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
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SECURITY COUNCIL OFFICIAL RECORDS

TWENTY-SEVENTH YEAR

1666th

MEETING: 29 SEPTEMBER 1972



NEW YORK

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NOTE

Symbols of United Nations documents are composed of capital letters combined with figures. Mention of such a symbol indicates a reference to a United Nations document.

Documents of the Security Council (symbol S/. . .) are normally published in quarterly *Supplements of the Official Records of the Security Council*. The date of the document indicates the supplement in which it appears or in which information about it is given.

The resolutions of the Security Council, numbered in accordance with a system adopted in 1964, are published in yearly volumes of *Resolutions and Decisions of the Security Council*. The new system, which has been applied retroactively to resolutions adopted before 1 January 1965, became fully operative on that date.

SIXTEEN HUNDRED AND SIXTY-SIXTH MEETING

Held in New York on Friday, 29 September 1972, at 3.30 p.m.

President: Mr. HUANG Hua (China).

Present: The representatives of the following States: Argentina, Belgium, China, France, Guinea, India, Italy, Japan, Panama, Somalia, Sudan, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America and Yugoslavia.

Provisional agenda (S/Agenda/1666)

1. Adoption of the agenda.
2. Question concerning the situation in Southern Rhodesia:

Letter dated 20 September 1972 from the representatives of Guinea, Somalia and the Sudan to the President of the Security Council (S/10798).

The meeting was called to order at 3.55 p.m.

Adoption of the agenda

The agenda was adopted.

Question concerning the situation in Southern Rhodesia:

Letter dated 20 September 1972 from the representatives of Guinea, Somalia and the Sudan to the President of the Security Council (S/10798)

1. The PRESIDENT (*translation from Chinese*): In accordance with decisions taken at our previous meetings on this question, I propose now, with the consent of the Council, to invite the representatives of Algeria, Senegal, Morocco, Zambia, Mauritania, Guyana, Kenya, Tunisia, Nigeria, Mali, Cuba and Saudi Arabia to take the places reserved for them in the Council chamber in order to participate, without the right to vote, in the discussion. They will be invited to take places at the Council table when it is their turn to speak.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. A. Rahal (Algeria), Mr. C. Diouf (Senegal), Mr. M. Zentar (Morocco), Mr. E. Mudenda (Zambia), Mr. A. Ould Meneya (Mauritania), Mr. S. Ramphal (Guyana), Mr. N. Mungai (Kenya), Mr. R. Driss (Tunisia), Mr. O. Arikpo (Nigeria), Mr. C. Sissoko (Mali), Mr. R. Alarcón (Cuba), and Mr. J. Baroody (Saudi Arabia) took the places reserved for them in the Council chamber.

2. The PRESIDENT (*translation from Chinese*): The Council received this morning the texts of two draft resolutions on this question sponsored by Guinea, Somalia and the Sudan. They have been circulated in documents S/10804 and S/10805.

3. The Security Council will now continue its discussion of the question before it.

4. Mr. SEN (India): I have already extended to you, Mr. President, the congratulations and compliments of my delegation, and I shall therefore not repeat them.

5. Over the last few years we have had many occasions to discuss the problem of Zimbabwe. The basic problem is known by now not only to the Council, but to many others besides. The question for us is simply this: What can we in the Council do? Unfortunately, and perhaps even cynically, the answer is simply: Very little.

6. It is not at all clear how far each of the great Powers is prepared to go separately towards finding a solution to the problem we are facing. What is clear, however, is that there is no agreement among them to take effective steps to bring about in Zimbabwe an overthrow of the illegal régime of Ian Smith and install, in its place, a government based on majority rule. If there were such an agreement among the great Powers, a large number of steps—ranging from the blockade of ports to utmost exertion of pressure on Portugal and South Africa—could have been taken. Such measures would have solved the problem not only of Zimbabwe, but also of Namibia, Angola, Mozambique and Guinea (Bissau), and also perhaps the problem of *apartheid*. However, it is clear that in the absence of great Power agreement, the progress towards the solution of the Zimbabwe problem must necessarily be slow, very slow, and the cost in human and material terms very great indeed.

7. It is because those realities were fully accepted by the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and by the Conference of Foreign Ministers of Non-Aligned Countries held in August in Georgetown, that the recommendations of these bodies were extremely modest and moderate. Great Powers were not present either at the meeting of the OAU or at Georgetown, but their attitudes were fully known. In these circumstances, if the Council cannot uphold even the decisions of Georgetown and of the OAU, it not only will fail to provide acceleration for the process of majority rule in Zimbabwe, which we all desire, but will in fact tend to retard its progress.

8. The debate over the last few months has established certain facts which perhaps no one in the Council need challenge. The first of these facts is that no outside power or group of individuals need worry about the economic and similar consequences for the black people of Zimbabwe of measures they may take. Representatives of black people have made it absolutely clear that they are prepared to pay the necessary price for majority rule, and for achieving the

end of the illegal régime of Ian Smith. No one, therefore, can claim that he has the interest of the black people of Zimbabwe more at heart than those people themselves. The second fact is that the régime of Ian Smith is being maintained primarily through the co-operation and connivance of Portugal and South Africa, and unless and until an end can be put to this co-operation and this connivance, the difficulties will remain and even perhaps continue to grow. The third fact is that the system of *apartheid* is in full operation in Zimbabwe and therefore any argument that measures of the type contemplated at the time when the Pearce Commission was established will prevent and inhibit *apartheid* is not valid. Fourth, large-scale violations of the sanctions have taken place, sometimes openly and sometimes surreptitiously, and some major Powers have been guilty of some of the violations and some other Powers are equally culpable. Fifth, several economic interests, not necessarily of South Africa or Portugal, are giving support and sustenance to the illegal régime. Those five facts are, I think, fully established.

9. At this point I should mention that the Government of India has scrupulously imposed the sanctions approved by the United Nations and has not been a party to any surreptitious deals. We have done our best to ensure that no private trading by Indian merchants has violated in any way the sanctions against trade and commerce with Zimbabwe, Portugal or South Africa. We have issued necessary orders, and firm laws have been adopted, and we have established effective administrative supervision so that sanctions against these countries are fully respected. If, in spite of these measures, any committee or study reveals that further tightening is possible, we should be very glad indeed to undertake necessary measures. According to our information, no goods from South Africa, Rhodesia or Portugal have entered India either directly or indirectly.

10. The various speakers have indicated the kind of action the Council may take for bringing about a solution to the Rhodesian problem. We have been gratified and honoured by the presence of so many Ministers for Foreign Affairs, particularly from African countries, addressing us on this occasion on a problem to which both they and we attach the greatest importance. We believe that some of the steps the Foreign Ministers have indicated can be taken and that a resolution in that sense would be most welcome.

11. Further, we consider that the utmost publicity should be given to all violations of sanctions. In this context I would recall the specific measures the Indian delegation suggested at Addis Ababa for the furtherance of our goal. In the giving of publicity to violations it is not necessary to limit ourselves to those facts which are established by the Council's Committee on sanctions. The United Nations and its publicity media could easily undertake to disseminate those reports which come from responsible organizations. They simply have to indicate the source of such reports. Communication, travel and immigration of all kinds can be cut. The United Nations can, and in our opinion should, encourage freedom fighters by every possible means. It is the people themselves who must fight and achieve their own independence, but those outside can certainly give them considerable help. We believe that the Council can consider the setting up of suitable machinery to examine

the kind of help that is necessary and how best it can be channelled and extended.

12. The responsibility of the Government of the United Kingdom in this matter cannot, in view of the repeated British declarations, be discharged by the use of force; but short of the use of force, there are many measures which that Government can take in order to bring about its declared intention to see the end of the illegal régime of Ian Smith and the adoption of majority rule.

13. Lastly, all countries, and particularly the countries of the region, can undertake well-co-ordinated programmes of publicity and information for encouraging the black population in the fight for freedom. The OAU can consider wider and more effective steps in that direction.

14. If the white Rhodesians are not prepared for negotiations and for justice, it is pertinent to ask what means could be made available to the blacks to achieve the objectives which we all support. If the Council can help the people of Zimbabwe in these directions, we believe that, in spite of the limitations the lack of agreement among the great Powers necessarily imposes on us, some progress can be made.

15. Finally, it is well to recall that no great objective can be achieved if we are constantly thinking of our pockets and our skins.

16. With that background, I should like to comment briefly on the two draft resolutions which were submitted on behalf of the sponsors by the representative of Somalia just before the previous meeting was adjourned.

17. The draft resolution contained in document S/10804 is generally acceptable to us. We would have liked some reformulation of the last preambular paragraph, but apart from that we do not have any major comments to make.

18. However, we have several amendments to suggest on the draft resolution contained in document S/10805. I am not proposing them formally, because I believe that this draft resolution, like the other, will be subjected to some consultations and negotiations.

19. With respect to the fifth preambular paragraph, which begins "*Having noted* the rejection by the African population . . .", we would have liked it to read "*Having noted with satisfaction* the rejection by the population of Zimbabwe . . .".

20. Secondly, it seems to us that operative paragraph 4, which starts off with the words "*Calls upon* the United Kingdom Government to create the conditions . . .", is unrealistic. The United Kingdom Government has repeatedly made it clear that it does not have any power to bring about the various objectives mentioned in that paragraph. Why it still continues to claim responsibility for the area is a different matter, but the fact is that it has no power to bring about any of these objectives. In these circumstances we would have liked a modification of the language of the opening sentence of operative paragraph 4, to read something like this: "*Calls upon* the United Kingdom to try its

utmost to bring about conditions necessary . . .”, because it is, I repeat, unrealistic to think that the United Kingdom can bring about those conditions, particularly those in subparagraphs (a), (b) and (c). All that we can expect the United Kingdom to do, and would be right in expecting it to do so long as it claims responsibility for the area, is to try its best in whichever way it can to achieve these goals.

21. Lastly, operative paragraph 6, which “*Condemns the United Kingdom . . .*” is not acceptable to my delegation, and for three good reasons. We are reluctant to condemn any Government, for the simple reason that condemnation is somewhat of a divine prerogative and we do not claim to be gods or anywhere near it. I do not think that this kind of condemnation will do the Council much good.

22. Secondly, since the United Kingdom Government has repeatedly made it clear that it cannot bring about the fall of the illegal régime in Zimbabwe short of using force—and it has repeatedly told us it will not use force—it is difficult for any delegation to say that, in these circumstances, the United Kingdom Government should be condemned.

23. Thirdly, if any condemnation has to be pronounced on the United Kingdom Government the question will arise in our mind: What has the Council done? The Council, in a sense, has failed to agree on measures that could bring about the fall of the illegal régime in Zimbabwe and is, perhaps, equally responsible for that failure. Why, therefore, select the United Kingdom for special condemnation?

24. For those reasons we shall not be able to vote for operative paragraph 6.

25. Those are preliminary remarks and in the course of the discussion, depending on how the negotiations develop, we may have to speak again. I hope that contingency will not arise, but I do not completely rule it out.

26. The PRESIDENT (*translation from Chinese*): The next speaker is the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Mali. I invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

27. Mr. SISSOKO (Mali) (*interpretation from French*): Mr. President, may I, first of all, thank you and the other members of the Security Council for giving me this opportunity to take part in this important debate on Rhodesia. The fact that this debate is taking place at the very beginning of the twenty-seventh session of the General Assembly and only a few months after the Council’s historic meetings at Addis Ababa, testifies to your concern at the extremely grave situation which prevails in the United Kingdom colony of Southern Rhodesia.

28. On 11 November next the Rhodesian crisis will go into its seventh year. For seven years, the Zimbabwe people have endured the illegal domination of the racist minority in Salisbury, with everything that entails in suffering, repression and humiliation. For seven years, Ian Smith’s clique has continued arrogantly to defy the international Organization. During this period we have had to content ourselves with pious promises to bring down what everyone has agreed to call the Salisbury rebellion. While this wait for

a just solution of the problem has continued incomprehensibly, the Government of the United Kingdom has strengthened our long-held conviction that it is determined to consolidate the racist régime by gaining time, for the United Kingdom certainly does not lack the means to put an end to the oppression of the African majority by a handful of misguided adventurers.

29. Back in 1962, the General Assembly tried to take up the question in accordance with the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples in General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV). The United Kingdom, for which the rebellion came as no surprise, opposed the move.

30. On 5 November 1965, the General Assembly, in its resolution 2022 (XX), warned the United Kingdom against any development of the situation in Southern Rhodesia to the detriment of the African majority. The most pertinent passage of that resolution reads as follows:

“*Noting with grave concern the manifest intention of the present authorities in Southern Rhodesia to proclaim independence unilaterally, which would continue the denial to the African majority of their fundamental rights to freedom and independence*”.

The General Assembly also requested that independence be granted only on terms in conformity with those of the Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

31. On 11 November 1965 Ian Smith, with the support of the white minority, unilaterally proclaimed Rhodesia’s independence, seizing power on behalf of that minority alone.

32. Vigorous action was expected of the United Kingdom Government to safeguard the rights of the majority, for such action would have been in accordance with legality; besides, similar action had already been taken by that country to confront far less justified situations. Unfortunately, no doubt because it was the fate of only the Zimbabwe people that was at stake, the expected intervention did not take place.

33. Need I recall that the only solution then considered by the administering Power to crush the rebellion rested on the application of economic sanctions? We are still wondering how one can believe the effectiveness of a policy of economic sanctions against Southern Rhodesia, which is surrounded by South Africa and the Territories under Portuguese domination. We wonder how one can have faith in economic sanctions that certain Powers refuse to apply. How can one in any case speak of economic sanctions when the ports of South Africa and the Territories under Portuguese domination are open to Rhodesian imports and exports and when the list of countries violating sanctions lengthens from year to year?

34. As was to be expected, sanctions have resulted in failure and the myth of sanctions has now been exploded. Ian Smith himself stated in 1968, “The economic sanctions are flabby,” and on 20 August 1968 he added, “We have won the game so far as the economic sanctions taken

against Rhodesia are concerned, but the most important part remains: the pacification of the country”.

35. Pacifying a country is a political undertaking. We have always declared that the question of Rhodesia will not be solved by means of an economic solution but rather by a political solution, the solution that the African States and the OAU have consistently proposed to the administering Power and the United Nations.

36. The approval and application of the proposals for an Anglo-Rhodesian settlement¹ would have culminated in the perpetuation of the seizure of power for the benefit of the white minority if it had not been rejected by the Zimbabwe people. The great majority of international opinion showed itself far-sighted in its opposition to the so-called settlement proposals, because it saw therein a means of legalizing the rebel régime of Salisbury. It was clear that the test of acceptability in normal conditions of consultation could result only in a rejection of the proposals.

37. We believe the time has come for the administering Power at last to address itself to the question of Southern Rhodesia with the realism the situation requires. If none of the steps recommended has thus far made possible the restoration of democracy in Rhodesia, it is simply because the United Kingdom has refused to discharge its obligations to the people of Zimbabwe.

38. As I had occasion to say in the general debate in the General Assembly, the United Nations for its part, guided by the principles of the Charter and particularly by the provisions of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV), should henceforth be guided in its attitude to Rhodesia in the light of the latest proposals of the African National Congress, as follows: the convening of a constitutional conference on the political future of the British colony of Southern Rhodesia. Such a conference would make it possible, through the play of democracy, to achieve a peaceful outcome to the Rhodesian crisis, ensuring that power passes to the majority.

39. We therefore urge the Government of the United Kingdom to understand how urgent it is that there be a final settlement of this question, taking into consideration the pertinent proposals of the African National Congress.

40. The United Nations will be able to recover the trust of our disenchanted peoples only if the Security Council, the guarantor of international peace and security, shoulders its full responsibilities when confronted with the grave problems of decolonization. The permanent members of the Security Council have special responsibility in our Organization and owe it to themselves to give both active and sincere support to it.

41. The PRESIDENT (*translation from Chinese*): The next speaker is the representative of Cuba. I invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

¹ See *Official Records of the Security Council, Twenty-sixth Year, Supplement for October, November and December 1971*, document S/10405.

42. Mr. ALARCON (Cuba) (*interpretation from Spanish*): Mr. President, first of all, I should like to thank you and, through you, the members of the Council for having granted the request that we made to you and for allowing us to participate in this debate.

43. We cannot conceal our satisfaction at this opportunity of speaking at this meeting of the Security Council for the first time under the presidency of the representative of the People's Republic of China. For my delegation, which always fought for the restoration of your legitimate rights in this Organization, it is a source of gratification and pride to attend this discussion under the guidance of Ambassador Huang Hua. The fact that you are presiding over this series of important meetings of the Council shows that the revolutionary peoples, if they work united and firmly can thwart the pressures and manoeuvres of the imperialists.

44. The item which today concerns the Council is also evidence of the stubbornness of the colonialists and the reactionaries, their vain and clumsy efforts to ignore the will of peoples and deny them the exercise of their inalienable rights.

45. Cuba has come forward at this meeting to testify to its solidarity with the people of Zimbabwe and all the African peoples who are fighting to win their national independence. Our position has been expressed unswervingly in various forums. We have said that the process leading to the emancipation of the subjugated peoples under the yoke of colonialism and racism has entered into a decisive stage. In recent years it has become evident that all the forces of imperialism, colonialism and racism have joined together and they are co-ordinating their actions to set up a single bloc against the national liberation movements, to organize reactionary resistance to bring the work of decolonization of the United Nations to stagnation, and to perpetuate the exploitation of those subjugated peoples. According to their plan to hold back the irresistible torrent of the liberation movement the retrogressive forces are acting under the direction of the Power that is their leader and bulwark, North American imperialism.

46. To observe this evidence, it suffices to ask whence come the weapons that the colonialists and racists use to oppress the liberation movements? Who own the monopolies which swallow up the wealth of the colonized Territories? Which are the countries that violate the sanctions established by the United Nations against the racist régimes? Which are the delegations that, in this Council and in the General Assembly, try to dull the sharp edge of anti-colonialist resolutions? So that no one may entertain any doubts on this point, the purchases of chrome and other minerals from the racist authorities of Rhodesia were the North American answer to the sanctions agreed upon by this Council.

47. The colonial problem is one and indivisible from the borders of the Zambesi to the shores of the Caribbean. In the face of the conspiracy of reactionary international forces, we must set up a solidly united front to guarantee the independence of all colonial peoples without exception. Only a consistent attitude which is resolutely opposed to colonialism in all of its forms and manifestations, which

expresses its complete solidarity with all subjugated peoples, from Puerto Rico to Zimbabwe, will be able to paralyse and overthrow imperialism's plans.

48. The enemy that the liberation movements in Africa, Asia or Latin America have to face is the same. Any breach, any failure to follow up the fight against this common enemy will work to the prejudice of the liberation movement as a whole. The right to the emancipation of the subjugated people is and can only be conceived of as a universal value which all enjoy without exception. For, indeed, does not the action of imperialism and its open support of colonialist and racist régimes have a world-wide nature? Do the imperialists not act beyond frontiers and do they not place their military hardware at the service of forces repressing the liberation movements? Indeed, have not the South African authorities publicly revealed that they are examining the colonial experiment of Puerto Rico in order to apply that system also to the Territories of southern Africa? Is it an accident that in recent months trade, travel and contacts between the Pretoria régime and the colonial authorities of Puerto Rico have been intensified?

49. The Revolutionary Government of Cuba condemns colonialism and racism in all their forms and manifestations, and offers its complete solidarity to the Zimbabwe people in its just struggle. In the face of the stubborn denial of its prerogative, it is entitled to fight with all the means within its grasp, and the international community has the duty to support it. In this connexion we should recall the agreement reached at the Conference of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Non-Aligned Countries held at Georgetown in August, which stated in the final declaration:

"In the face of the adamant refusal by the colonialist and racist powers for peaceful change the Conference agreed on the urgent necessity of assisting the legitimate armed struggle of the Liberation Movements in Southern Africa. In this context the Conference emphasized the importance of working out a specific programme calling for material aid and practical political solidarity so as to make a decisive contribution to the total and immediate eradication of every vestige of colonialism in the African continent".

50. The inquiry carried out by the Pearce Commission² brought out the resounding rejection by the Zimbabwe people of the so-called "proposals for a settlement" concluded between the Government of the United Kingdom and the illegal régime of Ian Smith. Public demonstrations in protest against that understanding, which is a conspiracy against the legitimate interests of the population, showed the world that the Zimbabwe people was engaging in a growing and vigorous resistance against the oppressor minority. This Council has the duty to assist the Zimbabwe people in its struggle against this racist iniquity imposed upon it by its oppressors. Despite the repeated agreements by the United Nations, the Salisbury authorities continue their policy of racial segregation. They deny to the

² See *Rhodesia: report of the Commission on Rhodesian Opinion under the Chairmanship of the Right Honourable the Lord Pearce*, Cmnd. 4964 (London, Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1972).

people their most elementary rights, they expel entire communities from their land; and they are unleashing repression of the most ferocious kind. In the course of this debate various distinguished Foreign Ministers and African Ambassadors have cited concrete examples of the more intense violence exercised, day by day, by the white settlers against the African population.

51. The United Nations must act to put an end to this situation, which constitutes an affront to all of mankind, and must guarantee to the Zimbabwe people its sacred right, to independence and freedom.

52. Fourteen centuries ago, when Europe was giving its first signs of awakening and leaving behind tribal antagonisms, the masses of Africa built from the Zambesi to the Cape a flourishing culture which left its everlasting testimony in monuments of granite. With the spirit of those builders, the Zimbabwe people will overthrow its enemies and will win its rights. Its resistance will be like the stone: powerful and indestructible. Its victory will be as inevitable and firm as granite.

53. Mr. PHILLIPS (United States of America): My delegation has listened with great interest to the statements of the distinguished Foreign Ministers who have spoken here thus far. The United States remains concerned about the situation in Southern Rhodesia. We believe, however, that the Council should look at the problem from a practical point of view and in terms of measures that the Members of the United Nations will actually carry out.

54. The United States continues to believe that racial equality and self-determination must become the inheritance of all of the people of Southern Rhodesia. We share the abhorrence expressed by previous speakers in this Council of an illegal régime that has tried to perpetuate control by a racist minority over an area of Africa which it has no right to govern.

55. The United States will continue to support practical means of achieving the realization of full political rights for all of the people of Rhodesia, but we recognize—perhaps more clearly now than in 1968—that the way will not be an easy one. We believe that the Council should not turn a deaf ear to any practical efforts to seek a solution and that it should not hasten to condemn the attempt made recently by the British to seek a settlement. The United Kingdom has acted in a wholly responsible manner in seeking to bring the situation in Southern Rhodesia under control, and we see no purpose in attempting to push the British Government into taking measures that would not contribute to the best interests of the majority of the people of Rhodesia. Thus we do not believe that it is appropriate for this Council to call upon the United Kingdom to take measures that could become effective only with the use of force.

56. In listening to the statements so far, we note that there has been great emphasis placed on imports by the United States of strategic materials from Southern Rhodesia, although several speakers have also called attention to widespread violations by others.

57. I wish, briefly, to set the subject in its proper perspective.

58. The sanctions programme is, first of all, a matter which affects various States differently. For some, sanctions have been easy to comply with since they have had no economic relations with Southern Rhodesia at all. For others there were difficulties, and in some cases hardships, since well-established commercial ties were broken. Still others, however, have found ways of keeping such links more or less intact, and it is because of them that economic sanctions against Southern Rhodesia have thus far not had the success we originally hoped for.

59. The second point I wish to make is that the co-operation of all States is needed to make sanctions more effective. As the Council is well aware, the Congress of the United States has passed legislation which exempts certain strategic materials from its observance of Rhodesian sanctions. Although the Executive Branch opposed that legislation, it was nevertheless adopted and became effective as law on 1 January 1972.

60. My Government has been forthright in making full and regular disclosures of our imports of those materials to the Security Council's Committee on sanctions. We would wish that the many other importers of Rhodesian commodities would be as candid about their transactions, so as to enable the Committee to gain a full and accurate picture of how Southern Rhodesia has for six years been able to surmount the mandatory economic sanctions established by the Security Council.

61. It has been pointed out at this session of the Council that sanctions have had some limited effect on Southern Rhodesia. The Smith régime has had difficulty in finding investment capital. Procedures adopted by the Southern Rhodesians to evade sanctions are complex and expensive. There is no doubt, however, that the programme is far from achieving the goals set out in Security Council resolution 253 (1968). My delegation strongly hopes that, in considering why the programme has not been more effective, other delegations will not succumb to the temptation to concentrate on one country, the United States, simply because it is easy to do so since its imports of certain strategic products have been made a matter of public record.

62. Our last report to the Committee on sanctions on our imports covered the period from 1 April to 30 June. Projecting our estimated annual imports against Rhodesia's annual exports, it appears that our share of Rhodesia's exports will be around 2 to 3 per cent of the total. Despite the fact that most of Southern Rhodesia's exports are going to other countries, the discussion on sanctions in this Council has centred to an unwarranted degree on the comparatively small amount of imports by the United States.

63. Let us look at the record on importations from Rhodesia during the first half of 1972. A good estimate of Rhodesia's total exports for the first half of 1972 would be \$200 million to \$220 million. What was the total value of the United States imports, all of which were reported to the Committee on sanctions, during the same period? The

answer is, \$3 million, a very small fraction indeed of that total. This is a troubling situation to us, not because so much time has been spent in examining United States imports but because so little time and effort have been expended to determine to whom Rhodesia sold the other 98.5 per cent of its exports during the first half of this year.

64. I believe members of the Council are also aware of the lengths to which my Government has gone to maintain and support the sanctions programme. Our laws and regulations—with the excepted area of strategic imports—continue to reflect our determination to do so, and so does the actual record of the United States not only in enacting the appropriate laws and regulations—although some governments, I would note, have not even done that—but also in enforcing them. Of the nations represented in this chamber today only two—only two—have actually taken appropriate enforcement measures. One of those two, I might add, is the United States. It may be argued that the nationals of other countries have not been prosecuted because they have studiously avoided dealings with Rhodesia, but I believe—and I think most impartial observers would agree—that the reports and statistics of the Committee on sanctions itself suggest an alternative explanation. So, I might add, does the evidence that has developed as a result of recent United States court actions.

65. We continue to regard with concern the very large number of cases of reported transactions in violation of sanctions—some 130 in all—compared with the handful of cases in which violations have been confirmed or admitted. When we examine the volume of reported violations, which we must assume is only the tip of the iceberg of total Rhodesian trade, and Rhodesia's obvious ability to market its goods abroad, it is clear that some countries simply have not taken their responsibilities seriously. This is not a problem that began with a statute adopted by the United States in 1972. The problem began as soon as it became clear that Security Council resolution 232 (1966) was being systematically evaded.

66. I appreciate the concern of those who argue that our action, because of its open, official character, will lead others to similar actions and will undermine the entire sanctions effort; but the logic of that position needs close examination. Those who attack us for this move are saying, in effect, "By your actions you will encourage others to do likewise." That is putting it backwards. No encouragement by us has been needed. The United States would not have acted as it did if it were not well known—widely and universally known—that the United States until this year was one of a handful of nations, along with the United Kingdom and a few others, which had taken the totality of the sanctions programme seriously, and had made it work. The United States did not act to create a new situation regarding sanctions. It is one thing to be the first to pierce a hole in the dyke, but in this case the dyke has been leaking, and leaking badly, for a long time.

67. With respect to chrome, for example, this Council is aware that United States firms have recently imported two lots of chrome ore totalling about 56,000 tons. But, again according to the estimates of the Committee on sanctions, Rhodesian chrome-ore production since 1966, most of

which has been sold abroad, has been about 400,000 tons per year, or more than 2 million tons since resolution 232 (1966) was adopted by this Council. Obviously, singling out the United States will not deal responsibly or adequately with this situation.

68. In this connexion, it is also interesting to note that in the fourth report of the Committee on sanctions³ the single largest number of reported cases of sanctions violations involved chrome ore and ferrochrome—34 such cases in all. Nationals of 23 nations reportedly were involved in this apparently widespread trafficking in chrome and ferrochrome. The United States was not mentioned in any one of those cases.

69. Another important mineral export of Rhodesia is copper. The United States may now, under the recent legislation, import copper from Rhodesia, although none has in fact been imported into the United States from that Territory since 1965. None the less, since the unilateral declaration of independence copper has risen from third to first place among Rhodesia's mineral exports and there are an estimated 30 to 40 copper mines now operating. The report of the Committee on sanctions documents a sharp curtailment of Rhodesian copper exports since 1966; at the same time, the evidence is that Rhodesian copper production has continued and even increased during the same period. It is, as the fourth report stated, very difficult to determine the true situation, but there can be no serious doubt that Rhodesian copper is going somewhere and in very substantial quantities. We have imported none, either this year or in years past. My delegation believes that sanctions can be made more effective only if this matter is given the further study and analysis it deserves.

70. We should not confine our attention to the area of strategic materials only. Turning for a moment to the agricultural sector, the evidence again points to widespread sanction violations on a truly massive scale. The United States does not, and under law cannot, import any of Rhodesia's tobacco, corn, beef or sugar. Yet these commodities continue to figure prominently in Rhodesia's exports.

71. Tobacco was Rhodesia's main export before sanctions. Although sanctions caused Rhodesia to lose its traditional tobacco market, much tobacco is being sold abroad. It is not going to the United States, but where is it going? An analysis of this question would properly begin with the excellent information compiled in the fourth report of the Committee on sanctions. Unfortunately, as far as we can determine, no further analysis has ever been attempted despite the 10 cases of suspected violations that have been brought to the Committee for action and despite the information developed by the Committee, which demonstrates that Rhodesia's neighbours, by their own figures, exported 87,000 metric tons of tobacco in 1968-1970, yet somehow trading nations elsewhere managed to import 142,000 tons of tobacco from the same countries during the same period.

³ *Official Records of the Security Council, Twenty-sixth Year, Special Supplement No. 2 and Corrigendum and Special Supplement No. 2A.*

72. Similarly, maize has grown substantially in its importance to the Rhodesian economy since the unilateral declaration of independence. No fewer than 11 cases of reported violations have been brought to the Committee on sanctions and it is clear that Rhodesian exports of this commodity have increased. But no one seems to know where any of it is going, although the fourth report of the Committee documents the remarkable fact that, while Mozambique reported exports of 172,000 tons of maize in the period 1967-1969, various countries reported for the same period maize imports from Mozambique of upwards of 1 million tons. That kind of 600 per cent discrepancy would, one would think, cause some serious questions to be asked. On the contrary, however, it seems to have escaped notice entirely.

73. We are also concerned that those who share our desire to see a fair and just outcome of the Rhodesian issue have not always focused on the broader aspects of the problem. We can understand concern about our legislation, but we would have hoped that the Council would pursue all sanctions violations more systematically. We would expect to see more interest displayed in the vital question of total Rhodesian trade. If we have imported 56,000 tons of chrome in the first half of 1972 we naturally expect to hear expressions of concern; but we would also hope to hear others ask: "To whom has Rhodesia sold over 2 million tons of chrome ore since sanctions came into effect?" If the United States during 1972 will buy 2 or 3 per cent of Rhodesia's exports, who will buy the rest?

74. Finally, if this Council is serious about making sanctions work it will avoid this one-sided approach and recognize that the real problem is far broader in nature and cannot usefully be addressed by singling out the United States Government or any other individual Government without reference to the total problem.

75. Sir Colin CROWE (United Kingdom): Since the Security Council last debated the Rhodesian question as a whole we have had the report of the Pearce Commission. Members of the Council will have seen copies of my letter of 23 May to the President of the Security Council, which was circulated as a Security Council document⁴ and with which I enclosed a copy of the report and of the statement made on it by Sir Alec Douglas-Home to the British House of Commons on the same day.

76. My delegation has heard with appreciation the compliments which more than one speaker in the present debate has paid to the manner in which Lord Pearce carried out his task and on the acceptance by the British Government of his conclusions. I hope that it will now be agreed by all, not least by those who, openly or secretly, feared beforehand that the Pearce Commission would do a whitewash job to cover up a sell-out, that Lord Pearce and his colleagues dealt with their complicated task in a painstaking, impartial and thoroughly objective manner.

77. Their conclusion was that the people of Rhodesia as a whole did not regard the November 1971 proposals as

⁴ *Ibid.*, Twenty-seventh year, Supplement for April, May and June 1972, document S/10656.

acceptable as a basis for independence. My Government, as is well known, was disappointed at that outcome but it loyally accepted the verdict, as it always said it would. One might have hoped that this episode would at the very least have made it unnecessary for others to doubt in future the good faith of the British Government and its plain and open approach to this important question. In this connexion I must admit that I find it particularly disappointing that one of the first draft resolutions to be submitted on this subject in the Security Council should seek to condemn my Government in respect of its efforts hitherto and that, even without this condemnation, it should implicitly reject the whole process which I have just described and try to bind my Government to different and specific ways of handling such questions in the future. But I shall have more to say about that in a moment.

78. As representatives know, the timing of this debate has been arranged so as to give the Foreign Ministers of certain countries with a close interest in this important African question the opportunity, while they are in New York for the opening stages of the General Assembly, to come and give us the benefit of their views. We are indeed fortunate not only in this but also in the fact that we are not meeting against the background of crisis as this Council so often has to do. Fortunately, inside Rhodesia there have been no dramatic developments of the kind we fear with only too good a reason there and elsewhere in southern Africa. In the present instance, we are holding our debate at a time when the situation might be described as being in a state of critical suspense. We should therefore discuss it, not without emotion, for the subject is of too basic and of too human a concern to be divorced from strong feeling, but without the kind of emotionalism which rarely helps this Council to reach constructive conclusions.

79. Against this background I should like to say a few words about how my Government sees the present situation, and what it considers to be the appropriate action. As the Council knows, my Government believes that the November proposals, for all their imperfections, offered a reasonable solution and provide a means of halting and reversing the all-too-evident trend in Rhodesian political affairs towards racial discrimination, *apartheid*, and worse. There is more than one view on this point, and as I have said, my Government has always maintained that the acceptance of the Rhodesian people as a whole is the determining factor in whether the proposals can be implemented. It may be—we devoutly hope so—that the darker dangers we see implicit in failure to reach a settlement will not materialize. Certainly we are determined that it shall not be due to any action of ours if this is to happen. It is for that reason above all that my Government considers a period of calm consideration is now required on all sides. We greatly hope that it is still not too late and that the Rhodesian people, African and European alike, will decide to choose the way of compromise. We for our part shall continue to look out for settlement on the basis of the five principles. Meanwhile, too, as we give the people of Rhodesia time for reflection, we maintain our existing position, on the issues involved, including sanctions. This does not mean that we wish to pretend that nothing has happened since November last year, because the revival of political activity in Rhodesia which came about as a result

of the Pearce Commission was in itself a most important development. But this is the right posture while we see what comes out of Rhodesia itself.

80. I should like now to deal with the question of sanctions. In doing so I shall be somewhat outspoken. I think my delegation has the right to be so. My delegation has throughout co-operated fully with the Committee established pursuant to resolution 253 (1968) in providing information and in trying to ensure that the Committee plans an effective role. I should like to repeat how we see that role. It is, first, to bring cases of possible evasions of sanctions to the notice of the Governments concerned, so that they can investigate them and so that, through the seeking and provision, where necessary, of clarification, the international community can satisfy itself that national legislation on sanctions is being fully enforced in accordance with the obligations laid upon Governments by the relevant Security Council resolutions. It is, secondly, to assist Governments in the application of their national legislation on sanctions by supplying them with information and advice on such matters as documentation, the analysis of certain materials, and the manner in which illegal trade is being conducted, so that Governments may be in a better position to investigate possibly suspect cargoes, whether they are doing so at the request of the Committee or on their own initiative as part of their normal checking procedures.

81. What is equally to the point, my Government's record in the application of sanctions has been second to none. And I accept with appreciation the recognition which some African delegations have given to the United Kingdom's role. Not only have we enacted legislation which faithfully reflects the sanctions provisions of this Council, but we have been scrupulous in policing and enforcing our own legislation—and this, I may add, at great cost to our own traders and industrialists who have seen others stepping into their traditional market and who have seen their competitors obtaining raw materials at a discount, because, regrettably, not all Governments have been as rigorous as mine in their application of sanctions; not all delegations have been as determined as mine to make the Committee on sanctions an effective instrument.

82. I do not think I need to say more on this question of sanctions, since we have already discussed it in July and I was then able to explain the position of my Government in greater detail. It was against this background that my delegation came to the present debate. We listened with interest to the contributions that have already been made by the Foreign Ministers and Permanent Representatives who have spoken. Clearly, there are many points on which we agree, particularly about the ultimate goals that we all want to see achieved in Southern Rhodesia. But when it comes to specific ways of reaching these goals I must admit that my delegation feels that some suggestions which have been made are over-optimistic, some ignore realities, and some are downright impossible.

83. Perhaps I may say a few words about the suggestion that many speakers have raised for a constitutional conference. In his statement presenting the Pearce report, in which he also announced Her Majesty's Government's

acceptance of its conclusions, my Foreign Secretary expressed the hope that the majority of Rhodesians, African and European alike, will decide to work together for orderly political change. The negotiations of last November, and the welcome upsurge of political activity during the time the Pearce Commission was at work, have created a situation in which many new ideas are current and which could become more fluid. There must be time for reflection, and it must be for the Rhodesians themselves to solve their own problems. There must, therefore, be consultation inside Rhodesia among the parties concerned. But although there are these possibilities for a more fluid situation, in some other essential aspects the situation remains unchanged. It is not only sanctions which continue in force; it is also the realities. It remains true that the people of Rhodesia as a whole face a stark choice between a multiracial society and a polarization of the races, between compromise and confrontation, between peaceful development and stultifying conflict.

84. It remains true also that, while the British Government has responsibility, it does not have the power to impose its will. Compromise is the only way forward. It is in the light of this situation that the proposal for a constitutional conference should be seen. The underlying thought behind this proposal is one that we can all endorse. It is indeed another way of saying that there must be consultation and compromise among all the parties concerned in Rhodesia. Not only is the underlying thought acceptable, but also the proposal itself is one which, in any other circumstances than the ones with which we are faced, would be entirely reasonable and constructive. However, the difficulty is that it is just not practicable for Her Majesty's Government to call a conference in Rhodesia without the acquiescence of the Smith régime. If it were, the Security Council would never have had to be concerned with the matter of Southern Rhodesia. And to summon a conference outside Rhodesia without the participation of the white minority, and perhaps without many Africans, would be quite fruitless. The call, therefore, for a constitutional conference to be summoned from outside, as it were, is thus, I fear, more likely to hamper than to help the process of consultation and discussion inside Rhodesia, which is the only way that a compromise can be reached. The proposals of last November and the Pearce report have given an unrivalled opportunity for political discussion in Rhodesia which it is to be hoped can continue. If some settlement can eventually be reached, it may well be that a constitutional conference will be the vehicle through which it can be done. But in the meantime it would be unwise for the Security Council to insist on such a measure until the time is ripe. My Government could not assume the responsibility of calling such a conference until it was satisfied that all the parties concerned were ready for it and that it showed some possibility of success. We are prepared to take note of the desire for a constitutional conference, and indeed to examine the possibilities and to keep them under constant review. But we are not prepared to give the impression that we could assume a commitment to a course of action which we are in no position to pursue.

85. Finally, I come to the two draft resolutions that have been submitted. It will be clear from what I have said that my delegation is doubtful whether any resolution seeking

to impose a solution from outside will advance matters at this stage.

86. The first draft resolution, moreover, is a repetition of proposals which have been made here before and on which successive British Governments have made clear their position, particularly in regard to measures designed to bind Her Majesty's Government, as administering Power, to courses of action that are obviously impractical. No Government could be expected to accept such directives. It will therefore be no surprise to any member of the Council to know that we cannot accept the provisions of the draft resolution in document S/10805.

87. With regard to the draft resolution on sanctions [S/10804], although it contains many propositions to which we do not take exception, we do not see that it contains any proposals that would be likely to advance the work of the Committee on sanctions in its proper task of ensuring the implementation of existing sanctions. We fear, in fact, that the suggestion for yet further studies will only impede that proper task.

88. The view of my delegation has always been that the most effective way of stopping up the loop-hole which undoubtedly exists through South Africa and the Portuguese Territories is to tackle the problem where the goods originate and arrive; that is, that the Committee on sanctions should get down to the job with which it was initially entrusted.

89. Finally, I must also yet once more place on record the views which my delegation made clear in respect of Security Council resolution 314 (1972), that the objective of sanctions is the objective which is stated for them in Security Council resolution 253 (1968). My delegation cannot accept any further interpretations of that objective.

90. Mr. FARAH (Somalia): Since the adjournment of the morning meeting, the African sponsors of the two draft resolutions before the Council have been in contact with several delegations and hope to be in a position to announce to the Council the agreements that have been reached, agreements which have the objective of trying to obtain as wide a support as possible for the draft resolutions that have been submitted.

91. My delegation has listened with considerable interest to the statement made this afternoon, and in particular to the statements made by the representatives of the United States and the United Kingdom. It was most interesting to hear from the representative of the United States so much important statistical information relating to the import and export trade which is being conducted with Southern Rhodesia by the international community. But of course this does not excuse any Member from its obligations under the Charter. What we sponsors of the draft resolutions see in the United States action is a reformalization of trade relations with Southern Rhodesia. It may be just 1.5 per cent, but what cannot be escaped is the fact that trade relations with Southern Rhodesia have been re-established. I had hoped that it would be possible to receive perhaps more precise information about those States that are responsible for importing the other 98.5 per cent of the

exports from Southern Rhodesia. Evidently the United States does have that information. I am sure it has information which would back up the charge it made in this Council—a very important charge—last February, and that is the kind of information that we have been seeking to receive, not only from the United States but from all Members of the United Nations.

92. As the representative of the United States quite rightly pointed out, we all have an equal responsibility and a common obligation to see that sanctions work. Now, even though it is only 1.5 per cent of the total exports of Southern Rhodesia that the United States is involved in at the present stage, let us suppose that each Member State that is in need of Southern Rhodesian exports also limited itself to 1.5 per cent: just imagine the impossible situation in which this Organization would be placed. It does not require a mathematical mind to lead one to the result.

93. What I am saying here is that it is within the power of the United States to prohibit the importation of chrome, and I am sure that if the decision of the United States Congress could be reviewed and reversed, it would act as a great inspiration to the rest of the international community.

94. My delegation was interested in the statement made by the representative of the United Kingdom. We are greatly disappointed that what has been recorded in the draft resolution in document S/10805 does not meet with the approval of the United Kingdom Government. It is agreed that responsibility rests with the United Kingdom, but surely there are certain guidelines for political action which must be established, must be accepted and must be used to guide us along the proper course of political action in Southern Rhodesia. "One man, one vote" has been the treasured political right of the British people for more than a century, but yet the United Kingdom finds difficulty even in endorsing that basic political right for the people of Zimbabwe. Can anyone here really in good conscience deny the endorsement of that right to the people? What we are asking here is for the Security Council to endorse what would be a bill of political rights for the people of Zimbabwe, since that people is not in a position to draw one up for itself and have it implemented.

95. My delegation certainly hopes that the United Kingdom Government will reconsider the position it has now announced it will take. It is true that some of the requirements of the draft resolution perhaps impose upon the United Kingdom a responsibility which it may not be in a position at the present time to execute, in view of the limitations which the United Kingdom Government itself has imposed on its actions.

96. The representative of Saudi Arabia, when he addressed the Council this morning, posed quite a legitimate question. He said in effect, "Suppose the rebel régime were a black régime . . . ?" Now, I myself do not wish to introduce into this Council's debate elements of racism or of prejudice, because we know that the United Kingdom itself is totally opposed to racism. What we believe is that there is a credibility gap. We have seen the United Kingdom act in other circumstances. In this one it has decided to limit its

actions, to set that limit, not at comprehensive mandatory sanctions, but at a restricted set of mandatory sanctions. If we wish to enforce sanctions, naturally it requires not only the decision but also the will to apply them. But that will has to be an honest one, and we certainly hope that other Member States, both around this Council table and in the United Nations as a whole, will re-examine their conscience and their positions and co-operate with the Council in the strict implementation and the strict observance of the sanctions.

97. Just to go back to what the representative of the United States has said. A very important question has arisen: What are the responsibilities or legal obligations of States under international law to ensure, by enacting appropriate legislation or taking other pertinent measures under their domestic law, that their nationals as well as any companies under their jurisdiction act accordingly? What are their responsibilities? And this is a very important point to which representatives might perhaps wish later on to give consideration, in view of the fact that there is now mounting opposition within certain countries to the policy of their Governments to continue trading with Southern Rhodesia despite the obligations of those Governments under the Charter.

98. My delegation had hoped that it would have been possible to receive, between lunchtime and now, the views of all the members of the Council on the two draft resolutions; it has received a number of them but not all. For that reason my delegation asks that this meeting be suspended to enable the sponsors to agree upon certain amendments to the draft resolutions which have been proposed during the course of our consultations and to receive from other delegations whatever views or suggestions they may have, so that the two draft resolutions can gain the Council's approval.

99. The PRESIDENT (*translation from Chinese*): I think no one will object to the proposal made just now by the representative of Somalia to the effect that we suspend the meeting now. If there are no contrary views, the Council will act accordingly.

The meeting was suspended at 5.25 p.m. and resumed at 5.50 p.m.

100. Mr. FARAH (Somalia): The three sponsors have now had an opportunity of discussing the various suggestions that have been made to them, both in the Council and outside, on the text of the two draft resolutions. The sponsors would also like to take the opportunity, in accepting some of the proposed amendments, to make also some changes of form. The final texts will appear in documents S/10804/Rev.1 and S/10805/Rev.1.

101. First, with regard to resolution S/10804, in the first preambular paragraph, after the word "required" the words "to take all necessary steps" should be deleted. This is a question of form. This part of the paragraph will then read: "... in which all States are required to implement and make effective the economic, political and other sanctions . . .".

102. The second amendment to the draft resolution relates to the last preambular paragraph, and here again it is a question of form. After the word "Condemning" the words "the refusal of" should be inserted. The paragraph will then read: "Condemning the refusal of South Africa and Portugal to co-operate with the United Nations...". The words "for their refusal" after "South Africa and Portugal" will be deleted.

103. I come now to the operative paragraphs. Operative paragraph 3, which begins "Calls upon the United States of America", will be amended to read: "Urges the United States of America to co-operate fully with the United Nations...".

104. In operative paragraph 4, the phrase "including action under Chapter VII of the Charter" should be deleted. The deletion of that phrase does not prevent members of the Committee, or the Committee, from considering action under that Chapter or under any other Chapter of the Charter, but since some delegations would be happier with the exclusion of the phrase in the draft resolution, the sponsors have accepted that. In the same paragraph, at the very end after the words "Southern Rhodesia", the following words should be added: "and to report to the Council not later than 31 January 1973". That would allow the Committee established under the resolutions of the Security Council to have sufficient time in which to consider this very important proposal.

105. In the last operative paragraph, the date "1 December 1972" should be replaced by "31 January 1973".

106. Again, that paragraph will be completed—assuming that this will be the final meeting of the Council in the series of meetings on this question—by adding after "the 1663rd" the words "to 1666th" meetings of the Council.

107. Now, I come to the amendments to the draft resolution contained in document S/10805.

108. In the fifth preambular paragraph, after the words "Having noted", the words "with satisfaction" should be inserted. The rest of the paragraph remains as it is.

109. Turning now to the operative paragraphs, in operative paragraph 4, after the words "United Kingdom Government" the words "to create" should be replaced by "to try its utmost to bring about".

110. Operative paragraph 6 should be deleted in its entirety.

111. In operative paragraph 7, "all measures" should read "effective measures".

112. There is one final amendment which the sponsors wish to make to the two draft resolutions. This relates to the title of the Territory. Since many members here, and indeed in the United Nations, describe the Territory as "the Territory of Zimbabwe", we wish these draft resolutions would, wherever the name of the territory is mentioned, carry the mention "Zimbabwe" in parenthesis after the words "Southern Rhodesia" so that there will not be any

doubt as to which territory we are all talking about. We hope the Secretariat will take account of this amendment and have it reflected in the final text of the two draft resolutions.

113. It is our hope that with these amendments it will be possible for some of those States which were on the margin, so to speak, to vote in favour of the draft resolutions and that they will command a very wide measure of support.

114. The PRESIDENT (*translation from Chinese*): We will now proceed to vote on the two draft resolutions, as amended by the sponsors. We shall vote on each of the drafts separately.

115. The first draft resolution to be put to the vote is contained in document S/10804/Rev.1.

A vote was taken by show of hands.

In favour: Argentina, Belgium, China, France, Guinea, India, Italy, Japan, Panama, Somalia, Sudan, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Yugoslavia.

Against: None.

Abstaining: United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America.

The draft resolution was adopted by 13 votes to none, with 2 abstentions.

116. The PRESIDENT (*translation from Chinese*): The Council will now vote on the draft resolution in document S/10805/Rev.1.

117. Mr. FARAH (Somalia): I should like to request separate votes on operative paragraphs 1 and 5.

118. The PRESIDENT (*translation from Chinese*): In accordance with the request of the representative of Somalia we shall vote separately on operative paragraphs 1 and 5.

119. I now put to the vote operative paragraph 1 of the draft resolution.

A vote was taken by the show of hands.

In favour: Argentina, China, Guinea, India, Japan, Panama, Somalia, Sudan, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Yugoslavia.

Against: United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.

Abstaining: Belgium, France, Italy, United States of America.

The result of the vote was 10 in favour, 1 against, with 4 abstentions.

The paragraph was not adopted, the negative vote being that of a permanent member of the Council.

120. The PRESIDENT (*translation from Chinese*): We shall now vote on operative paragraph 5 of this draft resolution.

A vote was taken by show of hands.

In favour: Argentina, China, Guinea, India, Japan, Panama, Somalia, Sudan, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Yugoslavia.

Against: United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.

Abstaining: Belgium, France, Italy, United States of America.

The result of the vote was 10 in favour, 1 against, with 4 abstentions.

The paragraph was not adopted, the negative vote being that of a permanent member of the Council.

121. The PRESIDENT (*translation from Chinese*): We shall now proceed to vote on the draft resolution as a whole, as amended by the non-adoption of paragraphs 1 and 5.

A vote was taken by show of hands.

In favour: Argentina, China, Guinea, India, Japan, Panama, Somalia, Sudan, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Yugoslavia.

Against: United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.

Abstaining: Belgium, France, Italy, United States of America.

The result of the vote was 10 in favour, 1 against, with 4 abstentions.

The draft resolution was not adopted, the negative vote being that of a permanent member of the Council.

122. Mr. NAKAGAWA (Japan): The views of the Government of Japan on the question of Southern Rhodesia have been made clear on a number of occasions. However, may I recapitulate them very briefly?

123. My delegation firmly believes that the Government of the United Kingdom as the administering Power has the primary responsibility and obligation to restore constitutional government in Southern Rhodesia and ensure that the African majority can enjoy all political, economic and social rights. We have consistently supported the principle of majority rule in Southern Rhodesia on the basis of universal suffrage. We wish to express our earnest hope that the Government of the United Kingdom will, with renewed determination, exert its utmost endeavours to bring about the earliest possible settlement of the question of Southern Rhodesia on a basis which is acceptable to the majority of the people of Zimbabwe. In the meantime, the economic sanctions decided upon by the Security Council remain in

force and should be fully implemented by all countries. Japan will continue, as in the past, to comply faithfully with all the relevant decisions of the Security Council and we shall also continue to co-operate to the best of our ability in the efforts of the United Nations in this respect.

124. My delegation considers it important to reiterate the position of my Government by quoting from the statement which I made on 27 September in the general debate at the current session of the General Assembly:

"The settlement of the questions related to southern Africa naturally requires a patient and practical approach."⁵

In this sense my delegation welcomed the changes introduced in the draft resolution in document S/10805/Rev.1 and voted in favour of it. Similarly, my delegation welcomed the changes made in the draft resolution in document S/10804/Rev.1 and voted in favour of that too.

125. Mr. PHILLIPS (United States of America): A brief explanation of my delegation's votes on the two draft resolutions upon which the Council has just voted.

126. The United States abstained in the vote on draft resolution S/10804/Rev.1, and I should like to explain very briefly why. Given United States law, the United States could not vote for the call by the Security Council with regard to across-the-board sanctions. Moreover, I am compelled to say that we consider that this resolution focuses attention unfairly on the United States. But I want to make it clear that the United States intends to continue to co-operate with the sanctions programme to the fullest extent of our ability.

127. My delegation abstained in the vote on draft resolution S/10805/Rev.1. We share the sentiments expressed by others that what is now needed, and what has been needed since the Pearce Commission announced its findings, is that all elements within Southern Rhodesia should remain in contact and jointly demonstrate their will to work out a solution to the present impasse. We are therefore particularly concerned about the trend of events in Southern Rhodesia in recent months and the growing evidence there of polarization. As we have made clear, we do not believe force is an appropriate or effective means of resolving the Rhodesian problem or the other fundamental difficulties in southern Africa. But neither do we believe that steps taken by the Rhodesian régime to suppress those committed to peaceful and constructive change can have any effect but to exacerbate an already difficult situation. We would also hope that circumstances could be brought about in which a constitutional conference including those representing all Rhodesians, Africans and European, could be called. We recognize that this would be impracticable under present conditions. But we call upon those who seek an orderly and just outcome to the present impasse to continue to seek common ground of discussion and possible compromise.

⁵ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-seventh Session, Plenary Meetings, 2042nd meeting, para. 18.*

128. Mr. DE LA GORCE (France) (*interpretation from French*): The votes that my delegation has just cast I think will not have surprised anyone.

129. We voted in favour of the draft resolution in document S/10804/Rev.1 because we are interested in the strictest and completest possible application of the system of sanctions, and we see that this is the primary purpose of the draft resolution that has just been adopted on this point. For our own part we consider that the tasks that we are entrusting to the Committee on sanctions should remain within the framework of the mandate already entrusted to that Committee.

130. With respect to the condemnation offered in the preamble to that document, I should like to associate myself with the comment made in the course of this meeting by the representative of India. It seems to me that the Council should have some hesitation in using language that is so fraught with significance.

131. We abstained in the vote on the second draft resolution in document S/10805/Rev.1. True, we agree with the general purpose that the authors of this text had in mind: self-determination of the people of Rhodesia and respect for democratic principles of the majority. And in this connexion I should like to remind the Council that this principle was applied in the past by my country in relation to countries with regard to which it exercised special responsibilities, and we have always considered that there should be no independence before a majority Government had been brought into power. However, in our opinion, it would be appropriate for the Council to bear in mind the conditions in which today the problem of Rhodesia confronts us.

132. The administering Power in the course of the current year has shown its will to seek a solution. Its efforts led to a major result. For the first time since the creation of the Territory of Southern Rhodesia, the whole of the Rhodesian people has had an opportunity to make its views heard, and the answer that it gave was beyond question. It was abundantly clear. And therefore, in the circumstances, it seems to us better that the Council should render justice to the political will affirmed by the United Kingdom, should abstain from useless criticism, should refuse to go beyond reaffirming our general purposes, and should also refrain from putting itself in the place of the administering Power in the discharge of its responsibilities.

133. Mr. LONGERSTAEY (Belgium) (*interpretation from French*): My delegation is satisfied at having been able to vote for the draft resolution S/10804/Rev.1, just adopted by the Council.

134. I would like to thank the representatives of Guinea, Somalia, and Sudan, the sponsors, for the understanding they showed in deleting from operative paragraph 4 the reference made to Chapter VII of the Charter. This reference is obviously undesirable since it would prejudice the result of the consideration which the Committee on sanctions was asked to undertake, and it would already have envisaged resort to this part of the Charter. The Committee must start its task with objectivity, without any

prejudice concerning the application of this Chapter of the Charter one way or the other.

135. We therefore took the position that we did on this resolution, and it is in this light that we shall express our attitude on the action taken by the Committee in due course.

136. In regard to our abstention in the vote on draft resolution S/10805/Rev.1, rejected by the Council, this abstention could have been foreseen in the light of the statement I made at the 1665th meeting, during the general discussion. We believe that the Council's mission is to define the objective to be attained, namely, the inalienable right of the people of Rhodesia to self-determination and independence, and to determine the framework within which the action of the administering Power should take place.

137. We do not believe, however, that specific terms for the policy to be followed can be set. Paragraph 5, for example, excludes any consultation with the people of Zimbabwe other than on the basis of the secret ballot and universal suffrage. I should like to pay a tribute to the impartiality demonstrated by the Pearce Commission the work of which showed that there are other means of ascertaining the wishes of the population concerned.

138. Account must also be taken of the realities of the situation in Southern Rhodesia. The conditions necessary for the free expression of the right to self-determination, as provided in paragraph 4, are not unreasonable. What would be unreasonable is to fail to recognize that in order to implement these conditions, the administering Power must deal with an illegal régime which holds the *de facto* power in Southern Rhodesia. We would have preferred a unanimous reaffirmation, first, of the commitment to put an end to the illegal régime in Southern Rhodesia; second, of the wish to apply the principle of self-determination; third and last, of the maintenance of effective and obligatory sanctions until such time as a solution is found. My delegation today once again reaffirms its loyalty to these principles.

139. Mr. CASTALDO (Italy): The hour is late, Mr. President, and I would not like to impose on you and the members of the Council a lengthy explanation of the votes cast by my delegation, all the more since the statement made this morning by Ambassador Vinci made clear what position my delegation would take in the vote on the proposals likely to be submitted to the Council. I shall therefore only refer to that statement, which will appear in the verbatim record of this morning's meeting. That statement indicates the main reasons why we have, despite the reservations we maintained on the practicability of some of the paragraphs, voted in favour of draft resolution S/10804/Rev.1 and abstained in the vote on draft resolution S/10805/Rev.1.

140. My country, of course, believes that Southern Rhodesia should not accede to independence before majority rule, but at the same time we think that this is a question for the people of Rhodesia to decide for themselves.

141. Mr. ABDULLA (Sudan): The views of my Government have been presented here by my Foreign Minister and they are, by and large, the views promulgated at the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the OAU at Rabat. I therefore need not go into this.

142. We should have liked today's resolutions to be much stronger; but we deliberately made them very mild so that they would not be refused—at least so we thought. We thought that the issue was so vital and so urgent that a positive response would be given to the resolutions. They contain the minimum of demands of the OAU in the present circumstances, bearing in mind the difficulties that have been mentioned here and there. But going back to the whole issue, we see that Britain, as the administering Power, has over the last 7 years been given a chance to bring the régime of Ian Smith to an end and to bring into being an independent Rhodesia through the means and methods that have been traditionally used by the British people themselves, and very highly regarded. But we all know that in the end it is the people of Rhodesia, the Zimbabwe people, who will fight for their freedom and, in the end, gain it. We see that for 7 years Britain has made various excuses about the practical difficulties involved. We all know that if in 1965 Britain had only declared that it would use force to settle this problem, Ian Smith would have succumbed—and it would not even have been necessary to use force. We know that this could have been done again in 1969, when Smith declared his illegal Constitution. Britain could have played the same role and brought down the racist régime. Nevertheless, the world was patient enough to give Britain a chance to use its good offices, to bring pressure to bear to change the situation that prevailed in Southern Rhodesia. But that did not happen.

143. What has happened since the Security Council meetings in Addis Ababa and the Pearce Commission? We see that Ian Smith is strengthening his oppressive laws, oppressing the people even more than before, coming much closer to *apartheid* than he had before.

144. We understand the difficulties for Britain on the practical side as they have been explained by the representative of the United Kingdom, but at the same time we realize that there is a situation that is deteriorating and that Ian Smith is turning that country into another South Africa. We think this is a dangerous situation, and that is why Britain should have played the necessary role. The statement by the representative of the United Kingdom to the effect that we should let the situation settle itself and that we really should not ask Ian Smith to do anything about it, is, I think, at least morally inadmissible, because Britain is still the administering Power of that country. If Britain took the initiative of consulting Ian Smith about the proposals, but without consulting the Africans, it should be possible for Britain to go again to Ian Smith and ask him to consult the Africans. This is a very mild request we are making of Britain, considering its responsibility.

145. My delegation therefore refuses to accept the assertion that it is impossible for Britain to tackle the situation anew. The fact is that a new and dangerous situation has arisen. As I said before, Britain cannot go on abdicating its responsibility; it cannot, with our agreement, gradually pull

away from that responsibility. Seven years have been given to Britain to change the situation in that country. What are we asking for? We are not asking for very much. I think that even the Africans of Zimbabwe are really being too reasonable for revolutionaries or for people asking for independence. They are asking only for a constitutional conference and they are asking Britain itself to chair that conference, to bring together all the races to decide on their future through democratic methods that are acceptable and that are already being practised by Britain everywhere. Is that demand so great as to justify the representative of the United Kingdom in saying that it is difficult to accede to a demand even for something so well known as universal suffrage? What is difficult, for Britain or for anybody else, about deciding right now to say, even in principle, that there should be, in the end, a sort of election by secret ballot? We know why there should be a secret ballot, and "one man, one vote". Even to admit the principle—is there anything difficult about that? That is all we are asking for.

146. Mr. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*translation from Russian*): The whole of Africa, including the people of Zimbabwe, and their true friends must express their indignation and outrage at the results of today's votes in the Security Council on the very important question of the struggle for independence of the people of Zimbabwe, suffering under the yoke of the Southern Rhodesian racists.

147. Today's votes have made crystal clear who are the friends and who are the enemies of a people fighting for its freedom and independence. The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of the United Kingdom, Sir Alec Douglas-Home, referred in his statement at a plenary meeting of the General Assembly to the different ways in which the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom interpret the idea of freedom. Today's voting has clearly shown the whole world the difference in those interpretations, and what lies at the heart of that difference.

148. With regard to paragraph 1 of draft resolution S/10805/Rev.1 the Soviet Union voted for authority to be given to the people of Zimbabwe, who constitute the majority in the country of Zimbabwe. The United Kingdom voted to allow authority to be exercised by a wretched handful of oppressors and racists who are imposing a régime of tyranny and terror on the overwhelming majority of the people of Zimbabwe.

149. With regard to paragraph 5, the Soviet Union voted for universal suffrage and a secret ballot on the basis of the principle of "one man, one vote," without regard to race, colour or educational, property or income considerations. The United Kingdom voted against these democratic principles and for the imperialist dictatorship of racists.

150. We thought we should point this out in order to show that Sir Alec Douglas-Home, who alluded to the different ways in which the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom interpret the idea of freedom, recognizes more clearly, on the basis of today's voting, what the essence of those differences is. From all this only one conclusion can be drawn: the British Tories, like the Bourbons in their day, have learned nothing and forgotten nothing.

151. Mr. FARAH (Somalia): The negative votes cast by the representative of the United Kingdom came as no surprise to the African delegations, either in the Council or outside. We had occasion to witness the same votes cast when questions of principle were brought before the Council relating to Southern Rhodesia in both the December debate in New York and the February debate in Addis Ababa.

152. I should like to inform the Council that Britain and the four delegations in this Council which decided to abstain, thereby indicating that they are not committed to the principles which we had put forward in the draft resolutions, represent one third of the membership of this Council. It is the intention of the African Group to show that this one third does not bear any relation to the number of delegations, the number of States Members of the Organization, which support draft resolution S/10805/Rev.1. To show this, it is the intention of the African Group of States to urge that priority be given in the General Assembly to the same draft resolution, with the necessary amendments, to be put forward to the Assembly as a whole and to have the United Nations express itself firmly either for or against these basic political and human rights that are contained in the vetoed draft resolution.

153. Mr. MOSJOV (Yugoslavia): In my substantive statement at the Council's meeting yesterday I said that we would support any draft resolution embodying the twin yet unified strategy of support for the just struggle of the people of Zimbabwe inside and for sanctions outside Southern Rhodesia.

154. The two draft resolutions submitted by three African members, as revised, meet those needs and, consequently, we voted in favour of them. Both draft resolutions are rather moderate in tone, especially after the amendments which the sponsors accepted in draft resolution S/10805/Rev.1. They are concentrated on the minimum of what we absolutely must do if we are to fulfil our responsibilities as members of the Security Council.

155. The rejection of that draft resolution, because of the negative vote of a permanent member of the Security Council, not only is regrettable but causes new and grave

concern. By vetoing the substantive draft resolution on Southern Rhodesia, in which basic principles are set out for the solution of the question of Southern Rhodesia, the United Kingdom as administering Power showed once again that it is not prepared to make any positive move towards the final solution of this very important question. Because of that, our concern should be a concern for vigilance regarding further developments in Southern Rhodesia.

156. The PRESIDENT (*translation from Chinese*): As the representative of CHINA, I should like to make a statement with regard to the result of the vote.

157. The Chinese delegation has voted in favour of the two draft resolutions on Rhodesia submitted by Somalia, Guinea and Sudan. But we have reservations with regard to paragraph 3 of the draft resolution in document S/10805/Rev.1, urging the British Government to convene a constitutional conference, because the Chinese delegation has consistently held that, according to the principles of the United Nations Charter and the universal desire of the Zimbabwe people, the Zimbabwe people should be given energetic support to achieve the immediate, true independence of Zimbabwe by eliminating foreign interference and putting an end to the Smith racist rule.

158. Secondly, we have seen today that once again this year the United Kingdom representative has vetoed the draft resolution on the question of Rhodesia submitted by the three African States members of the Council. The Chinese delegation cannot but express the utmost regret at this. By this action the British Government has once again shown that it stands completely on the side of the white racist régime of Smith and that it deliberately supports the latter in perpetuating its brutal colonialist rule over the 5 million Zimbabwe people. By this action the British Government has further set itself against the people of Zimbabwe and the rest of Africa. The people of Zimbabwe and the rest of Africa will surely draw the necessary lesson therefrom and will further unite themselves to carry out the necessary struggles and to put an end, with their own hands, to the brutal rule of the Smith racist régime.

The meeting rose at 6.45 p.m.

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