United Nations

A/61/699–**E**/2007/8

General Assembly
Economic and Social Council

Distr.: General
17 January 2007

Original: English

General Assembly
Sixty-first session
Agenda items 53 (c) and 69 (a)

Sustainable development: International Strategy for Disaster Reduction

Strengthening of the coordination of humanitarian and disaster relief assistance of the United Nations, including special economic assistance: strengthening of the coordination of emergency humanitarian assistance of the United Nations

Economic and Social Council
Substantive session of 2007
Item 5 of the provisional agenda*
Special economic, humanitarian and disaster relief assistance

Towards a United Nations Humanitarian Assistance Programme for Disaster Response and Reduction: Lessons learned from the Indian Ocean tsunami disaster

Note by the Secretary-General

The Secretary-General has the honour to transmit to the members of the General Assembly the report of the Joint Inspection Unit entitled "Towards a United Nations humanitarian assistance programme for disaster response and reduction: lessons learned from the Indian Ocean tsunami disaster" (JIU/REP/2006/5).

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* E/2007/100.

JIU/REP/2006/5

Original: ENGLISH

TOWARDS A UNITED NATIONS HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE PROGRAMME FOR DISASTER RESPONSE AND REDUCTION:
Lessons learned from the Indian Ocean tsunami disaster

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United Nations, Geneva 2006

In accordance with article 11.2 of the statute of the Joint Inspection Unit, this report has been "finalized after consultation among the Inspectors so as to test recommendations being made against the collective wisdom of the Unit".

CONTENTS

ACRONYMS

ACABQ	Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions
ACC	Administrative Committee on Coordination
ADPC	Asian Disaster Preparedness Center
ADRC	Asian Disaster Reduction Center
CAP	Consolidated Appeal Process
CCA	common country assessment
CEB	United Nations System Chief Executives Board for Coordination (formerly ACC)
CERF	Central Emergency Response Fund
CHAP	Common Humanitarian Action Plan
ESCAP	United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
IASC	Inter-Agency Standing Committee
IATF/DR	Inter-agency Task Force on Disaster Reduction
IDP	internally displaced persons
IFRC	International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies
ILO	International Labour Organization
IRP	International Recovery Platform
ISDR	International Strategy for Disaster Reduction
ITU	International Telecommunication Union
JLC	United Nations Joint Logistics Centre
NGO	non-governmental organization
OCHA	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
PAHO	Pan American Health Organization
SUMA	Humanitarian Supply Management System
UNDAC	United Nations Disaster Assessment and Coordination
UNDAF	United Nations Development Assistance Framework
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNFPA	United Nations Population Fund
UNHCR	Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNU	United Nations University
WFP	World Food Programme
WHO	World Health Organization
WMO	World Meteorological Organization

Executive summary

Objective:
To strengthen the capacity of the United Nations system to coordinate and support humanitarian assistance for disaster reduction and response through:
- ➢ **Integration of programme, resource management and coordination, and**
- ➢ **Streamlining and standardization of operational, administrative and financial practices related to disaster reduction and response.**

MAIN FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

A.   If anything, the Indian Ocean tsunami disaster experience has demonstrated that there is an urgent need for strengthening the understanding and application of existing internationally established guidelines on disaster relief and recovery in most of the disaster-affected countries. It was also demonstrated that there exist no clear and coherent regulatory agreements on disaster management and humanitarian assistance, except for the Tampere Convention on the Provision of Telecommunication Resources for Disaster Mitigation and Relief Operations (hereinafter called "the Tampere Convention"). Consequently, in order to have an international regulatory framework which disaster-affected countries and the assisting countries will be bound to apply on the ground, it is of utmost importance for the United Nations system to assist in strengthening national disaster management frameworks, and for the Economic and Social Council to initiate a process of formulating coherent international legal instruments and regulations in an intergovernmental decision-making process open to all types of potential stakeholders and actors concerned.

Recommendation 1

The General Assembly should request the Secretary-General to:
(a)   Review and assess the existing agreements, regulations, rules and guiding principles on international humanitarian assistance for disaster response and reduction developed by multilateral organizations, in terms of their relevance to the disaster-affected countries and the assisting countries;
(b)   Present his assessment thereon in 2007 to the Economic and Social Council for its consideration and approval, together with proposals on a set of international regulatory norms and legal instruments by which emerging global disaster threats would be tackled more effectively;
(c)   Take into account recommendations 2 to 6 in presenting his proposals above; and
(d)   Instruct the Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator to assist the disaster-affected countries in establishing national capabilities to adopt and implement current internationally developed procedures and guidelines on disaster preparedness and management.

> ➢ **The implementation of this recommendation would contribute to enhancing the effectiveness of the United Nations humanitarian assistance system.**

B.   There is a general consensus that the current minimum standard requirements in the Guidelines on International Displacement do not include the vital requirements and rights of the disaster-affected population to have access to humanitarian information and

communication tools, which would provide them with multihazard early warnings, security and safety measures.

> ➢ **The following recommendation would contribute to enhancing the effectiveness of future relief operations for the disaster-affected population.**

Recommendation 2

The General Assembly should request the Secretary-General to formulate an additional minimum standard requirement in the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement (E/CN.4/1998/53/Add.2), complementing those currently provided for, in order to ensure that the disaster-affected population has access to information-sharing and radio and telecommunication tools to have adequate humanitarian information.

C.   The existing emergency response system is based on the assessment of impacts of disasters limited to the affected country and their nationals. Response to large-scale transboundary disasters, such as the Indian Ocean tsunami, requires the re-examination of the current assistance framework by the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC). The experience of the authorities involved in the Thai Tsunami Victim Identification (TTVI) operation, which provides information to the victims of the tsunami, hence embodying universal dimensions of humanitarian assistance, could be considered as a best practice worth emulating.

> ➢ **The following recommendation is expected to disseminate the best practices identified in TTVI and benefit from them for future United Nations relief activities.**

Recommendation 3

The Secretary-General should carry out an in-depth assessment of the experience and achievements of the Thai Tsunami Victim Identification Operation as a good practice of a disaster management mechanism, and present his findings thereon to the Economic and Social Council and propose, as appropriate, a victim identification system for its consideration and adoption.

D.   From the perspectives of various officials of the Governments and the international organizations who shared and exchanged views with the Inspector, there was a general understanding that the current international legal framework regarding military and air relief operations does not provide for sufficient guidance on the rapid start-up of the disaster management process in large-scale disasters. Indeed, the continued protracted negotiations between the disaster-affected States and other States concerned over transiting and deployment of military air operations, including landing authorization, negatively affected the relief efforts.

> ➢ **In the view of the Inspector, the following recommendation would contribute to enhancing the efficiency of relief operations in large-scale disasters.**

Recommendation 4

> **The Secretary-General should consult on the relevant aspects concerned with the International Civil Aviation Organization and propose to the Economic and Social Council for its consideration in 2007 guidelines on the rapid start-up of a transboundary disaster management process, which would assist Member States in establishing standby arrangements among their national civil and military aircraft services.**

E.   The experience of the Indian Ocean tsunami disaster has increasingly magnified the need for articulating policy to ensure, in concrete terms, coherent transition from emergency and recovery to reconstruction and development. In other words, emphasis is placed on the need to link measures for disaster response and disaster reduction, in order to assist in establishing the resilience of communities recovering from emergencies to facilitate the transition. Most Asian experts in the field of natural disaster reduction share the view that the most effective way to link emergency disaster relief with recovery and risk reduction would have been to include seismologist experts in the assessment missions of the United Nations Disaster Assessment and Coordination (UNDAC) team, immediately following the tsunami disaster.

> ➢ **The following recommendation would contribute to enhancing the effectiveness of humanitarian assistance programmes, in particular in the recovery and reconstruction phases.**

Recommendation 5

> **The Secretary-General should:**
> **(a)   Include in UNDAC teams and/or any other relevant assessment missions organized by the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), experts capable of carrying out scientific assessments of the impact of disasters, prevention procedures and early warning systems so that their findings can serve in planning the recovery and reconstruction phases; and**
> **(b)   Develop standardized definitions and terminology for disaster response and reduction activities, as well as exit strategies and submit these to the Economic and Social Council at its substantive session of 2007 for its consideration and approval.**

F.   The multilateral agencies contributed a great deal in providing assistance to the Government of India during the Indian Ocean tsunami disaster, in terms of ensuring the coordinated international assistance and response to the affected local population and communities and in helping to design an adaptive reconstruction process that increases resilience to specific local multihazards. The agencies operated through their ongoing programmes under the effective coordination of the Resident Coordinator/Humanitarian Coordinator and the Disaster Management Team in India, with the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) office as a focal point for local non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and communities in the affected areas. In the opinion of the Inspector, this is an exemplary framework, which should be seen as a best practice and should, therefore, be emulated in other countries.

Recommendation 6

> **The General Assembly should request the Secretary-General to:**
> **(a)   Review and further develop the terms of reference of humanitarian coordinators, profiles and skills for humanitarian coordinators, as well as a selection, training and management system that would ensure their leadership in the transition from relief to recovery and development;**
> **(b)   Develop a set of compliance procedures that would enable Member States to monitor the performance and accountability of: (i) resident and humanitarian coordinators; (ii) related humanitarian agencies to support the development of national plans and programmes for preparedness, recovery and reconstruction; and**
> **(c)   Report to the General Assembly on progress made in points (a) and (b) above.**

> ➢ **The above recommendation would contribute under paragraph (*a*) to enhanced coordination among humanitarian agencies on the ground, especially in the transition from relief to recovery and development, and under paragraph (*b*) lead to enhanced accountability for the United Nations system recovery framework.**

G.   The lessons learned from the Indian Ocean tsunami disaster indicated the need for more adequate principles and guidelines for humanitarian assistance and its application, as well as an intergovernmental mechanism that would provide a robust system-wide governance and strategic management framework in this sector. Lack of such a framework within the United Nations system organizations – despite the call of the Secretary-General for consolidating and grouping humanitarian and humanitarian-related matters under a single "humanitarian umbrella" agenda – could negatively affect the mobilization and management of the allocation of resources for humanitarian assistance within the United Nations system. In other words, the current governance mechanism led by the General Assembly and the Economic and Social Council has been handicapped by the absence of specialized intergovernmental support bodies for system-wide coordination.

Recommendation 7

> **(a)   The Secretary-General should propose to the Economic and Social Council, for its consideration and approval, terms of reference for an intergovernmental committee on disaster reduction and response which shall act as its support body; and**
> **(b)   On the basis of the proposals of the Secretary-General, the Economic and Social Council may wish to establish an intergovernmental committee to deal with disaster response and reduction in an integrated fashion, in order to enhance international humanitarian assistance in all disaster-affected countries and reinforce its intergovernmental decision-making capacity and coordinating role within the United Nations system.**

> ➢ **This recommendation would improve coordination of humanitarian assistance activities for disaster reduction and response among the participating organizations concerned through enhanced governance at the intergovernmental level.**

H.   There is a strong intergovernmental consensus that an integrated strategic and system-wide planning and management framework needs to be in place, coupled with

results-based frameworks, in order to coordinate better the humanitarian activities within and outside the United Nations system. In this respect, the Inspector noted the importance attached to a matrix of roles and initiatives of the organizations being developed for implementing the Hyogo Framework for Action 2005-2015: Building the resilience of nations and communities to disasters. Such a matrix is to be accompanied by measurable indicators to achieve common goals by location and sector at international and national levels. The Inspector further noted that the United Nations system organizations concerned had set about implementing the recommendation in the OCHA Humanitarian Response Review of August 2005, to establish "a global mapping of humanitarian response capacities that would cover not only international actions but also national and regional action, the private sector and the military" (Executive summary, para. 28). Such instruments would constitute a sound and timely basis for developing a strategic framework by which the Governments concerned could give coherent guidance to those institutions operating in the field.

Recommendation 8

> **The General Assembly should request the executive heads of the United Nations system organizations to develop a joint integrated strategic and system-wide planning framework for the management and coordination of humanitarian assistance and disaster reduction and response activities.**

> ➢ **The implementation of this recommendation would contribute to enhancing the effectiveness of humanitarian assistance for disaster reduction and response.**

I.   The discontinuation, in 1995, of a reliable inter-agency reporting mechanism using the "Administrative Committee on Coordination (ACC) Programme Classification" tool on programmes and resources in the system, has made the existing statistical tools available to the United Nations increasingly inadequate for strategic planning and management of resources.

Recommendation 9

> **The Secretary-General, in his capacity as Chairman of the United Nations System Chief Executives Board for Coordination (CEB) should take the initiative to resume, in an appropriate form, the biennial report of the Board on the programmes and resources of the United Nations system covering humanitarian assistance and disaster management and submit it to the Economic and Social Council.**

> ➢ **The implementation of this recommendation would contribute to enhancing coordination and cooperation in the area of humanitarian assistance and disaster management.**

J.   An analysis of the lessons learned from the tsunami disaster efforts highlighted more problems of inadequate interfaces between the affected countries and international organizations at the community level, than at the national and regional levels. As a consequence, the disaster-affected communities were flooded with unsolicited uncoordinated supplies and equipment, which created major logistical bottlenecks. This was largely due to the failure of the humanitarian organizations to share accurate information on the situation on the ground that they could have obtained from community

leaders.[1] The Inspector found that only in India was there a disaster preparedness and recovery plan in place, capable of coordinating international assistance, drawing on local capacities sustained and harnessed by local disaster response and reduction centres, established with the support of the United Nations agencies.

Recommendation 10

The Secretary-General should encourage humanitarian coordinators to take, together with the host country, the following initiatives:
(a)   Establish minimum baseline indicators in order to ensure that relief supplies effectively reach the affected population in adequate quantity and standards; and
(b)   Mobilize, in close cooperation with the United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (ISDR) system and relevant United Nations regional commissions, all necessary support for the United Nations Disaster Management Teams.

> ➢ **The implementation of this recommendation would contribute to enhancing the effectiveness of local disaster response mechanisms in the affected communities.**

K.   National resilience to disasters and effective relief and recovery depend on the degree of the disaster preparedness that is built up through the normal work of the United Nations country teams (UNCTs) and based on the Common Humanitarian Action Plan (CHAP). Once a disaster occurs, CHAP serves as a primary basis for international humanitarian assistance meeting local needs, for example, through the Consolidated Appeal Process (CAP). The United Nations system organizations in the countries visited by the Inspector showed weaknesses in establishing and updating the operational CHAPs, specifically with regard to hazard maps and baseline assessments of the status of disaster reduction containing realistic and measurable indicators. The weaknesses also related to the high turnover of international staff, the lack of qualification profiles of OCHA staff deployed to the field, and the uneven leadership qualities of the United Nations resident/humanitarian coordinators.

Recommendation 11

The Secretary-General should ensure that humanitarian coordinators take the necessary measures to:
(a)   Build up country/regional assistance frameworks for disaster preparedness and resilience, effective relief, recovery and reconstruction;
(b)   Update the Common Humanitarian Action Plans as well as hazard risk maps and assessments, in consultation with the host Government concerned, taking into account the Hyogo Framework for Action and the capacity of the International Recovery Platform;
(c)   Use the Common Humanitarian Action Plans as a basis for launching local consolidated and flash appeals to national and international donor communities, where appropriate, and periodically report on progress made to the Economic and Social Council starting in 2007.

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[1] Fritz Institute, *Logistics and the Effective Delivery of Humanitarian Relief*, 2005, p.6.

> ➢ **The implementation of this recommendation would contribute to enhancing the effectiveness of disaster preparedness and response by UNCTs.**

L.   The General Assembly by its resolution 52/12B of 19 December 1997 decided to transfer the responsibilities of the Emergency Relief Coordinator for operational activities, capacity-building in disaster-prone countries for natural disaster mitigation, prevention and preparedness to the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). The ambiguities of such a decision have been a source of protracted discussions on coordination between various agencies and programmes at the operational level. This state of affairs has the potential to affect consultative and coordination processes with attendant delays in decision-making.

Recommendation 12

> **The General Assembly should request the Secretary-General to commission a thorough independent evaluation of the work done by UNDP and its use of the related grant in fulfilling the responsibilities for operational activities for natural disaster mitigation, prevention and preparedness transferred to UNDP from the Emergency Relief Coordinator by General Assembly resolution 52/12B, and should re-examine the rationale and necessary financial arrangements for carrying out these responsibilities, based on the conclusions reached in the independent evaluation.**

> ➢ **The implementation of this recommendation is likely to enhance coordination of activities for disaster mitigation, prevention and preparedness.**

M.   The fact that the Secretary-General has failed to appoint humanitarian coordinators in many countries, especially in those particularly vulnerable to disaster events, has greatly weakened United Nations humanitarian leadership in the respective countries, and hence given the impression that the United Nations is placing low priority on disaster prevention and management issues.

Recommendation 13

> **For those disaster-prone countries where a humanitarian coordinator has not been appointed, the Secretary-General should appoint the United Nations resident coordinators as humanitarian coordinators and provide them with adequate support when necessary.**

> ➢ **The implementation of this recommendation would enhance the effectiveness of disaster preparedness of the United Nations system in disaster-prone countries.**

N.   The role played by the United Nations regional commissions in advancing economic and social development in their countries of accreditation can also contribute immensely to the integrated response and recovery efforts in the communities concerned. Indeed, the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP) played a positive role in the aftermath of the tsunami disaster and in response to the South Asian earthquake disaster, which resulted in the formulation of strategies for disaster risk management and post-disaster investment in the context of socio-economic development. The ability of ESCAP to promote cooperation and mutual assistance among

regional and subregional intergovernmental organizations, such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), should be seen as a best practice and therefore deserves to be emulated.

O.   The management of global resources depends on the ability of the central support services, which OCHA can provide to its partners in terms of: ensuring common administrative services such as information on emergency situations on the ground; telecommunications technology resources and timely fielding of required personnel; and material available within and outside the United Nations system. Despite the entry into force of the Tampere Convention, OCHA is yet to establish a permanent support service for this Convention. Therefore, there is a need for a comprehensive review of the OCHA common support services system. Indeed, the experience of the Pan American Health Organization (PAHO) in developing the Humanitarian Supply Management System (SUMA), which has been proved to be effective in Latin America may also be relevant in other regions.

Recommendation 14

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The Secretary-General should:
(a)   Undertake a comprehensive review of the common support services system managed by OCHA, drawing on the expertise and input of the relevant members of IASC, so as to allow OCHA to have means to fulfil its functions of providing central support services. This review should include the Emergency Relief Coordinator's tasks under the Tampere Convention. The findings should be submitted to the General Assembly at its sixty-second session for its consideration and approval;
(b)   Submit to the Economic and Social Council, a global scheme for the application of the Humanitarian Logistics Support System in major disasters worldwide to be disseminated to and implemented by all relevant United Nations agencies and NGOs, drawing on the relevant experience of the World Food Programme and PAHO in resolving logistical difficulties.

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> ➢ **The implementation of this recommendation would enhance the effectiveness of common support services for humanitarian assistance, in particular in the fields of logistics and supply management, based on the good practice of SUMA.**

P.   Disparity in the responses to the consolidated appeals and the flash appeals has been evident in terms of sectoral and geographical allocation of the contributions. High-profile disasters and emergencies attracted much more positive response, sometimes accompanied by unsolicited or unspecified support, than the other so-called "neglected and forgotten disasters". The coverage of disasters by CAP itself has been limited and does not meet the needs of the vulnerable population in the neglected emergencies. Judging from the experience of the tsunami disaster appeals and the financial commitments and disbursements made, there is an urgent need for: selecting and prioritizing projects included in the consolidated appeals and strengthening national capabilities, and accountability of the disaster-effected countries to ensure that the assistance funds reach the disaster survivors and are only used for the authorized purposes at different stages of disaster management.

Recommendation 15

The Secretary-General should: **(a)   Review the present mechanism used in the consolidated and flash appeals with a view to identifying weaknesses and shortcomings and to devise ways and means of further improving it;** **(b)   Study the feasibility of strengthening the capacity of relevant national oversight authorities of the affected countries for monitoring and providing accountability for the use of the funds raised for the benefit of the affected population in the context of CAP, as suggested by the Board of Auditors, as part of the United Nations system's capacity-building support for national recovery platforms; and** **(c)   Report to the General Assembly on the improvements in the design of CAP procedures.**

> ➢ **The implementation of this recommendation would contribute to enhanced accountability for the use of funds raised through the Consolidated Appeal Process.**

Q.   No correlation has been established between the pattern of flash appeals and consolidated appeals and that of withdrawals from the Central Emergency Revolving Fund (a current cash flow reserve component of the Central Emergency Response Fund). The withdrawals from the Fund have essentially facilitated the cash management of the agencies concerned. OCHA has not assessed the real use made and the effects on their activities and neither has OCHA managed the Fund for disaster prevention purposes. The significant and prompt financial commitments made by donors to the Tsunami Flash Appeals obviated the need for recourse to the Fund.

Recommendation 16

The General Assembly, in conjunction with the independent review of the Central Emergency Response Fund to be carried out pursuant to its resolution 60/124, should direct the Secretary-General to submit, with the support of the participating agencies, a consolidated report on their use of the funds drawn from the Central Emergency Revolving Fund and its effects on their cash management; and report to the General Assembly at its sixty-second session on the investment policy in place to preserve the assets of the fund, including the disposition of the interest and income accrued.

> ➢ **The implementation of this recommendation would contribute to enhanced accountability for the use of funds drawn from the Central Emergency Revolving Fund.**

R.   The current funding mechanism for an effective humanitarian assistance programme for disaster response and reduction does not ensure critical mass of resources needed in order to enable OCHA and the ISDR secretariat to retain collective memory and lessons learned consistently for policy formulation and efficient backstopping capacity. The secretariats face a multitude of administrative and financial difficulties, including: disparate

systems of fund-raising and the separate management of the internal trust funds; and the mandatory setting aside of the operating cash reserve required by the internal guidelines. These difficulties have continued to affect negatively the smooth running of the secretariats concerned and more precisely with regard to the implementation of their respective recruitment policies.

In order to solve these problems, budgeting and financing should be based on the collective will of Member States formulated in an appropriate governing body to replace the current unpredictable system, which relies on bilateral funding arrangements with individual donors.

Recommendation 17

> **The General Assembly should take the following decisions to:**
> **(a)   Merge the general trust funds other than the Central Emergency Response Fund under the management of OCHA and the ISDR secretariat into one single general trust fund under the management of the Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, to be used for a humanitarian assistance programme for disaster response and reduction; and place it together with the Central Emergency Response Fund including its revolving cash facility (the Central Emergency Revolving Fund) under the framework of the said programme;**
> **(b)   Establish an appropriate body composed of Member States to assist the General Assembly in overseeing the management of these funds, which would, inter alia:**
> **(i) Approve, on the basis of the recommendations of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (ACABQ), the proposals of the Emergency Relief Coordinator on the administrative and programme support costs budget;**
> **(ii) Approve the budget of the operational programme of the consolidated funds; and**
> **(iii) Review and examine the operation of the Central Emergency Response Fund.**
> **(c)   Invite the Secretary-General to promulgate the financial rules of the programme (as referred to in paragraph (a)) taking into account, inter alia, the observations of the ACABQ, and report on the functioning and management of the consolidated funds at its sixty-second session.**

> ➢ **The implementation of this recommendation would contribute to enhancing the efficiency of managing trust funds for disaster response and reduction and would also enhance accountability of the United Nations for the planning and use of operational, as well as programme support and administrative expenditures for emergency risk management and reduction.**

Introduction

1.   This review originates from a proposal made in 2002 by the Regional Office for the Americas of the World Health Organization (WHO) to cover its interest in system-wide coordination in emergency and complex operations. While including the subject in its listing of potential reports for the programme of work of the Joint Inspection Unit (JIU) for 2003 and beyond (A/57/321, annex, para. 5), the Unit decided to expand the scope of the report to address interdisciplinary approaches of the United Nations system organizations to disaster management and coordination mechanisms and standardization of administrative procedures across the organizations. Now that many scientific and specialized agencies, with humanitarian or non-humanitarian mandates, work with different ministries and agencies of Member States in the development of national capacities that can support humanitarian operations, such approaches are even more necessary.

2.   This review aims at identifying and addressing current constraints of the United Nations humanitarian system and focuses on the need to enhance the guiding principles as contained in the annex to General Assembly resolution 46/182 of 19 December 1991. This resolution provides a framework governing the coordination of humanitarian emergency assistance of the United Nations system. It also represents agreement among Member States that humanitarian assistance must be provided in accordance with the principles of humanity, neutrality and impartiality and that the United Nations should ensure prompt and smooth delivery of relief assistance without discrimination. The United Nations humanitarian mandate also extends to the promotion of the smooth transition from relief to rehabilitation and reconstruction. However, as evidenced by the experience of the Indian Ocean tsunami disaster, the application of these principles and framework has been facing increased difficulties, as effective response to growing major disasters and complex situations is yet to be found in the absence of a robust humanitarian mandate of the United Nations system covering the entire disaster management cycle, i.e. emergency relief, prevention and preparedness, risk reduction, and post-emergency recovery and reconstruction.

3.   In the wake of the Indian Ocean tsunami disaster of 26 December 2004, the General Assembly, in its resolution 59/279 of 19 January 2005, emphasized the need to focus beyond emergency relief to support cooperatively the medium- and long-term rehabilitation, reconstruction and risk reduction efforts to promote cooperation among vast varieties of stakeholders and humanitarian assistance agencies and organizations. The World Conference on Disaster Reduction, held in Kobe, Japan, in January 2005, adopted the Hyogo Framework for Action 2005-2015: Building the resilience of nations and communities to disasters (hereinafter "the Hyogo Framework"), which represented an intergovernmental consensus on the modalities for integrating all phases of humanitarian assistance for disaster reduction and response, including early warning and with emphasis on the needs of the most vulnerable groups in the society.

4.   In preparing the present report, the Inspector undertook a desk review, following which he distributed a series of questionnaires among relevant participating organizations within the United Nations system and the International Organization for Migration, as well as non-governmental organizations (NGOs) active in humanitarian assistance and disaster reduction and mitigation.

5.   On the basis of responses received, the Inspector conducted interviews with officials of the participating organizations both at headquarters and local/field offices and sought the views of a number of additional international organizations, NGOs, disaster research institutions and representatives of Member States. As part of the review, the Inspector undertook field visits to the areas affected by the Indian Ocean tsunami disaster in India, Indonesia and Thailand as well as field offices in Costa Rica and Panama. In finalizing this report, the Inspector sought comments from participating organizations on his draft report and took them into account. The Inspector finalized the report after having tested it against a collective wisdom of the Unit through consultation among the Inspectors, both prior to and after obtaining the comments of the participating organizations.

6.   The Inspector wishes to express his appreciation to all who assisted him in the preparation of the present report, particularly to those who participated in the interviews and so willingly shared their knowledge and expertise.

I   Background

A.   Impact of disasters on the world and its bearing on the United Nations system

7.   Disaster means "a serious disruption of the functioning of society, posing a significant, widespread threat to human life, health, property or the environment, whether caused by accident, nature or human activity, and whether developing suddenly or as a result of complex, long-term processes".[2] This provides the broadest definition of disaster, which consists in impacts on human beings of natural hazards, armed conflicts, epidemics, complex situations facing refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs).

8.   Over the last several decades, disasters thus defined such as natural hazards, wars, accidents and infectious disease have shown exponential upward trends together with an increase of IDPs and refugees. Their attendant consequences risk nullifying hard-won achievements in sustainable growth and development in developing countries. Disasters would adversely affect the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals, as they impact more on the most vulnerable strata of national societies as well as the countries most at risk.

B.   Role of the United Nations system

9.   The General Assembly in its resolution 46/182 conferred on the United Nations a central and unique role in providing leadership and coordinating the efforts of the international community to support disaster-affected countries. Its comparative advantage is found in a leadership based on its universal membership and the global political acceptance of the guiding principles on humanitarian assistance defined in the annex to the resolution. Thus, the United Nations should ensure every source of assistance to provide the prompt and smooth delivery of assistance to all victims without discrimination.

10. The comparative advantage thus conferred on the system over other channels of assistance can only explain why it is expected to play an increasingly important role in coping with the exponential rise in diverse human and material losses caused by disasters.

C.   Are the resources of the United Nations system commensurate with the challenge of disasters?

11. Answering this question requires first a quantitative assessment of the magnitude of resources involved in humanitarian activities and its relative importance in the entire range of activities of the United Nations system. According to the compilation of the replies from the participating organizations, the United Nations system has spent annually US$ 2.1 billion to US$ 4.8 billion on humanitarian disaster assistance over the last five years (see annexes I and II).

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[2] Definition provided in paragraph 6 of article 1 of the Tampere Convention on the Provision of Telecommunication Resources for Disaster Mitigation and Relief Operations, adopted at Tampere, Finland on 18 June 1998.

12. Faced with exponential growth in disasters, assistance by the United Nations system in the humanitarian sector continued to grow faster than any other sector from 1999 to 2003 and amounted to US$ 3 billion in 2003, accounting for roughly 30 per cent, the largest share, in the expenditures of the United Nations system on operational activities for development.[3] The magnitude of the financial resources devoted to this sector in the United Nations system is significant (see figure below).

Share of expenditures on operational activities of the United Nations system by sector (2003)

Source: Comprehensive statistical data on operational activities for development for 2003: report of the Secretary-General (A/60/74-E/2005/57, derived from table 13), 6 May 2005.

13.   However, it remains to be examined whether the resources that the United Nations system mobilized were adequate enough to enable the system to perform its central coordinating role. Unearmarked general resources that the system received amounted to about US$ 1 billion, representing barely 15 per cent[4] of the US$ 7 billion aggregate humanitarian assistance made available by the international community. Such a modest share does not provide the United Nations system with resources commensurate with its central coordinating role in international humanitarian assistance.

14.   Bilateral donors provide considerable funds, but often earmarked for other purposes than those proposed in the consolidated or flash appeals established by the United Nations system[5] in certain cases of disasters with high media profiles. Contributions and commitments to these appeals have been marked with disparities in their levels and

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[3] Comprehensive statistical data on operational activities for development for 2003: report of the Secretary-General (A/60/74-E/2005/57), paras. 48-58.

[4] Development Initiatives, *Global Humanitarian Assistance Update 2004-05, 2005,* paras. 5.1 and 7.1.

[5] In 2005, against total requirements of US$ 5,87.9 million for consolidated appeals, official and private donors committed US$ 6,617.4 million to the projects not listed in the appeals including US$ 5,083.9 million for the Indian Ocean tsunami disaster and US$ 744.2 million for South Asian Earthquake appeals (Source: OCHA Financial Tracking Service, 26 May 2006).

directions. Disasters with high media profiles usually get more favourable responses than those so-called "forgotten and neglected emergencies".[6]

15.   In addition, apart from the still modest size of trust funds of the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), which is subject to earmarking (see annex III), the bulk of the resources available to the United Nations system's humanitarian operations is in the hands of the specialized agencies (e.g. the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), the International Labour Organization (ILO), the International Telecommunication Union (ITU), the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), WHO and the World Meteorological Organization (WMO)), various United Nations funds and programmes[7] (e.g. the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and notably, the World Food Programme (WFP)) spending three-quarters of the total. As the system has no robust intergovernmental mechanism to monitor and manage the entire resources, humanitarian assistance of the system tends to face a risk of fragmentation.

D.   How the United Nations system responded to the tsunami relief needs: a key to reform its role

16.   The tsunami of 26 December 2004 triggered one of the deadliest and most devastating disasters in living memory. The Secretary-General reported that it killed approximately 240,000 people and 50,000 were missing. More than one million persons were displaced without any advance notice.[8]

17.   As a result of its spectacularly dramatic nature and the capture of photographs and video recordings from several sources, of victims from the disaster-stricken countries, as well as expatriates, which were broadcast worldwide by the media, the Indian Ocean tsunami disaster received earlier and broader responses from many sources than any other crisis. The international community displayed unprecedented generosity and solidarity in providing financial, technical and logistical support to the region, including the largest modern peacetime deployment of military assets in the history of the United Nations.

18.   By the middle of 2005, close to US$ 7 billion were pledged from all sources (including US$ 1 billion from corporate and private donation[9]) against US$ 1.3 billion requested in the Tsunami Flash Appeals. If the pledges made to cover long-term needs of rehabilitation and reconstruction were taken into account, the total pledges from all sources consisting of donor Governments, international financial institutions, private individuals and companies as well as the disaster stricken-countries would amount to some US$ 15 billion.[10]

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[6] As of January 2006, countries such as the Central African Republic (35%), the Democratic Republic of the Congo (62%), Malawi (56%), the Niger (65%), Somalia (58%) and Uganda (75%) remain underfunded in contrast with 85 per cent coverage of the tsunami efforts.

[7] Legally they are part of the United Nations Secretariat.

[8] , Strengthening emergency relief, rehabilitation, reconstruction, recovery and prevention in the aftermath of the Indian Ocean tsunami disaster: report of the Secretary-General (A/60/86-E/2005/77), para. 2.

[9] Ibid., para. 11.

[10] Office of the Special Envoy for Tsunami-affected Countries, OCHA, Tsunami Flash Appeal Expenditure Tracking, see website: http://ocha.unog.ch/ets/Default.aspx.

E.   Lessons learned and problems

19. The unprecedented scale of the catastrophe, its transboundary nature and the magnitude of resources involved in the international response to the Indian Ocean tsunami disaster entailed enormously complex operations and shed light on the shortcomings of the existing global humanitarian system. The Inspector's reflection on the overall experience and lessons learned is summarized below:

Success

20. No significant secondary loss of life occurred during the relief efforts.

21. The efforts were supported by an unprecedented scale of positive response to the Flash Appeals due to the global impact of the disaster and a sense of solidarity among Member States, enhanced by the media attention, including the fact that many victims were visitors and tourists originating from major donor countries.

22. The experience of this tsunami disaster was significant enough for the establishment of early warning systems in the Asian and Pacific region in 2006, thanks to joint efforts by the secretariat of the International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (ISDR) and UNESCO. It was demonstrated that the work of WMO and the UNESCO Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission on the facilitation and development of early warning systems for different natural hazards is essential for humanitarian contingency planning.

Problems

23. The assistance in general was not need-driven, but supply-driven. It was uncoordinated at the response stage and was more so at the recovery stage. The implementation of the emergency assistance projects envisaged in the Flash Appeals had been slow: at the end of 2005, the rate of disbursement stood at 48.9 per cent against the commitment required by the Appeals.[11]

24. The tsunami disaster entailed difficulties in achieving a smooth transition from the relief to the recovery and the reconstruction phases. This was mainly due to the unprecedented scale of the disaster and the pre-existing complex situations in Banda Aceh and the northern and eastern parts of Sri Lanka, which required a more integrated approach, as well as neutrality and impartiality of assistance to be ensured by the Resident Coordinator and Humanitarian Coordinator.

25. The lessons also revealed some field-level limitations of the humanitarian principles and policies developed by the United Nations system as explained below:

At the national level:
(a)   Lack of unequivocal legal and institutional national frameworks dealing comprehensively with disaster preparedness, early warning and disaster management plans in most of the affected countries;
(b)   Lack of a pre-existing transition framework for recovery and reconstruction in most of the affected countries;

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[11] OCHA, Tsunami Flash Appeal Expenditure Tracking website: http://ocha.unog.ch/ets/Default.aspx (viewed on 22 December 2005).

(c)   Low degree of understanding by the Governments of the affected countries of the framework and procedures of the United Nations humanitarian system;

(d)   Inadequate interface between international humanitarian agencies and the affected population; and

(e)   Unsatisfactory implementation of community-based approaches to recovery and disaster preparedness.

At the international level:

(a)   Absence of a coherent set of internationally established principles, guidelines and conventions for disaster relief and reduction, covering regulations and standards adapted to emerging needs to cope with major and transboundary disasters;

(b)   Inadequate application of minimum standards for assistance to displaced persons, [12] and lack of a full awareness of the right of the affected population to have access to humanitarian information;

(c)   Lack of a central coordinating authority to plan and manage international assistance in relief, recovery and reconstruction, owing to inherent weakness in inter-agency administrative cooperation among the United Nations system organizations and the lack of effective intergovernmental guidance to them; in particular the dichotomy between disaster reduction and response was reflected in the institutional divide between the Inter-Agency Task Force on Disaster Reduction (IATF/DR) and the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) and was an impediment on the strategic management of the transition;

(d)   Weak common support services and unstable resource capacity of the system organizations due to their heavy reliance on unpredictable voluntary contributions as well as uneven deployment of humanitarian assistance assets by bilateral agencies;

(e)   Competition for bilateral project funding among international humanitarian organizations.

26.   These limitations caused delays in the organization of relief operations in the field, such as bottlenecks in customs clearance, transit of goods and equipment for emergency assistance, and other logistical and transport problems. These also resulted in duplication of assistance efforts and protracted the planning of the recovery and reconstruction process.

F.   Towards the reform of the system

27.   Quest for the leadership role of the United Nations system puts on the shoulders of the governing bodies and heads of secretariats concerned, an extraordinary responsibility to draw the conclusions of recent dramatic experiences, and provide the system with the basic elements which would help reshape it.

28.   The following lessons are relevant to the reform of the system:

(a) Current principles and guidelines for humanitarian assistance and its application have proved inadequate;

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[12] See the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement (E/CN.4/1998/53/Add.2), submitted to the Commission on Human Rights at its fifty-fourth session. The Guiding Principles had been prepared by the then Representative of the Secretary-General on internally displaced persons, Mr. Francis Deng.

(b)   There exists no intergovernmental mechanism which provides adequate governance and strategic management of global resources for disaster reduction and response among the organizations of the United Nations system, official and private bilateral donors;

(c)   The conditions under which the unprecedented international solidarity was displayed may have been sui generis to the response to the Indian Ocean tsunami disaster; the examination of such conditions will be a key for the United Nations system to succeed in mobilizing generous international assistance in future disasters and ensure more equitable provision of assistance;

(d)   In the case of this tsunami disaster where financial contributions were abundant, the success of the response of the United Nations system depended on its leadership capacity to mobilize resources, organize and coordinate delivery of assistance effectively and equitably throughout the entire disaster management cycle;

(e)   There is a need to disseminate good practices which include: provision of victim identification assistance for all nationalities in Thailand; and the system-wide support established under the United Nations Humanitarian Coordinator for the recovery and reconstruction framework of India.

29.   Bearing in mind these findings and lessons learned from the Indian Ocean tsunami disaster, the Inspector examines the shortcomings in the current global humanitarian system in terms of:
- (a)   Doctrine (principles and policies);
- (b)   Governance and strategic management:
  - Institutional framework
  - Coordination
- (c)   Common support services and resource mobilization;
- (d)   United Nations humanitarian assistance programme.

II. Principles and policies of the current humanitarian assistance system

30. The following sections deal with the weaknesses of current principles and policies of humanitarian assistance and address a number of emerging issues which should be dealt with by the United Nations system.

A. Review of current principles and guidelines

1. Existing international disaster law

31. The experience of the Indian Ocean tsunami disaster demonstrated that there were no clear and coherent regulatory agreements dealing with various aspects of transboundary disaster management and humanitarian assistance. The Tampere Convention on the Provision of Telecommunication Resources for Disaster Mitigation and Relief Operations, which entered into force on 10 January 2005, is the only international convention of this sort. The International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) states that the present state of international disaster law is a patchwork of over 130 diverse instruments, a majority of which are bilateral treaties concluded for the most part between European nations. There has been no clear identifiable pattern of general principles on key aspects of disaster response such as entry requirements, work permits, freedom of movement, information exchange, treatment of consignments, etc.[13]

2. Fragmentation of principles and policies

32. There are inter-agency guidelines and policies on humanitarian assistance and disaster reduction developed through IASC and IATF/DR. These bodies are inter-agency coordination bodies within the United Nations system chaired by the Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator responsible for emergency assistance and natural disaster reduction, respectively (see annexes IV and V). IASC is open to a limited number of international secretariats and NGOs, not to Member States. IATF/DR is a forum to provide a platform for the realization of ISDR by those sectoral entities within and outside the United Nations system involved in disaster risk reduction. It is open to relevant United Nations system organizations and bodies, experts from NGOs and sectors responsible for disaster reduction within the Governments of Member States. Following the adoption of the Hyogo Framework, the Secretary-General announced the reformulation and renaming of IATF/DR which would function as the Global Platform for Disaster Risk Reduction from 2007 onwards.

33. IASC has developed some 25 policies, principles and guidelines for humanitarian assistance (see annex VI). They are based on the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement[14] and the guiding principles contained in the annex to General Assembly resolution 46/182. IATF/DR has also developed inter-agency instruments for ensuring complementarity of initiatives by sectoral entities involved in the implementation of ISDR and the Hyogo Framework. They provide guidelines and matrices designed to highlight priority areas and to identify gaps in the activities undertaken through thematic, regional and national platforms and networks. Some examples of these are "Guidelines for

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[13] IFCR, *World Disasters Report 2000* (Geneva).
[14] See footnote 12 above.

integrating disaster strategy for disaster reduction into CCA (common country assessment) and UNDAF (United Nations Development Assistance Framework)"[15] and "Guiding principles: national platforms for disaster risk reduction".[16]

34.   The two distinct coordinating bodies, which are under the same authority of the Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, have nevertheless developed their guidelines, policies and procedures more or less in isolation. Despite the call for an integrated smooth transition from relief to reconstruction in General Assembly resolution 46/182 (annex, para. 9), these instruments address diverse constituencies in a fragmented way. The Inspector found that they have not been streamlined and compiled systematically under a single humanitarian umbrella in a readily available and understandable format for the benefit of a wider professional humanitarian audience, particularly humanitarian actors in the disaster-affected countries.

35.   It is highly advisable that the United Nations system organizations should establish a compendium, commentaries, a primer and manuals of the existing principles, norms or internationally developed standards, guidelines and policies, which would serve capacity-building purposes, for establishing and managing national regulatory frameworks and mechanisms in disaster-affected countries.

3.   Effectiveness of principles and policies

36.   Pursuant to their advocacy mission, IASC and IATF/DR expect that the affected countries and the bilateral donors would apply their policy and procedures framework as if they had a status of international conventions governing the operation of the international humanitarian community.[17] In spite of their efforts, the United Nations General Assembly has not formally endorsed these instruments although the Assembly accorded political blessing to some of these instruments such as: the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement; policy guidelines on disaster relief and recovery such as the Guidelines on the Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets to Support United Nations Humanitarian activities in complex emergencies; the Guidelines developed by the International Search and Rescue Advisory Group (INSARAG); and the Good Humanitarian Donorship Initiative.[18]

37.   In fact, these instruments are essentially of an administrative nature, applicable to participating United Nations specialized agency secretariats and associated organizations, and not to all humanitarian actors. Moreover, these instruments are not legally binding, although some of them, for example, the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, may be construed as soft law, as they compile relevant international norms and laws.

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[15] Contained in Draft Guidance Note, ISDR secretariat and UNDP, 23 March 2006.

[16] Working document of the ISDR secretariat, 17 October 2005 (available on website: http://www.unisdr.org/eng/country-inform/ci-guiding-princip.htm).

[17] The platform that IATF/DR seeks to provide for the realization of disaster reduction in a concerted manner is particularly through dialogue and *consensus-building among sectors both within and outside the United Nations system* (emphasis added). See also the IASC and IASC-Working Group secretariat, *Inter-Agency Standing Committee and Working Group: Concise Terms of Reference & Action Procedures,* Revised and abridged (Geneva, 1998). IASC stated that one of its primary objectives is to "advocate common humanitarian principles to parties outside the IASC".

[18] A set of 23 Principles and Good Practice of Humanitarian Donorship and an implementation plan developed by 16 industrialized country donors in a meeting convened in 2003 by the Government of Sweden to discuss good humanitarian donorship. (Source: http://www.goodhumanitariandonorship.org/background1.asp, Department for International Development, London, viewed on 22 February 2006.)

However their formal validity is limited due to the lack of formal approval by the General Assembly, despite repeated efforts by the Secretary-General to urge Member States to accept the Guiding Principles as "the basic international norm" for the protection of IDPs.[19]

## 4.	Mastery and ownership of principles and policies

38.	The above-mentioned instruments are yet to be recognized and implemented by most of the developing countries. This has been attributable to the lack of their understanding and the limited scope of their participation in the elaboration of these instruments. As a consequence, and as was reported in the workshops on the lessons learned from the tsunami disaster,[20] the preparedness of many of the Indian Ocean tsunami disaster-stricken countries ranged from uneven to inadequate and did not reflect the internationally established guidelines.

39.	In the light of their experience, the Asian countries concerned have been developing national and local regulatory frameworks that integrate disaster response and reduction approaches. These countries need to participate more actively as stakeholders in the elaboration of the instruments and receive required advocacy and training thereon from the United Nations system organizations.

40.	The effective implementation of these principles and guidelines depends on acceptance by the countries concerned. Therefore, Member States should establish mastery and ownership of the various norms, principles and guidelines to involve themselves fully in undertaking proper discussions on how they can benefit from these instruments and how their implementation can be improved. In order to have an international regulatory framework that is effectively applicable both to the disaster-affected countries and the assisting countries on the ground, it is necessary for the Economic and Social Council to review these principles and guidelines and initiate a process of legislation of coherent international norms and regulations open to all relevant stakeholders and actors **(see recommendation 1).**

## B.	Specific aspects of principles and guidelines

## 1.	Minimum standard requirements of internally displaced persons and access to information

41.	In the light of the lessons learned from the Indian Ocean tsunami disaster, the Inspector is of the view that the minimum standard requirements of assistance to IDPs by the humanitarian agencies, such as their access to essential food and water, shelter and housing, clothing, and medical services and sanitation had not been systematically applied and managed based on the accurate assessment of the local needs, in the light of the

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[19] In response to the call of the Secretary-General in his report, "In larger freedom: towards development, security and human rights for all" (A/59/2005, para. 210), the High-level Plenary Meeting and the General Assembly at its sixtieth session recognized the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement as "an important international framework" for the protection of IDPs (See resolution 60/1, para. 132 and resolution 60/168, op. para. 8).

[20] United Nations, "Regional workshop on lessons learned and best practices on the response to the Indian Ocean tsunami: report and summary of main conclusions", Medan, Indonesia, 13-14 June 2005 and "Post-tsunami lessons learned and best practices workshop: report and Working Groups output", Jakarta, 16-17 May 2005.

significant foreign assistance announced. Member States and their humanitarian assistance organizations are required to apply fully the standard requirements in the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement through their national regulatory emergency management frameworks based on the assessment of the affected communities' needs. The Inspector trusts that the Secretary-General will take this into account when implementing recommendation 1.

42.   Furthermore, the current minimum standard requirements in the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement do not include the vital requirements and rights of the disaster-affected population to have access to humanitarian information and communication tools which provide them with multihazard early warning, security and safety measures.[21] The Inspector was informed that an IASC working group addressed this issue. [22] He trusts that the ongoing work of IASC under the leadership of the Representative of the Secretary-General on human rights of internally displaced persons will result in the adoption of an additional minimum standard requirement as part of the Guiding Principles.

43.   In this respect, it was reported that during the relief stage in the Indian Ocean tsunami disaster, humanitarian operations had been hampered by excessive and costly reliance on wireless telephones with limited Short Message Service (or SMS) capacity and unnecessary government restrictions on the use of short-wave radios, which would have ensured the transmission of humanitarian information to the population. IFRC is of the view that information is a life-saving resource in disaster situations [23] **(see recommendation 2).**

2.   Victim identification

44.   According to OCHA, victim identification is not currently part of the international disaster management mechanism. The existing emergency response system focuses on the assessment of impacts of disasters limited to the affected country and its population. Response to large-scale transboundary disasters such as the Indian Ocean tsunami requires re-examination by IASC of the current assistance framework. It is based on the underestimation of life-saving abilities of the affected countries as well as the imperative to address the victims of these countries.[24]

45.   In major disasters, the central interest of the non-affected countries is to ensure the security and protection of their citizens in the affected country as well as establish identification of expatriate victims who were in the affected country or countries. Relevant IASC guidelines need to be revisited to strengthen mutual cooperation between the affected country and the assisting countries in order to take into account their concerns with victim identification in the deployment of humanitarian assistance for the benefit of all victims.

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[21] UNHCR has been working on a new edition of its useful basic standards but they do not refer to such access. Practical Guide to the Systematic Use of Standards & Indicators in UNHCR Operations, 2nd ed. (Geneva, Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 2006).
[22] See Inter-Agency Standing Committee, "Protecting persons affected by natural disasters: IASC operational guidelines on human rights and natural disasters", Geneva, 2006.
[23] See introduction by Markku Niskala, Secretary General of IFRC, in World Disasters Report: focus on information in disasters (Kumarian Press Inc., 2005), pp. 8-9.
[24] John Cosgrave, "Tsunami Evaluation Coalition: initial findings", Finding 3 ALNAP (London, Overseas Development Institute, December 2005). Also available at website: http://www.alnap.org/tec.

46.   The experience of the Thai Tsunami Victim Identification (TTVI) operation is a case in point. It provided information to the victims' relatives and private and public organizations, on the identification of all victims of the tsunami, thus embodying universal dimensions of humanitarian assistance. The operation has been successfully conducted by the Thai police authorities with the generous contributions of those countries from which residents and tourists were missing. These countries seconded their corps of forensic and other experts to the Thai authorities. TTVI received no support from the United Nations system, except for the association with WHO **(see recommendation 3).**

3.   Military and air relief operations

47.   According to existing sources and discussions with officials of the Governments concerned, the current international legal framework does not provide for sufficient guidance on the rapid start-up of the disaster management process in large-scale disasters. The relief work was often negatively affected by the lack of an agreed framework for the deployment of military and air relief operations, as well as by the unavoidable protracted negotiations among the States concerned over transiting and deployment of military air operations, including landing authorization. Delays of one to two weeks in the arrival of civilian-military coordination officers had an adverse impact on the relief operation. In view of the strains experienced by civil aviation due to significant airlift aid to the disaster areas in a short period, an expert group dealing with the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) Search and Rescue (SAR) services called for appropriate guidelines for expeditious deployment of aircraft in transboundary search, relief and rescue operations in major disaster situations.[25] There is an obvious need for defining standby arrangements among their national civil and military airlines and the role of OCHA designed to coordinate and facilitate deployment of their assets and delivery of humanitarian supplies by air.

48.   During the tsunami disaster, for example, much of the immediate logistical support came from the military resources provided by Member States often on their own initiative. Thirty-five countries dispatched 30,000 troops in total. The Combined Coordination Centre at the Thai Naval Base in U-Tapao that was established by the international Combined Support Force (CSF 536) (involving Australia, Canada, India, Japan, the Netherlands, the United States of America and the United Nations) to coordinate the first stages of the international relief effort became the heart of a coordinated international relief effort. It helped to overcome logistical bottlenecks until the United Nations was able to play a more central role[26] **(see recommendation 4).**

4.   Disaster management continuum and value of the scientific dimension to disaster assessments

49.   Experience of the tsunami disaster magnified the need for articulating policies to ensure in concrete terms coherent transition from emergency and recovery to reconstruction phases.

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[25] ATM/AIS/SAR/SG/15 appendix C to the report on Agenda item 3 3C – 1, Recommendations, ICAO Search and Rescue Seminar and Search and Rescue Exercise, Chennai, India, 7-11 March 2005.

[26] Ralph A. Cossa, **"**South Asian tsunami: U.S. Military provides 'logistical backbone' for relief operation", in e-journal USA (March 2005), available at: http://usinfo.state.gov/journals/itps/1104/ijpe/cossa.htm.

50.   The Hyogo Framework also emphasizes the need for linking measures of disaster response and disaster reduction to help establish the resilience of communities faced with emergencies, and ease the transition. In this light, a number of Asian experts in the field of natural disaster reduction told the Inspector that a way to link emergency disaster relief with recovery and risk reduction would have been to add scientists of relevant discipline, such as seismologists, to the assessment mission of the United Nations Disaster Assessment and Coordination (UNDAC) team immediately following the Indian Ocean tsunami disaster. They reiterated to the Inspector that OCHA and UNDAC disaster assessments would have been significantly strengthened if they had been accompanied by timely and immediate scientific disaster assessments supportive of recovery and long-term development.

51.   The dichotomy between disaster reduction and response embodied in the institutional divide between the ISDR system and IASC is an impediment to the strategic management of the transition. Such a dichotomy is germane only to these coordinating bodies whereas other United Nations system organizations have in-house capabilities to manage integrally the transition under the exit strategies approved by their governing bodies.[27] Usually, the valuable disaster response capacity once established by the intervention of OCHA does not remain after the end of the emergency stage. In other words, due to the OCHA practice of remaining in the field for only three to six months during emergencies, the field coordinating structure thus established by OCHA will not be maintained after the withdrawal of emergency and peacekeeping actors.

52.   Obviously, OCHA is not to be blamed in this regard as its mandate at the recovery and further stages remains unclear even under General Assembly resolution 46/182.[28] Due to the ambiguity of the OCHA mandate at the recovery stage and onwards, the very definition by OCHA of "humanitarian operation" is limited to "relieving human suffering" and appears to exclude two key aspects of disaster management: preparedness and recovery, which are included in the ISDR definition of emergency management. In the interest of a system-wide coherent transition, there is a need for common definitions of key terms as well as policies, strategy and, in particular, shared norms on exit strategies among the humanitarian assistance and developmental organizations concerned (**see recommendation 5).**

5.   Key role of the humanitarian coordinators in transition from relief to recovery and reconstruction

53.   The greatest lessons drawn from the Indian Ocean tsunami disaster and the outcome of the World Conference on Disaster Reduction are the importance of early warning, emergency preparedness and prevention, as well as a seamless transition from relief to recovery and reconstruction. Former United States president, William Clinton, Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Tsunami-affected Countries, reported to the Economic and Social Council in July 2005 that the focus of the recovery efforts was to "build back better" and to keep the momentum of the international community and the affected countries going to tackle long-term recovery, for example of livelihood and employment on the ground.[29]

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[27] Based on communications from WFP and ILO, and interviews with UNICEF officials.
[28] See General Assembly resolution 46/182, annex, paras. 35 (h) and 41.
[29] See the transcript of his remarks to the Economic and Social Council, Humanitarian Segment, Panel discussion "Lessons learned from the response to the Indian Ocean disaster", 14 July 2005, United Nations, New York. See also United Nations press releases: ECOSOC/6166, 14 July 2005 and ECOSOC/6167, 15 July 2005.

54. Essentially, the Hyogo Framework provides an integrated framework of risk management, linking measures of disaster response and disaster reduction, which establishes the resilience of the communities against emergencies and ensures an optimum path to early recovery and reconstruction. United Nations country teams (UNCTs) conducted and managed under the leadership of the humanitarian coordinators are supposed to assist Governments in this regard within the context of country programming frameworks.

55. However, in many countries, recovery of livelihoods and reconstruction of the affected areas could not smoothly get under way due to the unprecedented scale of the disaster and the pre-existing complex situations in the north and the east of Sri Lanka and Banda Aceh. OCHA assistance in most of the affected countries was inadequate in helping the countries formulate recovery and reconstruction plans within a six-month period following the earthquake. In their dual capacity as humanitarian coordinators, the United Nations Resident Coordinators in the countries visited attempted to fill in the coordination gap in supporting the transition from relief to recovery under considerable constraints. The limited duration of emergency response coordinated by OCHA and its lack of a clear mandate for the recovery stage vis-à-vis the other organizations and the host Governments did not always allow for system-wide strategic management of the transition.

6. A positive exception: the experience of India

56. The Inspector found a major exception to the foregoing observation in the formulation of the United Nations Recovery framework in support of Government of India for a post-tsunami rehabilitation and reconstruction programme[30] by which the United Nations agencies, as well as the Asian Development Bank and the World Bank under the leadership of the humanitarian/resident coordinator, had assisted the Government in formulating a comprehensive national reconstruction plan.

57. The Government of India did not make an appeal for external assistance at the relief stage. But the multilateral agencies conveniently provided assistance through their ongoing programmes and under the coordination provided by the United Nations resident/humanitarian coordinator and the Disaster Management Team in India, with UNICEF acting as the focal point for local NGOs and communities in the affected areas.[31] From the very day the tsunami struck, a United Nations Disaster Management Team emergency operation centre was established by staff at the UNICEF office in Chennai. In addition, a United Nations Recovery Team and NGOs established a central recovery resource centre and local centres in the tsunami-affected communities to help the local population ensure coordinated international assistance and design an adaptive reconstruction process that increased resistance to specific local multihazards.[32]

58. This Indian disaster management framework was built on the experience gained by the Government of India and the United Nations agencies from the post-cyclone work in Orissa (1999) and the post-earthquake work in Gujarat (2001), and reflected United Nations humanitarian principles and standards, as well as approaches prescribed in the Hyogo Framework designed to better rebuild the affected communities.

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[30] The United Nations "Recovery framework in support of Government of India for a post-tsunami rehabilitation and reconstruction programme" prepared by the United Nations Country Team under the leadership of the Resident Coordinator/Humanitarian Coordinator in India, in March 2005.
[31] Ibid., p. 8.
[32] United Nations Recovery Team India, Update, 22 June 2005, p. 4 (see website: http://www.un.org.in).

59. The experience in India demonstrates that even without the use of the Consolidated Appeal Process (CAP) and formal deployment of humanitarian assistance under the aegis of OCHA, there is a considerable potential for the United Nations system to support host Governments in achieving a seamless transition under the leadership of the resident/humanitarian coordinator within the existing coordinating framework of humanitarian assistance combined with the United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) and CCA at the country level, provided that the agencies collectively commit themselves to implementing the transition. This good practice should be emulated in other countries.

60. In this respect, the Inspector sees two issues to be resolved:

> First, it is commonly assumed that the performance of the resident/humanitarian coordinators depends too much on their personal qualities and diplomatic skills; where basic qualities exist, the system works.[33] Therefore, the role, profile and required skills as well as the selection, training and management system for humanitarian coordinators should be reviewed so that effective system coordination becomes the norm. While the Inspector is aware that OCHA has initiated such a review with respect to the relief stage[34] facing humanitarian emergencies, it should extend this to the recovery and further stages.

> Secondly, the current terms of reference of the humanitarian coordinator have not defined his or her responsibilities for coordinating humanitarian assistance of the entities of the United Nations system at the recovery and reconstruction stage, but have called for his or her cooperation with these entities in the planning and implementation of rehabilitation and development activities.[35] Consideration needs to be given to establishing a system of accountability to monitor the work of the resident and humanitarian coordinators, as well as the member organizations in UNCTs against clearly identified operational responsibilities for results, which include, in particular, the provision of a system-wide assistance framework at the recovery and further stages. General Assembly resolution 46/182 (annex, para. 39) requires them to facilitate the preparedness of the United Nations system and assist the affected countries in a speedy transition from relief to development **(see recommendation 6).**

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[33] Costanza Adinolfi and others., "Humanitarian Response Review", an independent report commissioned by the Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, OCHA, 2005, p. 49.
[34] Ibid., p. 51. See also IASC papers, "Strengthening the Humanitarian Coordinator's System: What is our goal and how do we get there?" (PR/0604/1515/7), endorsed by the IASC Principals Meeting on 24 April 2006 and "Strengthening the Humanitarian Coordinator's System, HC Training and the HC Profile" (WO/0607/7), endorsed by the IASC Working Group on 5-7 July 2006 for formal approval by the IASC Principals Meeting in December 2006.
[35] IASC, Terms of reference for the humanitarian coordinator (2003), available on website: http://www.humanitarianinfo.org/iasc.

III. Governance and management framework

A. Institutional framework

1. An intergovernmental committee on Disaster Reduction and Response

61. Humanitarian assistance has been the most important sector accounting for 30 per cent in the allocation of resources within the United Nations system. The amount of resources devoted and the multiplicity of stakeholders and actors in this sector far exceed those of any other sector including peacekeeping in 2003 (see annexes I and II).

62. Responses to the JIU questionnaire for this report identified three distinct groups of humanitarian actors and stakeholders, namely, IASC, IATF/ISDR and the international financial and development institutions. In addition, three other groups of entities can be identified, such as United Nations system humanitarian organizations, main NGOs, including the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, and the Governments who act not only as donors but also increasingly as providers of operational assistance. Diversification of the stakeholder groups which reflects the dichotomy between the IASC and the ISDR systems represents the risk of fragmentation and waste of initiatives by the numerous actors and funding sources involved along with the non-binding inter-agency coordination provided to them.

63. The lessons learned from the Indian Ocean tsunami disaster indicated the need for more adequate principles and guidelines for humanitarian assistance, applicable to Member State stakeholders and based on their ownership. It requires an intergovernmental mechanism, which would allow Member States to participate in their elaboration and provide adequate coordination, governance and strategic management in their implementation. Despite the call of the Secretary-General for consolidating and grouping humanitarian and humanitarian-related matters under a single "humanitarian umbrella" agenda,[36] so far no intergovernmental forum has discussed consistently disaster-related humanitarian assistance in depth. It should also be recalled that in proposing a humanitarian affairs segment of the Economic and Social Council in 1997, the Secretary-General had suggested a long-term objective for establishing a governing board for humanitarian affairs which could give directives on overall humanitarian issues and oversee the coordination of humanitarian response.[37]

64. The current governance mechanism run by the General Assembly and the Economic and Social Council in the humanitarian sector has been handicapped by the absence of specialized intergovernmental support bodies reporting to them. Yet, in other major economic and social sectors, there are 14 functional commissions and expert bodies under the Council reporting to it, of which nine are intergovernmental. In order to assist the Council in discharge of its functions in accordance with Article 68 of the Charter of the United Nations, these bodies to varying degrees advise the Council on system-wide coordination and mobilization of expertise of the inter-agency machinery in their respective fields. They are also mandated by the General Assembly to pursue the implementation of the outcome of the major United Nations conferences and summits

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[36] Mandating and delivering: analysis and recommendations to facilitate the review of mandates: report of the Secretary-General (A/60/733), para. 97.
[37] Renewing the United Nations: a programme for reform: report of the Secretary-General (A/51/950), para. 193.

through the consideration of experience gained and lessons learned in their fields.[38] In contrast, the disaster management field does not enjoy such a mechanism.

65.   Following the mandates and practices of these support bodies of the Economic and Social Council, if a specialized intergovernmental body were established in the field of disaster reduction and response, it would assist the Council in:

(a)   Reviewing and streamlining humanitarian laws and principles for emergency response and disaster reduction (as proposed in recommendation 1);

(b)   Ensuring legislative coordination and consistency between the specialized agencies, funds and programmes in policy-making and resource management, taking full advantage of the experience and expertise of these partners;

(c)   Providing a framework for strategic planning and coordination of policies of the organizations of the United Nations system at the intergovernmental level throughout the entire disaster management process;

(d)   Facilitating the monitoring, management and demonstration of accountability of the humanitarian assistance of the United Nations system organizations carried out with the resources mobilized in a system-wide fashion; and

(e)   Reviewing and assessing progress made in the implementation of the Hyogo Framework adopted at the World Conference on Disaster Reduction.

66.   These tasks cannot be performed by the existing inter-agency machinery. Integration of disaster reduction and response policies envisaged above is not possible due to the dichotomy of the two coordinating bodies, IASC and IATF/DR (and its successor, the Global Platform for Disaster Risk Reduction). The decisions of these bodies are not binding and most members revert to their respective headquarters for final decisions. In view of their administrative nature, these bodies are not competent to adopt a common strategy and programmes committing their respective governing bodies [39, 40]. As administrative bodies, they do not report to the Economic and Social Council. Under the present structure, the inter-agency machinery does not allow Member States to exercise governance over the humanitarian assistance of diverse entities and actors.

67.   Thus, the creation of a specialized intergovernmental forum, open to the main stakeholders and actors concerned, is justified. Only in such a forum can the governmental stakeholders establish the collective will, a basis for the strategic management of the resources they will mobilize. On the other hand, since such a forum would need to benefit from the technical expertise and findings of IASC and the Global Platform for Disaster Risk Reduction, its decisions should be based on the recommendations submitted by these bodies **(see recommendation 7).**

2.   Strategic management framework

68.   The Inspector considers that the introduction of strategic planning and a results-based approach could remedy the fragmentation of the United Nations humanitarian system.

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[38] General Assembly resolution 572/270B, para.46-48

[39] Inter-Agency Standing Committee and Inter-Agency Standing Committee and Working Group secretariat, Inter-Agency Standing Committee and Working Group, Concise terms of reference and action procedures, revised and abridged, Geneva, February 1998.

[40] Framework for Action for the Implementation of the International Strategy for Disaster Reduction, June 2001, p. 16.

69.   There is a strong intergovernmental consensus towards integrated strategic and system-wide planning, management and coordination of humanitarian assistance activities for disaster reduction and response within and outside the United Nations system through coherent results-based frameworks. In this respect, the Hyogo Framework calls upon IATF/ISDR and other international organizations to develop a matrix of their roles and initiatives for implementing the Hyogo Framework by location and sector with measurable indicators for the achievement of common goals at international and national levels. Many scientific and technical agencies not directly responsible for delivery of humanitarian assistance have increasingly been participating in the national capacity-building in hazards detection, dissemination of warning messages, education and regular training, so essential to relief operations. The Humanitarian Response Review [41] of August 2005 also recommended "a global mapping of humanitarian response capacities that cover international actions [as well as] national and regional action, the private sector and the military". Such instruments would constitute a sound and timely basis for developing a strategic framework by which the Governments of the disaster-affected countries concerned could give coherent guidance to those institutions operating in the field.

70.   In this connection, the Inspector recalls the endorsement by the General Assembly of the benchmark framework for Results-Based Management proposed by the JIU.[42] The Inspector believes that the strategic planning of the United Nations humanitarian assistance system would be facilitated, if the results-based approach were introduced in the respective programmes and planning processes of IASC and the ISDR systems provided that both management frameworks share integrated goals and objectives **(see recommendation 8).**

3.   Information and statistical tool

71.   The current statistical tools available to the United Nations system are not adequate for strategic planning and management of resources. For example, the reports of the Secretary-General on comprehensive statistical data on operational activities for development for 2003 [43] and 2005 cover programme resources devoted to technical cooperation but do not include data on policy formulation and planning. Neither do they include programme support expenditures nor administrative or other support costs. Although additional efforts have been initiated, this report excludes UNHCR expenses from its standard analysis, thus seriously underestimating the level of humanitarian assistance.

72.   Each agency has reported its humanitarian contributions and expenditures according to its own sources, practices, and definitions, particularly in the context of their reporting to OCHA in CAP. A common standardized humanitarian assistance reporting system for the full range of humanitarian activities of all the United Nations agencies concerned has not yet been established.

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[41] "Humanitarian Response Review" (see footnote 33 above), p. 12.

[42] On the recommendations of the Committee for Programme and Coordination in its report on its forty-fifth session (A/60/ 16), para. 248, as endorsed in General Assembly resolution 60/257 of 8 May 2006, para. 2, and - Overview of the series of reports on managing for results in the United Nations system: note by the Secretary-General (A/59/617) (JIU/REP/2004/5; Implementation of results-based management in the United Nations organizations: part I of the series on managing for results in the United Nations system: note by the Secretary-General (A/59/607) (JIU/REP/2004/6); Delegation of authority and accountability part II: series on managing for results in the United Nations system: note by the Secretary-General (A/59/631) (JIU/REP/2004/7); Managing performance and contracts: part III of the series on managing for results in the United Nations system: note by the Secretary-General (A/59/632) (JIU/REP/2004/8).

[43] Comprehensive statistical data on operational activities for development for 2003: report of the Secretary-General (A/60/74-E/2005/57).

73. There used to be a reliable inter-agency report providing more accurate magnitude of "humanitarian assistance and disaster management" differentiating three programme subsectors[44] based on the agreed ACC Programme Classification on programmes and resources in the system.[45] But that has been discontinued since 1995 for "unknown reasons" according to the ACC senior officers,[46] notwithstanding confirmation of the resumption given to JIU in 1999[47] and the active and favourable appraisal received from the Committee for Programme and Coordination and the General Assembly.[48]

74. There is also an obvious need for assessment of the total resource requirements and expenditures involved within the system, based on the data and information fed back from the field. Such assessment should be improved against the data and reports on expenditures involved in humanitarian assistance at the country level through CAP and CCA/UNDAF processes, in accordance with a bottom-up needs assessment as addressed in recommendations 10 and 11, and paragraphs 101 and 102 below **(see recommendation 9).**

B. Coordination at the country and regional levels

1. Community-based national contingency plans and regulatory frameworks in emergencies and recovery

75. The analysis of the lessons learned highlighted more articulated problems of an inadequate interface between the affected countries and the international organizations at the community level than at the national and regional levels, characterized by top-down disaster management planning by the agencies' headquarters and the inadequate understanding by the foreign relief agencies of local needs. It was compounded by the lack of understanding of the Governments of the host countries and local communities of the response mechanism and the procedures of international assistance. This resulted in the assignment of priorities derived from the ease of implementation, rather than the need for a response based on shared information of local needs.[49] The disaster areas were thus flooded with unsolicited uncoordinated supplies and equipment which created major logistical bottlenecks. This was largely due to the failure of the humanitarian organizations to share accurate information on the situation on the ground, which they could have obtained if they had interacted with community leaders, and was not due to the lack of financial resources.[50]

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[44] Protection of and assistance to refugees and displaced persons, disaster prevention and preparedness, and emergency relief.

[45] Administrative Committee on Coordination, addendum to the annual overview report of the Administrative Committee on Coordination, Programme and resources of the United Nations system (E/1991/42/Add.1), table 1 and Programme and resources of the United Nations system for the biennium 1992-1993 (E/1993/84), table 1, and for the biennium 1994-1995, E/1995/64, Table 4 Sector 160.

[46] The ACC Consultative Committee on Programme and Operational Questions (CCPOQ) and Consultative Committee on Administrative Questions (CCAQ) addressed the issue for the last time in 1998 and 1999, respectively (see ACC/1998/7 and ACC/1999/6 as well as CEB Management Handbook, section 17-6: Inter-organization financial reporting, para. C.4).

[47] JIU/REP/99/1, para.92.

[48] At its eighty-ninth session (ACC/1999/6 of February 1999, para. 31), CCAQ reminded itself that resumption of the ACC report on programmes and resources of the United Nations system after a hiatus of several years, was in response to a General Assembly request for such data to be included in a report by the Secretary-General, but made no headway.

[49] Government of Indonesia and United Nations, "Post-Tsunami lessons learned and best practices workshop: report and Working Groups output", Jakarta, 16-17 May 2005.

[50] Fritz Institute, Logistics and the Effective Delivery of Humanitarian Relief, 2005, p. 6.

76.   However, as reported in paragraph 56 above, only in India did the Inspector find in place a disaster preparedness plan that had been developed with the support of the United Nations specialized agencies, meeting both the national and local community needs. Notably the agencies kept updating the Common Humanitarian Action Plan (CHAP) and helped establish a local disaster response and reduction centre, with the participation of local government and NGOs which enabled the population to coordinate international assistance, organize reconstruction, and operate early warning services **(see recommendation 10).**

2.   System-wide country assistance to strengthen national resilience and early recovery

77.   National resilience to disasters and effective relief and recovery depend on the disaster preparedness that is built up through the normal work of UNCT based on CHAP. Once a disaster occurs, CHAP serves as the basis of international humanitarian assistance, for example, through CAP.

78.   The Inspector observed in Banda Aceh that the agencies had not always had a clear and standard policy of systematically involving the local communities and national NGOs in disaster management and risk reduction processes, as a way of building up their self-reliance capacities.

79.   In Central America, the Inspector observed that the highly disaster-prone countries, even some of them that had sophisticated regulatory frameworks for emergency response, had no adequate national platforms for recovery and reconstruction. This situation was mostly due to the lack of national consensus on disaster prevention, mitigation and capital investments for the recovery of the most vulnerable areas and population. While the need for support throughout disaster transition phases is obvious, the United Nations system organizations have provided little integrated effective assistance based on CHAPs.

80. Due to its coverage of major disasters, rather than relatively small but locally significant disasters, CAP was rarely activated to provide these countries with sizeable financial support for local recovery.

81.   The Hyogo Framework provides Member States with an integrated framework to address these problems through maintaining, among other things, hazard maps and baseline assessments of the status of disaster reduction containing realistic and measurable indicators, and implementing the International Recovery Platform (IRP), an inter-agency mechanism[51] for establishing disaster assessments from the inception of emergencies and assisting the national platforms in designing plans of recovery and investment built upon early warning systems and risk assessment capacities. Such a framework corroborating with CHAPs would also serve as an effective basis for fund-raising at the local level **(see recommendation 11).**

3.   Capacity-building; national platforms

82.   The General Assembly by its resolution 52/12B decided to transfer to the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) "the responsibilities of the Emergency Relief Coordinator for operational activities for natural disaster mitigation, prevention and

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[51] Consisting of UNDP, OCHA, ISDR secretariat and the International Labour Office.

preparedness".[52] The original proposals of the Secretary-General were to "transfer the Emergency Relief Coordinator's responsibilities related to the coordination of natural disaster mitigation activities to UNDP".[53]

83. Pursuant to this decision, the General Assembly has continued to grant a fixed amount subvention of US$ 2.3 million to UNDP in every biennium since 1998, based on the observations of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (ACABQ)[54] that UNDP would "manage and coordinate the operational activities on behalf of the Secretary-General". The amount was equivalent to the costs of nine posts with the responsibilities for operational activities for capacity-building in the former Department of Humanitarian Affairs funded from the United Nations regular budget. With these resources, UNDP made provision for the management administrative structure for a disaster management programme, currently supported by the Disaster Reduction Unit within the Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Reconstruction and Recovery.

84. Since then, UNDP has backstopped and coordinated UNDP field activities for natural disaster reduction. But the role the Disaster Response Unit has played in discharging the responsibilities entrusted by the General Assembly remains to be clarified and evaluated, because it is not clear what kind of coordinating function and operational activities the General Assembly transferred to UNDP. Yet, the General Assembly confirmed the coordinating responsibility of the Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator and that of the ISDR secretariat as a distinct entity integrated within OCHA when ISDR was launched in 1999 despite the ACC emphasis on the non-operational character of natural disaster advocacy of ISDR.[55]

85. The departments and bodies under the regular budget of the United Nations, such as the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP), have continued their technical assistance for disaster reduction. Before the General Assembly decided on the transfer arrangement, nearly US$ 1 million had been available for capacity-building for disaster reduction under the Regular Programme of Technical Assistance.[56] These resources were converted into funds for disaster response and emergency management implemented by OCHA and continued to be appropriated as such under the regular budget of the United Nations. The current programme budget provides US$ 967,900 for advisory services and training programmes to promote natural disaster reduction and to facilitate a smooth transition from emergency relief to rehabilitation and development.[57]

86. The national platform is a Member State's mechanism to provide coordination and policy guidance and to establish national consensus on disaster risk reduction efforts of a multisectoral and interdisciplinary nature among all stakeholders in the country. In

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[52] Methods of financing activities for natural disaster mitigation, prevention and preparedness beyond the biennium1998–1999: report of the Secretary-General (A/53/641).
[53] See footnote 37 above, recommendations, para. 193.
[54] Report of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (A/54/7).
[55] Recommendations on institutional arrangements for disaster reduction activities of the United Nations system after the conclusion of the International Decade for Natural Disaster Reduction: report of the Secretary-General (A/54/136) (the proposals of the Secretary-General for the establishment of the ISDR system put forward in paras.18-21 were endorsed in General Assembly resolution 64/2129 of 22 December 1999).
[56] Proposed budget for the biennium 1998-1999 (A/52/6/Rev.1), section 21: Regular programme of technical assistance cooperation had provided US$ 908,200 for natural disaster reduction.
[57] Proposed programme budget for the biennium 2006-2007(A/60/6, (sect.22)).

response to the repeated request of the General Assembly,[58] and in particular since the adoption of the Hyogo Framework, the ISDR secretariat has strengthened regional outreach to support the establishment of the national platforms in more than 40 countries through its four regional offices. The UNDP Disaster Reduction Unit for its part held the portfolio of disaster reduction programmes and capacity-building projects funded by UNDP implemented in some 24 disaster prone-countries in the 2004-2005 biennium.[59]

87. In addition, the Inspector was informed that some field functions established at the country and regional levels by OCHA (disaster response advisers), UNDP (disaster reduction advisers) and the ISDR secretariat (regional policy advisers) appeared increasingly duplicative in the last bienniums, required better implementation of their complementarities and developed sophisticated arrangements between the ISDR secretariat and UNDP in Africa.[60]

88. In view of the launching of the Hyogo Framework, it became difficult to keep the fine demarcation between the mandate of the ISDR secretariat and that of the UNDP unit because the work of the secretariat is not limited to non-operational activities. Its activities have been taking regional and national dimensions designed to create national platforms, service regional networks and platforms, promote early warning and prevention, and strengthen resilience supportive of recovery through IRP.

89. The ambiguities of the decision of the General Assembly in its resolution 52/12 B and its relationship with other decisions encouraging the regional outreach of ISDR for national platforms have been a source of protracted discussions on coordination at the operational level, notably complementarities among various agencies and programmes. The Inspector noted divergent views among the members of the ISDR system on the extent to which the ISDR secretariat carries out regional outreach. Some members of the system requested the ISDR secretariat in its 2006-2007 Workplan to focus "on advocacy", but not "on implementing disaster risk reduction initiatives at the country level".[61] The Inspector believes that the current arrangements have the potential for cumbersome consultative and coordination processes with attendant delays in decision-making **(see recommendation 12).**

4. Field structure

90. The Secretary-General has appointed only 30 individuals as humanitarian coordinators (see annex VII) against more than 100 resident coordinators worldwide. The absence of the humanitarian coordinator in many countries, especially in those particularly vulnerable to disaster events, could be construed, rightly or wrongly, that the United Nations gives low priority to disaster prevention and management issues. It is also worth noting that the appointment of the humanitarian coordinator is made in complex situations. In other situations, the resident coordinators normally assume the task of the humanitarian coordinators, who usually devote only part of their time to disaster-related issues without always being backed by any full-time specialists. This fact further weakens United Nations humanitarian leadership in the system-wide assistance in the implementation of national

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[58] Resolution 46/182, para.30; resolution 59/231, para.14; and resolution 60/195, para. 24.
[59] United Nations budget performance report, A/59/69, Section 25.
[60] F. Frost, O. Harlan & P. Turner-Smith, *Review of ISDR Secretariat's Regional Offices* (London, Department for International Development, September 2004), para. 71.
[61] ISDR secretariat, Preliminary Management Oversight Board for the UN/ISDR: report of First Meeting, 10 March 2006, para.2.4.2.

platforms of disaster response and reduction in the disaster prone countries. (The key role and the required profile for the humanitarian coordinators are discussed in the previous chapter and recommendation 6.) **(See recommendation 13.)**

5. Regional cooperation

91. The versatile functions of the regional commission in economic and social fields can contribute to the integrated response and recovery of the community's livelihoods. In the aftermath of the Indian Ocean tsunami disaster and the South Asian earthquake disaster, the role of ESCAP has been increasingly recognized by the countries of the region as a logical framework for the formulation of disaster risk management and post-disaster investment strategies in the context of socio-economic development. Indicative of such recognition is the establishment of a regional trust fund on multihazard early warning arrangements (US$ 12.5 million, with contributions from Sweden and Thailand as of December 2005).

92. ESCAP has been co-organizing workshops and seminars with UNESCO, OCHA and the ISDR secretariat on early warning systems and IRP, making active use of the capabilities of these entities available in the region, thus eliminating duplication of initiatives and promoting cooperation among Asian countries. This can be considered as a good practice in the United Nations regional commissions to take advantage of their broad socio-economic mandate in helping their Member States develop disaster transition strategies.

93. The ability of ESCAP to promote cooperation and mutual assistance among regional and subregional intergovernmental organizations such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations in humanitarian matters, based on its expertise accumulated through the Mekong Committee (established in 1957), the ESCAP/WMO Typhoon Committee (established in 1968) and the ESCAP/WMO Panel on Tropical Cyclones (established in 1972), should be better utilized.

94. The Inspector trusts that the Secretary-General would assess the ESCAP post-tsunami efforts as a good practice drawing upon the broad socio-economic competence of the United Nations regional commissions to promote regional cooperation among Member States for integrated response and recovery in the affected areas and replicate it with a view to helping Member States develop humanitarian transition strategies from disaster relief to recovery and development, in the context of the regional economic and social commissions.

IV. Common support services and resource mobilization

A. Central support services

95.   The management of global resources depends on the central services, which OCHA can provide to its partners. In terms of General Assembly resolution 46/182, OCHA is mandated to take initiatives for ensuring common administrative services within and outside the United Nations system, such as civil/military coordination, information on emergency situations on the ground, telecommunications technology resources and timely fielding of required personnel, as well as of equipment and material through smooth customs clearance.

96.   As noted earlier, delays occurred in the deployment and recruitment of personnel during the Indian Ocean tsunami disaster. Accurate information was lacking in the field and relief staff experienced bottlenecks in logistics.

97.   Under the Tampere Convention on the Provision of Telecommunication Resources for Disaster Mitigation and Relief Operations, the Emergency Relief Coordinator assumes the task of the operational coordinator of the Convention as defined in its provisions.[62] Despite the entry into force of the Convention on 8 January 2005, OCHA is yet to establish a permanent support service for the Convention. The request made by OCHA for the establishment of a full-time officer to assist in the tasks of the Emergency Relief Coordinator in this field has not yet been processed by the United Nations Office at Geneva.

98.   These problems indicate the need for a comprehensive review of the common support services system of OCHA. The members of the Board of Auditors and ACABQ[63] expressed similar concerns.

99.   WFP has taken the initiative to resolve logistical difficulties in the field, thanks to its pre-established logistical channels, humanitarian response depots, and supply centres with wide procurement options and partnerships with the private sector. During the tsunami disaster response, WFP provided both cargo and air transport services, base camp support through its standby partners and supported the set-up of the United Nations Joint Logistics Centre. The WHO/Pan American Health Organization (PAHO) took the initiative to develop new software, the Humanitarian Logistics Support System (LSS), jointly with WFP and other United Nations organizations with financial support from the Government of Sweden together with other donors. The latter was based on the Humanitarian Supply Management System (SUMA) developed by PAHO, which has proved not only its effectiveness in Latin America but also relevance to other regions since 1992. If LSS had been implemented in Asia at the time of the Indian Ocean tsunami disaster, it could have prevented the unsolicited and overlapped donations and bottlenecks faced during the disaster as reported earlier. It was observed that the involvement of OCHA in these operations was very limited indeed **(see recommendation 14)**.

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[62] They relate to the provision of telecommunication resources for disaster mitigation and relief operations and country specific applications; standard procedures; removal of regulatory, licensing and customs barriers regarding the transfer and use of telecommunications equipment; safeguarding the rights and immunities of foreign telecommunications personnel; guidelines; action plans and model agreements.

[63] Report of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (A/60/7), paras. VI. 36-38, p. 139.

B. Resource mobilization

1. The Consolidated Appeal Process

100. Disparity in the responses to the consolidated appeals and the flash appeals has been evident in terms of sectoral and geographical allocation of the contributions. High- profile disasters and emergencies attracted much more positive response, sometimes accompanied by unsolicited and unspecified support, than the other so-called "neglected and forgotten disasters". The coverage of disasters by CAP itself has been limited and does not fully meet the needs of the vulnerable population in the neglected emergencies. The new OCHA policy of selecting and prioritizing projects to be included in the consolidated appeals yielded 15 per cent less money in the appeals in 2005 than in 2004.[64] This indicates further scope for improving the effectiveness and savings in CAP, if it is better used as an instrument of planning.

101. The capacity of CAP as an instrument for planning, implementing and evaluating emergency preparedness, relief, recovery and reconstruction should be enhanced and linked more clearly to the effective use of CHAP and the United Nations common country assistance mechanism. This would require that CAP be primarily based on the pre-established, detailed strategic framework of contingency and recovery planning contained in CHAP, including technical and scientific early warnings of hazards. In this regard, CHAP should be initially established and updated in the agencies' normal programmes of work through the process of bottom-up assessment of all the needs, in particular risk reduction needs as an integral part of the CAP/flash appeal.

102. It is also necessary that CAP should take into account the need for increased ownership of the affected countries over its process, as well as the increased accountability of the participating agencies for the use of the funds raised in CAP. The current CAP Financial Tracking Service and the mid-term reviews of the flash appeals do not provide Member States with accurate information on the use and the disposition of unspent balances of the contributions, obtained by the participating agencies through CAP. There is a need for the Secretary-General to provide such information not only to the countries concerned, but also to the Economic and Social Council to allow an overall assessment of the effectiveness and accountability of the implementation of their activities funded via the appeals both at the relief and recovery stages.

103. As discussed above, the response to the Tsunami Flash Appeal has been unprecedented bringing aggregate grant aid pledges of US$ 6.5 billion by the governmental sources against the Appeal's target of US$ 1.3 billion. Most of the pledges are of a long-term nature and will be spent as and when recovery and reconstruction plans are implemented. The recipient Governments and the donors are committed to sustained accountability of the use of resources donated for the tsunami disaster response. The Board of Auditors informed the Inspector of the commitment of the leaders of national audit bodies in the tsunami-stricken countries to ensure expeditious delivery of the assistance funds for the rightful recipients and fight against corruption as their national movement,

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[64] OCHA, Annual Report 2004, p. 21.

pronounced at the Jakarta Conference of national audit boards of these countries on 25-27 April 2005.[65]

104.   In view of the long-term nature of the financial commitments made in the context of the Indian Ocean tsunami disaster appeals, there is an urgent need for strengthening national capabilities and accountability of the disaster affected countries to ensure that the assistance funds reach the disaster survivors and are used only for the authorized activities in respective stages of disaster management **(see recommendation 15).**

2.   Central Emergency Revolving Fund

105.   No correlation has been established between the pattern of consolidated and flash appeals and that of withdrawals from the Central Emergency Revolving Fund[66] (hereafter referred to as the Revolving Fund, a current cash flow reserve component of the Central Emergency Response Fund). The withdrawals from the Revolving Fund have essentially facilitated the in-house cash management of the agencies concerned. OCHA has not assessed the real use and the effects on their activities and has not managed the fund for disaster prevention purposes.

106.   The significant and prompt financial commitments made by donors to the Tsunami Flash Appeals obviated the need for recourse to the Revolving Fund. This might give rise to the issue of whether the Revolving Fund has effectively functioned as a quick cash-flow mechanism, bridging commitments and disbursements under emergencies.

107.   The use of interest earned by the Revolving Fund as grant for rapid response coordination to agencies concerned, as authorized by the General Assembly in its resolution 48/57 of 14 December 1993, as well as a last resort in the recovery of loans appears redundant with the grant component of the reformulated Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) and needs to be clearly regulated in relation to the latter.

108.   In December 2006, the General Assembly in its resolution 60/124 upgraded the Revolving Fund to a Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) through the addition of a grant facility as a source of predictable humanitarian funding to ensure a timely, life-saving response capacity and strengthen the core elements of humanitarian response in underfunded crises and to provide a minimum level of equity in the geographical distribution of assistance. The overall target of funding of the upgraded CERF is US$ 500 million voluntary contribution, consisting of a grant facility of US$ 450 million and the revolving cash facility of US$ 50 million. As of 23 June 2006, donors' commitments and contributions totalled US$ 263.8 million and US$ 34.7 million were disbursed.[67] The General Assembly will review the operation of the CERF at its sixty-third session on the basis of an independent review commissioned by the Secretary-General **(see recommendation 16).**

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[65] Summary and closing address by Dr. Anwar Nasution, Chairman of the Audit Board of Indonesia, 27 April 2005.

[66] In its report on the 2000-2001 biennium, the Board of Auditors noted that "The Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs had no internal guidelines on the activities eligible for the Central Emergency Revolving Fund funding, which was called upon by a very limited number of agencies" (A/57/5/Vol. I, p. 14 and para. 250).

[67] http://ochaonline2.un.org/Default.aspx?tabid=8022.

V. Towards a United Nations humanitarian assistance programme for disaster response and reduction

109. As mentioned above (executive summary, sect. R), OCHA and the ISDR secretariat face a number of administrative and financial difficulties. In this sector, in general, one-year contracts were issued subject to availability of funds to the staff members on extrabudgetary posts.[68] The financial system based on separate trust funds obliges the secretariats to set aside for each fund a mandatory operating reserve of 15 per cent or exceptionally 10 per cent for OCHA, of the estimated annual planned expenditures which will be maintained during the implementation of trust fund activities to cover shortfalls and will be utilized to meet the final expenditures under the trust fund concerned including any liquidating liabilities (see administrative instruction ST/AI/284, annex, sect. III.A.1, p. 5). Since liquidation of obligations and status of cash position are only verified at the audit completed on 31 March, the secretariats cannot extend staff contracts without attaching conditions subject to the availability of funds.[69] This situation is compounded by the disparate system of fund-raising for separate trust funds. A series of short-term employments creates anxiety and instability among the staff, and a high turnover of staff, which places a considerable administrative burden on the recruitment sector. In this context, training opportunities are rare, ineffective and costly. The current situation does not allow the secretariats to accumulate and maintain collective memory and lessons learned consistently for policy formulation and efficient backstopping for humanitarian activities for disaster reduction and response.

110. In order to solve these problems, budgeting and financing should be based on the collective will of Member States, formulated in an appropriate governing body to remedy the current funding system that relies on unpredictable bilateral arrangements with individual donors. The total level of the four funds of the Secretary-General administered by OCHA and ISDR amounts to US$ 130 million (see annex III). The Inspector considers that if these funds are merged and centrally managed in a new fund, the total level of resources would ensure a viable core secretariat structure and an administrative budget for OCHA to run its activities and generate a momentum of increasing unearmarked contributions for a coherent assistance programme.

111. The Inspector believes that the new fund should finance a United Nations Humanitarian Assistance Programme. The Inspector suggests the use of the proposed intergovernmental special committee on disaster reduction and response (**see recommendation 7**) as a governing body for this Programme, in view of the need for intergovernmental oversight both on the programmatic and management aspects of the budget, drawing on a similar arrangement made with the Commission on Narcotic Drugs for the United Nations International Drug Control Programme.[70]

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[68] This situation should be compared to 8,829 staff members employed by WFP with contracts of more than one year in 2004, and usually 4-5-year fixed term contracts offered for UNICEF and IFCR staff.
[69] OCHA, *Annual Report 2004*, United Nations, p.18.
[70] General Assembly resolution 46 /185 of 20 December 1991, sect. XVI.

112. The Central Emergency Response Fund, including its revolving cash facility component as re-established by General Assembly resolution 60/124, would be integrally governed and managed within the framework of that Programme. The administrative and programme support costs budget would ensure the core capacity of the secretariat to retain staff on long-term contracts, and elaborate and provide backstopping capacity to respond to a surge in field deployment **(see recommendation 17).**

…..

Annex I

TOTAL BUDGET OF THE UNITED NATIONS SYSTEM

Budgets of the United Nations system organizations				
(Millions of United States dollars)	*2000*	*2001*	*2002*	*2003*
1. United Nations system organizations				
Regular budgets	3 046.6	3 051.5	3 318.5	3 334.4
Voluntary contributions	6 098.80	7 871.1	7 041.0	9 828.7
2. PKOs (ending 30 June of the year	1 765.10	2 383.2	2 751.6	2 499.8
from July of the previous year)*				
3. ICTs				
Rwanda	86.2	94	96.8	111.7
(A/57/5/Add.11, p.41 and A/59/5/Add.1, p.44)				
Former Yugoslavia	106.1	108.5	125.9	162.4
(A/57/5/Add.12, p.41 and A/59/Add.12, p.30)				
(57/288 and 58/254)				
4. Total resources	11 102.8	13 508.3	13 333.8	15 937.0
[plus Oil-for Food programme]	[22 285.9]	[24 687.3]	[19 539.5]	[22 091.3]
Memorandum items				
Operational activities for development				
(a) All sectors	6 777.5	7 429.9	7 610.6	9 966.6
(b) Humanitarian assistance	1 755.4	2 102.7	1 545.0	3 019.9
Oil-for-Food Programme*	11 179.0	11 179.0	6 203.0	6 203.0

Sources: A/57/ 265 and A/59/515, unless otherwise stated.
Abbreviations: ICT, International Criminal Tribunals; PKO, Peacekeeping operations.
*   A/58/5(vol. II) and A59/5(vol. II).
**   Comprehensive statistical data on operational activities for development for 2003: report of the
       Secretary-General (A/60/74), table 13 & table B.1.
*** Report of the Board of Auditors.

Annex II

**FINANCIAL RESOURCES FOR DISASTER
REDUCTION AND RESPONSE
2000-2005**

BIENNIUM BUDGET		*2000 – 2001*		*2002 – 2003*		*2004 – 2005*	
ORGANIZATIONS		Regular budget/Regular resources* (US$)	Extrabudgetary (US$)	Regular budget/Regular resources (US$)	Extrabudgetary (US$)	Regular budget/Regular resources (US$)	Extrabudgetary (US$)
OCHA		18 394 000	149 881 700	20 931 400	145 210 800	23 915 500	217 701 300
ISDR			3 235 500		6 182 000		9 598 700
ESCAP**		7 600	-	7 600	300 000	7 600	640 000
ESCWA (n.a.)							
UNICEF[a]			436 000 000		684 000 000		1 528 000 000
UNEP			1 339 914		1 653 250		1 185 500
UNHCR							
UNFPA		3 000 000	10 000 000	5 000 000	25 000 000	5 000 000	40 000 000
UNDP[c]	Programme[d]	4 222 907	20 499 576	9 349 180	5 071 656	14 961 917	99 453 172
	Staff, op. cost, seed programme[e]	1 451 000	2 200 000	702 000	3 376 000	1 426 000	2 926 067
UNU		50 000	-	63 000	-	2 600 000	300 000
UNESCO		535 700	6 650 000	260 800	2 500 000	255 500	1 330 000
UNESCO (Culture)				556 224	565 000	200 000	700 000
FAO ***.)			n.a		n.a		301 500 000
ITU (ad hoc)							
IMO (n.a.)							
ILO[b]		1 070 000		1 000 000		720 000	70 000 000
WHO		2 983 000	54 500 000	7 978 000	88 000 000	8 332 000	150 000 000
PAHO		1 152 994		896 921		1 047 859	
Subtotal		**32 867 201**	**684 306 690**	**46 745 125**	**961 858 706**	**58 466 376**	**2 423 334 739**
ANNUAL BUDGET		*2000*	*2001*	*2002*	*2003*	*2004*	*2005*
Annual average of Regular budget and extrabudgetary in above entities		358 586 946	358 586 946	504 301 916	504 301 916	1 240 900 558	1 240 900 558
WFP (extrabudgetary)		1 158 283 000	1 777 042 000.	1 592 160 000	3 254 748 000	2 899 628 000	2 892 401 000
UNITAR				460 000	910 000	1 470 000	n.a
TOTAL ANNUAL BUDGET		**1 516 869 946**	**2 135 628 946**	**2 096 921 916**	**3 759 959 916**	**4 141 998 558**	**4 133 301 558**

Figures represent final appropriations and expenditures.

Source: Unless otherwise stated below, the compilation is based on replies to JIU questionnaire.

Abbreviations: ESCWA, Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia; IMO, International Maritime Organization; RB, regular budget; UNEP, United Nations Environment Programme; UNITAR, UNU, United Nations Institute for Training and Research; United Nations University; XB.

* Regular budget/Regular resources.

** Regular budget of ESCAP relates to travel.

***Extrabudgetary of FAO relates to emergency response up to April 2005.

[a] UNICEF, ORE: other resources/supplementary funding for emergencies.

[b] ILO: emergency response amounted to US$ 70 million in 2004/2005.

[c] According to UNDP financial data, as of 14 November 2005, UNDP had allocated US$ 47 million for disaster reduction broken down into: US$ 7.5 million, Prevention; US$ 5 million, Sudden response; US$ 32 million, Recovery; and US$ 2.5 million, Policy and Advisory Services with additional US$ 8 million donors' contributions to a natural disaster trust fund. NB: UNDP expenditures in 2004 consisted of: Crisis Prevention & Recovery US$ 45.5 million (RB) and US$ 334 million (extrabudgetary) and Natural Disaster Reduction US$ 6 million (RB) and US$ 21.3 million (extrabudgetary). (For 2004, UNDP Second Multi-year Funding Framwework Programme Expenditure by Practice and Service Line 2004; and for other years, DP/2003/CRP.14).

[d] Regular budget: Trac 1.1.3 (core) resources allocated to natural disaster response, recovery and reduction activities Extrabudgetary: resources mobilized under the Thematic Trust Fund for Crisis Prevention and recovery, for natural disaster response, recovery and reduction activities.

[e] Staff, operational costs and seed programme funds directly administered by the Disaster Reduction Unit.

Annex III

RESOURCES OF THE UNITED NATIONS OFFICE FOR THE COORDINATION OF HUMANITARIAN AFFAIRS AND THE INTER-AGENCY SECRETARIAT ON DISASTER REDUCTION

1. Budget for the 2004-2005 biennium

	Regular budget*	Extrabudgetary**	Regular budget staff	Extrabudgetary staff
OCHA	23.9	217.7	61	938***
ISDR secretariat	None	9.6	None	19****
Total	**23.9**	**227.3**	**61**	**957**

Source: Office of Programme and Planning, Budget and Accounts

* United Nations Regular Budget final appropriation in millions of United States dollars.

** Extrabudgetary in millions of United States dollars, estimate as of the time of formulation of the budget of the General Assembly for 2005-2006.

*** Includes 323 Professional category and above and 81 General Service, 534 positions (397 local-level and 137 national officers).

**** Includes 17 Professional level and 2 General Service (Other level).

2. Extrabudgetary financial balances, programme support costs, core activities: performance in 2004

2004 *(Thousands of United States dollars)*			
	OCHA	*ISDR*	*Total*
1. Total income	**119 055**	**10 674**	**129 729**
Trust Fund for the Strengthening of the Office of the Emergency Relief Coordinator	22 016	n.a.	
Trust Fund for Disaster Relief	97 039	n.a.	
Trust Fund for Disaster Reduction	n.a.	**10 628**	
Sasakawa Disaster Prevention Award Endowment Fund	n.a.	46	
2. Total Expenditures	**95 360**	**6 456***	**101 816**
3. Core activities expenditure**	**16 709**	**6 370**	**23 079**
Funded from:			
Trust Fund for the Strengthening of OCHA; unearmarked portion for core expenditure.	12 101	n.a.	
Trust Fund for Disaster Reduction	n.a.	**5 733**	
PSC Account to core expenditures	4 607	637	
4. Total Income to PSC Account***	**10 428**	**647**	**11 075**

Sources: For OCHA, *OCHA 2004*. For ISDR, *Financial Statements for the 12-month period for the biennium 2004-2005 ending 31 December 2004.*

Abbreviation: PSC, Programme support costs.

* Substantive programme costs for thematic platforms & inter-agency projects are not included.

** Core expenditures of ISDR (staff, travel and operating expenses) are recurrent expenses of the secretariat of ISDR inclusive of backstopping and coordination support of thematic platforms and inter-agency projects.

*** ISDR total PSC include PSCs of Sasakawa Endowment Fund and Trust Fund for Disaster Reduction.

Annex IV
CURRENT INSTITUTIONAL SCHEME OF DISASTER REDUCTION AND RESPONSE

HEADQUARTERS STRUCTURE

General Assembly

Regional Institutions; OAS; PAHO; SUMA; ASEAN; CEPREDENAC; ADPC; ADRC; etc.

CEB

Regional commissions
Early Warning

Economic and Social Council

OCHA

CERF

United Nations Agencies, Funds and Programmes
Response
Recovery

Administrator UNDP

Secretary-General

Donor Groups

ECHA
Chaired by ERC

Under-Secretary-General/ Emergency Relief Coordinator

INSARAG

UNDAC Team

International Recovery Platform

IASC
Chaired by ERC

IATF/ISDR
Chaired by ERC

Secretariat of ISDR

International Early Warning Platform/PPEW/ IOC (UNESCO)

COUNTRY STRUCTURE

UNJLCs/WFP

Regional Groups: Africa/Europe; America; Asia/Pacific

Humanitarian Coordinators (RCs)

United Nations Disaster Management Teams produce CAP & CHAP

UNCT/UNDMT

OCHA Field Offices Disaster Relief Advisers

United Nations Programmes, United Nations agencies

ISDR Field Offices Disaster Reduction Advisors

United Nations country teams produce CCA/UNDAF

Disaster-affected Countries

Donor Countries

Global Consortium for Tsunami-affected Countries

NGOs; IFRC, ICRC, etc.

Private corporations

Abbreviations

ASEAN	**Association of South East Asian Nations**
CEPREDENAC	**Centre for Disaster Prevention in Central America**
INSARAG	**International Search and Rescue Advisory Group**
IOC	**Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission**
OAS	**Organization of American States**
PPEW	**Platform for the promotion of early warning**
SUMA	**Humanitarian Supply Management System**
UNDMT	**United Nations Disaster Management Team**

Annex V

**SPHERE OF COMPETENCE OF ENTITIES RELATED TO
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE AT DISASTER
MANAGEMENT STAGES**

NATURAL DISASTER

IASC/OCHA
United Nations funds and programmes
United Nations agencies
NGO: Consortia, Emergency directors Network,
Inter-Agency Working

IATF/ISDR
United Nations funds and programmes
United Nations specialized agencies
NGOs,
Research Institutes

Development & Financial Agencies UNDP,
IFIs (World Bank & DBs), Bilateral
Agencies, Specialized Agencies

| RESPONSE | Recovery Reduction
Prevention Preparedness Early Warning | RECONSTRUCTION |
|---|---|---|

Disaster Cycle

Protection of IDPs   Ceasefire   Peace Agreement

Disarmament Demobilization Reintegration
Return of Refugees   Nation-Building

Peacemaking   PKO

IASC/OCHA, United Nations Funds & Programmes, United Nations agencies,
  Humanitarian NGOs

RECOVERY: UNDP Reconstruction: World Bank, United
Nations funds and programmes, specialized agencies,
Developmental NGOs

MAN-MADE DISASTER

Abbreviations

IASC	**Inter-Agency Standing Committee**
IATF	**Inter-agency Task Force**
IDP	**internally displaced person**
ISDR	**International Strategy for Disaster Reduction**
NGO	**non-governmental organization**
OCHA	**United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs**
PKO	**peacekeeping operations**
UNDP	**United Nations Development Programme**

Annex VI

**POLICIES, PRINCIPLES AND GUIDELINES DEVELOPED BY THE
INTER-AGENCY STANDING COMMITTEE**

The Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) has developed various policies, principles and guidelines on humanitarian assistance, of which the United Nations humanitarian coordinator is supposed to promote and monitor the implementation.[71] These include the following existing policies as well as future new ones as they are developed, adopted and issued by IASC.[72]

- Consolidated Appeal Process Guidelines (1994) and IASC Plan of Action for Strengthening the CAP (2002)
- IASC Appeal and Strategy Documents (2003)
- Guidelines on the Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets in Disaster Relief (1994)
- Guiding and Operating Principles for the Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets in Support of Humanitarian Operations (1995), Guidelines on the Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets to Support United Nations Humanitarian Activities in Complex Emergencies (March 2003)
- Exit Strategy from Relief to Development (1995)
- Respect for Humanitarian Mandates in Conflict Situations (1995)
- Guidelines for HIVAIDS Interventions in Emergency Settings (1996) and Revised Guidelines for HIV/AIDS in Emergency Settings (2003)
- Exit Strategy for Humanitarian Actors in the Context of Complex Emergencies (1997)
- Policy Statement for the Integration of a Gender Perspective in Humanitarian Assistance (1999)
- Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement (1999)
- IASC Policy Paper series no. 2 on Protection of internally displaced persons (1999)
- Guidelines for Field Staff Promoting Reintegration (Golden Rules) (2000)
- Inter-Agency Contingency Planning Guidelines for Humanitarian Assistance (2001)
- Recommendations on United Nations/Non-United Nations Field Security Collaboration (2001)
- Plan of Action on Protection from Sexual Exploitation in Humanitarian Crises (2002)
- Growing the Sheltering Tree: Protecting Rights through Humanitarian Action (2002)
- Frequently Asked Questions on International Humanitarian, Human Rights and Refugee Law in the Context of Armed Conflicts (2004)

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[71] *Source*: Revised Terms of Reference for the Humanitarian Coordinator, 2003.

[72] Since the adoption of the Revised Terms of Reference for the Humanitarian Coordinator in 2003, new policies, principles and guidelines have been issued by IASC. New additions developed since 2003 include among others:
- Technical Guidelines for the Consolidated Appeal Process 2006 (2005).
- Guidelines for Flash Appeals (2005).
- Guidelines for Gender-based Violence Interventions in Humanitarian Settings (2005).
- IASC Package on Internal Displacement (2004).
- Operational Guidelines of Human Rights in Natural Disasters (2006).
- Guidelines for the Use of the Self-Assessment Tool (2005).
- Field Guidelines for Assessing the Humanitarian Implications of Sanctions (2004).
- Exit Strategy for Humanitarian Actors in Conflict Situations (2003).

(Source: IASC website: http://www.humanitarianinfo.org/iasc/content/products/default.asp).

Annex VII

HUMANITARIAN COORDINATORS IN THE FIELD

Afghanistan*	Ethiopia	Niger
Angola*	Georgia	Russian Federation
Burundi*	Guinea	Sierra Leone*
Central African Republic	Haiti+	Somlia
Chad	India	Sri Lanka
Colombia	Indonesia	Sudan*
Côte d'Ivoire*	Iraq*	Tajikistan
Democratic People's Republic of Korea	Liberia*	Thailand
Democratic Republic of the Congo*	Maldives	Uganda
Eritrea	Nepal	Zimbabwe

Source: OCHA.

* cum Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General.