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**1642<sup>nd</sup>** MEETING: 25 FEBRUARY 1972

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#### NOTE

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## SIXTEEN HUNDRED AND FORTY-SECOND MEETING

Held in New York on Friday, 25 February 1972, at 3 p.m.

*President:* Mr. Mohamed FAKHREDDINE (Sudan).

*Present:* The representatives of the following States: Argentina, Belgium, China, France, Guinea, India, Italy, Japan, Panama, Somalia, Sudan, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America and Yugoslavia.

### Provisional agenda (S/Agenda/1642)

1. Adoption of the agenda.
2. Question concerning the situation in Southern Rhodesia:
  - (a) Letter dated 15 February 1972 from the representatives of Guinea, Somalia and the Sudan to the President of the Security Council (S/10540);
  - (b) Fourth report of the Committee established in pursuance of Security Council resolution 253 (1968) (S/10229 and Add.1 and 2);
  - (c) Interim report of the Committee established in pursuance of Security Council resolution 253 (1968) (S/10408).

### Adoption of the agenda

*The agenda was adopted.*

Question concerning the situation in Southern Rhodesia:

- (a) Letter dated 15 February 1972 from the representatives of Guinea, Somalia and the Sudan to the President of the Security Council (S/10540);
- (b) Fourth report of the Committee established in pursuance of Security Council resolution 253 (1968) (S/10229 and Add.1 and 2\*);
- (c) Interim report of the Committee established in pursuance of Security Council resolution 253 (1968) (S/10408\*\*)

1. The PRESIDENT: Referring to the previous decision of the Security Council at the 1640th meeting, I propose to invite the representative of Saudi Arabia to participate without vote in discussions of the item on the Council's agenda.

*At the invitation of the President, Mr. J. Baroody (Saudi Arabia) took the place reserved for him in the Council chamber.*

\* Official Records of the Security Council, Twenty-sixth Year, Special Supplement No. 2 and Corrigendum and Special Supplement No. 2A.

\*\* Ibid., Supplement for October, November and December 1971.

2. The PRESIDENT: The Council will continue its consideration of the question concerning the situation in Southern Rhodesia. At the close of our meeting yesterday, it was agreed that further consultations would be undertaken with regard to the draft resolution introduced yesterday and sponsored by Guinea, Somalia and the Sudan and contained in document S/10541.

3. Mr. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*translation from Russian*): The situation currently developing in Southern Rhodesia is arousing profound concern among the peoples of the world. The Soviet Union shares that concern.

4. In a situation of police terror, political and economic oppression and colonial plunder of the African population, carried out by the Southern Rhodesian racists, with the direct support of the United Kingdom Government, attempts are being made to consolidate this bastion of colonialism and racism in southern Africa, which is detested by the peoples. In these conditions the question of sanctions against the racist Smith régime assumes particular importance.

5. As has already been stressed several times by many representatives, the racist régime in Southern Rhodesia enjoys considerable support from outside—support provided by its friends and protectors. Who these friends and protectors are is common knowledge. First and foremost, there are South Africa and Portugal, the direct partners and allies of the Smith régime in the colonial bloc in southern Africa. Then there is the United Kingdom, which bears the principal and direct responsibility for the rise and the continued existence of the Southern Rhodesian régime. Finally, there are the United States and some of its allies in the NATO military bloc.

6. In this connexion it must be pointed out that recently colonialism and neo-colonialism have been blatantly trying to take the offensive in Africa, with the principal aim of attempting to consolidate for a long time, if not for ever, the white minority racist régime in Southern Rhodesia.

7. By throwing down this open challenge to freedom-loving Africa and international public opinion, the United Kingdom is attempting to give a semblance of legality to the racist régime in Southern Rhodesia, presenting to the world the hypocritical Smith-Home deal, which is clearly directed against the interests of the people of Zimbabwe and the interests of the peoples of Africa. At the same time—and this is no less important—the over-all aim of the imperialist powers is to break through the international

isolation in which the Salisbury régime has found itself as a result of the firm demands and actions of the Afro-Asian and socialist States in the United Nations.

8. As can be seen from the work of the Committee on Sanctions, whose reports are now before the Council, certain Western Powers long ago determined to wreck the sanctions and adopted a policy of directly violating Council decisions on sanctions against the Smith régime.

9. Until now they have claimed that sanctions were being violated only by the privately owned companies of a few Western countries, and that the Governments were not involved in their actions. But it is significant that all the attempts by the socialist and Afro-Asian countries in the Committee on Sanctions to draw up recommendations to the Security Council aimed at ensuring that such violations of sanctions are brought to an end have encountered extremely fierce opposition by the official—I emphasize that, official—representatives of certain Western Powers in the Committee. In particular, when the Committee's fourth report was being drafted, the representatives of certain Western countries applied the tactic of blocking the adoption by the Committee of the concrete conclusions and recommendations worked out jointly by the African countries and the socialist States which, if implemented, would greatly have increased the effectiveness of sanctions against Southern Rhodesia.

10. Anyone who reads the records of the Committee on Sanctions against Southern Rhodesia cannot fail to note that the line taken by certain Western Powers in that Committee has been aimed at depoliticizing that Council body and diverting it from its political work into technicalities, at the sending of all kinds of far-fetched questions and inquiries to Governments, clarifications, checks and counter-checks, and so on and so forth. It is not difficult to see that all this pretended frenetic activity in the Committee is undertaken only to prevent the Committee from seriously carrying out its main task. That task, as laid down in the relevant Security Council decisions, is to consider ways and means by which States might more effectively implement—I emphasize that, more effectively implement—the decisions of the Council concerning sanctions against the illegal régime in Southern Rhodesia, and to make recommendations to the Council.

11. Now certain States are openly attempting to throw aside the Security Council decisions on sanctions, to forget them themselves and to try to make others forget them. A glaring example of the direct violation of a United Nations resolution and a Security Council decision on sanctions which is binding on all States is the behaviour of the United States, whose Congress has in essence struck through the decision of the Council and taken its own decision on the lifting of the embargo on purchases of chrome ore in Southern Rhodesia by the American monopolies. This question is discussed in a special report of the Committee on Sanctions contained in document S/10408 which is now before the Council.

12. Reports are appearing in the press, especially in the African countries, regarding violations of sanctions against Southern Rhodesia by certain other countries too.

13. Thus, the Security Council has to deal with a substantially new situation. The fact is that Portugal and South Africa, those constant violators of Council decisions on sanctions, are now being joined by the United States of America and certain other States.

14. During the work of the first series of meetings of the Security Council away from Headquarters, in Addis Ababa, the question of strengthening sanctions against Southern Rhodesia was given particular attention in the statements of many representatives, and above all those of the representatives of African States.

15. In the draft resolution submitted to the Council at Addis Ababa by its African members—Guinea, Somalia and the Sudan—States were called upon to take more effective and stronger measures to ensure full implementation of the sanctions and to prevent any opportunities for individuals, companies or any other organizations to circumvent or violate them. However, on that occasion, at the Security Council meetings at Addis Ababa, as the peoples of African countries and the whole world could see with their own eyes, the Southern Rhodesian racists were defended and supported as before by their imperialist friends.

16. As has already been pointed out, the Council did not even adopt a relatively weak resolution on Southern Rhodesia because the representative of the United Kingdom voted against it. The peoples of Africa were also able to see one more significant sight: certain delegations from NATO member countries, although they did not vote against that resolution, nevertheless abstained from voting, in such conditions as could only be considered as support for the Southern Rhodesian régime by NATO's "silent minority".

17. As is well known, the United States decision on the removal of restrictions on the import of chrome from Southern Rhodesia evoked profound concern and indignation on the part of public opinion, in particular in the African countries. The General Assembly at its twenty-sixth session adopted a special resolution on that subject, resolution 2765 (XXVI). In that resolution the Government of the United States of America is called upon to take the necessary measures, in compliance with the relevant Security Council decisions, and bearing in mind its obligations under Article 25 of the Charter to prevent the importation of chrome into the United States from Southern Rhodesia.

18. We should also like to recall and draw the attention of the Council to another resolution of the same session of the General Assembly, resolution 2796 (XXVI), and in particular to paragraph 12 thereof. In that resolution, the Assembly draws the attention of the Security Council to the urgent necessity of taking steps to ensure the full and strict compliance by all States with the decisions of the Council, and to the need to widen the scope of the sanctions against the illegal racist minority régime and to impose sanctions against South Africa and Portugal, whose Governments persist in their refusal to carry out the mandatory decisions of the Security Council.

19. The Council cannot ignore the present situation. As is well known, the sanctions introduced by the Security

Council are not only mandatory, but fundamentally imperative. They were adopted in accordance with Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, as is unequivocally stated in all the relevant resolutions of the Security Council. In its resolution 277 (1970), the Council emphasizes the special role of States which bear primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, that is to say the permanent members of the Security Council, in assisting effectively in the implementation of sanctions. The mandatory nature of the sanctions is also reaffirmed in references in Council resolutions to Article 25 of the Charter which states that:

“The Members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the present Charter”.

20. Thus the sanctions which have been applied against the Southern Rhodesian racist régime are mandatory, and no single State has the right to violate them unilaterally.

21. The Soviet delegation expresses support for the demands of the African countries for the strengthening of the effectiveness and the broadening of the scope of application of the sanctions against the racist régime in Southern Rhodesia. In addition, we most firmly support the demand of the vast majority of Members of the United Nations, and particularly the African countries, for the application of sanctions against the colonial and racist régimes of Pretoria and Lisbon, which are undermining the sanctions against Southern Rhodesia and implementing colonial and racist policies on the African continent. The Soviet delegation also supports the recommendations contained in the report of the Committee on Sanctions against Southern Rhodesia to which I have already referred. The delegation of the Soviet Union considers it essential that the Security Council should require the Government of the United States unconditionally to fulfil its direct obligations under the Charter and comply with the sanctions against Southern Rhodesia.

22. The delegation of the Soviet Union strongly condemns these violations of the sanctions against Southern Rhodesia. This action on the part of the Government of the United States is contributing to a consolidation of the racist Smith régime and runs counter to the interests of the people of Zimbabwe, who are carrying out a just revolutionary struggle for their national liberation and for the realization of their inalienable lawful right to self-determination and independence. That right of the people of Zimbabwe has been recognized by the United Nations in many of its decisions.

23. In this connexion it is highly appropriate to recall that even the Government of the United States once publicly stated that it respected the right of the African peoples to self-determination and independence. It even called upon other countries to take the same stand. In his statement in the General Assembly on 22 September 1960, the President of the United States, Mr. Eisenhower, even proposed his own five-point programme for Africa, and the first thing for which the United States President appealed was: “a pledge by all countries represented at this session to respect the

African peoples’ right to choose their own way of life and to determine for themselves the course they wish to follow”.<sup>1</sup>

24. If the Government of the United States was really and sincerely ready to follow the widely publicized declarations it made at that time, it would not have embarked on a course of violating the sanctions imposed by the Security Council against the racist régime in Southern Rhodesia, for such a violation and such a policy on the part of the Government and the Congress of the United States are a direct threat to the national liberation interests of the people of Zimbabwe and are in blatant contradiction with that declaration by the President of the United States. In other words, the deeds of the United States Government should correspond to its words and should not contradict its own statements.

25. In this connexion, the Soviet delegation would like to reaffirm that the Soviet Union has consistently advocated and still advocates the adoption of the most effective measures, in accordance with Security Council and General Assembly decisions, designed to strengthen sanctions against Southern Rhodesia, remove that country’s racist régime, and speedily transfer power in Southern Rhodesia to its lawful holders in that country—the African people of Zimbabwe.

26. Such was, is and always will be the policy and practice of the Soviet Union, its Government and its multinational family of peoples.

27. The working class, the collective farm workers, the intelligentsia—the entire Soviet people—will this year, on 30 December, be celebrating the fiftieth anniversary of the founding of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. This is a great festival for our multinational people. In our multinational country, the national question was one of the basic questions in the construction of a socialist society. The fate of the new system largely depended on finding the correct solution to the problem.

28. The founding and successful development of the USSR is of great international significance and is an important landmark in the social progress of all humanity. Soviet experience in establishing a multinational socialist State, constructing a developed socialist society through the joint efforts of all our peoples, and resolving the extremely complex national question has received recognition throughout the world, and is of invaluable assistance to all those struggling for social and national liberation. As was emphasized in the recent decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union on preparations for the fiftieth anniversary of the founding of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the USSR acts on the international scene as a force which firmly and consistently pursues a policy of peace and friendship, upholds the Leninist principles of the equality of peoples, and speaks out strongly against colonialism, neo-colonialism and racism, and against all forms of national oppression.

29. Our country has established relations with young, national States on a basis of equality, mutual respect,

<sup>1</sup> *Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifteenth Session, Plenary Meetings, 868th meeting, para. 31.*

non-interference in internal affairs, and co-operation of all kinds in the common struggle against imperialism. The Soviet Union consistently supports the revolutionary national liberation movement of the peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America for economic liberation from imperialism and for social progress. The USSR is conducting a policy of international solidarity with patriots who have taken up arms against the remaining colonial and racist régimes.

30. The experience of history and of the international life of peoples teaches us that peoples who are struggling for freedom and national independence very quickly recognize and unmask those international forces which, disguising themselves as friends of the peoples struggling for their national and social liberation, are in fact making a secret deal with the imperialists.

31. No slanderous fabrications, infamous calumnies or hostile insinuations by the enemies of socialism—the ideologies of anti-communism, the proponents of right and “left” revisionism, social traitors of all colours and description, chauvinists and ultra-nationalists—nothing can distort the historical facts, which have been confirmed in international life throughout the existence of the first Soviet Socialist State in the world and throughout the 26 years in which the USSR has been participating in the activities of the United Nations.

32. No-one and nothing can shake the bonds of friendship, mutual understanding and common revolutionary liberation struggle in the united anti-imperialist, anti-colonial and anti-racist system of the peoples of the Soviet Union, the countries of the socialist community and the peoples of Africa.

33. The delegation of the Soviet Union has studied the draft resolution submitted for the consideration of the Council by Guinea, Somalia and the Sudan. We will say, frankly, that we would have preferred a stronger draft. We expect that, as a result of consultations and redrafting, this draft resolution will be strengthened, and we shall vote in favour of it, since the African representatives consider it acceptable and since it is aimed at ensuring strict compliance by all States with the decisions on sanctions previously adopted by the Security Council. However, in our opinion, the Council cannot limit itself to a mere reaffirmation of its previous decisions on this subject. In order to ensure that the sanctions introduced against Southern Rhodesia are more effective and make a greater contribution to the liberation of the people of Zimbabwe from racist tyranny, it is essential to go further. First of all, the scope of sanctions against the racist Smith régime should be widened. But this is not enough. It is also essential to apply strict sanctions against South Africa and Portugal, who are the major violators of the Security Council decisions on sanctions against the racist régime in Southern Rhodesia. Such action is required of all of us, of the Security Council, by the General Assembly’s decision at its twenty-sixth session set out in resolution 2796 (XXVI).

34. The PRESIDENT: I understand that the sponsors of draft resolution S/10541 have, as a result of their consultations with other members of the Council, decided to make

certain modifications in that draft. In order to save time I shall call upon the representative of Somalia, on behalf of the sponsors, to introduce the revised draft resolution, which is now being processed and, I understand, will be available later this afternoon.

35. Mr. FARAH (Somalia): Following the discussions in the Security Council yesterday afternoon, the sponsors of the draft resolution have made certain changes therein. They take into account the proposals which were made by the representatives of France and India. They also take into account representations which were made to the sponsors by several other delegations after the conclusion of yesterday’s meeting.

36. Only one change has been made in the preamble to the draft resolution. In the second paragraph, the word “*Reaffirming*”, will be replaced by the word “*Recalling*”.

37. Several changes have been made in the operative part of the draft resolution. Operative paragraph 1 will read as follows:

“1. *Decides* that the present sanctions against Southern Rhodesia shall remain fully in force until the aims and objectives set out in resolution 253 (1968) are fully achieved.”

38. When we speak of the “aims and objectives” of resolution 253 (1968), we are concerned not only with the application of sanctions. In addition, paragraph 2 of that resolution also:

“1. *Calls upon* the United Kingdom as the administering Power in the discharge of its responsibility to take urgently all effective measures to bring to an end the rebellion in Southern Rhodesia, and enable the people to secure the enjoyment of their rights as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations and in conformity with the objectives of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV);”

This important resolution, as members are aware, received a unanimous affirmative vote in the Security Council. It is in this light and in this spirit that the sponsors have agreed to rephrase operative paragraph 1 of the draft.

39. Operative paragraph 2 has been rephrased to read:

“2. *Urges* all States to implement fully all Security Council resolutions establishing sanctions against Southern Rhodesia, in accordance with their obligations under Article 25 and Article 2, paragraph 6, of the Charter of the United Nations, and deplores the attitude of those States which have persisted in giving moral, political and economic assistance to the illegal régime;”

40. Operative paragraph 3 has been rephrased to read:

“3. *Declares* that any legislation passed, or act taken, by any State with a view to permitting, directly or indirectly, the importation from Southern Rhodesia of any commodity falling within the scope of the obligations imposed by resolution 253 (1968), including chrome ore,

would undermine sanctions and would be contrary to the obligations of States;”.

41. Operative paragraph 4 has been rephrased to read:

“4. *Calls upon* all States to refrain from taking any measures that would in any way permit or facilitate the importation from Southern Rhodesia of commodities falling within the scope of the obligations imposed by resolution 253 (1968), including chrome ore;”.

42. The last change concerns operative paragraph 6, the original text of which has been replaced by the following:

“6. *Requests* the Committee established in pursuance of Security Council resolution 253 (1968) to meet, as a matter of urgency, to consider ways and means by which the implementation of sanctions may be ensured and to submit to the Council, not later than 1 April 1972, a report containing recommendations in this respect, including any suggestion which the Committee might wish to make concerning its terms of reference and any other measures designed to ensure the effectiveness of its work”.

43. Those are the changes the sponsors have agreed to make following consultations with the delegations around this table.

44. My attention has just been drawn to a statement the rebel leader Smith has given to the press which is reproduced in a magazine called *To the Point* being circulated in this and many other countries of the English-speaking world. It is interesting in that it shows the thinking of the Smith régime on this very important question of sanctions. Mr. Smith was asked: “After the settlement will you expect Britain to undertake diplomatic action on Rhodesia’s behalf to get other States to resume normal relations with you?” The answer was:

“I am not sure to what extent we could expect action on our behalf to try and encourage other people to recognize us. What the British will do as far as they themselves are concerned is to recognize us and legalize our position. We are satisfied that the strained relations which exist at the moment between ourselves and other countries with whom we were friendly in the past hinge solely on the question of our so-called illegality, and many of them have made it clear to us that they are happy about the present situation and they look forward to restoring normal relations . . .”.

45. Then he was asked if it was not correct that his main obstacle would probably be the Afro-Asian bloc in the United Nations and that “Britain would presumably have to secure the cancellation of the sanctions resolution, since it was passed at her instigation, albeit under the previous Labour Government”. His reply was as follows, and it is important that members take account of this reply:

“This is quite a difficult legal problem, but as we see it, and here our people agree with British legal experts, there is no need for concurrence of the United Nations. Britain simply has to notify the United Nations of the fact that

they have now legalized the position of Rhodesia. Once they have done that, the present sanctions will automatically fall away. You see, they were sufficiently . . . wise enough at the time of going to the United Nations and asking for sanctions, to hinge the whole exercise on the words ‘the illegal Rhodesian régime’—‘illegality’ of the Rhodesian Government. Now once they remove the ‘illegality’, and it has always been accepted, even by the United Nations, that this was a British problem, that only Britain could do this—they have always accepted that. It would be difficult for them now to try to claim that Britain cannot carry out this exercise. So once Britain has carried out the exercise”—he is referring to the test of acceptability—“as we see it, they simply have to notify the United Nations that we are no longer ‘illegal’ and then the whole sanctions resolution will fall away.”

46. This is the thinking of the Smith régime, and currency is being given to the assertion that the United Nations would simply endorse any action taken by the United Kingdom, as if the United Nations itself had no responsibility in the matter. This is a view which my delegation does not accept. We do not believe that according legal recognition to the rebel régime would in any way remove responsibility for the situation in the Territory from the United Nations. The United Nations has the responsibility, as has been spelt out in various resolutions of the General Assembly and of the Security Council, to ensure that the illegal régime is brought to an end and that the people of the Territory are accorded their right to self-determination and independence in accordance with General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV). On this point the whole of Africa cannot compromise.

47. The PRESIDENT: I call on the representative of the United States on a point of order.

48. Mr. BUSH (United States of America): Is it your intention, Mr. President, to put this draft resolution to the vote today after all the speakers have been heard?

49. The PRESIDENT: I think perhaps we can decide that question when we have the draft resolution before us. I am afraid I cannot give an answer at this moment.

50. Mr. FARAH (Somalia): It is true that the consultations on the revised draft resolution did not end until five minutes before the commencement of this meeting. In all fairness to delegations we should give them time to receive instructions on the revised text, so that all will have had an equitable opportunity of expressing themselves fully before the vote.

51. The PRESIDENT: The next name on the list of speakers is that of the representative of Saudi Arabia. I invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

52. Mr. BAROODY (Saudi Arabia): I wish to thank you, Mr. President and members of the Council, for allowing me to address myself again to the item with which you are concerned. I refrained from speaking during the previous meeting so as to give the sponsors of the draft resolution

before the Council an opportunity to have consultations with other members of the Council and perchance to come to an agreement on a workable text that would yield tangible, if not practical results. The modifications to the draft resolution, as presented by my good friend Mr. Farah of Somalia, are pertinent as far as legalities are concerned, but I was hoping that the Council would not dwell only on the question of sanctions. I do not want to repeat what I said during the 1640th meeting about sanctions, which are desirable, but unfortunately not implementable. Therefore it looks to me as if we are propitiating ourselves by talking about certain proposals that cannot be put into practice. After all, I am the representative of a Member of the United Nations. Though Saudi Arabia is not a member of the Council, it allows me to air my views here from my humble experience of the past 27 years.

53. The Committee on Sanctions meets here at the Headquarters of the United Nations. Its members are colleagues of ours. I do not want to call them bureaucrats or economists or financiers. All I want to say is that there are men of good will who sit on committees and talk and talk about what should be done, without any result therefrom. Let us face the facts. My good friend and colleague the representative of the Soviet Union made an excellent statement this afternoon. Although he also spoke about the ideology of his country, which is quite permissible, I will refrain from talking about my own country. He spoke about technicalities and clarifications and said he expected the co-sponsors to do something about them. Then, if I may quote him, he said that we should "consider ways and means by which States might more effectively implement . . . the decisions of the Council". The decisions of the Council take shape in resolutions. I would say that this is one of scores of resolutions that have been adopted by the Council. I would ask my friend from the Soviet Union—or, for that matter, anyone who would like to tell me—how we are going to give teeth to the resolution of the Council. Will there be another resolution that will be printed by the ream and sent to the press section on the third floor? I believe the correspondents are dismissing such resolutions with two or three lines in the world press because they have become redundant.

54. Somebody might take exception to this and say, "Should we do nothing, therefore?" We should do something, but we should explore other avenues and not be stymied by following a course that has not so far yielded results as far as sanctions are concerned. There was something very revealing in what Mr. Malik said, namely that, if we were going to apply sanctions, they should equally be applied to South Africa and Portugal. But I have told the Council time and again—and Mr. Malik was sitting here—that Portugal is a member of NATO. It is not going to be disavowed by the other members of NATO. Let us face the facts. Nor is South Africa to be discounted as far as Western economic and financial operations are concerned. Let us assume that the Council adopts a resolution that is stronger than the one before us. Who is going to police the ships that carry the chrome ore or the tobacco of Southern Rhodesia? What country? Does the United Nations have ships? If it has ships, do they have authority to shoot at any cargo ship carrying the ore? I submit they do not.

55. I should like to recall something to your memory. At one time certain States—I shall not name them, so as not to embarrass them—wanted to patrol the Red Sea in 1956, allegedly to prevent the slave trade. That was prior to the Suez adventure. I had to go to Geneva in May and uncover the plot before it happened. I went and participated in a certain conference there as an observer, but I asked to be heard and my analysis of the situation was correct. The United Nations was supposed to authorize two States to use their own warships to patrol the waters in our region. Anyway the whole scheme backfired and I must say that I had a little finger in making it backfire because I revealed what the intentions were of certain Powers in that period. But I do not want to touch the susceptibilities of States by recalling what happened in the past.

56. I am asking this of my good colleagues around this table, and especially my non-African colleagues, because our African colleagues do not have the means of patrolling the seas in order to stop cargoes of chrome or tobacco or any other commodity which is exported by Southern Rhodesia or South Africa, or Portugal, for that matter. If the United States Congress has lifted the ban on chrome for economic reasons it is deplorable—I agree with our friend Ambassador Malik. We get back to economics, because I believe they use chrome in the American car industry. All those cars are rusting anyway. I am no longer buying cars from this country. They do not have enough chrome or whatever is needed. Their cars are rusting and they need the ore. And economics is more important than politics. It is deplorable. Would the Soviet Union and Saudi Arabia for that matter—although they are communists and we are monarchists we are of the same view that it is unfair that there should be no sanctions—be willing to patrol the seas unless they had the authority of the Council? It is true, of course, that Saudi Arabia has no warships. But let us get down to brass tacks. The Council would not give the Soviet Union the authority to patrol the seas and confiscate any chrome cargoes or any commodity emanating from Southern Rhodesia. The British Government would fall overnight if it seized any cargoes—overnight. Let us face the facts. It is deplorable. We do not like it, but there are many things in life that we do not like.

57. Oh, my friends who follow legalities, as I did when I was young, will say there are ways and means. They will say that there is a certificate of origin—that when you want to ship something, you have to issue a certificate of origin. But what if the certificates of origin are falsified so as to appear not to relate to embargoed commodities? The tradesmen and the exporters have a way of doing things when there is a demand for a commodity or for any sort of import into a country. Suppose the chrome is sent by way of Portugal. Portugal is a member of NATO. Who is going to chastise Portugal? The British or the Americans? Nobody will chastise Portugal. Therefore it is not practical. You say, "Well, it is better than nothing". But this is nothing itself; the draft resolution means nothing. I am an Asian and I am bound to tell my African brothers and tell you all—you are all my brothers, for that matter—the truth. Therefore why waste the time of the Council just to propitiate our friends from Africa or Asia, or those who are of the same opinion from other continents, for that matter, like Latin America, who would like to see sanctions applied because they feel



that these people, the blacks of Southern Rhodesia, should exercise the right of self-determination? When Ambassador Malik mentions South Africa and Portugal and said that sanctions should be applied against them, I agree fully with him. But it is not practicable. That is the tragedy of it all.

58. I began to think and think during the last two days about the other avenues. I do not say that this draft resolution submitted by my good friend Ambassador Farah, and Ambassador Fakhreddine and my good friend and brother from Guinea should be discarded. By all means go ahead and vote for it. Even if nobody vetoes it I submit that it cannot be implemented. What are the other avenues? I will not call it my inspiration. The days of inspiration in the United Nations are gone. But I did a little analysis and got my cue from the White Paper entitled "Rhodesia: Proposals for a Settlement", issued by Her Majesty's Stationery Office and presented to Parliament by the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs by command of Her Majesty, November 1971. If we turn to section VI of the proposals, we read as follows:

"The British Government will provide up to £5 million per year for a period of 10 years in capital aid and technical assistance to be applied to purposes and projects to be agreed with the Rhodesian Government to be matched appropriately by sums provided by the Rhodesian Government for this development programme."<sup>2</sup>

59. My idea is to refer you back to resistance by non-violence or what was called when I was young, in the days of Mahatma Gandhi, "satyagraha". I would not instigate all the black workers in Southern Rhodesia, to strike in all industries, because they would starve. But let them start with one industry, the chrome industry. Let them boycott mining chrome ore. Let us have a draft resolution to that effect, something that will stir the Government of Mr. Ian Smith and make it think twice. And I would ask my British colleague to tell his Government to consider contributing the £5 million per year in order to give the strikers enough money to live on. This is a radical solution. Where is the Soviet Union, which talks about radical solutions? This is a radical solution. Members will see how Ian Smith and his cohorts will accelerate the process of self-determination, because it will pinch their pockets. Why do we not create a fund—beginning with the £5 million which the British Government might consider contributing—a United Nations fund so that the workers who refuse to work in the chrome mines can be paid from that fund. In that way the chrome can be stopped at the source. Chrome is a heavy metal, but once it is produced it will fly like feathers from Southern Rhodesia abroad. Do not tell me how they will smuggle it out and about the certificates of origin.

60. We had an Asian leader at one time—may God rest his soul in peace—none other than Mahatma Gandhi. And Mahatma Gandhi was not the initiator of "satyagraha". The initiator was the Emperor Asoka.

61. I told the Council the last time I spoke here that I read financial reports, and not merely financial papers. Subse-

quent to my statement, what I read seeped into the financial press. I am not going to embarrass anybody by mentioning names, but members will know. I shall do it, as we usually say, without mentioning the names of States. The article states:

"Rhodesian chrome ore is on its way to a certain country"—and to reassure our friends, the socialist countries, I wish to state that it is not one of the socialist countries—"with the first cargo scheduled for discharge sometime next month. Prior to the embargo such ore cost \$32 a ton. Subsequent prices charged by the Russians"—who produce ore too—"for chrome ore, probably including some of Rhodesian origin, more than doubled."—I think that is mischievous. They wanted to pass on the guilt to the Russians, so I am giving you the benefit of the doubt.—"Upon the lifting of the embargo, Soviet traders have shaded their price by about \$5 a ton. Hopes are high that once United States imports have become routine, the price will drop to a little above the pre-embargo level."

62. Now if there were "satyagraha", the Russians could sell their ore at \$64 per ton. I am speaking in terms of dollars and not roubles. Even if it is an eroded dollar, it is still a dollar. This is not a joke. These are figures.

63. I should like to tell the Council what happened. I studied the chrome situation myself. For some time the Southern Rhodesians placed a restraint on themselves not to export chrome in large quantities. They have a word for it, namely, stockpiling. They stockpiled their chrome to get a better price for it at the right time. At that juncture, Russian chrome shot up in price, which is natural. The demand was more than the supply. When the demand for Russian chrome was much higher, the American manufacturers brought pressure on their Congress to lift the embargo, which is a natural thing to do. Even if it came from the devil, and not from Rhodesia, they would still have it. They would take it from the devil himself, as long as it was chrome. That is the game. It is not a political United Nations game. It is a supply-and-demand game. It is the non-application of sanctions. It is, in a way, not a beautiful game. It may be called a little dirty this game, but that is the way of life. We cannot alter life to make it as we would like it to be.

64. Therefore, I believe that the pronouncements of presidents and kings and high members of Governments, regardless of the ideology to which their countries belong, do not solve the problem. Ambassador Malik of the Soviet Union cited what Mr. Eisenhower had said. I remember his five points. He was a very sincere man in the sense that he sent the National Guard to a little town called Little Rock in Arkansas to enforce desegregation. And I thought he was wrong. When I said in the Third Committee that I thought he was wrong, members perked up their ears, as if to say, "Who is this Baroody to say that President Eisenhower was wrong?" My statement is on the record. I said that desegregation should be brought about by education and understanding and not at the points of bayonets. Therefore, let us not quote people in high office. They are not sacrosanct. They make mistakes or they may be misguided. They are human.

<sup>2</sup> See *Official Records of the Security Council, Twenty-sixth Year, Supplement for October, November and December 1971*, document S/10405, annex B.

65. The only way to bring about results, my good friends from Africa—and I speak as one of you—would be to explore new avenues. Try them: they may succeed. If they fail, nothing is lost. What can the Committee on Sanctions do? They meet here and talk and talk and talk, and all that talk is printed in reams, with no effect. What we need is goodwill. And I am afraid that even Governments with goodwill sometimes have their hands forced by the traders, by the manufacturers, as the Congress did. I have lived long enough in this country, and so has Ambassador Malik, to know that if they do not go along with the people who pay for their campaigns they will not return them to office. They will excommunicate them from politics. They will say "You are not good representatives". So they have to bend and do what those who elect them want them to do.

66. But if there is goodwill on the part of the United Kingdom Government, it will entertain the idea of creating a fund which will begin with £5 million a year so that the United Nations—not the United Kingdom, because the United Kingdom cannot afford to do it—will sustain the miners in the chrome industry who strike and refuse to produce the chrome. Why do you not think of such a draft resolution and see what happens, instead of drafting resolutions about sanctions. I am exasperated with resolutions that are not worth the paper on which they are printed.

67. Let us remember that we are insolvent here in the United Nations. We are adopting all these futile resolutions, trying to cure our ills, as an Arab proverb says, by treating the fever with a watermelon poultice in the age of antibiotics. Let us try something radical, from within. This is the language that Ian Smith and his régime and his cohorts understand, the thing that pinches their pockets, and not an academic gathering addressing itself to sanctions. Oh, if I were he I would be laughing up my sleeve. Think of effective measures. Think of that which would force him, perhaps, to accelerate—I would not say overnight—the process of self-determination.

68. The PRESIDENT: Since there are no other names on the list of speakers, I should like, with the permission of the members of the Council, to make a statement as the representative of the SUDAN.

69. The Council of Ministers of the Organization of African Unity, during its recent session in Addis Ababa, again considered the problem of Southern Rhodesia, a problem that has come to pose itself as a challenge to the will and determination of the people of Africa to live in freedom and dignity. The representatives of Africa at that session reaffirmed their adherence to the objectives of the Charter of the Organization of African Unity. They pledged the support of the countries of Africa to the struggle for liberation of the people of Zimbabwe. They also appealed to all the peoples of the world to lend their support to that struggle.

70. The Council of Ministers of the Organization of African Unity, in the name of its Chairman, addressed a message to this Council which reads as follows:

"At a time when the Security Council is once again considering the question of Rhodesia, the Council of

Ministers of the Organization of African Unity, which is currently holding its eighteenth session and is also considering the same problem, wishes to express the profound concern of the African peoples over the grave situation which prevails in Southern Rhodesia.

"The holding of a special session of the Security Council in Africa had raised immense hopes precisely in view of the explosive situation which prevails in southern Africa. The rejection of draft resolution S/10606 of 2 February 1972, as a result of the United Kingdom veto, represents a real challenge to all our peoples.

"The Council of Ministers of OAU reaffirms that the current situation in Southern Rhodesia constitutes a grave threat to international peace and security.

"The Council of Ministers of OAU also reaffirms the full responsibility of the United Kingdom, which, as administering Power, is bound to take the necessary measures to enable the Zimbabwe people to accede to independence in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV).

"The Council of Ministers of OAU wishes to express its full support for Bishop Abel Muzorewa, Chairman of the African National Council of Zimbabwe, whom the Security Council will hear on the situation in Southern Rhodesia, and expresses the hope that the Security Council, and in particular its permanent members, will re-examine the question of Rhodesia fundamentally, on the basis of draft resolution S/10606, in order to repair the historic error of 4 February 1972 and the wrongs committed against the peoples of Africa."

One wonders if the historic error will be repaired. One wonders if it is not vain to hope that those who have primary responsibility for the fate of the 5 million Africans of Zimbabwe will not abandon them to the fascist government of Ian Smith and his South African allies.

71. Our meeting here, seven years after the Council adopted its first resolution on economic sanctions against the rebel régime [*resolution 217 (1965)*], in order to reassert the validity of those sanctions, is evidence of the ineffectiveness of those measures when the means of their enforcement are lacking and the scope of their application is so limited.

72. Seven years ago the African members of the United Nations pointed out that if economic sanctions against the Smith régime were to be effective, they had to be mandatory. The Government of the United Kingdom, which had declared to the world that the downfall of the illegal régime in Southern Rhodesia would take place in a matter of weeks, did not heed the African counsel at that time.

73. Three years later Britain awakened to the need for mandatory sanctions. However, by 1968, when the Security Council finally adopted resolution 253 (1968) to this effect, the rebel régime had had time enough to brace for

the siege and prepare its economy for circumventing the sanctions.

74. The psychological shock effect of the sanctions had been lost by their piecemeal application. The rebel régime not only survived but was immeasurably encouraged and sustained by the open defiance by South Africa and Portugal of the mandatory sanctions.

75. In imposing mandatory sanctions by its resolutions 253 (1968) and 277 (1970) the Council expected all States to respect their obligations under Article 25 of the Charter of the United Nations. South Africa and Portugal never fulfilled that expectation. Indeed, they declared their intention to continue normal trade with Southern Rhodesia, and proceeded to do so without regard to the Security Council, or to its resolutions. In its fourth report the Committee on Sanctions stated that South Africa and Portugal "not only continue to maintain military, trade and other relations with Southern Rhodesia, but . . . also encourage the issuance in their respective territories of the misleading documents of origin of the goods, thus assisting the illegal [régime] and other countries in evading the sanctions." [See S/10229, chap. VI, appendix III, para. 2.] The report goes on to say that ensuring the implementation by South Africa and Portugal of the sanctions remains the most urgent and pressing objective.

76. It is relevant to point out here that besides South Africa and Portugal other countries, as revealed by the data in the reports of the Committee on Sanctions, have continued to maintain their trade with Rhodesia. Recently, the United States Government saw fit to ignore General Assembly resolution 2765 (XXVI), which called upon it to prevent the importation of chrome from Rhodesia and proceeded to enact legislation to make this possible. The argument put forward in defence of this action was partly that the amount thus imported would be "insignificant compared to contraband quantities imported by other countries". That argument is not convincing. It is not convincing because it seems to seek to legitimize the open contravention of an internationally binding obligation by asserting and citing instances of its clandestine violation.

77. It was observed by the Committee on Sanctions that:

"Despite the lack of reliable and up-to-date information on Rhodesian trade, it would appear to the Committee that this is still at a high level, and it is probable that some sectors of industry and tourism are developing. Tobacco production and exports continue to be significantly affected by sanctions, but output and export of other crops are more dependent on climatic conditions . . . To a considerable extent the loss stemming from lower tobacco production has been made good by new exports, particularly of minerals . . ." [ibid, appendix II, para. 3].

78. The international community has undertaken to chastise the rebel régime in Rhodesia for its denial of the most basic rights of the Africans of Rhodesia. It is bound to uphold this decision. This Council is obliged, legally and morally, to see to it that the sanctions remain in force until the people of Southern Rhodesia are able to exercise their legitimate right to self-determination and independence freely in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples.

79. The draft resolution before the Council calls for no more than the full and conscientious implementation of economic sanctions against Southern Rhodesia, and that Member States respect and fulfil their obligations in this respect. That is not an extravagant or unrealistic demand.

80. The people of Africa now realize that it is by their efforts and struggle that they can attain their freedom. But in asserting this we cannot claim that we are thereby absolved. We have to reaffirm our faith in the right of all people to be free. We have to endeavour to establish conditions in which their freedom is attained in peace. Otherwise we shall have failed; we shall have failed because we lacked the will to support our high hopes.

81. The three African members of this Council are offering us the means to renew our resolve that we should not fail. The choice remains ours.

82. Speaking again as PRESIDENT, I would say that there are no other names on the list of speakers and I accordingly propose to adjourn the meeting to afford members of the Council an opportunity to study the revised draft resolution which has been introduced by the representative of Somalia on behalf of Guinea, Somalia and the Sudan. That revised draft resolution is now available in three languages [S/10541/Rev.1]. I hope we shall be able to take a decision on it early next week.

#### Statement by the President

83. The PRESIDENT: Before I adjourn the meeting I should like to bring to the attention of the Council a letter I received today from the representative of Lebanon, which will be distributed shortly as document S/10546.

84. I understand that all the representatives on the Council will be available for a meeting tomorrow morning in order to consider the question raised by the letter, and, accordingly, the next meeting of the Council will be held tomorrow morning at 10.30.

*The meeting rose at 5.40 p.m.*

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