《关于禁止发展、生产和储存细菌(生物)及毒素武器和销毁此种武器的公约》缔约国第六次审查会议

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2006 年 11 月 20 日至 12 月 8 日，日内瓦
临时议程项目 10
按照第十二条的规定审查
《公约》的实施情况

《生物与毒素武器公约》第十条

芬兰代表欧洲联盟提出 [1]

一、导　言

1. 欧洲联盟于 2006 年 3 月 20 日通过《共同立场》2006/242/CFSP，其中概述了欧盟对 2006 年《生物与毒素武器公约》第六次审查会议的目标和优先事项。《共同立场》第 3 条提到欧盟将编写供缔约国在审查会议上审议的有效加强《生物与毒素武器公约》实施情况的具体、实际和可行建议。本工作文件是上述一系列建议中的一个，应当被视为欧盟为加强《生物与毒素武器公约》及其实施情况采取的全面做法的一部分。

二、《生物与毒素武器公约》第十条

2. 《公约》第十条规定《公约》缔约国有权参与并承诺促进交换关于生物剂使用于和平目的方面的设备、材料和情报以及这方面的科技合作。此外，第十条规定实施《公约》时应避免妨碍缔约国的发展或和平生物活动方面的国际合作。前几次《公约》审查会议在审查第十条实施情况时已提出了一些原则、目标和加强实施情况的措施。

[1] 这是欧盟成员国提出供缔约国审议的一系列补充文件中的一个。申请加入国保加利亚和罗马尼亚，候选国土耳其、克罗地亚和前南斯拉夫的马其顿共和国，稳定与结盟进程国和潜在候选国阿尔巴尼亚、波斯尼亚和黑塞哥维那、塞尔维亚以及乌克兰和摩尔多瓦共和国支持本文件。

3. 第六次审查会议将在逐条审查《公约》实施情况时讨论第十条。自第五次审查会议以来，除了生物科学和生物技术迅速进展外，全球、区域和国家各级发生了一些与第十条高度相关的事态发展。本工作文件评估了相关的事态发展并讨论了将由第六次审查会议商定的与第十条有关的可能行动。

三、与实施第十条有关的最新事态发展

4. 由于和平生物活动范围很广，有关这些问题的国际合作很多，这里将只着重说明少数最新的有关事态发展：

(一) 2004 年 12 月举行的《公约》缔约国会议及 2004 年 7 月举行的其专家筹备会议被认为在讨论和促进有关监测、检测、诊断和防治传染病的共同谅解和有效行动方面非常成功。

(二) 在世界卫生大会于 2001 年和 2002 年通过关于全球卫生安全的决议以及关于对故意使用影响健康的生物和化学物剂或放射性核材料的公共卫生防备和应对的决议后，卫生组织努力增强其在与可能的生物武器物剂有关的疾病方面的能力，以及粮农组织、国际兽疫局和国际植物保护公约增强这方面的能力。

(三) 2005 年对《国际卫生条例》的修改将从 2007 年起实施。

(四) 《卡塔赫纳生物安全议定书》于 2003 年生效，随后建立的信息交换机制，包括能力建设，以确保《议定书》所有缔约方都能够执行其规定并促进关于生物安全的信息交流。

(五) 全球一级和区域一级在生物技术和生物多样性方面正在作出的其他政府间和非政府努力，包括国际遗传工程和生物技术中心、国际植物遗传资源研究所、环境署、教科文组织、工发组织和开发署/环境署/世界银行全球环境基金的相关工作，经合组织生物技术倡议，包括可能建立全球生物资源中心网络，以及若干非政府组织和网络的倡议。

(六) 国际社会为防止禽流感传播大力作出的努力。

(七) 私营部门的国际生物和生物技术合作迅速增长，这大大有利于交换有关预防疾病或其他和平用途的技术和信息。

5. 欧洲联盟及其成员国积极参与上述全球努力，此外还进行一些具体行动支持《公约》第十条的执行，其中包括：

(一) 执行 2002 年欧盟关于生命科学和生物技术的战略及相关行动计划，其中也包括国际合作和欧洲对发展中世界的责任(见附件一，只有英文本)。

(二) 2005 年建立欧洲疾病防治中心，其任务也包括向第三国提供援助。

(三) 欧盟在若干相关部门的发展合作承诺，从卫生和农业到协助达到卫生和植物检疫要求，欧盟及其成员国是世界上最大的发展援助提供者。

(四) 欧盟教育和研究政策，特别是高等教育方面的合作方案，纳入欧盟研究框架方案的国际合作活动和欧盟资助的研究，特别是在生物安全、传染病和生物技术方面的研究。

(五) 欧盟的紧急情况援助，例如在亚洲海啸中为 90,000 人提供初级保健服务，为 880,000 多人提供安全饮水和卫生设施。

6. 第六次审查会议应确认执行第十条取得的进展，并承认上述和其他正在进行的国际、区域、双边和国家努力对有效执行第十条的贡献。

四、监测、检测、诊断和防治传染病

7. 欧盟欢迎为 2004 年缔约国会议进行的筹备工作以及缔约国会议的讨论和结论，特别是主席的综合文件[2] 和秘书处提供的背景文件。[3]

8. 在第六次审查会议上，缔约国应重申 2004 年缔约国会议的结论[4] 并商定以下行动：

(一) 缔约国应继续加强现有国际组织和网络，特别是卫生组织、粮农组织、国际兽疫局和国际植物保护公约的网络以及从事传染病工作的非政府行为者。

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[2] 从各国代表团就专家会议讨论的专题所作的介绍、声明和发言以及提交的工作文件中摘出的各种考虑、经验教训、观点、建议、结论和提议的综述，BWC/MSP/2004/3, 附件三。

[3] BWC/MSP/2004/MX/INF.1, BWC/MSP/2004/MX/INF.2。

[4] WBC/MSP/2004/3。

(二) 缔约国应促进在各自职权范围内行事的上述组织之间的合作和相辅相成。

(三) 缔约国应重申加强卫生组织、粮农组织、国际兽疫局和国际植物保护公约与可能的生物武器物剂有关的疾病方案应当严格地在这些组织的职权范围内进行。缔约国应注意到这些组织的作用仅限于任何疾病突发的流行病学和公众/动物/植物方面，但承认与它们交换信息的增加值。

(四) 承认运作良好的保健服务系统是确保对疾病突发作适当防备和应对的关键，同时缔约国应继续建设和/或改善国家和区域调查、检测、诊断和防治传染病的能力并将这些努力纳入国家紧急情况和疾病管理计划。关于专家能力，鼓励缔约国探讨有助于最佳利用稀少资源的创新安排(例如，见关于联合王国“前瞻”方案的附件二(只有英文本)和关于芬兰生物威胁防备中心的附件三(只有英文本))。

(五) 缔约国应尽可能使用现有标准、指南和建议。特别是，缔约国应努力执行卫生组织的实验室程序规范和临床程序规范、粮农组织的紧急情况管理规范和国际植物保护公约的监测规范。

(六) 缔约国应努力改善有关所有各级疾病监测的信息通报，包括与卫生组织、粮农组织、国际兽疫局、国际植物保护公约和非政府组织以及缔约国之间的信息通报，并利用民间社会来源提供的信息。

(七) 有能力这样做的缔约国应继续直接以及通过国际组织支持在监测、检测、诊断和防治传染病及相关研究方面需要援助的缔约国建设能力。

(八) 缔约国应推动疫苗开发和生产，包括通过国际合作和公私合伙。

(九) 缔约国应继续交流这方面的经验和最佳做法，特别是考虑在 2007 年 10 月的《生物与毒素武器公约》闭会期间会议讨论检测病原体和实时应对流行病问题。

五、加强第十条执行情况的进一步行动

9. 以前的《生物与毒素武器公约》审查会议就执行第十条需要采取的行动得出了广泛的共同谅解，这除其他外反映在第四次审查会议的最后宣言。在第六次审查会议上，缔约国应审查这些谅解以便重申它们，并应特别注意以下各点：

(一) 提高对生物恐怖主义危险的警觉需要所有缔约国紧急、有力地作出努力在国内执行《生物与毒素武器公约》承诺。为了建立加强生物安全与促进生物科学和生物技术之间的相互依存关系，缔约国应认识到全世界各国有效地执行《公约》对于充分利用生物的巨大潜力于和平用途是很重要的。

(二) 确认私营部门对技术和信息转让的重要作用，缔约国应越来越多地让私营部门行为者参与国家、区域和国际各级加强执行第十条的努力。

(三) 以后的审查会议审查第十条的实施情况时将可受益于有关第十条执行情况的更全面信息，包括有关缔约国确定的需要和作出的努力的信息。缔约国应自愿地与其他缔约国分享这一信息，同时秘书处应便利这一信息交流。

Annex I

[ENGLISH ONLY]

EXTRACT FROM: LIFE SCIENCES AND BIOTECHNOLOGY – A STRATEGY FOR EUROPE, COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS, 27 JANUARY 2002 (COM(2002) 27 FINAL)

A European Agenda for International Collaboration

Action 24

The Commission should continue to play a leading role in developing international guidelines, standards and recommendations in relevant sectors, based on international scientific consensus and, in particular, push for the development of a consistent, science-based, focused, transparent, inclusive and integrated international system dealing with food safety issues.

Implementer: Commission
Timeframe: 2002 onwards

Europe's Responsibilities Towards the Developing World

Agriculture

Action 25

The Commission will in co-operation with Member States support:

(i) The redefining of national research towards an appropriate mix of traditional techniques and new technologies, based on priorities developed with local farmers.
(ii) The establishment of effective research partnerships between public and private research organisations in developing countries and in the EU, and the adequate capacity and infrastructure for developing countries to enter into such partnerships, in accordance with international commitments under the Conventions.
(iii) Sub-regional, regional and international organisations, in particular the International Agricultural Research Centres.

Implementer: Member States, Commission
Timeframe: 2002 onwards

Genetic resources

Action 26

The Commission and the Member States will support the conservation and sustainable use of genetic resources in developing countries and their equitable sharing of benefits arising from their use by:

(i) Supporting the development and enforcement of effective measures to conserve, to use sustainably and to provide access to genetic resources and traditional knowledge, as well as to share equitably the benefit arising from them, including income generated by intellectual property protection. Support for local communities is vital to conserve indigenous knowledge and genetic resources.
(ii) Supporting the participation of delegates from developing countries in the negotiations of relevant International Conventions.
(iii) Supporting measures to promote greater regional co-ordination in legislation to minimise disparities in access, benefits and also trade in products derived from genetic resources, in accordance with international commitments.

Implementer: Member States, Commission
Timeframe: 2002 onwards

Health

Action 27

The Commission and the Member States should work with the international community to concretise the commitment to research to combat HIV/AIDS, malaria, TB and other main poverty-related diseases and also identify effective measures to support developing countries in establishing the structures needed to deploy a health policy.

Implementer: Member States, Commission
Timeframe: 2002 onwards

Responsible and careful use

Action 28

The Commission should support:

(i) The safe and effective use of modern biotechnologies in developing countries, based on their autonomous choice and on their national development strategies.
(ii) Measures to increase the capacity of developing countries to assess and manage risk for man and the environment, under conditions prevailing in the country.
(iii) The development of appropriate administrative, legislative and regulatory measures in the developing countries, for the proper implementation of the Cartagena Protocol.

(iv) That international research on social, economical and environmental impacts are effectively adapted to take into account conditions prevailing in developing countries and that the findings are subsequently disseminated to them in an appropriate format.

(v) That the international regulatory requirements remain manageable by developing countries, so as not to impede their trade and production prospects.

Implementer: Commission
Timeframe: 2002 onwards

Annex II

[ENGLISH ONLY]

AN EXAMPLE FROM THE UK: FORESIGHT. INFECTIOUS DISEASES: PREPARING FOR THE FUTURE

1. The 'Foresight' programme is owned by the Office of Science and Innovation in the United Kingdom with the aim of producing challenging visions of the future in order to ensure effective strategies now. It has produced reports in several different areas. One of its most recent projects was on infectious diseases and it aimed to use the best available science to evaluate the threats of infectious diseases in humans, animals and plants over the next 10-25 years; and to produce a vision for their management, specifically through systems for detection, identification and monitoring. The project involved more than 300 scientists, experts and stakeholders from around 30 countries. The project findings, which are available at http://www.foresight.gov.uk/Detection_and_Identification_of_Infectious_Diseases/Reports_and_Publications/Final_Reports/E1_ID_Executive_Summary.pdf, provide a considerable body of scientific analysis and fresh insights to inform policy development by the relevant stakeholders at both national and international levels.

2. The project resulted in the development of an action plan, which includes, *inter alia*:

(i) Building a more sustained, pro-active and integrated approach to international surveillance for infectious diseases of humans, animals and plants;
(ii) Developing effective and sustainable partnerships between richer and poorer countries that help provide infrastructure, technologies and skills to support detection, identification and monitoring activities, specifically the UK and Africa;
(iii) A wide range of stakeholders will need to act together if the benefits are to be realised.

3. Participants in the action plan include national and international bodies concerned with infectious diseases, and research funders.

4. Under the auspices of the project a Pan-African Workshop was held in Uganda in August 2005, in collaboration with leading African experts. The project report notes that: *"In August 2005, a ground-breaking workshop was held in Entebbe, Uganda, concerning the future of infectious disease in Africa. This event was unprecedented in Africa and perhaps worldwide, since it brought together leading disease experts spanning plant, animal and human health. The aim was to take a fresh look at this crucial topic and to inject fresh thinking. The event involved experts from 14 African countries, African institutions, and important international organisations such as the World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE), the Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations (FAO), the World Health Organisation (WHO), the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, and the Gatsby Foundation. The event generated a wealth of expert advice about the future challenges facing Africa, and options for response."*

Annex III

[ENGLISH ONLY]

FINNISH CENTRE FOR BIOTHREAT PREPAREDNESS

1. The Finnish Strategy to Secure Vital Functions of Society from November 2003 defined vital functions of Finnish society and established targets and development policies that would guide each administrative branch of the government in dealing with its strategic tasks. The strategy called for cooperation between each government sector in combating new threats towards society. According to the Government Report on Finnish Security and Defence Policy of 2004, terrorism and epidemics caused by infectious diseases were listed as key threats affecting national security.

2. Based on the above resolutions, the Centre for Biothreat Preparedness started operation in Helsinki in May 2005. The Centre, which will initially employ eight experts, is a centre of excellence for Finnish scientific and laboratory know-how on biological defence, as well as on biothreat assessment and preparedness. The Centre will actively seek domestic and international collaboration. The Centre is composed of two Units; the Biological Defence Unit of the Finnish Defence Forces, and the Biological Threat Unit of the National Public Health Institute, where scientific work will be carried out in a special biological safety laboratory (BSL-3).

3. The Finnish Defence Forces are developing their Territorial and Operational NBC Defence units for National Defence, as well as a NBC Detachment for the EU Battle Groups and other international tasks. The NBC Detachment will be equipped with a deployable, diagnostic biological and chemical (BC) laboratory. This field laboratory is under development and it will be operational in 2008.

4. The development of the Deployable BC Field Laboratory is led by Army Staff in cooperation with the Defence Forces Technical Research Centre and the Centre for Biothreat Preparedness, together with the Centre of Military Medicine. One of the Biothreat Centre’s initial operational tasks will be to establish the biosafety and microbial identification requirements for the BC laboratory. To achieve this, international collaboration with other countries as well as domestic collaboration between expert organisations is needed. The techniques that are developed for microbial identification are primarily based on molecular amplification of microbial genes to ensure laboratory safety and rapidity of the assays. Early microbiological diagnosis will enable timely medical intervention, before onset of possible severe clinical symptoms of those exposed to deliberate release of selected agents.

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