a result of the illegal Israeli invasion of the territory of Lebanon, an event that Ecuador has unfailingly condemned on various occasions and in various forums, prompted the resumption on three occasions of the seventh emergency special session of the General Assembly. We then emphasized the urgent need for the withdrawal of all foreign occupation forces from Lebanon, whether of Israeli, Syrian or any other origin, except for the United Nations contingents, as preservation of the political independence and national unity of Lebanon is essential. Public opinion throughout the world demands a prompt ending of the anguish of the long-suffering Lebanese people, which has every right to live in peace, to have its territorial integrity respected and to determine its own destiny freely, democratically and without external pressure of any kind.

95. My country is deeply concerned at the alarming deterioration of the situation in that region, as it steadily

*Resumed from the 82nd meeting.

becomes more serious and threatens to turn into an international conflict with unforeseeable consequences, in view of the escalation of actions drifting perceptibly towards a tragic East-West confrontation.

96. Ecuador once again calls for compliance with the relevant Security Council resolutions as the most effective means of arriving at a just and lasting solution to the problem. This requires a comprehensive political settlement which must necessarily include recognition of the legitimate national rights of the Palestinian people, including the right to establish an independent State. To achieve that objective, it is essential that Israel and the PLO recognize each other as parties to the negotiations and that negotiated solutions for coexistence be found. To that end, an atmosphere of reduced tension and a spirit of understanding must be brought about, free of political and religious intolerance. This is not impossible, nor would it be something new in the centuries of history in which the three major monotheistic religions have lived side by side and their peoples have managed to co-operate in culture and well-being.

97. Ecuador, therefore, will continue to participate in and support any measure designed to settle the question of Palestine, which is the core of the Middle East problem. Otherwise there will be no peace or security in that region, and the underlying danger will remain that at any time there may be a recurrence of criminal acts such as those that have occurred in Lebanon, taking a distressing toll of innocent victims and perhaps kindling the flames of a general conflagration that might be impossible to contain. It is in that constructive spirit, with the aim of achieving a comprehensive and lasting peace in the Middle East through a just solution of the problem of Palestine, that Ecuador will vote in favour of the draft resolutions proposed under this item.

98. Mr. HARLAND (New Zealand): In his statement to the General Assembly at the beginning of this session [18th meeting], the Prime Minister of New Zealand referred to the Middle East when he stated that peace and security cannot be achieved by force of arms alone. The continuing tragedy and suffering in that region bear out that truth.

99. Settlement of the Palestinian issue remains the key to peace in the Middle East. Yet, year after year, a solution to that problem has eluded us. It is now 16 years since the Security Council adopted its resolution 242 (1967). The principles embodied in that resolution and in General Assembly resolution 181 (II), on partition, continue to provide a realistic basis for a peaceful settlement.

100. Of fundamental concern are the rights and aspirations of the people of Palestine. Their most basic right is that of self-determination, including the right to establish their own State if that is their wish. If the Middle East problem is to be solved, the question of a homeland for the Palestinians must be settled. It is time, we believe, for Israel to come to terms with the concept of an Arab Palestinian State.

101. New Zealand has welcomed the recent cease-fire in Lebanon and the subsequent reconciliation talks. They are signs that even long-standing foes can put aside personal grievances and sit down together to discuss their problems. It is this spirit of co-operation that needs to be emulated by the major parties in the Middle East dispute so that the issues involved in that dispute can be resolved and peace brought to the region.

102. My delegation regrets that it is unable to support all those draft resolutions that are to be voted on today, not least because they do not adequately reflect the balance of principles embodied in Security Council

resolution 242 (1967). The draft resolution contained in document A/38/L.36, in particular, falls short in this respect. We have previously expressed reservations about the cost of information activities, such as those referred to in draft resolutions A/38/L.37 and L.40. My delegation will abstain in the vote on those three draft resolutions.

103. New Zealand's reservations about draft resolution A/38/L.38 relate not to its endorsement of the Geneva Declaration on Palestine, adopted at the International Conference on the Question of Palestine, or the guidelines set down for the conduct of the proposed Middle East peace conference contained in the Declaration. We support, in principle, the idea of a settlement of the Palestine question under the auspices of the United Nations but we doubt the practicability of this proposal. Until such time as all parties concerned are prepared to participate, with realistic expectations, in such a conference, New Zealand doubts that the resources of the United Nations should be committed in this way. Therefore, my delegation will reluctantly abstain on this draft resolution too.

104. I say "reluctantly" because New Zealand wishes to support the moderate line taken by the Arab nations at the International Conference on the Question of Palestine, which New Zealand attended as an observer. We particularly welcome the reference, in the Geneva Declaration on Palestine and in draft resolution A/38/L.38, to the right of all States in the region to existence within secure and internationally recognized boundaries. That, in our view, is only a small step away from formal recognition of Israel's independence and sovereignty. We look forward to the day when Israel's neighbours feel able to take that last small step.

105. Mr. BARBOSA DE MEDINA (Portugal) (*interpretation from French*): The statements made during our debate on this agenda item have reaffirmed the need for recognition of the rights of the Palestinian people, in particular its right to self-determination, with all the consequences that the attainment of that right implies. This must be done in the context of a peaceful settlement guaranteeing all the States of the region the right to exist within secure, internationally recognized boundaries.

106. While taking part in the International Conference on the Question of Palestine, held at Geneva from 29 August to 7 September this year, I had an opportunity to emphasize that this policy constitutes the very essence of my Government's position on this problem, the importance of which, in view of the interests and values involved and all the attendant risks, is both singular and universal in nature.

107. The draft resolutions before us express the prevailing acceptance of the principle of the responsibility of the international community, which is in duty bound to contribute to bringing about a solution with regard to a situation of such gravity from the point of view of the security of States and of its human dimensions. My delegation's vote, of course, will be consistent with the position set forth during Portugal's participation in the International Conference on the Question of Palestine.

108. My delegation will therefore vote in favour of all the draft resolutions upon which the Assembly is about to vote. We must, however, say that we are quite convinced that it would be premature to convene a peace conference because the conditions do not yet exist in which the presence of all the interested parties can be guaranteed, and without this my delegation believes that such an initiative would stand very little chance of success.

109. Mr. DE PINIÉS (Spain) (*interpretation from Spanish*): In the words of the Secretary-General, the past year

has been one of frustration and once again the Assembly is faced with the pressing need to find a peaceful solution to the problem of Palestine. The most recent events in Lebanon, with their sad sequel of death and destruction, are irrefutable confirmation of the impossibility of achieving a just and lasting peace in the Middle East without first resolving the question of Palestine.

110. Although Spain's position is well known and has been expressed at every opportunity in the United Nations, both in the General Assembly and in the Security Council, my delegation considers it its duty to highlight once again the essential principles of a solution to the problem of Palestine and, through that, the attainment of peace in the Middle East. These are: first, the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by force, and the consequent necessity that Israel withdraw from all the Arab territories occupied in 1967; secondly, the right of all the States of the region, including Israel, to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries; and, thirdly, respect for the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people, including their right to self-determination.

111. In accordance with this position of principle and extremely concerned at the development of the conflict in the Middle East, the Government of Spain has supported all efforts aimed at finding a just and comprehensive solution to the conflict. In this connection, Spain considers that Security Council resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973), although fundamental milestones in the search for a solution to the conflict in the Middle East, are not a sufficient basis for a comprehensive, lasting peace since they do not deal with the core of the issue. The Security Council should therefore amplify those resolutions with wording that clearly and unequivocally reaffirms the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people.

112. As regards the long chain of efforts to bring about peace in the region, the Government of Spain takes a positive view of the Arab peace plan⁴ drawn up in September 1982 at the Twelfth Arab Summit Conference, since it presupposes a new Arab and Palestinian attitude that could open up prospects of dialogue leading to the attainment of that peace.

113. Guided by its conviction that it is necessary to explore, without pre-conditions, all non-violent paths towards the settlement of the conflicts in the region, the Government of Spain played an active part in the International Conference on the Question of Palestine and joined in the consensus on the Geneva Declaration on Palestine.

114. In that same constructive spirit, the delegation of Spain will vote in favour of the five draft resolutions on the question of Palestine submitted to the Assembly. With regard to draft resolution A/38/L.38, my delegation wishes only to reiterate the reservation formulated by the Government of Spain with regard to paragraph 5 of the Declaration adopted by the Conference, as follows:

"Spain, which has repeatedly demonstrated its profound interest in the problem of the Palestinian cause and its early solution by means of a comprehensive, just and lasting peace, wishes to state, with respect to paragraph 5 of the Geneva Declaration on Palestine, that although it fully subscribes to the content of that paragraph as regards the convening of an international peace conference on the Middle East, in the terms stated, it is nevertheless of the view that acceptance of this principle does not imply the exclusion of other peace plans for the region."⁵

115. With his usual sincerity and foresight, the Secretary-General, in his report [A/38/458], reiterates the need to tackle the roots of the problem of the Middle East and

to begin immediate, serious and realistic negotiations, with the participation of all parties. My Government shares that view completely.

116. The history of the Middle East since the adoption of General Assembly resolution 181 (II) is a history of failed efforts to achieve peace and of lost opportunities that not only leave the accumulated problems unresolved but also increase discouragement and frustration among the parties. That vicious circle must be broken, for it vitiates the political will and frustrates the desire for peace of all the interested parties.

117. The path towards peace can only be entered upon with the participation of the Palestinian people. The constant frustration of their legitimate aspirations inevitably leads to discord and constitutes an additional element of destabilization. My Government wishes to take this opportunity to make a sincere appeal for the unity of the Palestinian people so that, without outside interference, they may play their proper, fundamental role in the efforts to bring about the historic reconciliation of all the peoples of the region.

118. Mr. LUNDBIK (Sweden): As a full participant in the International Conference on the Question of Palestine, held at Geneva this year, Sweden was associated with the consensus that led to the adoption of the Geneva Declaration on Palestine. My delegation considers it appropriate to remind the Assembly that Sweden's position in joining in the consensus at the Conference was clarified in a statement that was annexed to the report of the Conference.⁶ In that statement, it was pointed out that in the view of the Swedish Government a comprehensive and lasting solution to the conflict in the Middle East will necessarily have to take into account the legitimate interests of all the parties concerned. Sweden's participation in the International Conference on the Question of Palestine should be seen as an effort to contribute actively to such a fair and equitable solution.

119. In recent years, there has been a trend towards a broad international consensus concerning certain basic elements that must form part of a negotiated settlement. These basic elements, as seen by the Swedish Government, are withdrawal by Israel from the territories occupied in 1967, recognition of the right of all States in the region, including Israel, to exist within secure and recognized borders and recognition of the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination, including the right to establish a State of their own.

120. The Geneva Declaration on Palestine included these elements in a way that made it possible for the Swedish delegation to join in the consensus. It should be placed on record, however, that the Declaration does not in all respects adequately reflect the Swedish position. Lacking are references to Security Council resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973), which the Swedish Government regards as forming the basis for a settlement, and also lacking is an explicit reference to Israel's right to existence within secure and recognized borders. These omissions, as well as certain sweeping and unsubstantiated formulations, make the Declaration less balanced than the Swedish delegation would have wished.

121. It was furthermore pointed out in the Swedish statement that Sweden maintains reservations in relation to some parts of the Programme of Action for the Achievement of Palestinian Rights,⁷ which was also adopted by acclamation by the Conference. The Programme of Action contains formulations that we find sweeping, categorical or unrealistic and therefore not fully acceptable.

122. With those considerations in mind, my delegation will vote in favour of draft resolutions A/38/L.38 to L.40.

123. Mr. KNIPPING VIC'ORIA (Dominican Republic) (*interpretation from Spanish*): For the Government of the Dominican Republic, peace is the highest of social values. We consider peace to be the common asset of mankind. Without peace there can be no advancement and economic and social development. Peace, therefore, must be the great consensus of nations.

124. Bearing these convictions in mind, my delegation will vote in favour of draft resolution A/38/L.38 as we believe that any effort aimed at seeking peace deserves acceptance. However, my delegation would have preferred the draft resolution to have taken into account Security Council resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973), which, it should be recalled, remain fully in force. Reaffirmation of the principles contained in those resolutions would, in my delegation's view, have given the draft resolution greater objectivity and consistency since there is no doubt whatsoever that they continue to be basic to negotiations aimed at achieving a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in the Middle East, through an equitable solution to the problem of Palestine. Therefore, on the basis of that position, we would have liked to have seen those resolutions incorporated in the draft resolution.

125. Furthermore, my delegation wishes to take this opportunity to state it will be voting in favour of all the draft resolutions.

126. Mr. VRAALSEN (Norway): In the opinion of the Norwegian Government, the basic elements of a comprehensive, just and lasting peace settlement in the Middle East are contained in the Charter of the United Nations and in Security Council resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973). The most important elements remain the following: first, the acquisition of territory by force cannot be accepted; secondly, all States in the area must have the right to live in peace within secure and internationally recognized borders; thirdly, the legitimate national rights of the Palestinian people, including the right to self-determination, must be recognized and implemented.

127. Taken together, these basic elements strike a balance between the most vital interests of the parties concerned. Only if the parties mutually recognize these fundamental interests will it be possible to break out of the vicious circle which for so many years prevented a peaceful solution in the Middle East.

128. These basic elements and this balance are not, however, reflected in the Geneva Declaration on Palestine¹ and the Programme of Action for the Achievement of Palestinian Rights,¹ adopted at the International Conference on the Question of Palestine. Both documents contain elements which are not acceptable to my Government. On several fundamental issues, the documents either are in contradiction to the interests of one of the parties or omit to take such interests into consideration.

129. My Government cannot, therefore, endorse the outcome of the Conference and, as a result of these and other considerations, my delegation will have to abstain in the vote on draft resolutions A/38/L.36 to L.38 and L.40.

130. Mr. MAHER LUKASHA (Jordan): My delegation supports draft resolution A/38/L.38. We also support the call for an international conference to be held on the Middle East, mentioned in paragraph 3. However, we cannot endorse the reference in the draft resolution which goes beyond what was agreed upon in the Geneva Declaration on Palestine.

131. Mr. ALI (Singapore): My delegation would like to clarify our position in voting for all the draft resolutions on this item. We fully support the relevant resolutions of the Security Council, particularly resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973), which established the fundamental

basis for a stable and lasting peace in the Middle East. A key element in the search for a lasting peace would be the recognition of the rights of all States in the region, including Israel, to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries, free from threats or acts of force. By the same token, we support the establishment of a Palestine homeland and the right to self-determination of the Palestinian people.

132. My delegation believes that the question of Palestine is at the core of the conflict in the Middle East. We hold the view that a solution to the question of Palestine must uphold the rights of the Palestinians and preserve the legitimate rights of the State of Israel. We would have liked to see this principle reflected in the draft resolutions on the question presented to the Assembly. My delegation firmly believes that any course of action that seeks to deny the rights of one side or to destroy the existence of the other will be doomed to failure.

133. Mr. MIZERE (Malawi): In a nutshell, there are two main controversial issues which the representatives today are requested to consider: first, the request by the Palestinians to have their own independent State where they can live with dignity and be free to exercise their inalienable rights without external interference; secondly, the need to recognize and accept the existence of Israel in the Middle East as a sovereign State with secure boundaries.

134. There is a consensus, it would appear, on the need to find a solution to the dispute but, unfortunately, the international community cannot agree on the question of reconciling the security concerns of Israel with the establishment of a State for the Palestinians. This is the challenge—nay, the dilemma—Member States face at every session of the General Assembly.

135. It will be recalled that there are many resolutions on this matter that have been adopted by the Security Council and the General Assembly and there are several proposals that have been submitted in this regard, such as the Arab peace plan, proposed at Fez,⁴ the Reagan proposal,³ the Franco-Egyptian proposal,⁶ the Soviet Union proposals⁷ and the Camp David accords. It was against the background of these resolutions and proposals that the International Conference on the Question of Palestine was held at Geneva from 29 August to 7 September 1983. In this connection, my delegation has noted the comments made by the President of the General Assembly at its thirty-seventh session, Mr. Hollai, who outlined the realities of the situation as being: first, that a solution favouring only one of the parties could never be a lasting one; secondly, that it was a fact of life that not a single serious crisis with international implications could be solved without the joint agreement of the super-Powers; thirdly, that all international disputes, particularly the most sensitive ones, could and must be resolved only through peaceful means by negotiations; and, fourthly, that the Middle East question could be resolved only through the recognition of the rights of all peoples and States in the region, with international guarantees for their security.⁸

136. My delegation would like to appeal to all parties concerned to adopt confidence-building measures and to have a direct dialogue aimed at achieving an amicable settlement of the dispute. To promote such a process, my delegation will vote in favour of all the draft resolutions, because it cherishes and recognizes the principles of negotiation or communication among all States in the region and believes that any serious consultations should be supported and encouraged without further hesitation.

137. My delegation is fully aware that there are many crucial issues still outstanding which call for further

attention. Some of those issues are: first, the withdrawal of Israeli forces from all Arab territories occupied since 1967; secondly, the rights of the Palestinians in the region and the exercise of these rights in an independent State; thirdly, the participation in future negotiations by all States in the region and the role of the two super-Powers in such negotiations; and, fourthly, the security concerns of all the States in the region, including Israel, and the ability of these States to coexist within internationally recognized and secure boundaries.

138. My delegation wishes to assure all parties to the conflict that these crucial areas have been mentioned not to embarrass any of those parties but to appeal to all concerned to alleviate the suffering of the victims of the conflict and to stop once and for all the wanton loss of innocent lives and indiscriminate destruction of property in the region. This is a friendly appeal, without bitterness, that comes from the bottom of our hearts.

139. In conclusion, I would reiterate the Malawi Government's stand stated in this Hall some years ago as follows: "A meaningful and lasting solution can be achieved only through the full participation of all the parties in the search for peace".

140. Mr. HERRERA CACERES (Honduras) (*interpretation from Spanish*): The Minister for Foreign Affairs of Honduras has stated in past years and this year [26th meeting] before the General Assembly that the legitimate, inalienable right of the Palestinian people to self-determination and to establish its own State, as well as Israel's right to and need for secure and recognized boundaries, are goals that require constant dedication to the search for peaceful understandings that will bring about an atmosphere of harmony and stable coexistence. The Government of Honduras has also expressed the hope here that wisdom and good sense will prevail so that such solutions may be achieved.

141. In that spirit, Honduras will support draft resolutions A/38/L.36, L.37, L.39 and L.40 because they can help us to achieve the goals to which I have just referred.

142. However, for the same reasons, Honduras will not take part in the voting on draft resolution A/38/L.38. In conformity with our international policy, we believe that, as a matter of principle, the determination of the guidelines of and participation in any international peace conference must be based on the free and unanimous consent of the States directly concerned of the region in question. That must be done if what is desired is the achievement of the free, peaceful understanding which is a vital and immutable foundation for a just and lasting peace, in the Middle East or anywhere else in the world.

143. Mr. KERGIN (Canada): An important debate has ended with the submission of five draft resolutions on the question of Palestine. These draft resolutions, like many others which have been before the General Assembly, address the plight of the Palestinian people. This question, which is of deep concern to my Government, has been on the agenda for many years. Regrettably, little effective action has been taken.

144. In connection with these draft resolutions, I should like to make some observations concerning Canada's approach to the Arab-Israeli conflict, including the Palestinian question. As is well known, the Canadian Government has long maintained that both the right of the Palestinians to a homeland in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip and the right of Israel to live within secure and recognized borders must be taken into account in any settlement of this conflict.

145. The Palestinian question is an integral part of the Arab-Israeli conflict. We hope that the parties to this

conflict will participate in peace negotiations within the framework established by Security Council resolution 242 (1967). This imposes an equitable balance of obligations on the parties. It recognizes the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by force, and calls for Israeli withdrawal from occupied territories. It calls for respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of every State in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries. Without these elements there cannot be a just and lasting peace. My Government also very strongly believes that a just provision for the future of the Palestinians is essential because, unless there is recognition of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people, peace will not prevail.

146. This notwithstanding, the Canadian Government holds the view that the nature of the Palestinian homeland and its relations with its neighbours should be decided by the parties through negotiations. We continue strongly to oppose attempts to prejudge the outcome of negotiations, whether by action on the ground, such as Israeli settlements, or, on the other hand, by imbalanced resolutions in international forums, such as some of the texts being considered today. Canada cannot support resolutions which attempt to commit the United Nations and its institutions, including the Security Council, to a particular course of action which takes so little account of the legitimate concerns of one party to the dispute.

147. Canada attended the International Conference on the Question of Palestine, held at Geneva from 29 August to 7 September 1983, as an observer, and followed the debate closely. We did not attend as a participant, because we did not agree with the declared objectives of the Conference, which were inconsistent with Canada's oft-stated policy of not prejudging the outcome of negotiations. The Geneva Declaration on Palestine,¹ adopted by the Conference, contained, in addition, a number of specific items Canada does not support. Nevertheless, we were encouraged by implicit recognition, in the Declaration, of Israel's right to exist. This implied recognition has been reiterated in draft resolution A/38/L.38. We view this as a positive development. But the sponsors of this text must be encouraged to make such recognition explicit.

148. My delegation is unable to support draft resolution A/38/L.38 as a whole, because of its repetition of certain one-sided elements contained in the Geneva Declaration on Palestine which cannot contribute to bringing the parties to the conflict closer together.

149. Regarding draft resolution A/38/L.37, we continue to have strong reservations regarding both the usefulness and the appropriateness of the Division for Palestinian Rights of the Secretariat.

150. We will vote against draft resolution A/38/L.40, because we judge that it proposes to duplicate machinery already in place for disseminating information on the Palestinian situation and, furthermore, implies that an element of the United Nations Secretariat, the Department of Public Information, which receives its mandate from the General Assembly, must submit its programmes in this area to a Committee whose membership is selective and non-representative of the United Nations as a whole.

151. We will support draft resolution A/38/L.39, however, because, while UNDP is already involved in co-ordinating the programme of economic and social assistance to the Palestinian people, and a general meeting of specialized agencies seems unnecessary, we continue to support the principle of international assistance to Palestinians.

152. In the light of the above considerations, my delegation will abstain in the voting on draft resolution A/38/

L.36 and vote against draft resolutions A/38/L.37, L.38 and L.40. We will vote in favour of draft resolution A/38/L.39.

153. Mr. RODRÍGUEZ (Colombia) (*interpretation from Spanish*): Colombia believes it necessary to demonstrate the determination of the international community that a Palestinian State should exist to permit full realization of the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people. As a contribution to the search for a final settlement of the conflict, we shall vote in favour of draft resolutions A/38/L.38 to L.40, but we believe that in order to have a comprehensive picture of the problem of the Middle East and create the necessary climate for final negotiations we must bear in mind the regional and extra-regional causes of the conflict—and not just one cause—so that appropriate and viable solutions can be found in order to bring about a final peace.

154. Mr. BLUM (Israel): The remarks made in the course of the debate on the agenda item before us, as well as the draft resolutions before us, clearly demonstrate that many delegations have not learned the lessons of recent events and developments in the Middle East. Paradoxically, while it has tendentiously and ritualistically gone through the motions of dealing with the problem at hand, the Assembly has not only been oblivious to events in our region, but also ignored the proceedings in the Security Council.

155. Just a few days ago, one faction of a terrorist organization—rather than appealing to its so-called Arab brothers—was begging, through the Security Council, for the protection of the United Nations in order to escape the wrath of another faction of the same terrorist organization. It is inconceivable, particularly in the wake of the terrorist outrage perpetrated on 6 December 1983 against a bus carrying civilian passengers in Jerusalem, for which responsibility was assumed by the faction now seeking the protection of the United Nations flag, that the United Nations should still be willing to provide the terrorists with any assistance or facilities, allegedly on "humanitarian grounds".

156. Together with *The New Republic*, in its edition dated 26 December 1983, which came out this week, we ask:

"If humanitarianism is what the United Nations . . . is after, . . . where [are] the ships and flags and havens . . . when truly innocent people need them? . . . Will the world's seizure of humanitarian concern extend to the victims of the PLO? . . . Even raising the question is useless. The very idea that one would have such expectations of the . . . United Nations has the look of the ridiculous."

157. At the risk of looking naïve, I wish to appeal once again to the Secretary-General to ensure that no mockery be made of the fundamental concepts of humanitarianism and of the United Nations flag, and to refrain from putting that flag at the disposal of these notorious terrorists, who have pledged to continue their acts of terrorism against civilians in Israel and elsewhere after their planned escape from Tripoli.

158. Taken together, the five draft resolutions before us are purposely designed by their sponsors to sabotage a genuinely peaceful solution of the Arab-Israeli conflict. All of them comprise part of the ongoing campaign of political warfare against my country, and discredit the United Nations, which—by tolerating the passage of similarly motivated resolutions in the past—has already had its integrity severely tarnished.

159. Draft resolution A/38/L.36 endorses the activities and recommendations of a Committee which, from its

very inception, and from the time it submitted its first pernicious recommendations seven years ago, has pursued an utterly biased and irresponsible policy in league with those implacably opposed to peace. On the basis of past performance, we can expect that the members of that Committee will squander, at a time of dire financial straits, more of the limited funds and resources of the United Nations on numerous travel junkets and the like. Those who foot the bill will not be the sponsors of the draft resolution but will be the taxpayers of those countries which contribute the bulk of the United Nations budget and which have consistently voted against the activities of the Committee as being a waste of money.

160. Draft resolution A/38/L.37 requests that the Division for Palestinian Rights of the United Nations Secretariat continue its activities and even expand them. That Division, too, was from its inception intended as yet another tool at the disposal of the foes of a peaceful solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict. As a mouthpiece of propaganda for the anti-peace camp—headed by the Arab States and their backers—that unit has gravely compromised the Secretariat's integrity, and has also contributed to the heavy drain on United Nations resources.

161. Draft resolution A/38/L.38 is not the General Assembly's first attempt to undermine Security Council resolution 242 (1967) by setting guidelines that are incompatible with and contrary to that resolution. These guidelines would actually eliminate the carefully balanced meaning and intent of resolution 242 (1967). In fact, resolution 242 (1967) is, very significantly, not even mentioned at all in the draft resolution. The intent is clear. The sponsors of the draft resolution seek to eradicate the only viable resolution which has already proved its constructive value as the sole agreed-upon basis for a peaceful settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Without a doubt, in keeping with the predetermined and biased course defined by this draft resolution, the proposed conference would harm the chances for peace.

162. For those who still harbour some doubts as to whether the General Assembly generates resolutions which constitute no more than propaganda exercises on behalf of the PLO and its supporters, we suggest that they take a second look at the progenitor of the conference proposed in draft resolution A/38/L.38, namely, the "International Conference" which was held at Geneva a few months ago. That Conference bore a price tag of approximately \$6 million. Now the Assembly is being asked again to harness the United Nations to a similar exercise in propaganda which, undoubtedly, will also cost the international taxpayer millions of dollars. The draft resolution calls upon all parties to the Arab-Israeli conflict to participate. I wish to state clearly that, given the purposes and objectives of this entire exercise, Israel will be no party to it.

163. Draft resolution A/38/L.39 calls, in effect, for the adoption of the recommendations which stem from the Geneva propaganda exercise of last August and September. We reject the draft resolution, which seeks to accord legitimacy to an illegitimate enterprise, thus serving the narcissistic excesses of the PLO propagandists and their fellow travellers rather than the cause of peace. If implemented, the proposed recommendations would pour additional sums of money down what appears to be a bottomless drain.

164. Yet another severe drain on United Nations funds, if adopted, would be draft resolution A/38/L.40. That draft resolution would deal another blow to the credibility and integrity of the Secretariat, which, owing to similar resolutions in the past, has been forced to abandon legitimate functions by becoming a mouthpiece for interests

and forces extraneous to the United Nations system. The sponsors of this draft resolution not only seek to press the Department of Public Information into the service of hostile propaganda and political warfare against Israel but would also monopolize that Department's time, manpower and resources to the severe detriment of its other responsibilities.

165. The financial implications of all these wasteful draft resolutions amount, according to the report of the Fifth Committee [A/38/725], to approximately \$4.7 million—excluding, of course, the hidden expenses, which may well exceed the visible ones.

166. Had the intention of the draft resolutions before us been to promote a constructive solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict, they would have called for direct negotiations between the States concerned on the basis of the already proved Security Council resolution 242 (1967)—the only agreed framework for a peaceful solution of the Arab-Israeli conflict—and the Camp David accords, which are anchored in that resolution. Rather than introduce barren formulas and hostile rhetoric, the States of our region would be advised to take advantage of this constructive alternative.

167. Israel will vote against the draft resolutions before us and calls upon the delegations of other States sincerely interested in an Arab-Israeli peace to do likewise.

168. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Spanish*): The following delegations have become additional sponsors of the draft resolutions under consideration: A/38/L.36 and L.37: Bangladesh, Guinea, Guyana, Madagascar and Viet Nam; A/38/L.38: Bangladesh, Guinea, Guyana, Madagascar, Mongolia and Viet Nam; and A/38/L.39 and L.40: Bangladesh, Guinea, Guyana, Madagascar and Viet Nam. The report of the Fifth Committee on the administrative and financial implications of draft resolutions A/38/L.37, L.38 and L.40 is contained in document A/38/725. The General Assembly will now take a decision on the various draft resolutions before it.

169. We turn first to draft resolution A/38/L.36 and Add.1. A separate vote has been requested on paragraph 2. If I hear no objection to that request, I shall put paragraph 2 to the vote. A recorded vote has been requested.

A recorded vote was taken.

In favour: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cape Verde, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Kampuchea, Democratic Yemen, Djibouti, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Gabon, Gambia, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Greece, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malawi,⁹ Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Somalia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Cameroon,

United Republic of Tanzania, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zambia, Zimbabwe.

Against: Australia, Canada, Israel, Norway, United States of America.

Abstaining: Austria, Belgium, Costa Rica, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Finland, France, Germany, Federal Republic of, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Sweden, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Zaire.

Paragraph 2 was adopted by 118 votes to 5, with 18 abstentions.

170. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Spanish*): We shall now vote on draft resolution A/38/L.36 and Add.1 as a whole. A recorded vote has been requested.

A recorded vote was taken.

In favour: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Kampuchea, Democratic Yemen, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Gabon, Gambia, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Greece, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malawi,¹⁰ Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Cameroon, United Republic of Tanzania, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe.

Against: Israel, United States of America.

Abstaining: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Costa Rica, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Federal Republic of, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.

The draft resolution as a whole was adopted by 126 votes to 2, with 19 abstentions (resolution 38/58 A).

171. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Spanish*): The Assembly will now proceed to vote on draft resolution A/38/L.37 and Add.1. A recorded vote has been requested.

A recorded vote was taken.

In favour: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Kampuchea, Democratic Yemen, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Gabon, Gambia, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Greece,

Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Cameroon, United Republic of Tanzania, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe.

Against: Canada, Israel, United States of America.

Abstaining: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Federal Republic of, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.

The draft resolution was adopted by 127 votes to 3, with 17 abstentions (resolution 38/58 B).

172. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Spanish*): The Assembly will now proceed to vote on draft resolution A/38/L.38 and Add.1. A recorded vote has been requested.

A recorded vote was taken.

In favour: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Kampuchea, Democratic Yemen, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, Gambia, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Greece, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Cameroon, United Republic of Tanzania, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe.

Against: Israel, United States of America.

Abstaining: None.

The draft resolution was adopted by 144 votes to 2 (resolution 38/58 D).

174. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Spanish*): The Assembly will now vote on draft resolution A/38/L.40 and Add.1. A recorded vote has been requested.

A recorded vote was taken.

In favour: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Kampuchea, Democratic Yemen, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, Gambia, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Greece, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Cameroon, United Republic of Tanzania, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zambia, Zimbabwe.

Against: Australia, Canada, Israel, United States of America.

Abstaining: Belgium, Costa Rica, Denmark, France, Germany, Federal Republic of, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Solomon Islands, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.

The draft resolution was adopted by 124 votes to 4, with 15 abstentions (resolution 38/58 C).

Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Cameroon, United Republic of Tanzania, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zambia, Zimbabwe.

Against: Canada, Israel, United States of America.

Abstaining: Australia, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Federal Republic of Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Ivory Coast, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.

The draft resolution was adopted by 125 votes to 3, with 15 abstentions (resolution 38/58 E).

175. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Spanish*): I shall now call on those delegations that wish to explain their votes after the vote.

176. Mr. PRITCHARD (United States of America): The United States is deeply concerned about the plight of the Palestinian people and shares many of the concerns expressed during the course of the debate on this item regarding the circumstances in which many Palestinians must now live their lives. Unlike some of the Governments whose representatives have spoken on this subject, we have given our feelings concrete expression by our contributions to United Nations activities which seek to alleviate these circumstances. We wish others would do the same.

177. The United States takes note of the fact that some of the Governments whose representatives stridently profess at this rostrum their devotion to the Palestinian cause have a long and dishonourable record of killing Palestinians, of promoting internecine fighting among the Palestinians and of cynically manipulating the Palestinian issue for their own narrow political ends.

178. The United States remains actively engaged in the search for a just political settlement to the Palestinian problem. Such a settlement can be achieved only by free and unconditional negotiations among the parties to the conflict. Thirty-five years of war have not recovered a single *dunam* of land for the Palestinians; nor has terrorism; nor has the refusal of some States to recognize the fact of Israel's existence or even to pronounce its name in this body; nor has the convoluted "diplomacy" of some parties, which is designed to produce anything—declarations, resolutions, even international conferences—to avoid confronting the necessity of direct, face-to-face negotiations with Israel.

Mrs. Coronel de Rodríguez (Venezuela), Vice-President, took the Chair.

179. That such direct negotiations can produce positive results is a fact, not a theory. The Camp David accords of 1978 and the Egypt-Israel treaty of the following year, firmly grounded on the principles set forth in Security Council resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973), established peace between two neighbours which had been at war for a generation. They led to Israeli withdrawal from occupied Arab territory. They established a framework for future negotiations concerning the occupied West Bank and Gaza. Building on these concrete achievements, and to reinvigorate the peace process, President Reagan, on 1 September 1982, put forth additional proposals for peace.¹ They envisage free, open, unconditional negotiations among the Israelis, the Jordanians and the representatives of the Palestinian people, leading to the withdrawal of Israeli authority from occupied territory and to the establishment of a self-governing Palestinian entity in association with Jordan. They encourage a freeze on Israeli settlements to stimulate the search for peace.

180. The United States is convinced that this initiative of President Reagan's embodies the most workable elements for a peace which can reconcile the legitimate security concerns of Israel and the legitimate needs of the Palestinian people, leading not only to a solution to the Palestinian problem that is acceptable to the Palestinian people, but to the establishment of a real peace between Israel and its Arab neighbours. We invite the parties to the conflict to take up the challenge for peace in the framework of the President's proposals and, through the process of direct negotiations which it envisages, to resolve among themselves the issues involved in this long-standing dispute.

181. The United States is committed to promoting the process of peace and to encouraging Arabs and Israelis to seek solutions to the Palestinian problem through direct and unconditional negotiations. We measure the utility of General Assembly resolutions by this standard: what furthers the peace process, we support; what obstructs it, we oppose. By this measure, the resolutions adopted today are without substantial merit. Instead of a practical negotiating process, they promise only another oratorical free-for-all in which the passions generated since 1947 get another airing and become inflamed. They attempt to dictate in advance what the outcome of the negotiations should be, which is precisely the opposite of what unconditional negotiations are all about. They call for costly activities by various United Nations bodies to propagate partial, partisan views of the Palestinian issue; hardly the function of an Organization dedicated to the fair and peaceful settlement of international disputes. For these reasons, these resolutions are unhelpful to the peace process which the United States is trying to further. Accordingly, we opposed them.

182. Mr. KEISALO (Finland): The position of the Government of Finland on the question of Palestine is well known and remains unchanged.

183. Finland recognizes the continuing importance of the question of Palestine in the search for a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in the Middle East. There can be no peace in the region without a just solution to the problem of Palestine through the attainment and exercise by the Palestinian people of their legitimate rights, including their right to national self-determination. Israel must therefore withdraw from Arab territories occupied since 1967. Palestinians and the PLO, as their legitimate representative, must be given the right to participate in all negotiations on their own future.

184. Conversely, the Government of Finland continues to consider the attainment of their legitimate rights by the Palestinians to be a part of and to come within the framework of a comprehensive solution of the question of the Middle East through negotiations based on Security Council resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973). Accordingly, all States in the region, including Israel, have the right to live in peace within secure and internationally recognized boundaries, free from threats or acts of force.

185. The resolutions just adopted unfortunately fail to represent the balance which my Government finds a prerequisite for a comprehensive, just and lasting settlement. My delegation therefore abstained in the vote on draft resolutions A/38/L.36 and L.37 and, while it voted in favour of draft resolutions A/38/L.38 to L.40, it did so with reservations. With particular reference to draft resolution A/38/L.38, it will be recalled that Finland participated in the International Conference on the Question of Palestine and joined in the consensus on the final documents of that Conference. However, we did so with reservations, as set out in annex V to the report of the Conference.² Suffice it here for my delegation to reaffirm those reservations.

186. Mr. MANOLATOS (Greece): I speak on behalf of the 10 member States of the European Community in explanation of their votes on the resolutions we have just adopted. In their common statement in the debate which took place in this Assembly under this item, the Ten reiterated that their commitment to the right of Israel to live in peace and security is fundamental and unwavering. Correspondingly, they further confirmed that there can be no real peace or stability in the region unless the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people are recognized. In particular, self-determination for the Palestinian people, with all that it implies, remains a key issue which must be taken into account in the context of a comprehensive, just and lasting settlement of the conflict. The Ten are convinced that negotiations are the key to the solution and that it is for the parties directly concerned to negotiate a lasting settlement. These negotiations will have to embrace all the parties concerned, including the Palestinian people, and the PLO will have to be associated with them.

187. With regard to the draft resolutions on the question of Palestine, in particular those referring to the final documents adopted by the International Conference on the Question of Palestine, it will be clear that the Ten have reservations on those elements, notably in the Programme of Action for the Achievement of Palestinian Rights, which are not in accordance with their common position regarding the principles for a comprehensive peace settlement. The Ten were able to vote for draft resolution A/38/L.39 and understand that this text deals only with economic and social assistance to the Palestinian people. In this connection, they recall their statement in the Second Committee [39th meeting] in explanation of vote on draft resolution A/C.2/38/L.24/Rev.1, entitled "Assistance to the Palestinian people". The Ten trust, with regard to draft resolution A/38/L.40, that the Department of Public Information of the Secretariat will continue to be guided in its activities by the principle of impartiality and will maintain its normal decision-making process. Finally, they believe that, given the difficult international financial situation, every effort should be made to avoid placing unnecessary burdens on the United Nations budget.

188. Mr. BORIO (Brazil): With regard to draft resolution A/38/L.38, the Brazilian delegation wishes to reiterate the explanation of vote it made³ after the adoption by acclamation of the Geneva Declaration on Palestine and the Programme of Action by the International Conference on the Question of Palestine.

189. Brazil is of the opinion that the time-limit established for the Secretary-General in paragraph 7 of draft resolution A/38/L.38 may be insufficient for the task entrusted to him. We would also have preferred a more carefully drafted wording, of a less detailed nature, of the guidelines listed in paragraph 3.

190. Mr. PAPAJOJGI (Albania): The Albanian delegation voted in favour of all five draft resolutions. However, we wish to state that we have reservations with regard to the wording of certain paragraphs, especially those referring to some previous United Nations resolutions.

191. Although we cast our vote in favour of A/38/L.38, we should like to make it clear that we cannot agree with the concept or the wording of paragraph 4, in which the United States of America and the Soviet Union, among others, are invited to participate in the International Peace Conference on the Middle East. We have stated our position in this regard on previous occasions. We are against the participation in the Conference of the super-Powers—the United States of America and the Soviet

Union. Such a Conference could not produce the desired results, as the super-Powers would try to manipulate it for their own purposes.

192. Mr. PORTUGAL RODRÍGUEZ (Peru) (*Interpretation from Spanish*): The delegation of Peru voted in favour of all the draft resolutions submitted under agenda item 33, on the question of Palestine.

193. In connection with the Geneva Declaration on Palestine and the Programme of Action for the Achievement of Palestinian Rights, which were adopted by acclamation of the International Conference on the Question of Palestine, held from 29 August to 7 September 1983, the Peruvian Government made the following statement:

"Through this statement, the Peruvian delegation wishes to reiterate its support for all efforts directed towards enabling the Palestinian people to exercise its inalienable right to self-determination and to independent statehood. The Peruvian delegation also supports the right of all the States of the region to exist within secure and internationally recognized boundaries, in accordance with the provisions of Security Council resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973) and of other decisions taken by the international community.

"However, the approach and drafting of several of the paragraphs in the Declaration and Programme of Action prevent the Peruvian delegation from supporting the document as a whole. This is true, in particular, of paragraphs (5) and (18) of part I of the Programme of Action."

194. Mr. BENKHIAL (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya) (*Interpretation from Arabic*): My delegation voted in favour of all five draft resolutions submitted under agenda item 33, on the question of Palestine. My delegation affirms that our votes do not alter the firm position of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya on the question of Palestine. We are against any references which might be directly or indirectly construed as legitimizing the Zionist occupation of Palestine or as recognition of the Zionist entity.

195. My delegation also reaffirms that its reservations recorded in the report of the International Conference on the Question of Palestine⁴ apply to the paragraphs in the draft resolutions on which we have just voted which refer to the Geneva Declaration on Palestine and the Programme of Action for the Achievement of Palestinian Rights, adopted by the Conference.

196. Mr. EL-FATTAL (Syrian Arab Republic) (*Interpretation from Arabic*): The delegation of the Syrian Arab Republic voted in favour of draft resolution A/38/L.38 because it supports the general trend of that draft resolution. However, it wishes to put on record its firm position of principle concerning certain elements which have been circumvented or ignored in the draft resolution, despite the fact that the call for an international peace conference on the Middle East was based on the Geneva Declaration on Palestine, adopted by the International Conference on the Question of Palestine. This call was made on the basis of the guidelines in the Declaration but was not linked to the ideas or elements contained in paragraph 5 thereof, in which it is explicitly stated:

"In order to give effect to these guidelines, the Conference considers it essential that an international peace conference on the Middle East be convened on the basis of the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and the relevant resolutions of the United Nations, with the aim of achieving a comprehensive, just and lasting solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict, an essential element of which would be the establishment of an independent Palestinian State in Palestine. This peace conference should be convened under the auspices of the United Nations . . ."

In other words, we note that paragraph 4 of the draft resolution does not reflect the content or the thrust of paragraph 5 of the Declaration. Furthermore, the delegation of the Syrian Arab Republic would have preferred the wording of paragraph 6 to reflect explicitly the content of the Declaration, in particular with regard to the responsibility of the Security Council to adopt appropriate guarantees and institutional arrangements on the basis of relevant United Nations resolutions in order to put into effect the agreements which might result from the International Peace Conference on the Middle East.

197. The delegation of the Syrian Arab Republic holds the view that these shortcomings weaken the text and constitute an attenuation of the language of the Geneva Declaration on Palestine. Our delegation has already explained its position in the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People.

198. While we voted in favour of this draft resolution, we reaffirm our commitment to the Arab peace plan and we interpret the resolutions on the question of Palestine or on the situation in the Middle East within the framework of respect for the principles adopted at the Twelfth Arab Summit Conference at Fez in September 1982. These principles embody the Arab consensus.

199. Mr. LASARTE (Uruguay) (*interpretation from Spanish*): The five draft resolutions submitted under agenda item 33 which have just been adopted by the Assembly are essentially inspired by the Geneva Declaration on Palestine and the Programme of Action for the Achievement of Palestinian Rights, adopted at Geneva in September this year.

200. Uruguay's affirmative vote on these five draft resolutions is consistent with my country's participation in the Geneva consensus and with our constant desire for solutions by peaceful means. Nevertheless, we consider it necessary to reaffirm our reservations concerning certain elements in the Declaration and Programme of Action which are set out in the report of the International Conference on the Question of Palestine.⁴

201. Mrs. CARRASCO MONJE (Bolivia) (*interpretation from Spanish*): The delegation of Bolivia supported the resolutions which the Assembly has just adopted. Our affirmative vote is in keeping with our great desire to cooperate in the efforts to establish conditions in the region which will make possible a just, stable and lasting peace. We believe that all the parties concerned should take part in these efforts. Bolivia believes that draft resolution A/38/L.38 complements Security Council resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973), which established the guidelines for a negotiated solution. We recognize the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination and independence on Palestinian land. We consistently support the principles of international law, which do not recognize the acquisition of territory by force of arms. My country also recognizes the right of all States in the region to independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity, in keeping with the resolutions of the Security Council.

202. Bolivia will continue to support all efforts aimed at bringing about a solution to the problem of Palestine in keeping with the principle of the peaceful settlement of disputes.

203. Mr. ZUMBADO JIMÉNEZ (Costa Rica) (*interpretation from Spanish*): Costa Rica's position on the question of Palestine has always been one of support for a peaceful settlement based on the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and on Security Council resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973), which establish the basis for a lasting peace in the region. We have constantly

reaffirmed our support for the right of all the peoples in the region to sovereignty, territorial integrity and self-determination, which includes the right of the Palestinian people to establish its own State. At the same time, we support Israel's right to exist in the region within secure and internationally recognized boundaries. These principles continue to be valid.

204. My delegation is concerned that on this occasion again there is no mention of Security Council resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973).

205. My delegation abstained in the vote on two of the draft resolutions—A/38/L.36 and L.38—because we cannot support the Geneva Declaration on Palestine in its entirety. In the case of draft resolution A/38/L.38, the guidelines laid down in paragraph 3 for the convening of an International Peace Conference on the Middle East in our opinion prejudice the results of that Conference and thereby jeopardize the possibility of the parties directly involved in the conflict entering into the negotiating process necessary for achieving a lasting peace.

206. Costa Rica voted in favour of two of the draft resolutions—A/38/L.37 and L.39. With regard to the former, my delegation thinks it right that the Division for Palestinian Rights of the Secretariat should continue its delicate and important tasks. We supported draft resolution A/38/L.39 because we believe that the United Nations system must play its part in giving economic and social assistance to the Palestinian people.

207. Finally, we abstained in the vote on draft resolution A/38/L.40 because we believe that draft resolution A/38/L.37, for which we voted, contains the necessary provisions concerning information and we do not want to run the risk of contributing to a duplication of efforts in this field.

208. Mr. THOMPSON (Trinidad and Tobago): My delegation voted in favour of all five draft resolutions submitted under agenda item 33 because we support their general thrust.

209. Trinidad and Tobago is conscious that a just and lasting solution to the problem of Palestine and the attainment by the Palestinians of their inalienable rights are integral to a peaceful solution to the grave situation obtaining in the Middle East. Trinidad and Tobago participated in the recent International Conference on the Question of Palestine at Geneva and joined in the adoption by acclamation of the Geneva Declaration on Palestine¹ and the Programme of Action for the Achievement of Palestinian Rights.² However, we expressed reservations then with regard to the implications of certain language which was not fully acceptable to our delegation.³ We reiterate these reservations just as we reaffirm our support for the attainment of a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in the Middle East through a just solution of the problem of Palestine.

210. Mr. HOSEINY (Islamic Republic of Iran): The position of the Islamic Republic of Iran on the question of Palestine is crystal clear. We categorically state that the Zionist entity should be removed from the region so that a just and lasting peace may come to the Middle East and specifically to Palestine.

211. Although we voted firmly and unambiguously in favour of all five draft resolutions, we have some reservations on certain preambular and operative paragraphs. I shall not go into details now, but, generally speaking, we categorically reject and record our reservations on any preambular or operative paragraph which, directly or indirectly, explicitly or implicitly, recognizes the illegitimate Zionist entity in occupied Palestine as a party to negotiations. The recognition of the illegitimate Zionist

entity, directly or indirectly, is not acceptable in any way to the Islamic Republic of Iran. There is only one inalienable right to be exercised and that is the right of the Palestinians. We believe that in all the occupied lands the flag of Palestine should be flying. Just and lasting peace will come to Palestine only through the total removal of the cancerous tumour from Palestine—namely, the Zionist entity. We all believe in that and we will vote for the cause.

212. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Spanish*): The Observer of the Palestine Liberation Organization has asked to be allowed to make a statement. I call on him in accordance with General Assembly resolution 3237 (XXIX).

213. Mr. TERZI (Palestine Liberation Organization): In his statement to the International Conference on the Question of Palestine, Mr. Yasser Arafat, the Chairman of the Executive Committee of the Palestine Liberation Organization, declared:

"... we welcome all peace initiatives based on the recognition of the rights of our people. We are ready to co-operate with all forces, and primarily the United Nations and its agencies, within the framework of international legitimacy and their resolutions concerning the question of Palestine. In this connection, we are calling for an international conference, under the auspices of the United Nations, in which the two super-Powers would participate with the rest of the parties concerned on the basis of the United Nations resolutions relating to the question of Palestine."

Chairman Arafat also said:

"Like other peoples of the world, the Palestinian people hate war but are fighting for justice. Our people love peace and yearn for it. But they recognize that peace cannot be achieved while their rights and national identity are being denied."

"The history of our people abounds with accounts of its continual resistance against invasion and occupations of its homeland."

"With this deep-rooted human heritage, our people are not fighting just for the sake of fighting. They are struggling for peace based on justice."

214. The International Conference on the Question of Palestine responded to that sincere call by the Palestinian people to bring peace to the region through a just solution of the question of Palestine. That is why the Conference considered it essential that an International Peace Conference on the Middle East be convened on the basis of the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and the relevant resolutions of the United Nations.

215. The Assembly has just endorsed that declaration in all its aspects, and therefore we are most encouraged to see that draft resolution A/38/L.38 received 124 votes in favour and only 4 votes against. We are now more and more encouraged, and we are entrenched in our belief that through the United Nations, and only through the United Nations, can a just solution be found which will find its legitimacy in this body.

216. Naturally, a few attempts have been made to reach accords ostensibly to attain peace but actually to eliminate the prospects for peace. On the electronic voting board in this Hall there has been a constant: the two red lights against the names of the United States and Israel. While the red light is a constant of United States policy, another constant is its denial of the existence of the Palestinian people, its denial of the basic and fundamental rights of the Palestinian people to self-determination. It was with this denial in mind that the United States concocted the

ill-fated so-called Camp David accords. A statement was made here about the Camp David accords, but where in the Camp David accords is the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination stated or even mentioned? Where in those accords is a reference to the right of the Palestinian to return to his home, in accordance with the principles of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights? That right to return is obliterated and annulled. The right to self-determination is eliminated. But we are not surprised, since the policy of the Government of the United States has been constant in denying that right and doing all it can to eliminate that right.

217. We have heard some speakers explaining their votes. We understand that some of them are rather pre-occupied and concerned, but what is really at stake is peace and not a few words here or a few words there. The PLO made it very clear at the Conference at Geneva, in the words of its elected Chairman, Yasser Arafat, that we are for peace, but we are not for the abandonment of our existence and of our rights.

218. Of course, it might be said that some rigid conditions have been voted for in regard to that peace. They are not so rigid. We believe that the matter of self-determination for a people does not constitute a rigid basis; it is a fundamental basis. Otherwise, what can be done with a people when it is denied the right to self-determination?

219. There have been many failed efforts for peace on the part of the United Nations. There was the first effort for peace by the United Nations when it dispatched the first peace envoy, Count Folke Bernadotte. Not only were his efforts killed, but the man himself was murdered, and by whom? By none other than the man who took the rostrum the other day masquerading as the Prime Minister of the State of Israel. The failed efforts may lead to frustration, but the Palestinian people do not despair, because we shall continue our struggle until we attain all our rights.

220. Again, others stated that they doubted the practicability of holding an international conference, or that it was premature to convene a peace conference and that the initiative stood little chance of success. That is prejudging the issue. Since 1947, there has been no peace in the region. Is it not really worth our while to think for a moment and accept the challenge? I call it a challenge for peace and not for anything else. Why not accept that challenge and get the parties to the Arab-Israeli conflict to sit down together and discuss the future? Naturally, it is not an innovation to suggest that the Soviet Union and the United States should be parties to those negotiations and that the negotiations should be convened nowhere but within the framework of the United Nations. This is an institution that gives hope for peace to the international community.

221. Others have referred to Security Council resolution 242 (1967), that ill-fated resolution. Where in resolution 242 (1967) is there any reference to the rights to self-determination of a people? Where in that resolution is there any constructive approach? Let us ask ourselves, and be honest in answering, whether resolution 242 (1967) was ever implemented. The policy of expansion and annexation and the establishment of all those settlements, the financing by the United States, the hundreds of millions of dollars poured into Israel to help it establish more and more settlements, the arms agreement and the new military alliance between the United States and Israel—are they not all an indication that neither the United States nor Israel has any respect for resolution 242 (1967), much less for the efforts for peace in the region?

222. As has been mentioned, the money allocated to further the issue and to make the world understand what the question of Palestine is and what the fate of almost 5 million Palestinians amounts to a few million dollars—\$5 million, \$6 million or \$10 million. I say to those who are complaining about the taxpayers' money, are they not the same people—and I am referring now to the representative of Israel—that are receiving \$1.7 billion in grants in the form of armaments to bring war and destruction and devastation to the region? And this money is not just granted once; the grant is repeated from time to time.

223. We trust that the Secretary-General will immediately start making contacts in order to translate the provisions of draft resolution A/38/L.38 into reality, and let us hope that next summer the United Nations will convene the International Peace Conference on the Middle East, which will be welcomed by all Palestinians and by the entire world.

The meeting rose at 7.35 p.m.

NOTES

¹See *Report of the International Conference on the Question of Palestine, Geneva, 29 August-7 September 1983* (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.83.I.21), chap. I.

²*Official Records of the Security Council, Thirty-eighth Year, Supplement for July, August and September 1983*, document S/15990.

³See *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, Washington, D.C., Government Printing Office, 1982, vol. 18, No. 35, p. 1081.

⁴See *Official Records of the Security Council, Thirty-seventh Year, Supplement for October, November and December 1982*, document S/15510.

⁵See *Report of the International Conference on the Question of Palestine, Geneva, 29 August-7 September 1983* (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.83.I.21), annex V.

⁶See *Official Records of the Security Council, Thirty-seventh Year, Supplement for July, August and September 1982*, document S/15317.

⁷*Ibid.*, document S/15403.

⁸See *Report of the International Conference on the Question of Palestine, Geneva, 29 August-7 September 1983* (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.83.I.21), annex III.

⁹The delegation of Malawi subsequently informed the Secretariat that it had intended to abstain in the vote on paragraph 2 of the draft resolution.

¹⁰The delegation of Malawi subsequently informed the Secretariat that it had intended to abstain in the vote on the draft resolution.

¹¹See *Report of the International Conference on the Question of Palestine, Geneva, 29 August-7 September 1983* (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.83.I.21), annex II.