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NOTE

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SIXTEEN HUNDRED AND SIXTY-FIFTH MEETING

Held in New York on Friday, 29 September 1972, at 10.30 a.m.

President: Mr. HUANG Hua (China).

Present: The representatives of the following States: Argentina, Belgium, China, France, Guinea, India, Italy, Japan, Panama, Somalia, Sudan, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America and Yugoslavia.

Provisional agenda (S/Agenda/1665)

1. Adoption of agenda.

2. Question concerning the situation in Southern Rhodesia:

Letter dated 20 September 1972 from the representatives of Guinea, Somalia and the Sudan to the President of the Security Council (S/10798).

The meeting was called to order at 11.20 a.m.

Adoption of the agenda

The agenda was adopted.

Question concerning the situation in Southern Rhodesia:

Letter dated 20 September 1972 from the representatives of Guinea, Somalia and the Sudan to the President of the Security Council (S/10798)

1. The PRESIDENT (*translation from Chinese*): In accordance with the decisions taken at the previous meetings on this question, I propose now, with the consent of the Council, to invite the representatives of Algeria, Senegal, Morocco, Zambia, Mauritania, Guyana, Kenya, Tunisia and Nigeria to take the places reserved for them at the side of the Council chamber, in order to participate without vote in the discussion. They will be invited to take places at the Council table when it is their turn to speak.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. A. Rahal (Algeria), Mr. C. Diouf (Senegal), Mr. M. Zentar (Morocco), Mr. E. Mudenda (Zambia), Mr. A. Ould Meneya (Mauritania), Mr. S. Ramphal (Guyana), Mr. N. Mungai (Kenya), Mr. R. Driss (Tunisia) and Mr. O. Arikpo (Nigeria) took the places reserved for them in the Council chamber.

2. The PRESIDENT (*translation from Chinese*): I wish to inform members of the Council that I have received additional requests to be allowed to participate in our discussion of this question from the representatives of Mali and Cuba in letters dated 28 and 29 September respectively. In accordance with the usual practice I propose, if there

is no objection, to invite the representatives of Mali and Cuba to participate in the discussion and to take places at the side of the Council chamber, on the understanding that they will be called to the Council table when it is their turn to speak.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. C. Sissoko (Mali) and Mr. R. Alarcon (Cuba) took the places reserved for them in the Council chamber.

3. The PRESIDENT (*translation from Chinese*): The Security Council will now continue its discussion of the question before it. The first name inscribed on the list of speakers for this morning's meeting is that of the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Nigeria. I now invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

4. Mr. ARIKPO (Nigeria): Mr. President, I am most grateful to you and to the members of the Security Council for giving me the opportunity to participate in your deliberations on this very important issue. Before going into the substance, however, I should like to convey to you, Mr. President, my warm congratulations on your assumption of the presidency of the Security Council. The high honour is a fitting climax to the first year of your country's assumption of its rightful place in the United Nations.

5. The last time the Security Council considered this agenda item in Addis Ababa the whole world was still wondering what would be the outcome of the Pearce Commission, which was then testing the principle of acceptability of the extraordinary proposals agreed between the British Government and the rebellious Smith régime.¹ Not only were the proposals themselves a travesty of the proverbial British sense of justice and fair play, but the spectacle of Her Majesty's Government, the imperial authority over Zimbabwe, negotiating once again with Her Majesty's rebellious subjects on terms which amounted to a complete capitulation of the British Government to the rebels was something quite extraordinary.

6. To all freedom-loving and just people the terms of the proposed settlement constituted a total capitulation to bigotry, racism and tyranny, as symbolized by the Smith régime.

7. As it turned out, the black Rhodesian population, unsophisticated as we are led to believe they are, showed a greater awareness of the ephemeral nature of the proposals.

¹ See *Official Records of the Security Council, Twenty-sixth year, Supplement for September, October and November*, document S/10405.

They categorically and unequivocally rejected the proposals for a settlement which, if accepted, would have condemned them to a state of perpetual enslavement.

8. In the statement issued on behalf of my Government on 23 December 1971 on these proposals,² I pointed out that they violated General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960 on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples, which declared, principally, that the subjection of peoples to alien subjugation, domination and exploitation constituted a denial of fundamental human rights, and that it was contrary to the Charter of the United Nations and an impediment to the promotion of world peace and co-operation.

9. The black population of Rhodesia did themselves and the whole of Africa proud by seeing through the disguises and subterfuge and pronouncing a massive "No".

10. From this verdict of the people of Zimbabwe on the proposals, two facts clearly emerge. The first is the political awareness and maturity of the black Rhodesians, who have often been denigrated as being politically naive and therefore incapable of exercising hegemony over the minority white Rhodesians through the exercise of the universally recognized democratic principle of "One man, one vote". The second is the political courage of the black Rhodesian population which, in spite of threats and intimidation, expressed openly their deep conviction that they would rather endure these trials and tribulations than consciously sign away their liberty and live in perpetual servitude.

11. In view of this massive rejection of the proposals, what is the next step? I must, of course, pay a tribute to the British Government for accepting without any reservation the report of the Pearce Commission.³ But it is now four months since the report was published and no action has been taken by the British Government.

12. In his statement in the House of Commons shortly after the release of the report,⁴ the British Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs insisted that the proposals that had been rejected "still represent a genuine attempt to find a sensible and in all circumstances a just solution to Zimbabwe's special social and political problems." He concluded that statement by observing: "If there are to be processes of consultation inside Rhodesia they are likely to take some time and meanwhile the *status quo* will remain." I appreciate the wisdom of allowing tempers to cool; but delay may be dangerous. Fresh initiatives ought to be taken without any further delay to get talks started.

13. For an administering Power which has the very creditable record of decolonization that Great Britain has in other areas of the world, I cannot believe that the Zimbabwe problem is too difficult to solve. I am aware that

the way is hard and that there are still difficulties to overcome; but to pretend that the *status quo* can remain, even for one month, is to fly in the face of facts. For we all know—and the British Government knows—that in fact the *status quo* in Zimbabwe has not remained for one day since Lord Pearce's report.

14. We know that the rebel régime of Ian Smith has further tightened its oppressive rule. An increasing number of the people of Zimbabwe are being detained and clamped into gaol without cause. Members of the African National Council, a group which believes in and works for multi-racialism, are being harassed. The distinguished leader of the Council, that courageous son of Africa, Bishop Muzorewa, is being victimized. In fact, if the Bishop is not here with us today during the debate of this most important question it is not out of a wish to be absent; rather, it is because the rebel régime has impounded his passport and refused to allow him to travel outside Zimbabwe, even though the régime knows full well that, apart from everything else, the Bishop needs medical attention which he cannot obtain in Zimbabwe. What is more the rebel régime has, since the report of Lord Pearce, continued with its arbitrary ejection of Africans from their ancestral lands to make way for expropriation of the lands for use by the white minority.

15. I wish to pay a particular tribute, in this connexion, to the gallant Chief Tangwena and his people, who, in spite of the overwhelming odds against them, have resisted forcible ejection from their land. The unspeakable suffering inflicted on women, children and the aged in the process of the carrying out of this barbarous act of the rebel régime has failed to arouse the attention of that vocal segment of the so-called civilized world: there have been no press reports on this matter.

16. But I must say that, while Britain must continue to bear the primary responsibility for the events in Zimbabwe, the United Nations—and in particular the Security Council—must fully assume its responsibilities under the Charter. From the very beginning African countries have been very sceptical about the effects which sanctions were likely to have in bringing down the rebel régime. Nevertheless we were told that sanctions would in fact have an effect within a short time. It is now clear that the sanctions have failed for two main reasons: first, the non-compliance of South Africa and Portugal; and, secondly—and worse still—the breach by loyal Members of the United Nations, including some permanent members of the Security Council. The Government of South Africa and Portugal will stop at nothing to ensure the failure of the United Nations sanctions against the illegal régime in Zimbabwe. The Security Council must not continue to allow these two reactionary régimes to frustrate with impunity the collective decisions of the United Nations.

17. In this connexion, my Government is greatly distressed by the breach of sanctions by the Government of the United States, which claims to be a friend of the oppressed all over the world, when it decided to resume its importation of chrome and nickel from Zimbabwe. Coming as it did from a very powerful member of the Security Council, and a permanent member at that, the United States action

² *Ibid.*, document S/10481.

³ See *Rhodesia: Report of the Commission on Rhodesian Opinion under the Chairmanship of the Right Honorable the Lord Pearce*, Commd. 4964 (London, Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1972).

⁴ *Official Records of the Security Council, Twenty-seventh year, Supplement for April, May and June 1971*, document S/10656.

has provided both moral and economic strength to the illegal régime in Salisbury and support for those countries which continue to breach the sanctions.

18. The timing of the breach of sanctions by the United States was in itself most unfortunate, occurring when pressure was being exerted from other quarters on the people of Zimbabwe to believe that they had no other choice but to capitulate to the illegal régime, and when the British Government was courageously standing up to reactionary pressures from its own people against accepting the recommendations of Lord Pearce.

19. Now that the people of Zimbabwe have shown their courage in resisting the pressures, it is the hope of my Government that the United States will resume its responsibilities and contribute to the solution of the problem of Zimbabwe by strictly adhering to the sanctions imposed on the illegal régime by the United Nations.

20. The need not only to maintain but to strengthen and expand sanctions has become evident. I propose that the Council should urgently establish a more effective system of enforcement of sanctions, complete with the preparedness to act swiftly against any country guilty of breaking sanctions. The Security Council must ensure that the Government of the United Kingdom, which is the administering power over Zimbabwe, discharges its obligations towards all the people. Seeing that it is the primary responsibility of Great Britain to enable the people of Zimbabwe to exercise their right to self-determination and independence, the Council should require Britain, first, to give a guarantee that it will not grant independence before majority rule is attained and, secondly, to make such arrangements as will enable all the people of Zimbabwe to participate freely and equally in determining the future constitution of the country. To this end, Great Britain should vigorously pursue Bishop Muzorewa's suggestion for a convention of all the peoples of Zimbabwe. In the meantime, the Security Council should give all encouragement to the authentic representatives of the people of Zimbabwe to enable them to maintain the struggle against oppression and exploitation.

21. The determination of Africa to rid itself of the cancer of colonialism and racism, as typified by the régime in Zimbabwe, cannot be dampened. In Rabat, the Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity pledged greater assistance to the liberation movements. In Guyana, the Foreign Ministers of the Non-Aligned Countries expressed their support in concrete terms. Let the Security Council therefore lend the weight of its authority to this movement for the realization of the ideals of our Charter. In this great but urgent task, Nigeria pledges its maximum support.

22. The PRESIDENT (*translation from Chinese*): I thank the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Nigeria for the friendly words he addressed to the Government and people of China.

23. Now I should like to make a statement as the representative of CHINA.

24. The Chinese delegation has listened carefully to the important speeches made by the Foreign Ministers and representatives of many African countries and the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Guyana on the question of Rhodesia. Those speeches gave profound expression to the strong determination of the Asian, African and Latin American countries and peoples for unity against colonialism and neo-colonialism and in support of the Zimbabwe people's struggle for national independence. Now the Chinese delegation wishes to make a few remarks on the Rhodesian question.

25. First, the essence of the Rhodesian question is the Zimbabwe people's struggle against colonialist rule by the white minority racists to achieve national self-determination and independence. The Smith white racist régime is a direct product of the British colonial policy and a criminal tool used by colonialism and neo-colonialism to suppress the Zimbabwe people and oppose the independent African States and peoples. The only solution to the Rhodesian question lies in the achievement of complete national independence by the Zimbabwe people free from outside interference.

26. It has been repeatedly pointed out by delegations from many African countries, as well as by the Chinese delegation, that the so-called proposals for the "settlement of the independence dispute of Rhodesia" concocted by the British Government in collaboration with the Smith authorities, is a sheer hoax. The so-called test of acceptability conducted by the Pearce Commission is also a farce to dupe the masses. This has been borne out by the facts. These performances have all ended in complete failure as a result of the heroic struggle of the Zimbabwe people. Even the British Government had to admit willy-nilly in the investigation report of the Pearce Commission published in the latter part of May that "the people of Rhodesia as a whole do not regard the Proposals as acceptable as a basis for independence", and that "in spite of the incidents of intimidation the Africans' rejection by a substantial majority was a genuine expression of opinion".

27. The total bankruptcy of the "settlement proposals" and the complete failure of the "test of acceptability" are important new victories achieved by the Zimbabwe and other African peoples in their struggle against racist and colonialist rule. All the justice-upholding countries and peoples of the world rejoice over this.

28. Secondly, last June the Assembly of the Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity in Rabat adopted a series of important resolutions on the decolonization of Africa [*see S/10741*]. These resolutions reflect the firm determination of the African countries and people to fight shoulder to shoulder to win and safeguard national independence. In considering the Rhodesian question, the Security Council must pay full attention to these resolutions, especially the one on Zimbabwe, if the Council is not to betray the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and not to repudiate its political obligations to the African and Zimbabwe people.

29. The resolution on Zimbabwe condemned the British Government "for its failure to take effective measures to

bring to an end the illegal régime in Zimbabwe” and congratulated the Zimbabwe people for having fought against the so-called “settlement proposals” agreed upon between the British Government and the illegal régime in Rhodesia and “for having displayed a high degree of political consciousness, unity and determination in defence of their inalienable rights”. The resolution reaffirmed “. . . any attempt to negotiate the future of Zimbabwe with the illegal régime on the basis of independence before majority rule would be in contravention of the inalienable rights of the people of that territory”. It stressed the need for “continued imposition of political, diplomatic, economic and social sanctions against the illegal Smith régime until that illegal minority racist régime is brought to an end” and it “pledges to increase its assistance to the people of Zimbabwe in their armed struggle for self-determination and independence”. The resolution also rightly condemned the United States Government for its continued importation of chrome ore from Rhodesia and called upon the United States Government to desist from further violations of the sanctions and to observe faithfully and without exception the provisions of Security Council resolutions on this question. The Chinese Government supports the above correct views of the ninth summit conference of the Organization of African Unity.

30. Thirdly, how can Africa truly achieve decolonization thus bringing true liberation to the peoples in the non-independent regions of Southern Africa, including Zimbabwe? On this matter the African people have acquired rich experience through their own protracted struggle for national independence and have drawn the correct conclusions therefrom. As stated explicitly in the resolution of the ninth summit conference of the OAU, “the prevailing situation leaves the African people in these territories no other choice but armed struggle”. Imperialism, colonialism and neo-colonialism, as well as the white racists, will never step down from the stage of history of their own accord. If you do not hit those reactionary forces they will not fall. At present the Zimbabwe people are overcoming numerous difficulties and are marching forward courageously in their struggle for national independence, which has won the ever-wider sympathy and support of all the justice-upholding countries and peoples of Africa and the world. Although there will be twists and turns in the struggle and difficulties on the road to progress, the Zimbabwe people, upholding unity and persevering in their struggle, will surely win complete victory in their struggle for national liberation.

31. Fourthly, the Chinese delegation holds that in order to support the just struggle of the Zimbabwe people and to implement General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV), as well as the relevant Security Council resolutions on the Rhodesian question, the Security Council has the obligation to reaffirm that the Zimbabwe people are entitled to their sacred right to national independence and that they should achieve national independence immediately, free from any foreign interference; severely condemn the white racist régime in Rhodesia for its barbarous atrocities of repression against the Zimbabwe people; further strengthen and expand the sanctions against the Rhodesian white racist régime and, in view of the fact that South Africa and Portugal have violated the sanctions against Rhodesia in

contravention of the Security Council resolutions, the Security Council should expand the sanctions to cover South Africa and the Portuguese colonial authorities; severely condemn all acts in violation of the United Nations resolutions on sanctions against Rhodesia, including continued United States importation of chrome and nickel from Rhodesia in open violation of the United Nations resolutions; and call upon all justice-upholding countries and peoples of the world to render stronger assistance and material support to the Zimbabwe people.

32. Mr. De GUIRINGAUD (France) (*interpretation from French*): On four occasions since the beginning of this year the Security Council has been convened to debate the Rhodesian question. The number of our meetings—and we may well fear that they weaken in significance as they increase in frequency—testify nevertheless to the real concern of States at the maintenance of the power of the illegal régime in Salisbury.

33. The most recent information that we have about the situation in Rhodesia shows that, although the Rhodesian economy is not flourishing in the way claimed in Mr. Smith’s propaganda, it is standing up against the efforts of the greater part of the international community and even, in certain areas, has succeeded in expanding.

34. At the same time, unfortunately, the apprehensions one might have had about the possible introduction into the Territory of a system of racial discrimination at the expense of the indigenous inhabitants seem to have been well-founded. I refer to the 95 per cent of the Rhodesian population that is being affected in this way.

35. Last year the Council was informed by the United Kingdom, the administering Power, of the proposals for settlement that that administration had negotiated with Mr. Smith to bring Rhodesia out of the impasse in which it had been for a number of years.

36. At that time the French delegation refused to pass any value judgement on those proposals; it merely expressed its perplexity at some aspects of the system which had been described to it and noted that the process envisaged was in many respects quite different from what had been put into effect in other regions of Africa by the United Kingdom or by France. It noted, however, that the proposals for settlement—to use the London formula—would be tested for their acceptability by the people concerned.

37. When, three months later, at the Council session in Addis Ababa, someone proposed breaking off this test of acceptability because of the incidents which had accompanied its application at the outset, the representative of France spoke in favour of pursuing the test [*1635th meeting*]. He said that after years of muzzled silence Africa was speaking out; the people of Rhodesia were expressing themselves, but, unfortunately, sometimes they fell victim to their courage, yet certain masks were also falling and certain illusions vanishing.

38. Events have, indeed, borne us out. When the Chairman of the Commission of Inquiry, Lord Pearce—and here, like many other speakers, I would render a tribute to his

integrity, his sincerity and his objectivity—prepared his final report, he could say, without fear of contradiction, that the conclusions reflected the opinion of the Rhodesian people as a whole.

39. This experience—negative since the people rejected the proposals for settlement—none the less had a twofold merit: on the one hand, it showed that the United Kingdom was determined not to evade its responsibilities while on the other it enabled direct contacts to be established between the administering Power and the population, thus giving the indigenous majority some hope. That hope must not be dashed.

40. If, since the time the Pearce report was submitted, it was possible to think that the situation in Rhodesia was going to return to what it was in October last, and if the rebel leaders for their part, were able to cherish the illusion that public disavowal of their position inflicted on them by the people would only result in giving them a free hand, events have belied those forecasts.

41. Never before—as our meetings attest—was such attention focused on the situation in Rhodesia. Never has so much imagination been displayed in the search for new solutions. For its part, at the risk of disappointing our listeners, my delegation has no miracle cure to offer. We have said this, and we repeat it: no real progress can be made without the participation and initiative of the United Kingdom.

42. Here, as in other non-self-governing territories, it is by joint action by the administering Power and the indigenous population concerned that we can find motivating force for evolution; but, as was said on 27 September by the representative of Morocco, the spokesman for the President of the Organization of African Unity, His Majesty King Hassan II,

“The solution . . . lies also in action to be determined by the Security Council, on condition that it is applied without any demonstration of weakness” [1663rd meeting, para. 17].

43. In fact, since the unilateral declaration of independence was made, and the initiative of the United Kingdom, the Security Council has not remained inactive in the face of the deterioration of the situation in Rhodesia. It has unanimously condemned the repression to which the indigenous inhabitants are subjected. It has launched an appeal to all Member States—and only two States have failed to heed the appeal—that all consular and other relations with Salisbury should be broken off. It has decided that Member States should prevent the entry into their territories of persons holding Rhodesian passports. And finally, and above all, it has set up a régime of economic sanctions within the framework of Chapter VII of the Charter.

44. Without underestimating the effectiveness of these measures *per se*—as we have never failed to state—but without minimizing either the pressure that they can exert on rebel leaders, France voted in favour of their institution in 1968 and their extension in 1970. It has applied them,

first by setting up the appropriate regulatory and penal machinery and then by addressing instructions to its customs services, and it has repeatedly frustrated attempts to import Rhodesian exports. Finally, it has participated actively in the Committee set up under Security Council resolution 253 (1968) since the day it was established.

45. Some speakers have thought fit to refer to press reports or mere rumours to formulate on this question certain spiteful insinuations. Allegations of this type have already evoked, on many occasions, a firm denial on the part of the French delegation and I once again confirm those denials. Moreover, I should like to add that in the course of four years of co-operation with the Committee on sanctions my delegation has heard accusations of violations of sanctions against countries of all continents and all geographic regions and all political beliefs. We have looked at all with the same care. We have refused to take as good currency reports which cannot be verified—a press clipping or a report from the radio imputing to a particular company or public business acts of illicit trade with the rebel colony. We have come to the conclusion that the easy approach, reassuring for some, of collusion by certain countries with Salisbury while the rest of the world scrupulously applies sanctions does not coincide with reality.

46. From the experience we have obtained, France would therefore advise everyone to be mistrustful of preconceived ideas and to leave to the Committee entrusted with the responsibility the task of following up the application of resolution 253 (1968) to verify information concerning possible violations of the régime of sanctions, to compare statistics, to ascertain their source and to ascertain whence come and whither go the men and goods in transit through Rhodesia; to determine who maintains economic and technical relations with Rhodesian administrations and businesses.

47. Having said that, I would add that it is quite clear that imports and exports are passing in too large quantities through the net stretched by the Council around the rebel colony. It is quite certain also that as all of us—or almost all of us—agreed last July at the time of the adoption of resolution 318 (1972), the methods of fighting evasion of sanctions should be improved, and no effort should be spared in order to put an end as quickly as possible to deliberate violations of the régime set up under resolution 253 (1968).

48. Let the vice be tightened around Salisbury; let Governments take, if necessary, fresh measures to prevent or punish any public or hidden infraction of this system; let them report on their own decisions, which may not be in accordance with the resolutions of the Council; and then the action by the administering Power, which today is more thoroughly aware of the wishes of the population, will bear its fruits.

49. Mr. LONGERSTAEY (Belgium) (*interpretation from French*): We are met today once again to consider how the Security Council can most usefully contribute to the establishment in Rhodesia of a régime compatible with the wishes of the Rhodesian people.

50. I think it may be well to emphasize here the importance of the work done by the Pearce Commission, which demonstrated the determination of the people to be associated in any settlement concerning their destiny and their refusal to accept an arrangement that they did not feel to provide the guarantees they needed. The United Kingdom Government has endorsed the Commission's conclusions, thus demonstrating its determination to accept no political settlement which would jeopardize the interests or the rights of the Rhodesian people.

51. Being thus apprised of the aspirations of the Rhodesian people, and having secured further proof of the willingness of the United Kingdom to take them fully into account, we can ask ourselves how we can most usefully foster our common objective: the independence of Rhodesia and respect for the five principles.

52. Can the Council properly say what measures should be taken? Should it not rather call for dialogue and support what the United Kingdom is doing in Salisbury so that the African community may have specific prospects of political emancipation and, meanwhile, avoid a sterile confrontation? The question of Rhodesia can be solved only by its inhabitants. We must not forget this in considering the resolution on which we shall have to vote. My delegation hopes that the Security Council, while once again recalling the objective to be attained, will show the necessary realism really to facilitate a political solution.

53. My delegation reserves the right to speak again in the course of this debate when specific draft resolutions have been introduced and explained by their sponsors.

54. Mr. VINCI (Italy): Mr. President, since this is the first time that I have taken the floor under your presidency, I should like to begin by saying how sincerely gratified we are to see the representative of the People's Republic of China in the Chair this month, for the first time, guiding the work of the Security Council. We have all had many opportunities of appreciating your talents, skill and human qualities since November last when your great country took its rightful seat in the United Nations. May I add that in the course of this month we have had a further opportunity to gain a better cognizance of your exemplary sense of fairness and impartiality in leading our deliberations and your human understanding of the obligations of each member of the Council and all the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and leaders of delegations who have honoured us by taking part in our discussions. We thank you, Sir, for all this.

55. Exactly 10 months ago the Security Council met at the request of the United Kingdom in order to receive full information on the proposals for a settlement agreed upon by the British Government and the Salisbury rebel régime. Since then the Council has held quite a number of meetings on the question of Southern Rhodesia, the last ones in Addis Ababa, focusing its attention on various aspects of the proposals and in particular on the carrying out of the test of acceptability. This is understandable in view of the widespread concern that the proposals raised. When these proposals were discussed for the first time the Italian delegation expressed the opinion that a detailed study of them should be postponed until the completion of the test.

We now resume consideration of the question for the first time since the termination of the test—in other words, now that the proposals are no longer topical since they have been rejected by the majority of the population. It is the test itself that remains the most important event of these last months and that arouses our interest today.

56. We never had any doubt about the value of the test and the necessity to carry it out in the best democratic conditions. At the meeting of the Council on 30 December 1971, I said in particular:

"The test is not, of course, the exercise of self-determination. Nobody has assumed that it would constitute that exercise. But self-determination may well be preceded by one or more tests that may prepare for it. I have already mentioned that the main problem in this respect is to make a majority of the people aware of their fundamental rights; it is to awaken in their hearts the aspiration to be a nation—in other words, to have them strive for self-determination.

"Now, the test of acceptability provides really the first opportunity to reach individuals and groups of people in each corner of the Territory and to begin doing what has been badly needed for a very long time: namely, to make the adult African population of Rhodesia think about its future and its fundamental rights." [1623rd meeting, paras. 29 and 30.]

57. The test has produced these effects and the Pearce Commission report goes even beyond the expectations of my delegation at least. It is in many ways an extremely important document. It gives us first of all an objective and complete survey of the present situation in Rhodesia. In all our deliberations, particularly those relating to questions of self-determination and decolonization, a good knowledge of the situation involved is essential if our discussions are not to be diverted into academic or ideological exercises. The Pearce Commission report provides us with the results of a very accurate fact-finding mission well in conformity with the principles and traditions, often reaffirmed by this Organization, which should always inspire its approach to concrete situations.

58. We should like to add our voice to those of statesmen around the world, and particularly in Africa, who have highly praised the objectivity and the thoroughness of the Commission. This is another example of the fairness and political honesty which stems from the heritage and tradition of a country which has been associated throughout history with the principles of freedom and democracy.

59. The over-all picture which emerges from the report is one of a complex situation in which, along with anachronistic positions deeply rooted in colonial privileges, we can perceive the ferments of a society striving for political and social changes and the attitude of groups more aware of this reality and of the necessity to meet gradually the aspirations of the great majority of the population. The report catches vividly the symptoms of a social and political movement in the making, with all the inevitable hesitations but at the same time with some avenues still open before it which could lead to peaceful, reasonable and positive

changes. To begin with, racial relations—so important in this situation—are not strained to the point at which the various groups are heading fatally towards an open and irreparable conflict. The University of Salisbury is integrated and nearly half of its student population is made up of Africans. The majority of Africans and the most enlightened of the Europeans think in terms of establishing a climate of racial harmony. Most Africans, says the report, “accepted a gradual, if not too gradual, process and recognized that the future of the country lay in co-operation between the two races.” On the other hand, continues the report, “many Europeans realized that majority rule had to come”.

60. If we leave aside for a moment the radical minority we see that the great majority of the population is oriented towards the search for sensible and gradual solutions. In this respect the Africans are rather articulate and show a high degree of wisdom and political realism. Their opposition was directed not so much against the proposals as such as against the ruling circles, in which they do not place any confidence—and rightly. They believe that the task of their emancipation should be carried out by the United Kingdom, which should continue to be involved in their future. “Africans in general”, notes the report, “retained a loyalty to the Crown and belief in Britain’s ability to influence events in Rhodesia.” They are well aware of the need for gradualness in the process that should lead to a democratic independent Rhodesia under the guidance of the United Kingdom.

61. The Commission has found out that “immediate majority rule as such did not figure so high in priority”. The ideal which seems to inspire Africans is one of a multiracial society to the progress of which the various groups should contribute their different talents, skills and abilities, so that the inevitable coming of majority rule would in no way hamper the welfare of the entire population. Expressing a pertinent criticism of the electoral arrangements of the proposals, the Africans have enunciated principles that show a remarkable political farsightedness. “There should be a common role”, they said, “or cross voting, so that the Africans could vote for Europeans they respect, and Europeans would have to seek African votes”.

62. In the light of this complex situation, still open to peaceful changes, it becomes even more clear how well inspired and important is the Lusaka Manifesto⁵, which the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Zambia, His Excellency Mr. Mudenda, rightly recalled yesterday. The then Minister for Foreign Affairs of Italy, Mr. Moro, in welcoming the Manifesto had this to say in the General Assembly on 8 October 1969: “. . . we have read with interest the Lusaka Manifesto on Southern Africa which was authoritatively presented by the President of Cameroon and which, we hope, will not go unheard”.⁶

63. We deeply regret that the hand so generously stretched out by the African Governments with this Manifesto has

still not met in southern Africa the response which it deserved and which we will strongly advocate.

64. The Pearce Commission report is not only the first accurate survey of the situation in Rhodesia; it constitutes a political fact of great importance in itself. The conviction of the white minority that its supremacy is legitimate and that its rule is justified and can only secure everybody’s well-being is largely based upon a long-standing impression of political apathy on the part of the African population. The report notes that, as far as the white minority is concerned, “the implication, often precisely stated, was that the African was either politically immature or just not interested in politics; the proposals were beyond his comprehension”.

65. The ruling minority, therefore, although vitally interested in the proposals, did nothing to commend them to the population. The presence and activity of the Commission have shown how mistaken this assessment was and have destroyed the myth of the Africans as docile objects of paternalistic rule. The African population, says the report, was alive with political activity. Nobody in Rhodesia can any longer ignore this fact. The rebel régime can no longer pretend to function as if nothing had happened, as if the situation had remained that of the happy old days when African political aspirations were believed to be non-existent. And this capital fact, produced by the work of the Commission, has implications that go beyond the borders of Rhodesia, since the denial of self-determination in the other remaining colonial territories is based upon and justified on the same mistaken assumption.

66. It is only too understandable that the Africans, and with them all those who wish to see justice triumph in Rhodesia, are determined to exploit the momentum created by recent events to expedite the desired change. What can we do? What can this Organization do to help this process? My delegation believes that discussions among us about ideal schemes for a settlement, about legal definition of principles, or on long resolutions aimed at committing the Power responsible for, but not present in, the Territory to tasks that cannot be carried out—these all are of little or no help, in our view.

67. Moreover, we have a body of resolutions which already provide a vast and comprehensive literature on the matter, a vast and comprehensive documentation. My delegation believes that we should rather direct our action along two paths. The first one is the application of sanctions. It is not an easy path. On the one hand, complexities of international trade are such that implementation of sanctions at 100 per cent is an ideal very difficult to achieve. On the other hand, Rhodesian society is largely based on an agricultural economy. It can offer by its very nature a large margin of resistance to sanctions. What sanctions can do, and in fact are doing, is to prevent the industrialization of that economy. They cannot stifle it quickly. The extension of sanctions, while not increasing their impact, will surely compound the difficulties of their application. In our opinion, if we wish to increase the effectiveness of sanctions, we should bear in mind two points. First, we should concentrate our efforts upon those sectors which are vital to the development of the Rhodesian

⁵ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-fourth Session, Annexes*, agenda item 106, document A/7754.

⁶ *Ibid.*, *Plenary Meetings*, 1783rd meeting, para. 20.

economy, these being the production of minerals, providing Rhodesia with foreign exchange and the sources of energy, particularly oil. Secondly, we should fully realize that the Articles of the Charter under which we are applying the sanctions not only place binding obligations upon Member States but also constitute a framework for co-operation. The various activities of international commerce are so intertwined that the application of sanctions becomes more difficult without the unreserved co-operation of all Member States. Italy for its part has scrupulously applied the sanctions and will continue to do so and to lend full co-operation to the United Nations for the control of the implementation of the relevant resolutions of the Security Council. Any allegations to the contrary are clearly refuted by the records of this Council.

68. The second path we should explore is the action this Organization could best deploy to consolidate and reinforce political unity and determination of the African population and prepare it for gradually assuming its direct responsibilities. The tasks in this direction rest mainly with the United Kingdom, which claims responsibility over the Territory—a responsibility which has been acknowledged once again by all previous speakers. The United Kingdom Government sought, in fact, with farsightedness to accomplish them by also including in the proposals a wide programme for the improvement of the education of the African population. Projects along these lines or aiming at assisting the democratic forces of the country, the African movements, the groups of European liberals etc., should still be considered, in our view, by the administering Power, possibly with the help of appropriate organs of the United Nations.

69. We are convinced that the Rhodesian situation does not require any other lengthy resolutions, as I have said before, to be added to the many we have already adopted. It requires, rather, patient, persistent action that will foster and accelerate the determined efforts of the people of Rhodesia on their way towards nationhood and independence, a historic process that will be fashioned mainly by the peoples themselves.

70. It is with those considerations in mind that my delegation will determine its stand on the proposals that will be submitted to the Council.

71. The PRESIDENT (*translation from Chinese*): I wish to thank the representative of Italy for the friendly words he has addressed to the Government and people of China.

72. I have just received a letter from the representative of Saudi Arabia, in which he asked to be allowed to participate in this debate. Since I hear no objections, I take it that the Council agrees to invite the representatives of Saudi Arabia, in accordance with the provisional rules of procedure and the practice of the Council, to participate in our present discussion without the right to vote.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. J. Baroody (Saudi Arabia) took a place at the Council table.

73. The PRESIDENT (*translation from Chinese*): I call on the representative of Saudi Arabia.

74. Mr. BAROODY (Saudi Arabia): Mr. President, it is an honour for me to extend to you my warm congratulations on your presiding over the Security Council, not merely because you hail from the largest country in the world, but more because you represent one of the oldest world civilizations. Chinese culture flourished through thousands of years without losing its essential values, values that continue to enchant the learned with China's moral codes, its art and its literature, and no less its rejuvenated dynamism.

75. The question of Rhodesia has been with us for many, many years, whether in the Fourth Committee of the General Assembly or in the Security Council, with practically no results emanating from our quite often repetitious debates. The question remains whether Southern Rhodesia may still be deemed to be a British colony. The majority of the Members of the United Nations still consider Southern Rhodesia a British colony. In consequence, this makes the United Kingdom technically responsible for its administration. I say "technically" because the United Kingdom has not renounced its responsibility. On the contrary, every now and then the United Kingdom Government sends emissaries to try to find a solution. Emissaries are sent to Mr. Ian Smith, whom all here regard as a rebel—against the United Nations, and, to begin with, against the British.

76. What has the United Kingdom done, whenever this subject has been brought up for discussion, but try to submit all kinds of so-called projects to delay the adoption by the United Nations of drastic measures to contain Mr. Ian Smith and his cohorts in Southern Rhodesia?

77. I should like to ask my good colleague from the United Kingdom whether his Government would have acted in the same manner if Ian Smith had a dark skin. He might tell me that things have changed, that we are living in the era of the United Nations and the United Nations should avoid violence. Of course he would not tell me—and he would have to be excused for that—that regardless of what party happens to be in power in London, the British Government does not dare chastise the rebellious Ian Smith and his clique, for the simple reason that the Government would fall. There are many Powells who are not articulate in the United Kingdom. They would rebel against their Government rather than chastise the whites in Southern Rhodesia. Therefore let us not expect that the United Kingdom will take any drastic measures to punish the rebel and his clique.

78. What is the alternative? We who elaborated the principle of self-determination into a full-fledged right in the Universal Declaration on Human Rights and in the many resolutions of the United Nations, should we just give up and consider self-determination, whether in the Declaration or as reaffirmed in our resolutions, to be an academic matter? Or is there some idea, which derives from the actual facts and philosophy, bolstered by freedom of expression, that if the Africans, and those supporting them on the grounds that self-determination should be respected, just get things off their chests and make speeches, that may give them the satisfaction of having said their say? Then, when we know what is going on in their minds, another meeting of the Security Council can be scheduled and other

meetings in the Fourth Committee can be devoted to this question, *ad infinitum* and without any results whatsoever.

79. At one time our African colleagues thought that they could invoke the super-Powers, or the big Powers, or the Powers which exercise a good measure of power regardless of their size, to intervene on the basis of justice and equity. I took that line of action about 10 years ago, and I found out that the major Powers were not ready to have a confrontation with one another about injustices, whether in Africa or the Middle East or any other part of the world. They thought of the era after Mr. Khrushchev came on the scene as the era of détente—to the detriment of those fighting for their liberation.

80. Therefore, what shall we do? Shall we meet again and again and again, with no results emanating from our deliberations?

81. I asked the Secretariat to furnish me with the verbatim records on this question for this year—leave aside previous years—and I find that we spoke on this very same question in the Security Council on Wednesday, 16 February 1972 [1640th meeting] and also on Friday, 25 February 1972 [1642nd meeting]. And I warned the Council, you may recall Sir, that much as sanctions may be desirable, those who may vote for those sanctions will not observe them. I cited how chrome, last year and early in this year 1972, was being shipped and commingled with chrome from another country. I do not want to name that other country lest I exacerbate matters by having someone say: “Here Baroody is trying to fish in troubled waters”. Far be it from me to do that, but with their knowledge the chrome from Southern Rhodesia was commingled and sold by brokers to whomever needed it. And we only know what the United States Congress did. It just decided that chrome could be imported from Southern Rhodesia—which proves that economics is much stronger than politics.

82. With your permission, Sir, I shall quote a few excerpts from what I said earlier this year in my statement on 16 February. I said in part:

“Again, in spite of the fact that I said that all I had mentioned on this question of Southern Rhodesia is on the record, I must say that neither the Africans, nor the Asians, if they were to ally themselves with the Africans, are in a position to fight and dislodge those whites [of southern Africa].” [1640th meeting, para. 77.]

83. And then I continued:

“As a result of my personal experience I have stated to the Security Council time and again that we should put aside any literature on the question of sanctions, that sanctions will not work. Economics is stronger than politics. And in the world politics revolve around economics. My good friend Ambassador Malik once said that this is the Marxist theory. I am not a Marxist, but I say to the Security Council that it is the same thing; we come to the same conclusions.” [Ibid., para. 78.]

84. Then let us assume that this afternoon we vote again on sanctions against Southern Rhodesia. And I quote once

more at the risk of being repetitious, from what I said on 16 February of this year:

“I should like to remind the Council that the Government of the United Kingdom, after 10 years of negotiation, recently agreed to join the Common Market which is a conglomeration of Western States. And those Western States have common interests, not only common economic interests, but also common military interests and alliances. Whether they should or should not have alliances is beside the point, but we have to face the facts. *En passant*, Portugal, too, is a member of the alliance called NATO. The Western countries, because of the community of interests are not going to turn their backs on the United Kingdom, or on Portugal for that matter, and do what the blacks in Southern Rhodesia would want them to do. This is the truth, but we either do not have the courage to say it or we clothe it in diplomatic language and embellishments. Therefore, I submit, sanctions will not work.” [Ibid., para. 80.]

85. I do not want my African brothers to think that I am against sanctions; I am only saying, from my humble experience, that the one who would laugh up his sleeve would be Ian Smith. He would still sell his tobacco. The more tobacco is aged, the higher price it brings. So it does not matter sometimes if the tobacco piles up in Rhodesia. It can be sold for a better price. And the chrome will still appear in the ornamentation of cars of many makes—I am not going to say which makes.

86. Then what shall we do? There are two ways open to this Council if it means business. The first is to persuade the United Kingdom to follow a course which stems from a suggestion it made early this year, and I shall come later to the second. Of course, resolutions on sanctions should still be adopted as a reaffirmation of the position of our African brothers.

87. We know how strikes paralyse not only corporations but also States as such. At one time our colleague from the United Kingdom mentioned that his Government was willing to contribute £5 million annually for the social and educational development of the blacks in Southern Rhodesia. That is like treating a fever with watermelon poultices instead of using something radical. Fever comes from inside, and that £5 million would be like applying a poultice of watermelon rind to the skin; it does nothing for the insides. But that £5 million could be put in a United Nations fund and used, through churches—many of which in Southern Rhodesia happen to be on the side of the blacks—for humanitarian purposes or for practical purposes, since we know that in 10 or 15 years the ratio of the whites to the blacks will be 1 to 20. So I think that in order to save their skins, men of religion or of politics would be wise to think of the future. We would ask the wealthy countries also to contribute generously to that fund and send word, not only by messengers but also by United Nations broadcasts, to those who mine the chrome and grow the tobacco to go on strike. Unless they perished from famine the fund would pay. We would begin with the £5 million from the United Kingdom. That is how they could bring Ian Smith to reason—because if his economy totters he has to compromise. But we can talk our heads off from now till

doomsday about sanctions and nothing will happen so long as the whites have power—and not local power, but power to bolster them.

88. Although the members of the European Economic Community may quarrel among themselves for propaganda purposes, and although they may say—and there are sincere people among them—that it is not fair that the blacks should be suppressed, the fact is that they will see to it that chrome and tobacco and other Rhodesian products are exported to them and others. For after all they need the chrome and tobacco and they are produced in Southern Rhodesia with cheaper labour than in other areas of the world. It is a question of price; it is not a question of the availability of chrome. I think Canada has chrome; the Soviet Union has chrome; many other areas have chrome. The price is important.

89. This is a drastic measure that I mentioned last year and nobody acted upon it. I repeat it because sometimes there is benefit in repetition and I hope that the United Kingdom will consider that course. The United Kingdom is conservative, but I think it has shown a lot of political sagacity throughout its history. When it found itself cornered by its own rebels it had to resort to drastic measures.

90. There is a second avenue which we can explore and which I have mentioned in previous statements. It is persuasion, with a little moral pressure; it is to try and prevail on Mr. Ian Smith and his clique that it is not in their interest as whites in the African continent to make their position untenable—if not for them during their lifetime, then for their children and grandchildren.

91. The blacks are proliferating very quickly. They do not understand about ecology; those people have been left in ignorance of what goes on in the world. The only thing they can do for entertainment is copulate and procreate. One cannot blame them; they have no movies or other entertainment. The instinct of sex is there and I can assure representatives that, with geometrical progression, in about 20 years there will be possibly 10 times more blacks than whites in Southern Rhodesia.

92. So if Mr. Ian Smith and his cohorts feel secure at least for five or 10 years, what will the picture be 15 or 20 years hence? We know how swiftly time flies. He should therefore be prevailed upon to accept municipal rule—because, after all, I believe there is segregation between the whites and the blacks. We will not go into racial discrimination; it is a long subject and it is being discussed in many United Nations organs. But give the blacks municipal rule or the rule which obtains in cantons; we have models of that—in Switzerland the cantons are a sort of federation.

93. For the time being, that is what I have to say about the second avenue to find a way out of the predicament.

94. The first is a radical one; it needs courage and generosity. I refer to the method of fomenting strikes and paralysing the economy, with the proviso that there be a United Nations fund, to which the United Kingdom would contribute £5 million, as it had said it would for another

purpose. I believe that Ambassador Phillips or Ambassador Bush—they are such persuasive gentlemen—could prevail on the United States Government to see that Congress also made an appropriation. Then I think we do not have to have long strikes. Mr. Smith will know that the big Powers mean business. I do not know how many roubles the Soviet Union would want to contribute, but instead of oratory and words and things like that—well, there are too many words and very little action. I will try and tell our Government to do its little share. If there is good will, there will be a way.

95. Summing up, the second method would be to prevail on Mr. Ian Smith and his régime without undue delay to consider giving the blacks municipal rule, autonomous cantons, with the hope that if they see their interest lies with the whites, because of the know-how and the future, then, when racial discrimination fades out, as we all hope it will in two or three decades, I believe the Africans will be satisfied because their dignity will have been preserved and at least we can see a little hope on the horizon that things may turn out as they should be.

96. Mr. FARAH (Somalia): Since it is important that Council members understand the purposes behind the two draft resolutions, so as to enable consultations to take place this afternoon, I should like at this stage to introduce them.

97. The two draft resolutions which my delegation has the privilege to introduce on behalf of Guinea and the Sudan and on its own behalf address themselves to the political and sanctions aspect of the Southern Rhodesian question. The draft resolutions, contained in documents S/10804 and S/10805, are efforts once again to get this Council to commit itself to firm lines of political and coercive action in keeping with its responsibilities in this matter. I do not think that there is any question which has come before the Council where the issues are as clear-cut as they are in the case of Southern Rhodesia. At the request of the administering Power, this Council is committed to end a racial régime whose aim is to keep the black majority of Southern Rhodesia in subjection. If we can do this, we shall have prevented the full development of another *apartheid*-type society and obviously it is better to prevent such a development while there is still a possibility of doing so rather than to try to deal with it after it has become entrenched in the society.

98. Our second responsibility is to help to bring about the conditions under which the Territory can achieve independence on the basis of the political and social equality of all its people.

99. It is not the intention of my delegation to go back into the history of this question or to analyse its implications in any great detail. During the previous two meetings, and once again today, we have had many distinguished speakers who have covered the subject thoroughly and eloquently. I merely want to explain the purposes of the two draft resolutions.

100. The draft resolution contained in document S/10805 is based on principles and goals whose validity cannot be questioned. They are rooted in the Charter and have been

unanimously approved or adopted by overwhelming majorities in the past by resolutions of the General Assembly and of the Security Council. The draft resolution expresses, too, the firm consensus of the recent Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity which took place in June at Rabat. Operative paragraphs 1 and 2 of that draft resolution go immediately to the heart of the matter. The political leaders of the African majority of Zimbabwe hold as a cardinal principle that there should be no independence before majority rule, and they are supported in this principle—indeed, in this right—by the total membership of the Organization of African Unity, by the non-aligned group of States and by the overwhelming majority of the General Assembly. If it were possible for the detained authentic leaders of Zimbabwe to be present here today—leaders like Joshua Nkomo, who has been detained since 1964, or Joseph Msika, Bishop Muzorewa, the Reverend Banana, Mr. Josiah Chinamano and his wife, who have been detained since January 1972, and Mr. Garfield Todd, who has been detained under house arrest since January 1972, if those leaders of the majority opinion in Rhodesia were here today—they would themselves have asked and demanded that this Council endorse the principle, the right, that there should be no independence in that Territory before majority rule is attained.

101. Surely, the United Nations cannot in good conscience agree to any settlement which would allow the minority group to legalize its existence and to remove itself completely from the authority of the administering Power while there is no firm safeguard for the rights of the African majority. Those rights cannot be assured unless the majority is able to exercise immediately the power which is its due.

102. One hears a lot about realism, but what is real in a territory where the minority ruling group is outnumbered 20 to 1? What realism is there when we hear—indeed, the total membership of the United Nations has accepted the fact—that the will of the people of a country must prevail, must be paramount. There can be no compromise on that. Following the unsuccessful attempt by the United Kingdom to arrive at a settlement with the rebel régime and the clear rejection of that settlement by the African majority, the question arises what is to be done now. It is surely not the intention of the administering Power, and it cannot be the policy of the United Nations, to drop the matter or put it in limbo—to say that nothing further can be done and to leave the people of Zimbabwe to their own fate, while the rebel régime receives assistance, military, economic and political, to enable it to retain its iron grip over the population.

103. So we must ask ourselves, what new initiative can be taken and what must be the basis for any new initiative? Clearly the failure to have African political leaders—and by that I mean the authentic leaders—participate in the recent attempt by the United Kingdom to negotiate a settlement ensured a rejection of that settlement. The whole idea was killed at the time it was born. A new course of action must be entered upon and it must have as its basis a process of democratic consultation with representatives of all the people.

104. Operative paragraph 4 follows naturally on operative paragraph 3. The United Nations has already made specific commitments with regard to the establishment of normal political conditions and the establishment of conditions for the free expression of the will of the people. The provisions of operative paragraph 4 repeat provisions already approved by the Council in its resolution 202 (1965).

105. Operative paragraph 5 asks the administering Power to accord to all the people of the Territory the same democratic privileges and rights as those on the basis of which the overwhelming majority of colonial territories were brought to independence. Universal adult suffrage, the secret ballot, the principle of “one-man, one-vote”—these are universally accepted norms of political development. I challenge today any Member State here to say in good conscience that these same political rights and principles should be denied to the people of Zimbabwe.

106. Finally, I should like to make a few introductory remarks on the draft resolution contained in document S/10804. It has always been the African view—and this has been stated repeatedly in the past two meetings and again this morning by representatives of Africa—that the sanctions alone would not be sufficient to bring about a speedy end to the rebellion in Southern Rhodesia, no matter how sincerely and how thoroughly they were applied. However, it is recognized, as the Rabat resolution clearly indicates, that sanctions constitute an important measure that must be maintained with all vigour and determination so that the illegal régime will be forced to struggle for economic survival. Above all, the continuation of sanctions would ensure the international isolation of the illegal régime and deny it recognition.

107. If, as my delegation has pointed out on another occasion in this Council, sanctions were to be partially or wholly lifted, or if this Council were to endorse, to condone, or to remain silent on violations of sanctions, then a dangerous situation would no doubt develop which would destroy all that this Council has attempted and is committed to achieve. This danger was recognized by the Rabat Assembly when the member States decided to give full support and co-operation to the United Nations in all measures designed to enforce sanctions. At the same time, it also expressed grave concern about the undesirable consequences that could arise from the refusal by Member States to co-operate fully in the observance and implementation of sanctions.

108. To the Rabat Assembly the issues at stake went beyond the question of demanding compliance and condemning violations. To that Assembly the issue was to ensure that Member States of the United Nations honour their Charter obligations and respect scrupulously the decisions and authority of this Council. Consequently, the Rabat Assembly endorsed a proposal made by the three African members of the Security Council at an earlier meeting of the Council that the time and circumstances were now appropriate for the Council to consider what measures might be taken in respect of those States—and we have in mind South Africa and Portugal—which have openly, defiantly and persistently refused to implement

sanctions against the illegal régime, and which have provided that régime with the facilities, the means and the assistance by which it has been able to survive.

109. In an international sanctions operation, such as the one that has been launched against the illegal régime, it is essential that the machinery for supervising and implementing sanctions be efficient and commensurate with the task and that there be regular and frequent meetings of the Security Council committee on Southern Rhodesia to study and report on all proposals offered by Member States for improving the effectiveness of sanctions. In the course of this series of meetings the Council has received many valuable proposals. In the view of the African sponsors of this draft resolution, these proposals, together with those offered by recognized governmental and non-governmental organizations concerned with the Southern Rhodesian question, should be studied without delay by the Committee and the results reported back to the Council within a reasonable period of time, but no longer than two months.

110. There is abundant evidence to show that many States are not complying with the resolution on sanctions. Those States deny any charges that are made against them yet their goods are being sold openly and in increasing quantities within Southern Rhodesia.

111. Unfortunately it has not been possible to obtain from many States, that are in a special position to give it, the co-operation which it is their duty to offer in this matter. States, for example, which have consular, diplomatic and trade representation in South Africa and in Mozambique—the two territories through which the bulk of Southern Rhodesian import and export trade passes—do not use this vantage point in order to co-operate with the United Nations and to report suspected cases of violation of sanctions.

112. In the two years that my delegation has been on the Security Council and has worked closely with the committee on sanctions, it has not seen any country—apart from the United Kingdom—that has close trade relations with or representation in South Africa and Southern Rhodesia, or the Portuguese-dominated territories of Mozambique and Angola, which has ever provided the Council or its committee with any information on which the Council could proceed.

113. We hear a lot of expressions of sympathy. We hear a great many expressions of surprise that violations can continue with such great impunity, but many of the States are themselves actively involved. Indeed, it was the United States delegation in this Council which stated—and of course we should like to receive evidence to this effect—that no fewer than eight States represented around this Council table had trade relations, if not overtly then at least covertly, with Southern Rhodesia. Of course, when an accusation of these dimensions is launched in the Council one would have hoped that the charge would have been backed by some kind of evidence to enable the committee on sanctions to proceed with its investigations. I trust that in the course of this debate we will receive information from the United States to back that very serious charge. The United States is certainly in a position, like many other

States represented at this table, because of its superior economic and commercial intelligence, to provide the Security Council with a great deal of information about suspected or known cases of violation.

114. If it were not for the information which the United Kingdom has continued to bring to the attention of the committee on Southern Rhodesia regarding suspected violations, the committee would have had little or no information on which to operate. Our problem is to devise better methods and to secure commitments—firm commitments—of increased co-operation from all States if sanctions are to be successfully implemented.

115. Much has been said about the importation of the chrome ore and nickel and other minerals which the United States continues to purchase from Southern Rhodesia in contravention of the Charter and of Security Council resolution 253 (1968). Admittedly, the total imports amount to no more than 2 per cent of the total illegal trade that is being conducted with the Smith régime; but in this case the violations assume a far greater significance because they have been carried out openly with the full official sanction of the United States Government, and because of the position which the United States holds in this Organization and in the world at large.

116. In this Organization we are all governed by the same Charter, by the same set of international laws. Whether this is accepted or not, we are all equals—equals in so far as both our rights and our obligations as Member States are concerned.

117. As was pointed out by the Foreign Minister of the Sudan in his address at the previous meeting, many prominent senators and diplomats have testified before the United States Congress that the chrome importations not only are illegal in the context of international law but also are unnecessary and unjustified since the United States has large stockpiles of chrome and in any case is able to obtain additional supplies from sources other than Southern Rhodesia. There is, then, no excuse for this action. If the United States can escape with the argument that the minerals of Southern Rhodesia are essential for its strategic and economic needs, then any other State can make the same excuse about its requirements in minerals, or even tobacco, from Southern Rhodesia: We can admit no exceptions to this rule. Small countries or big countries, they are all governed by the same set of laws. The rule of law must apply equally to all States. In this matter the United States is in clear and serious contravention of its Charter obligations so long as it continues to import minerals and any other commodities from Southern Rhodesia in defiance and in contravention of Security Council resolution 253 (1968).

118. We trust that the United States, which has in the past always stated that it would firmly observe its commitments in this respect, will review its position and remedy it.

119. The proposals of the two draft resolutions are, in view of the sponsors, eminently reasonable. The United Nations cannot do less than has been proposed in them and

remain true to its obligations. The sponsors trust that the draft resolutions will receive the unanimous support of this august body.

120. Before concluding I should like to say that now that the draft resolutions have been submitted and the Council is officially seized of them the sponsors would be happy to hear any views of delegations around this table on their content, in the hope that we can elaborate further on some points in the resolutions, or perhaps take account of some of the reactions which delegations might have in the light of the explanations I have offered.

121. The PRESIDENT (*translation from Chinese*): I think all members of the Council have taken note of the two draft resolutions submitted by Guinea, Somalia and the Sudan. At the same time we have all taken note of the explanations concerning those two draft resolutions made by the representative of Somalia on behalf of the sponsors. The representative of Somalia also hopes that any representative who has any views on the draft resolutions will bring them to his attention as early as possible.

The meeting rose at 1.40 p.m.

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