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NOTE

Symbols of United Nations documents are composed of capital letters combined with figures. Mention of such a symbol indicates a reference to a United Nations document.

Documents of the Security Council (symbol S/. . .) are normally published in quarterly *Supplements of the Official Records of the Security Council*. The date of the document indicates the supplement in which it appears or in which information about it is given.

The resolutions of the Security Council, numbered in accordance with a system adopted in 1964, are published in yearly volumes of *Resolutions and Decisions of the Security Council*. The new system, which has been applied retroactively to resolutions adopted before 1 January 1965, became fully operative on that date.

THIRTEEN HUNDRED AND EIGHTY-THIRD MEETING

Held in New York on Friday, 24 November 1967, at 8 p.m.

President: Mr. Mamadou Boubacar KANTÉ (Mali).

Present: The representatives of the following States: Argentina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, China, Denmark, Ethiopia, France, India, Japan, Mali, Nigeria, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and United States of America.

Provisional agenda (S/Agenda/1383)

1. Adoption of the agenda.
2. Letter dated 26 December 1963 from the Permanent Representative of Cyprus addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/5488):
Letter dated 24 November 1967 from the Permanent Representative of Cyprus addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/8262).

Statement by the President

1. The PRESIDENT (*translated from French*): The present meeting of the Council has been convened at very short notice at the urgent request of the representative of Cyprus. Owing to the urgency of the situation, I was obliged to convene the meeting without being able to hold the customary consultations with all members of the Council. I have no doubt that members will understand that I have acted solely in the interest of international peace and security in the very serious circumstances of which we are all aware.

Adoption of the agenda

The agenda was adopted.

Letter dated 26 December 1963 from the Permanent Representative of Cyprus addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/5488):

Letter dated 24 November 1967 from the Permanent Representative of Cyprus addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/8262)

2. The PRESIDENT (*translated from French*): By letters dated 24 November 1967, the representatives of Cyprus, Greece and Turkey have requested permission to participate without vote in the discussion of this agenda item. These letters have been circulated as documents S/8263, S/8264 and S/8265 respectively. If I hear no objection I propose with the consent of the Council to invite the representatives of Cyprus, Greece and Turkey to take places at the Council table.

At the President's invitation Mr. Z. Rossides (Cyprus), Mr. O. Eralp (Turkey) and Mr. A. S. Bitsios (Greece) took places at the Council table.

3. The PRESIDENT (*translated from French*): The Security Council will now take up the complaint submitted to it in document S/8262. I call upon the first speaker on my list, the representative of Cyprus.

4. Mr. ROSSIDES (Cyprus): I am sorry that the Council had to be convened at such a late hour, but my country is under imminent threat of attack and invasion by a powerful neighbour, Turkey, with which we wish to live in peace. During the last few days there have been continuous threats of invasion, preparations for invasion, by the navy, military forces and air force of Turkey. Then we have had a series of flights over the territory of Cyprus—a great number of them, daily—some flying at a very low level—as low as 500 feet—and some remaining over the Island for as long as thirty minutes, flying from one end of the Island to the other, terrorizing the population and constituting a threat of invasion.

5. I have sent two letters dated 22 and 23 November to the President of the Security Council giving a list of the overflights, the hours and the heights in each case, and the type of aircraft which was flying over the territory [S/8260 and S/8261].

6. I do not think that I need elaborate to a great extent on the existing threat of invasion. It has been proclaimed almost boastfully by Turkey itself and it is within the knowledge of all Governments that this week-end has been predetermined as the time when this illegal act of invasion of Cyprus is to take place. Of course, if this were the eighteenth or the nineteenth century, or even the days before the Second World War, this would have been a normal practice. But we are now in the United Nations era. We have the Charter of the United Nations, which explicitly forbids any threat or use of force against the territorial integrity and political independence of any State. No threat or use of force in international relations is allowed under the Charter, and this is an obligation solemnly undertaken by all States Members of the United Nations; it is indeed the cornerstone of the Charter. It is that part of the Charter that introduced the change into our world from a world of force and domination to one of reason and co-operation in peace. If this concept, contained in Article 2, paragraph 4, which is a legal obligation under the Charter, is torn to pieces, then the United Nations can no longer exist, or it will have no meaning, and the world will find itself on a steep downward path—not just a downward path, but on

the edge of an actual precipice—to regression, to the rule of the jungle. That is the meaning contained in the threats of aggression against Cyprus which, as I said before, we are very sorry to note are made with little concern for the Charter.

7. I shall cite a few of the facts as given out. A military source in Ankara said that air force, army and navy units stationed in south central Turkey, just forty miles north of Cyprus, were on the alert. Military activity has been noted around Ankara and on the highways leading to the Mediterranean coast. Then, when Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel was asked whether a landing would be made on Cyprus, he told reporters: "Let no one worry; we can land."

8. The list of threats to invade Cyprus is a long one and I shall refer to it if necessary, but this has been linked with certain events that took place at Ayios Theodoros. A patrol which had regularly patrolled for the last four years stopped its patrols and resumed them again later; the attack by Turkish rebels against the patrol led to bloodshed and fighting. All this is most regrettable and causes great concern on our part. However, these events are not the cause of Turkey's threatening attitude with regard to Cyprus. If we look back, we can see that this is not the first time that Turkey has threatened to invade Cyprus; each time it has found some pretext. The real reason is that, all along, it has been the policy of Turkey to invade Cyprus and partition it by force. Partition of the Island has been the aim of Turkey. It knows very well that it cannot attain it through the United Nations or by any peaceful means. It cannot even bring it forward as a claim in any international forum. It may do so in private negotiations which it tries to carry on, but not in any international forum. Therefore, if Turkey cannot achieve its aims by negotiations, it wants to attain them by force. There is a great deal of evidence to this effect not only now, but there has also been in the past.

9. In 1964 we heard repeated statements to that effect. In May of that year Mr. Kemal Satir, who was Turkish Deputy Prime Minister, said: "Today everything is ready for Turkish intervention in Cyprus and Turkish forces can occupy Cyprus within six hours." Was that in anticipation of the Ayios Theodoros events? But we know more. What did the same Mr. Kemal Satir mean by saying, in a public statement made in the same month and in the same year, "Cyprus will be divided into two sections, one of which will join Turkey"? That was the purpose of invasion at that time and that is the purpose of the projected invasion now. So let us see things as they really are. The reality is that Turkey insists on having Cyprus partitioned by the use of force, and in following that use of force it simply rules out the rule of law.

10. My appeal to you, Mr. President and members of the Security Council, is that my country must be protected from this threat of invasion. Cyprus is a small island in the Mediterranean and it is threatened by a big, powerful, neighbour Turkey, which boasts of its great population of over 30 million and of its military power. For our part we have no military power. We had no forces at all before the events, and what we have now was built up purposely to

prevent aggression and invasion from Turkey and make it less easy for Turkey to invade Cyprus. But it has become more difficult to defend Cyprus from external dangers, because for the past two years Turkey has begun an intensive build-up and a feverish training of troops and has undertaken airborne operations for the specific purpose of invading Cyprus. That is the reason why it is threatened now, and I ask this Council to afford us the protection we need.

11. I have a long list of facts here but I do not wish to take up much of the time of this Council in quoting from them. Mr. Erkin, who was the Turkish Foreign Minister, in an interview given in June 1964 said: "The radical solution of Cyprus would be to cede one part of Cyprus to Greece, and the other, closest to the Turkish Adriatic coast, to Turkey". So that is the position with which we are now faced. I will not proceed further but, I would ask for a resolution of this Council that would protect the territorial integrity, the sovereignty and political independence of Cyprus from this grave threat of invasion by Turkey.

12. The PRESIDENT (*translated from French*): I now call on the representative of Turkey.

13. Mr. ERALP (Turkey): The Council has been called to a meeting at this late hour upon an urgent appeal by Ambassador Rossides whom we have just had the privilege of hearing. This meeting comes at a time when the peace in Cyprus and the Eastern Mediterranean has been once again jeopardized by the irresponsible actions of the Greeks and Greek Cypriots under General Grivas. It comes at a time when not only the friends of all parties to the dispute but also the Secretary-General of the United Nations and his Special Representative in the area are making a supreme effort to avert the fire which has been kindled in Athens and Nicosia. The meeting has obviously been called by Ambassador Rossides so that he may once again indulge in his now well-known distortions of fact and in his attempts to whitewash brazen and brutal aggression by crying "wolf" and diverting the attention of the Council to other wider issues. I shall attempt briefly to correct the perspective by dwelling on the real issues involved.

14. We have heard from Ambassador Rossides pious protestations of national sovereignty and territorial integrity of Cyprus and the existence of an imminent threat to this integrity. We do believe that the territorial integrity and the independence of the State of Cyprus are in mortal danger. We also believe that the Greek and Greek Cypriot attack on the Turkish Cypriot villages of Ayios Theodoros and Kophinou was the initiation of the process which would have ultimately put an end to the independence of Cyprus by completing its union with Greece. Those areas of Cyprus which are under the authority of the Greek Cypriot Administration have been, in most respects, under the occupation of Greece since 1964. The Secretary-General in his numerous reports has brought to the attention of the Security Council the infiltration of the Greek Army of occupation into Cyprus which was taking place in collusion with the Greek Cypriot Administration. The result of this is that the Greek Cypriot armed forces on Cyprus consist largely of the army regulars in Greece; the officer corps consists almost entirely of the Greek Army officers and the

Commander-in-Chief is a Greek general responsible not to any Greek Cypriot authority but directly to the Office of the Greek General Staff in Athens. When in 1966 a personal misunderstanding arose between this Commander-in-Chief and the Greek Cypriot President of Cyprus and Archbishop Makarios requested from the Government of Greece the replacement of the Commander-in-Chief, he was properly rebuked by the then Greek Prime Minister and had to withdraw his request.

15. The latest warning sounded by the Secretary-General regarding this encroachment on the sovereignty of the State of Cyprus was contained in paragraph 29 of his report of 13 June 1967 submitted to the Council in which the Secretary-General informed the Council that:

“Over the past few months the Force has noticed increased signs of a tendency to identify the Cyprus National Guard with the Greek Army. These include the widespread use of the Greek Army cap badge by the National Guard and the use of the Greek royal crown in flags and sign boards at many National Guard camps, while the oath taken by recent National Guard recruits on enlistment now incorporates allegiance to the King of Greece”. [S/7969, para. 29.]¹

16. Greece and the Greek Cypriot Administration, acting in collusion and relying on the military strength they built up on the Island, set out, in total disregard of resolution 186 (1964) of the Security Council of 4 March 1964, to adopt measures designed to lead to the annexation of Cyprus to Greece. As the build-up of Greek military power in Cyprus grew, Greece and the Greek Cypriot Administration became more audacious in their actions. In February 1966, in a joint *communiqué* issued in Athens the then Prime Minister of Greece and Archbishop Makarios precluded any solution to the question of Cyprus which excluded *Enosis*. More recently, the most influential member of the junta which is ruling Greece at the moment, Colonel Papadopoulos, thought his Government's military position in Cyprus strong enough to refer with impunity to Cyprus as “the southern part of Greece”, during a visit he paid to Cyprus in August of this year. Archbishop Makarios saw no harm in stating on the occasion of that visit that the immutable aim of their struggle was *Enosis*, while the Greek members of the Cyprus House of Representatives, meeting without the Turkish members, adopted a resolution in June 1967 which affirmed that the struggle would continue until Cyprus as a whole was united with Greece.

17. The military action against the Turkish Cypriot villages of Ayios Theodoros and Kophinou was launched against this background. The detailed account of the preparation and the initiation of the Greek and Greek Cypriot attack is provided with accuracy in the Secretary-General's report to the Council in document S/8248.² I shall not, therefore, abuse the patience of the Council by going over this account once again, and shall confine myself to pointing out its salient points. These are:

18. First, the attack was launched at a time when UNFICYP had already been informed by the Turkish side that its plan—that is UNFICYP's plan—for the resumption of patrolling in Ayios Theodoros was acceptable and that this reported change in the Turkish attitude was reiterated to the Greek Cypriot Administration on 14 November.

19. Second, Kophinou, the second Turkish village, which simultaneously came under attack, was not connected with the question of patrolling [*ibid.*, para. 10].

20. Third, even though the patrolling, the resumption of which was the subject of negotiation, was to take place twice a week, on 14 November the Greek Cypriot armed personnel conducted several patrols at short intervals—which was not customary and no doubt was an important factor in the developments that followed [*ibid.*, para. 19].

21. Fourth, the magnitude of the operation and the speed with which it was carried out clearly indicated that it was planned in advance [*ibid.*, para. 24].

22. Finally, the UNFICYP Commander saw no justification for what the Greek Cypriots tried to explain away as defensive action [*ibid.*, para. 22].

23. In fact, the Turkish Government is in possession of reliable information that a joint Greek and Greek Cypriot Force of approximately 3,000 men supported by about three dozen armoured cars and heavy weapons and artillery, was utilized in this attack. Furthermore, there were strong indications that the military operation launched against these two Turkish Cypriot villages would be extended to Mari, another Turkish Cypriot village some five miles further south. General Grivas, who personally directed the Greek attack, was apparently out to put into practice what he had vowed on 30 October 1967 to do. On the occasion of Greek celebrations held annually on that date, he declared: “If *Enosis* is denied to them then the Greeks will conquer it with their swords.”

24. The attack on the two Turkish Cypriot villages has been brutal beyond description. The villages were almost completely destroyed as a result of indiscriminate shelling by heavy artillery and mortar fire. But, the attackers were not content with the destruction of non-military buildings and death they had rained on the civilian population. When they overcame the resistance of the one hundred-odd Turkish Cypriot fighters who defended the two villages, they ransacked, pillaged and looted every building. We have first-hand information from the Turkish Embassy in Nicosia about the hatred and enmity unleashed on the Turkish Cypriots of this village. Bodies were found in the two villages which were dismembered, which had been shot repeatedly, burned and had the eyes gouged out. Among those were elderly civilians and women.

25. We have reason to believe that had the Turkish Government not taken the very firm attitude that it took and had it not been for the very energetic intervention of the Secretary-General and of UNFICYP, the same fate would have befallen the Turkish village of Mari and possibly the Turkish sector of Larnaca, town in the South of the

¹ *Official Records of the Security Council, Twenty-second Year, Supplement for April, May and June 1967.*

² *Ibid.*, Supplement for October, November and December 1967.

Island where recent fortification and troop deployment by the Greek Cypriots along the Artemis Road, encircling the Turkish sector of the town, as early as May of this year, are viewed by the Cypriot Turks as one of the links in the Greek plan of completing the *de facto* union of the Island with Greece.

26. Moreover, the Turkish Government believes that the Government of Greece is directly responsible for the attack on the two Turkish villages. General Grivas, as I just mentioned, personally directed the operation and it is also known that the Greek units which were occupying the two villages were withdrawn on orders which emanated not from Nicosia but from Athens. The significance of this can be better realized when it is considered together with the method utilized in the execution of the operation. The Secretary-General's report on the Greek Cypriot operation relates [*ibid.*, *para.* 22] how UNFICYP units were forced to evacuate their positions, how these positions were occupied by the Greek troops and how UNFICYP soldiers were forcibly and deliberately disarmed and their means of communication disabled. The inescapable conclusion drawn by the Turkish Government from these incidents is that the presence of this powerful Greek army in Cyprus greatly jeopardizes the ability of UNFICYP to carry out its mandate and that the Greeks are in a position to eliminate the UNFICYP presence, whenever they desire, from the area of their intended operation. Based on these considerations and in the light of recent events, the Turkish Government firmly believes that the only element which threatens the peace on the Island, which poses the greatest danger to the security of life of the Turkish community, and the most direct impediment to the effective functioning of UNFICYP in Cyprus, emerges as the presence of the illegal Greek Army of occupation which has been brought to the Island surreptitiously and with the collusion of the Greek Cypriot Administration.

27. This Greek Army of occupation, which has not flinched at attacking and putting out of action units of the United Nations Peace-keeping Force, thereby openly defying the authority of this Council, must go if peace is to return to the troubled Island.

28. At the time this Greek military build-up was initiated and the Greek Cypriot National Guard was in the process of formation with the material assistance of the Government of Greece, the Secretary-General in his reports of 15 June 1964 [*S/5764*] and 10 September 1964 [*S/5950*] drew the attention of the Security Council to the ramifications of this build-up and raised the question whether the importation of arms into Cyprus was consistent with the letter and spirit of the Security Council resolution 186 (1964) of 4 March 1964. For our part, we had no doubt in our minds that this build-up, which continued unabated to date, was inconsistent with the letter and spirit of that resolution. We, therefore, proposed on 8 August 1964 [*1142nd meeting*] and at subsequent meetings of the Security Council, several measures which we believed could effectively check the Greek and Cypriot military build-up on the Island. These proposals included, *inter alia*, the placing of points of entry into Cyprus under effective control and surveillance, and controlled disarmament of both sides. Unfortunately, neither the Secretary-General's warning nor our suggestions

found then the response they deserved. I think it will be quite in order to say now that had the Council taken that course we would have been spared the ominous dangers of the present grave crisis.

29. It is somewhat poor satisfaction for us to see that the Secretary-General, in the appeal he issued this afternoon to the parties, envisages more or less the same measures we had then demanded and failed to obtain.

30. Despite the ferocity of the Greek Cypriot military action mounted against the two Turkish Cypriot villages, their near total destruction and the heavy casualties inflicted on their Turkish inhabitants, the Turkish Government acted with restraint and refrained from taking action directly connected with the Greek and Greek Cypriot operations, in order to save the peace of the region. Despite this restrained attitude and in complete disregard of the repeated appeals and protests addressed to the Greek Cypriot Administration by UNFICYP, the Greek Cypriots have not only continued to send frequent patrols to the Turkish sector of Ayios Theodoros, but they have gone so far as to establish a permanent patrol post there in an extremely provocative manner. Information in our possession indicates that the Greek Government continues at an accelerated pace to ship military arms and equipment, particularly heavy arms, to the Island, and Greek papers on the Island announce with fanfare that actions against the Turkish Cypriots will be launched and extended all over the Island.

31. With respect to the immediate action which the Council may feel disposed to take concerning the situation around Kophinou and Ayios Theodoros, my Government believes that the following three points should be seriously considered:

(a) The condemnation of the inhuman crimes perpetrated against the Turkish community at Kophinou and Ayios Theodoros;

(b) The payment of compensation to the inhabitants of the two villages; and

(c) The provision of effective guarantees for the security of the two Turkish villages.

32. From what I have just said, it is evident that my Government believes that the most important question we are faced with at the moment is the removal of the element of ever-present threat posed by the illegal presence of the Greek forces in Cyprus. Unless this is accomplished and accomplished promptly we cannot hope to achieve anything concrete towards the restoration of peace and quiet on the Island; we cannot expect to remove the impediment obstructing the efficient functioning of UNFICYP, and we cannot dispel the fear and doubt lurking in everybody's mind that such Greek atrocities may occur again.

33. The PRESIDENT (*translated from French*): I call on the representative of Greece.

34. Mr. BITSIOS (Greece) (*translated from French*): "The hour of reckoning has come." These threatening words are the Turkish Foreign Minister's reply to the appeals for

moderation addressed to him from all sides. It is likewise the reply which Mr. Çağlayangil gave to the conciliatory proposals made to him by the Foreign Minister of Greece in a supreme effort to avoid the worst. To give substance to these utterances, the Turkish army, navy and air force are preparing for war and again threatening the Island of Cyprus. This is the reason which has brought us here again tonight.

35. Before we furnish proof of the danger which is threatening peace in this area of the eastern Mediterranean, the Council would no doubt like to hear the views of the Greek Government on the circumstances which have led to this lamentable state of affairs.

36. Mr. President, you have heard the account given by the representative of Cyprus of the circumstances surrounding the events which took place on 15 November at Ayios Theodoros and Kophinou. We deeply deplore these events, and we are opposed to any action likely to involve the loss of human life. The Greek Government's attempts at moderation over many years lend weight to what I say.

37. The Turkish representative saw fit to add his somewhat violently expressed indignation to the general expression of regret and disquiet concerning these developments. He was wrong to do so because the root of these events is the refusal of the Turkish Government to co-operate with the United Nations regarding the resumption of patrols by the Cyprus police. The resumption of patrols fell within the framework of the sovereign rights of the State of Cyprus. This right is incontestable and has not been contested by the United Nations. What the United Nations did was to try to secure the prior agreement of the Turkish Government so that the patrols could take place without incident.

38. It may seem strange that it was thought necessary to secure the agreement of Ankara regarding action which came within the sovereign rights of the Cyprus Government. Certainly there is no legal, juridical explanation and one is tempted to conclude that the efforts made in Ankara resulted from the idea that, in the last analysis, the reaction of the Turkish Cypriots in Ayios Theodoros towards the patrols would depend on the instructions given them by the Turkish Government.

39. It has been established that for two months the Turkish Government has turned a deaf ear to the injunctions of the United Nations. The Secretary-General tells us in his report:

"I . . . made repeated representation at Headquarters to the Permanent Representative of Turkey to the United Nations in support of these efforts" (that is, the efforts of the Force). "On 27 October I addressed an urgent personal appeal to the Turkish Government, requesting its co-operation with the Force and its acceptance of the proposed time-table for the resumption of patrols."
[S/8248, para. 6.]

40. September, October, mid-November—the patrols were not resumed until the 14th of this month. In virtue of what obligation could the Government of Cyprus be expected to wait any longer for the assent from Ankara? The assent

was not forthcoming, and for a good reason! Obviously, Ankara wanted to set up another Turkish enclave in the region of Ayios Theodoros, in other words, to prevent peaceful coexistence between Turkish and Greek elements there too.

41. Yet only a few days before these incidents took place, the Cypriot Government gave spectacular proof of its desire to prevent the situation in Cyprus from worsening by setting at liberty that most fanatical of fanatics Mr. Raouf Denktash.

42. It seems to me that it was for Ankara to make a conciliatory gesture in its turn by informing the Turkish army officer commanding the rebels at Ayios Theodoros that it had agreed to the resumption of patrols.

43. But apparently, in and around Cyprus conciliatory gestures are regarded by Ankara as one-way traffic. Otherwise, how are we to explain the shooting and machine-gun fire with which the Turkish Cypriots have welcomed the government patrols?

44. A series of grave events ensued which, I say again, we deeply deplore. The Greek Government's regret is to be measured by the speed with which it brought its moderating influence to bear and helped to bring about appeasement.

45. I now feel it my duty to put before the Security Council a number of facts which will enable it to make a better evaluation of the situation now under consideration. This information concerns the behaviour of the Turkish Government prior to the incidents of 15 November and will help to show that, during the week which preceded these incidents, Turkey spared no effort to create an atmosphere charged with tension. And of course, the spark at Ayios Theodoros set the powder alight.

46. I should like to remind the Council of certain facts with which it is already familiar. As a result of talks between the representatives of Greece and Turkey lasting, with a few interruptions, over a period of more than a year and conducted on more than one occasion by the Foreign Ministers of the two countries, the Greek Government took the initiative of crowning these talks with a meeting at the highest level in an endeavour to bring them to a successful conclusion. The Prime Ministers of Greece and Turkey, accompanied by their closest collaborators, met on 9 and 10 September this year to discuss the state of relations between the two countries and the Cyprus question, as well as ways and means of solving existing problems. Unfortunately, in Thrace the negative attitude of the Turkish Government caused the meetings to end in a stalemate and brought the solution of the Cyprus question to an impasse. However, the two Prime Ministers reached agreement on two points which were mentioned in the final *communiqué* of that meeting: (1) That appropriate measures were necessary to prevent any increase of tension in Cyprus; (2) That it was in the interest of both countries to strengthen their bonds of friendship, good neighbourliness and co-operation.

47. The *communiqué* is dated 10 September 1967. It would be interesting to look more closely at the manner in

which Turkey has implemented the agreement on those two points, especially following the accusations which our colleague, Mr. Eralp, has just made against Greece.

48. First of all, as regards the peaceful situation on the Island of Cyprus, the Council has already taken cognizance of the responsibility of the Turkish Government on the question of patrols. The background to its stonewalling attitude which led to the events of 15 November is amply described in the Secretary-General's reports to the Council.

49. But that attitude does not apply to those particular events alone. The aggressive and threatening voice of Turkey made itself heard long before they took place. One or two examples will give an idea of the tone used.

50. On 18 September the Turkish newspaper *Yeni Istanbul* published the following statement by General Tansel, the Turkish aviation chief:

"We are ready, not to repel aggression, but to launch an attack at any time. Look at the example of Cyprus . . . We launched our attack on 8 August 1964. If we had not been stopped, there would be no Cyprus problem today. Even today, the same result could be achieved at any time. However well Cyprus may organize its defences, there is no problem for us; it is a matter of hours."

This was on 18 September, a few days after the meeting in Thrace and the *communiqué* promising co-operation, and two months before the events at Ayios Theodoros.

51. This warlike atmosphere is reflected characteristically in a speech made by the head of the Turkish National Party at Edirne on 17 September. This is what he said, speaking of Cyprus:

"The solution to the Cyprus problem is extremely simple. All that is necessary is to bomb the Island with 200 aircraft, conquer it, then negotiate from a position of strength. It is as simple as that."

52. Then we have the secret dispatch to Cyprus of Mr. Raouf Denktash, whose extremist views are well known. It is so obvious that the Turkish Government was aware of the disastrous effect of his presence in the island that Mr. Denktash was carefully kept in Turkey throughout the entire period of the talks between Greece and Turkey. So much for the "peaceful situation" on the Island!

53. The voice of the Turkish representative is familiar to me. I have memories of his statements in the Council in 1964 and 1965, of his rapid-fire accusations against the Greeks, charging them with genocide against the Turkish race. I ask him to examine his statistics more carefully. He will find among them some very startling figures. But he will also discover that the genocide is on his side, for the statistics will show him that, while the number of Turkish Cypriots and Muslims in Thrace has remained unchanged, the Greeks of Istanbul and those of the island of Imvros have been decimated. Of the 100,000 living in Istanbul at the beginning of the Cyprus crisis there are now only 30,000 left. On Imvros the extermination programme is diabolical in conception and ghastly in its details. More

than 50 per cent of the Greek inhabitants of the island have been forced to flee their homeland and their birthplace.

54. So much for the genocide, and so much for the balance established by the Treaty of Lausanne, and cited by Turkey as an excuse for its armed opposition to the just and equitable solution of the Cyprus problem, while in the meantime it upsets that balance to its own advantage. For as it stretches forth its right hand in the name of the balance set up by the Treaty of Lausanne to receive "compensation" in any solution—I repeat, in any solution of the Cyprus problem—with its left hand it has already taken the lion's share throwing that balance to the winds.

55. My Government has already brought before the Security Council the question of the fate of Greek nationals in Istanbul and the Greek minority living in Turkey. Although the Council has been unable to help them, it will at any rate recall the facts described to it by my delegation at the time and confirming the accuracy of the additional information I have given today. I therefore express the hope that the Council will advise the Turkish representative to broaden his field of vision, since we are not only dealing here with the question of the victims of the incidents at Ayios Theodoros and Kophinou; we are concerned with a tragic escalation stemming from Ankara which has on each occasion resulted in the gradual but systematic extermination of the Greek element, and the Greek element alone.

56. After that diversion, let me return to the events of the present. Among the provocative acts of the Turkish Government which preceded the events at Ayios Theodoros were wholesale violations of Greek air space, from 2 November 1967 onwards, by Turkish military planes, singly and in formation. Contrary to the belated explanations of the Turkish Government these violations—which my delegation reported to the Security Council—took place without the knowledge of the Greek authorities and in defiance of international rules. None of the international or *ad hoc* procedures governing the flight of military planes belonging to one State in the air space of another State were followed by the Turkish Government, whose military planes in some cases penetrated Greek air space to within a few minutes' flight of the Greek capital.

57. Following the events of 15 November, Turkey pushed its intimidation tactics to extremes. Turkish sabre-rattling could be heard throughout the entire region from Cyprus to the Greek-Turkish frontier, and can still be heard today. In addition, the Turkish National Assembly authorized the Turkish Government to use the country's armed forces beyond its national borders. Any possible doubt as to the significance of that resolution of the National Assembly was dispelled by the government-controlled Radio Ankara in a broadcast on 18 September 1967 at 7 p.m. I quote part of it:

"Even without this National Assembly resolution, Turkey could intervene in Cyprus under the treaties of London and Zurich in the capacity of a guarantor Power. Consequently, the great National Assembly was not convened for this reason but, although it has not been clearly stated, in order to authorize the Government to extend the scope of its action should Greece become involved in the course of the intervention in Cyprus."

58. The reason why I am being so frank and downright in my criticism of the Turkish attitude is my confidence in my Government's role as moderator and peacemaker, prompted by a true desire for peace, justice and fair play.

59. Thus, in the course of the many months during which efforts were made by the United Nations Force and by the Secretary-General on the question of the patrols at Ayios Theodoros, the Greek Government constantly brought its influence to bear in favour of restraint. From the very beginning of the incidents at Ayios Theodoros and Kophinou, my Government did not hesitate to run the risk of being criticized for its conciliatory and peace-seeking attitude by calling for a cease-fire and a withdrawal of the United Nations Force to its former position, in the conviction that what is important first and foremost is the maintenance of calm and order in the island and peace in the region as a whole.

60. The Greek Government has also asked General Grivas to return to Athens. Its behaviour was the same before the incidents. Thus, despite the highly provocative nature of the repeated violations of Greek air space by Turkish military planes, the Greek Government has displayed a restraint and a cool-headedness without which the present critical situation would have become explosive at a much earlier stage.

61. I do not believe I need to continue this enumeration. It is a well-known fact that Greece has perseveringly followed an undeviating policy of peace and conciliation.

62. During the Council's meeting of 19 March 1965, the last in which I had the honour to participate, I made the following statement:

"At Athens we are waiting for the time when some real progress can be made towards the solution of this problem. Of course, we want this solution to be just and lasting." [1193rd meeting, para. 148.]

I also said that as far as we were concerned we would do everything in our power to achieve that.

63. I now appeal to the Council and put the question to it: Has Greece kept its promise or not? Has it spared any effort on its side to try to solve the problem? Has it not taken the initiative in the sincere desire to reach agreement? Has it advanced reasons of prestige—I emphasize: prestige—as Turkey has done, to impede all progress and prevent a solution by making demands first for one thing and then for another, but always in the most uncompromising manner?

64. A second question called for at this point, I think, is what was the attitude of Greece and what was that of Turkey towards the attempts made by various United Nations bodies to try to find a solution?

65. At no time has Greece refused its co-operation. I leave it to the Turkish representative to enlighten the Council, if it needs enlightenment, as to his Government's attitude. Or does no responsibility lie with those who repeatedly and categorically refuse to be guided by the suggestions, advice

and recommendations of the various United Nations bodies? Who then bears the responsibility for the tragic events which have resulted from that refusal thus prolonging the crisis? Surely not those who accept and are willing to abide by the recommendations of this organization.

66. At the present moment preparations seem to be complete in Turkey for launching an attack. Armed forces and units of the military air arm are massed along the coast facing Cyprus and along the frontier between Turkey and Greece. The latest information indicates that the launching of an aggressive attack is imminent. The Turkish Foreign Minister confirmed that the day before yesterday when he told the Greek Ambassador in Ankara: "We can no longer return to the stage of diplomatic negotiation."

67. As we know, the Secretary-General has appealed to the Governments involved and has reinforced his appeal by dispatching a Special Representative [see S/8248/Add.3]. We are grateful for what he has done and hope that this move will be successful. Meanwhile events are gathering momentum and danger is threatening. We are confronted by a threat of the use of force which is to be carried out. We are sure that the Council is aware of the extreme gravity of the situation. It is evident that the independence and territorial integrity of a State Member of the United Nations are in danger. The United Nations body primarily responsible in matters of international peace and security cannot afford to shirk its responsibility at this critical moment. The fundamental principles of the Charter are at stake. Peace in the eastern Mediterranean is in danger. It seems to me that the Council's immediate task is clear: it must prevent the use of force and put an end to the threat to use force.

68. I address these words to you on behalf of a country which has a clear conscience in that throughout the entire Cyprus crisis, and particularly during the last few days, Greece has done everything in its power to safeguard peace, both by impressing on Cyprus the need for moderation and by itself making every conciliatory gesture compatible with national dignity.

69. Mr. FEDORENKO (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*translated from Russian*): The Security Council is today holding an emergency meeting to deal with the serious aggravation of the situation in Cyprus and the adjacent area. The Council has before it the report of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, U Thant, on the question under consideration [S/8248], and we have just heard statements by the representatives of Cyprus, Turkey and Greece. The facts they have given uncontroversibly reveal the danger of the situation, which is fraught with far-reaching consequences.

70. The Soviet Government is attentively following the course of events in the area of Cyprus and we deem it necessary to state, as we have stated earlier, that the USSR strongly supports the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus and opposes foreign interference in the internal affairs of that country and provocations and attempts to increase tension on the Island.

71. There is, and can be, no doubt that it is for the Cypriot people themselves to settle their own internal

affairs. The question of Cyprus must be settled without outside interference and the legitimate rights of the Greek and Turkish populations on Cyprus must be upheld. The Soviet Union is firmly opposed to any intentions or attempts to settle the question of Cyprus behind the backs of the Cypriot people, at the expense of their vital interests and for the benefit of the imperialist Powers.

72. We are deeply convinced that, in order to preserve the genuine independence and territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus, all foreign troops must be withdrawn and the foreign military bases located there must be dismantled. We have said this many times before, in the Security Council as elsewhere. All this takes on special importance now, when there has been a sharp turn for the worse in the situation on Cyprus.

73. In this connexion, we should like to draw the attention of the members of the Council to the Soviet Union Government's statement of 22 November 1967 [see S/8268] explaining the position of the USSR on the most recent events in Cyprus and the adjacent area.

74. Although armed clashes on Cyprus have now ceased, the situation in the region remains tense and the threat to the sovereignty and independence of the Republic of Cyprus and to the cause of peace in the eastern Mediterranean is increasing.

75. The information we have received shows that the Greek Army has been placed on battle alert. The reactionary officers' group in Athens has been making patently inflammatory statements in an effort to establish a pretext for open interference in the internal affairs of Cyprus.

76. We know, too, that the Turkish Government, for its part, having regard to its own particular interests, has taken a number of measures in connexion with the worsening situation on Cyprus. Turkish armed forces have also been brought to a state of battle readiness; special detachments are being formed for a possible landing on Cyprus; and warships are conducting manoeuvres in that area.

77. The Soviet Union has already drawn attention to the fact that the military *coup d'état* in Greece in April of this year has posed a direct threat to the independence and normal democratic functioning of the State of Cyprus, a full Member of the United Nations. Current events in Cyprus must not be viewed in isolation from the policy followed by reactionary circles in Greece, which, with the support of outside forces, have for a long time been working out plans for settling the problem of Cyprus by military means and for depriving the State of Cyprus of its independence and territorial integrity through what is called *Enosis*, i.e. the Union of Cyprus with Greece.

78. The military circles now in power in Greece, which, as we know, have their henchmen in the Cypriot armed forces, are trying to transform the whole Island of Cyprus into a NATO military base and to deal with the democratic forces of that Island by using the same criminal and terrorist methods that they are now using in Greece itself. Casualties, including civilian casualties, have occurred as a result of recent military action on Cyprus, in which Greek troops,

under the command of General Grivas, the henchman of the reactionary militaristic circles in Greece, took part.

79. In the light of the foregoing, we consider it necessary to draw the attention of the members of the Security Council to the actions of the Greek authorities, who are widely using methods of physical coercion against their ideological opponents, guilty only of having raised their voices in defence of the rights of their people. The whole world has seen a new wave of mass persecutions of democrats in Greece, over whom hangs the threat of reprisals, that may even go as far as their physical annihilation, as the trials in Athens and Salonika have shown.

80. We should like to inform the members of the Security Council that the Soviet Government has sent a communication to the Greek Government in which it vigorously protested against the acts of lawlessness and arbitrary rule that are being perpetrated in Greece, the flouting of elementary humanitarian principles, the flagrant violation of universally accepted standards confirmed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, one of whose signatories is Greece. The Soviet Government has urgently appealed to the Greek Government to show good sense and restraint and to allow no action that might threaten the lives of Greek democrats.

81. From all indications, the deterioration of the situation on Cyprus is directly connected with the plans of those NATO circles which wish to settle the differences that have arisen among the members of that military bloc at the expense of the interests of the Cypriot people and their freedom and independence. We are struck by the difference between statements made by official circles in the United States of America, describing United States policy in that region as a policy of "peacemaking" and the practical actions of the United States Government, which tend to exacerbate the situation and lead to interference in the internal affairs of the Cypriot people. It is hardly credible that the Greek officer corps could act in Cyprus without the influence and support of the United States inasmuch as Greece itself is firmly in the grip of the United States military bases. It is obvious that this new and serious complication of the situation on Cyprus was the work of reactionary foreign forces, trying to aggravate the situation in the area and threaten the existence of the Republic of Cyprus. Such action can lead to a deterioration of the situation on Cyprus and threaten international peace.

82. The Soviet Government, prompted by a desire to maintain and preserve the peace in the Eastern Mediterranean, calls upon the parties to exercise restraint and good sense and to refrain from attempting to solve the problems that have arisen between the Cypriot Greeks and the Cypriot Turks by force of arms.

83. A solution to the problem of reducing the tension prevailing on Cyprus and in the surrounding area must be sought on the basis of a peaceful settlement, respect for the sovereign rights of all the Cypriot people, and strict compliance with the Security Council's resolutions on Cyprus, which have repeatedly called upon all sides to exercise restraint and to refrain from actions that might worsen the situation.

84. The Soviet Government hopes that all sides will show an awareness of their great responsibilities and an understanding of their duty to the peoples, since a widening of the conflict around Cyprus, and particularly a military clash in the area of Cyprus, might lead to unforeseeable consequences.

85. Lord CARADON (United Kingdom): I had not intended to speak at this stage in our debate, and indeed I gather from a number of other members of the Council that it is generally agreed that there is no call for a long list of speakers tonight. But as I listened to the speech of the Soviet representative I felt that some comment might be made without further delay.

86. If I may very respectfully say so, I thought that the beginning of his speech and the end were admirable in their appeal for respect for the principles of the Charter, for restraint and for respect for the sovereignty of the State of Cyprus. I regret that in the middle the standard of his speech sagged somewhat.

87. I would say to him, in respect and in friendship and, indeed, in full regard for what he said to us at the beginning and at the end of his statement, that all of us have tonight—as we always have, it is true, in this Council, but tonight we have specially—a very great responsibility. If we attempt in our debate tonight to increase animosity, if we make wild accusations, allot responsibility for past events, then it may be that we will fail to carry out the heavy responsibility which we have on this dangerous night.

88. No doubt all of us who have been concerned in the terrible history of the last ten years or so in Cyprus have faults and failures. I think it is true that even in this Council, as a Council, we must admit that, although we have regularly provided the means to keep the peace, we have as a Council failed to go to the root of the disagreements and divisions which take place, and the situation which we now face, the dangerous situation which we now face, in Cyprus is to some extent due to the failures of us all. But if at this grave moment we are to embark on a series of accusations and counter-accusations between the countries involved in the present crisis, then it seems to me we will be failing to live up to the heavy responsibility which now lies upon us.

89. Moreover, I think that it is incumbent upon us to guard our language tonight because we know that a single word could provide a spark which would cause an explosion which we would live to regret.

90. The extent and the gravity of the danger is, I think, in all our minds. We meet here in comparative calm and quiet, but we know that tonight very many people are living in fear—fear of bloodshed, violence and all the devastating effects of war and, worse than that perhaps, the suffering which can come to civilian populations when war sets off a conflagration which envelops far beyond the soldiers who are engaged.

91. Tonight, as I think of the Island of Cyprus, with which I am familiar, I think of the forests, the villages, the populations of Cyprus in that beautiful Island. I remember

the time, nine years ago, when I was responsible for the affairs of Cyprus. I had at that time twenty-one regiments in the Island, and when communal fighting took place it was with the utmost difficulty that, with that number of troops, we could maintain security as between the Greek Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriots of the Island. If war should come, I think not only of the devastations of war but also of the terrible results which would be inflicted upon the innocent civilian populations, both Greek and Turkish, of the Island. If the dangers of war should be released, then it is impossible for us to calculate the consequences, both in Cyprus and beyond; nor could we ever compute in advance the amount of suffering to innocent people which would be involved.

92. Therefore, it seems to me that we here in this Council tonight should devote ourselves not to accusations, not to an attempt to allot blame, but to a most serious effort to find amongst ourselves the action which can most be conducive to maintaining the peace and to making a start towards the removal of the causes of tension and friction.

93. I would, therefore, most respectfully—and if I may do so without impudence—commend the actions which have been taken by our Secretary-General. Not only has he sent his personal representative to the area, where he is now actively engaged in seeking a way to peace, but he has given us in two statements, in two appeals [*see S/8248/Add.3 and 5*], a lead in the directions, which we must subsequently consider, of a reduction of tension and a reduction, too, of the armed forces involved. And in his appeal which he issued today [*see S/8248/Add.5*], in pointing the way to a reduction in the numbers of Greek and Turkish troops to the numbers allowed under the 1960 Treaty, and indeed speaking of the possibility of a complete withdrawal of troops from the Island, he has been seeking out the practical courses which can be taken towards the establishment of a permanent peace.

94. We thank him for that leadership. We are grateful to him for pointing the way to all concerned, not only in general phrases or in appeals, but in the practical methods to reduce the numbers of Greek and Turkish forces in the Island so that we can move towards, God willing, a final settlement.

95. I do not suppose that any words of mine will have much effect on others who feel the necessity for reply, but I would greatly hope, if replies are to be exchanged across the floor of this Council tonight, that they should, in the interests of the maintenance of peace, be kept to a minimum, and that we should, as I greatly hope, under your leadership, Mr. President, conclude our discussions as soon as possible in order that we may be able, together, to accomplish what I believe we all wish to do tonight—record a general consensus that can make a contribution following up the appeal of the Secretary-General in a way which will be effective.

96. I myself have had opportunities to consult with you, Sir, and with other members of the Council, and I am sure that we are all willing to rally to your leadership in securing a result from tonight's debate which will be fully constructive. I welcome the lead that you are giving us, and I hope

we may soon proceed to that task. No doubt, we must keep this matter under constant review and be ready to reassemble at any time. But tonight I wish that we can send out to all concerned, and to the world, a message from this Council that will have the effect—so we dearly hope—of reducing tension, and the friction, reducing the enmities which exist, and of pointing the way to practical results, in an endeavour to find a way to the pacification of the Island and to a peaceful settlement which will not be a mere truce but which will be a final peace.

97. Mr. GOLDBERG (United States of America): Like our distinguished colleague Lord Caradon, I did not intend to speak tonight; I shall do so, however, only briefly, because of what has been said.

98. I had hoped that after hearing from the parties, this Council could act promptly and without debate in the interests of pacifying the dangerous situation regarding Cyprus. However, if we are to appeal to the parties to exercise restraint, then we must first of all exercise restraint ourselves. Despite the provocation, I shall merely say of Ambassador Fedorenko's comments concerning my country and our NATO allies that they are the products of his fertile imagination. I reject them categorically as typical Soviet "boiler-plate".

99. Now, Mr. President, my country is not interested, in light of the grave situation which confronts us, in scoring debating points; rather, we are interested in prompt Council action in the interests of peace. We are deeply disturbed and troubled by the tension and dangerous situation in the eastern Mediterranean between countries and peoples for whom the United States has the greatest respect and affection.

100. Efforts are now under way, initiated with commendable and great vigour and urgency by the distinguished Secretary-General, and there are other efforts, including efforts of our own, to avert the tragedy which armed conflict would entail for the free countries concerned, as well as for the peace in the area.

101. We believe strongly that these efforts must be allowed to continue unimpeded and that the Governments concerned should extend their fullest co-operation to these efforts, missing no opportunity and overlooking no possibility to ensure their successful outcome, for their success will benefit all concerned.

102. We therefore appeal to all concerned to exercise every means to maintain the peace and offer their fullest co-operation to the peace efforts now under way—efforts which offer the promise of bringing about a permanent settlement.

103. My Government, for its part, will continue to do everything within its power to ensure the success of such efforts, and tonight will do everything within its power to contribute to constructive Council action.

104. The PRESIDENT (*translated from French*): I call on the representative of Cyprus to speak in exercise of his right of reply.

105. Mr. ROSSIDES (Cyprus): In the first place I wish to thank those members of the Council who have spoken drawing attention to the dangerous night that we are now passing through and the dangerous situation which we are at this very moment facing in regard to Cyprus, and to the need for a peaceful settlement with strict observance of the resolutions of the Security Council and the Charter of the United Nations. These were words spoken by members of the Council. Yet, the representative of Turkey, who spoke at length of the incidents at Ayios Theodoros and Kophinou, astonishingly had no word to say about the dangers of this night.

106. And what are the dangers of this night that the members of the Security Council have referred to but the threat of aggression and invasion of Cyprus by Turkey? There was no word from the representative of Turkey to the effect that Turkey did not intend to invade Cyprus, that such gross violation of the Charter was far from Turkey's mind, as one would expect, that Turkey would abide by its obligations under the Charter and would not for a moment consider invading a small country and bring all the destruction that an invasion would entail and which the war which would follow would mean, the war that has been deferred by those members of the Security Council who have spoken.

107. We are not here tonight to face dangers arising from the past or of an operation launched to overcome resistance to the police patrol. We said that that was a deplorable event; that we are sorry about the loss of life, but that has now ended; what happened afterwards was merely local provocations and the killings of Cypriot Greeks by the Turks—a list of which I have provided—the cold-blooded killing of women and men by Turkish terrorists, without any provocation and without any retaliation from the National Guard or anyone else. But those were local events; they do not constitute the danger that faces us tonight. We all know what the danger is.

108. Turkey has proclaimed openly and boastfully that it is going to invade Cyprus this weekend. It is very regrettable indeed that the representative of Turkey made no reference to this fact. Is Turkey going to invade Cyprus, or is it not?

109. The Secretary-General has made an ardent appeal in this matter. He said: "Alarming reports continue to reach me of military preparations"—what are the military preparations but the preparations of Turkey?—"the movement of forces and threatening statements by Governments particularly concerned . . ." [*S/8248/Add.3.*] What are the movements of forces but the ones which I have mentioned, movements of naval, air and military forces that have been moved about opposite Cyprus and along the Greek-Turkish frontiers with such energy for warlike purposes? Turkey now feels that it has been so well supplied with weapons that it can bravely trumpet about its intention to go to war. These are the concerns which prompted the Secretary-General, in his concern for the peace of the world, and as representative of the United Nations, to appeal to the parties interested. And one of the parties primarily concerned in this dangerous night—as the representative of the United Kingdom called it—is Turkey.

110. The Secretary-General went on to say: "Such activities can only add to the high degree of tension already prevailing in Cyprus...". Is not the representative of Turkey the one who should speak about this matter, which directly concerns his country? What is the ominous meaning of his avoidance of saying that Turkey will not use force?

111. In the Secretary-General's second appeal he said: "The portents regarding Cyprus are increasingly ominous." [S/8248/Add.5.] Why are these portents increasingly ominous? Because the threats from Turkey continue, because of the overflights, and because of the statements that are made and the information that has come—some confidential and some not—that this weekend is a critical one in so far as invasion is concerned. Furthermore, indications at this moment are that Greece and Turkey are at the brink of war. Are these the reasons why the Security Council has been convoked, or is it because of the events of a fortnight ago in Kophinou and Ayios Theodoros, with which the representative of Turkey has been dealing?

112. I wish it to be recorded that my country has already said that it will abide by the Secretary-General's appeal in every respect and also by his second appeal for the elimination of all military forces in Cyprus. We do not want to have forces. The reason why we built up a force there—and in this respect we had assistance from Greece—was that we were so constantly threatened with aggression and invasion from Turkey. If that threat had not existed, those forces would not have been needed. We had no forces before the events of December 1963. We had a right to maintain 2,000 men and we established a force of only some 300. We should be very happy to have no military forces in Cyprus, to remove them all from the territory of the Republic, provided the United Nations would guarantee the territorial integrity and political independence of our country, provided that there could be some protection from outside invasion that was threatened three times in 1964. It was threatened, and in some cases attempted, for the sole purpose of partition. In June 1964 preparation was made not for any particular incident, but for the invasion of Cyprus. Who remembers any incident? The purpose was partition.

113. In a letter dated 5 June from President Johnson to Premier İnönü, it was stated: "It is our understanding that you propose to invade Cyprus for the purpose of partitioning the island." And that letter also stated: "If you rely for that right on the Treaty of Guarantee, we should remind you that this is in direct conflict with the Treaty of Guarantee."

114. But that is not the point. We consider the Treaty of Guarantee invalid *ab initio* as conflicting with the principles of the Charter and it is under the Law of Treaties which has been adopted here and which, we hope, will eventually be implemented, and under Article 103 of the Charter, that any international agreement which conflicts with the obligations under the Charter is void *ab initio*. Therefore, any idea that Turkey has of being able to use the Treaty of Guarantee as a means of giving it the right to violate the Charter and to use force or the threat of force to turn back the will of history to the days preceding the Second World

War and to bring war, means that the Treaty of Guarantee is of no value if it contains provisions for war.

115. The reason for my intervention now is to point out that we would wish to hear the representative of Turkey say what other members of the Security Council have said, and what I say now—that we abide by the appeal of the Secretary-General and wish to see a peaceful solution of the problem of Cyprus within the principles of the Charter and in strict obedience to the resolutions of the Security Council and the consensus of the Council of 11 August 1964, forbidding overflights over Cyprus in violation of its sovereignty. These resolutions and this consensus have been violated by Turkey so many times in the last few days that it would take a great deal of work to count the violations which have been carried out so lightheartedly by Turkey.

116. We respect Turkey. It is a neighbour of ours and we wish to have friendly relations with it. We have the best feelings towards Turkey. Indeed, we have the best feelings towards all the Turks in Cyprus, and I would remind the representative of Turkey that it is only when they resist that there is fighting: it is only when they are armed that there is fighting. Over 60,000 Turks live without any trouble in the Republic outside the enclaves and there is no fighting. There is the desire among the Greek and Turkish Cypriots to live in peace and amity, but this is being prevented by Turkey, by Turkish rule and Turkish terrorist activities, by their forbidding the Turks to have friendly relations with the Greeks, from even entering their shops; they are punished by thrashing and imprisonment and even the gravest punishment if they show any tendency towards conciliation with the Greeks. Why is that? It is because they feel that if there is conciliation, if they mix with the Greeks, if they are allowed to become friendly, then the prospect of partition would disappear. That is really the cause of the whole trouble in Cyprus. This idea, this *idée fixe*, of partition which makes them keep up the strife in the Island, which makes them wish to invade the Island, which causes the enclaves, the fighting, the armed posts—all that is because the people of Cyprus must not be allowed to conciliate and live together in peace.

117. Why should other countries from outside interfere with the human rights of the people of Cyprus to live in peace and amity? That is the situation. I do not in the least wish to say that all the fault lies on one side and all the rights are on the other side. We admit our faults; we admit our mistakes; we admit everything and we regret it. But basically partition is responsible. For our part, we have a unified policy. We go along with the moral forces of the universe in this respect, not with splitting countries. If we look around the world today we see which are the very dangerous situations, which are the problems with which the world and the Security Council are faced. The situation in Viet-Nam? Partition. The situation in Palestine? Partition. Are there problems which are dormant but always pregnant? Korea, Berlin, Germany? Partition. That is the scourge of our world today—partition, the legacy of partition through colonialist policies and cold war, mixed together in some cases, and this is what is the trouble with Cyprus.

118. But we have not come here to discuss the question of Cyprus. That is why I have not entered on that problem nor

am I going to enter into the details of that problem. I only want to concentrate on the central basic cause which runs through the whole Cyprus situation, and specifically come to the very point on which my speech at first centered—I had to say those things in answer.

119. We have a dangerous situation in the eastern Mediterranean, and I would say not only in Cyprus, arising from the threat of invasion of Cyprus.

120. We are very happy to have heard the very constructive words of those members of the Security Council who spoke in favour of a peaceful settlement, not through aggression and war, but through a peaceful settlement. This would be the sense of the resolution. I repeat that my country and all small countries which are today in the same position as Cyprus—which were yesterday or will be tomorrow—wish to see this Council pronounce itself very directly and very courageously—not by evading questions—to the effect that the threat and use of force is not allowed in our time; that the acquisition of territory by force and invasion is not permitted in this United Nations age. I think that was very clearly stated in the resolution which this Council adopted on the Middle East question. We want a resolution clearly protecting Cyprus from the threat of invasion under which it now finds itself and we also want the resolution to endorse the very constructive appeal made by our Secretary-General.

121. The PRESIDENT (*translated from French*): I call upon the representative of Greece in exercise of the right of reply.

122. Mr. BITSIOS (Greece) (*translated from French*): I have listened to the Soviet Union representative's statement with the utmost attention, such as I always accord to the speeches of Ambassador Fedorenko, the representative of a great Power which plays a very active, at times perhaps a trifle too active role in all parts of the world. But this evening I was unable to follow him. I missed his customary clarity. I thought there must be something wrong with my earphone switch; I turned it to all the languages and in all of them I heard the same thing, that Greece was threatening to intervene in Cyprus and was directly threatening its existence. I asked myself how that was possible, since Cyprus has a representative here and it would have been quite easy for Mr. Fedorenko to ask Mr. Rossides whether Greece was in fact threatening his country. What has happened? If Greece were really threatening Cyprus, Mr. Rossides would have appealed to the Security Council to take action against my country. But if my earphone was functioning correctly, I heard Mr. Rossides complaining about another country!

123. I can assure Mr. Fedorenko that I listened most carefully and with concentration to his appeal, and that I shall of course transmit it to my Government. Athens is always open to all appeals for peace; this is in keeping with our outlook. I trust that such an assurance will also be given to Ambassador Fedorenko by his—shall I say his newer—friends?

124. The PRESIDENT (*translated from French*): I call on the representative of Turkey.

125. Mr. ERALP (Turkey): I am very much tempted to abide by the well-meaning appeal of the representatives of the United Kingdom and the United States, and to refrain from any reply. But unfortunately recriminations and accusations have been made and I must put the record straight. But, I shall try to be very brief.

126. I shall start with the remarks made by my colleague from Greece, Ambassador Bitsios. He took a very different view of this incident involving the patrols which ended up in the massacre of the villagers in Ayios Theodoros. In the first place, he said that these patrols were the right of the Cypriot Government, as he calls them, and that the Turks had no authority or right to prevent them from entering the area. Furthermore, the Turkish Government need not have been consulted on the subject. But, the fact remains that trouble started in the area in July and the Greek patrols were stopped so as to avoid just the kind of incident as the one with which we are faced. The Turkish community leaders said that they would view favourably the reviving of the patrols along with the UNFICYP forces, in accordance with the plan submitted by UNFICYP, as soon as the tension in the area was dispelled and, in fact, one day before the attack—the premeditated attack—on the villages started, communication was made to UNFICYP that the plan had been accepted, as I mentioned in my main statement.

127. Ambassador Bitsios said that it was obvious that the Turks were creating an enclave there. That does not correspond with the facts because assurances were given at the time to the UNFICYP authorities that the Turks did not intend to create an enclave in the area and were willing to revive the patrols if and when the tension subsided. It is obvious that this was just an excuse to put into effect a premeditated plan which had been arranged for a long time and which would be the beginning, the thin end of the wedge, for a series of incidents like the one in Ayios Theodoros. If there had not been effective opposition to that, today we might have had other incidents leading on and on to heaven knows where.

128. I was very shocked to hear my friend Ambassador Bitsios use the word "rebels" with regard to the peaceful villagers of Ayios Theodoros. There is rebellion in the Island as I have said on many other occasions, and the rebels are the Greek Cypriot usurpers of power in the Island. They are the rebels, not the Turks who have been defending their constitutional rights, gun in hand, for the last four years, nearly.

129. I was glad, on the other hand, that he referred to the talks between the Prime Ministers of Greece and Turkey which he said had met with failure due to the intransigence of the Turkish Prime Minister. That, of course, could not be further from the truth. The talks failed because the Greek counterparts came to us with one idea and one idea alone, the idea of *Enosis*, out and out expansionism. We have never accepted it and they knew that. They thought that perhaps the time had come for us to collaborate with them to bring about the territorial expansion of Greece. I am afraid they were in for a disappointment there.

130. On the other hand they did show good will in reaching this agreement which I shall read from the joint

communiqué—"The Prime Ministers further agreed on the need to take appropriate measures to safeguard and facilitate the efforts aimed at reaching a peaceful and agreed settlement and preventing the increase of tension in Cyprus"—which, of course, the Greek Government promptly proceeded to implement by giving orders to the General in command to attack a defenceless Turkish village.

131. I am also glad he mentioned the meeting at the frontier between the two Prime Ministers because the joint communiqué has in it a clause which I shall also read. It says: "They noted with gratification that there existed an identity of views that all treaties between the two countries should be respected."—"All treaties between the two countries" including those which concerned the fate, the presence, the independence, the territorial integrity of Cyprus. And that is sufficient explanation to other questions put to us before as to our interest and grave concern regarding events which take place in Cyprus. We would have thought that the Greek Government would have been equally concerned.

132. It was a great disappointment to me to see a very able and distinguished ambassador like my colleague, Ambassador Bitsios, refer to the fate of Greeks in Turkey and attempt to draw a parallel between their fate and the genocide attempts in Cyprus. He even used the word "genocide" and pretended that there was decimation in the case of the Greeks in Turkey. I think it is hardly fair to make a comparison there. It is a well-known fact that not a single Greek in Turkey has had a bloody nose, even at times when the furore rose very high. And that, of course—the other story—we are fully acquainted with.

133. As for the flights of military planes over Greek territory, my colleague wrote a number of letters to which I replied in one final letter [S/8244]—as I thought it would be—to the effect that these were training flights and they were undertaken with the full knowledge of Turkish and Greek authorities. Of course, if the Greek Government did not know about this, they might have a policy of keeping their right hand from knowing what their left hand is doing.

134. Ambassador Bitsios accused us of failing to co-operate with the organs of the United Nations; in that regard I would merely say that the Council is given the answer to that charge in the last reports of the Secretary-General. It was a Greek General, a Greek officer who ordered soldiers of UNFICYP dislodged from their positions, disarmed by force and their means of communication disabled. Is this a Greek understanding of co-operation with the United Nations organs?

135. Finally, I must turn again, very briefly, to my colleague Ambassador Rossides. For a moment I thought I was listening to him as he spoke on television the other night. But, of course, here there is an entirely different audience and you cannot put things over on the Council. The points he tried to make are very well known to the members of this Council because they have been hearing them for four years and they know the real issues involved. I shall dismiss very summarily the various statements which he adduced, were made several years ago, by several statesmen, about intentions of partition and that sort of

thing. I was very much surprised he did not go back to Sultan Mohammed the conqueror and make quotations from him.

136. As for the flights over Cyprus, we are all aware of the faulty intelligence of the Greek Cypriot authorities. Therefore, we must rely on the reports of the Secretary-General and UNFICYP regarding any flights over Cyprus. We have had these reports and they refer to various unidentified planes. Well, unidentified flying objects have been flying all over the place. I think the last one was over Sofia in Bulgaria, but they have not caused anybody any undue alarm.

137. Finally, he referred to the danger of this night. The danger of this night is a failure of all concerned, with the help of the Secretary-General and other friendly countries, to provide effective means of avoiding massacres similar to the ones which occurred recently in Cyprus. If we fail to do that, the aggressor will be emboldened and we shall always be in trouble.

138. Mr. FEDORENKO (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*translated from Russian*): We wish to speak in order to exercise our right of reply to the statements made by the United Kingdom and United States representatives. We certainly do not wish to analyze their speeches in detail. The contents of their speeches hardly warrant any such searching analysis. However, in their statements, they made it a point to stress that they did not wish to speak today, thus seeming to say that they had come to the Security Council to sit in meditation. It was probably precisely this that provoked their complaints that their concerted silence was unexpectedly disturbed by our statement. But each of us has his own position and his own thoughts on the subject, and we should like to ask whether it is possible to remain silent, whether it is permissible to remain indifferent, at this disquieting moment, when the Security Council has been called into emergency session to consider the highly dangerous situation that has arisen in the Mediterranean. Really, have we come here to give ourselves over to silent melancholic reverie, however sweet the idyllic recollections of the former United Kingdom Governor of Cyprus may be?

139. Our statement gave a realistic assessment of the dangerous situation prevailing in the region of Cyprus, which, as we showed, has been created and is being intensified by certain specific forces. We tried to abide by the facts, and I doubt whether there is any justification for the complaints of the United Kingdom and United States representatives, and the other speakers who followed them, about the contents of the statement made by the Soviet delegation. If they saw reason for their concern in the facts we adduced, this can only be a proof of the compelling nature of those facts, which revealed those who are to blame for the situation created in the area of Cyprus.

140. The PRESIDENT (*translated from French*): I call upon the representative of Cyprus, who wishes to speak in exercise of the right of reply.

141. Mr. ROSSIDIS (Cyprus): I shall be very brief but there are two or three points raised by the representative of

Turkey, Ambassador Eralp, which require slight clarification.

142. First of all, he referred again to the events concerning the patrol and he spoke as if it were a massacre of innocent civilians whereas it concerned a nest of fighters, armed to the teeth. A whole mass of heavy armaments was taken; there was fighting on both sides, and of course in a fight like that in an inhabited area there are more casualties than there otherwise would be. However, I said that we very much regretted and deplored this. Why continue to speak about that event and pass silence over the most important things that this Council is meeting to consider? The representative of Turkey has not mentioned anything about the violation of the air space of Cyprus, which constitutes a violation of the consensus of 11 August 1964. He has not said anything to explain that. He has not said that they do not intend to repeat it. He has not said anything so far about any of the substantive matters that have been brought out in this debate.

143. He said that I quoted very old matters, going back to Mohammed, but I only went back to 1964; I can quote even today's statements—this year, 1967—by Minister for Foreign Affairs Çağlayangil, who said: "The four Turkish forces are keeping watch on our coast near Cyprus like the sword of Damocles, paralysing those of bad will." Who are those of "bad will"? Those who do not bow to the will of Turkey. If you so decide, he says to the National Assembly, we will act—that is, we will attack Cyprus—then we will sit at the table and impose our will. The Turkish representative wants more recent statements; there it is, one from 1967.

144. The same Foreign Minister and President Sunay, in messages to several Heads of State today, said in connexion with the appeal to Turkey to desist from force: "Turkey's decision is to solve the problem of Cyprus once and for all—that is, now, by force."

145. Those are the matters about which this Council is concerned and on which we want to hear the representative of Turkey, but he is voiceless, like a fish, when it comes to this very important issue, whereas he is very vocal on other, trivial matters of the past.

146. We should like to hear him also in answer to my challenge to him to express himself concerning the appeals of the Secretary-General and about desisting from attacking or invading Cyprus. On those issues and on those matters we should like to hear him, and I call upon him to express himself clearly on them.

147. Even today there has been a report of an overflight, which reads: "At 15.49 hours on 20 November two Turkish jet aircraft were identified flying low over UNFICYP headquarters in Nicosia." Two F-104 planes belonging to Turkey, flying low, and terrorizing the people—creating tension, causing the very tension he contends they want to avoid.

148. Really, what are we doing here if we are not going to hear Ambassador Eralp pronounce himself one way or another? Either he says "We have a right to do these things; we ignore the Security Council resolutions and the

consensus; we disregard the Charter and throw it away and we are going to do these things because we have a right given to us by God"—or I do not know what—or else he must say "We are not going to do them", or "We have not done them", or "We are not committing these offences and aggressive acts". None of those things has been stated; that is very ominous, and I hope the Security Council will keep it in mind in drafting the resolution that is going to be issued, that that posture of aggression is there and should be met by an effective Security Council resolution.

149. The PRESIDENT (*translated from French*): I have no further speakers on my list. I suggest that we suspend the meeting for half an hour to allow members of the Council to consult with one another regarding what is to be done about the problem before us. If I hear no objection, I shall take it that it is agreed, and the Council will resume at 11.20 p.m.

It was so decided.

The meeting was suspended at 10.50 p.m., and resumed at 2.15 a.m. on 25 November.

150. The PRESIDENT (*translated from French*): It has certainly taken us some time, but I am happy to be able to inform the Council that we have arrived at a consensus thanks to the spirit of understanding and co-operation shown by the members of the Council. I shall read out the consensus reached.

151. After holding consultations with members of the Council, I have been authorized to make the following statement on behalf of the Security Council:

"The Council has now acquainted itself with the position of the parties directly concerned. It is gravely concerned in view of the tense and dangerous situation with regard to Cyprus. The Council notes with satisfaction the efforts undertaken by the Secretary-General to help maintain peace in the region and calls upon all the parties concerned to show the utmost moderation and restraint and to refrain from any act which might aggravate the situation in Cyprus and constitute a threat to the peace. The Security Council further requests all concerned urgently to assist and co-operate in keeping the peace and arriving at a permanent settlement in accordance with Security Council resolution 186 (1964) of 4 March 1964."

152. If there is no objection, I shall consider the consensus adopted.

It is so decided.

153. The PRESIDENT (*translated from French*): I call on the representative of Cyprus.

154. Mr. ROSSIDES (Cyprus): Mr. President, I wish, on behalf of my country, to thank you and the other members of the Council for having given careful attention and for having devoted your efforts to the problem that has arisen in consequence of the dangerous situation which is threatening Cyprus and international peace. I thank you also for

the consensus arrived at with the view to averting the danger that was threatening my country.

155. The PRESIDENT (*translated from French*): I have no further speakers on my list and I therefore propose to adjourn this meeting, on the strict understanding that this question will remain before the Security Council and that

the members of the Council will hold themselves in readiness to meet again at any moment, should it become necessary. Subject to this understanding, if I hear no objection I shall bring the meeting to an end.

*The meeting rose at 2.20 a.m. on Saturday,
25 November 1967.*

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