



General Assembly

Sixty-first session

First Committee

19th meeting

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Official Records

Chairperson: Mrs. Juul (Norway)

The meeting was called to order at 3.10 p.m.

Agenda items 82 to 97 (*continued*)

Thematic discussion on item subjects and the introduction and consideration of all draft resolutions submitted under all disarmament and international security agenda items

The Chairperson: Before calling on the first speaker in the discussion, I give the floor to the Secretary for an announcement.

Mr. Sareva (Secretary of the Committee): I want to bring to the Committee's attention the fact that the texts of oral statements for the following draft resolutions, which are yet to be acted upon, are currently available in room S-2977: A/C.1/61/L.25, on Assistance to States for curbing the illicit traffic in small arms and light weapons and collecting them; A/C.1/61/L.47/Rev.1, on implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-personnel Mines and on Their Destruction; A/C.1/61/L.28, on the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific; and A/C.1/61/L.24, on the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa.

The Chairperson: I will now give the floor to those remaining delegations wishing to make statements on the subject of disarmament machinery

Ms. Skorpen (Norway): Since Norway has aligned itself with the statement made on behalf of the

European Union, I would like to focus my intervention on steps to further improve the working methods of the First Committee. We consider it essential that the General Assembly play a prominent role in promoting disarmament and non-proliferation.

There have been improvements in the working methods of the First Committee. The large number of statements on the nuclear tests by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, including your own, Madam Chairperson, the resolution on an arms trade treaty, and our debate on regional security issues all show that the Committee responds to new challenges. Yet we believe that more could be done to further enhance the relevance of our Committee. Let me highlight some aspects.

While there has been an overwhelming number of statements in our deliberations, we need to devote more time to interactive debates. To a large extent, dialogue should be focused on draft resolutions and decisions on which we are to take action. Open-ended consultations are crucial to promoting transparency and for advancing common understanding of and responses to current security challenges.

We recognize that it is difficult to have in-depth discussions on more than 50 draft resolutions. That is why we continue to advocate that the Committee should, to the extent possible, deal with fewer draft resolutions. Our point of departure must be that any resolution adopted by the General Assembly remains valid until otherwise decided.

This record contains the text of speeches delivered in English and of the interpretation of speeches delivered in the other languages. Corrections should be submitted to the original languages only. They should be incorporated in a copy of the record and sent under the signature of a member of the delegation concerned to the Chief of the Verbatim Reporting Service, room C-154A. Corrections will be issued after the end of the session in a consolidated corrigendum.



We also need to discuss the follow-up of resolutions. Again, the sheer number of resolutions makes effective follow-up difficult. The dismal reporting record by Member States to the Department of Disarmament Affairs certainly underlines the need for streamlining reporting procedures and for taking a critical view of the added value when requesting further reporting. In addition, on some resolutions, we could ask the Secretariat to provide more of an analytical assessment of the responses from Member States.

The panel discussions on the various clusters have clearly demonstrated the value of involving external experts in our work. We also consider the non-governmental organization segment to be a very useful contribution. We are convinced that our debates benefit from even more contributions by civil society, and we do not think that such involvement would undermine the intergovernmental character of the First Committee.

Ms. Mtshali (South Africa): Much has already been said about the disarmament machinery, and I have little to add in the way of suggesting a quick-fix solution to the challenges that confront the disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control architecture.

It would appear that the image of a machinery leads some to imagine that a part of it is broken and requires replacement or fixing to make sure that the machine can function properly again. However, perhaps it is time that we take a close look at the operator of the machine before we start replacing parts that may possibly not require replacement after all. By the operator of the machine, I refer to us, the States members of the various bodies and entities that may be said to constitute the disarmament machinery.

If, for instance, one looks at the Conference on Disarmament, one cannot claim that the structure of the Conference does not allow negotiations to take place. Indeed, if that were the case, it would not have been possible for the Conference on Disarmament to have negotiated any treaty to date. One cannot argue that if the Conference secretariat had more staff, then negotiations would commence. Similarly, one cannot say that the lack of funding prevents the Conference from negotiating.

Neither can one make the case that the Conference's agenda does not allow negotiations to

take place. The consensus rule in the Conference on Disarmament has often been cited as the main reason by the Conference has not been able to negotiate anything in the last couple of years. But is it not perhaps the misuse of the consensus rule, grounded in the rule itself, that has created this problem? The rule does not apply itself; it is the members of the Conference on Disarmament that choose when and how to apply it. When it is used to block the commencement, not merely the finalization of the negotiations, one can perhaps understand why some refer to the tyranny of consensus. We should therefore not forget that it is the member States who decide whether or not to negotiate, not the machinery or the institution.

Similarly, the rules of procedure are often said to be in need of revision. But the rules of procedure also do not prohibit negotiations. On the contrary, the rules merely seek to structure, guide and expedite the work of the Conference on Disarmament. Nevertheless, there seems to be an abundance of experts on rules of procedure, just as there appears to be an abundance of interpretations of various rules. An ad hoc committee sometimes means two different things to two different delegations, whilst a programme of work can even mean three different things to only two different delegations.

In this regard, I was struck by the words of one delegation during the informal consultations that South Africa has been conducting during the past two weeks as incoming Conference President for 2007. That delegation said that perhaps the Conference on Disarmament does not require a programme of work — it merely requires a programme that works.

The lack of negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament has been ascribed to a number of things, but many delegations and commentators often refer to lack of political will as a cause, or the perhaps the main cause, of the absence of progress in the Conference over the years. In this regard, we should not overlook the fact that we as representatives of our countries have an important role to play in recommending courses of action to our principals that may influence or shape the exercise of political will.

All member States obviously have priorities, but different priorities need not necessarily be mutually exclusive. With a little ingenuity and a lot of flexibility and compromise, it should be possible for us to work

with and not against each other. I am often reminded of article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which calls for parties to the Treaty “to pursue negotiations in good faith”. In that regard, I am of the view that good faith should not only be displayed during the negotiations but that it should also be present beforehand, in order to allow negotiations to begin.

What I have said about the disarmament machinery does not apply only to the Conference on Disarmament; neither does it mean that we should all sit back and wait until the day arrives that we can all start to negotiate much-needed instruments in the fields of disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control. It goes without saying that even the best of machines could do with a drop of oil from time to time. Any suggestions to improve our methods of work, our effectiveness and our productivity should therefore be welcomed and considered on their merits. If we can make things happen better, faster and in a more cost-effective fashion, we should certainly do so. But we should also bear in mind that we are responsible for creating a favourable climate that will allow substantive discussions to be conducted and negotiations to take place.

In conclusion, I can only appeal to all delegations to exhibit the good faith, flexibility and compromise required to enable the disarmament machinery to run on all cylinders. South Africa stands ready to explore all options and avenues to get the Conference on Disarmament back to work. I invite all delegations to share their views with us on how to make that possible.

Mr. MacLachlan (Australia): For 10 years, the Conference on Disarmament has failed to deliver for the international community. Successive calls for action from the First Committee and other forums have gone unheeded. The failure of the Conference to negotiate a fissile material cut-off treaty despite repeated calls for action is a particular concern, given the persistent threat from nuclear proliferation and terrorism. The status quo of a deadlocked Conference is unacceptable. It cannot be allowed to continue.

Encouragingly, the Conference is showing signs of renewed determination to move through its impasse. This year the Conference held one of its more substantive sessions. That it did so owes much to the innovation and will of the six Presidents of the Conference: Poland, the Republic of Korea, Romania,

the Russian Federation, Senegal and Slovakia. Their effort provided the basis for sustained and detailed debate on all issues throughout the year, including vital international security issues not previously addressed by the Conference, such as man-portable air defence systems. Australia commends the six Presidents for their efforts. We look forward to working with the incoming Presidents for the 2007 session of the Conference on Disarmament to help the Conference return to its primary task of negotiation.

But we also recognize that the difficulties besetting the Conference will not be resolved by simple procedural fixes. It will require political commitment and will from all States to achieve progress. In that regard, all States members of the Conference on Disarmament need to demonstrate the same innovation and flexibility as this year’s Commission Presidents. States need to move beyond past proposals that have failed to offer a way forward after several years and look to new approaches.

In that regard, Australia was one of the many States that supported the proposed agenda put forth by the group of five ambassadors as a possible basis for consensus in the Conference. We still could. It is clear, however, that that proposal does not enjoy consensus and will not deliver the Conference from its impasse. It is time to look for new approaches that will actually address the security needs of the international community. The Australian delegation remains fully flexible about such approaches.

It is clear, in particular in the wake of the test by Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s test of a nuclear weapon, that the international community can ill afford another decade of deadlock in the Conference on Disarmament. We must act, beginning with negotiation of the issue ripest for negotiation — a fissile material cut-off treaty — while continuing our substantive deliberations on all other issues vital to international security.

Mr. Cynkin (United States of America): My delegation is taking the floor this morning to share with colleagues some observations regarding the conduct of this year’s session of the First Committee. Delegations will recall that during our first intervention, on 5 October (see A/C.1/61/PV.5), our delegation expressed its confidence that the First Committee would prosper under your direction, Madam Chairperson. We are pleased to be able to state

that, to date, our confidence has not been misplaced. Ninety-four delegations, more than in past years, addressed the Committee during the general debate. As seen by the growing number of inscriptions on the daily list of speakers, interactive dialogue has captured the imagination of delegations. Representatives of multilateral bodies dealing with disarmament issues now have the opportunity, through the Committee, to report on their priorities, achievements and challenges to the General Assembly each year. Finally, the Chairperson had the foresight to reserve Friday as a make-up day. Indeed, the Committee is so well organized that we have even been able to lend an hour of our conference services to our colleagues in the Fifth Committee.

Of course, our delegation also stated, just two weeks ago, that the revitalization of the First Committee remained incomplete. That remains the case. We hope that, in its concluding report to the General Assembly, the Chairperson will call on the General Assembly formally to adopt the agenda clusters that the Committee endorsed by consensus in 2004. Our delegation continues to believe that their implementation would contribute further to improving the effectiveness of the methods of work of the Committee, as the General Assembly envisioned when it adopted resolutions 58/41 and 59/95 by consensus.

Our delegation also takes this opportunity to recall for delegations the difficulties that the recent Secretariat practice of presenting programme budget implication statements orally, rather than in written form, has posed for Member States. All delegations benefit from the ability to make informed and considered decisions on all budgetary matters. Accordingly, our delegation respectfully calls on our colleagues in the Secretariat to continue to ensure that, even when they report no additional spending, statements regarding programme budget implications are circulated at least 24 hours in advance, to permit delegations to assess them properly.

Our delegation also wishes to express the concern of our Government that the trend to readily convene groups of governmental experts threatens to impinge significantly upon the budget of the Department for Disarmament Affairs. The United States suggests that each Main Committee consider limiting itself to authorizing one group of governmental experts per calendar year. Member States should oppose efforts to convene a new group of governmental experts on a

subject on which another such group recently concluded its work without issuing a substantive report. Our delegation believes that there should be a cooling off period of one to two years for the solicitation and distribution of the views of Member States before a new group of governmental experts on the same subject can be convened. After all, if the views of Member States on the subject in question have not changed, a new group of governmental experts will most likely suffer the same fate as its predecessor. In this era of limited budgets and competing priorities, more efficient practice is in order.

Finally, our delegation wishes to suggest that future sessions of interactive dialogue be organized so as to permit delegations to address given issues under consideration on the days on which those issues are actually considered. The quality of most of our invited speakers has been such that they have generated great interest and interactive participation by many delegations. Still, future schedulers of the interactive dialogue segments of the Committee should keep in mind the natural interest of Member States, in particular those introducing draft resolutions, in addressing fellow representatives on the issues at hand during the various segments of interactive dialogue, and should give due priority to presentations by Member States.

Our delegation hopes that the Chairperson and our fellow delegates will receive our suggestions this morning in the constructive spirit in which we offer them. As we observed to numerous delegations during our recent consultations with the various regional groups, Member States have ample cause for pride in the steps that we have taken in a transparent and consensual manner to improve the effectiveness of the methods of work of the First Committee. Our delegation continues to believe that, in the long term, these procedural innovations will assist delegations in overcoming our differences on the issues of the day so that we can act in concert once again to strengthen international peace and security.

Mr. D. Alemu (Ethiopia): Let me start by expressing my delegation's appreciation for the Secretary-General's latest reports on pivotal issues of peace, security and development. It is within that overarching context that I am making my statement today: the relationship between disarmament and development, under agenda item 90 (k), which falls

within the framework of the First Committee's thematic cluster debate, which is now being conducted.

Much has been said about the symbiotic relationship between the pertinent issues of disarmament and development, based on the generally agreed premise that the two can, and should, be made interdependent and mutually reinforcing. There is no doubt that disarmament creates a conducive situation whereby development objectives can be better achieved at the national, regional and international levels. Conversely, excessive investment in armaments can negatively affect development endeavours by diverting and draining financial, human and other resources that could have been used otherwise. We can hardly talk about development in the midst of an arms race or armed conflicts. It is therefore not a point of contention that, for any economic or social development agenda to be successfully effected, peace and security remain the utmost priorities — in particular for the developing world, where each and every measure in the direction of disarmament can create and nurture an ideal environment for development that can be sustained in order to benefit the poor.

As we have seen since the adoption, on 11 September 1987, of the Final Document of the International Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development (see A/CONF.130/39) — and in particular during the 1990s — spending on armaments by individual countries was beginning to show signs of reduction. That was indeed considered to be a positive development towards ensuring long-term national, regional and global stability and security and equitable prosperity for all. However, from the dawn of the twenty-first century, there have been indications that military expenditures by many countries are back on the rise. The possible impact of that trend on the overall global economy and the fight against poverty has been a source of concern, and even frustration, for pro-development activists and development partners alike.

Over the past several years, the United Nations has adopted numerous resolutions calling for the diversion of scarce resources from military expenditures to the socio-economic development of developing countries. Moreover, various lofty global development schemes, including the Millennium Development Goals, have been agreed upon and are in the offing in terms of implementation. But that will all

be unattainable by poor countries in the absence of mutually shared vision, concern and, above all, political will and determination to act to achieve those objectives.

Although some might still be of the view that disarmament per se cannot lead to development, the positive contributions that disarmament makes in terms of promoting an environment of security and boosting economic strength continue to be crucial for development. No further evidence is necessary to demonstrate that, as has been stated on many occasions, the overall cost of international military expenditures continues to be exceedingly high and come at the expense of social and economic development activities. My delegation believes that, in order to realize our common wish to ensure a better world for tomorrow, this matter should be given serious consideration now by all States alike, including through the First Committee's current deliberations. To that end, the United Nations bears a profound responsibility, and indeed plays an indispensable role in ensuring that developing countries, and the least developed countries in particular, are provided with better access to adequate and sustainable financial and technical assistance, so as to be able to meet their national development objectives, withstand the complex challenges of globalization and defeat poverty and all its evils.

As a staunch believer in both disarmament and development, and as a devoted member of the Non-Aligned Movement, Ethiopia has, for its part, been a fervent supporter of that very agenda and will continue to promote it in the future in collaboration with all those who share the vision and understand the stakes involved. While upholding the principles of disarmament and non-proliferation, as we have done to date, Ethiopia remains single-mindedly focused on multifaceted domestic development activities, to which all valuable resources available from both internal and external sources are being channelled and prudently utilized, with aim of attaining both national growth targets and the Millennium Development Goals.

It is due to that unwavering commitment that Ethiopia continues to hold high the banner of peace, despite the current loud-and-clear threat by a coalition of extremists and an irresponsible State in our subregion to use brute force against our sovereignty — a situation of which the international community, and the United Nations in particular, is well aware. In that

connection, we would like to express our strong support for draft resolution A/C.1/61/L.55, entitled “Towards an arms trade treaty: establishing common international standards for the import, export and transfer of conventional arms”, submitted by Australia, Costa Rica, Finland, Japan, Kenya and the United Kingdom. We would like to assure the Committee that, based on its principled position regarding disarmament and non-proliferation, Ethiopia both strongly supports and would do its level best to implement that draft resolution in letter and in spirit. In addition, I would like to state that we have been delighted to become a sponsor of the draft resolution.

In conclusion, I would like to reaffirm Ethiopia’s firm commitment to discharge all its treaty obligations and to uphold United Nations resolutions hitherto adopted in the areas of disarmament and, more important, the relationship between disarmament and development. That commitment is based on our principled position regarding those issues and our vehement determination and resolute struggle to overcome poverty and economic backwardness.

Mr. Darwish (Syria) (*spoke in Arabic*): At a time when nuclear arsenals are being developed, stockpiles are being increased, new types of nuclear weapons are being developed, the threat of use of such weapons is growing and nuclear Powers refuse to fulfil their promises and obligations entered into during the 1995, 2000 and 2005 Review Conferences of the States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, pressure is being exerted to prevent countries from acquiring the means to defend themselves and their sovereignty — a right guaranteed by the Charter of the United Nations, international law and international agreements currently in effect.

The actions of Israel, which acquired nuclear weapons outside the scope of the NPT regime, are being overlooked at a time when we aspire to the total elimination of nuclear weapons and to the universality of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). Indeed, Israel’s actions are supported at a time when NPT States parties are being denied the right to use nuclear technology for peaceful and development purposes: the main reason for the establishment of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

In the Middle East region, Israel continues its policy of aggressively arming itself with an enormous

arsenal that includes every sort of conventional and non-conventional weapon and weapon of mass destruction, most notably nuclear weapons. Israel is carrying out a dangerous military nuclear programme that threatens the security of the region and the world; it is doing so in the absence of any effective international oversight, or even an international reaction to its dangerous actions. Unlike any other region of the world, the Middle East thus continues to be the most susceptible to threats and the falsification of facts.

Syria was among the first countries to call for the establishment in the Middle East of zone free of all weapons of mass destruction, in particular nuclear weapons. We have worked earnestly and seriously to realize that goal. Syria has contributed to various initiatives to that end, the most recent of which was our presentation to the Security Council, on 29 December 2003, on behalf of the Arab Group, of a draft resolution on the establishment of a zone free of all weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East, in particular nuclear weapons (see A/58/667). Such a zone would be under the collective supervision of the international community under the aegis of the United Nations. That would serve to strengthen the role of multilateral international conventions pertaining to disarmament.

The fact that that Arab initiative was not adopted only served to encourage Israel to continue to refuse to accede to the NPT and to place all of its nuclear facilities and programmes under the international supervision of the IAEA. In that regard, we call upon the international community to exert pressure on Israel to adhere to the NPT and to develop an effective mechanism to realize that goal in a manner that contributes to strengthening stability in the region and that makes it possible to work towards a just, comprehensive and lasting peace in the Middle East.

The Chairperson: I now call on the representative on Indonesia, who will introduce draft resolutions A/C.1/61/L.4 and A/C.1/61/L.9 on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement.

Mr. Rachmianto (Indonesia): I wish, on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement, to introduce for the Committee’s consideration two draft resolutions.

I should first like to introduce, under sub-item (dd) of agenda item 90, the draft resolution entitled “Convening of the fourth special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament” (A/C.1/61/L.4).

In accordance with resolution 59/71, which was adopted by the General Assembly on 3 December 2004, the Open-ended Working Group on the holding of the fourth special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament (SSOD-IV) was supposed to hold an organizational session, to be followed by three substantive sessions, on dates scheduled in 2006. However, due to unavoidable circumstances at the time that the substantive sessions were to begin, with the adoption of decision 60/559, of 6 June 2006, the General Assembly decided to postpone the work of the Group to a later date. In that context, heads of State or Government of the Non-Aligned Movement — meeting at their Summit Conference held in Havana, Cuba, in September 2006 — reiterated their support for the convening of SSOD-IV and emphasized the need to reconvene the Open-ended Working Group at an early date, preferably in 2007. To reflect the decision by the Summit, we made some technical updates to the text of the draft resolution, namely, to the first and fifth preambular paragraphs and to operative paragraphs 2 and 4.

The report of the Open-ended Working Group would be submitted prior to the conclusion of the sixty-first session of the General Assembly — by August 2007 at the latest. Following consultations with the Secretariat to take into account the calendar for other disarmament meetings, the tentative dates for the meetings of the Open-ended Working Group are as follows. The organizational session would be held on 12 February 2007. The first substantive session would be held from 2 to 5 April 2007. The second session would be held from 25 to 29 June 2007. The last session would take place from 13 July to 3 August 2007. In accordance with the proposed programme budget for the biennium 2006-2007, as contained in document A/60/6 (sect. 4), meeting services have been allocated for the holding of the meetings of the Open-ended Working Group in 2007.

In our view, the convening of SSOD-IV is both timely and appropriate for the following reasons. First, it can set the future course of action and a balanced approach to reaching consensus in the areas of arms control, disarmament, non-proliferation and related international security matters, including a comprehensive review of disarmament machinery. Secondly, there is a need to address existing and new threats to international peace and security in a comprehensive and transparent manner, with the broad

participation of all Member States. Thirdly, in view of unprecedented threats and challenges, concerted efforts under multilateral auspices, which offer the only legitimate and lasting solution, have become an imperative in which the United Nations should play a more effective role. Lastly, there is general agreement among Member States about the need to revitalize the disarmament machinery, including the First Committee, the Disarmament Commission and the Conference on Disarmament. We cannot afford to allow its agenda to remain deadlocked. Thus, the disarmament agenda set out in the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament (resolution S-10/2) should be revived on an urgent basis.

We fully recognize that adequate preparation for the convening of the SSOD-IV is required. In that context, we believe that the substantive sessions of the Open-ended Working Group are the appropriate forum to achieve that objective. We encourage all Member States to work closely and constructively to fully utilize the forthcoming substantive sessions of the Open-ended Working Group, which is mandated to consider the objectives and agenda of SSOD-IV, including the establishment of its preparatory committee.

Since some consultations are still taking place, we request that action on draft resolution A/C.1/61/L.4 be postponed to a later date.

The second draft resolution I wish to introduce, under sub-item (c) of agenda item 91, is entitled “United Nations regional centres for peace and disarmament” (A/C.1/61/L.9). The Non-Aligned Movement would like to underline that the United Nations Regional Centres for Peace and Disarmament have been instrumental in promoting understanding and cooperation among States in their respective regions in the fields of peace, disarmament and development. The General Assembly continues its appeal to all Member States, as well as to international governmental and non-governmental organizations, to make voluntary contributions to the Centres in order to strengthen, facilitate and implement their programmes and activities.

We hope that all delegations will once again be able to join us in supporting the draft resolution that my delegation has just introduced.

Mr. Ortega (Ecuador) (*spoke in Spanish*): I should like to begin by expressing to you, Madam, my delegation's satisfaction at seeing you preside over the Committee and to congratulate you on the work accomplished so far.

I am pleased to address the Committee, on behalf of the Group of Latin and Caribbean States, to introduce draft resolution A/C.1/61/L.14, issued 9 October 2006 and entitled "United Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean", under sub-item (d) of agenda item 91.

The draft resolution has simply been updated — particularly in the fourth preambular paragraph, which includes a number of the conclusions set out in the Secretary-General's report on the Centre (A/61/157).

This draft resolution adopted is annually by the Committee, and the Latin American and Caribbean Group is sponsoring it in the firm belief that the Centre plays an important role in promoting confidence-building measures, arms control and limitation, disarmament and development at the regional level. In that connection, we call on the Committee to study the draft resolution and to adopt it by consensus in due course.

Mr. Dhital (Nepal): My delegation has the honour to introduce draft resolution A/C.1/61/L.28, entitled "United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific", under sub-item (e) of agenda item 91. My delegation expresses its sincere gratitude to all the sponsors and to those delegations that will add their names to the list of sponsors.

The Regional Centres for Peace and Disarmament are an important tool for building confidence and assisting the process of disarmament in their respective regions. As host of the Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific, Nepal is committed to enhancing the constructive role of the Centre in the region by consolidating the Kathmandu process so as to contribute to peace and disarmament in our region.

We are confident that the internal procedure for finalizing the host country agreement and the related memorandum of understanding will be completed soon in order to ensure the physical operation of the

Regional Centre in Kathmandu within six months of the date of signature of the host country agreement.

We have made textual and technical upgrades, while most paragraphs of the draft resolution remain unchanged, as in the resolution adopted at the sixtieth session of the General Assembly. My delegation hopes that all member countries will adopt the draft resolution without a vote, as in previous years.

Mr. Mistrík (Slovakia): It is an honour and a privilege for me to introduce draft resolution A/C.1/61/L.29, on the report of the Conference on Disarmament. I am particularly pleased to do so on behalf of the delegations of Poland, the Republic of Korea, Romania, the Russian Federation, Senegal and my own delegation, that of Slovakia.

The structure and content of the draft resolution are based on those of the resolutions of past years, which were adopted without a vote.

First, I would like to draw the attention of members to the preambular part of the draft resolution. As my delegation underlined earlier, the Conference managed to increase its deliberations substantially this year. That positive development in the Conference in 2006 is reflected in the sixth preambular paragraph. Here, I must admit that that paragraph compensates, in brief, for the inability of the Conference to produce a substantive report, which we came very close to adopting. It highlights the constructive contributions of member States of the Conference, which made it possible to carry out a number of encouraging activities aimed at resuming negotiations on important disarmament instruments in the Conference. Let me stress that the report of the Conference should be viewed in its entirety, including its appendices.

The following lesson could be drawn from this year's report adoption process. On the one hand, the Conference was able to come to an understanding on a number of future-oriented activities, while on the other, it failed to reflect them in the report. Resolving that problem remains a challenge for next year.

The positive development that I mentioned earlier created favourable conditions for the Secretary-General to address the Conference after a period of seven years and to observe that new momentum appears to be gathering in the Conference. The Secretary-General's appearance is mentioned briefly in the ninth preambular paragraph. The tenth preambular paragraph

is dedicated to a topic that my delegation touched upon when discussing disarmament machinery. I believe that the positive developments in the Conference in 2006 not only represent a modest but important step towards revitalization of the Conference, but also can be considered a contribution to the process of revitalizing the disarmament machinery as a whole.

Since I wish to be brief, let me conclude by drawing the attention of members to operative paragraph 4. Although the wording of the paragraph is standard, it has a particular connotation. As the 2006 experience proves, consultations between the current President and the incoming President can bring about substantive progress with regard to developments in the coming year. Therefore, we view this element of the report of the Conference and of the draft resolution from a perspective of full sincerity.

On the whole, 2006 demonstrates that the current President is not alone in his important task of encouraging the strenuous support of all the Presidents of the current year. The implicit message that we are trying to convey is that cooperation and coordination pay, and produce a result from which we can all benefit.

On behalf of all the sponsors, I ask the Committee to adopt this draft resolution without a vote.

Mr. Udedibia (Nigeria): I have the honour, on behalf of the sponsoring States, to introduce draft resolution A/C.1/61/L.24, entitled "United Nations Regional Centres for Peace and Disarmament in Africa". The draft resolution was submitted in recognition of the important role that Regional Centre can play in promoting peace, security and arms control and disarmament at the regional level, thereby enhancing progress in the area of sustainable development. Regrettably, the Centre has been carrying out its mandate under very strenuous financial and operational difficulties, as noted by the Secretary-General in his report (A/61/137). The activities and the staffing of the Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa have been reduced in view of the limited resources at its disposal.

Most of the problems of the Regional Centre were clearly described a few days ago by Mr. Nobuaki Tanaka, Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs, and Ms. Agnes Marcaillou, Chief of the Regional Disarmament Branch. It was evident from their presentations that the Centre faces two major

challenges: a lack of reliable source of funding that would ensure the sustainability of its operations, and the need to reorganize it and possibly review its mandate in the light of developments since its establishment related to peace and security in Africa.

The most worrisome development regarding the Centre is the observation in the report of the Secretary-General to the effect that its future looks bleak due to lack of a reliable source of funding that would ensure the sustainability of its operations. Unfortunately, the efforts undertaken to mobilize the necessary resources for the operational costs of the Centre have yielded very little dividends when compared to its needs. While we remain grateful to the few countries that have made financial contributions to the Centre, there is still an urgent need for additional financial contributions from the donor community to enable the Centre to deal with the increasing challenges of peace, security and disarmament in Africa.

In addition to the need to reorganize the Centre, there is also a need to establish close cooperation between it and the Peace and Security Council of the African Union, in particular its institutions in the field of peace, disarmament and security, as well as with the relevant United Nations bodies and programmes in, and for, Africa, for greater effectiveness.

The Consultative Mechanism of interested States established last year by the General Assembly for the reorganization of the Regional Centre has not completed its work and will require more time. There is a great deal of lot of work before that body. In addition to identifying areas for close cooperation between the Regional Centre and the Peace and Security Council of the African Union, as well as with the relevant United Nations bodies and programmes in, and for, Africa, the Consultative Mechanism is also expected to examine ways and means of establishing cooperative arrangements between the Centre and these bodies or institutions and improving any existing ones. It is also expected to consider the perennial problem of funding for the Centre.

In general, the Consultative Mechanism is expected to consider all necessary factors that will enable the Centre to respond adequately to Africa's needs in the areas of peace, security and disarmament. It may also consider the need for the Centre to be proactive in promoting or initiating preventive measures against armed conflict, where possible. In

view of the need for more time, the draft resolution requests the Consultative Mechanism to continue its work with a view to identifying concrete measures to revitalize the Centre. We believe that the Consultative Mechanism will represent a major step towards enhancing the effectiveness of the Regional Centre as well as in attracting requisite funding for its operational activities.

The draft resolution urges all States, as well as international governmental and non-governmental organizations and foundations, to make voluntary contributions in order to strengthen these programmes and activities and facilitate their implementation.

It appeals to the Regional Centre, in cooperation with the African Union, regional and subregional organizations and the African States, to take steps to promote the consistent implementation of the 2001 United Nations Programme of Action against the illicit small arms trade. The draft resolution, which is submitted annually, has always been adopted by consensus in both the First Committee and the General Assembly. It is our wish that the draft resolution be similarly adopted at this session.

I should like now to introduce a second draft resolution on behalf of my delegation.

On behalf of the 130 sponsoring States, I have the honour to introduce the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/61/L.12, entitled "United Nations disarmament fellowship, training and advisory services".

The United Nations programme of fellowships on disarmament was launched in 1979 as a follow-up to a decision of the General Assembly taken at its tenth special session in 1978. The programme is aimed at promoting expertise in the field of disarmament in more Member States, particularly developing countries. The programme has succeeded in developing greater awareness of the importance and benefits of disarmament and to enhancing the knowledge and skills of fellows so that they can participate more actively in arms control and disarmament deliberations and negotiations at all levels.

Since it was launched in 1979, the programme has trained 704 officials from 155 States, many of whom hold positions of responsibility in the field of disarmament within their own Governments and their Permanent Missions to the United Nations in Geneva,

New York and Vienna. In 2005 alone, 53 alumni of the Programme served in their respective Permanent Missions to the United Nations in Geneva and New York, and 40 alumni represented their Governments at various disarmament meetings and conferences. It is also gratifying to observe that a number of alumni of the fellowship programme are representatives of their Governments at this session of the First Committee.

It is equally gratifying to note that the fellowship programme on disarmament was identified by the United Nations Office of Internal Oversight Services as the most successful United Nations training programme it had ever reviewed.

The draft resolution considers the decision of the General Assembly, contained in paragraph 108 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, the first special session devoted to disarmament, to establish a programme of fellowships on disarmament, as well as its decisions contained in annex IV to the Concluding Document of the Twelfth Special Session of the General Assembly, the second special session devoted to disarmament, in which it decided to continue the programme. It considers that the programme has continued to contribute significantly to developing greater awareness of the importance and benefits of disarmament and better understanding of the concerns of the international community in the field of disarmament and security, as well as to enhancing the knowledge and skills of fellows, allowing them to participate more effectively in efforts in the field of disarmament at all levels.

It also considers that the programme has trained a large number of officials from Member States throughout its 28 years of existence, many of whom hold positions of responsibility in the field of disarmament within their own Governments. It also recognizes the need for Member States to take into account gender equality when nominating candidates to the programme. It further considers that the forms of assistance available to Member States, in particular to developing countries, under the programme will enhance the capabilities of their officials to follow ongoing deliberations and negotiations on disarmament, both bilateral and multilateral.

In substantive terms, the draft resolution reaffirms the decisions of the General Assembly contained in annex IV to the Concluding Document of the Twelfth Special Session of the General Assembly

and the report of the Secretary-General approved by the Assembly in its resolution 33/71 E of 14 December 1978. In the draft resolution, the General Assembly expresses its appreciation to all Member States and organizations that have consistently supported the programme throughout the years, thereby contributing to its success, in particular to the Governments of Germany and Japan for the continuation of extensive and highly educational study visits for the participants in the programme, and to the Government of the Peoples Republic of China for organizing a study visit for the fellows in 2006 in the area of disarmament.

It also expresses its appreciation to the International Atomic Energy Agency, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization and the Monterey Institute of International Studies for having organized specific study programmes in the field of disarmament in their respective areas of competence, thereby contributing to the objectives of the programme.

Finally, the draft resolution commends the Secretary-General for the diligence with which the programme has continued to be carried out and requests him to continue to implement annually the Geneva-based programme within existing resources.

The draft resolution is essentially the same as the one submitted during the fifty-ninth session of the General Assembly, when it was last considered.

The draft resolution has always been adopted by consensus in the past. It is the wish of the sponsors that it be similarly adopted at this session.

Mr. Meyer (Canada): I am taking the floor with respect to draft resolution A/C.1/61/L.23, entitled "Prohibition of the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices".

Canada's decision to introduce this draft resolution was based on the important developments in this area over the course of the past year. Most significantly, this year the Conference on Disarmament engaged in structured, focused debates on all its agenda items. That was cause for optimism that the Conference is closer to opening negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty than it has been for some time.

Given the importance of this subject, we felt that it would be appropriate for the First Committee to

make a contribution as well. In support of this, Canada decided to put forward draft resolution A/C.1/61/L.23, which calls for the immediate start of negotiations on such a treaty in the Conference on Disarmament. This draft resolution seeks to capitalize on the momentum that we have seen this year at the Conference on Disarmament and to send a signal from the international community that we want that Conference to take the next step. It was also drafted with the goal of restoring a consensus within the First Committee around this issue.

By design, draft resolution A/C.1/61/L.23 sticks closely to these objectives. It does not attempt to predict the outcome of negotiations; nor does it look to establish parameters for starting them. The draft also does not attempt to prejudge what other tasks the Conference on Disarmament may choose to take up. These elements, in our view, are not necessary for achieving the draft resolution's primary purpose.

During the consultations that we have held on this draft resolution, however, it has become clear that not all delegations are convinced that this admittedly minimalist approach is the right way forward. While no delegation has opposed the idea of starting negotiations, there remains a divergence of views as to the conditions under which those negotiations should start. We have come to the conclusion that, in the time available to us here, it will not be possible to reconcile the different points of view.

In the absence of our hoped-for consensus, we are obliged to ask ourselves whether the draft resolution would provide an appropriate signal to the Conference on Disarmament of the desire of the international community to get negotiations started. Our conclusion here is that it would not. For this reason, Canada has decided to withdraw draft resolution A/C.1/61/L.23.

We hope that those who have expressed support for this draft will understand this decision. Canada will do its part to ensure that the Conference on Disarmament returns to fruitful and productive work in 2007, including the beginning of negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty, and encourages all States represented here to support that goal.

Mr. Oh Joon (Republic of Korea): As Chairman of the United Nations Disarmament Commission for the 2006 session and on behalf of the sponsors, who are the members of the expanded Bureau of the Commission, it is my pleasure to introduce draft

resolution A/C.1/61/L.11, entitled “Report of the Disarmament Commission”.

This draft is the result of open-ended informal consultations among the Member States. It has been prepared in a manner similar to that of previous resolutions regarding the Disarmament Commission, with appropriate changes in the text as circumstances requires.

The draft resolution, in addition to the organizational elements that are basically unchanged from last year, contains recommendations on additional measures for improving the effectiveness of the Commission’s methods of work, which were agreed by consensus at the 2006 substantive session.

Based on my consultations, the Disarmament Commission Bureau has decided to propose 9 to 27 April as the dates for the 2007 session of the Commission. These dates take into consideration other multilateral disarmament events also scheduled for next year.

Now, allow me to speak briefly about the report of the Commission itself (document A/61/42). As in previous years, the report consists of four chapters containing the results of the deliberations on the agenda items during the 2006 substantive session. The first three chapters include the introduction, the organizational section and the list of documents. Chapter IV, “Conclusions and recommendations”, covers the two consensus reports of the Working Groups, one on agenda item 4, entitled “Recommendations for achieving the objective of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons”, and the other on agenda item 5, on “Practical confidence-building measures in the field of conventional weapons.” Chapter IV also includes recommendations on additional measures for improving the effectiveness of the Commission’s methods of work, which were agreed by consensus.

In the course of last year’s organizational session, the Commission agreed on two agenda items – namely, “Recommendations for achieving the objective of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons” and “Practical confidence-building measures in the field of conventional weapons.” In addition to these, the Commission decided that the issue of “Measures for improving the effectiveness of the Commission’s methods of work” be considered in

plenary meetings at its 2006 substantive session, with equitable time allocated to it.

Accordingly, the Commission held a three-week substantive session in 2006 from 10 to 28 April. At this session, the Disarmament Commission concluded consideration of the issue of “Measures for improving the effectiveness of the Commission’s methods of work” and considered the two substantive items on nuclear disarmament and conventional weapons as the first segment of its three-year cycle.

In the course of seven meetings devoted to general discussion within the framework of Working Group I, delegations made comments on a wide variety of nuclear disarmament and related international security issues, expressed their concerns over emerging trends and presented concrete ideas and proposals. As a result, the Chairman of Working Group I submitted two versions of his working paper, the second of which took into consideration written and oral submissions, as well as comments by delegations on his first draft.

With regard to Working Group II on practical confidence-building measures in the field of conventional arms, Member States showed flexibility and were ready to work towards an agreement on this issue. The intellectually challenging and target-oriented deliberations were focused on the Chairman’s updated paper. This document was compiled on the basis of the Chairman’s wide-ranging consultations with all Member States prior to the substantive session and of the discussion at the substantive session itself.

The Chairman’s working papers of both Working Groups are not attached to the report of the Commission, owing to an absence of agreement on whether they should be attached. Even though the Working Group Chairman’s papers are the sole responsibility of the Chairmen and do not represent a negotiated position, I believe that they can serve as a good basis for further consensus-building. It is also heartening to note that the Chairs of both Working Groups intend to continue their informal consultations with Member States during the inter-sessional period. I wish them success in their endeavour.

I would like to take this opportunity to express my gratitude to all delegations for their understanding and support, as well as to the Bureau members and the Chairs of the two Working Groups, for their valuable assistance. I would also like to thank Under-Secretary-General Chen and Under-Secretary-General Tanaka

and their respective staffs, as well as to the Secretary of the Disarmament Commission, Mr. Timur Alasaniya, and his colleagues for the excellent service provided to the Commission.

Before concluding, allow me to remind delegations that the organizational session of the United Nations Disarmament Commission will be held in mid-November, and the Regional Groups are kindly requested to nominate their candidates for the Bureau as soon as possible. Electing the Bureau at least three months before the beginning of the substantive session is one of the agreements contained in the draft resolution before us, and I will do my best to ensure its implementation.

I hope that draft resolution A/C.1/61/L.11 will be adopted by consensus, as was the case with similar resolutions in the past.

The Chairperson: There seem to be no more delegations wishing to introduce draft resolutions pertaining to the issue of disarmament machinery. We have thus concluded the second phase of the Committee's work.

Agenda items 82 to 97 (continued)

Action on all draft resolutions submitted under all disarmament and international security agenda items

The Chairperson: In accordance with the Committee's programme of work and timetable, the Committee will now begin the third and final phase of its work, namely, action on all draft resolutions and draft decisions submitted under agenda items 82 to 97.

The Committee will first take action on draft resolutions that appear in informal working paper No. 1, which was circulated last Friday, starting with cluster 1, "Nuclear weapons".

After action is completed on draft resolutions and draft decisions contained in cluster 1, the Committee will then proceed to take action on draft resolutions contained in cluster 2, "Other weapons of mass destruction", starting with draft resolutions contained in document A/C.1/61/L.5, entitled "Measures to uphold the authority of the 1925 Geneva Protocol", followed by draft resolutions and decisions contained in clusters 3 to 7.

In proceeding with our work, I would like to remind delegations that the Committee will follow the

procedure I have already outlined and as explained in the information paper on ground rules that was previously circulated. Consequently, I once again appeal to all delegations to kindly observe the outline procedure and to avoid any interruption once voting on a cluster begins.

Allow me quickly to remind delegations that sponsors of draft resolutions may make general statements at the beginning of the meeting on a particular cluster. But, in accordance with the rules of procedure, they may not make statements in explanation of vote either before or after action is taken.

Before the Committee proceeds to take decisions on all draft resolutions contained in cluster 1, "Nuclear weapons", as listed in informal working paper No. 1, I shall give the floor to those delegations wishing to make a general statement, other than an explanation of vote, or to introduce draft resolutions.

Mr. Zarka (Israel): I would like to make a general statement on draft resolution A/C.1/61/L.2, entitled "The risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East".

In the light of the current realities in the Middle East, we believe that it is rather obvious that draft resolution A/C.1/61/L.2 is blatantly one-sided, missing in facts, contentious and divisive. As such, it undermines rather than enhances confidence between the States of the region.

There is no doubt that the risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East indeed exists. As events of the last years prove, it is in fact a major and imminent one. Our region faces growing threats, stemming from the non-compliance by some States with their international obligations and norms, in particular the ongoing activities of Iran and its total disregard of both the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors and the relevant Security Council resolutions.

Under such a title, one could have expected to find, at a minimum, cause for compliance by States in the region with the relevant international obligations or for mutual recognition and peaceful relations among countries of the region. Lamentably, the draft resolution does not reflect the realities of our troubled region. Moreover, it chooses to completely ignore the

relevant internationally acknowledged evidence and formal IAEA and Security Council resolutions.

This draft resolution also overlooks the profound hostility of States in the region towards Israel, the refusal for reconciliation and mutual recognition and explicit threats to our existence. Furthermore, this draft resolution focuses entirely and by name on Israel, and singles us out in manner unlike any other United Nations Member State in the First Committee. Israel has never threatened its neighbours or abrogated its obligations under any disarmament treaty; it has acted with the utmost responsibility in the nuclear domain.

Adopting such a draft resolution will not serve the greater objective of curbing proliferation in the Middle East, but can rather compromise it. Draft resolutions regarding the risks of proliferation in the Middle East should focus on objective ways to address such risks as they emerge.

The First Committee should not once again become a venue for political discrimination. We would like to call upon members to vote against this draft resolution and distance themselves from attempts to deteriorate the credibility of this United Nations body.

The Chairperson: I give the floor to the observer of Palestine.

Mr. Hijazi (Palestine): I wish to make a general statement on the draft resolutions submitted under agenda items 87 and 93.

The proliferation of nuclear and other non-conventional weapons is a threat to the world's security. In the Middle East, it is a threat to the very existence of the peoples in the region — their rich heritage and the noble messages they have spread throughout the world. Hence, the international community must ensure that this region stays free of these tools of maximum destruction. This is of the utmost importance.

However, this must be a comprehensive, rather than a selective effort. For what adds to this existential threat is the turning of a blind eye by some world Powers towards States that have spent decades stockpiling and developing non-conventional and nuclear weapons, while refusing to submit to international inspection. It is illogical and counterproductive to exert such extraordinary efforts in the pursuit of a Member State on the basis of suspicion, while another Member State, proven to possess and

produce these unconventional weapons, remains immune from so much as inspection or oversight.

No State, especially a State proven to act with utter disdain towards international law and to violate the rights of other peoples, has the right to be above international law or oversight. No State should be allowed to persist in snubbing the will of the international community to curb the spread of these weapons of mass destruction, especially in a region suffering from such political volatility.

We hope that the adoption of both draft resolutions on the Middle East will consolidate efforts to make the Middle East a nuclear-weapon-free zone and to allow the International Atomic Energy Agency to be an objective partner that conducts oversight comprehensively, rather than selectively, to ensure that this region and the world at large is free of these weapons of mass destruction.

Finally, the Middle East is in need of the proliferation of economic and social prosperity, of human and political rights and more importantly, of hope. We do not need more weapons; we do not need more threats to our lives, homes and environment.

The Chairperson: The First Committee will now proceed to take a decision on the draft resolutions in cluster 1, "Nuclear weapons", beginning with draft resolution A/C.1/61/L.1, entitled "Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East".

I shall call first upon those representatives who wish to speak in explanation of position or vote in a consolidated manner on all draft decisions and draft resolutions listed in cluster 1 in informal working paper No. 1.

Mr. Kahiluoto (Finland): I am speaking on behalf of the European Union on two draft resolutions under the nuclear weapons cluster. The first is draft resolution A/C.1/61/L.2, entitled "The risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East". The acceding countries Bulgaria and Romania, the candidate countries Turkey, Croatia and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, the countries of the Stabilization and Association Process and potential candidates Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia and Montenegro, and the European Free Trade Association countries Iceland and Norway, members of

the European Economic Area, align themselves with this statement.

The European Union supports the objective that the Middle East should become a zone free from all weapons of mass destruction, but we are concerned that the draft resolution does not cover some relevant recent developments with respect to nuclear proliferation in the region.

The European Union will vote in favour of the draft resolution, and calls on all States in the region to adhere to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) as non-nuclear-weapon States. We also call on all States in the region that have not yet done so to conclude comprehensive safeguards agreements and to sign and ratify the Additional Protocol.

The EU shares the concern about Iran's nuclear programme expressed by the Security Council and the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Iran's non-compliance with its safeguards obligations and Security Council demands raises serious questions and is not compatible with the international non-proliferation regime. It is of critical importance not only that all States in the Middle East accede to relevant non-proliferation treaties and conventions, but also that all parties to the treaties and conventions implement fully their obligations under those instruments.

The European Union fully supports Security Council resolution 1696 (2006), which, inter alia, made it mandatory for Iran to suspend all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, including research and development, which are to be verified by the IAEA. Suspension is no longer a voluntary confidence-building measure, but an international obligation. The Security Council also called upon Iran to act in accordance with the Additional Protocol and to implement without delay all transparency measures that the IAEA may request in support of its ongoing investigations.

We deeply regret that, as demonstrated by the report of the IAEA Director General, Iran has not fulfilled the obligations set out in the Security Council resolution, nor taken the steps required by the IAEA Board of Governors. The European Union reiterates its view that prompt and full Iranian compliance with the relevant international obligations and other requirements would facilitate negotiations for a

diplomatic solution. We recall the statement of the Council of the European Union of 17 July 2006 that if Iran did not comply with the Security Council's requirements, the European Union would work for the adoption of measures under Article 41 of the Charter. The EU also recalls that in resolution 1696 (2006), the Security Council expressed its intention to adopt appropriate measures under Article 41 if Iran did not comply.

Accordingly, the EU believes that Iran's continuation of enrichment-related activities has left the EU no choice but to support consultations on such measures. The EU notes that the door to negotiations nevertheless remains open. We reaffirm our commitment to a negotiated solution and believe that such a solution would contribute to the development of the EU's relations with Iran. We urge Iran to take the positive path being offered.

I will now turn briefly to the draft resolution entitled "Missiles". I am speaking on behalf of the European Union. The same countries align themselves with this statement as did with regard to the previous draft resolution.

The European Union is not in a position to support draft resolution A/C.1/61/L.3, "Missiles". Let me underline that this must not be regarded as a lack of commitment on the issue. On the contrary, the European Union is convinced that the proliferation of ballistic missiles capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction puts at risk the security of all States and peoples. The development by several countries of concern of programmes of autonomous capacity in the production of medium- and long-range ballistic missiles capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction, as well as cruise missiles and unmanned aerial vehicles, is a growing cause for concern within the European Union. In this regard, we regret that the text before us does not mention the relevant resolutions adopted this year by the Security Council.

The European Union supports the International Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation, which was adopted in 2002 in The Hague and to which, to date, 125 States have subscribed. The draft resolution under consideration does not make any specific reference to the Hague Code. The EU was not in a position to support the draft resolution under consideration when it was last presented in 2004, as we

had concerns regarding the effectiveness of the steps proposed in it.

We note that the third Panel of Governmental Experts on the issue of missiles in all its aspects is to begin its work in 2007. We consider it important that the work of the third Panel be based on the work done by the two previous Panels and, in particular, the nearly completed final report of the second Panel. We would not like to see the third Panel repeat work already done.

Those are the reasons why the EU is not in a position to support draft resolution A/C.1/61/L.3.

Mr. Meyer (Canada): I am taking the floor to explain Canada's vote on resolution A/C.1/61/L.2, "The risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East".

Delegations will recall that Canada took the floor after the vote on last year's version of this draft resolution to register our concern about the lack of balance evidenced by the absence in the draft resolution of any reference to other nuclear proliferation risks in the Middle East region.

To the degree to which this draft resolution is intended to recognize that the proliferation of nuclear weapons in the Middle East would pose a serious threat to international peace and security, we regretted that no reference was made to the findings of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) regarding Iran's non-compliance with its safeguards obligations pursuant to the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).

Since that time, the issue of Iran's nuclear activities remains unresolved. We are particularly cognizant of Security Council resolution 1696 (2006) of 31 July and presidential statement S/PRST/2006/15 of 29 March, both of which called upon Iran to return to compliance with its obligations. Nevertheless, Iran has chosen to ignore those Security Council actions and the efforts of the international community to arrive at an equitable and lasting solution that would meet the concerns of the international community with regard to Iran's intentions. Furthermore, Iran has repeatedly threatened its neighbour, Israel — and the people of Israel — with annihilation.

Iran's rhetoric, combined with its refusal to respect the decisions of the international community as represented in the statements and resolutions of the Security Council, cause us grave and serious concern.

If the goal of this draft resolution is the prevention of proliferation of nuclear weapons in the Middle East, as its title would seem to indicate, then the content of the draft resolution should, in our view, address the obligations of all States in the region to clear and unequivocal adherence to the NPT and full compliance with its obligations.

In this regard, we would recall the language of Security Council resolution 1696 (2006), which, in the fourth preambular paragraph, notes

"with serious concern that the IAEA Director General's report of 27 February 2006 (GOV/2006/15) lists a number of outstanding issues and concerns on Iran's nuclear programme, including topics which could have a military nuclear dimension, and that the IAEA is unable to conclude that there are no undeclared nuclear materials or activities in Iran".

The Government of Canada has deep and serious concerns about the proliferation of nuclear weapons in the Middle East. Those that have adhered to the NPT should respect meticulously and rigorously the obligations and undertakings that they have assumed as States parties to that Treaty.

We continue to have reservations about the incomplete scope and unbalanced nature of this draft resolution. We hope that by the time we gather together for the next meeting of the First Committee, we will have a draft resolution that more fully reflects the situation in that region. If the draft resolution remains the same, we will again reconsider our position.

For the reasons I have expressed in this statement, we will abstain in the voting on this draft resolution.

Mr. Najafi (Islamic Republic of Iran): I am taking the floor to explain my delegation's position on draft resolution A/C.1/61/L.1, on a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, and on draft resolution A/C.1/61/L.2, on the risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East.

The idea of the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone as an important disarmament and confidence-building measure in the region of the Middle East was first initiated by Iran in 1974 and was followed by the adoption of numerous resolutions by the General Assembly. Since 1980, the General Assembly has annually adopted by consensus a

resolution on this issue. The repeated adoption of this resolution by the General Assembly is a manifestation of the global support that exists for the promotion of peace, security and stability in the Middle East through the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region.

Unfortunately, however, due to Israel's non-adherence to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and, more importantly, the refusal of that regime to place its unsafeguarded clandestine nuclear facilities under the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) verification system, such a zone — a lofty and long-held aspiration of the countries of the region — has yet to materialize.

The irresponsible behaviour of that regime, supported by certain nuclear-weapon States in this respect, has put the establishment of such a zone in the region in the near future in serious doubt. As the Final Document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference indicates, all countries in the Middle East region except for the Israeli regime have become States parties to the Treaty. The risk posed by Israel's nuclear facilities therefore makes it necessary for the international community to bring enough pressure to bear on Israel to accede to the NPT and place all its nuclear weapons, programmes and facilities under IAEA safeguards in order to pave the way for the achievement of the long-sought goal of the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East.

The Islamic Republic of Iran, as a party to the Chemical Weapons Convention, the Biological Weapons Convention and the NPT, is committed to all provisions of those instruments. It is acting with transparency by making declarations and accepting international monitoring and inspection by the competent international bodies, in particular the IAEA, and it has always stated that it would not give up its right to the peaceful use of nuclear technology due to politically motivated accusations. All reports by the IAEA since November 2003 have been indicative of the peaceful nature of the Iranian programme, and the Agency repeatedly reaffirmed that it "has not seen any diversion of nuclear material to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices." (*GOV/2006/15, para. 53*)

Ironically — and this is indeed ridiculous — the Israeli regime, a non-member of the NPT, whose

nuclear arsenal, coupled with its expansionist and State terrorism policies, which is repeatedly recognized as the single most serious threat to regional peace and security, cries wolf about Iran's peaceful nuclear programme and has led a campaign of threats, lies, deception and blackmail against Iran. This indicates that those who are misled and manipulated by that campaign are in fact serving the interests of the Israeli regime.

Ms. Millar (Australia): I would like to make a statement in explanation of vote on First Committee draft resolution A/C.1/61/L.2, entitled "The risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East".

Australia supports the establishment of an effectively verifiable Middle East zone free of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, as well as the universality of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). We have also been consistent in our support for the General Assembly resolution that calls for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East freely arrived at among the States of the region.

Australia staunchly supports the right of all Middle East States to exist and live in peace within secure and defined borders. Regrettably, however, we continue to have a number of substantive difficulties with the draft resolution entitled "The risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East", notably its emphasis on the State of Israel, with no reference to other Middle Eastern States of nuclear proliferation concern.

In September 2005 the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors, reflecting continuing international concern about Iran's nuclear intentions, found Iran in non-compliance with its NPT safeguard agreement. Following the Board's referral of the Iran nuclear issue to the Security Council, on 31 September the Council made mandatory the suspension of all of Iran's enrichment- and reprocessing-related activities. Iran has yet to comply with that legally binding resolution.

It is regrettable that the proposed draft resolution makes no reference to the international community's serious concerns about this matter. Australia is committed to preventing the spread of nuclear weapons and to the goal of a nuclear-weapon-free world. As a strong supporter of the NPT, we will continue to promote those objectives in the forthcoming NPT

review cycle and in all other relevant international forums.

Mr. Streuli (Switzerland) (*spoke in French*): I should like to explain our vote on draft resolution A/C.1/61/L.2.

Switzerland will vote this year once again in favour of draft resolution A/C.1/61/L.2, “The risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East”. This draft resolution is aimed at achieving the universality of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and is addressed to the only country in the region that has not ratified the NPT.

While supporting these efforts, Switzerland also attaches great importance to the enhanced implementation of existing obligations. We will continue to defend that position also in the field of disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation.

In that context, the full cooperation of States with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is essential. We share the concerns expressed by the Board of Governors of the Agency and by the Security Council with regard to the Iranian nuclear issue. Switzerland fully supports Security Council resolution 1696 (2006), which is legally binding, and calls on Iran to comply with it as soon as possible.

Switzerland views the text of the draft resolution entitled “The risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East” as a political appeal against nuclear proliferation in the region as a whole. To ensure the broadest possible support, it is vital for the sponsors of the draft resolution to take into account the current context and all developments affecting all the countries in the region.

The Chairperson: The Committee will now proceed to take action on all draft decisions and draft resolutions contained in informal working paper No. 1, beginning with draft resolution A/C.1/61/L.1, entitled “Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East”.

I give the floor to the Secretary of the Committee to conduct the voting.

Mr. Sareva (Secretary of the Committee): Draft resolution A/C.1/61/L.1, entitled “Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East”, was introduced by the representative of Egypt at the 17th meeting, on 19 October 2006. The sponsor of

the draft resolution is named in document A/C.1/61/L.1.

The Chairperson: The sponsor of the draft resolution has expressed the wish that the draft resolution be adopted by the Committee without a vote. If I hear no objection, I shall take it that the Committee wishes to act accordingly.

Draft resolution A/C.1/61/L.1 was adopted.

The Chairperson: The Committee will now proceed to take action on draft resolution A/C.1/61/L.2. A recorded vote has been requested. A separate recorded vote has been requested on the sixth preambular paragraph.

I give the floor to the Secretary of the Committee to conduct the voting.

Mr. Sareva (Secretary of the Committee): Draft resolution A/C.1/61/L.2, entitled “The risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East”, was introduced by the representative of Egypt at the 17th meeting, on 19 October 2006. The sponsors of the draft resolution are listed in documents A/C.1/61/L.2 and A/C.1/61/CRP.5.

The Committee will first take a separate vote on the sixth preambular paragraph of draft resolution A/C.1/61/L.2, which reads as follows.

“Recognizing with satisfaction that, in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the Conference undertook to make determined efforts towards the achievement of the goal of universality of the Treaty, called upon those remaining States not parties to the Treaty to accede to it, thereby accepting an international legally binding commitment not to acquire nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices and to accept Agency safeguards on all their nuclear activities, and underlined the necessity of universal adherence to the Treaty and of strict compliance by all parties with their obligations under the Treaty”.

A recorded vote was taken.

In favour:

Albania, Algeria, Andorra, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, Belize, Benin,

Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Eritrea, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Malta, Mauritania, Mexico, Monaco, Mongolia, Moldova, Montenegro, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Romania, Russian Federation, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, San Marino, Saudi Arabia, Serbia, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Timor-Leste, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of), Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe.

Against:

India, Israel.

Abstaining:

Bhutan, Ethiopia, Mauritius, Pakistan, Togo, United States of America.

The sixth preambular paragraph was retained by 151 votes to 2, with 6 abstentions.

The Chairperson: We shall now take action on draft resolution A/C.1/61/L.2 as a whole. A recorded vote has been requested.

I give the floor to the Secretary of the Committee to conduct the voting.

Mr. Sareva (Secretary of the Committee): The Committee will now vote on draft resolution A/C.1/61/L.2, entitled "The risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East", as a whole.

A recorded vote was taken.

In favour:

Albania, Algeria, Andorra, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cape Verde, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Monaco, Mongolia, Moldova, Montenegro, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Romania, Russian Federation, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, San Marino, Saudi Arabia, Serbia, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Timor-Leste, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Venezuela

(Bolivarian Republic of), Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe.

Against:

Israel, Micronesia (Federated States of), Palau, United States of America.

Abstaining:

Australia, Cameroon, Canada, Ethiopia, India, Tonga.

Draft resolution A/C.1/61/L.2, as a whole, was adopted by 156 votes to 4, with 6 abstentions.

The Chairperson: The Committee will now proceed to take action on draft resolution A/C.1/61/L.3. A recorded vote has been requested.

I give the floor to the Secretary of the Committee to conduct the voting.

Mr. Sareva (Secretary of the Committee): Draft resolution A/C.1/61/L.3, entitled "Missiles", was introduced by the representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran at the 12th meeting of the First Committee, on 12 October 2006. The sponsors of the draft resolution are listed in document A/C.1/61/L.3.

A recorded vote was taken.

In favour:

Algeria, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Burkina Faso, Cambodia, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Cuba, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Jamaica, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Qatar, Russian Federation, Rwanda, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Saudi Arabia, Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Syrian Arab

Republic, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkmenistan, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of), Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe.

Against:

Albania, France, Israel, Micronesia (Federated States of), United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America.

Abstaining:

Andorra, Angola, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Canada, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Kenya, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Monaco, Moldova, Montenegro, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Romania, San Marino, Serbia, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Togo, Turkey, Ukraine.

Draft resolution A/C.1/61/L.3 was adopted by 105 votes to 6, with 55 abstentions.

The Chairperson: The Committee will now proceed to take action on draft decision A/C.1/61/L.16. A recorded vote has been requested.

I give the floor to the Secretary of the Committee to conduct the voting.

Mr. Sareva (Secretary of the Committee): Draft decision A/C.1/61/L.16, entitled "United Nations conference to identify ways of eliminating nuclear dangers in the context of nuclear disarmament", was issued on 10 October 2006 and is sponsored by Mexico. The sponsors of the draft decision is named in the document.

A recorded vote was taken.

In favour:

Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo,

Costa Rica, Cuba, Cyprus, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Nepal, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Qatar, Rwanda, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Saudi Arabia, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of), Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe.

Against:

France, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America.

Abstaining:

Albania, Andorra, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Canada, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Israel, Italy, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Moldova, Montenegro, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Romania, Russian Federation, San Marino, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Switzerland, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Turkey, Ukraine.

Draft decision A/C.1/61/L.16 was adopted by 116 votes to 3, with 44 abstentions.

The Chairperson: The Committee will now proceed to take action on draft resolution A/C.1/61/L.39. A recorded vote has been requested.

I give the floor to the Secretary of the Committee to conduct the voting.

Mr. Sareva (Secretary of the Committee): Draft resolution A/C.1/61/L.39, entitled "Nuclear disarmament", was introduced by the representative of Myanmar at the 16th meeting, on 18 October 2006. A list of sponsors of the draft resolution is contained in documents A/C.1/61/L.39 and A/C.1/61/CRP.5.

A recorded vote was taken.

In favour:

Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Burkina Faso, Cambodia, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Cuba, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Mauritania, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Nepal, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Qatar, Rwanda, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Saudi Arabia, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Togo, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of), Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe.

Against:

Albania, Andorra, Australia, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Israel, Italy, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Micronesia (Federated States of), Moldova, Monaco, Montenegro, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, San Marino, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Switzerland, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom of

Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America.

Abstaining:

Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belarus, India, Ireland, Japan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Malta, Mauritius, Pakistan, Republic of Korea, Russian Federation, Sweden, Uzbekistan.

Draft resolution A/C.1/61/L.39 was adopted by 105 votes to 45, with 16 abstentions.

The Chairperson: The Committee will now proceed to take action on draft resolution A/C.1/61/L.45. A recorded vote has been requested.

I give the floor to the Secretary of the Committee to conduct the voting.

Mr. Sareva (Secretary of the Committee): Draft resolution A/C.1/61/L.45, entitled “Conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons”, was introduced by the representative of Pakistan at the 18th meeting on, 20 October 2006. The sponsors of the draft resolution are listed in documents A/C.1/61/L.45 and A/C.1/61/CRP.5.

A recorded vote was taken.

In favour:

Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Cuba, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Qatar, Rwanda, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Saudi Arabia, Sierra Leone,

Singapore, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkmenistan, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of), Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe.

Against:

United States of America.

Abstaining:

Albania, Andorra, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Belarus, Belgium, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Canada, Côte d’Ivoire, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Micronesia (Federated States of), Moldova, Monaco, Montenegro, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Romania, Russian Federation, San Marino, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.

Draft resolution A/C.1/61/L.45 was adopted by 108 votes to 1, with 57 abstentions.

The Chairperson: The Committee will now proceed to take action on draft resolution A/C.1/61/L.49. A recorded vote has been requested.

I give the floor to the Secretary of the Committee to conduct the voting.

Mr. Sareva (Secretary of the Committee): Draft resolution A/C.1/61/L.49, entitled “Reducing nuclear danger”, was introduced by the representative of India at the 10th meeting, on 10 October 2006. A list of sponsors of the draft resolution is contained in documents A/C.1/61/L.49 and A/C.1/61/CRP.5. In addition, Bangladesh has become a sponsor of the draft resolution.

A recorded vote was taken.

In favour:

Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei

Darussalam, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Chile, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Cuba, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Qatar, Rwanda, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Saudi Arabia, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Togo, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkmenistan, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of), Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe.

Against:

Albania, Andorra, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Micronesia (Federated States of), Moldova, Monaco, Montenegro, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, San Marino, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America.

Abstaining:

Argentina, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, China, Ecuador, Japan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Paraguay, Republic of Korea, Russian Federation, Uzbekistan.

Draft resolution A/C.1/61/L.49 was adopted by 105 votes to 50, with 13 abstentions.

The Chairperson: The Committee will now proceed to take action on draft resolution A/C.1/61/L.51. A recorded vote has been requested.

I call on the Secretary of the Committee to conduct the voting.

Mr. Sareva (Secretary of the Committee): The Committee will now proceed to take action on draft resolution A/C.1/61/L.51, entitled "Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons". The draft resolution was introduced by the representative of India at the Committee's 10th meeting, on 10 October 2006. The sponsors are listed in documents A/C.1/61/L.51 and A/C.1/61/CRP.5.

A recorded vote was taken.

In favour:

Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Cuba, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Qatar, Rwanda, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Saudi Arabia, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Togo, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkmenistan, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of), Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe.

Against:

Albania, Andorra, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark,

Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Micronesia (Federated States of), Moldova, Monaco, Montenegro, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, San Marino, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America.

Abstaining:

Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Côte d'Ivoire, Japan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Republic of Korea, Russian Federation, Uzbekistan.

Draft resolution A/C.1/61/L.51 was adopted by 108 votes to 50, with 10 abstentions.

The Chairperson: I now call upon those delegations wishing to explain their decision or vote after the decision has been taken.

Mr. Zarka (Israel): I would like to explain my delegation's vote on draft resolution A/C.1/61/L.1, entitled "Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East".

Israel once again joined the consensus on draft resolution A/C.1/61/L.1, notwithstanding our substantive reservations regarding certain elements of the draft resolution. We did so because Israel remains committed to a vision of the Middle East developing into a zone free of chemical, biological and nuclear weapons, as well as ballistic missiles. Yet, we are also realistic enough to know that, in the current realities of the Middle East, that noble vision is not going to materialize any time soon. We welcome the return of the spirit of consensus, which, regrettably, was absent at the recent General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

Israel has always maintained that the nuclear issue — as well as all regional security issues, conventional and non-conventional alike — can be realistically addressed only within the conventional context.

Israel believes that current political realities in the Middle East mandate a gradual process based on a step-by-step approach. Such a process should begin with modest confidence-building measures, carefully selected so as not to detract from the security margins

of any State in the region, followed by the establishment of peaceful relations, reconciliation, mutual recognition and good-neighbourliness and complemented by conventional and non-conventional arms control measures. That could, in due course, lead to more ambitious goals, such as the establishment of a mutually verifiable nuclear-weapon-free zone.

Such a process is also grounded in the vast experience gained in other regions. As the international community has recognized, the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone should emanate from the region. It can be based only on an arrangement freely arrived at through direct negotiations among the States of the region and those directly concerned. Such a zone cannot be imposed from the outside, nor can it emerge before the conditions required for it have ripened.

Moreover, since the ultimate goal in the Middle East — as in other regions — is regional peace and security, the process of arms control negotiations should adequately address the threat perceptions of all participating States and must not hamper the security of any party. That process clearly cannot begin in situations where some of the parties concerned still maintain a state of war with each other, refuse in principle to maintain peaceful relations with Israel or even recognize its right to exist.

In that context, it should be recalled that in the Middle East — unlike in other regions of the world where nuclear-weapon-free zones have been established — there are continuing threats in the region and beyond against the very existence of one State, namely Israel. Those threats are significantly exacerbated by the irresponsible behaviour of certain States concerning the export of weapons of mass destruction and related technology and the discrepancy between their stated commitments and their actual behaviour.

Those circumstances and the poor track record of non-compliance with international obligations on the part of several States of the region have a critical impact on the ability to embark on a joint process of regional security-building that could eventually lead to a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. Let us bear in mind that three out of the four recognized cases of non-compliance with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons have taken place in the Middle East.

Israel has reiterated its vision of promoting regional peace and stability. Regrettably, last year's events did not bring us closer to that vision. We harbour no illusions: progress towards realizing that vision cannot be made without a fundamental change in regional circumstances and, not least, without a significant transformation in the attitude of States in the region towards Israel.

It is therefore our view that efforts in this context should be directed towards the creation of a stable environment of peace and reconciliation in our part of the world. Israel will continue to dedicate its efforts to achieving that goal. We call upon our neighbours to do the same.

Mr. Denot Medeiros (Brazil): I would like to take this opportunity to explain Brazil's vote on two draft resolutions under this cluster: A/C.1/61/L.49 and A/C.1/61/L.51.

First, with regard to draft resolution A/C.1/61/L.49, entitled "Reducing nuclear danger", my delegation voted in favour, because we are convinced that a review of nuclear doctrines, as called for in operative paragraph 1, could indeed help to reduce the risks of unintentional and accidental use of nuclear weapons by, for instance, de-alerting and de-targeting nuclear weapons.

Reducing the so-called nuclear danger cannot, however, be a substitute for multilaterally agreed disarmament measures. Irreversibility, transparency and verification would make disarmament measures consistent with the obligations under article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

Moreover, my delegation does not share the view, expressed in the draft resolution's first preambular paragraph, that the use of nuclear weapons poses the most serious threat to mankind. It is our understanding and conviction that the mere existence of these weapons is what constitutes a great risk to the whole world. We therefore would have preferred that the draft resolution be more in line with the thrust of the fourth preambular paragraph, which states that nuclear disarmament and the complete elimination of nuclear weapons are essential to remove the danger of nuclear war.

Turning to draft resolution A/C.1/61/L.51, entitled "Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons", Brazil again voted in favour. This,

essentially, was because we support the statement, contained in the third preambular paragraph, that a multilateral, universal and binding agreement prohibiting the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons would contribute to the elimination of the nuclear threat.

Negative security assurances, however, cannot be a substitute for multilaterally agreed disarmament measures. As I just stated, only irreversibility, transparency and verification would make disarmament measures consistent with the obligations under article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

We take note with satisfaction of the steps taken by the Russian Federation and the United States of America on bilateral measures of nuclear arms reduction, as referred to in the fourth preambular paragraph of document A/C.1/61/L.51. We concur that such bilateral measures are welcome, as they contribute to a more stable international security system. Again, however, they cannot be a substitute for multilaterally agreed disarmament measures. Accountability before the international community is an indispensable ingredient.

While information on nuclear reduction activities is certainly useful, we would have preferred, however, that the two nuclear Powers referred to in the draft resolution, as well as the other such Powers, would also reaffirm their commitment before the General Assembly to move the disarmament process forward and to provide information on their future intentions in this regard.

Mr. Cynkin (United States of America): First, I would like to offer an explanation of vote on the draft resolution A/C.1/61/L.3. Let me state that the United States has repeatedly made clear that it disagrees with the inclusion of this item on our agenda. Consequently, our delegation has voted against this draft resolution.

However, since the draft resolution has been adopted and a third panel of Governmental Experts will begin work in 2007, our delegation would like to reiterate some points that we made on this Group of Governmental Experts during the thematic debates. The two earlier Panels on the issue of missiles in all its aspects devoted extensive and valuable work to producing a report on this topic, and our delegation would not like to see their efforts wasted. The second Panel produced a final draft that represents near

consensus. We believe that the work of the third Panel should be based on this nearly completed final report, rather than beginning the process all over again, thereby repeating work that already has been conducted.

Our delegation considers that, despite its obvious value as a resource for next year's panel, the new report of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research on missiles is neither suited nor appropriate, for a variety of reasons, to serve as the basis on which the third Panel should begin its work.

Finally, we believe that the Panel should complete its work during 2007.

I would also like to offer an explanation of vote on A/C.1/61/L.45. The United States voted against draft resolution A/C.1/61/L.45, on concluding international arrangements on negative security assurances. We wish to make clear, as we have made clear in other contexts, that the United States continues to oppose any proposal for a negative security assurances treaty or other global, legally binding security assurances regime.

Mr. Ngoh Ngoh (Cameroon) (*spoke in French*): My delegation is taking the floor to give an explanation of vote on draft resolution A/C.1/61/L.1, entitled "Establishment of a nuclear-weapons-free zone in the Middle East" and on A/C.1/61/L.2, on "The risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East".

My delegation has customarily joined the consensus on draft resolutions on the creation of nuclear-weapons-free zones in the Middle East. Indeed, we believe that the creation of nuclear-weapons-free zones is a positive aspect because they contribute to the ultimate goal of global nuclear disarmament.

On the other hand, my delegation has abstained in the vote on A/C.1/61/L.2, on "The risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East". While we agree with the essential principles contained in the draft, we have difficulty with the wording of certain provisions which, in targeting and naming a single State, does not seem conducive to the achievement of consensus. This provision, in the view of my delegation, would benefit from being reformulated in a more balanced, non-discriminatory and less polemic manner.

Mr. Prasad (India): My delegation has requested the floor to explain its vote on draft resolutions contained in document A/C.1/61/L.2, entitled "The risk

of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East", and document A/C.1/61/L.39, entitled "Nuclear disarmament".

India abstained in the vote on A/C.1/61/L.2 as a whole and voted against its sixth preambular paragraph as it believes that the focus of this draft resolution should be limited to the region it intends to address. According to the rules of customary international law, codified in the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, States are bound by a treaty based on the principle of free consent. The call to those States remaining outside the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) to accede to it and to accept International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards on all their nuclear activities is at variance with that principle.

India also abstained in the vote on the draft resolution entitled "Nuclear disarmament", as contained in document A/C.1/61/L.39. India believes that the threat posed by nuclear weapons can only be addressed through their complete elimination in a progressive and systematic manner by pursuing global, verifiable and non-discriminatory disarmament.

As stated by our Prime Minister in the Indian Parliament, India's commitment to work towards universal nuclear disarmament will remain our core concern. We thus very much share the objective of the draft resolution, which is to establish a nuclear-weapons-free world. We have, however, been constrained to abstain in the vote on the draft resolution since it incorporates references to the NPT on which the Indian position is well known. Our vote in no way detracts from our support for the long-standing position on nuclear disarmament of the Non-Aligned Movement, which has accorded the highest priority to this goal.

Mr. Mine (Japan): I would like to explain Japan's voting on two draft resolutions.

First, on the draft resolution entitled "Nuclear disarmament", contained in document A/C.1/61/L.39, Japan shares the same ultimate goal as the draft resolution, namely the total elimination of nuclear weapons. In this regard, my delegation takes note of positive elements concerning nuclear disarmament in this draft resolution. Japan appreciates that the text contains a reference to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) as the cornerstone of nuclear non-proliferation and

disarmament, as agreed in the Final Document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference.

However, this draft resolution does not contain elements which are necessary for the international community, including nuclear-weapon States, to form an agreement towards nuclear disarmament. My delegation firmly believes that the steps towards nuclear disarmament should be realistic and progressive, with the involvement of all nuclear-weapon States. Therefore, my delegation would prefer to see a different approach from that proposed in this draft resolution towards the shared goal of the total elimination of nuclear weapons.

Secondly, I wish to explain my vote on the draft resolution entitled "Conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons", as contained in document A/C.1/61/L.45. Japan voted for that resolution, and it is Japan's view that the issue of the negative security assurance should be dealt with without prejudice to, and based on, the result of the ongoing discussions in the Conference on Disarmament.

Mr. Hashmi (Pakistan): I have taken the floor to explain our position on draft resolution A/C.1/61/L.39, entitled "Nuclear disarmament".

Achieving nuclear disarmament is a goal that Pakistan has always supported. My delegation shares a number of elements contained in the draft resolution, including on negative security assurances and others. However, we remain convinced that the resolution's references to documents and documentation relating to the NPT Review Conferences are unwarranted. Therefore we have abstained on this resolution, in keeping with our well-known position on the NPT.

The Chairperson: The Committee will now proceed to take action on draft resolutions under cluster 2, "Other weapons of mass destruction".

I give the floor to the representative of Finland to make a general statement on behalf of the European Union.

Mr. Kahiluoto (Finland): I am making this statement on behalf of the European Union on draft resolution A/C.1/61/L.27, entitled "Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction". The acceding

countries Bulgaria and Romania, the candidate countries Turkey, Croatia and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, the countries of the Stabilization and Association Process and potential candidates Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia and Montenegro, and the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) country Iceland, member of the European Economic Area, as well as Ukraine, align themselves with this statement.

The objective of the European Union is to further strengthen the Convention. The EU will promote this objective by actively working towards a successful outcome of the Review Conference later this year. For these purposes, the EU will, inter alia, contribute to a full review of the operation of the Convention, promote efforts to enhance transparency through an increased exchange of information among States parties, support further action being taken on the result of the intersessional work and support the further intersessional work programme until the seventh Review Conference, which should be held no later than 2011.

The European Union has submitted working papers in which our views and suggestions are elaborated in detail. The EU welcomes the positive outcome of the Preparatory Committee meeting in April and looks forward to a successful Review Conference with substantive results.

The Chairperson: Are there any other delegations wishing to make a general statement? Are there any explanations of votes before the vote? If not, the Committee will proceed to take action on draft resolution A/C.1/61/L.5.

A recorded vote has been requested.

I give the floor to the Secretary of the Committee to conduct the voting.

Mr. Sareva (Secretary of the Committee): Draft resolution A/C.1/61/L.5, entitled "Measures to uphold the authority of the 1925 Geneva Protocol", was introduced by the representative of Indonesia on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement at the 12th meeting, on 12 October 2006. The sponsors are listed in the draft resolution.

A recorded vote was taken.

In favour:

Albania, Algeria, Andorra, Angola, Antigua and

Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Moldova, Monaco, Mongolia, Montenegro, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Romania, Russian Federation, Rwanda, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, San Marino, Saudi Arabia, Serbia, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Timor-Leste, Togo, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of), Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe.

Against:

None.

Abstaining:

Israel, United States of America.

Draft resolution A/C.1/61/L.5 was adopted by 163 votes to none, with 2 abstentions.

The Chairperson: I first give the floor to the representative of Poland.

Mr. Januchowski (Poland): I apologize for taking the floor, but before the Committee takes action on draft resolution A/C.1/61/L.19, entitled "Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction" — of which Poland is the sole sponsor — my delegation would like to propose an oral revision. But before entering into the details, I would like to explain, and I am very pleased to inform all delegations to this Committee, that on 20 October 2006, one more country acceded to the Chemical Weapons Convention, namely, the Central African Republic. Let me congratulate the delegation of that country for its very right and timely decision to accede to the Convention.

I would then ask that this additional accession be reflected in the draft resolution. In the third preambular paragraph, change the number "five" to "six" in the reference to States that have acceded to the Chemical Weapons Convention in the past year, and correspondingly change the number of States parties to this Convention from "one hundred and seventy-nine" to "one hundred and eighty".

The Chairperson: The Committee will now proceed to the vote on draft resolution A/C.1/61/L.19, as orally revised.

I give the floor to the Secretary of the Committee.

Mr. Sareva (Secretary of the Committee): Draft resolution A/C.1/61/L.19, entitled "Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction", was introduced by the representative of Poland at the 12th meeting, on 12 October. The sole sponsor of the draft resolution is listed in document A/C.1/61/L.19.

The representative of Poland has just introduced two oral revisions to the third preambular paragraph, by which the word "six" would replace "five", and the words "one hundred and eighty" would replace "one hundred and seventy-nine".

The Chairperson: The sponsor of the draft resolution has expressed the wish that the Committee adopt the draft resolution, as orally revised, without a vote. If I hear no objection, I shall take it that the Committee wishes to act accordingly.

Draft resolution A/C.1/61/L.19, as orally revised, was adopted.

The Chairperson: The Committee will now proceed to take action on draft resolution A/C.1/61/L.27.

I give the floor to the Secretary of the Committee.

Mr. Sareva (Secretary of the Committee): Draft resolution A/C.1/61/L.27, entitled “Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction”, was introduced by the representative of Hungary at the 12th meeting, on 12 October. The sponsor of the draft resolution is listed in document A/C.1/61/L.27.

In connection with draft resolution A/C.1/61/L.27, entitled “Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction”, I wish to put on record the following statement of financial implications on behalf of the Secretary-General.

“Under the terms of operative paragraph 7 of draft resolution A/C.1/61/L.27, the General Assembly would

‘[Request] the Secretary-General to continue to render the necessary assistance to the depositary Governments of the Convention and to provide such services as may be required for the implementation of the decisions and recommendations of the Review Conferences.’

“The costs related to the implementation of the decisions and recommendations of the review conferences, including any subsequent meetings that might be held in accordance with positions and recommendations made by the sixth Review Conference, would be borne by the States parties and States non-parties to the Convention participating in such meetings, in accordance with the United Nations scale of assessments, adjusted appropriately.

“It is recalled that all activities relating to international conventions or treaties under their respective legal arrangements are to be financed outside the regular budget of the United Nations. These activities would be undertaken by the

Secretariat after sufficient funding is received in advance from States parties.

“Accordingly, the adoption of draft resolution A/C.1/61/L.27 would not give rise to financial implications under the programme budget for the biennium 2006-2007.”

The Chairperson: The sponsors of the draft resolution have expressed the wish that the Committee adopt the draft resolution without a vote. If I hear no objection, I shall take it that the Committee wishes to act accordingly.

Draft resolution A/C.1/61/L.27 was adopted.

The Chairperson: The Committee will now proceed to take action on draft resolution A/C.1/61/L.52*.

I give the floor to the Secretary of the Committee.

Mr. Sareva (Secretary of the Committee): Draft resolution A/C.1/61/L.52*, entitled “Measures to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction”, was introduced by the representative of India at the 12th meeting, on 12 October. The sponsors of the draft resolution are listed in documents A/C.1/61/L.52* and A/C.1/61/CRP.5. In addition, the following countries have become sponsors of the draft resolution: Argentina, Cyprus, Croatia, Ireland, Singapore and Serbia.

The Chairperson: The sponsors of the draft resolution have expressed the wish that the Committee adopt the draft resolution without a vote. If I hear no objection, I shall take it that the Committee wishes to act accordingly.

Draft resolution A/C.1/61/L.52 was adopted.*

The Chairperson: I now give the floor to the representative of Pakistan, who wishes to speak in explanation of position on the draft resolution just adopted.

Mr. Hashmi (Pakistan): I wish to explain my delegation’s position on draft resolution A/C.1/61/L.52*, entitled “Measures to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction”.

We support the objective of the draft resolution, although we continue to believe that its language could have been improved to convey a more objective reflection of reality. The fear that terrorists and other non-State actors might acquire and use weapons of

mass destruction (WMDs) is a recent phenomenon. However, this danger must be viewed in perspective. Terrorist organizations and other non-State actors are more likely to acquire and use chemical weapons or biological weapons capabilities. The acquisition and use of nuclear weapons by terrorists and other non-State actors is much less likely. This concern should not become an excuse for discrimination against selected countries.

The international community must not, however, lower its guard if it wishes to prevent the development and use of “dirty” bombs. Increased international cooperation, including the initiation of negotiations on a radiological weapons convention, should be given serious consideration.

As regards denying terrorists the means to acquire, possess and use WMDs, it is necessary for all States to enact and enforce national physical protection and export-control measures to prevent WMD technology from falling into the hands of terrorists. International assistance and capacity-building are areas that require urgent attention.

To lend greater legitimacy to international efforts in this area, interim measures, such as the adoption of Security Council resolutions 1540 (2004) and 1673 (2006), which were designed to fill the gap in international law, need to be taken up by a more inclusive and representative United Nations forum.

We agree with the widely held view that the best guarantee against the threat of possible use of nuclear, chemical or biological weapons is their elimination. Faithful implementation of existing treaty regimes, such as the Chemical Weapons Convention, can effectively address most of these threats. The early disarmament of chemical stocks would enhance the level of confidence against the likelihood of their acquisition and use by terrorists. However, as long as the process of chemical weapons disarmament proceeds at this slow pace and huge quantities of chemical weapons exist, the possibility of such weapons falling into terrorist hands will remain as well.

The control of biological weapons should be of more concern, in particular, to the industrially advanced States, due to the extensive use of biological agents. The Biological Weapons Convention should, therefore, be strengthened, in particular by reviving the draft biological weapons verification protocol, which was negotiated over eight years. We are convinced that a revival of that process would fully serve the goal of promoting international peace and security, as well as address the concerns expressed, for example, in this draft resolution.

We are convinced that a comprehensive strategy must be evolved in order to prevent the possibility of terrorists gaining access to weapons of mass destruction; this must include, first, depriving terrorist organizations of their operational and organizational capabilities; secondly, strengthening the relevant existing multilateral regimes; thirdly, negotiating a universal treaty to fill the gaps in current international instruments; fourthly, augmenting States’ capacity to implement global treaty obligations; and, finally, addressing the root causes of terrorism. A distinction must be made between counter-terrorism and counter-proliferation.

Draft resolution A/C.1/61/L.52*, quite appropriately, mentions the Final Document of the Fourteenth Summit of the Non-Aligned Movement as having expressed itself on the issue of weapons of mass destruction and terrorism. We would like to recall that, in the context of the issue of terrorism, the same document also stresses the need to address the causes that sometimes lead to terrorism — causes that lie in suppression, injustice and deprivation.

The Chairperson: Owing to time constraints, the Committee has been unable to complete its action on all of the draft resolutions and decisions contained in informal paper No. 1. Consequently, at its next meeting the Committee will first take action on the remaining draft resolutions in that paper, starting with those in cluster 3.

The meeting rose at 6 p.m.