
2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

19 June 2006

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Main Committee I

Summary record of the 2nd meeting

Held at Headquarters, New York, on Thursday, 19 May 2005, at 3 p.m.

Chairman: Mr. Parnohadiningrat (Indonesia)

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The meeting was called to order at 3 p.m.

General exchange of views (*continued*)

1. **Ms. Martinic** (Argentina) said that her delegation welcomed the progress achieved regarding the three pillars of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT): non-proliferation, disarmament and peaceful uses of nuclear energy. However, the international climate had changed dramatically over the past five years, and the agreements reached at the 2000 Review Conference had been undermined by attempts to blur the meaning of the commitments made.

2. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea's withdrawal from the Treaty and the subsequent disclosure that it possessed nuclear weapons had been two of the most unfortunate events ever faced by the Review Conference process. The international community must respond decisively to the development of nuclear weapons outside the Treaty and to instances of non-compliance, and the Security Council should demonstrate stronger commitment in that regard.

3. With regard to the 13 practical steps for the systematic and progressive implementation of article VI of the Treaty, agreed at the 2000 Review Conference, her delegation was concerned at the lack of progress made in the implementation of steps one, three, four, five and seven. Moreover, nine years after its adoption the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) had still not entered into force because certain countries had not yet ratified it. Argentina was also concerned that the Conference on Disarmament had still not begun negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty (FMCT).

4. Argentina welcomed the common position of the Council of the European Union, set forth in document NPT/CONF.2005/MC.I/WP.1, calling upon nuclear-weapon States to reaffirm existing security assurances contained in Security Council resolution 984 (1995) and to sign and ratify the relevant protocols on nuclear-weapon-free zones.

5. Her delegation wished to draw attention to the role of the New Agenda Coalition in reminding States parties of the threat posed to international security by tactical weapons and of the need to incorporate such weapons in disarmament and arms-control agreements. In that regard, Argentina regretted the development of new security doctrines that failed to exclude the use of nuclear weapons.

6. Argentina hoped that the Review Conference would lead to the strengthening of reporting and transparency, a clear mandate for the work of the Conference on Disarmament, and a renewed commitment on the part of the five nuclear Powers to arms control and disarmament. It also trusted that the Review Conference would be conducted in an atmosphere of openness, dialogue and cooperation, aimed at achieving consensus.

7. **Mr. Agam** (Malaysia), speaking on behalf of Bolivia, Costa Rica, Malaysia, Nicaragua, Timor-Leste and Yemen, introduced a working paper entitled "Follow-up to the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice on the *Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons*: Legal, technical and political elements required for the establishment and maintenance of a nuclear weapon-free world" (NPT/CONF.2005/WP.41).

8. **Ms. Camejo** (Cuba) said that her delegation wished to associate itself with the statement made by the representative of Malaysia on behalf of the Group of Non-Aligned States parties to the Treaty. Although the Treaty was regarded in many quarters as an end in itself, Cuba saw it as just one step along the road to nuclear disarmament. No State or group of States could claim a monopoly on the possession of nuclear weapons, and there was certainly no legitimate reason for the further development of such weapons by the exclusive club of five nuclear-weapon States.

9. The only way to overcome the Treaty's fundamental flaws was to achieve the total elimination of nuclear weapons, thereby guaranteeing the security of all peoples. As a State party to the Treaty, Cuba would continue to assert that the application of the principle of non-proliferation was not sufficient to eliminate nuclear weapons. Only the application of a systematic approach, which included the components of disarmament, verification, assistance and cooperation, could guarantee their total elimination.

10. Although the Treaty clearly aimed to achieve nuclear disarmament, the lack of concrete progress in implementing its article VI was a matter of profound concern. Nuclear-weapon States were primarily responsible for its implementation, and Cuba deeply regretted the failure to make concrete progress in the implementation of most of the 13 practical steps agreed at the 2000 Review Conference. Some of those steps had become impracticable because of the unilateral action of the world's premier nuclear Power.

11. Cuba had long advocated the establishment of a committee on nuclear disarmament within the Conference on Disarmament and the immediate start of negotiations on a phased programme for the total elimination of nuclear weapons within a specific period of time, including the development of a nuclear-weapons convention. Moreover, Cuba called for the immediate start of negotiations within the Conference on Disarmament on a non-discriminatory, multilateral and effectively verifiable treaty that banned the production of fissile material for the manufacture of nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices. It was essential that such a treaty should include not only non-proliferation measures but also nuclear-disarmament measures.

12. Cuba deeply regretted the failure of the nuclear-weapon States to make concrete progress in fulfilling their unequivocal commitment to the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals. Since the 2000 Review Conference, the process had been marked by a number of serious setbacks. The five nuclear-weapon States mentioned in the Treaty together possessed more than 21,000 nuclear weapons. The decision of the United States to withdraw unilaterally from the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems (ABM Treaty) and to begin preparations for the deployment of a new national missile defence system had very negative implications for disarmament and arms control and was a regrettable setback to nuclear-disarmament efforts.

13. Cuba noted the commitments made by the Russian Federation and the United States in 2002 to reduce their stockpiles of non-strategic nuclear weapons. Those commitments should be formalized through a legally binding instrument guaranteeing that the measures adopted would be irreversible and verifiable. The United States and the Russian Federation should resume the implementation of the Treaty on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START II Treaty) and conclude negotiations on a future START III Treaty. They should also work together on a programme for the control of their non-strategic nuclear weapons by formalizing and verifying the related measures adopted by the two States in 1991 and 1992.

14. The nuclear-weapon States parties to the NPT should ensure the non-operational status of their nuclear arsenals and their simultaneous and irreversible reduction and should begin negotiations on a legally binding international instrument by which they guaranteed not to use or threaten to use such weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States.

15. The most effective way to ensure that weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons, were not used by terrorists was to secure their total elimination. Moreover, such concerns should be addressed within the framework of the existing international instruments on disarmament and non-proliferation and the relevant international treaties and institutions, notably the NPT and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

16. The imposition of selective, non-transparent mechanisms outside the framework of the United Nations and international treaties was not the proper response to international terrorism or to the link between international terrorism and weapons of mass destruction. The so-called Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) therefore undermined the international unity that should exist with regard to non-proliferation and the fight against terrorism, and it in effect sought to supplant the United Nations and the relevant existing international treaties and intergovernmental agencies. Moreover, in its conception and application, the PSI was a violation of the fundamental principles of the Charter of the United Nations and of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.

17. The 2005 Review Conference offered an excellent framework within which to reaffirm and build upon the unequivocal commitment made by nuclear-weapon States to eliminate all their nuclear weapons in a transparent, irreversible and verifiable manner. It also offered an opportunity for all States parties to the Treaty to adopt new measures towards that end.

18. **Mr. Heinsberg** (Germany) said that German policy remained focused on achieving a nuclear-weapon-free world. There was general agreement on the final goal of the nuclear-disarmament process, which was to achieve the total elimination of nuclear weapons. That goal had been made explicit in the principles and objectives adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference. The Treaty had faced several serious challenges since 1995 with respect to non-compliance with the Treaty's non-proliferation provisions, and the Review Conference would have to address those issues carefully.

19. However, the situation regarding new opportunities in nuclear disarmament had not changed since 1995, and full use of those opportunities should continue to be made. First, the Conference should strongly reaffirm its commitment to implement the decisions taken at the 1995

Review and Extension Conference and in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference with respect to nuclear disarmament. The 13 practical steps must remain the benchmark for further progress in that regard. Second, the Conference should acknowledge that the total elimination of nuclear weapons could not be achieved in one step and should endorse the concept of a step-by-step approach as already enshrined in the 13 practical steps. There should be common agreement on the concept of an incremental approach which would gradually lead to the total elimination of nuclear weapons. Third, the Conference should, while recognizing the progress already made towards disarmament since the end of the cold war, underline the need to create a new momentum in efforts to achieve their total elimination.

20. One of the most important steps was to restore the process of the Conference on Disarmament, which was the sole permanent multilateral body for disarmament negotiations and which should be brought rapidly back to work. The unblocking of the Conference would represent a visible sign of a willingness to continue the global nuclear disarmament process in a decisive manner. The seriousness of any decisions taken by the Review Conference would otherwise be jeopardized.

21. Germany remained particularly committed to the early entry into force of the CTBT and called on all States that had not yet done so — especially those whose ratification was necessary to its entry into force — to sign and ratify the CTBT without delay. In the meantime Germany expected the nuclear-weapon States to maintain their moratoriums on nuclear testing and also expected China rapidly to introduce its own moratorium. There should be no doubt that nuclear testing was a thing of the past.

22. The next important step towards the total elimination of nuclear arsenals was the rapid start of negotiations on an FMCT, without preconditions. Germany had from the outset supported the objective of a non-discriminatory, universally applicable and verifiable cut-off treaty. The further reduction in the number of substrategic or tactical nuclear weapons should be pursued on the basis of a step-by-step approach. The complete implementation of the respective unilateral commitments made by the Russian Federation and the United States in 1991 and 1992 should be a first step in that regard and should be followed by agreed transparency measures leading to the formalization and verification of those unilateral commitments.

23. It was irrelevant to discuss when a nuclear-weapon-free world could be achieved. Instead, the Review Conference should devote all its efforts to making continued, sustained progress towards that end, and there should be no room for doubt that the world was moving irreversibly forward.

24. **Mr. Benryane** (Morocco), after associating himself with the statement made by the representative of Malaysia on behalf of the Group of Non-Aligned States parties to the Treaty, said that States parties to the Treaty must recognize that the crisis affecting the non-proliferation regime was due largely to the paralysis of the main disarmament mechanisms. By honouring their commitments under the Treaty, all States parties, especially the nuclear Powers, would give the non-proliferation regime more credibility.

25. Morocco, like all States parties to the Treaty, attached great importance to the valuable and considerable progress made at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and at the 2000 Review Conference. The Committee should therefore seek to reaffirm the full support of all States parties to the commitments made at those conferences and determine ways and means to achieve general and complete disarmament. In that context, Morocco wished to reiterate its desire for the rapid entry into force of the CTBT and the opening of negotiations on an FMCT.

26. The international community should, through the transparent and irreversible implementation of all relevant international instruments, reduce the role played by nuclear weapons in the definition of security policies and ensure that nuclear energy was used for peaceful purposes only. His delegation also wished to support the establishment, within the Committee, of a subsidiary body on nuclear disarmament and negative security assurances.

27. **Mr. Paulsen** (Norway) said that his delegation wished to underline the importance of the principles and objectives adopted at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and to reaffirm the relevance of the concrete, systematic steps agreed at the 2000 Review Conference. Although considerable progress had been made since the end of the cold war, there were still far too many nuclear weapons in the world and those that were insufficiently protected could fall into the wrong hands. Irreversible cuts were therefore in the interests of all parties.

28. Norway had welcomed the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions (“the Moscow Treaty”) as an

important contribution to stability and to disarmament. However, it had also urged the Russian Federation and the United States to make deeper cuts, and to do so on the basis of transparency, irreversibility and verifiability. The 2000 Review Conference had called for further reductions in the number of non-strategic nuclear weapons and for the gradual codification of the relevant presidential initiatives of 1991 and 1992.

29. Nuclear disarmament was about more than simply reducing the number of nuclear weapons. It also required that the development of new types of weapons should be curbed. His delegation therefore wished to see the rapid entry into force of the CTBT and had urged all countries to ratify it as soon as possible. Pending its entry into force the nuclear-weapon States must adhere to their unilateral test moratoriums, and the Preparatory Commission of the CTBT Organization must be given adequate funding.

30. An FMCT would have a positive impact on non-proliferation and disarmament efforts. However, a future cut-off treaty must also address the question of existing stocks, and Norway urged all nuclear-weapon States to place fissile material no longer required for military purposes under the IAEA verification regime.

31. Transparency was essential to effective nuclear disarmament, and reporting was a clear obligation. Norway therefore welcomed the regular reports provided by the nuclear-weapon States and looked forward to their continuation during the next review cycle. Legally binding negative security assurances would diminish the role played by nuclear weapons in national security policies, and his delegation therefore hoped that the Review Conference would reaffirm the provisions of Security Council resolution 984 (1995) and make further progress towards achieving such legally binding assurances.

32. Lastly, he recalled that Norway had introduced a working paper (NPT/CONF.2005/WP.23), entitled "NPT — a dynamic instrument and core pillar of international security", which addressed issues of great relevance to the Committee. He therefore hoped that it would be taken into consideration in the Committee's report.

33. **Mr. Reimaa** (Finland) said that the outcome of the 2000 Review Conference, including the agreed common position on non-strategic weapons, had been encouraging. Moreover, the working papers, statements and discussions of delegations during the present Review Conference had demonstrated recognition of the need for

serious and substantial deliberations. Finland supported many of the positions raised in those various contributions and wished to associate itself in particular with the statement made by Luxembourg on behalf of the European Union.

34. The presidential declarations made by the Russian Federation and the United States in 1991 and 1992 had created a basis for unilateral reductions in nuclear-weapons stockpiles. Although subsequent statements had strengthened expectations that the declarations would be fulfilled, that had not yet proved to be the case. It was regrettable that the dismantling of tactical weapons had not taken place in line with the joint goals set forth at the 2000 Review Conference. The two parties concerned had specific obligations, and also very special responsibilities, to increase the openness of the process as a confidence-building measure.

35. The present global security situation demonstrated the need for closer international cooperation and underlined the importance of fighting against the threat of nuclear weapons, including non-strategic weapons. It was to be hoped that the present review process would lead to stronger measures and efforts, not only in the field of nuclear arms control and disarmament, but also in the fight against terrorism and in nuclear safety. The issue of non-strategic nuclear weapons must be considered in all its aspects.

36. **Mr. Asmady** (Indonesia) said that the 2000 Review Conference had produced an unequivocal undertaking to accomplish the total elimination of nuclear weapons, leading to nuclear disarmament, and the adoption of the 13 practical steps had provided a road map for achieving that objective. Taken together with article VI of the Treaty, those two decisions had provided an essential basis for ridding the world of the threat of nuclear weapons. The lack of a discernible shift in the positions of the nuclear-weapon States on that critical issue had led to a growing pessimism.

37. Past legal and political commitments were being treated as matters of political convenience rather than as binding obligations. It was unlikely that the CTBT would enter into force in the foreseeable future, although it remained an indispensable goal. The logical next step — the start of negotiations on an FMCT — had yet to become a reality. Moreover, it was unlikely that the Conference on Disarmament would soon establish subsidiary bodies to deal with that subject or the subject of nuclear disarmament.

38. States parties were faced with an unsustainable arms-control agenda which focused on non-proliferation rather than on nuclear disarmament. Problems relating to irreversibility, accountability and verifiability remained. There was no doubt that the nuclear-weapon States had the solemn obligation to dismantle their nuclear arsenals at an early date. That obligation was not subject to self-serving and casuistic interpretations. The failure to comply fully with Treaty obligations had undermined the credibility of the non-proliferation regime, and efforts should be made to build equitable regimes that addressed the legitimate needs of those non-nuclear-weapon States that had fulfilled their commitments.

39. None of the 13 practical steps had been implemented, and some had been totally ignored. They should be pursued because they would reduce the incentive to acquire nuclear weapons, address the concern of all States to agree on a legally binding international convention against the use and threat of use of nuclear weapons, encourage the observance of international law and establish a mechanism for the implementation of nuclear-disarmament obligations within the agreed time frame, thus restoring the Treaty's viability and effectiveness.

40. All nuclear and related issues should be addressed at the same time. They were global problems which required multifaceted solutions, achieved under multilateral auspices. The three non-signatory States had, to varying degrees, undermined the Treaty-based regime, thus highlighting the need for de facto nuclear-weapon States to accept their obligations with respect to non-proliferation. The concept of reporting should also be developed at the Review Conference as an institutional component of the Treaty.

41. States parties to the Treaty would then be able to reach the appropriate conclusions regarding current and future nuclear-weapons policies and plans. The linkage between non-proliferation, disarmament and education was particularly urgent in the present very worrying international security climate, and would therefore require a sustained response from national Governments, international organizations and civil society.

42. **Mr. Park In-kook** (Republic of Korea) said that the disarmament obligations of nuclear-weapon States, as set forth in article VI of the Treaty, were fundamental to the Treaty's full implementation. The unequivocal undertaking by nuclear-weapon States to achieve the total

elimination of their nuclear arsenals was among the Treaty's key commitments.

43. Nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation were mutually reinforcing components of the Treaty's implementation. Nuclear-weapon States should therefore attach the same importance to disarmament as they attached to the Treaty's other two pillars: non-proliferation and peaceful uses of nuclear energy. While pursuing their non-proliferation commitments, nuclear-weapon States must simultaneously take steps towards disarmament. By doing so they would enhance their moral authority to deter potential proliferators.

44. Respective national, regional and global security environments were important factors in determining the nature and characteristics of nuclear disarmament, since different environments often called for different approaches. In that context his delegation supported practical steps towards the systematic and gradual achievement of nuclear disarmament. Moreover, it was imperative that the international community should foster a favourable environment for that process, preferably through a combination of unilateral, bilateral, multilateral and global initiatives.

45. While his delegation welcomed the progress made thus far by nuclear-weapon States in reducing their nuclear stockpiles, and also welcomed their commitments to further reductions, it expected them to make good on their promises. There was a growing gap in the perceptions of nuclear and non-nuclear-weapon States concerning the implementation of disarmament obligations. Narrowing that gap would enhance the moral authority and political legitimacy of nuclear-weapon States.

46. In that regard his delegation wished to underscore the need to implement faithfully the principles and objectives adopted at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and the 13 practical steps agreed at the 2000 Review Conference. It was essential that the CTBT should enter into force at an early date, and those States that had not yet signed or ratified that Treaty — especially those States whose ratification was necessary for its entry into force — should do so without delay. In the meantime it was imperative to maintain the moratoriums on nuclear testing.

47. Furthermore, negotiations on an FMCT should begin as soon as possible and should be rapidly concluded. In the meantime, his delegation called on all nuclear-weapon States and non-Treaty States to declare

and abide by a moratorium on the production of fissile material for nuclear-weapons purposes. The Conference on Disarmament should resume its work as soon as possible, and nuclear-weapon States should demonstrate enhanced accountability and transparency in fulfilling their disarmament obligations.

48. Nuclear-weapon States should report their disarmament progress to the international community on a regular basis, and non-nuclear weapon States should also report on their nuclear stockpiles and inventories. However, given the current divergence of views on the modalities for reporting, there should be a degree of flexibility. Non-proliferation efforts, which should be strengthened and enhanced, would be most effective if they addressed the root causes of proliferation.

49. The best way to prevent proliferation was to eliminate incentives for acquiring nuclear weapons while ensuring that nuclear arsenals were ultimately negative to the security interests of the proliferators. His delegation supported the concept of negative security assurances and believed that nuclear-weapon States should provide strong and credible assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States that were in compliance with their obligations regarding safeguards. There was also value in providing enhanced security assurances and other incentives to States parties that voluntarily accepted additional non-proliferation commitments.

50. Lastly, he wished to draw to the Committee's attention his Government's working paper, which was entitled "Views on substantive issues of the 2005 Review Conference" and was contained in document NPT/CONF.2005/WP.42.

51. **Mr. Freeman** (United Kingdom) said that the United Kingdom had always been committed to the ultimate goal of verifiable nuclear disarmament, and it remained so. It had played a full role in achieving consensus on the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference and continued to support the relevant disarmament measures contained both in that document and in the decisions of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference.

52. Over the past 12 years the United Kingdom had made substantial progress with regard to its global nuclear disarmament obligations under article VI of the Treaty. It was the only nuclear-weapon State to have reduced its nuclear arsenal to a single nuclear-weapon system, and it had effectively reduced the explosive

power of its nuclear weapons by 70 per cent since the end of the cold war.

53. Since 2000 the United Kingdom had also been pursuing a programme to develop expertise in verifying the reduction and elimination of nuclear weapons internationally. The overall aim of its research programme was to examine and test potential methodologies for use in a future nuclear-disarmament verification regime. The work was part of the United Kingdom's commitment to meeting the requirements of the Treaty's disarmament provisions and should be seen in the context of the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference.

54. The latest results of the research programme had been published as a working paper of the Review Conference, contained in document NPT/CONF.2005/WP.1. The United Kingdom would continue its research and would explore the possibility of exchanges with other countries.

55. The United Kingdom was committed to the maximum degree of transparency concerning its nuclear and fissile material stockpiles, in accordance with its national security requirements. It had halted the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices. It welcomed the fact that several other nuclear-weapon States had taken the same step, and called on other States, including States that were not parties to the Treaty, to follow that example. The United Kingdom had been the first State voluntarily to declare the total size of its stockpiles. It had voluntarily placed all fissile material no longer required for defence purposes under international safeguards and remained committed to transparency with respect to fissile material.

56. The United Kingdom continued to support the negotiation of an FMCT and had been working actively in the Conference on Disarmament to draw up a programme of work agreeable to all parties. It had signed and ratified the CTBT and remained firmly committed to it. It had not conducted a nuclear explosive test since 1991, and its commitment had been demonstrated by its continued support for the CTBT Organization and its activities. The United Kingdom welcomed the increase in the number of States parties to the CTBT and urged all other States to sign and ratify the CTBT as soon as possible.

57. He wished to reaffirm the United Kingdom's positive and negative security assurances. The United

Kingdom also fully supported the principle of nuclear-weapon-free zones and played an active and constructive role in their development. It continued to work with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to produce an agreed protocol to the Treaty of Bangkok and hoped that ASEAN would continue consultations with the nuclear-weapon States. It also supported the proposal for a weapon-free zone in Central Asia and believed that the way forward was to make further progress with the nuclear-weapon-free-zone treaties and protocols.

58. The United Kingdom had thus made significant progress towards the goals set forth in article VI of the Treaty, but also continued to encourage mutual, balanced and verifiable reductions in the number of nuclear weapons worldwide. When the United Kingdom was satisfied that sufficient progress had been made (for example, through further deep cuts in the nuclear forces of the Russian Federation and the United States) to make it possible to include its nuclear weapons in any multilateral negotiations without endangering its security interests, it would do so. In that context, it warmly welcomed the entry into force, in 2003, of the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions between the Russian Federation and the United States.

59. **Mr. Dolgov** (Russian Federation), emphasizing the firm commitment of the Russian Federation to disarmament in accordance with article VI of the Treaty, said that the complete elimination of nuclear weapons must be achieved step by step, using a comprehensive approach involving all the nuclear-weapon States, and in a manner which preserved strategic stability. Key steps towards that goal were the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles (INF Treaty), which had entered into force indefinitely on 1 June 1988, and the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START I), which had entered into force on 5 December 1994, following the removal of all the nuclear weapons of the former Soviet Union to the territory of the Russian Federation, and the accession of Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine to the NPT as non-nuclear-weapon States. The Russian Federation had fulfilled, and in some cases exceeded, its obligations under the INF and START I Treaties. Since the previous Review Conference alone, the Russian Federation had eliminated over 350 launchers and reduced total warhead numbers to 1,740.

60. The Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation, which had entered into force on 1 June 2003 and had been hailed by the General Assembly in its resolutions 57/68 and 59/94, was a substantial advance in nuclear disarmament. The President of the Russian Federation, Vladimir Putin, had reaffirmed repeatedly the willingness of the Russian Federation to continue reducing its strategic nuclear arsenal even further.

61. The Russian Federation had cut back the number of tactical nuclear weapons to less than a quarter of the total inherited from the former Soviet Union and would continue to reduce its stock. Remaining weapons from all over the former Soviet Union had been collected at central storage sites in the Russian Federation to ensure their physical and technical safety and integrity. Comprehensive plans had been developed and implemented to prevent terrorist action involving nuclear sites. As an example, the armed forces and the Federal Atomic Energy Agency had held a large-scale exercise in the Murmansk *oblast* in August 2004, with 48 observers from 17 States members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in attendance. The exercise had given the international community an accurate picture of the arrangements for secure storage and transportation of nuclear weapons in the Russian Federation and of rapid-reaction teams' high state of preparedness to cope with unforeseen incidents. The transparent conduct of a sensitive exercise demonstrated the effectiveness of the Russian Federation's action to keep nuclear weapons secure. In addition, it was methodically fulfilling its treaty obligations to cut back and destroy conventional and chemical weapons, at considerable financial cost.

62. The Government of the Russian Federation encouraged efforts to establish nuclear-weapon-free zones in various parts of the world as a step towards meeting new challenges and threats, consolidating nuclear non-proliferation measures, building confidence between States, boosting international stability and security and helping to sustain the momentum of global and regional disarmament. It placed great value on the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and hoped for its rapid entry into force, despite the current slow pace of ratification. As part of its progress towards nuclear disarmament, the Russian Federation had considerably altered the structure of its weapons sector. On the grounds that output capacity exceeded defence needs, it had been halved. The production of uranium for weapons had long since been halted, while the graphite-moderated

reactors which had produced weapons-grade plutonium were being shut down with the assistance of the United States of America, and a commitment had been made to make the plutonium in question unusable for weapons. Finally, the Russian Federation continued to oppose the placing of any kind of weapon in space, as doing so would seriously threaten international stability and security and arms-control efforts. The risk of a new arms race, either in space or on earth, and the risk of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, must be countered. To that end, the Russian Federation had joined China and other States in proposing an international agreement to prevent the stationing of weapons in space. It called on all States with space programmes to join such efforts.

63. **Mr. Trezza** (Italy) said that Italy supported the objectives set forth in article VI of the Treaty and would encourage good-faith negotiations on effective measures for the early cessation of the nuclear arms race, on nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament. Italy, together with its partners in the European Union, looked forward to further systematic and progressive efforts to achieve nuclear disarmament.

64. Italy had finalized its report on the implementation of article VI of the Treaty and on paragraph 4 (c) of the 1995 Review Conference decision on principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. Although much remained to be done to achieve nuclear disarmament, the progress already achieved should not be minimized or dismissed.

65. He wished to note that the delegation of Luxembourg had submitted, on behalf of the European Union, a working paper entitled "European Union common approach: Cooperative Threat Reduction — Global Partnership Initiative", contained in document NPT/CONF.2005/WP.37.

66. The significant reductions made in nuclear weapons stocks over recent decades, through multilateral, bilateral and unilateral treaties and processes, had shown the international community that disarmament negotiations were meaningless unless the weapons involved were either physically destroyed or disposed of appropriately. Over the past decade many countries had worked together under the Cooperative Threat Reduction initiative to secure and dismantle nuclear, biological and chemical weapons materials, carriers and infrastructure. Those efforts had culminated in the Global Partnership agreed

by the leaders of the Group of Eight (G-8) countries in June 2002.

67. At a time when nuclear proliferation was becoming a growing threat to international peace and security, and in view of the risk that terrorists might seek to possess fissile material or nuclear weapons, the Cooperative Threat Reduction initiative should be seen as a new way to address the problem of nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation. It strengthened trust between States and facilitated the cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons, in accordance with the Treaty. It also accelerated the nuclear-weapons reduction process and facilitated accession to the Treaty, thereby strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation regime.

68. In conclusion, Italy fully supported the invitation of the European Union presidency to "recognize the importance, from the point of view of nuclear disarmament, of the programmes for the destruction and the elimination of nuclear weapons and the elimination of fissile material as defined under the G-8 Global Partnership" and wished that language to be included in the Final Document of the Review Conference.

69. **Ms. Hobbs** (New Zealand), speaking on behalf of the New Agenda Coalition, said that the objective of the Coalition at the Review Conference was the achievement of real progress towards nuclear disarmament. In that regard she would draw the Committee's attention to three documents which outlined essential elements of the Coalition's position: the text of the statement made to the plenary Review Conference by New Zealand on behalf of the Coalition; the working paper submitted by New Zealand on behalf of the Coalition, contained in document NPT/CONF.2005/WP.27, entitled "Working paper on nuclear disarmament for Main Committee I"; and the New Agenda Coalition's working paper on security assurances, originally submitted to the second Preparatory Committee as document NPT/CONF.2005/PC.II/WP.11. The Coalition would be drawing on those papers and making contributions on specific subjects throughout the Review Conference.

70. **Mr. Streuli** (Switzerland) said that Switzerland supported all multilateral disarmament and arms-control initiatives aimed at achieving concrete and verifiable results. It attached particular importance to the implementation of article VI of the Treaty as well as to respect for the commitments that had led to the signing of the Treaty by States that had agreed to renounce their

own nuclear ambitions in return for commitments by nuclear-weapon States to pursue negotiations in good faith towards nuclear disarmament.

71. The vast majority of non-nuclear-weapon States parties had respected their commitment not to acquire nuclear weapons, and nuclear-weapon States should continue to work towards the gradual fulfilment of their obligations. Since the last Review Conference there had been positive developments. The Moscow Treaty, for example, would produce a significant reduction in strategic nuclear weapons and should therefore be welcomed as a step in the right direction.

72. However, in order to be credible, any bilateral or unilateral disarmament measure should adopt the principles of transparency, irreversibility and verifiability. Whereas the implementation of non-proliferation measures was subject to the IAEA multilateral verification regime, nuclear-disarmament measures were not subject to any verifiable multilateral regime. In that regard, he welcomed the studies conducted by the United Kingdom in the area of verification. In the field of non-strategic nuclear weapons, progress remained somewhat mixed. There was a significant disparity between promises made on a unilateral basis and their effective implementation.

73. His delegation supported all the commitments made in the Final Documents adopted at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and the 2000 Review Conference. Together, the two documents constituted a set of established laws and practices which underpinned the credibility and value of the Treaty as the cornerstone of international security. His delegation wished to emphasize in particular the need to respect the nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament principles and objectives agreed at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference. However, it should be noted that not all the decisions taken at that Conference a decade earlier had yet been implemented. He therefore called on the States concerned to assume their related responsibilities.

74. In that regard, his delegation wished to make a number of points. First, in order to safeguard the CTBT it was essential that States whose ratification was necessary for its entry into force should proceed to ratify it as soon as possible. In the meantime, they should maintain their moratoriums on nuclear testing. Second, a special committee should be set up within the Conference on Disarmament, aimed at facilitating the opening of negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty. His

delegation shared the view that States which produced fissile materials for military purposes should introduce a moratorium on the production of such materials and place existing stocks under IAEA control.

75. Third, the negative security assurances provided by nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty remained inadequate because they were generally accompanied by reservations. Regardless of whether they belonged to a nuclear-weapon-free zone, non-nuclear-weapon States parties had a legitimate right to security assurances against the use and threat of use of nuclear weapons. His delegation therefore requested that, in accordance with the recommendations contained in the principles and objectives agreed in 1995, a binding multilateral instrument on security assurances should be negotiated within the Conference on Disarmament. Furthermore, it welcomed the efforts made by Mexico to that end.

76. The 13 practical steps adopted at the 2000 Review Conference also constituted a set of established laws and practices, and it was a matter of regret that only limited overall progress had been made towards their implementation. His delegation would support any proposals reaffirming the unequivocal commitment of States parties to the 13 steps, and urged the Review Conference to focus on strengthening some of the steps. In that context, it welcomed the proposals made by Canada on the implementation of article VI, and would note that it had submitted its own report on the same subject.

77. Unfortunately, the achievement of the nuclear disarmament goals set forth in article VI of the Treaty remained a very distant prospect. The Final Document of the Review Conference should therefore contain a strong message reiterating the need for all States parties to respect all their Treaty obligations. Switzerland expected nuclear-weapon States parties to make a new and unequivocal commitment to the ultimate goal of the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals.

78. **Mr. Smith** (Australia) said that his country remained committed to a nuclear-weapon-free world. As one of the vast majority of States parties to the Treaty that had forsworn nuclear weapons, it expected the nuclear-weapon States vigorously to pursue their disarmament commitments under the Treaty. Australia had joined Japan in putting forward ideas for further progress on nuclear disarmament, which had been circulated as working paper NPT/CONF.2005/WP.34 entitled "Further

measures to be taken to strengthen the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons regime”.

79. It was also important to recognize the substantial progress made in the area of nuclear disarmament. A major development since the 2000 Review Conference had been the conclusion of the Moscow Treaty between the United States and the Russian Federation. The reductions contemplated under that agreement were significant and undeniable. However, the two States should continue their efforts to reduce strategic and non-strategic nuclear weapons in both deployed and reserve holdings.

80. Australia also wished to acknowledge the nuclear disarmament steps taken by the United Kingdom and France. The fact that American and Russian nuclear arsenals were many times larger did not excuse nuclear-weapon States with smaller arsenals from honouring their commitments under the Treaty. The significance of the Treaty lay not just in its quantitative reductions but also in its having established a more cooperative arms-control relationship between the two main nuclear Powers.

81. Australia welcomed the steps taken to reduce the operational readiness of nuclear-weapon systems, including de-targeting and reducing the alert status of certain nuclear-weapon systems. It looked to the nuclear-weapon States to pursue further reductions in the operational status of nuclear-weapon systems in ways that promoted international stability and security.

82. As long as the nuclear-weapon States continued to possess nuclear weapons, they had a responsibility to ensure that their nuclear-weapon policies did not detract from the global non-proliferation norm. Otherwise, the Treaty's basic foundation might be eroded. In particular, nuclear-weapon States must ensure a reduced role for nuclear weapons in their national security policies.

83. A key outcome of the 2000 Review Conference was that the principle of irreversibility should apply to nuclear disarmament. Australia recognized that progress had been made on irreversibility, and also welcomed the work being done by the United Kingdom on means of verifying the reduction and elimination of nuclear weapons. Effective verification would be central to irreversible nuclear disarmament.

84. All States parties must demonstrate their commitment to practical steps to facilitate nuclear disarmament. Australia placed particular importance on the entry into force of the CTBT. It should not be

forgotten that the CTBT International Monitoring System (IMS) delivered real security and other benefits, including a possible role in a global tsunami warning system. The Review Conference should urge those countries that had yet to sign or ratify the CTBT to do so as soon as possible. Until the CTBT entered into force, existing moratoriums on nuclear testing must be maintained, and strong support should continue to be given to development of the IMS.

85. Capping the amount of fissile material available for nuclear weapons was an essential step towards irreversible nuclear disarmament. And yet, negotiations on an FMCT had still not begun because of the deadlock in the Conference on Disarmament. The failure of the Conference on Disarmament to fulfil its mandate in that regard raised doubts as to its usefulness as an effective disarmament forum. The Review Conference must serve as a catalyst for an immediate start to negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty and to its early conclusion. To be credible and effective, such a treaty should include appropriate measures to verify that parties were complying with their obligations.

86. Australia welcomed the moratorium introduced by most nuclear-weapon States on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons. It hoped that China would join the other nuclear-weapon States in announcing its own moratorium and would urge India, Pakistan and Israel to do the same.

87. Australia placed great importance on nuclear-weapon-free zones as a vehicle for providing binding negative security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty. Over the past decade the signing by nuclear-weapon States of the protocols to nuclear-weapon-free zones had increased the number of non-nuclear-weapon States benefiting from legally binding negative security assurances, and, in cases where nuclear-weapon States had not yet signed or ratified such protocols, Australia encouraged discussions aimed at enabling them to do so.

88. Universality remained essential to the full realization of the Treaty's objectives, and while it was certainly a long-term goal, it was not unattainable. History had shown that nuclear proliferation was reversible. Pending their accession to the Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon States, the non-Treaty States — India, Pakistan and Israel — should refrain from taking actions contrary to the universal norms embodied in the Treaty. In particular, they must support the global nuclear non-

proliferation norm by ensuring that strict domestic controls were kept on their nuclear materials, equipment, technology and knowledge.

89. The non-Treaty States should also support practical progress on nuclear disarmament, and it was a matter of concern that India and Pakistan had not yet signed the CTBT and that Israel had not yet ratified it. For each of those countries the CTBT was an opportunity to take a significant confidence-building measure in a region of tension.

90. It should never be forgotten that the Treaty played a central role in maintaining global peace and security, even while nuclear disarmament remained a work in progress. Furthermore, it should always be acknowledged that nuclear disarmament could not be considered in isolation from other aspects of the Treaty or from the wider international security environment. Movement on nuclear disarmament should not be a precondition for further improvements to the non-proliferation regime.

91. **The Chairman** said that he had been approached by the representative of China, who wished to exercise his country's right of reply under rule 19 of the rules of procedure of the Review Conference.

92. **Mr. Hu Xiaodi** (China) said that he wished to clarify his delegation's position in the light of the statement made by the representative of Germany. China had in fact introduced a moratorium on nuclear testing many years ago. It had always firmly supported the CTBT and had actively participated in the relevant negotiations. As a nuclear-weapon State, and as one of the annex-II countries to the CTBT, China was well aware of its special responsibility to promote the Treaty's entry into force and to maintain its own test moratorium. The Chinese National People's Congress was presently reviewing the Treaty, in accordance with the relevant procedures. He therefore wished to stress, once again, that China had always honoured its commitment to its moratorium on nuclear-weapon testing, and would continue to do so.

Introduction of subsidiary body by its Chairman

93. **Mr. Caughley** (New Zealand) said that the subsidiary body would focus its work on nuclear disarmament and security assurances and would hold two meetings during the Review Conference, focusing on each topic in turn. He wished to encourage a dialogue and a certain degree of interactivity and fluidity in the subsidiary body's proceedings. If delegations wished to

put forward proposals, he would encourage them to provide the Secretariat with written statements. Lastly, he would be open to receiving advice and to engaging in consultations, although delegations should try to focus on practical proposals.

94. **Mr. Zarif** (Islamic Republic of Iran) wondered whether the members of the subsidiary body would receive a preparatory text ahead of the two meetings, as such a text would greatly facilitate their discussions.

95. **Mr. Caughley** (New Zealand) said that he would prefer to listen to the various statements in the Main Committee before attempting to prepare such a text, although he would be guided by delegations' wishes in that regard.

The meeting rose at 5.10 p.m.