



SECURITY COUNCIL OFFICIAL RECORDS

TWENTY-SECOND YEAR

1375th MEETING: 13 NOVEMBER 1967

NEW YORK

CONTENTS

	<i>Page</i>
Provisional agenda (S/Agenda/1375)	1
Adoption of the agenda	1
The situation in the Middle East: Letter dated 7 November 1967 from the Permanent Representative of the United Arab Republic addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/8226)	1

NOTE

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THIRTEEN HUNDRED AND SEVENTY-FIFTH MEETING

Held in New York on Monday, 13 November 1967, at 10.30 a.m.

President: Mr. Mamadou Boubacar KANTE (Mali).

Present: The representatives of the following States: Argentina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, China, Denmark, Ethiopia, France, India, Japan, Mali, Nigeria, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and United States of America.

Provisional agenda (S/Agenda/1375)

1. Adoption of the agenda.
2. The situation in the Middle East:
Letter dated 7 November 1967 from the Permanent Representative of the United Arab Republic addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/8226).

Adoption of the agenda

The agenda was adopted.

The situation in the Middle East

Letter dated 7 November 1967 from the Permanent Representative of the United Arab Republic addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/8226)

1. The PRESIDENT (*translated from French*): In accordance with the decision taken by the Council at its 1373rd meeting on 9 November, I propose, with the consent of the Council, to invite the representatives of the United Arab Republic, Israel and Jordan to take places at the Council table and to participate without vote in the discussion.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Mahmoud Riad (United Arab Republic), Mr. A. Eban (Israel) and Mr. A. M. Rifa'i (Jordan) took places at the Council table.

2. The PRESIDENT (*translated from French*): I have received a letter dated 11 November [S/8237] from the representative of Syria asking that his delegation be invited to participate without vote in the discussion. If I hear no objection, I shall invite the representative of Syria to take a place at the Council table.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. A. Daoudy (Syria) took a place at the Council table.

3. The PRESIDENT (*translated from French*): The Security Council will now resume its discussion of the question before it. I should like to draw the Council's attention to the draft resolution dated 10 November [S/8236] on this

question submitted by the Soviet Union delegation. The first speaker on my list is the representative of Israel. I now call upon him.

4. Mr. EBAN (Israel): I thank you, Mr. President, for agreeing on 9 November that I make immediate reply to the accusations brought against Israel by the Foreign Minister of the United Arab Republic [1373rd meeting]. That agreement was frustrated, and members of the Council went on to formulate their views after hearing one party and not the other.

5. I draw relative satisfaction from the fact that eight members of the Security Council voted for the normal decencies of equitable discussion. This is not a procedural issue alone. Since 1953, the Security Council has been prevented by the Soviet veto policy from adopting any resolution to which an Arab State is opposed, irrespective of the merits of the case or of the majority view. We have now had an initiative from the same source to prevent a normal procedure of discussion by parties at interest in an international dispute. The denial to Israel of equal opportunity to succeed in its advocacy in the Security Council has for fifteen years been an important factor in the derangement of the Middle Eastern equilibrium. If the imbalance is extended from matters of substance to those of procedure, the Security Council's function in the Middle Eastern conflict will become progressively undermined. Surely then a vigilant resistance to discrimination must be waged not only by international organizations, but within them.

6. I now come to this table to clarify Israel's attitude on three questions: What answer do we make to the violent accusations directed against us by the Foreign Minister of the United Arab Republic? How does Israel propose to advance peace and security in the Middle East? How can the Security Council, within the terms of our Charter, best promote the settlement of the conflict arising from the war which the Arab States have been waging and maintaining against Israel for nearly two decades?

7. The Security Council has been called into session at the request of the Government of the United Arab Republic, which in the summer of this year attempted to destroy the State of Israel and wipe it forever off the map of the earth. Humility and repentance would have been more appropriate to the Egyptian Foreign Minister than the plaintive belligerence which he has expressed.

8. Seldom has a Government committed a more wanton assault on international peace than that which the United

Arab Republic concerned five months ago. After a decade of tranquillity on the Egyptian-Israel demarcation line, the Government of the United Arab Republic plunged the Middle East into sudden war. Mr. Riad has insulted the memory as well as the critical faculties of his audience. In discussing the origins of the conflict, he never allowed prosaic truth to restrict his creative imagination. He chose not to tell the Security Council how the United Arab Republic moved its armies into Sinai in mid-May; how the United Arab Republic brought up 90,000 troops against Israel's southern region; how the United Arab Republic supplied, according to President Nasser, with Soviet reports of non-existent Israel troop concentrations on the Syrian demarcation line, 900 concentrated tanks with their advance forces within swift striking distance of Israel; how the United Arab Republic occupied the entrance to the Strait of Tiran with belligerent purpose; how the United Arab Republic, having evicted the United Nations Forces overnight, admitted the Secretary-General of the United Nations to Cairo with careful timing so that the blockade of the Gulf of Aqaba might be announced while he was in mid-journey; how the United Arab Republic representative at this table told the Security Council on 29 May that: "there is not a shadow of doubt as to the . . . existence of" a "state of war between the Israelis and . . . the Arabs" [1343rd meeting, para. 89]; how he laid arrogant claim in this very place to Israel's southern coastal strip and the Port of Eilat; how the Jordanian monarch was summoned to Cairo to sign a pact of encirclement and aggression, and returned to Amman with the macabre Mr. Shukairy gloating at his side; how Arab troop contingents from Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Algeria moved into battle positions ready for their share of the spoils; how Egyptian air commanders were given instructions, now in our hands, about the specific Israel targets which they were to bomb; how King Hussein's brigades were instructed in writing that Israel's villages were to be occupied and "all their inhabitants put to death"; how Jordan, refusing the most specific Israel proposals for avoiding the conflict, poured shells and bombs into Jerusalem's streets from guns and mortars carefully sheltered by the Holy Places; how Syria took up the aggression with artillery bombardment from the Golan heights; how President Nasser filled the air with frank and exuberant announcements of his intention to bring about Israel's doom.

9. I can still recall his voice as I heard it on 26 May: "We have been biding our time until we were perfectly ready and prepared . . . we now feel that we are sufficiently strong and that, engaging in war with Israel, we can, with God's help, be victorious." Lest this be not clear enough, we heard the official announcement from Radio Cairo later that day: "The Arab people is firmly resolved to wipe Israel off the face of the globe."

10. There has never been an aggressive war for which responsibility is more explicit and unmistakable than the United Arab Republic's responsibility for this war. The representative of the United Arab Republic has told the Security Council nothing of all this. His Government now comes here saturated with war guilt, heavy with responsibility for nineteen years of purposeful aggression, to lay complaint and accusation against Israel.

11. What is the Egyptian Foreign Minister's complaint against Israel? His complaint is that Israel energetically refused to be destroyed. What is his proposal? His proposal is that Israel put itself in the position most congenial for the next attempt to destroy it. What is his purpose? His purpose is to refuse negotiation and agreement. To the offense of making war, Cairo adds the offence of refusing peace. For this refusal, the United Arab Republic seeks the Security Council's sanction.

12. But the dramatic facts which the United Arab Republic representative has wantonly suppressed are not forgotten in Israel. They will never be forgotten there. A new dimension has been added to the national memory, and the exploration of it will long continue. Our nation still lives intimately with the peril and the solitude which afflicted it in those agonizing weeks. We still remember the cold horror which that peril evoked in world opinion. We still recall how the imminent extinction of Israel's statehood and the massacre of its population were seriously discussed across the world in wild intoxication of spirit in every Arab capital, and with tormented but impotent sorrow in other lands. We take unbounded pride in the six days of resistance by which the danger was gloriously overcome. And we remember the heavy price exacted in death and bereavement, in mutilation and anguish and suffering.

13. These are our memories. I evoke them here in vehement rejection of the attempt by the United Arab Republic representative to wash his hands clean of his Government's sustained aggression against the security of Israel and the peace of the Middle East. I recall them also because these memories lie at the heart and centre of Israel's policy today. If you ignore our memories, you cannot understand our policy. That policy can be expressed in a single sentence. It is our firm resolve never, never to return to the danger and vulnerability from which we have emerged. This resolve must prevail over every other consideration. To avoid a return to any of the conditions which prevailed on 4 June is a supreme national purpose, worthy of every effort and any consequence.

14. In their speeches to the Security Council on 9 November [1373rd meeting], the Soviet and United Arab Republic representatives sought to persuade the Security Council of two things: firstly, that Israel's refusal to be strangled and bludgeoned to death was an act of "aggression", and secondly, that the way to get peace in the Middle East is to reproduce the precise conditions which brought about the war. These are the only two ideas which the Soviet and Arab representatives have expressed during the long discussions of the summer and autumn months. I submit that there is not a single grain of truth or value in either of them.

15. It is especially important that this problem of aggression be faced and probed. It is the starting point for any rational understanding of past events and future necessities. The Egyptian Foreign Minister spoke of Israel "aggression" sixty-one times; the Soviet representative only twenty-four. Frequency of reiteration is a typical symptom of weak argument. Never has this been more true than in this case. To the charge of aggression I reply that Israel's resistance to

the assault concerted against it last summer will resound across the generations as a triumphant assertion of human freedom. From the dawn of its history, the people now rebuilding the State of Israel has struggled, often in desperate conditions, against tyranny and aggression. Our defence last June falls nobly within that tradition. As Israel freed itself from the aggressive stranglehold, we could hear the cry of ardent relief that resounded across the peace-loving world from end to end. Alone, embattled, neither requesting nor receiving aid, Israel, by independent effort and sacrifice, had withstood a conspiracy of violence. In the life of our generation, it is hard to think of any other hour in which progressive opinion has rallied in such tension and agony of spirit to any cause. Never have justice, honour, peace, national freedom and international morality been more righteously defended.

16. Something of this world opinion found expression even in the international organizations where Arab and Soviet positions have a great numerical advantage. Proposals seeking to define Israel's action as "aggression" were rejected in the Security Council on 14 June [1360th meeting], and in four separate votes in the General Assembly at its emergency session on 4 July [1548th meeting]. In each case, the rejection of the charge was so emphatic as to imply a rebuke to those who had invented it. Of special significance was the defeat of what the spokesman of the Latin American group called "the ridiculous Soviet resolution" on Israel "aggression" for the discussion of which the General Assembly had been convened in emergency session.

17. I am aware that Israel's decision to survive has caused some difficulty for Arab representatives and those who support them. But in the light of international judgements and of massive world opinion, everyone who speaks of Israel "aggression" is uttering a violent untruth. Israel's defensive action was taken when the choice was to live or to perish, to protect the national existence or to forfeit it for all time. We even have Arab acknowledgement that this was our choice. The official Cairo Radio on 23 May defined the situation with unusual veracity. It said: "Israel is faced with two alternatives, either of which will destroy it. It will either be strangled to death by the Arab territorial and economic blockade, or it will perish by fire of the Arab forces encompassing it from the South, from the North and from the East."

18. The most important action which the United Nations has taken, beyond the cease-fire, has been to determine the non-aggressive character of Israel's operations in early June. Everything in our policy flows from this premise. Our thinking on the political, juridical, territorial, and security aspects of the Middle Eastern problem is based on the secure premise that we have repelled aggression, are still being threatened with its renewal, and must now so act as to ensure that it shall not succeed in any new assault.

19. In rejecting the description given by the United Arab Republic representative on past events, I cannot fail to comment on the general record of veracity. This theme is illustrated by an extraordinary event of which the international implications have not yet been fully explored. The Governments of the United Arab Republic and the

Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan have confessed to having forged a story of alleged intervention by two major Powers on Israel's side in the hostilities of last June.

20. It is hard to recall a more flagrant violation of international civility. The accusation mocked the truth of Israel's solitude in danger and defence. It was also calculated to convert a serious local conflict into a global issue affecting the entire human destiny. Should not those responsible for a falsehood of such vast scope be treated with intense scepticism in relation to whatever else they say? It is in this light that the United Arab Republic's version of all that happened in this tempestuous year should be examined.

21. I understand that both Governments have now confessed this forgery. But it remains for ever inscribed on the tablets of history. It is reasonable that all other Egyptian and Jordanian assertions on the origins and evolutions of this conflict be assessed in the light of this dangerous manoeuvre.

22. So much then for the charge of Israel "aggression". The other part of the Soviet and Arab case as presented on 9 November is that the 4 June situation should be restored. The folly and injustice of this suggestion were expounded by many eminent statesmen who took part in the General Assembly discussion last summer. Speakers from all five continents stressed what should now be an international axiom. It was perhaps most incisively stated by the Minister of External Affairs of Canada, quoting a previous statement by his eminent Prime Minister:

"Are we to go through all this again? Are we to return to the *status quo*? Such a return would not be to a position of security . . . but would be a return to terror, bloodshed, strife, incidents, charges and counter-charges and ultimately another explosion."¹

23. The most profound need of the Middle East is for constructive innovation. We must not be satisfied to rebuild the fragile provisional structure which, under the weight of years and the brunt of Arab hostility, has fallen about our heads in ruin. We must now build a durable edifice of relations insuring security and peace for our tormented region.

24. In the light of this principle, I now come to state Israel's national policy: a cease-fire has been established by the Security Council as a provisional measure within the terms of the Charter. We shall maintain and respect the cease-fire until it is replaced, as we wish to replace it, by peace treaties ending the state of war, determining the agreed national frontiers of States, and ensuring a stable and mutually guaranteed security. We cannot return to the shattered armistice régime or to any system of relations other than a permanent contractually binding peace. And we agree with those who have said in the General Assembly and elsewhere that the fragile armistice lines must be superseded by agreed and secure national boundaries. After

¹ Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifth Emergency Special Session, Plenary Meetings, 1533rd meeting, para. 115.

the cease-fire lines, a permanent and mutually recognized territorial boundary is our only possible destination.

25. In their meeting at Khartoum, the Heads of the Arab States proclaimed a policy of seeking a solution on the basis of three principles: No recognition, No negotiation, No peace. For reasons which will for ever remain mysterious to me, some writers have described these three refusals as symptoms of "moderation". Against the Khartoum policy of no recognition, no negotiation and no peace, Israel presents its policy: Recognition, negotiation, peace. Is there any honest doubt which of these two policies conforms with our Charter and which of them violates it? If it were necessary to distil the essence of the Charter into three words, would not those words be recognition, negotiation and peace? By recognition I mean an acknowledgement of the sovereign equality of States and of their consequent duty to determine their relations directly with other States, free from external intervention or pressure. By negotiation I mean the exchange of ideas, the comparison and harmonization of interests and the reciprocal acceptance of defined rights and obligations. By peace I mean not only the opposite of war, but an order of relations beginning with mutual acceptance and evolving into a community of States reconciling their full and separate sovereignty with a widening process of co-operation.

26. The international discussion of the Middle East has been long and intricate. It is possible, however, to define the theme and issue in simple terms. There has been not a six-day war, there has been a nineteen-year war conducted by the Arab States against Israel in varying degrees of intensity, with the ultimate hope and purpose of Israel's destruction. The issue is whether this war is going to be liquidated now by a final peace settlement or merely interrupted in order to be resumed in conditions more propitious for success. We should fail in candour if we were to describe the issue in less clear and lucid terms. The question is not whether Arab States do or do not recognize Israel's right to exist. We do not seek Arab recognition of our nation's right to exist. Israel's right to exist is precisely equivalent to theirs and is not in any degree dependent on their consent. There is even something invidious in the phrase. What we seek and what the international community should promote is not a meaningless formula, but a meaningful act. The act of which I speak is the negotiation and conclusion of peace treaties by direct negotiation between Israel and the Arab States.

27. In adopting this policy we are faithful to international precedents and traditions. It is a traditional principle of international law, as United Arab Republic representatives have so often pointed out, that a state of war can be terminated only by a treaty of peace. This was last said at this table in May 1967. It is also a universal tradition that cease-fire lines are superseded by permanent boundaries, and that a transition from a state of war to a state of peace is effected by bilateral agreement. Every item in Israel's current policy conforms with established international practice. We are behaving as any State is entitled to behave against which a state of war has been openly proclaimed and brutally practised. Israel is not in a position of juridical defence.

28. Never in Charter history has there been a case such as this where several States have conspired to expunge another

from the map of the world and to destroy its people. The idea that Israel should move from the cease-fire line in the absence of a formal peace settlement ending the state of war and fixing recognized national boundaries is so irrational and unprecedented that it is amazing to hear it expounded at all. Such an idea could only arise in the atmosphere of anomaly which has dominated the Arab-Israel discussion. For nearly two decades it has been accepted that Arab States may behave towards Israel as though there is war, while Israel must behave towards them as though there is peace. Surely those days are over. It is more legitimate to break out of siege and blockade than it is to impose them.

29. The irrationality of replacing the cease-fire by anything short of peace is illustrated by a study of the address of the United Arab Republic's Foreign Minister. If we were to follow his advice, we should be consciously inaugurating a prelude to the next explosion. There would be a renewed blockade of Israel's southern approaches. There would be immunity for terrorist incursion from a reoccupied Gaza. There would be the old inferno of insecurity in the heights of Golan and upper Galilee. There would be the constant possibility of menacing troop concentrations in Sinai. There would be a military frontier tearing Jerusalem apart between two rival sovereignties. Israel after its peril and sacrifice would be restored to full vulnerability. In the absence of a peace treaty with a final boundary settlement, there would be the continuing tension arising from reciprocal territorial claims. Everything would be ambiguous, provisional, precarious and unresolved.

30. This policy should be examined in the light of President Nasser's address to the Khartoum conference in which he said, in effect, that Israel's withdrawal should be politically achieved because the Arab States were not strong enough to achieve it militarily. Once withdrawal was accomplished without negotiation or reconciliation with Israel, he said, an Egyptian army and air force rearmed by Soviet weapons could, by intimidation or action, inaugurate the next phase of pressure leading to the "recovery of Palestine". Something of this view was there endorsed by King Hussein. The central idea was to have an interval, not to have a termination.

31. The Security Council will note that in his address the Egyptian Foreign Minister promised nothing in return for what he asked. We must assume, in accordance with the latest recorded statement, that it is still the policy of the United Arab Republic to close the Suez Canal to Israel shipping. A contrary statement by the Foreign Minister of the United Arab Republic would, of course, be of interest here. We must still assume that it is the policy of the United Arab Republic to regard the Gulf of Aqaba as an internal Arab waterway; to maintain an economic boycott by pressure on other States; and to preserve territorial claims beyond the point of the withdrawal which they seek. The Egyptian representative's assertion at this table last summer that his Government does not regard Eilat as part of Israel has not been cancelled. Is the Foreign Minister in a position to cancel it? If the previous Egyptian policies on the Canal, the Gulf and the open character of the territorial disposition have changed, would the Foreign Minister say so at this table? He has not said so. He has not responded to the

specific questions which I put to him from the General Assembly's rostrum. His speech on 9 November sounded as if he were dictating a punitive settlement to a vanquished Israel. This is not his right, nor is it our position.

32. The severity of this verdict is not reduced by the nostalgia of the United Arab Republic for the 1949 Armistice Agreement. When the Foreign Minister of the United Arab Republic says that he wants to return to that Agreement he is uttering a threat and not a promise. For that Agreement worked and would work only according to the United Arab Republic's interpretation of it. It was converted long ago by the United Arab Republic's interpretation into a formula for belligerency, a prescription for blockade, a basis for irredentism, and an alibi for a refusal to make peace. In this Security Council on 29 May Ambassador El Kony correctly stated that that Agreement was based on military considerations alone. But he also stated on that occasion that: "The existence of a state of war . . . is distinctly and explicitly stated in article IV, paragraph 3", and that "the conclusion of a partial or general armistice agreement does not end the state of war" [1343rd meeting, paras. 90 and 87].

33. Thus, whenever a representative of the United Arab Republic speaks of the 1949 Agreement we should know what he means. The United Arab Republic has declared, published and proclaimed that that Agreement was consistent with the doctrine of a state of war; with non-recognition of sovereignty; with permissive encouragement of terrorist incursion; with unresolved territorial claims; with an unrenounced hope of bringing about Israel's liquidation. We are tired of contesting the United Arab Republic's interpretations. We accept them; we accept that the 1949 Agreement signifies what the United Arab Republic has always interpreted it to mean: the absence of peace, maritime blockade, and a prelude to ultimate total war. That is why that Agreement exploded long ago. It was, in the Egyptian conception, a regulated system of unilateral hostility.

34. We can, accordingly, have nothing to do with it or with any of its apparatus or with any similar situation of juridical anarchy. The only juridical possibility now available is full, formal peace. Why should we evade this fact? Everything else has been tried. War has been tried three times; cease-fires, truces and armistices have been tried for nineteen years, only to explode in successive violence. Only one thing has not been tried: only peace has not been tried. The hour is ripe for the untried experiment of peace.

35. It is remarkable and ominous that after two decades of war and fragile armistice it should be necessary to argue that the only alternative to the cease-fire is now formal peace. My friend the Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of Ireland said, on 27 June: "the only hope I see of avoiding another outbreak in the area is the speedy negotiation and signing of a permanent treaty of peace by Israel and the neighbouring States".²

36. Yet we have not lived to see the day when this simple, precise idea is expressed in a draft resolution or a working

paper. The closest approximation to it came when the Foreign Minister of Brazil proposed to the Arab States and Israel last September that a signed peace agreement and consequent orders for moving from the cease-fire lines be ratified on the same day.

37. Just as it is paradoxically necessary to labour hard to persuade international organs of the necessity to advocate peace treaties, so is it necessary to prove that the advocacy of negotiation is not an extravagant and somewhat immoderate pursuit. This is the most extraordinary of all recent developments. The United Nations jurisprudence on the problem of negotiation has been in constant retreat for many years.

38. Nineteen years ago the General Assembly called on the Arab States and Israel "to seek agreement by negotiations . . . with a view to the final settlement of all questions outstanding between them". That is the text of the General Assembly's recommendation of 11 December 1948 [*resolution 194 (III)*]. That call was repeated by the General Assembly in identical terms on 14 December 1950 [*resolution 394 (V)*], and on 26 January 1952 [*resolution 512 (VI)*]. The latter declared significantly that "the governments concerned have the primary responsibility for reaching a settlement of their outstanding differences"; this was said by the United Nations General Assembly fifteen years ago.

39. On 11 August 1949, this Security Council, having approved the General Armistice Agreements, expressed the hope that the signatory States would "at an early date" seek agreement by negotiations conducted either with the Conciliation Commission for Palestine or directly for a settlement of all questions outstanding between them [*resolution 73 (1949)*].

40. On 17 November 1950, the Security Council was obviously beginning to think that the armistice had lasted too long. Accordingly, it reminded Egypt, Israel and Jordan of their obligation to negotiate for permanent peace [*resolution 89 (1950)*]. On 18 May 1951, the Security Council was visibly perturbed by the fact that the armistice had lasted for two whole years. Accordingly, the Security Council expressed "its concern" at the failure of Syria and Israel to move beyond the armistice to "permanent peace" [*resolution 93 (1951)*].

41. Today, after nearly two decades, the Security Council and the General Assembly are inhibited not only from acting but even from speaking about the negotiation of permanent peace. The Arab States have been allowed to banish the word "negotiation" from the United Nations vocabulary. No delegation has allowed this fatal concept to appear in any text that we have been shown. The idea of negotiation has been converted from a Charter principle into an Israel eccentricity. Worse than this seems to have happened. Negotiation is sometimes described as a beautiful dream, but beyond the scope of rationality. The eminent Foreign Minister of France said on 22 June:

"How can it be expected that these Arab countries, which for twenty years have refused to negotiate with Israel—however great the shock they suffered or possibly

² *Ibid.*, 1538th meeting, para. 39.

even because of that shock—would be any more ready to negotiate today than they were yesterday? ”³

42. It seems to me, with all respect, that one of the factors which make negotiation difficult is the proclamation by eminent statesmen of their impracticability. The prediction helps to create the condition which it predicts. And when the representative of France tells us on 9 November that it would be “unrealistic” to have negotiations without withdrawal, I only invite the Council to believe that it is unrealistic to believe that there can be withdrawal without negotiation. At any rate, every known international precedent supports this view.

43. I have never heard of any substantive agreement on any subject ever having been achieved by Governments that do not set eyes on each other. When there is no shock we are told that negotiation is unnecessary. And when there is shock, we are told that it is unrealistic. I do not believe that a Security Council which declined to assert the inadmissibility of refusing negotiation would be likely to stimulate a purposeful move towards peace.

44. So much, then, for the concepts of peace and negotiation, which I think are indispensable in any statement of Security Council objectives.

45. In addition to these, the Israel Government attaches primary importance to the necessity, after nineteen years of ambiguity, of determining permanent and agreed national boundaries. Now this is really the very heart of the Arab-Israel problem. The central issue to be negotiated in a peace settlement is the establishment of permanent boundaries. Without this how can we envisage any solution of the deadlock? The position was stated with complete precision by the Prime Minister of Denmark, Mr. Krag, when he said to us in the General Assembly on 21 June:

“I therefore suggest that the problem of withdrawal cannot be envisaged as an isolated step. The problem of the withdrawal of troops is closely connected with some of the most burning and sensitive political problems, such as the final settlement of the borders in the area and the claim of Israel, and indeed of all States in the area, for the safeguarding of their territorial and political integrity.”⁴

46. This observation was made almost at the same time as that in which the President of the United States was emphasizing the necessity of applying the principle of territorial integrity to accepted and secure national frontiers and not to fragile armistice lines. A few days ago the representative of Canada spoke of the transition from war to peace and of the necessity for secure, recognized, respected and acknowledged boundaries.

47. The problem is too serious to be dismissed by Soviet charges of what the Deputy Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union called Israel expansionism. A glance at the map of the Soviet Union as it has evolved in the past three decades lends a remarkable aspect to any observations by the Soviet

Union on the inadmissibility of territorial change. But of course each continent has its own experience. The Middle Eastern experience is different from any other. On 29 May the Jordanian representative objected to the use of the term “territorial integrity” in relation to Israel. His objection was soundly based. His case was that the 1949 to 1967 Armistice Agreement did not fix boundaries. It fixed a demarcation line. He said, “I know of no territory; I know of no boundary” [1345th meeting, para. 84]. And he went on to deny Israel’s full title to the territory on its side of the demarcation line.

48. It did not occur to Ambassador El-Farah that a legal principle, if it is to be applied at all, must be applied reciprocally. But it can be certainly agreed that nothing has been more effective in preventing an atmosphere of stability in the Middle East than the fact that for nineteen years there have been demarcation lines based, according to the 1949 Agreements, on “military considerations” alone. Nothing has been regarded as permanent. Everything has been unresolved. The text of the Egyptian-Israel Agreement said:

“The Armistice Demarcation line is not to be construed in any sense as a political or territorial boundary and is delineated without prejudice to rights, claims and positions of either Party . . . as regards ultimate settlement.”

And also:

“It is also recognized that the basic purposes and spirit of the Armistice would not be served by the restoration of previously held military positions.”⁵

49. Israel does not ask the Security Council to endorse or refute any specific view on the manner in which a secure and agreed boundary should be negotiated. We are, however, entitled to ask that our position in that inevitable negotiation be not prejudiced. It is not relevant to transfer the territorial doctrines and experiences of another hemisphere to an area in which the only territorial agreements which have ever existed have been based on military considerations alone. If territorial dispositions based on military considerations are “inadmissible”, then the inadmissibility applies to territories occupied by Egypt and Jordan in defiance of cease-fire and truce resolutions in May 1948. Indeed, it applies to the whole of the territory of the previous Palestine Mandate. It would be discriminatory to apply the principle in one direction alone. Regional doctrines cannot be transplanted from one continent to another without regard to the different juridical circumstances which prevail. We must work within the law and the necessities which apply to our own region. Our own region, to its disaster, has only had demarcation lines based on military conquests or military considerations. The distinction is vital. A demarcation line means vulnerability. A negotiated boundary means stability. A demarcation line means the maintenance of reciprocal territorial claims. A boundary implies their mutual and final renunciation. Surely, in view of the importance of this matter, it is the

³ *Ibid.*, 1531st meeting, para. 101.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 1529th meeting, para. 73.

⁵ *Official Records of the Security Council, Fourth Year, Special Supplement No. 3*, article V, para. 2; article IV, para. 2.

absolute right of any party to approach the peace negotiation without having this matter prejudiced in advance.

50. In the light of the purposes that I have outlined, my delegation wishes to comment on some of the draft texts before the Security Council. Our standard of judgement is whether or not they prejudice our negotiating position in advance. The draft resolution of 7 November presented by India, Mali and Nigeria [S/8227] does not meet this test. It was initiated and formulated without consultation with Israel. We have studied it and we reject it unreservedly. The suggestion that Israel should move from the cease-fire lines without a peace treaty defining permanent and secure frontiers is unacceptable. There is no basis for such a proposal in international law or tradition.

51. The three-Power draft also prejudices our territorial and security problem by asking for withdrawal without a final peace treaty and by defining in advance the territorial and security situations which should follow the cease-fire. That was not done in 1948. The situation to be achieved after the cease-fire was left for the negotiation of the parties, with the help of the United Nations. It is for the sovereign Governments of the area to determine by negotiation the situation to succeed the cease-fire.

52. The statement on maritime freedom in this text is entirely compatible with the United Arab Republic's doctrine on the exclusion of Israel's shipping from the Suez Canal and with the definition of the Gulf of Aqaba as an Arab waterway. If this were not so, the text would frankly speak of freedom for the shipping of all States, including Israel, in the Suez Canal and the Gulf of Aqaba. In view of the role of the navigation problem in the wars of 1956 and 1967, this obscurity is perilous to peace. In view of these fundamental weaknesses, the Israel Government has decided that it cannot give consent, support or co-operation to this proposal or to any diplomatic processes based upon it. Israel will give its constructive attention to any proposal based on a negotiated peace which does not prejudice our substantive interests in advance. There are no proposals tabled which prejudice the Arab theory or doctrine or negotiating position. Ours should not be prejudiced. Similarly, there are no proposals on the table which give sufficient weight in our view to the conception of negotiation and agreement.

53. It is vital that at this important stage of our work we should understand the principles by which we should guide our action. The Security Council is acting within Chapter VI of the Charter in pursuit of pacific settlement. It is seeking agreements and not imposed solutions. If it were able to impose anything, the time to have acted seriously would have been when the Canadian and Danish delegations, in those perilous hours last May, called for action to prevent the impending tragedy of war.

54. But when the clouds of war gathered fast and Israel's danger electrified the conscience of mankind, the Security Council was prevented by its internal structure and power balance from doing or saying anything to prevent the impending war. It offered Israel no single grain of support or encouragement in her ordeal of encirclement and blockade. The paralysis of the Council's function in that

crucial hour ranks with the Egyptian-Jordanian pact and the blockade of the Strait of Tiran as one of the main factors on which President Nasser based his conviction that he could, in his words, "restore the situation to what it was before 1948".

55. In May the United Arab Republic representative, with the support of the Soviet and Bulgarian representatives on the Security Council, was asking the Council for non-intervention. They said that there was no reason why the Security Council should be wasting its time in having a meeting at all. That was their view in the third week of May 1967.

56. In the last week of May, we had the unbelievable spectacle of the Soviet, Bulgarian and Arab representatives arguing that there was no reason for the Security Council to do anything, there was nothing to cause concern—only a murderous troop concentration against Israel on three fronts, only a fully-fledged maritime blockade, only the declaration of a state of war and the announcement by President Nasser that he was now going to secure Israel's total destruction. The Arab States then succeeded in obtaining from the Security Council the non-intervention which they sought. They now ask it to intervene in order to rescue them from that success. The United Arab Republic virtually says to the Security Council: "Stay out of the way when I wish to make war against Israel. Come and restore me if my adventure fails."

57. This surely is not the Council's task. I was impressed by the weight of opinion expressed around this table on 9 November in favour of a consensual result in which the parties could acquiesce because they would feel that their positions were not prejudiced in advance. This, I think, is the only reasonable course which can still be pursued with some hope of success.

58. I was surprised that, in introducing the three-Power text, the Indian representative did not attach any importance to the question of whether Israel's co-operation had been sought or could be anticipated. I was surprised because, in United Nations jurisprudence, his Government has always laid great stress on the need for securing the agreement of the parties for any United Nations effort within the domain of pacific settlement.

59. For example, on 24 January 1957, the Indian representative said:

"... there are only two ways in which any settlement can be reached. One is imposition; and I submit that the United Nations has no power under the Charter of imposing a settlement. The other is by the agreement of the two parties. Therefore, today to record another resolution which reaffirms something that one party has rejected, reaffirms the large number of resolutions which we have rejected... is, in our submission, not calculated to promote the purposes of the United Nations or of the exercise by the Security Council of the tasks entrusted to it." [765th meeting, para. 140.]

On 15 February 1957 he added:

“Any attempt to interfere in this or not to allow this question to be solved by direct negotiation . . . would be wrong.” [769th meeting, para. 175.]

The Indian representative said on 20 February 1957:

“[Those] who produced this draft resolution which has now been co-sponsored by others, had both private and public knowledge that the Government of India would in no circumstances agree to this. Therefore, to produce a proposition which requires the consent of the parties, in the face of our declaration that we will not agree to it, is either to take the view that what we say does not mean anything or that their persuasive powers would be so great that we would surrender our principles. I think that neither of those conclusions is justified.” [773rd meeting, para. 79.]

On 7 May 1964 the Foreign Minister of India, Mr. Chagla, said:

“My final appeal to the Security Council is to realize that the differences between India and Pakistan can be solved only by those two countries, and that there is more chance of a settlement if there is no intervention by third parties. No superimposed solution will do any good.” [1113th meeting, para. 61.]

And on 12 May 1964 he said:

“If the Council is interested in the maintenance of peace and international relations, it should avoid any solution superimposed upon the two countries or intervention in any talks or discussions we might have with each other.” [1115th meeting, para. 35.]

60. These doctrines are of immaculate validity. But Israel, like India, has been a sovereign State for nearly two decades, and her vital interests should not be, cannot be, determined outside her consent. Moreover, there is one criterion which distinguishes Israel from every other State. It is well that I should speak of it frankly. Israel, alone in the family of nations, is struggling not for a marginal interest or even for a cherished objective but for her very existence and survival. All men of sensitive conscience and of historic imagination must surely respect this consideration with special care.

61. The Arab Press is already full of articles about how Israel can still be destroyed in a second stage, if at this stage she can be lured or pressed back to where she was on 4 June 1967, without peace and without a permanent frontier delimitation.

62. We have learnt this summer to take Arab public statements very seriously. And when Israel's survival is brought into question, there comes into the human consciousness a great mass of memories of holocausts and massacres for which Israel's sovereignty and security are the only shelter and consolation. Therefore this is not a matter to be dealt with lightly. We in the Government of Israel must guide our action in the light of a responsibility which

we hold in solitude. Our co-operation can be expected only for ideas which do not jeopardize the security and peace of our nation.

63. If the Security Council wishes us to consider the appointment of a United Nations representative, our view is that such a representative could play a useful role in bringing parties together only if his directives or frame of reference do not prejudice our policies or our negotiating position in advance. Indeed, they need not prejudice the positions or the negotiating positions of any party.

64. I say this because we do not wish to stand still. We want the caravan of peace to move forward, but in prudence and in sure direction. We believe that a directly negotiated peace settlement is not only possible but inevitable. Our basic premise is the inadmissibility of refusing negotiation in an international dispute. As the British Prime Minister said in the General Assembly two years ago, “the enemies of negotiation are the enemies of peace”.⁶

65. A peace negotiation, for us, is not an abstract principle. We have serious and constructive proposals to make in these communications with neighbouring States. Those proposals would be conducive to the interest and the national honour of all negotiating States. We should, of course, have to be ready to consider and react to ideas put to us directly by the other side. We have a concrete vision of what peace means in terms of our region's daily life: peaceful relations instead of violent acts; normal dialogue instead of belligerent threats; thriving commerce instead of boycotts and blockades; intensive regional development within a community of sovereign States; a constructive and compassionate approach to the population problems created by two decades of war and Arab belligerency; a respectful concern, formally expressed, for universal spiritual interests; liberation from the crushing burden of competitive armament; the devotion of Arab and Israel efforts, free from military strife and political rancour, to the advancement of the total human destiny. These are not impossible objectives. They lie ready to our hand. We shall maintain our position until they are achieved, but it is to their achievement, to the achievement of peace, that our effort will be consecrated, be the journey short or long.

66. The PRESIDENT (*translated from French*): I call upon the representative of Jordan.

67. Mr. RIFA'I (Jordan): The issue before the Council today is one of principle and lies at the very roots of the United Nations. It defines the problem which has been before the Council for the past five months. The answer which the Council gives will determine the future course of events in the Middle East as well as the image of the United Nations in the world. Are we in this Organization prepared to stand firm and take a clear decision, or are we to shrink from our responsibilities and sit back and let matters drag on and lead to failure, confusion and an arbitrary state of affairs based on military activities?

⁶ Official Records of the General Assembly, Twentieth Session, Plenary Meetings, 1397th meeting, para. 43.

68. This Council has been invited to meet in urgent session in order to give an answer to and provide a remedy for this basic issue—namely, is occupation or acquisition of territory by military conquest admissible under the Charter of the United Nations and international order? If the answer is in the negative, then the basic foundations of peace will be established and the United Nations will emerge as the centre for harmonizing the actions of nations in the attainment of the principles and purposes of its Charter. But, if the answer is in the affirmative, then I must ask in all fairness what good purpose this Organization serves if it is not able to implement its principles and aims or if it cannot reap the fruits of its hard work during the past twenty-two years.

69. Members of the Council will recall that, on the outbreak of fighting, Security Council resolution 233 (1967) called, as a first step, for an immediate cease-fire and for a cessation of all military activities in the area. Surely that resolution was a prelude to something basic that was supposed to follow—that is, the elimination of acquisition of territory by military conquest, in order that a state of affairs might be created which would bring about peace and justice, of which this area has been deprived for the past twenty years. Instead, we find that we are now where we were on the day we first met in this Council, and the problem has been left unresolved, and diplomatic efforts and counter-efforts have taken the place of urgent and affirmative action. In the course of this long delay Israel defiance has been building up.

70. In its resolution 237 (1967) of 14 June, the Security Council called upon the Government of Israel to ensure the safety, welfare and security of the inhabitants of the areas where military operations had taken place and to facilitate the return of the inhabitants who had fled the areas since the outbreak of hostilities. Israel failed to comply with that resolution, and of the 200,000 citizens who fled from west to east Jordan it refused to allow more than 14,000 to return.

71. In its resolutions 2253 (ES-V) and 2254 (ES-V), the General Assembly, deeply concerned at the situation prevailing in Jerusalem as a result of the measures taken by Israel to change the status of the City, considered that Israel measures were invalid and called upon Israel to rescind all measures already taken and to desist forthwith from taking any action which would alter the status of Jerusalem.

72. In direct challenge to those resolutions, the Israel Prime Minister stood in the Knesset on 30 October 1967 to declare his Government's master plan to build in the Old City of Jerusalem 1,500 housing units for the Jewish settlers from all over the world. I should say in this respect that there is not one single acre of land which is Jewish property in the Old City of Jerusalem. Arab land ownership there and in the surroundings of the Old City of Jerusalem is 100 per cent.

73. Everyone knows that Israel disregards those resolutions and continues to defy the wishes and decisions of the Organization which brought Israel into existence. We are bound to ask the reason for this. It is simply that Israel's

defiance seems to derive from the hesitation and constant delay of this Council as regards taking firm action in accordance with the tasks entrusted to it by the Members of the Organization.

74. Here, then, is where the tragedy lies—a tragedy that will lead to danger and create a precedent which will threaten the existence of small and disarmed nations.

75. Now we have reached a stage where the time element is vital. Arab delegations made their first journey to the fifth emergency special session and asked for the immediate withdrawal of all Israel armed forces from all occupied territories, back to the positions they had held prior to 5 June 1967. It was clear that the principle of immediate and complete withdrawal was upheld by all the membership of the General Assembly of the United Nations. The Secretary-General said in the introduction to his annual report to the General Assembly:

“There is the immediate and urgently challenging issue of the withdrawal of the armed forces of Israel from the territory of neighbouring Arab States occupied during the recent war. There is near unanimity on this issue, in principle, because everyone agrees that there should be no territorial gains by military conquest. It would, in my view, lead to disastrous consequences if the United Nations were to abandon or compromise this fundamental principle.”⁷

76. Withdrawal of Israel's forces from all Arab territories has been the central point in all the statements of representatives in this Council and in the General Assembly. Every Member voted for the withdrawal of all Israel forces from the territories occupied by them as a result of the recent armed conflict. Nevertheless, the Organization and its membership were unable to protect the principle of withdrawal from being drowned in political argumentations alien to the merits of that fundamental principle. We therefore had to make a second urgent demand, for the sake of peace in our region and for the sake of the survival of the United Nations.

77. We have come again this time with the same political approach and with a great deal of awareness of the consequences should the United Nations fail again in its responsibilities for the maintenance of international peace and security.

78. The recent Arab summit conference held in Khartoum, convened to deal with this question, demonstrated one great fact. It demonstrated a high degree of responsibility by the Arab States towards peace and stability in their region and, undoubtedly, in the whole world. If the policy and spirit of the Khartoum conference can be adequately appreciated by this Council, and if appropriate decisions to remedy the situation can be taken, then peace in the Middle East will find its way. Otherwise any moderate approach or conciliatory attitude on the part of the Arabs in the treatment of the present crisis will, I am afraid, prove to be far from realistic. The United Nations will then cease to be the direction towards which we should

⁷ *Ibid.*, Twenty-second Session, Supplement No. 1A, para. 47.

turn to ask for the removal of armed aggression from our occupied lands. In such a case we shall have to return to our people and explain to them that they have no other course but to mobilize their own efforts, to use their own resources and to organize themselves in order to liquidate the Israel aggression, no matter what the price and the sacrifice might be.

79. Consultations have been going on, intensively and extensively, among the representatives on the Council and with various groups and members outside the Council, for the purpose of reaching an understanding regarding the decision which the Council ought to take as a result of its present deliberations. Our position in those consultations and in the discussions inside and outside this Council has been made clear. It is our strong and sincere conviction that the most fundamental requirement in the present crisis of the Middle East, for the creation of a state of peace, is undoubtedly the removal of Israel's military occupation and the withdrawal of Israel forces from all the Arab territories occupied by Israel since 5 June.

80. Half of my country is now under Israel occupation as a result of Israel's military conquest. On the west bank of the Jordan there are a million Jordanians who are under the persecution, torture and intimidation of the Israel military authorities. My people on the west bank of the Jordan have been ruined by the Israel occupation and every individual has suffered but is still determined to exist as a Jordanian.

81. The development on the west bank of the Jordan is second to none in the whole area. In the past nineteen years towns and cities have grown up, with modern homes, hotels, hospitals, schools, gardens, factories, and other establishments which are something that any nation could be proud of. Those towns and cities have been built up by the sheer hard work of men and women who took up employment in different parts of the world in order to be able to build their homes in the lands close to those from which their fathers had been ejected some nineteen years earlier. The great development achieved on the west bank is a tribute to the people of Jordan and their determination to live in peace and prosperity. We need only look at Arab Jerusalem, and see the great development there. Towns such as Nablus, Ramallah, Beit Hanina, Shuafat, Hebron, Bethlehem and Jericho are but examples of the wonderful and great achievement of our people.

82. In the economic field this prosperity and development in such a short period is beyond description. Speaking of education, on the west bank something like 40,000 to 50,000 men and women graduate every year. Most of them take up employment in different parts of the Arab world and contribute significantly to the general development that is taking place in the Middle East. Those men and women earn their living by hard work and determination, in order to sustain their families on the west bank and develop their country in a magnificent manner.

83. With those facts brought before the Council, can the United Nations—the Organization which was founded for the welfare of man—abstain from assuming its responsibility and allow the very life and existence of the million Jordanians to be shattered and destroyed as a result of the military conquest and subjugation by the force of arms?

84. We want peace in our region, for it is the essential security for the safeguarding of our civilization and the continuation of the progress we have achieved. Indeed, all our collective security arrangements are defensive in character, defensive against any unexpected Israel armed attack on all or any of our territories. The Israelis, however, keep repeating irrelevant and fallacious arguments to justify their military occupation and continued refusal to withdraw from the territories conquered through aggression. They claim that withdrawal without sufficient guarantees for what they term future peace and security in the area is not acceptable.

85. But what is the main threat to peace and security in the area? What has been the main source of instability and frequent explosions, and what are the real guarantees for future peace? For many years the peoples of the region lived in peace and quiet. It has only been during the last twenty years that the world has felt the threat to peace coming from the Middle East.

86. The main threat to peace and security in our region has been caused by two main factors. The first has been the systematic Israel expansionist policy based on military aggression as the record of Israel clearly shows. It has been a record of systematic Israel expansion from one line to another at the expense of the Arab lands.

87. A record of further expansion in the demilitarized zones created by the United Nations; the repeated and organized Israel attacks on neighbouring Arab countries under the guise of retaliation or so-called punitive raids; the wiping out by Israel of several Arab villages and the mass slaughter of their inhabitants, particularly on the Jordanian front-lines; and two major, large-scale attacks and occupation of vast Arab territory, once in 1956 and once in 1967. These manifestations of Israel's systematic policy of violence and steady expansion are the main explosions that occurred in the area and were each time described as a threat to peace and security in the area and the world, as in fact they were. In all these cases Israel was the aggressor, and the neighbouring Arab countries were the targets and the victims. In all these cases it was the security of the Arab countries, not of Israel, that was threatened and endangered. The United Nations knows this fact, and it has registered it in its annals and records.

88. For nineteen long years, hundreds of thousands of our innocent people have been living in camps far from their homes and native land on meagre international charities. For nineteen years our Arab borders were the targets of Israel aggressive military attacks and our citizens were killed and murdered in cold blood. For nineteen years our natural resources, property and income fell into Israel hands. For nineteen years we kept coming to this Council with one complaint after another against Israel's aggression and belligerence. We maintained a normal approach and a peaceful conduct. It has been Israel that professed peace but exercised war and violence. If Israel now feels, and has felt, insecure it is only the feeling, very genuine and justified, that the policy of continued violence and perpetual state of aggression cannot make Israel acceptable or its acquisition of war-spoils legalized.

89. The second factor causing the threat to peace and security in the area and the world is this: For twenty years

the living symbol of the Palestine tragedy, the main victims of the gross act of injustice done to the Arabs in Palestine, the dispossessed and displaced, have struggled for their rights and their future, but have till now been denied justice. Despite their inalienable right to go back to their homes and regain their life and property, and despite successive reiterations by the United Nations of the resolutions recognizing this right and ordering repatriation and compensation, Israel continued to ignore that right and to defy the United Nations resolutions. For twenty years this problem has continued to survive in the midst of the human, political, economic and international life of the area. It will continue to do so as long as the weight of world conscience and international efforts does not bring pressure to bear on Israel. Injustice breeds revolt, and the revolt of peoples and nations is a sign of a failing international system and an erosion of world peace.

90. What kind of peace can the Israelis envisage when Israel continues to ignore and to defy the United Nations resolutions on the problem created directly and exclusively by Israel in its very act of emergence into being? Israel spokesmen have no right to aspire for peace while refusing to accept its prerequisites. They cannot invoke the right of security and destroy, by their acts and position, the very basis of peace.

91. The Arabs, on the other hand, have not been a burden on peace. Despite a deep sense of continuing grievance, the Arabs have restrained themselves in act and deed as befits a nation born in the values and doctrine of peace. The only tangible—and perhaps not so tangible—expressions of belligerence they have made, throughout these twenty years, have been their dedicated and uncompromising attitude of refusal to give legitimacy to continued injustice and their refraining from recognizing an unjust and illegal situation.

92. What threat is there in that for the peace in the world and in the area? The insecurity of Israel comes from within, from the sense of guilt, from the sense of Israel's irrational dependence on a futile policy of violence and aggression, from the feeling that the international forces which have so far supported Israel's policy have done so either out of ignorance of the facts or under a system of Zionist manipulation which is not likely to continue with success.

93. The Arab attitude has not been the source of instability in the area, nor has it been opposed to a genuine concept of peace. It is, therefore, a false and unfounded argument by Israel spokesmen that withdrawal from occupied Arab territories is not a prescription for peace. Israel's withdrawal from our territory is in itself necessary and right. It is also a precondition for peace in the area and in the world. It is the duty of the Security Council and the United Nations to bring this about, for it was initially in the United Nations that the original problem was born. And it is with the positive efforts by the United Nations to correct the mistake committed two decades ago, and to implement its principles and resolutions, that a just and lasting peace can be achieved.

94. World public opinion everywhere has supported the validity of our stand, a stand which offers a sound basis for a just peace.

95. On 20 February 1957, President Eisenhower said: "Should a nation which attacks and occupies foreign territory in the face of United Nations disapproval be allowed to impose conditions on its own withdrawal?" That statement remains as true now as when it was made in 1957. I can quote many important statements made in this Council and outside the Council advocating this argument, namely, that withdrawal of Israel troops from all the occupied Arab territories which they held after 5 June is the first requirement along the way of peace.

96. The Arab representatives to the United Nations have made their position clear. My King, His Majesty King Hussein, advocated throughout the world and during his visits to various countries the just cause of our people.

97. We have nothing more to say. We, and our peoples, are therefore waiting for the result of your efforts.

98. Mr. TARABANOV (Bulgaria) (*translated from French*): I should like first of all, as I begin my statement, to dwell for a moment on one particular passage in the statement made by the Foreign Minister of Israel where he gave a striking example of the intransigence and truculence of the extremist and military circles in Israel, which have set in motion every conceivable means of propaganda throughout the world in an endeavour to gain acceptance for their territorial and other claims. According to him, some members of the Security Council are guilty of having prevented the Council from taking action against the Arab countries last May, when the latter were alleged to have been planning intervention and aggression against Israel.

99. As everyone knows, at that time we received an assurance through the Secretary-General that the Arab countries would not undertake any action calculated to endanger peace in the Middle East and did not intend to commit any act of aggression. Those countries have kept their word; they have done nothing.

100. The representative of the People's Republic of Bulgaria was included in this accusation. But he did not know at that time—and I am sure the same was true also of the representative of the Soviet Union and other representatives—that large-scale aggression was being planned. On the other hand, those who had a more or less precise idea of the situation and knew, from accurate information received from sources in Israel as well as from sources of their own that Israel's forces were preparing to strike, tried at the time to turn the feelings of the Security Council and its members, and against whom?—against the future victims of the Israel aggression then being prepared. Therein lies the responsibility of those countries, and their representatives here, who have to answer the charge made before the Council: they refused to act against the aggression being planned by the Israel representatives and by Israel's military forces.

101. More than five months have passed since the Security Council last discussed this problem and failed to condemn Israel's aggression against the neighbouring Arab States owing to the stubborn opposition of certain Western delegations, headed by the United States.

102. In view of the Security Council's powerlessness to act, the General Assembly was convened in emergency

special session. It too failed to find a solution to the problem of obliterating the effects of Israel's aggression, again because of the determined opposition of those same countries, which instead of condemning the aggression and the aggressor tried by every possible means to explain away and condone the aggressive acts.

103. The present session of the Security Council comes at the end of a long series of consultations between the interested parties and the members of the Security Council. In particular there have been a number of private consultations and meetings between the non-permanent members of the Security Council, at which efforts have been made to find some common ground between the Afro-Asian and Latin American countries on the basis of the draft resolution submitted by the Latin American countries during the fifth emergency special session of the General Assembly.⁸ These efforts have culminated in nothing more than a consensus regarding the procedure to be followed—in particular the appointment of a special representative of the Secretary-General, with terms of reference defined on the basis of certain fundamental principles. The consultations failed, however, when the question arose of defining the terms of reference and the principles which would guide the special representative—and this in spite of the fundamental concession made by the non-aligned countries to take as the basis for their work and their efforts in the Security Council the draft resolution for which the Western Powers had voted during the emergency session of the General Assembly.⁹

104. At this point it is interesting to note that in the course of the fifth emergency special session, which was convened to deal with the problems of the Middle East, when it became clear that the draft resolution submitted by the Latin American countries had no chance of being adopted owing to the general political atmosphere prevailing in the region concerned, the United States of America and certain Western countries voted in favour of the draft. But now, when the Arab countries state, in the words of the Foreign Minister of the United Arab Republic, that: "In these consultations"—the recent consultations in which members of the Security Council took an active part—"we travelled a long way in an effort to meet all the points raised by those who were sincerely labouring to find a just and reasonable formula" [1373rd meeting, para. 73], and when the Afro-Asian and the Latin American countries have prepared a document, both the substance and the wording of which are embodied in the draft resolution submitted by India, Mali and Nigeria [S/8227], the United States of America and some of its allies make it known—or are about to do so, as the very fact of submitting draft resolution S/8229 of 7 November indicates—that they are not in agreement with the principles and assertions expressed in the three-Power draft resolution introduced by India. Yet these are the very principles and assertions defined in the Latin American draft resolution submitted to the General Assembly.

⁸ *Ibid.*, Fifth Emergency Special Session, Annexes, agenda item 5, document A/L.523/Rev.1. Also circulated as document S/8235.

⁹ *Ibid.*, Annexes, agenda item 5, document A/L.522/Rev.3.

105. We are not at all convinced by the Danish representative's explanation of the opposition to the draft resolution submitted by those three countries, when he said on 9 November last:

"There is a structural difference between resolutions of the General Assembly which take the form of recommendations and which as such can be regarded as expressions of world opinion, and resolutions of the Security Council which are to form the basis of action." [1373rd meeting, para. 237.]

106. On the contrary, this explanation constitutes an indictment of the Western Powers themselves. The truth is that apart from the fact I have just outlined, which makes it clear that the Western countries were prepared to vote and did vote for this draft resolution when they were sure that it had little chance of being adopted by the General Assembly owing to the situation prevailing in the Middle East, it now appears that they do not want action to be taken on the basis of those principles as embodied in a recommendation for which they nevertheless voted.

107. Hence we are forced to conclude that, if the Latin American draft resolution had been adopted during the fifth emergency special session in June and July, the Western countries, and particularly the United States, would not have considered those recommendations as a basis for action. This is a strange idea of the role of the United Nations.

108. It would be dangerous for the United Nations, within its own organs, to apply a double standard in its policies. But, how else can we explain the following sentence in the Latin American draft resolution submitted to the General Assembly and accepted by the Western Powers at that time?

"1. Urgently requests:

"(a) Israel to withdraw all its forces from all the territories occupied by it as a result of the recent conflict." [S/8235.]

This has now been changed into the following—and here I am quoting from the United States draft resolution just submitted to the Security Council:

"Affirms that the fulfilment of the above Charter principles requires the achievement of a state of just and lasting peace in the Middle East embracing withdrawal of armed forces from occupied territories . . . secure and recognized boundaries." [S/8229.]

109. The only purpose of this wording from the United States draft resolution now before the Security Council is to make it possible for the occupying aggressor to remain in the territories where its troops are now installed. Hence it can only complicate matters. The substitution of the idea of "secure and recognized boundaries" for the words "withdraw . . . from all the territories", definitely implies that the aggressor may decide to withdraw its troops at its own convenience. If this is not so, then the United States representative should give us an explanation.

110. The conviction that the United States draft resolution is submitted with the aim of finding a way of continuing the occupation of the territories is also strengthened by the fact that the terms of reference of the Secretary-General's special representative, clearly defined in the three-Power draft resolution of India, Mali and Nigeria as: "to co-ordinate efforts to achieve the purposes of this resolution" [S/8227, para. 3], are changed in the United States draft resolution into the establishment and maintenance of: "contacts with the States concerned with a view to assisting them"—note the expression: "with a view to assisting them"—"in creating a just and lasting peace in the area" [S/8229, para. 3].

111. Today we have heard the repeated and categorical statement by the Foreign Minister of Israel that he would accept nothing less than direct negotiations for the conclusion of new agreements under the threat of permanent occupation. Despite all the decisions of the United Nations, Israel considers the agreements concluded under United Nations auspices as null and void.

112. Yet the whole series of problems relating to the present crisis have always been connected with action by the United Nations; even the setting up of Israel was based on United Nations action. From the very beginning in 1948 up to the latest cease-fire resolution, the United Nations has played an important role.

113. At the same time, the present state of relations between the parties directly involved also demonstrates that the most realistic method of approaching a political settlement of the problems under dispute is through direct and active participation by the United Nations. The Organization's participation cannot be made light of at a time when its role is more essential than ever.

114. At the present time, Israel's insistence that direct negotiations are the only alternative and its attempts to impose such negotiations make it clear that what it wants is to drag out the problem indefinitely so as to cover up the want of a sincere desire for a peaceful political settlement. This demand for direct negotiations turns out to be a negation of all the agreements concluded up to the present time, a negation of negotiations of any kind. In these circumstances we must steadfastly oppose the attempts by the Israel Government to refuse the participation of the United Nations, to spurn its help and to repudiate its decisions.

115. While the United Nations has been reduced to inaction by such manoeuvres over the past five months, the situation in the Middle East has deteriorated considerably. Israel's occupation of the Arab territories as a result of the aggression of 5 June has created an extremely explosive situation in the area and has given rise to growing tension which could lead to new armed outbreaks. The Israel army's recent premeditated provocations in violation of the cease-fire resolutions have resulted in large-scale destruction. The havoc caused to the city of Suez and the refineries there, which was organized by the Israel authorities, has made the situation in the area extremely tense.

116. The unreasonable delay in arriving at a solution to the problem of removing the consequences of Israel's

aggression could have disastrous effects. It could encourage militarist, extremist and expansionist circles in Israel to pursue their territorial claims and make them even more truculent. It might encourage them to adopt measures to strengthen the occupation régime and to transform the *fait accompli* into "permanent frontiers". In eloquent demonstration of this, the Prime Minister of Israel declared in the speech he gave in the Knesset on 30 October of this year:

"Israel will continue to maintain in full the situation as it was established in the cease-fire agreements and will consolidate her position, in keeping with the vital needs of her security and development."¹⁰

117. The deliberate delay in finding a solution to the problem of the Middle East keeps the existing tension alive and makes for a critical deterioration in the situation. By turning the United Nations into a powerless spectator of this frustrating situation, brought about in flagrant violation of the Charter and its principles, this delay does immense damage to the prestige of the United Nations in the eyes of world public opinion. The very role of the United Nations as an instrument of peace and security is called in question throughout the whole world. This could sow the idea in the minds of the Israel extremists and militarists that they can commit crimes with impunity and even encourage them to embark on more irresponsible acts still in the future. As the proverb goes "The more you have the more you want".

118. But even if the United Nations were to be forced into inaction as a result of clever stratagems, it is difficult to believe that such an injustice would ever be accepted by the Arab peoples. The great Arab peoples have, over several thousands of years of history, suffered defeats yet have always emerged stronger and more vigorous than ever; but more important still they have been responsible for economic and cultural developments from which the world has greatly profited and for which it is greatly in their debt.

119. Still less could the Arab States tolerate the humiliation and the insult to the entire Arab race of seeing their soil under foreign occupation and their people expelled from the homes in which they have lived for countless generations. Contemporary history is full of examples of nations which have risen up and reacted proudly against the provocations of foreign soldiery. We need only recall the history of the last few years to see that this is so.

120. The extreme state of tension now prevailing in the Middle East presents a very real threat to the peace and security of that region and to the peace of the world. It also represents a decided danger for the people of Israel themselves. During the last two decades, Israel's extremist circles have by wars and aggressions succeeded three times in scoring some military victory, but the people of Israel have not gained peace thereby. In this age of national liberation of oppressed peoples, peace in the Middle East can only be achieved through the self-determination of peoples and the search for a just and peaceful solution to the thorny problems of this region which has suffered so much from the intervention of imperialist forces, both in

¹⁰ Quoted in English by the speaker.

the past and in the present. Peace and security, respect for sovereignty and the recognition of the territorial integrity and political independence of every State, are all part and parcel of the acknowledgement of this great principle of our era, that the occupation or acquisition of territory by military conquest is inadmissible. This means that Israel's armed forces must withdraw unconditionally from all the territory occupied as a result of the recent fighting. That preliminary step is essential before any attempt can be made to solve the problem of peace and security in the Middle East. It is unnecessary to point out that the acquisition of foreign territory by military conquest represents a flagrant violation of the principles of the Charter and of the rules of international law, and constitutes an international crime for which the perpetrator should be condemned and forced to assume proper responsibility at the international level.

121. The withdrawal of the aggressors' troops to the positions they occupied on 4 June would be the first step and the basic prerequisite for a political settlement of all the other contentious questions; otherwise the aggressor would be participating in the settlement negotiations from a position of strength and would be able to use the usurped territories as bargaining counters.

122. The entire speech by the Foreign Minister of Israel which the Security Council has just heard was nothing more than a glorification of all the acts of aggression committed by Israel's armies, backed by the attitude of the United States of America as expressed in its draft resolution. The Foreign Minister made it clear to anyone who would listen that the extremist circles in Israel have no intention of withdrawing so long as they can count on that backing. Accustomed as he is to enjoying privileges even in the United Nations, he complained at the Council's decision to allow him to speak only when his turn came. This is symptomatic of the state of mind which has become characteristic of the Israel extremist circles he represents.

123. The People's Republic of Bulgaria has always made it plain that no solution is possible without the withdrawal of the Israel troops. In his speech at the fifth emergency special session on 20 June 1967, the Prime Minister of the People's Republic of Bulgaria, Todor Jivkov, said, and I quote:

"The main prerequisite for the solution of the Middle East problems at the present moment is the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of the Israel troops from the occupied Arab territories. The continued seizure of those territories is nothing but a continuation of the aggression. The illegal presence of Israel troops in those areas is aimed at offering undeserved advantages to the aggressor; in point of fact, it fans its expansionist claims and places obstacles to the solution of the questions relating to the restoration and consolidation of peace in the Middle East."¹

124. The immediate withdrawal of the aggressor's troops from the occupied territory is even more essential in view

of the intention of the Israel expansionists to convert the provisional military occupation into a permanent annexation of foreign lands to the territory of Israel. This point was emphasized by Mr. Mahmoud Riad, the Foreign Minister of the United Arab Republic, in the statement he made on 9 November [1373rd meeting]. Indeed, until the consequences of Israel's aggression are removed and so long as there is no withdrawal of the Israel troops from all the occupied territories, it will be impossible even to reopen the Suez Canal to navigation after its closure because of Israel's occupation, let alone to safeguard navigation. This problem too is linked with that of the withdrawal of the Israel troops from the occupied territories, and the same is true of all the problems which should come before those whose task it is to deal with them.

125. The elimination of all the consequences of the aggression will create a favorable atmosphere in which the situation can be brought back to normal, including the guaranteeing of free passage through the waterways of the region, in conformity with the requirements of contemporary international law.

126. It is clear that lasting peace and stability in the Middle East cannot be ensured unless an effort is made to destroy the root cause of the tension which has prevailed in that part of the world for the last two decades, and by this I mean the solving of the problem of the Palestine refugees. I say solving, and not merely making a show of solving, as some would wish. Any lasting and just settlement of the political problem should unquestionably include a settlement of the situation of Palestine's Arab population with due regard for their legitimate interests and on the basis of the relevant United Nations resolutions. Naturally this has nothing to do with those who have become refugees as a result of the recent conflict, since they have the right and should have the opportunity to return automatically to their homes as soon as the occupying forces have withdrawn from all the occupied territory.

127. We cannot expect to see a lasting peace in the Middle East until these fundamental and urgent problems have been solved. As long as the Israel troops remain in possession of all the territory occupied as a result of the recent conflict, and as long as the refugee problem continues to poison the atmosphere of that region, there can be no peace in the Middle East or any assurance of security in the world.

128. As was pointed out by the Foreign Minister of the United Arab Republic, Mr. Mahmoud Riad, the Arab countries have travelled a long way in an effort to meet the points raised by those labouring to find a just and reasonable solution to the problem of the Middle East. The non-aligned countries which are members of the Security Council have prepared a working paper based on the draft resolution submitted by the Latin American countries at the fifth emergency special session, and this is now submitted as a draft resolution by India, Mali and Nigeria. It is now the duty of those countries, headed by the United States, which voted in favour of the Latin American draft resolution, to remain faithful to the commitment into which they entered at the emergency session as expressed by their vote. The beginning of a solution to the problems of the Middle East depends on them alone.

¹ 11 Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifth Emergency Special Session, Plenary Meetings, 1528th meeting, para. 30.

129. Guided by the above considerations, the delegation of the People's Republic of Bulgaria will do everything in its power, both during the discussion and in the course of future endeavours, to contribute as far as it is able towards solving the problems of peace and security in the Middle East and hence in the whole world.

130. The PRESIDENT (*translated from French*): I call on the representative of India, who wishes to exercise the right of reply.

131. Mr. PARTHASARATHI (India): My delegation has listened with care to the statement made by the Foreign Minister of Israel. At this meeting I should like to comment only on one or two points.

132. The Foreign Minister of Israel has said that the three-Power draft resolution was drafted without any consultations with Israel. I should like to state quite categorically that in working out the draft the three Powers took into consideration not only the discussions and draft resolutions, formal and informal, during the emergency session and the twenty-second regular session of the General Assembly, but also the discussions among the permanent and non-permanent members of the Security Council over the past several weeks. It has to be appreciated also that this draft was worked out by six members of the Council who had contacts with the various parties concerned.

133. As I said on 9 November in this Council, in working out our draft we had in mind the views of the other members of the Council as well as of the parties concerned. And as my colleague and friend, Mr. Adebo, the representative of Nigeria, said on 9 November:

“... I can say honestly and frankly that throughout our deliberations I was in touch with both parties ascertaining their views. However, I regret to say that at no time in the negotiations was I able to persuade either party to my own point of view, and that remains the position today.”
[1373rd meeting, para. 109.]

134. Similarly, my good friend the representative of Ethiopia stated in the same meeting that the three-Power draft won his delegation's approbation not only because it was based on the Latin American draft resolution presented to the emergency session of the General Assembly, but also because the approach was, in his view, “a sound one and the principles involved were affirmed and maintained in reasonable balance”[*ibid.*, para. 200].

135. I now turn to another substantive point raised by the Foreign Minister of Israel. He has stated that the three-Power draft resolution prejudices bilateral talks between the Arabs and the Israelis. The aim of the three-Power draft

resolution is essentially to provide a framework of principles and guidelines within which the special representative of the Secretary-General can contact the parties concerned in order to co-ordinate efforts to achieve the purpose of the draft resolution, which is to initiate the process of peaceful settlement of the crisis. The draft resolution provides for the adoption of all peaceful methods and actions agreed to by the parties to settle the dispute and does not rule out any particular means of settlement. We leave it to the parties concerned to agree on the particular means they will employ in seeking solutions of their disputes. This is in accordance with Article 33 of the Charter, which enjoins the parties to any dispute the continuance of which is likely to endanger international peace and security, to seek pacific settlement of the disputes, and gives the choice to the parties to seek a solution, either by negotiation or by some other peaceful means of their own choice, such as inquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice—I repeat: of their own choice. It is thus left to the parties to choose any of the methods of peaceful settlement. This has been and remains the position of my delegation. We have all along and consistently maintained it in the past on all such matters before the Council, and we shall continue to do so.

136. The representative of Israel has also referred to the position of my Government on India-Pakistan relations. I must state in all frankness that the two situations are completely different and have no bearing whatsoever on the question under discussion. The Foreign Minister of Israel, while comparing his Government's stand with that of the Government of India, ignored—and I am sure he will be the first to appreciate this—the differing origins of the unfortunate situations as well as the divergent histories of relationships among States in different regions of the world. If, however, the Foreign Minister of Israel insists upon drawing parallels, he should remember the eminent practice of this Council, which, in 1965, insisted upon coupling the demand for a cease-fire with a call for withdrawal to positions previously held. Thereafter, it was possible for India and Pakistan, which had never interrupted their formal diplomatic relations, to negotiate at Tashkent with the help of the Soviet Union.

137. The PRESIDENT (*translated from French*): I have no other speakers on my list. As a result of informal consultations, it appears that members of the Council are agreed that the date for our next meeting on the Middle East situation should be Wednesday, 15 November 1967, at 10.30 a.m. If there is no objection, I shall take it that this proposal is adopted.

The meeting rose at 1.10 p.m.

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