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TWENTY-SEVENTH YEAR

**1664<sup>th</sup>** MEETING: 28 SEPTEMBER 1972

NEW YORK

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## NOTE

Symbols of United Nations documents are composed of capital letters combined with figures. Mention of such a symbol indicates a reference to a United Nations document.

Documents of the Security Council (symbol S/. . .) are normally published in quarterly *Supplements of the Official Records of the Security Council*. The date of the document indicates the supplement in which it appears or in which information about it is given.

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## SIXTEEN HUNDRED AND SIXTY-FOURTH MEETING

Held in New York on Thursday, 28 September 1972, at 3 p.m.

*President:* Mr. HUANG Hua (China).

*Present:* The representatives of the following States: Argentina, Belgium, China, France, Guinea, India, Italy, Japan, Panama, Somalia, Sudan, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America and Yugoslavia.

### Provisional agenda (S/Agenda/1664)

1. Adoption of the agenda.
2. Question concerning the situation in Southern Rhodesia:  
Letter dated 20 September 1972 from the representatives of Guinea, Somalia and the Sudan addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/10798).

*The meeting was called to order at 3.40 p.m.*

### Adoption of the agenda

*The agenda was adopted.*

#### Question concerning the situation in Southern Rhodesia:

**Letter dated 20 September 1972 from the representatives of Guinea, Somalia and the Sudan addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/10798)**

1. The PRESIDENT (*translation from Chinese*): In accordance with the decisions taken yesterday, I propose now, with the consent of the Council, to invite the representatives of Algeria, Senegal, Morocco, Zambia, Mauritania, Guyana and Kenya to take the places reserved for them at the side of the Council Chamber, in order to participate without vote in the discussion. They will be invited to take places at the Council table when it is their turn to speak.

*At the invitation of the President, Mr. A. Rahal (Algeria), Mr. C. Diouf (Senegal), Mr. M. Zentar (Morocco), Mr. E. Mudenda (Zambia), Mr. A. Ould Meneya (Mauritania), Mr. S. Ramphal (Guyana) and Mr. N. Mungai (Kenya) took the places reserved for them in the Council Chamber.*

2. The PRESIDENT (*translation from Chinese*): I have just received a letter dated 28 September from the representatives of Tunisia and Nigeria, in which they ask to be allowed to participate in the discussion of the question before the Council, under the terms of Article 31 of the Charter. As I hear no objection, I shall, in accordance with the provisional rules of procedure and the usual practice, invite the representatives of Tunisia and Nigeria to take the

places reserved for them at the side of the Council Chamber, on the understanding that they will be called to the Council table when it is their turn to speak.

*At the invitation of the President, Mr. R. Driss (Tunisia) and Mr. O. Arikpo (Nigeria) took the places reserved for them in the Council Chamber.*

3. The PRESIDENT (*translation from Chinese*): The Security Council will now continue its discussion of the question before it. The first name inscribed on the list of speakers for this afternoon's meeting is that of the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Kenya. I now invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

4. Mr. MUNGAI (Kenya): I wish to express the gratitude of the Kenya Government for being allowed to speak on the question of Zimbabwe. Since the series of meetings of the Security Council which were held in Addis Ababa specifically on the question of Africa, the situation in Zimbabwe has deteriorated gravely. That is why it is most appropriate that the Security Council should once again be seized of this extremely important question.

5. The rebel régime of Smith continues to be sustained by the vested interests of foreign Powers. The Africans are the prime sufferers in this process. Their efforts to achieve self-determination have been snuffed out. Unprecedented repression of millions of Africans by a minority racist régime promises a racial conflagration of unknown dimensions. This is bound to present real threats to international peace and security.

6. A land of 5 million Africans and a quarter of a million imported settlers and immigrants has been converted into a white, unrepresentative, racist, rebel stronghold. However, for purposes of securing a just settlement acceptable to the Rhodesians as a whole, all these people should be treated as Rhodesians, irrespective of their colour, race, creed or country of origin.

7. Decisive action on the part of Britain in the early stages could have arrested the unilateral declaration of independence by Smith and the subsequent consolidation of his authority. Later series of negotiations between Britain and the rebel clique proved fruitless. The latest independence settlement terms worked out by Sir Alec Douglas-Home and Smith<sup>1</sup> were categorically rejected by the overwhelming majority of Rhodesians of varying shades and beliefs.

<sup>1</sup> See *Official Records of the Security Council, Twenty-sixth Year, Supplement for October, November and December 1971*, document S/10405.

8. In recording this rejection, the Pearce Commission did a thorough and admirable job. The British Government should be credited with publicly accepting the recommendations of the Commission.<sup>2</sup> However, all having been said and done to arrive at a solution without any degree of success, we are back to square one on the Rhodesian crisis. A new solution is imperative.

9. Since the last Security Council meeting on Rhodesia, new Draconian legislation has been enacted by the Smith régime. It legalizes the most bizarre forms of intimidation, molestation, and extermination of African leadership and African aspirations to independence. Its provisions are applied with ruthless terror, particularly with regard to the African National Council, so ably led by Bishop Abel Muzorewa. Bishop Muzorewa is a Christian who believes in and practises principles of Christianity and democratic process without regard to any racial or religious considerations. He represents the articulate voice of the African conscience and is a type of leader needed in Africa today.

10. All the assets of the African National Council have been seized and its activities declared illegal. Followers and sympathizers of this movement have been fined, victimized and incarcerated in gaols which are packed like tins of sardines with political prisoners. Even those who paid very small subscriptions to the African National Council have been molested.

11. Those who manifested the slightest and most indirect opposition to the Salisbury Agreement are systematically harassed and detained. The entire leadership of the African National Council has been prevented from functioning, largely through arrests. Very few have managed to escape from the clutches of Smith's dictatorship and police terror. Their property has been confiscated and their relatives treated in a punitive and vindictive way in accordance with arbitrary laws and discretionary powers.

12. With regard to the liberation movements of Zimbabwe, like ZANU (Zimbabwe African National Union), ZAPU (Zimbabwe African Peoples Union) and FROLIZI (Front for the Liberation of Zimbabwe), military operations aimed at the physical extermination of those movements have been stepped up. In this exercise the South African racists and the Portuguese colonialists are willing collaborators. This has led very often to direct acts of aggression against free African States bordering Zimbabwe. Zambia has, time and again, borne the brunt of aggressive assaults against its territorial integrity. However, the gallant struggle of the liberation movements continues; the adamant resistance of the Zambians and the Tanzanians to such aggression continues unabated and undeterred.

13. We are pledged to give the victims of aggression every form of support. We shall do so through the Organization of African Unity and even directly when necessary. Kenya's efforts in this regard shall never be found wanting.

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<sup>2</sup> See *Rhodesia: Report of the Commission on Rhodesian Opinion under the Chairmanship of the Right Honourable the Lord Pearce*, Cmnd. 4964 (London, Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1972).

14. On the military front, Smith has vastly increased military expenditure—from about £11 million in 1965 to £17 million in 1971. Police expenditure has increased from £8 million to £9.5 million over the same period. The Rhodesian armed forces have been reinforced by South African paramilitary units estimated to number from 3,000 to 5,000 men. Security chiefs from Portugal, South Africa and Rhodesia have met several times to forge closer links between these countries to annihilate the resistance movements. Rhodesia is reported to have received from South Africa vast numbers of tanks, armoured cars, helicopters and aircraft. Supplies of military hardware are received from external sources by South Africa, particularly from some members of the Security Council whose representatives are sitting here now, and have reportedly been diverted to bolster the military position of the racist rebel régime in Rhodesia.

15. On the economic front Rhodesian trade, which had previously been adversely hit by sanctions, seems to be making a remarkable recovery. Rhodesia does not now suffer from an acute breakdown and equipment shortages in the transportation, agricultural and engineering sectors. Nor does it seem to be experiencing currency and capital shortfalls.

16. The above-mentioned results have been achieved through direct trade with South Africa and Portugal and indirect trade, mainly in tobacco and minerals, with certain Western European and other Western countries.

17. The United States has imported over 50,000 tons of Rhodesian chrome, thereby openly contravening the sanctions for which it voted affirmatively in this very Council and greatly improving the foreign exchange standing of the Smith régime. The United States Senate, in authorizing the importation of chrome, has capitulated to the lobbying pressures of Union Carbide and Foote Mineral, two giant United States corporations with extensive mining interests in Rhodesia.

18. The new United States policy defies comprehension, particularly considered against authoritative reports that the United States currently holds strategic stockpiles that stand in excess of its requirements in the foreseeable future. In any case, it could have drawn its supplies from the extensively developed sources in other countries that are non-controversial. We believe that Member States of the United Nations would have gladly supplied chrome to the United States, obviating the need for it to turn to Rhodesia in open violation of the sanctions scheme of the Security Council and the United Nations.

19. United States purchase of chrome can be seen as endorsement of the Smith régime. It will encourage the rebels to refuse concessions towards majority rule. International pressures against Salisbury have been immensely weakened. The enforcement of sanctions has been rendered ineffective. Smith can laugh to his heart's content when Britain moves sanctions against Rhodesia in the face of United States defiance.

20. Purchase of chrome should not be equated with human liberty; chrome should not be traded with human

suffering and oppression. After all, economic profitability should be subjected to some considerations of international morality and voluntarily accepted legal obligations under Security Council resolution 253 (1968) which imposed sanctions on Rhodesia.

21. The Kenya Government strongly appeals to the United States to reimpose an embargo on chrome and other Rhodesian products while minority rule continues in Rhodesia. It should pledge assistance to the United Nations in enforcing the embargo and support the African struggle for the attainment of majority rule.

22. In promoting the African advance to majority rule in Rhodesia, the exploited and enslaved people of that unhappy land and the rest of the world justifiably demand action from the Security Council. This Council must ensure the implementation of the following objectives.

23. First, international peace and security should be preserved. The existing situation is explosive in the extreme. The frustrations of the Africans and the Hitlerite measures on the part of Smith could result in the eruption of violence that would be difficult to control and would have far-reaching repercussions on race relations throughout the world, particularly in southern Africa, the cradle of racism and oppression.

24. Secondly, the political independence and territorial integrity of the free African States should be preserved. The existing situation and numerous acts of armed aggression against Zambia and the United Republic of Tanzania imperil their sovereignty. The Security Council must act effectively to remove those threats.

25. Thirdly, the *apartheid* front of South Africa, Portugal and Rhodesia should be dismantled. Unless this widened *apartheid* front is destroyed Africans will be doomed to slavery in perpetuity. The vast resources of these lands will be used to consolidate the supremacist régimes at the expense of the helpless, innocent Africans.

26. Fourthly, supplies of military hardware to all the unrepresentative régimes of southern Africa should be terminated. The Security Council should act to cut off supplies of military hardware to the racist régimes of southern Africa because these enable them to entrench their positions and to use them for internal repression and external aggression. Britain and France bear a special international responsibility in this regard. We do not concede that any considerations justify the policy of sales of arms to those régimes, be they considerations of security or of an economic or a legal nature.

27. Fifthly, assistance to African liberation movements should be increased. The Security Council should render every form of assistance to the African liberation movements which are struggling for the restoration of African freedom and independence.

28. In this context, it should be observed that the United Nations is under an obligation to promote self-determination in colonially dominated territories. That has been

affirmed time and again by numerous resolutions of the General Assembly and decisions of the Security Council pursuant to the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations. Those commitments should be translated into concrete reality.

29. The Kenya Government specifically recommends that the following steps should be taken by the Security Council to promote independence in Rhodesia.

30. A national independence constitutional conference of all the interested parties should be convened under the aegis of the United Nations. Its fundamental purpose would be to accelerate the advance to African majority rule in Zimbabwe.

31. The scheme of sanctions should be strengthened and effectively applied, particularly to the ports of Beira and Lourenço Marques. Those countries which traffic in Rhodesian tobacco and minerals through the back door should be identified and exposed. Thereafter, every Member State of the United Nations should be free to take appropriate retaliatory action against the offending State or States.

32. The Security Council should work out a scheme of confiscation of Rhodesian exports at the place of entry into the importing country.

33. The Security Council should recommend to States the refusal of landing rights to national airlines which land at Salisbury and whose Governments permit Rhodesian planes to land in their countries.

34. All communications—postal, telegraphic and other—should be cut off.

35. Ways and means should be found to secure the expulsion of South African military units and police contingents from Rhodesia.

36. All States bordering Rhodesia which fear aggression from Rhodesia, South Africa and Portugal should be given enforceable guarantees of protection by the Security Council.

37. All political prisoners now in detention should be released. No settlement can be just, or durable, or workable which excludes their participation in shaping the destiny of their country.

38. In conclusion, my Government is convinced that if the Security Council takes the bold and decisive measures I have outlined true independence for the people of Zimbabwe under a representative order cannot long be delayed or denied. We shall watch with keen interest how this responsibility is discharged by the Council in the interests of world peace, justice and international understanding.

39. Mr. MOJSOV (Yugoslavia): Mr. President, since on a previous occasion, in my absence, the Yugoslav delegation availed itself of the very welcome opportunity to greet you,

the representative of the People's Republic of China, for the first time in your capacity as President of the Security Council and to express our readiness to co-operate fully with you, I shall, while associating myself with those sentiments, refrain from repeating them now. May I only add that recently, while sojourning in Peking, the capital of your great country, I had the privilege of benefiting from the most courteous reception by and interesting talks with high officials of your Government. I was very appreciative of that indeed.

40. My delegation is gratified that the Security Council is considering the Southern Rhodesian question again at this time. There are two reasons for this. First, the presence and participation of distinguished Foreign Ministers of African States is in itself a major contribution to the scope, weight and great significance of the consideration of the issue in question and the attention we are giving to it. Secondly, it is already some time since we have had a broad, over-all examination of political and other developments in and around Southern Rhodesia and it is high time to do so as, since our Addis Ababa meetings, we have dealt mainly with the sanctions issue in a more specific manner. The Council decided long ago to be seized continuously of the Southern Rhodesian question and we were quite right in our perseverance to demonstrate our constant alertness and readiness to do this. It was at the Council's meeting of 28 July [1654th meeting] that my delegation stressed our understanding that we should consider soon—and not later than September of this year—the political context of the Southern Rhodesian situation, especially after the report of the Pearce Commission.

41. The last time we considered the Southern Rhodesian situation exhaustively was in Addis Ababa and since then several highly important, indeed some fateful, developments have taken place. First, the people of Zimbabwe have resolutely rejected the so-called proposals for settlement and have continued their relentless struggle. Secondly, the illegal Smith régime continues unabated by the oppression of the people of Zimbabwe and intensifies its policy of racial discrimination. Thirdly, the Government of the United Kingdom, in issuing the report of the Pearce Commission to that effect, acknowledged and let it be known that it too considered that the situation had reverted to the *status quo ante*, which meant that obligations and commitments, including those regarding sanctions, remained intact. Fourthly, the Security Council, prompted by continuous, even open and admitted, violations of sanctions, met on two occasions, in February and July this year, and categorically requested all States, and especially those which persist in such violations, to honour their solemn commitments under the Charter. It adopted the special report of its Committee on Southern Rhodesia<sup>3</sup> and tightened measures for combating and preventing the violation of sanctions. Fifthly, in June at Rabat the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity adopted a strong resolution about Zimbabwe which, with all the other decisions, gave proof of still stronger unity and singleness of purpose on the part of the Organization of African Unity. The

<sup>3</sup> Official Records of the Security Council, Twenty-seventh Year, Supplement for April, May and June 1972, document S/10632.

Conference of Foreign Ministers of Non-Aligned Countries meeting at Georgetown in August firmly supported the Rabat resolution and, *inter alia*, called for the strictest measures for the implementation of sanctions. Sixthly, the so-called Southern Rhodesian team representing the illegal Ian Smith régime was prevented by the International Olympic Committee from participating in the Twentieth Olympiad as a result of the public outcry, the firm position of African States and the recommendations of several United Nations bodies.

42. What are we to make of these and related developments? What general and practical conclusions are we to draw from them? And, in the light of those developments, what are we to do, what is our duty, the duty of the Security Council and the Member States?

43. If we are to find a general thread linking all these developments, then, we submit, the essential elements are as follows.

44. The people of Zimbabwe not only are conscious of their rights but are prepared to struggle until they achieve, they win, them; and they are not prepared to accept anything less.

45. The illegal Ian Smith régime has not misled and cannot mislead anyone into thinking that it represents in any way anything but a racist minority whose oppression of the Zimbabwe peoples has created an explosive situation which threatens peace in the region and in general.

46. The duties and obligations of the administering Power not only remain unchanged but are unequivocally reaffirmed by the United Nations.

47. All the relevant resolutions of the Security Council on Southern Rhodesia remain intact and their implementation is our unmistakable commitment and duty under Article 25 of the Charter.

48. Public opinion at large, with ever growing concern and insistence, requests and expects us to remain dedicated to and become more effectively engaged in assisting the Zimbabwe people as a whole to achieve self-determination and independence and preventing anyone from effectively denying that to them by whatever means.

49. It is a fact, and a welcome one, that Lord Pearce and other members of his Commission have demonstrated their personal integrity and probity by managing to submit a report which does them credit in reflecting the attitude of the Zimbabwe people in rejecting the so-called proposals for settlement and their demands for true self-determination, equality, freedom and independence. The publication of that report, too, was a commendable act. But, having said that, we should like to recall that as long ago as the Council's meeting in Addis Ababa on 4 February 1972 we stated that: "From the beginning of its work [the Commission] demonstrated what we already knew anyway—that the people of Zimbabwe would not want to sign for their own further enslavement." [1639th meeting, para. 14.]

50. The people of Zimbabwe now rightly expect that they will not be submitted to any new procedures like the proposals for settlement. One reads in the press reports that Ian Smith wants to "keep his options open" to reach a settlement with Britain. A report from Rhodesia in *The New York Times* of 24 September states that:

"Many took this as a signal that he will now seek to convince Britain he has the support of the majority of the black population and that the verdict of the [Pearce] commission must be reversed."

Here, then, is again a serious danger and we must guard against it.

51. Having in mind all these facts and new developments we can, if we wish to be logical and adopt a suitable position in this situation, lay down the following basic principles which any resolution of the Southern Rhodesian situation must observe strictly.

52. First, there should be no independence before majority rule. Secondly, the administering Power should not transfer or accord, under any circumstances, any powers and attributes of sovereignty to the illegal régime. Thirdly, all decisions on the political future of Zimbabwe must be based on the principle of "One man, one vote", without discrimination on any grounds. Fourthly, there should be no further attempts to work out any framework or political development in Southern Rhodesia which would not be based on full consultations with, and the decisive participation of, the genuine political representatives of the people of Zimbabwe.

53. We have already heard at this series of meetings—as we did on earlier occasions—many expressions of view, especially from the representatives of African States, about the concept of convening a national constitutional conference. Fully supporting these African views, we think that such a conference would really represent the only true and promising alternative in the present circumstances for solving the question of Southern Rhodesia. The United Kingdom, as the administering Power, should convene a national constitutional conference as soon as possible. Through such a conference genuine political representatives of the people of Zimbabwe must be enabled to chart a settlement for the future of their own country. Finally, the people must approve a settlement so arrived at through democratic and free procedures.

54. That and other basic principles were incorporated in the resolutions of the Rabat and Georgetown Conferences and my delegation fully supports them.

55. In the meantime, until the illegal racist minority régime is brought to an end, we firmly uphold the right of the people of Zimbabwe to wage their liberation struggle with all means, including armed struggle. We are saying this with particular emphasis today because it is so important to distinguish the right of the oppressed peoples and occupied countries to wage an armed, guerilla struggle from criminal, senseless terrorist acts which have nothing in common with such a struggle.

56. It is in the context of the above-mentioned fundamental political considerations that we place the tremendously important issue of the continuation, tightening and developing of the system of sanctions and the application of sanctions. Sanctions are not a technical, marginal matter, but one of the most telling and potent weapons that we could devise and have devised in order to bring about the necessary change in Southern Rhodesia.

57. There were those who tried to persuade the world that sanctions mostly hurt the African people in Zimbabwe and therefore should be discontinued. But, if any evidence to the contrary was necessary for anyone, it was supplied here in February this year by Bishop Muzorewa, who, in his brilliant presentation [1640th meeting], brought the most welcome confirmation that sanctions should stay, that they do hurt the Smith régime, and that no African asks for their dismantling: quite the contrary.

58. There were those who, because sanctions were and are violated, tried to persuade the world that they are ineffective, that they are inherently unimplementable; that they are, in the nature of things, violatable and that we should cease making futile efforts. But it was precisely so much insistence on the need to dismantle the sanctions that persuaded us that they must be hurting; otherwise they would have been buried under the cloak of silence. And, indeed, in the already cited report of *The New York Times*, we can read that one of Ian Smith's underlying reasons for hoping for another settlement is economic considerations, and that he wants "international recognition and the removal of sanctions [because that] would attract foreign investment and relieve Rhodesia's acute shortage of foreign currency", which is precisely a result of sanctions.

59. More specifically on what our further sanctions policy should be, we should like to make two points. First, on the basis of our over-all experience with sanctions—as applied now, and as suspected violations are investigated and open ones committed—it is my Government's firm conclusion that sanctions against Southern Rhodesia cannot be made fully effective unless applied against Portugal and the Republic of South Africa as well, and that all exports from and imports to Portuguese-occupied African Territories, especially through the ports of Beira and Lourenço Marques, must *a priori* be officially suspected by all States to be contraband, without waiting for United Nations decisions. My Government has adopted and is applying the strictest measures to that effect.

60. Secondly, after receiving three interim reports about persistent and openly committed violations, we must not weaken our efforts to persuade those concerned to change their fundamentally wrong and unacceptable policy. The violation is not less onerous because it is open. In some ways it is particularly damaging because it can be interpreted as a deliberate disregarding of the obligations and commitments of the Charter, thereby encouraging those who need and want encouragement to follow suit. We are prepared to support every proposal and activity that contributes to the strictest implementation and observance of sanctions, and my Government has given practical proof of this where it matters most.

61. In conclusion, let me stress that support for the just struggle of the people of Zimbabwe inside Southern Rhodesia, and support for sanctions outside Rhodesia, must remain our twin, yet single, strategy in the United Nations policy of securing self-determination and independence for the people of Zimbabwe. We shall support any resolution embodying that strategy.

62. The PRESIDENT (*translation from Chinese*): I should like to thank the representative of Yugoslavia for his reference to his visit to Peking and the friendly words he expressed in his statement.

63. Mr. CISSOKO (Guinea) (*interpretation from French*): On 14 December 1960, at its fifteenth session, the General Assembly, by an overwhelming majority, adopted resolution 1514 (XV), entitled Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. By that solemn Declaration, our Organization, after affirming the inalienable right of peoples to full liberty, proclaimed thereby the necessity of putting an end speedily and unconditionally to colonialism in all its forms and manifestations. It specified in particular that:

"The subjection of peoples to alien subjugation, domination and exploitation constitutes a denial of fundamental human rights, is contrary to the Charter of the United Nations and is an impediment to the promotion of world peace and co-operation."

64. It emphasized, among other things, the need to transfer all powers to the colonial peoples of territories under foreign domination, without condition or reservation and without distinction as to race, creed or colour.

65. Twelve years after the adoption of that Declaration, although the majority of African States have recovered their national independence, Southern Rhodesia continues to constitute a challenge to international conscience. A white minority, a handful of white men, supported and encouraged by the régimes of South Africa, of Portugal and of other Powers, arrogate to themselves all rights and continue to keep 5 million Africans in a state of terror. The Zimbabwe people, muzzled, tortured, driven out of its fertile lands, is witness daily to the liquidation, through arbitrary detention, by mysterious disappearance and by assassination, of its political leaders.

66. Despite all these savage repressions, Zimbabwe is more than ever resolved to fight for respect in the application of resolution 1514 (XV).

67. The situation thus created in Rhodesia by the racist minority of Ian Smith is a constant threat to international peace and security. Its progressive deterioration, a subject of constant concern for the States of Africa, has led the three African members of the Security Council to call for the convening of the present meeting.

68. During the discussions that were held once again on 25 November 1971, the representative of the United Kingdom, the administering Power, after having given us a rapid recapitulation of the colonization of Southern Rhodesia

and after having explained that, following the illegal declaration of independence in 1965, the use of force was neither possible nor desirable, himself recognized that the situation of the Africans had deteriorated to such a point that the climate was similar to that of *apartheid* in South Africa, and he reaffirmed that it was to reverse that deterioration that his Government felt itself in duty bound to find a solution in conformity with the five principles it had advanced.

69. In conclusion, the United Kingdom assured us that the acceptance of its proposals by the population of Southern Rhodesia as a whole was an essential condition for general implementation of those proposals.

70. The overwhelming majority of the Zimbabwe people rejected the proposals. For what then is Great Britain waiting before assuming its responsibilities? What the Africans of Zimbabwe and the peoples of Africa want is what the numerous resolutions of the Organization of African Unity and the Declaration in resolution 1514 (XV) have constantly demanded—the right to freedom and to dignity.

71. Proceeding from the principle that it is always better to rely first of all upon oneself, the African Heads of State, meeting in Rabat, unanimously and solemnly pledged that they would intensify their assistance to the liberation movements. In the resolution adopted unanimously, they once more appealed to Great Britain not to transfer or to grant, under any pretext whatsoever, to the illegal régime of Ian Smith any of the powers or rights of sovereignty, but to promote the accession of the country to independence through a democratic system of government in conformity with the aspirations of the majority of the population. They requested Great Britain, as the administering Power, to convene as soon as possible a constitutional conference with the participation of authentic political representatives of the Zimbabwe people.

72. Great Britain, the administering Power for Southern Rhodesia, for purposes of dodging its responsibilities, has frequently fallen back on the problem of sanctions. Let us take a realistic look at this and let us try to draw an effective and useful lesson for the struggle of the Zimbabwe people.

73. If, in certain fields, economic sanctions have produced meagre results, it must be admitted that in their present forms they have turned out to be inadequate if not actually ineffectual. The measures laid down in resolutions 217 (1965), 221 (1966) and 232 (1966), as is known, did not succeed in putting an end to the rebellion in Rhodesia.

74. The Security Council adopted resolution 253 (1968), aimed at strengthening the sanctions and at economic isolation of the illegal régime of Southern Rhodesia.

75. And what have we seen as a result of that? While it is true that the United Kingdom and certain other Western countries have slightly reduced their trade exchanges with Southern Rhodesia, that reduction is more than balanced by the extension in the trade of that country with South



Africa and Portugal, through the intermediary of which trade relations with the Smith régime are in fact continued. It is a secret to no one that the monopolies of the Western countries continue to carry on their activities in Southern Rhodesia. This is what a great French daily newspaper writes in this connexion:

"These sanctions adopted by the United Nations in 1968 are the subject of humorous comments in Salisbury. Their most serious effect, it is said, is to cause a shortage of golf balls. All the great European brands-names can be found there. Peugeot automobiles, which are very numerous, are assembled right there from parts coming from South Africa. The majority of taxis are Renaults."

Questioned by the newspaper, a major concessionaire replied:

"In principle, we are acting quite illegally, but who can make us believe that the great industrialists of your country are not aware of this?"

The newspaper continues:

"Did the Western countries adopt the sanctions as a joke?"

One is almost tempted to believe this, considering the numerous cases of flagrant violation on the part of a great number of States Members, even permanent members of the Security Council. These States not only make a mockery of the principles of the Charter to which they have all subscribed; they also, and above all, are helping the illegal régime of Ian Smith to maintain itself and grow stronger. So they reveal themselves as the enemies of the freedom of the Zimbabwe people in particular, and of the African peoples in general.

76. Indeed, the Committee established in pursuance of resolution of 253 (1968) at present has before it more than 135 cases of such violations which it has agreed to call, with some prudence, "presumed or possible violations", even though it is well known that they are flagrant and deliberate violations. The major difficulties experienced by this Committee in the study of the cases of violation reside in the fact of the triangular alliance brought together by Southern Rhodesia, South Africa and Portugal. So far, it has been virtually impossible for the Committee to establish the real origin of any given product, which is nevertheless known to be Rhodesian and which is channelled towards this or that country with South African or Portuguese certificates of origin. They may go on flouting international opinion, strong in their support and their invulnerability.

77. By its resolution 314 (1972) the Council requested the Committee responsible for the effective application of sanctions against Southern Rhodesia to seek and examine new ways and means to strengthen measures and make all concrete recommendations and proposals to the Council on this subject.

78. The three African members of the Council, in collaboration with other delegations on the above-mentioned

Committee, then formulated specific proposals to have the sanctions measures extended to South Africa and Portugal under the obligations incumbent upon them pursuant to Article 25 of the Charter of the United Nations.

79. All the members of the Council recognize the importance of the ports of Beira and Lourenço Marques. Their closure to the illegal régime of Ian Smith would largely and more definitely affect the economy of that racist régime. The African countries remain aware that the constant threat represented by the use of these ports by Rhodesia constitutes an aggravation of the situation in that part of southern Africa. That is why my delegation hopes that the Security Council will adopt a resolution extending sanctions to these two fascist régimes of South Africa and Portugal.

80. The Africans know that the first victims of the intensification of economic sanctions will be the Africans themselves, but the people of Zimbabwe is ready for this new sacrifice. The Council must therefore not only intensify but ensure respect for them and their strict application.

81. The delegation of the Republic of Guinea continues to be convinced that it is for the United Kingdom, the administering Power, in the first instance to take all necessary measures, including the use of force, to put an end to the rebel régime and to ensure the self-determination of the people of Zimbabwe. The African peoples will be able, through this distressing Rhodesian problem, to recognize their true friends.

82. Mr. McLOUGHLIN (Argentina) (*interpretation from Spanish*): Mr. President, may my first words be to express to you my particular satisfaction at participating in this debate under such a distinguished presidency.

83. China and Argentina have many opportunities to develop an intense and effective co-operation. This purpose, which is common to both countries, has already been demonstrated in the understanding in many fields between the two delegations to the United Nations. I am sure this will be strengthened and broadened with the conduct of our respective Ambassadors in Peking and Buenos Aires.

84. The question of Southern Rhodesia, the importance of which is certainly very significant, has been the subject of many debates in this Council and in the General Assembly. In both forums Argentina has already clearly and firmly stated its position in connexion with this unjust rebellion, which incredibly still continues in the heart of Africa.

85. We shall never tire of reiterating our rejection of the illegal régime of Ian Smith. We shall always unflinchingly reaffirm the inalienable right of the people of Southern Rhodesia to self-determination and independence.

86. To put an end to such a regrettable state of affairs, the Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 253 (1968) which, having been adopted under Chapter VII of the Charter, strengthened the sanctions imposed against the illegal régime. Much time has passed and the situation in Southern Rhodesia has not changed. This defiance of the

international Organization continues in force and now we wonder what will be the results for the United Nations should we fail to reach the proposed objectives.

87. Economic sanctions are an important instrument available to the Council. Their use must be the subject of careful thought. However, having taken the decision that they are mandatory, we must work in solidarity in quest of the objective which led to the decision to have recourse to measures reserved exclusively for cases of threats to peace, a breach of the peace or acts of aggression. The issue is not only that the principles of the United Nations should be fully in force in Southern Rhodesia. The issue is also—and we must bear this very much in mind—to demonstrate the effectiveness of this body in similar situations.

88. This is how my Government understands it. I am therefore particularly happy to report here that, whereas in some sectors the sanctions are undermined and violated, Argentina has on the contrary decided to reaffirm in deeds that they are really and fully in force; our words become realities. As we announced a short time ago in this forum, we have recently adopted new legislation on this subject in addition to that which already existed. Our law 19846, which was passed in September 1972, clearly establishes that the mandatory character of the sanctions continues to be fully enforced on Argentine territory. Through this legal instrument the executive power of the State, the public departments and organizations, provinces, and even the municipalities are asked to adopt in their respective jurisdictions measures suitable for the implementation of the decisions of the Security Council.

89. We thereby reiterate our will to comply with what has been agreed upon in this field.

90. The sanctions, however, must be watched over, not only internally, but also and particularly at the international level. At this level its zealous guardian is the Security Council Committee established under resolution 253 (1968) regarding the question of Southern Rhodesia, which is presided over with so much skill and zeal by Ambassador Abdulla of Sudan. In this organ our delegation has worked assiduously since we became a member of the Council. We shall continue to do so with like vigour until the end of our term.

91. Now the Committee, with the adoption of resolution 318 (1972), has an opportunity to refine its mechanism and make the control of the system of sanctions more effective. The first task is to bring about in deed that which was agreed by the Committee regarding the negotiations to be undertaken, as endorsed in the Council.

92. It is worth while reiterating today that we aspire to seeing that the inalienable right of the entire population of Southern Rhodesia to self-determination and independence is fully respected. The principle of "One man one vote" can never be left out of this process. The majority of the Zimbabwe people and the minority of European origin must merge peacefully on that basis. Thus will the foundation be laid for a nation which will project its sovereign image to the world.

93. Today we hold the same belief as yesterday. We trust that, the circumstances having changed, the Council will be able to adopt a resolution on this important matter.

94. Mr. KHALID (Sudan): For the third time this year we feel constrained to call the attention of the Council to the situation in Rhodesia. That situation has taken a new turn as a result of two significant developments this year: first, the report of the Pearce Commission on the acceptability of the Home-Smith agreement of November 1971, and, secondly, the openly admitted violations of Security Council resolutions on sanctions against Rhodesia by the United States of America.

95. The verdict of the Pearce Commission is now a matter of common knowledge. It is not our intention here to delve into Pearce's findings and verdict. Pearce is relevant to us only in so far as he represented Britain's way of giving effect to the resolve of this Council.

96. The representative of the United Kingdom has stated in this Council at the 1602nd meeting that the settlement which his Foreign Secretary concluded with Smith—the rank rebel of the Empire—was a result of their interpretation of the call that was most recently affirmed by this Council in paragraph 2 of Security Council resolution 288 (1970), which calls upon "the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, as the administering Power in the discharge of its responsibility, to take urgent and effective measures to bring to an end the illegal rebellion in Southern Rhodesia and enable the people to exercise their right to self-determination in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations".

97. If that were the intention of the United Kingdom in dispatching Lord Pearce to Salisbury we are entitled to ask today: After Pearce, what and whither? In the words of Pearce, "the majority of Africans rejected the proposals"; again in his words, "this was so not only in the urban areas where one might have expected it but also in the Tribal Trust Land". The finding of the Commission—to use Pearce's words again—is that: "the people of Rhodesia as a whole do not regard the proposals acceptable as a basis for independence".

98. Unfortunately, the answer to what and whither is yet to come from Britain. This Council, Africa and, indeed, the whole community of nations would have expected a reaction from the United Kingdom Government other than the timid statement of Sir Alec Douglas-Home before the House of Commons on 23 May last,<sup>4</sup> when he said: "the *status quo* will remain".

99. Sir Alec's statement is in line with the former sustained efforts of Britain to dilute, if not to abdicate, its responsibility in Rhodesia. The various representatives of the United Kingdom in this Organization have almost invariably pleaded mitigating circumstances in respect of this question.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, document S/10656.

100. It was said "that Rhodesia was not an ordinary colonial situation in what one might call the classic sense . . . Britain has never in fact administered Rhodesia directly"; the argument was also adduced that "at all times since 1923 it has been necessary on internal questions for the British Government to work by agreement with those who control power in Rhodesia" [1602nd meeting, para. 7].

101. The United Kingdom Government's inaction might not have been prompted by indifference or indolence; but the circumstances under which Britain finds itself supine are its own creation. It is no secret that, under the 1923 Constitution, Britain reserved to itself the Power to disallow any discriminatory legislation that might be passed by the self-governing régime. But it is significant to note that that power was never used by Britain to arrest the growth of the plethora of discriminatory legislation passed in Southern Rhodesia; on the contrary, such legislation received the tacit approval of the Crown and was formally perpetuated in the 1961 Constitution.

102. Even Lord Goodman, who negotiated the so-called settlement, admitted British connivance in turning Rhodesia into what it is now. In an article which he wrote explaining his reasons for settling with Smith and published in *The Observer* of 5 December 1971, he said:

"The Africans had been sold out long before. This happened during the long years of British colonial administration which, notwithstanding our reserved powers, accepted discriminatory legislation against the black man, proffered constitutions that entrenched discrimination . . . and ultimately remained supine at the seizure of power by a handful of desperate men determined to assert that the black man would never be fit to rule."

103. If the United Kingdom Government is waiting for Smith to learn or change it might have to wait very long. The actions of Smith and his cohorts against the Tangwenas tribesmen—and only one month after Pearce's conclusions—burning their abodes, confiscating their property and chasing them out of their ancestral home is yet more fresh evidence of the complete disdain which that man has for the world community, the norms of civilized behaviour and the decisions of this Organization. Actions against the Tangwenas were taken following an arbitrary decree by the so-called President of Rhodesia, Clifford Dupont, reversing a decision of his own High Court on the right of those tribesmen to their land, which the racist minority intends to develop under its infamous Land Tenure Act into a Tribal Trust Land, which is Rhodesia's version of a Bantustan.

104. The British Government has put it on record that it has accepted the Commission's conclusions and has gone on to assure the international community that its future policy shall be decided in the light of those conclusions. Yet the facts are that Smith, arrogant and unrepentant, continues in power and, because of the rebuff dealt to him by the African "no", indulges in more excesses in repression.

105. The United Kingdom Government must, from now on, give clear and convincing evidence of real determination to end the rebellion in Southern Rhodesia. It must let go the illusion that the problem is a question of gradual movement towards progress and freedom for the Africans in Rhodesia.

106. The rulers of the white minority in Rhodesia will not change. Like the Bourbons they have learned nothing and forgotten nothing. Like them they will have to be made to pay, sooner or later, the price of their follies—and sooner better than later, because this Organization cannot afford to allow such anachronistic barbarities to continue.

107. There is a causal relationship between the privileges that the white minority enjoys in Rhodesia and the political situation pertaining there. Real progress for the majority of Rhodesians could not be reconciled with the existing privileges of the white population there. The mentors of Smith revealed a long time ago their conception of black and white co-operation in Rhodesia. According to Lord Malvern, the former Prime Minister of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, the partnership between the whites and the blacks should be in the nature of the partnership between the rider and the horse. It is to those built-in privileges, therefore, that we should address our efforts. Moreover, it is because of this that the question of intensification of mandatory sanctions becomes important.

108. It is now abundantly clear that sanctions against Southern Rhodesia virtually represent the strongest measures that the international community has agreed to adopt against the rebel régime in that country. The object was to end the rebellion and help attain the independence of Zimbabwe on the basis of majority rule in conditions which allow the development of human dignity for all citizens, and equality between them all. Yet behind the initial move to apply sanctions against the Smith régime lie six and a half frustrating and inglorious years of trying to bring that régime to heel. In its fourth report, the Committee established in pursuance of Security Council resolution 253 (1968) noted "with regret that the sanctions have not yet led to the desired result".<sup>5</sup> This is primarily because:

"Despite the repeated Security Council resolutions . . . South Africa and Portugal continue actively to support Southern Rhodesia. They not only continue to maintain military, trade and other relations with Southern Rhodesia, but . . . also encourage the issuance on their respective territories of misleading documents of origin of the goods, thus assisting the illegal authorities of Southern Rhodesia and other countries in evading the sanctions."<sup>6</sup>

109. This Council is well aware of the catalogue of infamies in this respect: the ineffective British blockade of oil through Beira in Mozambique and its replacement by Lourenço Marques; the construction of an oil refinery 15 miles to the interior, from where oil is transported to

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, Twenty-sixth Year, Special Supplement No. 2 and Corrigendum, chap. VI, appendix II, para. 3.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, appendix III, para. 2.

Southern Rhodesia; the deceptive calls by foreign commercial vessels between South African ports and ports in Mozambique; the forged commercial documents at those ports; the roaring trade in goods and vehicles—Mercedes, Toyota, Peugeot—which should not have been there if words were matched with deeds. As the fourth report of the Committee notes, it is estimated that over one third of Rhodesian exports in 1968 and 1969 reached countries outside southern Africa whose Governments are—or supposed to be—applying sanctions against Rhodesia.

110. Thus the reasons for the failure of sanctions to achieve their goal is that they have been half-hearted, because no action has been taken against those who have breached them and because many nations have not had the political will to make them effective.

111. We are aware of the fact that what we are up against are not only Governments of Member States and non-Member States that are called upon to abide by the Charter and the delegated legislation ensuing from it. We are also up against powerful trusts and concerns to whom gold is god. We are up against a racket whose conscience is shackled and whose sense of international responsibility is non-existent. But Governments cannot abdicate their responsibility. They cannot allow their citizens, be they persons or corporations, to run amok frustrating every effort by this Organization to put order in a already ill-mannered world. Governments, Members and non-members, have a responsibility which they should not abdicate. Otherwise all the lip-service they are paying here to sanctions will be nothing but an ill-bred joke.

112. This situation has aroused the complaint from the British Foreign Secretary, Sir Alec Douglas-Home, that evidence of widespread evasion by other countries is in fact general rather than particular; I refer to his statement in the House of Commons on 9 June 1972. This is one instance where we find ourselves completely in agreement with the British Foreign Secretary on Rhodesia.

113. In this connexion we note with a certain measure of satisfaction the strict application of sanctions by the United Kingdom Government and its declared policy to continue to apply them. Britain, however, is urged not to relax its surveillance of Beira and to exercise, together with others, a more effective blockade of Lourenço Marques.

114. Towards the end of last year, the United States Senate adopted the Byrd Amendment to a Military Procurement Bill that would permit importation of chrome from Rhodesia. The President signed that Bill into an Act of Congress on 17 November 1971. The day before, the General Assembly in its resolution 2765 (XXVI) had expressed grave concern about this Act and called on the United States Government to prevent any importation of chrome from Rhodesia.

115. The Committee on sanctions of the Council considered the matter and, like other members of this Council, took a serious view of the consequences of the enactment of that Amendment and proposed that the Committee

bring the matter formally to the attention of the Council. This was done in an interim report<sup>7</sup> to the Council.

116. Some few weeks later the Council discussed the question of the situation in Southern Rhodesia and, on 28 February, it adopted resolution 314 (1972) by which it restated its position with regard to the imposition of sanctions on Southern Rhodesia. The relevant paragraphs, 1 and 3, of the resolution are before the Council.

117. The United States imports stand out as one of the most blatant breaches of sanctions against Rhodesia. Even the United States Department of State admits this. Under-Secretary of State John Irwin wrote in May to a Senator that the importation of chrome from Rhodesia puts the United States "in violation of its international obligations". I have quoted that from *The New York Times* of 31 May 1972.

118. The arguments used to defend such a violation cannot stand up to any serious examination. Briefly stated, the arguments are, first, that the United States needs the chrome for "compelling reasons of national security" and that the United States should not be placed in a distinctly disadvantageous position with regard to the importation of strategic commodities—that statement was made by Ambassador Phillips in this Council; and secondly, that anyway other countries, including most of the permanent members of the Security Council, are clearly breaching sanctions while claiming to apply them.

119. The first argument, to say the least, is spurious. For contrary to what the representatives of the United States had said, the United States has more chrome than it knows what to do with. Writing in the autumn issue of *Africa Today*, Robert Good, former United States Ambassador to Zambia, pointed out:

"We currently have 5.3 million tons of chromium ore in the national stockpile. The Office of Emergency Preparedness has declared that 2.2 million tons are in excess of foreseeable strategic needs while the Administration has actually submitted legislation to authorize the Government to dispose of 1.3 million short dry tons of excess metallurgical chrome from national stocks."

120. The appended argument about the undesirability of United States dependence on the Soviet Union for chrome is as perishable as the principal argument. Cold warrior arguments cannot make any mark on the minds of even the most gullible in view of the deservedly acclaimed journeys for peace by the President of the United States. Reference to Rhodesia as a free country is very revealing. It seems that the United States policy towards Rhodesia is being determined by those who, as Conor Cruise O'Brien says in his book *To Katanga and Back*,<sup>8</sup>

"think of freedom primarily as something already achieved in a given geographical area and to be defended by the defence of that area against the rulers of another given area, who were the enemies of freedom."

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, Supplement for October, November and December 1971, document S/10408.

<sup>8</sup> London, Hutchinson & Co. (Publishers) Ltd., 1962.

121. The so-called free world for such people includes Rhodesia and South Africa; thus it is hard for such people in practice to disentangle *apartheid* from the institutions of the so-called free world.

122. As to the second argument, I have already said that we deplore the sheer hypocrisy of certain Members of this Organization, who while professing support for sanctions are secretly violating them. That the United States should willingly submit to this contagion and further put itself on record as having upset part of sanctions is most unfortunate.

123. But the United States Government as a permanent member of the Council should have known that the greatest affront to law and order is when the lawmaker becomes himself a lawbreaker. In the words of one of the great lawyers of that country, Justice Brandeis, "Crime is contagious. If the Government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for the law." Is that what we want to achieve here?

124. The attempt by the United States representatives to say that their Government's action is not undermining the efforts of the international community to isolate the Smith régime does not impress us. The fact is that there is no dearth of suggested ways to make sanctions effective.

125. Mr. Seymour Maxwell Finger, former senior adviser to the United States Ambassador to the United Nations, told a House Sub-Committee on 15 June what could be done. He said:

"To be very candid since I am no longer employed by the United States Government, I think we would have to be willing to embarrass some of our friends and allies by giving greater publicity to the evasions that have taken place . . . Prior to the Byrd Amendment we and the British were working on a programme to lighten them and to more investigation . . . We have a lot of presumptive evidence, but we stopped trying to give publicity at the time we ourselves decided to violate sanctions . . ."

Mr. Finger went on to express his feelings about the true state of affairs when, talking about the Byrd Amendment, he said:

"I am not persuaded that what is good for Union Carbide and Foote Mineral is necessarily good for the United States of America".

126. Africa will no longer settle for rhetoric. In the words of Senator McGee, Chairman of the United States Senate Sub-Committee on Africa,

" . . . the time has come when the African nations no longer accept double-talk and hypocrisy from this country—as it concerns their vital interests and needs . . . Either we believe in their aspirations or we don't. Either we believe in the United Nations or we don't. We cannot have it both ways."

That is really the choice.

127. The issue that faces the United Nations is therefore whether it continues with the present unsuccessful programmes in the knowledge that Members flout them at will, or whether it considers that the question of Rhodesia represents a threat to world peace and a problem of such profound importance to the future of the United Nations that it should put its prestige behind attempts to turn the present sanctions against Rhodesia into full-scale economic warfare in order to achieve its objectives. The purpose of sanctions, as has been mentioned time and again, is to prepare the ground for real settlement in Rhodesia.

128. Before the Pearce Commission those people who claimed to know the mind of the African or to divine his interest used to say it was the politicians who made a fuss about politics in Rhodesia; the rest of the African population was not that interested. Now a British Commission has proved this to be false. Yet some desperate exercises in pedantry are still being performed.

129. It has been the habit of those who feign sympathy with the Africans to say that their main interest is the welfare of Africans, and therefore to indicate concern about the suffering that sanctions will cause to the Africans in Rhodesia. To such people the Africans have given their answer, and it was very eloquent. Speaking before this Council in February, Bishop Muzorewa said:

"The Africans accept sanctions as a price for their freedom and declare as our enemy any person who claims on our behalf that sanctions should be withdrawn to alleviate African suffering through lack of employment."  
[1640th meeting, para. 15.]

130. It is for those reasons that we propose the following for the consideration of the Council.

131. First, the Council should call on the United Kingdom Government to ensure that and declare that no negotiations on the political future of Southern Rhodesia shall be undertaken without the active and free participation of the majority of the people of Southern Rhodesia as represented by their genuine leaders; and should further call on the United Kingdom as the administering Power to convene as soon as possible a national constitutional conference in which the genuine political representatives of Southern Rhodesia would be able to work out a settlement relating to the future of the Territory for subsequent endorsement by the people through democratic process.

132. Secondly, the Council should increase the United Nations role in policing of sanctions. This would involve placing United Nations observers at the ports of major importers from Rhodesia to verify the true origin of raw material shipped under forged documents. It would also involve tight surveillance. The United Kingdom should resume further surveillance of Beira. In case it is said that Britain cannot do that alone, there is reason for us to believe that some other members of this Council are ready to share the burden.

133. Thirdly, there should be a campaign by the United Nations to publicize the methods and names of countries

which flout sanctions as a way of proving and increasing world concern.

134. Fourthly, the Council should agree that any cargo from Rhodesia must be impounded by the Government of the port of call.

135. Rhodesia is not only an African but a world tragedy. The tragedy still awaits its end. We expect that in the name of humanity, so treasured by some of us, something must be done to deal with this problem with a certain degree of concern, with a certain degree of interest, inasmuch as people are concerned about and interested in cases of individual terrorism and the plight of African-Asians.

136. Mr. BOYD (Panama) (*interpretation from Spanish*): In connexion with the problem of Southern Rhodesia the delegation of Panama wishes to benefit from the presence of the Foreign Ministers of Africa who have honoured us with their visit and avail itself of the opportunity to affirm once again its anti-colonialist position and state that it is completely against any forms of discrimination, and very definitely against racial discrimination.

137. It is for this basic reason that we have from the outset supported the adoption of sanctions against the illegal régime of Ian Smith. We do not believe that the sanctions imposed on Salisbury by the international community will in the short run bring about the downfall of the racist régime, but the prolonged isolation is creating a situation of progressive deterioration which is increasingly serious for the oppressors. This will compel the racists, by fair means or foul, to abandon their policy of exploitation and enslavement of the indigenous population, which is in fact sole master of the land.

138. Panama has in this century suffered discrimination by foreigners installed in the so-called Panama Canal Zone. We know how much racial discrimination hurts with regard to salaries and opportunities, education and housing—in short, every kind of discrimination based on the colour of one's skin—because we have suffered such discrimination against our flesh and blood on our own soil.

139. That is why people who suffer the same injustices arouse our most sincere sympathy and support.

140. When in April 1966 the British tanker *Plymouth* intercepted near the port of Beira the ship *Iona V*, flying a Panamanian flag, because it suspected that that tanker was carrying petroleum for Southern Rhodesia, the Government of Panama immediately revoked the registration of that ship, which was flying the flag of Panama, because it felt that it had violated clear provisions of the United Nations. My country acted in accordance with decisions adopted by the Security Council, which are respected by Panama, as are all United Nations decisions.

141. In discussing the question of Rhodesia today my delegation wishes to recall the case of *Iona V* because this received great publicity throughout the world and was one of the first challenges Panama had to face as a Member of

the Organization in complying with decisions adopted with regard to the declaration of independence by the illegal Government of Ian Smith.

142. Throughout the years our standard of conduct has not varied. We therefore consider it appropriate to bring up to date the position of our Government in regard to Southern Rhodesia.

143. First, the Government of Panama believes that the economic sanctions against Southern Rhodesia, even though they are not as effective as we might have wished, do constitute a form of pressure against the rebel régime, which must be used as extensively and drastically as possible.

144. Secondly, Panama wishes to make perfectly clear its position that since sanctions were established we have spared no effort in co-operating so that there might be effective compliance with all the provisions against Southern Rhodesia.

145. Thirdly, the Government of Panama declares that it has given instructions to its consular agents to cancel the re-registration of any ship sailing under the flag of Panama whenever such a ship violates the provision of the resolution adopted by the Security Council against Southern Rhodesia.

146. Fourthly, in the same way we state that we shall carefully and with genuine sympathy study any draft resolution envisaging measures which the Security Council could take in order to put more life into, and make more severe, the economic sanctions against Southern Rhodesia.

147. Fifthly, the present Revolutionary Government of Panama, aware of its anti-colonialist position and consistent with its policy, which is against any form of discrimination, wishes to avail itself of this opportunity to declare once again that we are in solidarity with the people of Zimbabwe and, at the same time, that we do not recognize the legality of the Ian Smith régime which has been imposed upon Southern Rhodesia by a racist minority.

148. We know that some months ago the United Kingdom, in good faith, thought it could accomplish something by the Pearce Commission. It proved, however, that the Zimbabwe people was not satisfied with the minimal concessions, which arrived so late. The gradual participation offered to the African majority in Rhodesia did not provide guarantees that it would bring about in the foreseeable future the end of the régime of oppression that exists there.

149. The Security Council must persist with every kind of measure until the independence of Rhodesia is achieved, on the basis of majority government.

150. In accordance with the purposes stipulated in the Charter, the Council considered that in order to fulfil its obligations more effectively it should hold a series of meetings in Africa. Despite the fact that the Council did not adopt the resolution on Rhodesia which the majority wished, we consider that it was extremely useful and



beneficial to place before the African peoples, with sincerity and frankness, the problems of the Zimbabwe people.

151. The meetings of the Council on African soil made it possible to consider the problems confronting that continent which have a direct bearing on matters pertaining to international peace and security. The experience thus acquired will, we are sure, be very useful to us for other meetings of this kind when the Council meets away from Headquarters.

152. Several months after the Addis Ababa meetings we identified ourselves with the dissatisfaction of the representatives of Africa in this body, since we sincerely wished that measures be taken that would represent a greater hope for an oppressed people which, despite its frustrations, continues its struggle to recover its fundamental rights—recognized, indeed, by the Charter of the United Nations.

153. Panama, like all Latin American countries, has always been very much attached to the principle whereby respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms constitutes one of the essential foundations for the protection of international peace and security. Accordingly, we now once again express our solidarity with our African brothers in their quest for recourse against the excesses and arbitrariness of the white minority in Rhodesia.

154. The PRESIDENT (*translation from Chinese*): The next name on my list is that of the representative of Tunisia. I invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

155. Mr. DRISS (Tunisia) (*interpretation from French*): For years we have been considering the problem of Rhodesia. We turn it this way and that, in every direction, but all that this examination serves to do is to arouse in us a certain despair.

156. Yet there is in the fact of seeing you, Mr. President, the representative of the People's Republic of China, presiding over the Security Council which is dealing with the question of Rhodesia, reason for us to hope that one day this body will be presided over by the representative of an independent Zimbabwe, freed of racism and of the minority régime.

157. I ought now to fulfil my other duty, which is to thank you and the members of the Council for allowing me to participate in this important debate on one of the most painful tragedies which continues to unfold on the African continent.

158. As long ago as 1965, President Bourguiba, who was paying an official visit to Yaoundé, declared:

“We can draw up a strategy which would destroy the *fait accompli* of the ‘Smiths’ and assist in establishing a new order in Salisbury, with the agreement of Great Britain if possible or against it if necessary. Allow me to say that not only would it be in the interests of the European Powers and the United States but also that

their future in Africa depends upon this should they throw all their weight in the balance to destroy the last enclaves of racism on our continent. Rhodesia might be their last opportunity in that part of the world. All the Western countries are in fact today implicated in this affair. They know very well that they could easily stifle the new régime were they to organize a serious boycott of Rhodesia. Yet do the Western Powers really want a serious boycott? That is the problem. Nevertheless we should give them the benefit of the doubt and even assist them. In any case, we shall judge them by their acts and their determination to put an end to the *fait accompli* of Salisbury. The future of white civilization in Africa depends on that.”

159. That declaration was made seven years ago. In history this is a short period, but how long and painful for a people which has been suffering an agony for almost a century. Since 1888, when the British Crown entrusted the administration of that distant territory to Cecil Rhodes—more exactly, since 15,000 Europeans went to the polls to decide on the destiny of a country which did not belong to them and in the absence of its 500,000 inhabitants—the same unjust régime has continued to be imposed on the Africans of Rhodesia, who today number 5 million, by a minority which now numbers no more than a mere 250,000 people. Since the Constitution of 1923 and the Agrarian Law of 1930, the minority in Rhodesia has done many deeds which I need hardly mention but which in fact have been reflected internally in a policy of racial segregation and total exclusion of Africans from the management of their country, while externally there has been a slow but implacable evolution towards a break in relations with the metropolis and the establishment of increasingly solid relations with South Africa. All this finally led to the unilateral declaration of independence of 1965, an act which was in defiance of Great Britain and provoked the wrath of Africa and the disapproval of public opinion throughout the world.

160. Let us think first of Great Britain, which no one can deny bears the major responsibility for the situation with which we are faced and also bears the responsibility for seeking a way out of what one might call the Rhodesian impasse. In 1965, and before and after that date as well, Great Britain always started by protesting loudly and addressing warnings to Salisbury before yielding to the *fait accompli* and undertaking negotiations. It showed concern for the Africans, certainly, but only in the declarations of intent and when drafting certain principles which, theoretically, should govern its Rhodesian policy. But when the time comes for negotiations the only valid partner is the Government of the minority. There is in the behaviour of Great Britain a dilemma, as it were, a sort of struggle or tug-of-war between on the one hand the noble ideals of the twentieth century with which its people is imbued—there can be no doubt about that—and on the other hand a certain feeling of solidarity which goes back to the nineteenth century and which, it must be said, is part of the concepts of that century. That is perhaps the dilemma which is at the base of the ambiguity of the policies of Great Britain. It is perhaps that dilemma which has so far forbidden the London Government to go beyond sanctions.

Is it not the duty, indeed even in the interest, of Great Britain courageously to go beyond this limit now that there is a most striking clarity as to the true intentions of Salisbury and its determination to oppose any evolution now that it has become apparent that neither the sanctions—at least as now applied—nor negotiations with the minority régime alone can lead to a just and reasonable solution of the Rhodesian problem?

161. Then there was the test of acceptability of the Salisbury agreements. Since January we have seen in the reaction of the African people of Rhodesia, which went into the streets, braving repression, to say “No” to the agreements, the ardent desire of that people to be freed, at the same time as its aspiration to attain within a reasonable time and not in the twenty-first century a specific objective: independence for the majority régime. On 23 May we read in the press reports: “In our opinion the people of Rhodesia as a whole do not consider that the proposals are acceptable as a preparatory basis for independence.” As everybody knows, that sentence appears in the conclusions of the report of Lord Pearce.

162. But what happened after that? Ian Smith, as was to be expected, gave vent to his anger and denounced the report, saying it was inept and naive and that “of all the reports and enquiries in the history of Rhodesia, this is the least serious”. But London, what was the reaction in London? It seems to us that it consisted essentially in saying: “Now we must think it over”. Think what over? How to modify the verdict of the Rhodesian people? More than four months of thinking it over have elapsed and we see no sign which augurs any intention to follow up the honest conclusion of the Pearce report.

163. Be that as it may, the problem is now before the Security Council in very clear terms: the African people of Rhodesia has said what its choice is; Great Britain, on the contrary, seems not to be able to follow any given policy; the illegal régime is incapable of evolution; sanctions are insufficient.

164. What should we do now? Those who have spoken before me have stated eloquently the African proposals and what Africa expects from the Security Council: reaffirmation of the right of the people of Rhodesia to independence through the majority régime and of the legitimacy of its struggle; the strengthening of sanctions and their extension to the allies of Rhodesia. Finally, Africa, in agreement with the leaders of the Rhodesian people, has proposed the convening as soon as possible by the United Kingdom of a constitutional conference at which the genuine political representatives of the Zimbabwe people could prepare a settlement in regard to the future of Rhodesia.

165. As we see it, the essential thing at the present stage is no longer to obtain a resolution from the Security Council but a decision which will be applied. And here is the question anew: how far is Great Britain prepared to go? We are firmly convinced that the convening by London of a constitutional conference should not once again be the subject of delay. Great Britain must fully assume its responsibility and respond to the appeal which will be launched by the Security Council.

166. Let us listen to the statement of Bishop Muzorewa in London on 1 September:

“If we had not been there, there would have been far more serious troubles when the British mission arrived in Rhodesia. We played a moderating role in the January incidents, which were fomented by the police. We secured the rejection of the Anglo-Rhodesian agreement by peaceful means. But the ‘No’ was not an end in itself. It must be a first step towards a constructive solution: the convening of a constitutional conference at which whites and blacks will meet.”

167. The least one can say of this declaration is that it is moderate, while being firm on the substance of the problem—the need to give the African people of Rhodesia an opportunity to speak. If the Security Council and Great Britain were to reveal themselves incapable of satisfying this claim, the Rhodesian people will take the floor by force and Bishop Muzorewa will perhaps not be able to play a moderating role as he did in January 1972.

168. Accordingly, it is the duty of the Security Council to prevent having in Rhodesia the infernal process of violence which is unfortunately already the lot of many people.

169. Mr. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*translation from Russian*): The Security Council is again meeting, for the third time this year, to consider the question concerning the situation in Southern Rhodesia, the question concerning the fact that the racist Smith régime continues to hold sway over the Territory and to oppress the overwhelming majority of the indigenous population of Zimbabwe.

170. This problem causes serious concern to all peace-loving and anti-colonialist forces, and above all to the African countries which requested that the Security Council should again be convened. This concern has been reflected particularly in the statements made by the Ministers for Foreign Affairs and the representatives of the African States taking part in the work of the Council. It has also been reflected in the decisions taken at the meeting of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity held in June of this year at Rabat, at which the entire African continent was represented. The Soviet delegation fully shares this concern because the intolerable racist terror in Southern Rhodesia, where the people of Zimbabwe are still being repressed, constitutes a threat to peace and security on the African continent and, indeed, not on that continent alone.

171. The Soviet Union has consistently, firmly and steadfastly followed a policy directed towards the complete, unconditional and final elimination of colonialism and racism in all its forms and manifestations, a policy which includes opposition to the illegal régime of Ian Smith in Southern Rhodesia. The position taken by the Soviet Union at the United Nations on problems relating to the struggle against colonialism and racial discrimination derives from the very essence and nature of our multinational socialist State which is celebrating its fiftieth anniversary this year. The Soviet Union, as a multinational socialist State which guarantees complete equality to all its 130 nations and



peoples, has from the time when it was first established been in the forefront of the struggle for true equality among all peoples, against colonialism in all its forms, against racism and *apartheid*, and for freedom and the national independence of all colonial countries and peoples.

172. Proceeding from this position of principle, the Soviet delegation has always steadfastly supported and continues to support in the Security Council all appropriate measures aimed at contributing to the speedy attainment of the main objective, that is, the realization by the people of Zimbabwe of their inalienable right to national freedom and independence. We also proceed from the premise that previous decisions taken by the Security Council on Southern Rhodesia oblige the Council not to remain indifferent to the increasingly serious situation developing in southern Africa as a whole and in Southern Rhodesia in particular as a result of the reckless policy being followed by the racists, relying on the support of imperialism and colonialism.

173. The Security Council has adopted a whole series of important decisions relating to the illegal Salisbury régime, including resolutions on the application of sanctions by States against that racist régime. A special Security Council committee on Southern Rhodesia which has been established and is now functioning deals with questions relating to the implementation of Council resolutions on Southern Rhodesia.

174. How is it, then, that the racist Smith régime, in spite of all the measures taken against it by the Security Council, manages to stay in power? The main reason is that the Smith régime, in spite of and in violation of the Security Council's resolutions, continues to receive support from outside—that neither the letter nor the spirit of the Council's decisions are being complied with.

175. For example, what is the fundamental reason for the ineffectiveness of sanctions against Southern Rhodesia?

176. The work of the Security Council committee on Southern Rhodesia very clearly shows that the main gateways through which, in direct violation of the Council's decisions on sanctions, goods are pouring into Southern Rhodesia are the Republic of South Africa with its racist régime and Portugal and its colonial Territories in southern Africa. Southern Rhodesian goods are also being exported by those same routes. What can the Council do about this? In resolution 318 (1972) adopted in July of this year the Security Council approved the recommendations contained in the special report of the committee on Southern Rhodesia. That resolution means that all certificates emanating from South Africa and Portugal in respect of the origin of goods should be considered *prima facie* suspect, for it is through the use of such false certificates that the trade which is being carried on in Southern Rhodesian goods in violation and in circumvention of Security Council resolutions is concealed. The Security Council has thus branded the Republic of South Africa and Portugal as States that are violating the sanctions against Southern Rhodesia. The Council cannot remain indifferent to those violations. In other words, experience confirms the justice

of the demands being made by the African countries concerning the need to move on to further, more decisive and effective measures in connexion with sanctions, the need to extend them to those who are deliberately and with evil intent violating the binding decisions of the Security Council on sanctions against Southern Rhodesia, that is, South Africa and Portugal.

177. The open violations of the sanctions by some States Members of the United Nations are unquestionably a factor in the continued existence of the Smith régime. For example, it is common knowledge that the United States is now openly importing chrome ore and nickel from Southern Rhodesia. Special reports of the Security Council committee on Southern Rhodesia have been devoted to this question. The matter has been considered by the Council. The meeting of the Organization of African Unity at Rabat adopted a special resolution on it in which the United States was invited to apply strictly, without any exceptions, the provisions of the Security Council resolution. Any violations of the Council sanctions should be stopped. The sanctions introduced by the Council were adopted in accordance with the provisions of Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, as is stated perfectly clearly in the Security Council resolutions. And those Council resolutions, as the Charter clearly indicates, are binding on all States.

178. Finally, if the sanctions against Southern Rhodesia are to be effective they must be broadened. In this connexion the Soviet delegation fully supports the demands of the African States that the existing sanctions against Southern Rhodesia should be broadened, in particular by applying measures of the kind provided for in Article 41 of the Charter, such as the complete interruption of radio, telephonic and telegraphic and all other means of communication with Southern Rhodesia.

179. However, the sanctions against Southern Rhodesia and their effective implementation and expansion are just one means, although an important one, of achieving the realization of the inalienable right of the people of Zimbabwe to freedom and independence.

180. Several years ago the Security Council confirmed, in a series of decisions, the need for a solution to the basic problem, the need of a settlement in Southern Rhodesia which would be in keeping with the interests of the majority of the population of that country, that is, in keeping with the interests of the people of Zimbabwe. To that end, the Council took decisions to the effect that in Southern Rhodesia all measures of political repression against freedom-fighters among the people of Zimbabwe, including arrests, detentions, trials and executions, should be brought to an end. The Security Council was in favour of enabling the people of Zimbabwe to exercise their inalienable rights to freedom and independence in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV). Lastly, the Security Council invited all States Members of the United Nations to increase their moral and material assistance to the people of Zimbabwe in their legitimate struggle to attain freedom and national independence.

181. Those decisions taken by the Security Council, one of the principal organs of the United Nations, reflect the attitude and position of principle of that organ and of the United Nations as a whole with respect to the problem of Southern Rhodesia. Accordingly, there should be no deviation from those principles, and any talk of a "compromise" with the Smith régime or a "dialogue" with the Southern Rhodesian racists to the detriment of those principles, as has been proposed by the colonialists and racists and their supporters and protectors, should be firmly and indignantly rejected.

182. However, as the Ministers for Foreign Affairs and the representatives of African States in the Council have rightly pointed out, certain colonialist forces have attempted and are still attempting to make a deal with the racist minority in Southern Rhodesia to the detriment of those principles and of the basic interests of the people of Zimbabwe; those attempted deviations from the decisions of principle taken by the Security Council are particularly dangerous.

183. First of all, we must put an end to the political flirtation of the United Kingdom with the racist Smith régime, the attempts at appeasement and at the creation of a semblance of dialogue with that régime. None of those racist manoeuvres, as experience shows, serve the cause of the liberation of the people of Zimbabwe. On the contrary, they are directed against the interests of that people and play into the hands of the racists in Salisbury. Openly challenging freedom-loving Africa, world public opinion, the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity, the United Kingdom has tried to give the racist régime in Southern Rhodesia a semblance of legality by offering to the world the hypocritical deal between Douglas-Home and Smith which is obviously directed against the interests of the people of Zimbabwe, against the interests of the peoples of Africa. The illegal régime has thus been elevated to the level of an "equal contracting party", to the level of a partner in negotiations putting forward its own conditions and demands. But a deal with the racist Smith is not what the people of Zimbabwe are demanding. They are legitimately demanding the implementation of the decisions of the United Nations, they are demanding that the existence of the racist régime in Southern Rhodesia which has usurped authority over the people of Zimbabwe should be brought to an end. They are demanding the implementation of their lawful right, recognized by the United Nations, to freedom and national independence.

184. How the first round of this attempted flirtation with the racists in Southern Rhodesia ended is well known to everyone—it ended in a resounding fiasco not only on the African but on the world-wide scale. In spite of threats and intimidation, oppression and terrorism, the people of Zimbabwe responded to the British-Rhodesian collusion with a firm and clear "no". They indignantly rejected the deal between Douglas-Home and Smith. Even the British Pearce Commission was forced to acknowledge in its report that "the majority of Africans rejected the proposals" and that "the people of Rhodesia as a whole did not regard the proposals as acceptable as a basis for independence". Nothing could be clearer than that. In this connexion it must be noted that the United Nations, the overwhelming

majority in the United Nations, assessed this secret collusion correctly from the very beginning and rejected the deal, just as the people of Zimbabwe rejected it.

185. In the light of these facts and of experience, it is quite clear that any new attempts to sacrifice the interests of the people of Zimbabwe to the interests of the terrorist clique of the Southern Rhodesian racists also must and will be rejected. Thus what is needed is not any "dialogue" or compromise with the Smith régime and its racist dictatorship but the immediate replacement of that régime by the democratic rule of the people of Zimbabwe through their lawful representatives invested with full powers.

186. In conclusion, it must be stated that the strict application of sanctions and other effective measures by the Security Council against the racist minority régime in Southern Rhodesia should not, of course, be seen as an end in itself. The main aim is that, as a result of the application of sanctions and other measures, the racist régime should be removed and all power in Southern Rhodesia should immediately be transferred to the country's lawful masters, the African people of Zimbabwe, so that an end can be put to the present course of events in Southern Rhodesia, which, as the distinguished Minister of Foreign Affairs of Zambia rightly pointed out in his statement to the Council at the previous meeting, constitutes a serious threat to peace and security in that area and in Africa as a whole.

187. The Soviet delegation in the Security Council once again confirms the position of principle of the Soviet Union on this issue and considers it necessary to state that it will support the relevant proposals to be submitted by the representatives of countries of Africa.

188. The PRESIDENT (*translation from Chinese*): No other members of the Council nor any of the representatives who have been invited to participate in our discussion wish to speak at this time. I understand, however, that Mr. Eshmael Mlambo is present in the Council chamber and is prepared to make a statement. Yesterday, at the 1663rd meeting, the Security Council agreed to extend an invitation, under rule 39 of its provisional rules of procedure, to Mr. Mlambo, as requested in the letter dated 27 September 1972 from the representatives of Guinea, Somalia and the Sudan [S/10802].

189. As I hear no objection, I take it that the Council agrees to hear him at this time. In accordance with rule 39 of the provisional rules of procedure, I invite Mr. Eshmael Mlambo to take a place at the Council table and to address the Council.

190. Mr. MLAMBO: Mr. President and distinguished representatives, on behalf of the five and a half million people of Zimbabwe, I should like to express my sincere thanks to you for allowing me to participate in the debate on Southern Rhodesia today. My gratitude goes to the African nations for their indefatigable fight against colonialism, oppression and racialism which, in the case of Rhodesia, they have waged since 1962.

191. First, I shall deal with the situation since the Pearce Commission Report.

192. Following rejection of the Home-Smith settlement by the Africans under the leadership of Bishop Abel Muzorewa, the régime has resorted to vindictive actions and intensification of oppression in order to suppress any form of opposition to its policies for seeking a settlement with the United Kingdom Government. Immediately after the announcement of the results, the régime enacted a law called "Departure from Rhodesia Act", which imposed penalties on anyone who left the country to address political meetings abroad, and also give itself power to withdraw passports and other documents from anyone who might indulge in political activities outside the country. As a result of this Act, Bishop Muzorewa, President of the African National Council, has been denied the right to travel to the United States to address the Security Council, to conduct his church business and to receive medical treatment. Furthermore, it is going to make it difficult for Africans to stop any sell-out contemplated between the British Government and the régime. Today Bishop Muzorewa's health is in question and he has been in the hospital for nearly two months, with poor medical facilities, and without any hope of recovering in time to resume his political activities despite the doctor's recommendations that he should travel abroad for treatment. This inhuman treatment of a man fighting for his freedom demands the world's condemnation, and indeed should bring a sense of shame to those who support the régime under the name of free trade and perpetuation of western civilization in Africa.

193. This brings me to the matter of the repression of the African National Council. As a result of the Pearce report, the régime has curtailed the political activities of the African National Council. Ministerial decrees have made it impossible for the African National Council to recruit members, to issue membership cards or to raise the necessary revenue to continue its organizational activities. Similarly, funds from sympathizers outside the country have been banned. This has frustrated the movement of the leadership within the country during its organizational work. The principal purpose behind these measures is to make it impossible for the leadership to determine the strength of its support. This suits the régime's intentions because it can then tell the British Government that the African National Council has no support and, therefore, put forward the chiefs as the people's representatives in order to get a settlement—which, we suspect, is due early next year.

194. Also arising from the Pearce report is the intensification of repression of those chiefs and rural people who opposed the régime publicly before the Commission. From time to time policemen and soldiers are sent to the rural areas to collect people who have spoken out strongly against the régime and to charge them with intimidation because, to date, the régime has never believed that the rejection of it was a genuine desire by the Africans to gain their freedom. It is noteworthy that as far as the white minority is concerned, any form of legitimate opposition is called "intimidation". The régime continues to put blame on the "intimidators" and, as a result, people are collected from the rural areas and detained without charge, and even without trial, for periods up to a month, and released only after a great deal of questioning and intimidation by the police. A good number of those who supported the African

National Council during its campaign and those who continue to do so have been sent to detention and restriction areas. Some of the chiefs have been deposed and imprisoned.

195. The background that I have so far given of the situation demonstrates quite clearly that Africans can never trust any attributes of sovereignty being given to the racist minority. Let me make it quite clear that we are determined to regain our freedom and any settlement reached between the British Government and that régime which does not provide for "One man, one vote" in the future will be vigorously opposed, even at the cost of our lives—as the world saw early this year. As far as economic warfare is concerned, the régime has been under comprehensive mandatory sanctions for four and a half years now. The result of it brought the settlement proposals between Sir Alec Douglas-Home and Ian Smith. The decision by the régime to opt for a settlement was not an easy one, especially after it had proclaimed to its supporters and the world at large that it was independent and free and would never sit down with the British Government.

196. The reason the régime has not totally collapsed is that sanctions were imposed halfheartedly and that what the United Kingdom Government intended to achieve in Rhodesia was not the same as what the United Nations understood. While the United Nations was determined to get rid of the régime and its racialism, the British Government wanted to bring it back to legality and to retain power in the hands of its kith and kin. Viewing the sanctions policy in terms of the British intention, they have produced the results because the settlement between Britain and the régime has only been prevented by Africans who rejected the proposals and thereby ended the first purpose of sanctions.

197. It is now time for the United Nations to impose genuine sanctions designed to topple the régime and bring about majority rule in the country. These sanctions would have to be viewed with that purpose in mind rather than mere concern with legality.

198. The position of sanctions at the present level of effectiveness continues to isolate the régime and deprive it of much needed foreign exchange. In its desire to achieve a settlement, the régime would like to manoeuvre Britain into a position in which it can be argued that unless a settlement is achieved now the condition of the African majority will deteriorate still further in the future.

199. It is often argued by the British Government that if a settlement is not achieved the régime will introduce *apartheid*. Thus it is said that it is in the interests of the African majority to accept the best terms available now, for the opportunity for any terms will not recur. I should like to inform the international community that the situation in Rhodesia is in no way different from that in South Africa, and in some cases it is far worse. What prevails in the cities of Pretoria, Johannesburg, Cape Town and Durban is duplicated in Bulawayo, Salisbury, Gwelo and Umtali.

200. To claim that the situation of the Africans will deteriorate is purely an attempt to intimidate the British

Government, which claims to have African interests at heart, into legalizing an internationally outlawed régime. I should like the nations of the world to use "One man, one vote" as the criterion for recognizing any future government in my country. Britain has always maintained that it is its intention to make sanctions effective; but we do not believe in the sincerity of this claim because experience has shown that Britain would like to prevent any effective means of handling the régime in Salisbury.

201. At present, Rhodesia survives principally because of the following loopholes in the sanctions. Apart from the refusal of South Africa and Portugal to apply sanctions at all and their deliberate efforts to help Rhodesia avert them, Rhodesia has been able successfully to sell on the world market all its mineral production, and this has clearly expanded in the years since the unilateral declaration of independence.

202. The Byrd amendment, passed last autumn in the United States, has made this even easier. Up to the passing of the amendment, the United States had a good record in terms of applying United Nations sanctions and, in fact, did prosecute its citizens who broke them. Unfortunately, that record has been disastrously marred by the decision to join the racist camp of South Africa and Portugal as the third country in the world openly to defy the United Nations and break sanctions. This is regrettable because the United States, as a permanent member of the Security Council, ought to have realized the effect of flouting Security Council decisions.

203. A number of countries are notorious in breaking sanctions, although they pay lip service to the principle of

applying them. The European countries of the Federal Republic of Germany, France, Belgium, Luxembourg and Italy, as well as others outside Europe, such as Japan, Dahomey and Gabon, have similarly indulged in clandestine trade with the régime. Apart from South Africa, Switzerland acts as a channel for capital funds for the régime. Without the services of the Swiss banks the régime would have collapsed long ago. The activities of transnational companies, such as Anglo-American, Turner and Newall, Rio Tinto Zinc, Falcon and Dutch Biltong, have helped the régime to survive the sanction warfare.

204. The sanctions have effectively cut off key imports, especially machinery, spare parts, tractors and other capital goods. As a result, the economy of the régime is gradually grinding to a halt. To complete this requires, therefore, a rededication by the United Nations to impose stiffer sanctions by extending the blockade, which is presently confined to the port of Beira and to Lourenço Marques, to cover all articles mentioned in Security Council resolution 253 (1968) of 29 May 1968.

205. I should like to make it clear that, from the beginning, the Africans have regarded sanctions as the price for freedom. No one should hesitate to impose them in the belief that the absence of luxury goods in Rhodesia is going to hurt Africans. In the first place, it must be remembered that the imports and exports are confined to the European sector of the economy and they have little bearing on the African population.

*The meeting rose at 6.15 p.m.*