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Estimates in respect of special political missions, good offices and other political initiatives authorized by the General Assembly and/or the Security Council

Thematic cluster I. Special and personal envoys, special advisers and personal representatives of the Secretary-General

Report of the Secretary-General

Addendum

Summary

The present report contains the proposed resource requirements for 2007 for seven special political missions grouped under the thematic cluster of special and personal envoys, special advisers and personal representatives of the Secretary-General.

It is recalled that, in its report on the estimates in respect of special political missions, good offices and other political initiatives authorized by the General Assembly and/or the Security Council, the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions recommended, inter alia, that thought should be given to reorganizing the future reports on budget proposals for special political missions in order to present them in clusters, on the basis of thematic or regional considerations.

The present report takes into account the recommendations of the Advisory Committee on the presentation of reports of special political missions and includes the 2007 budget proposals for seven special and personal envoys, special advisers and personal representatives.

The estimated requirements for 2007 for special political missions grouped under this cluster amount to \$6,656,400.



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Financial overview

The estimated requirements for 2007 for special political missions grouped under this cluster amount to \$6,656,400 and requirements by mission are detailed below.

(Thousands of United States dollars)

Category of expenditure	1 January-31 December 2006		Variance	Requirements for 2007		
	Appropriations	Estimated expenditures		Total requirements	Net requirements	Non-recurrent requirements
	1	2	3 = (1-2)	4	5 = (4-3)	6
1. Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Myanmar	205.5	22.5	183.0	198.4	15.4	—
2. Special Adviser of the Secretary-General for Africa	199.6	55.8	143.8	175.5	31.7	—
3. Special Adviser of the Secretary-General on Cyprus	399.6	24.6	375.0	571.3	196.3	—
4. Special Adviser of the Secretary-General on the Prevention of Genocide	874.7	640.1	234.6	1 082.5	847.9	—
5. Personal Envoy of the Secretary-General for Western Sahara	345.6	282.9	62.7	352.8	290.1	—
6. Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the implementation of Security Council resolution 1559 (2004)	1 467.7	663.1	804.6	1 191.7	387.1	—
7. Personal Representative of the Secretary-General for Lebanon	1 615.4	1 199.9	415.5	3 084.2	2 668.7	—
Total requirements	5 108.1	2 888.9	2 219.2	6 656.4	4 437.2	—

1. Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Myanmar

(\$198,400)

Background, mandate and objective

1.1 The Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Myanmar was appointed in accordance with the mandates entrusted to the Secretary-General by the General Assembly, most recently, in its resolution 60/233 of 23 December 2005, to continue to provide his good offices and to pursue discussions with the Government and people of Myanmar on the situation of human rights and the restoration of democracy.

1.2 Since his appointment in April 2000, the Special Envoy for Myanmar has visited Myanmar several times in connection with the good offices role of the Secretary-General and has played a catalytic role in the confidential confidence-building talks between the Government and Daw Aung San Suu Kyi from 2000 to 2003 as well as in the national reconciliation process in that country. National reconciliation in Myanmar is by its nature a “home-grown” process and the roles of

the Secretary-General and his Special Envoy under the good offices mandate given by the General Assembly are primarily to facilitate that process.

1.3 In order to help revitalize the process, the Special Envoy visited Myanmar from 1 to 4 March 2004. As a result of his facilitation efforts, the National League for Democracy was allowed to reopen its headquarters in Yangon, although its regional offices across the country remain closed. The Government-sponsored National Convention was reconvened briefly in May 2004, in February 2005 and again in December 2005 for about two months, without the participation of the National League for Democracy and some ethnic nationality political parties. Owing to the political stalemate on the ground, the Special Envoy has not been allowed to return since March 2004 and he resigned from his position in January 2006. The appointment of a new Envoy is under consideration.

1.4 In the meantime and in an effort to resume contacts with the Government, the Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs visited Myanmar in May 2006 as the emissary of the Secretary-General. The Secretary-General remains committed to provide his good offices and to pursue discussions with the Government and people of Myanmar on the situation of human rights and the restoration of democracy. It is anticipated that during its sixty-first session the General Assembly will extend the mandate of the Secretary-General to continue to pursue his good offices role in connection with Myanmar.

1.5 In implementing the mandate entrusted to the Secretary-General by the General Assembly, the Special Envoy and the Department of Political Affairs of the Secretariat cooperate and collaborate closely with the United Nations Resident Coordinator and the United Nations country team. There has been increasing awareness of and concern over the impact that the lack of progress in national reconciliation has on in-country operational activities in the economic and social areas. It has become established practice for the Special Envoy to meet with members of the country team when he visits Myanmar and for the United Nations Resident Coordinator and other members of the team to meet regularly with representatives of the Department of Political Affairs when they visit Headquarters.

1.6 The good offices efforts of the Secretary-General would no longer be required when national reconciliation and democratization in Myanmar are achieved based on the participation of all the parties concerned and in accordance with a series of General Assembly resolutions. Until that objective is achieved, the Assembly is expected to request the Secretary-General to continue his good offices efforts to facilitate the process.

1.7 The objective, expected accomplishments and indicators of achievement of the Special Envoy are presented below.

Objective: To advance the national reconciliation and democratization process in Myanmar.

Expected accomplishments	Indicators of achievement
(a) Restoration of the freedom of movement of political and other leaders	<p>(a) Release of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and her deputy from house arrest and release of other political prisoners</p> <p><i>Performance measure:</i> Number of political and other leaders released from prison</p> <p>2005: 249</p> <p>Estimate 2006: No information is available as there was no access to the country by the Special Envoy</p> <p>Target 2007: Most, if not all, of the political prisoners are released from prison</p>
(b) Restoration of political activities	<p>(b) (i) Reopening of the offices of the National League for Democracy throughout the country</p> <p><i>Performance measure:</i> Number of reopened offices</p> <p>2005: 1</p> <p>Estimate 2006: No information is available as there was no access to the country by the Special Envoy</p> <p>Target 2007: Most, if not all, of the offices are reopened</p> <p>(ii) Resumption of dialogue between the Government, the National League for Democracy and ethnic nationalities on ways to advance the country's transition to democracy</p> <p><i>Performance measure:</i> Number of key political and other parties included in the National Convention</p> <p>2005: Partial number of key political and other parties included</p> <p>Estimate 2006: No information is available as there was no access to the country by the Special Envoy</p> <p>Target 2007: All of the key political and other parties included</p>

Outputs

- Discussions and consultations with the Myanmar authorities
- Discussions and consultations with the international community, especially with the countries of the region
- Statements and reports on the situation in Myanmar

External factors

1.8 The good offices role of the Secretary-General, carried out largely through the Special Envoy, is expected to achieve its objective provided that the Government of Myanmar, the National League for Democracy and ethnic nationality groups are willing and committed to reach a political solution and that the international community, especially the countries of the region, provide support for the Secretary-General's efforts.

Resource requirements

(Thousands of United States dollars)

	<i>1 January-31 December 2006</i>		<i>Variance</i>	<i>Requirements for 2007</i>		
	<i>Appropriations</i>	<i>Estimated expenditures</i>	<i>Savings (deficit)</i>	<i>Total requirements</i>	<i>Net requirements</i>	<i>Non-recurrent requirements</i>
<i>Category of expenditure</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>2</i>	<i>3 = (1-2)</i>	<i>4</i>	<i>5 = (4-3)</i>	<i>6</i>
Civilian personnel costs	108.0	—	108.0	100.9	(7.1)	—
Operational costs	97.5	22.5	75.0	97.5	22.5	—
Total requirements	205.5	22.5	183.0	198.4	15.4	—

1.9 The estimated requirements for the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Myanmar for a one-year period ending 31 December 2007 amount to \$198,400 net (\$234,800 gross) and would provide for the salary of the Special Envoy at the Under-Secretary-General level, who would be engaged on a when-actually-employed basis for a period of 210 days in 2007, as well as those of local staff for a period of three months (\$100,900), operational costs (\$97,500) comprising official travel (\$48,300), services of consultants (\$43,900), communications (\$2,300) and other miscellaneous supplies and services (\$3,000).

1.10 Of that amount, \$183,000 would be met from the estimated unencumbered balance against the appropriation for 2006. Thus the overall requirements for the Special Envoy for 2007, after taking into account the unencumbered balance, amount to \$15,400 net (\$51,800 gross).

2. Special Adviser of the Secretary-General for Africa

(\$175,500)

Background, mandate and objective

2.1 The main objective of the Special Adviser is to contribute, within the ambit of the good offices of the Secretary-General, to the promotion of peace and security in the Horn of Africa by closely monitoring the situation in and related to the Horn of Africa and by engaging in conflict resolution efforts in the region. Under the guidance of the Secretary-General and in close cooperation with the Department of Political Affairs, he represents the United Nations in peacemaking initiatives in the Horn of Africa, liaises with the parties to the conflict as well as with national, regional and international organizations concerned with conflict resolution in the Horn of Africa, provides advice, in particular on matters related to Eritrea, Ethiopia, Somalia, the Sudan and Uganda, and accompanies or represents the Secretary-General at summits of the African Union, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and other regional forums on issues related to the Horn of Africa.

2.2 The Special Adviser's close working relations with academic and research institutions, think tanks, eminent persons and civil society groups in the Horn of Africa region contribute significantly and uniquely to the work of the Department of Political Affairs.

2.3 In accordance with the Secretary-General's proposal contained in his letter dated 14 December 2005 to the President of the Security Council (S/2005/808) and the latter's reply of 20 December 2005 (S/2005/809), the current appointment of the Special Adviser is extended to 31 December 2006. While the Council has yet to be requested to make a decision with regard to the extension of his appointment beyond 31 December 2006, it is anticipated that the mission of the Special Adviser will be extended into 2007, given the importance of continued good offices.

2.4 In 2006, the Special Adviser remained actively involved in the peace process between the Government of the Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation Army/Movement led by IGAD. He collaborated closely with the Representative of the Secretary-General for Somalia and the United Nations Political Office for Somalia. The Special Adviser continues to cover developments in countries of the region and maintains contact with eminent persons, political leaders and civil society groups, with an emphasis on the internal conflicts in Ethiopia, Somalia and Uganda.

2.5 During 2007, the Special Adviser is expected to undertake periodic and focused consultation missions in support of good governance and participatory political processes in the countries of the region, focusing on cross-cutting issues that have regional implications.

2.6 In addition, it is anticipated that the Special Adviser will also undertake representative missions, in particular in relation to the activities of IGAD, the League of Arab States and the Organization of the Islamic Conference, and join the missions of the Secretary-General to the region, including the summits of the African Union.

2.7 The objective, expected accomplishments and indicators of achievement of the Special Adviser are presented below.

Objective: To promote international peace and security, in particular in the Horn of Africa.

Expected accomplishments	Indicators of achievement
Increased consideration of cross-cutting issues and their implications by regional organizations	<p>Regional and cross-cutting issues addressed at summits and other meetings of the African Union and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development</p> <p><i>Performance measures:</i> Whether cross-cutting issues were addressed</p> <p>Actual 2005: Yes</p> <p>Estimate 2006: Yes</p> <p>Target 2007: Yes</p>

Outputs

- Monitoring of the situation in the Horn of Africa, with emphasis on regional and cross-cutting issues
- Reports and oral briefings to the Secretary-General, the Department of Political Affairs and other senior United Nations officials
- Contribution to the deliberations of the Security Council, the Senior Management Group, the Executive Committee on Peace and Security, the Executive Committee on Humanitarian Affairs and the United Nations Development Group on issues of the Horn of Africa
- Consultations with regional leaders and other external actors on progress towards regional peace, stability and cooperation
- Representation of the United Nations at international meetings related to conflict situations in the Horn of Africa, such as those of the African Union, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development and its Partners' Forum and so on

External factors

2.8 The efforts of the Special Adviser are expected to achieve their objective, on the assumption that the parties, donors, facilitators and regional organizations display sufficient political will and commitment to address cross-cutting and regional issues in the region of the Horn of Africa.

Resource requirements

(Thousands of United States dollars)

<i>Category of expenditure</i>	<i>1 January-31 December 2006</i>		<i>Variance</i>	<i>Requirements for 2007</i>		
	<i>Appropriations</i>	<i>Estimated expenditures</i>	<i>Savings (deficit)</i>	<i>Total requirements</i>	<i>Net requirements</i>	<i>Non-recurrent requirements</i>
<i>Category of expenditure</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>2</i>	<i>3 = (1-2)</i>	<i>4</i>	<i>5 = (4-3)</i>	<i>6</i>
Operational costs	199.6	55.8	143.8	175.5	31.7	—
Total requirements	199.6	55.8	143.8	175.5	31.7	—

2.9 In anticipation that the mandate of Special Adviser will be extended until December 2007, the estimated requirements amounting to \$175,500 would provide for official travel (\$168,500), ground transportation (\$1,400), communications (\$3,600) and other supplies (\$2,000) for the Special Adviser's missions. The Special Adviser, who is based in Geneva, is engaged on a \$1-per-year contract and will be supported by staff of the Department of Political Affairs as necessary on his representation and consultation missions.

2.10 Of that amount, \$143,800 would be met from the estimated unencumbered balance against the appropriation for 2006. Thus the overall requirements for the Special Adviser for 2007, after taking into account the unencumbered balance, amount to \$31,700.

3. Special Adviser of the Secretary-General on Cyprus

(\$571,300)

Background, mandate and objective

3.1 The question of Cyprus has been on the agenda of the Security Council for over 40 years and is one of the oldest items continuously addressed by the Secretary-General through his good offices. The latest efforts towards a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem began seven years ago when, by its resolution 1250 (1999) of 29 June 1999, the Security Council requested the Secretary-General to invite the leaders of the two sides to negotiations in the autumn of 1999. Proximity talks were held from December 1999 to November 2000 and direct talks from January 2002 to February 2003. Following a stalemate in the talks, the Secretary-General in March 2003 announced that the process begun in December 1999 had reached an end. A renewed effort commenced on 13 February 2004 and ended when the proposed Foundation Agreement on the "Comprehensive Settlement of the Cyprus Problem" was submitted to separate simultaneous referendums on 24 April 2004. The Agreement was rejected by the Greek Cypriot electorate by a margin of three to one and approved by the Turkish Cypriot electorate by a margin of two to one. It therefore did not enter into force, thus resulting in a divided Cyprus entering the European Union on 1 May 2004.

3.2 At the request of the Secretary-General, a mission was undertaken by the Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs from 29 May to 7 June 2005 to hear the views of all parties on the future of the Secretary-General's mission of good

offices. On 22 June 2005, the Security Council was briefed on the findings that all parties wished to see a resumption of the Secretary-General's good offices. However, the gap between the parties on substance remained wide, while confidence between them was low. Council members recommended that, for the time being, the United Nations limit itself to sending "pulse-taking" missions on a regular basis so as to identify the concerns of the parties and determine the way forward.

3.3 In January 2006, the Secretary-General appointed a new Special Representative and Head of Mission for the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus, who started to explore prospects for a resumption of activities with the two sides.

3.4 In his report to the Security Council on the United Nations operation in Cyprus of 23 May 2006 (S/2006/315), the Secretary-General reported that in February the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot leadership had agreed to a proposal to establish a mechanism for them to engage on issues of common concern through bicommunal discussions at the technical level. In its resolution 1687 (2006) of 15 June 2006, the Security Council encouraged active participation in bicommunal discussions at the technical level under the leadership of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, and expressed its full support for the latter. The Secretary-General also stated his intention to dispatch the Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs to assess the political situation in and around Cyprus and the prospect of a full resumption of his good offices. In the meantime, the Secretary-General's Special Representative and Head of Mission would continue to function as a high-level point of contact on the ground.

3.5 The Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs briefed the Security Council on 27 June 2006 on his scheduled visit to Ankara, Athens and Nicosia and subsequently visited the region from 3 to 9 July 2006.

3.6 In his letter dated 25 July 2006 (S/2006/572), the Secretary-General informed the President of the Security Council that the Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs had met with Tassos Papadopoulos and Mehmett Ali Talat on 8 July 2006 and that the meeting had resulted in the two leaders signing an agreement stipulating that technical committees on issues that affected the day-to-day life of people would be established by the end of July provided that, at the same time, the two leaders had also exchanged a list of issues of substance and that its contents had been studied by expert bicommunal working groups and finalized by the two leaders. The two leaders would meet further, from time to time as appropriate, to give directions to the expert bicommunal working groups as well as to review the work of the technical committees. Subsequently, the Secretary-General approved the Under-Secretary-General's recommendation to appoint a new Special Adviser in the event that an understanding was reached on a list of substantive issues and real progress was made in the work of the technical committees on day-to-day issues and of the expert bicommunal working groups on substantive issues.

3.7 On 31 July 2006, the lists of issues of substance were exchanged as agreed at the 8 July 2006 meeting.

3.8 Throughout the month of August 2006, the Special Representative and Head of Mission met regularly with the envoys of the leaders with a view to implementing the 8 July agreement, which might result in the establishment of up to 15 technical

committees and 20 expert working groups in the final months of 2006 and the first half of 2007.

3.9 Depending on the developments on the island, in 2007, the Secretary-General may decide to appoint a Special Adviser to carry out his good offices mission with a view to achieving a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem.

3.10 The objective, expected accomplishments and indicators of achievement of the Special Adviser are presented below.

Objective: To achieve a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem.

Expected accomplishments	Indicators of achievement
(a) Implementation of the 8 July 2006 agreement	<p>(a) Establishment of technical committees and expert working groups</p> <p><i>Performance measure:</i> Number of technical committees and expert working groups established</p> <p>2005: not available</p> <p>Estimate 2006: 0</p> <p>Target 2007: 15</p>
(b) Resumption of negotiations to reach a comprehensive settlement	<p>(b) Number of substantive issues agreed as the basis for a comprehensive settlement</p> <p><i>Performance measure:</i> Number of agreements on substantive issues</p> <p>2005: not available</p> <p>Estimate 2006: 0</p> <p>Target 2007: 8</p>

Outputs

- Consultations with interested parties
 - Convening and servicing of technical committees and expert working groups
 - Advisory services on procedural, legal and technical aspects of substantive issues
 - Working papers and proposals serving as the basis for a comprehensive settlement
 - Reports to and briefings of the Security Council
-

External factors

3.11 It is expected that the objective will be achieved, provided that there is political will and commitment on the part of both sides to reach a comprehensive solution, as well as continuing support from the international community.

Resource requirements

(Thousands of United States dollars)

	<i>1 January-31 December 2006</i>		<i>Variance</i>	<i>Requirements for 2007</i>		
	<i>Appropriations</i>	<i>Estimated expenditures</i>	<i>Savings (deficit)</i>	<i>Total requirements</i>	<i>Net requirements</i>	<i>Non-recurrent requirements</i>
<i>Category of expenditure</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>2</i>	<i>3 = (1-2)</i>	<i>4</i>	<i>5 = (4-3)</i>	<i>6</i>
Civilian personnel costs	274.4	—	274.4	334.2	59.8	—
Operational costs	125.2	24.6	100.6	237.1	136.5	—
Total requirements	399.6	24.6	375.0	571.3	196.3	—

3.12 In anticipation of the appointment of a Special Adviser in 2007, the estimated requirements amounting to \$571,300 net (\$639,500 gross) would provide for salaries and common staff costs for the Special Adviser and his/her support staff (\$334,200), consultancy services on core issues that need to be addressed as part of the comprehensive settlement (\$101,800), official travel (\$124,700), communications (\$6,600) and other supplies (\$4,000).

3.13 Of that amount, \$375,000 would be met from the estimated unencumbered balance against the appropriation for 2006. Thus the overall requirements for the Special Adviser for 2007, after taking into account the unencumbered balance, amount to \$196,300 net (\$264,500 gross).

4. Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on the Prevention of Genocide

(\$1,082,500)

Background, mandate and objective

4.1 In his letter dated 12 July 2004 (S/2004/567), the Secretary-General informed the President of the Security Council of his decision to appoint Juan Mendez as his Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide, following the Council's invitation to the Secretary-General, in its resolution 1366 (2001) of 30 August 2001, to refer to the Council information and analyses from within the United Nations system on cases of serious violations of international law, including international humanitarian law and human rights law. In his reply of 13 July 2004 (S/2004/568), the President of the Security Council informed the Secretary-General that the Council had taken note of the Secretary-General's decision. The appointment of the Special Adviser became effective on 1 August 2004.

4.2 According to the outline of the mandate contained in the annex to the Secretary-General's letter (S/2004/567), the Special Adviser's responsibilities would be: (a) to collect existing information, in particular from within the United Nations system, on massive and serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian law of ethnic and racial origin that, if not prevented or halted, might lead to genocide; (b) to act as a mechanism of early warning to the Secretary-General, and through him to the Security Council, by bringing to their attention

potential situations that could result in genocide; (c) to make recommendations to the Council, through the Secretary-General, on actions to prevent or halt genocide; and (d) to liaise with the United Nations system on activities for the prevention of genocide and to work to enhance the United Nations capacity to analyse and manage information related to genocide or related crimes.

4.3 Since his appointment in August 2004, the Special Adviser has established a small office with two Professional and one General Service staff and has created a system of information exchange to provide early warning of situations of massive violations of human rights and international humanitarian law with an ethnic, racial, religious or national character, which if left unchecked could lead to genocide.

4.4 During 2006, the Special Adviser participated as a member in the meetings of the Executive Committee on Peace and Security and the Inter-Departmental Framework for Coordination on Early Warning and Preventive Action, providing guidance on genocide prevention and establishing information-gathering conduits. He also participated in the discussions of the Secretary-General's Policy Committee that had a bearing upon his mandate. The Special Adviser maintained close collaboration with the Department of Political Affairs, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs of the Secretariat, having established an information exchange with the Early Warning Unit and the Inter-Agency Standing Committee's Working Group on Preparedness and Contingency Planning and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, maintaining close contact and exchange of information with relevant human rights charter- and treaty-based bodies and procedures. The Special Adviser's office collaborated with the Department of Public Information of the Secretariat by providing guidance on characteristics of hate speech and incitement and in the implementation of the General Assembly mandate relating to public information for the prevention of genocide in accordance with Assembly resolution 60/7 of 1 November 2005. In the conduct of his activities, the Special Adviser and his office maintained contact with civil society and non-governmental organizations as well as with regional organizations and institutions.

4.5 Since his appointment, the Special Adviser has relied on written and verbal communication with the Secretary-General on situations of concern within the framework of his mandate. He provided reports to the Secretary-General with regard to the situation in the Darfur region of the Sudan, where, despite ongoing international concern over ethnically motivated killings, widespread violence continued during the course of the year and other, less acute situations in which violations of an ethnic, racial or religious nature were of concern. Regarding Darfur, the Special Adviser maintained a public profile, calling for a comprehensive approach to prevent a further deterioration of the situation.

4.6 During 2006, the Special Adviser and his office provided logistical, administrative and substantive support to the Advisory Committee on Genocide Prevention, which was appointed by the Secretary-General on 3 May 2006 and which met in New York in June and October 2006. The Committee provides guidance and support to the work of the Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide and contributes to the broader efforts of the United Nations to prevent genocide. It is composed of distinguished individuals with a diversity of backgrounds related to conflict prevention, human rights, peacekeeping, diplomacy and mediation. By the end of 2006, the Advisory Committee intends to present

recommendations to the Secretary-General on how to increase the effectiveness of the genocide prevention activities of the Special Adviser.

4.7 In keeping with the support expressed by Member States in the 2005 World Summit Outcome for the development of an effective early warning mechanism to prevent genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity (General Assembly resolution 60/1, para. 138), the Office of the Special Adviser launched a consultancy project to review and analyse genocide early warning requirements and to provide options for the development of an early warning system.

4.8 In 2007, the Special Adviser will continue to liaise with entities of the United Nations system and regional bodies and to collect information on massive and serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian law that may lead to genocide and will continue to act as an early warning mechanism for the Secretary-General and the Security Council.

4.9 The objective, expected accomplishments and indicators of achievement of the Special Adviser are presented below.

Objective: To facilitate international action to prevent massive violations of human rights and international humanitarian law of a national, ethnic, racial or religious character that could lead to genocide.

<i>Expected accomplishments</i>	<i>Indicators of achievement</i>
(a) Increased understanding and knowledge of situations that could lead to genocide	<p>(a) Contributions to increase the number of measures that are taken to prevent situations that could lead to genocide</p> <p><i>Performance measure:</i> Measures taken on genocide prevention</p> <p>2005: 10</p> <p>Estimate 2006: 15</p> <p>Target 2007: 15</p>
(b) Improved cooperation with United Nations entities on action to be taken in situations that could lead to genocide and early detection at the regional level of signs of genocide	<p>(b) Development of procedures and cooperative frameworks with key partners within and outside the United Nations system to detect and monitor situations that could lead to genocide and interaction with regional mechanisms to monitor evidence of massive and serious violations of human rights and international law of ethnic and racial origin</p> <p><i>Performance measure:</i> Interactions with relevant partners for information-sharing and early warning</p> <p>2005: 5</p> <p>Estimate 2006: 10</p> <p>Target 2007: 10</p>

- (c) Early detection at the regional level of signs of genocide
- (c) Interaction with regional mechanisms to monitor evidence of massive and serious violations of human rights and international law of ethnic and racial origin

Performance measure: Interactions with relevant partners for information-sharing and early warning

2005: 5

Estimate 2006: 10

Target 2007: 10

Outputs

- Reports to the Secretary-General
- Provision of good offices, studies, analyses, publications and information materials
- Development of a database, website and outreach activities
- Organization of expert group meetings and workshops
- Conduct of advisory missions, including consultations and liaison activities
- Development of inter-agency cooperation mechanisms and guidelines

External factors

4.10 The objective is expected to be achieved, provided that there is political will on the part of members of the Security Council and other intergovernmental bodies to engage with the Special Adviser in order to consider and, as necessary, act upon his/her analysis and recommendations; that there is willingness among States that are host to critical events to allow access to and engage with the Special Adviser; and that there is goodwill and active involvement of regional and other organizations.

Resource requirements

(Thousands of United States dollars)

	1 January-31 December 2006		Variance	Requirements for 2007		
	Appropriations	Estimated expenditures		Total requirements	Net requirements	Non-recurrent requirements
Category of expenditure	1	2	3=(1-2)	4	5=(4-3)	6
Civilian personnel costs	528.0	377.0	151.0	714.1	563.1	—
Operational costs	346.7	263.1	83.6	368.4	284.8	—
Total requirements	874.7	640.1	234.6	1 082.5	847.9	—

4.11 The estimated requirements for the Special Adviser of the Secretary-General on the Prevention of Genocide for the one-year period ending 31 December 2007 amount to \$1,082,500 net (\$1,196,300 gross), which would provide for international staff costs of the Special Adviser and his/her support staff (\$714,100), consultancy

services (\$41,300), official travel (\$118,500), rental and maintenance of office space (\$182,000) and other operational and logistical requirements, including miscellaneous supplies and services (\$26,600).

4.12 Of that amount, \$234,600 would be met from the estimated unencumbered balance against the appropriation for 2006. Thus the overall requirements for the Special Adviser for 2007, after taking into account the unencumbered balance, amount to \$847,900 net (\$961,700 gross).

5. Personal Envoy of the Secretary-General for Western Sahara

(\$352,800)

Background, mandate and objective

5.1 In his letter dated 25 July 2005 (S/2005/497), the Secretary-General informed the President of the Security Council of his decision to appoint Peter van Walsum (Netherlands) as his Personal Envoy for Western Sahara and indicated that the Envoy would help him assess the situation and explore with the parties, neighbouring States and other stakeholders how best to overcome the prevailing political impasse in Western Sahara. Following that communication, in a letter dated 28 July 2005 (S/2005/498), the President of the Council informed the Secretary-General that his decision to appoint Ambassador van Walsum as his Personal Envoy had been brought to the attention of the members of the Council, who had taken note of the Secretary-General's intention.

5.2 Since his appointment, the Personal Envoy has established contact with the parties concerned, with neighbouring States and with members of the Group of Friends of Western Sahara to ascertain their views on the political situation and has also assessed their position as regards the various initiatives presented in past years.

5.3 In 2007, the Personal Envoy will continue to hold discussions with the parties concerned and with neighbouring States. In that connection, he will meet with the Government of Morocco, the leadership of the Constitutive Congress for the Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguía el Hamra and Río de Oro (Frente POLISARIO), and with the Governments of the two neighbouring States, Algeria and Mauritania. Further, he will coordinate closely with members of the Group of Friends of Western Sahara, both in their capitals and in New York.

5.4 In carrying out his mandate, the Personal Envoy reports to the Secretary-General through the Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs. In support of his mandate, the Department of Political Affairs and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations closely coordinate policy initiatives and provide guidance and periodic updates on political developments in the region and on the situation on the ground as well as other political analysis and advice. The Department of Peacekeeping Operations provides logistical support during visits of the Personal Envoy to the Western Saharan region.

5.5 The objective, expected accomplishments and indicators of achievement of the Personal Envoy are presented below.

Objective: To achieve a comprehensive settlement of the question of Western Sahara.

Expected accomplishments

Indicators of achievement

Progress towards a comprehensive settlement of the question of Western Sahara

Agreement by both parties on a comprehensive settlement of the question of Western Sahara

Performance measures:

(i) Number of meetings between the parties to discuss to resolve the impasse

2005: 0

Estimate 2006: 0

Target 2007: 1

(ii) Agreements reached

2005: No

Estimate 2006: No

Target 2007: Yes

Outputs

- Discussions and consultations with the parties concerned, with neighboring States and with the international community
- Reports to, and briefings of, the Security Council

External factors

5.6 The Personal Envoy of the Secretary-General for Western Sahara is expected to achieve the objective and expected accomplishments, provided that the two parties are willing and committed to reach a political solution and that the neighbouring States and the international community provide support for the efforts of the Secretary-General and his Personal Envoy.

Resource requirements

(Thousands of United States dollars)

	<i>1 January-31 December 2006</i>		<i>Variance</i>	<i>Requirements for 2007</i>		
	<i>Appropriations</i>	<i>Estimated expenditures</i>		<i>Total requirements</i>	<i>Net requirements</i>	<i>Non-recurrent requirements</i>
<i>Category of expenditure</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>2</i>	<i>3=(1-2)</i>	<i>4</i>	<i>5=(4-3)</i>	<i>6</i>
Civilian personnel costs	115.5	99.6	15.9	97.7	81.8	—
Operational costs	230.1	183.3	46.8	255.1	208.3	—
Total requirements	345.6	282.9	62.7	352.8	290.1	—

5.7 The estimated requirements in 2007 for the Personal Envoy amount to \$352,800 net (\$388,300 gross), and would comprise international staff costs

(\$97,700), provisions for consultants (\$108,400) and official travel (\$141,600) as well as communication costs and costs for other supplies, services and equipment (\$5,100).

5.8 Of that amount, \$62,700 would be met from the estimated unencumbered balance against the appropriation for 2006. Thus the overall requirements for the Special Adviser for 2007, after taking into account the unencumbered balance, amount to \$290,100 net (\$325,600 gross).

6. Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the implementation of Security Council resolution 1559 (2004)

(\$1,191,700)

Background, mandate and objective

6.1 In a presidential statement of 19 October 2004 (S/PRST/2004/36), the Security Council requested the Secretary-General to continue to report to it every six months on the implementation of its resolution 1559 (2004) of 2 September 2004. In that connection, in a letter dated 14 December 2004 to the President of the Security Council (S/2004/974), the Secretary-General informed the Council that he had decided to appoint Terje Roed-Larsen as his Special Envoy for the implementation of resolution 1559 (2004) to enable him to fulfil the Council's mandate effectively. In carrying out his mandate, the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General consults with the Government of Lebanon and other interested Member States to assist in the preparation of the semi-annual reports of the Secretary-General on the implementation of resolution 1559 (2004).

6.2 In April 2005, the Secretary-General submitted his first semi-annual report to the Security Council on the implementation of resolution 1559 (2004) (S/2005/272) and indicated therein that efforts had concentrated on the provisions of the resolution calling for the withdrawal of all remaining foreign forces from Lebanon and for the strict respect of the sovereignty, territorial integrity, unity and political independence of Lebanon, in particular through the conduct of free and credible parliamentary elections. The Secretary-General concluded in that report that the requirements of resolution 1559 (2004) had not yet been met, but that the parties concerned had made significant and noticeable progress towards implementing some of its provisions.

6.3 On 23 May 2005, the Secretary-General submitted to the Security Council the report of the United Nations mission to verify the full and complete withdrawal of Syrian forces from Lebanon pursuant to resolution 1559 (2004), covering the period from 26 April to 13 May 2005 (S/2005/331). The verification mission had been dispatched earlier to verify the full and complete Syrian withdrawal from Lebanese territory. In its report, the mission stated, inter alia, that it had found no Syrian military forces, assets or intelligence apparatus in Lebanese territory and concluded to the best of its ability that no Syrian military intelligence personnel remained in Lebanon in known locations or in military uniform.

6.4 In October 2005, the Secretary-General submitted his second semi-annual report to the Security Council on the implementation of resolution 1559 (2004) (S/2005/673), in which he concluded that, since his previous report to the Council,

the parties concerned had made considerable further progress towards the implementation of resolution 1559 (2004). He also indicated that the requirements of the withdrawal of Syrian troops and military assets, as well as of the conduct of free and credible legislative elections, had been met. Progress had also been made through ongoing work on broader electoral reforms, with the assistance of the United Nations. The Secretary-General stated that he was encouraged by his dialogue with the Government of Lebanon on the extension of its control over all Lebanese territory. Although important progress had been made, he would continue to assign the matter the highest priority in his efforts to assist the parties in the implementation of resolution 1559 (2004).

6.5 In his statement of 23 January 2006 (S/PRST/2006/3), the President of the Security Council stated that the Council welcomed the second semi-annual report of the Secretary-General (S/2005/673), reiterated its call for the full implementation of all the requirements of resolution 1559 (2004), urged all concerned parties to cooperate fully with the Council and the Secretary-General to achieve that goal and commended the Secretary-General as well as his Special Envoy for their efforts and dedication to facilitate and assist in the implementation of all provisions of the resolution.

6.6 In April 2006, the Secretary-General submitted his third semi-annual report to the Security Council on the implementation of resolution 1559 (2004) (S/2006/248), in which he concluded that, since his last report to the Council (S/2005/673), Lebanon had made further significant progress towards implementing in full all the provisions of resolution 1559 (2004), in particular the agreements reached in the Lebanese national dialogue. However, he also stated that the provisions of resolution 1559 (2004) calling for the disbanding and disarmament of all Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias, the extension of the control of the Government of Lebanon over all Lebanese territory and the strict respect of the sovereignty, territorial integrity, unity and political independence of Lebanon under the sole and exclusive authority of the Government had not yet been fully implemented. Further, he concluded that there had not been a presidential election process, as called for in the resolution and in the Security Council's presidential statement of 23 January 2006 (S/PRST/2006/3).

6.7 In reaction to the report of the Secretary-General of 19 April 2006 (S/2006/248), the Security Council adopted resolution 1680 (2006) on 17 May 2006, in which the Council welcomed the report of the Secretary-General; reiterated its call for the full implementation of all the requirements of resolution 1559 (2004); strongly encouraged the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic to respond positively to the request made by the Government of Lebanon, in line with the agreements of the Lebanese national dialogue, to delineate their common border, especially in those areas where the border was uncertain or disputed and to establish full diplomatic relations and representation, noting that such measures would constitute a significant step towards asserting Lebanon's sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence and improving the relations between the two countries, thus contributing positively to stability in the region, and urged both parties to make efforts through further bilateral dialogue to that end, bearing in mind that the establishment of diplomatic relations between States, and of permanent diplomatic missions, took place by mutual consent.

6.8 As a result of the continuing escalation of hostilities in Lebanon and Israel in July 2006, the Security Council adopted resolution 1701 (2006) on 11 August 2006, in which it in particular emphasized the importance of the extension of control of the Government of Lebanon over all Lebanese territory in accordance with the provisions of resolutions 1559 (2004) and 1680 (2006), and of the relevant provisions of the Taif Accords; requested the Secretary-General to develop, in liaison with relevant international actors and the concerned parties, proposals to implement the relevant provisions of the Taif Accords, and resolutions 1559 (2004) and 1680 (2006), including disarmament, and for delineation of the international borders of Lebanon; and requested the Secretary-General to report to the Council within one week on the implementation of the resolution and subsequently on a regular basis.

6.9 On 12 September 2006, the Secretary-General issued his report on the implementation of resolution 1701 (2006) (S/2006/730), which included proposals for the full implementation of resolutions 1559 (2004) and 1680 (2006).

6.10 The Special Envoy works closely with the Office of the Personal Representative of the Secretary-General for Lebanon, who informs the Special Envoy on a regular basis on political developments in Lebanon and carries out ad hoc political missions on the ground with the Special Envoy. Further, the Office of the Personal Representative of the Secretary-General for Lebanon, the Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia, and the United Nations Special Coordinator provide logistical support for the trips of the Special Envoy to the Middle East.

6.11 The mandate of the Special Envoy will be deemed completed when the Security Council certifies that resolution 1559 (2004) has been fully implemented.

6.12 The objective, expected accomplishments and indicators of achievement of the Special Envoy are presented below.

Objective: Full implementation of Security Council resolution 1559 (2004) and all subsequent related decisions of the Council, in particular resolution 1680 (2006) and the relevant provisions of resolution 1701 (2006).

<i>Expected accomplishments</i>	<i>Indicators of achievement</i>
(a) Strict respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity, unity and political independence of Lebanon under the sole and exclusive authority of the Government of Lebanon throughout its territory	<p>(a) (i) Increased efforts towards the establishment of mutual diplomatic relations between Lebanon and the Syrian Arab Republic and the delineation of the international boundaries of Lebanon, in particular of those with the Syrian Arab Republic</p> <p><i>Performance measure:</i> Number of missions to the region</p> <p>2005: 5</p> <p>Estimate 2006: 6</p> <p>Target 2007: 7</p> <p>(a) (ii) Increased extension of authority of the Government of Lebanon throughout Lebanese territory, in particular along its borders</p>

Performance measure:

2005: none

Estimate 2006: partial

Target 2007: full

(a) (iii) Cessation of the illegal flow of weaponry to Lebanon

Performance measure:

Actual 2005: none

Estimate 2006: partial

Target 2007: full

Outputs

- Regular meetings of the Special Envoy with representatives of the Government of Lebanon and other interested Governments
- Support to the Government of Lebanon on the implementation of the provisions of the relevant Security Council resolutions, in particular through good offices
- Semi-annual reports of the Secretary-General to the Security Council

*Expected accomplishments**Indicators of achievement*

(b) Disbanding and disarmament of all Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias

(b) (i) Increased accession by the Government of Lebanon to the right to exert the monopoly on the use of force throughout its territory

Performance measure:

2005: none

Estimate 2006: partial

Target 2007: full

(b) (ii) Number of groups other than the official armed forces carrying arms

Performance measure:

2005: several

Estimate 2006: several

Target 2007: none

(b) (iii) Number of militia or other armed groups operating in Lebanon

Performance measure:

Actual 2005: several

Estimate 2006: several

Target 2007: none

Outputs

- Support to the Lebanese national dialogue related to the disbanding and disarmament of Lebanese militias, in particular through meetings with the Government of Lebanon
- Facilitation of a dialogue between the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO)/Palestinian Authority and the Government of Lebanon on the disbanding and disarmament of Palestinian militias, in particular through meetings with the PLO/Palestinian Authority and good offices between the PLO and the Government of Lebanon
- Good offices and consultations with all foreign Governments that might have influence on the Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias in Lebanon to assist in implementing the requirements of the relevant Security Council resolutions in a peaceful manner
- Semi-annual reports of the Secretary-General to the Security Council

*Expected accomplishments**Indicators of achievement*

(c) Strengthened response by the Governments of Lebanon and the Syrian Arab Republic to the provisions of paragraph 4 of Security Council resolution 1680 (2006)

(c) (i) Increased efforts by the Governments of Lebanon and the Syrian Arab Republic to engage in regular bilateral dialogue, including enhanced bilateral relations

Performance measure:

Actual 2005: not available

Estimate 2006: none

Target 2007: some

(c) (ii) Increased efforts to encourage the establishment of full diplomatic relations and representation between the Governments of Lebanon and the Syrian Arab Republic

Performance measure: Missions to the region

Actual 2005: not available

Estimate 2006: 6

Target 2007: 7

Outputs

- Good offices and consultations with the Governments of Lebanon and the Syrian Arab Republic, and other regional players, with the purpose of facilitating bilateral dialogue, leading to the establishment of diplomatic relations and the delineation of the borders
- Good offices and facilitation of bilateral and multilateral dialogue between Lebanon and its neighbours
- Regularization and clarification of Lebanon's borders
- Semi-annual reports of the Secretary-General to the Security Council

External factors

6.13 The objective and expected accomplishments are expected to be achieved on the assumption that: (a) there is political stability and security in Lebanon; (b) hostilities in the region are not resumed; (c) there is political goodwill on the

part of the parties concerned; (d) there is a positive influence on the parties concerned of the political goodwill of Member States; and (e) there are no tensions between Lebanon and its neighbours.

Resource requirements

(Thousands of United States dollars)

	<i>1 January-31 December 2006</i>		<i>Variance</i>	<i>Requirements for 2007</i>		
	<i>Appropriations</i>	<i>Estimated expenditures</i>	<i>Savings (deficit)</i>	<i>Total requirements</i>	<i>Net requirements</i>	<i>Non-recurrent requirements</i>
<i>Category of expenditure</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>2</i>	<i>3=(1-2)</i>	<i>4</i>	<i>5=(4-3)</i>	<i>6</i>
Civilian personnel costs	241.4	196.7	44.7	246.5	201.8	—
Operational costs	1 226.3	466.4	759.9	945.2	185.3	—
Total requirements	1 467.7	663.1	804.6	1 191.7	387.1	—

6.14 The estimated requirements for the Office of the Special Envoy for 2007 amount to \$1,191,700 net (\$1,232,700 gross) and would comprise international staff costs (\$246,500), consultancy services (\$58,400), travel costs (\$780,100), requirements for ground transportation (\$14,600), communications (\$34,400) and other supplies, services and equipment (\$57,700).

6.15 Of that amount, \$804,600 would be met from the estimated unencumbered balance against the appropriation for 2006. Thus the overall requirements for the Special Envoy for 2007, after taking into account the unencumbered balance, amount to \$387,100 net (\$428,100 gross).

7. Personal Representative of the Secretary-General for Lebanon

(\$3,084,200)

Background, mandate and objective

7.1 The situation in southern Lebanon after the withdrawal of the Israel Defense Forces in May 2000 was characterized by a high degree of potential instability and the risk of continued conflict between Israel and Lebanon. For that reason, it was decided that there should be a United Nations political presence in Beirut to lend support to international efforts to maintain peace and security in southern Lebanon. Accordingly, the Office of the Personal Representative of the Secretary-General for Lebanon was established in August 2000 following a proposal submitted by the Secretary-General in his report of 20 July 2000 on the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) (S/2000/718).

7.2 Beginning in 2004, Lebanon experienced several dramatic political changes. As a result, there has been a deeper and broader United Nations involvement with regard to the political situation in Lebanon. In order to ensure political and policy coherence to maximize synergies, the Secretary-General decided to expand the United Nations mandate to include coordination of its political activities for the whole of Lebanon, as described in his letter dated 14 November 2005 to the President of the Security Council (S/2005/725) and as noted by the members of the

Council according to the letter of its President (S/2005/726). The Office of the Personal Representative of the Secretary-General for Lebanon would therefore serve as the lead political office and would coordinate all political and politically related United Nations activities in Lebanon. At the same time, the Office has maintained its existing peace and security and socio-economic mandate for southern Lebanon.

7.3 Lebanon's military conflict with Israel that began on 12 July 2006 will bring even further structural changes in the future for Lebanon in terms of both the overall political reality, the situation on the ground in the south of the country and the country's socio-economic status. The involvement of the United Nations in general and the Office of the Personal Representative of the Secretary-General for Lebanon in particular will continue to broaden and deepen. The Office will continue to provide the necessary political and diplomatic assistance it provided to Lebanon in its post-conflict transition. As the lead political office, therefore, it will continue to take on continually greater responsibility for all political issues in Lebanon.

7.4 Furthermore, as the Secretary-General's Representative to the countries of the Core Group supporting the country's financial development, the Office will also play a key role in mobilizing international donor assistance to Lebanon, in particular in this post-conflict period. The Office is also responsible for the management of a coordination mechanism that involves all relevant members of the United Nations system based in Lebanon, requiring regular policy coordination meetings and consultations. With the post-conflict national reconstruction process currently under way, the Office will also play a central role in ensuring a coordinated long-term response by the international community. To fulfil the Office's role in the Core Group and its expanded mandate, it is proposed to establish a coordination unit.

7.5 Since the establishment of the enhanced mandate of the Office in 2005, it has maintained an even closer collaboration with all political, peacekeeping and socio-economic United Nations entities in the country and the region.

7.6 While the office of the United Nations Special Coordinator maintains overall regional responsibility for the Middle East peace process, the Office of the Personal Representative of the Secretary-General for Lebanon coordinates United Nations political activities specifically in Lebanon and focuses on political and security-related developments in the country. In doing so, it contributes to the Special Coordinator's overall analysis of the region and reports to him on all issues relating to the peace process. The functions performed by the Office also complemented the new mandate of UNIFIL. The UNIFIL Force Commander is responsible for all military, operational and political issues as they relate to the activities of the Force under Security Council resolutions 425 (1978), 426 (1978) of 19 March 1978 and 1701 (2006). The Personal Representative is responsible for the wider political issues related to those resolutions and to the overall situation in Lebanon.

7.7 During times of increased tension and conflict across the Blue Line, the United Nations Special Coordinator, the Office of the Personal Representative of the Secretary-General for Lebanon and UNIFIL have coordinated their political action closely and launched joint initiatives aimed at maintaining calm and complementing one another's work. The responsibility of the Office for the broader political issues in Lebanon has also led to close contact and information-sharing between it and the Office of the Special Envoy for the Implementation of Security Council resolution 1559 (2004). The Office of the Personal Representative of the Secretary-General for Lebanon has also continued to work closely with the entire United Nations Country

Team and the Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia and with the members of the Core Group on promoting the continued socio-economic development in Lebanon.

7.8 The Office of the Personal Representative of the Secretary-General for Lebanon has established various formal and informal mechanisms with other political and peacekeeping entities and missions in Lebanon in order to meet its wider responsibilities in 2004 and 2005. Those procedures have proved effective in achieving greater collaboration, regular information-sharing and synchronization of action. With regard to its continued mandate for peace and security in southern Lebanon, the Office has in the past 12 months undertaken 53 specific acts of preventive diplomacy that were part of international diplomatic efforts to cease hostilities and maintain stability along the Blue Line. It has continued to provide constant analyses of the political and security situation throughout Lebanon, timely reporting during serious incidents and advance notice regarding potential points of tension around which conflict might occur. It has also maintained its role of mobilizing political attention and support for the continued socio-economic assistance to Lebanon as the Secretary-General's representative to the Core Group of donor countries.

7.9 The objective, expected accomplishments and indicators of achievement of the Personal Representative are presented below.

Objective: Overall political stability in Lebanon and the maintenance of international peace and security in southern Lebanon.

<i>Expected accomplishments</i>	<i>Indicators of achievement</i>
(a) Maintenance of a constant policy and political dialogue with the parties to ensure a peaceful resolution of their disputes	<p>(a) Interactions with relevant parties to identify points of friction and preventive diplomatic actions to prevent escalation and contain conflicts</p> <p><i>Performance measures:</i> Number of interactions and preventive diplomatic actions</p> <p>2005: 170</p> <p>Estimate 2006: 250</p> <p>Target 2007: 320</p>

Outputs

- Analytical reporting and early warning on political and security-related developments
- Briefing of the diplomatic community and government delegations on the political/security situation
- Meetings with political and religious leaders
- Information-sharing and policy coordination meetings with entities of the United Nations system

<i>Expected accomplishments</i>	<i>Indicators of achievement</i>
(b) Prevention of violations of the Blue Line	(b) Respect for the Blue Line by the parties as measured by transgressions <i>Performance measures:</i> Air, sea or ground incursions and firing incidents 2005: Yes Estimate 2006: Yes Target 2007: Limited

Outputs

- Good offices role for the parties and substantive meetings with Lebanese authorities regarding the situation in the south
- Public statements identifying violations of the Blue Line and calling for restraint
- Policy coordination meetings with UNIFIL regarding the situation along the Blue Line

<i>Expected accomplishments</i>	<i>Indicators of achievement</i>
(c) Consistent policy coordination among relevant entities of the United Nations system	(c) Coordinated United Nations policy position on issues of common concern <i>Performance measures:</i> Joint programme initiatives, programmes and public initiatives 2005: Yes 2006: Yes 2007: 12

Outputs

- Meetings with relevant entities of the United Nations system
- Meetings with key donors under the auspices of the Core Group
- Meetings with relevant officials of the Government of Lebanon
- Policy papers, notes and guidelines

External factors

7.10 It is anticipated that the objective and expected accomplishments will be achieved, on the assumption that the domestic political situation, overall security situation and regional developments do not adversely affect stability in Lebanon and along the Blue Line.

Resource requirements

(Thousands of United States dollars)

	1 January-31 December 2006		Variance	Requirements for 2007		
	Appropriations	Estimated expenditures		Total requirements	Net requirements	Non-recurrent requirements
Category of expenditure	1	2	3=(1-2)	4	5=(4-3)	6
Civilian personnel costs	1 123.5	702.0	421.5	2 198.6	1 777.1	—
Operational costs	491.9	497.9	(6.0)	885.6	891.6	—
Total requirements	1 615.4	1 199.9	415.5	3 084.2	2 668.7	—

7.11 The estimated requirements in 2007 amount to \$3,084,200 net (\$3,442,000 gross) and would provide for civilian personnel costs (\$2,198,600), reflecting the upgrading of the existing ASG-level position of the Personal Representative to the USG level and an increase by a total of 14 positions for: (a) the creation of a coordination unit, headed by a chief at the P-5 level, supported by a coordination officer at the P-3 level and one assistant (national staff); (b) one administrative officer (P-3) and one driver (national staff) for overall support to the Office; and (c) eight security officers (national staff) and one driver (national staff) to strengthen close protection of the Personal Representative.

7.12 Given the increased link between the political, economic and international aid processes in Lebanon, it will be necessary for the Office of the Personal Representative of the Secretary-General for Lebanon to have the dedicated capacity of a coordination unit to provide policy guidance to the Office on aid coordination strategies in Lebanon and to strengthen the efforts of the Office to provide policy guidance and coordination to United Nations entities working in Lebanon, in particular on socio-economic development, reconstruction and reform.

7.13 The combination of deterioration in the security environment and the Office's increased role in sensitive political issues in Lebanon has led to pressing concern regarding the assessed risk to the physical security of the Personal Representative. Accordingly, a strengthening of the Office's close protection has been urgently recommended by the Department of Safety and Security of the Secretariat in order to provide the adequate level of close protection.

7.14 Requirements further comprise official travel (\$105,500), facilities and infrastructure (\$180,100), ground transportation (\$452,200), air transportation (\$9,300), communications (\$89,800), information technology (\$16,800) and other supplies and services (\$31,900).

7.15 Of the total amount, \$415,500 would be met from the estimated unencumbered balance against the appropriation for 2006. Thus the overall requirements for the Special Representative for 2007, after taking into account the unencumbered balance, amount to \$2,668,700 net (\$3,026,500 gross).