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NOTE

Symbols of United Nations documents are composed of capital letters combined with figures. Mention of such a symbol indicates a reference to a United Nations document.

Documents of the Security Council (symbol S/. . .) are normally published in quarterly *Supplements of the Official Records of the Security Council*. The date of the document indicates the supplement in which it appears or in which information about it is given.

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SIXTEEN HUNDRED AND EIGHTH MEETING

Held in New York on Monday, 6 December 1971, at 3.30 p.m.

President: Mr. I. B. TAYLOR-KAMARA (Sierra Leone).

Present: The representatives of the following States: Argentina, Belgium, Burundi, China, France, Italy, Japan, Nicaragua, Poland, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Syrian Arab Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and United States of America.

Provisional agenda (S/Agenda/1608)

1. Adoption of the agenda.
2. Admission of new Members:
Letter dated 2 December 1971 from the President of the United Arab Emirates to the Secretary-General (S/10420).
3. (a) Letter dated 4 December 1971 from the Permanent Representatives of Argentina, Belgium, Burundi, Italy, Japan, Nicaragua, Somalia, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/10411);
(b) Report of the Secretary-General (S/10410 and Add.1);
(c) Report of the Secretary-General on the situation along the cease-fire line in Kashmir (S/10412 and Add.1).
4. Question concerning the situation in Southern Rhodesia:
(a) Letter dated 24 November 1971 from the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/10396);
(b) Fourth report of the Committee established in pursuance of Security Council resolution 253 (1968) (S/10229 and Add.1 and 2);
(c) Interim report of the Committee established in pursuance of Security Council resolution 253 (1968) (S/10408).

Statement by the President

1. The PRESIDENT: The Security Council is engaged in a discussion of a very grave problem which is causing untold suffering on the subcontinent of South Asia. As President of the Security Council I should therefore like to make a strong appeal to all members of the Council, as well as to

those invited to take part in the discussion, to make every effort to employ moderate language so as to avoid in any way exacerbating the situation or further inflaming passions. Likewise I would urge that in the interests of accommodation and orderly procedure we all avoid bringing into our remarks any extraneous issues which might better be raised in another forum.

Adoption of the agenda

2. The PRESIDENT: The provisional agenda for today's meeting comprises three items in accordance with the decision taken yesterday. The first substantive item concerns the admission of a new Member to the United Nations. It is expected that that item can be quickly dealt with, as the Council will have to consider only the procedural aspect of the admission. The next item is the one discussed yesterday and the day before, which has been included in the agenda in view of the extreme urgency of the problem and the continuing serious and grave situation between India and Pakistan.

3. As the representative of Sierra Leone, I wish to say that I am very distressed by the continuation of bloodshed on the Indian subcontinent. Indeed it seems to me that in view of the immense suffering of the population, which is further aggravated by the continuation of hostilities, the Council is in duty bound to take this matter up after we have disposed of the procedural aspects of the first item.

4. The third item on the agenda is the question concerning the situation in Southern Rhodesia, which has been included in the agenda in accordance with the decision taken at the 1605th meeting.

The agenda was adopted.

Admission of new Members

Letter dated 2 December 1971 from the President of the United Arab Emirates to the Secretary-General (S/10420)

5. The PRESIDENT: Rule 59 of the provisional rules of procedure of the Security Council provides that unless the Council decides otherwise applications shall be referred by the President to the Committee on the Admission of New Members. Accordingly, unless I hear a proposal to the contrary, I shall ask that Committee to study the application of the United Arab Emirates and to submit its report thereon to the Security Council as soon as possible.

6. As no member of the Council has asked to speak at this stage, I take it that my proposal is adopted.

7. Mr. FARAH (Somalia): Now that the Council has adopted a decision to submit the application of the United Arab Emirates for admission to this Organization to the Committee on the Admission of New Members, I should like to urge that that Committee expedite its report so that the Council can consider it at its next meeting. I understand that that meeting is likely to take place tomorrow. In this manner the way will be cleared for the question of the admission of the new State to be taken up quickly by the General Assembly.

8. Mr. TOMEH (Syrian Arab Republic): I should like to support the proposal made by the representative of Somalia to the effect that since the Committee on the Admission of New Members has been scheduled to look into the matter tomorrow its decision should be communicated to the Security Council if possible at our meeting tomorrow, so that the final decision by the Council also may be taken tomorrow—this in view of the fact that the application of the United Arab Emirates for membership of the Arab League has already been approved by that body.

9. The PRESIDENT: In accordance with the decision that has been taken, the application of the United Arab Emirates is referred to the Committee on the Admission of New Members for examination and report. I would suggest that a meeting of that Committee be tentatively scheduled for tomorrow morning at eleven, so that it will be in a position to meet if the Security Council is not meeting.

10. That concludes our consideration of this item of our agenda for this afternoon.

(a) Letter dated 4 December 1971 from the Permanent Representatives of Argentina, Belgium, Burundi, Italy, Japan, Nicaragua, Somalia, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/10411);

(b) Report of the Secretary-General (S/10410 and Add.1);

(c) Report of the Secretary-General on the situation along the cease-fire line in Kashmir (S/10412 and Add.1)

11. The PRESIDENT: At its 1606th meeting the Council decided to invite the representatives of India and Pakistan to participate in the discussion of the item on its agenda without the right to vote. In accordance with that decision, and with the consent of the Council, I shall invite the representatives of India and Pakistan to take places at the Council table.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. S. Sen (India) and Mr. A. Shahi (Pakistan) took places at the Council table.

12. The PRESIDENT: At its meeting yesterday the Council also decided to extend invitations to the representatives of Tunisia and Saudi Arabia to take the seats reserved for them at the side of the Council table, with the understanding that they would be invited to take a seat at the Council table when it was their turn to address the Council. Accordingly, I shall, with the consent of the Council, invite the representatives of Tunisia and Saudi Arabia to take the seats reserved for them at the side of the Council table.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. R. Driss (Tunisia) and Mr. J. Baroudy (Saudi Arabia) took places at the Council table.

13. The PRESIDENT: As I stated yesterday before adjourning the meeting, the Council still has before it the draft resolution submitted by the People's Republic of China [S/10421], and the six-Power draft resolution [S/10425], to which the Council may wish to address itself now, but we understand that consultations are still taking place on the Chinese draft resolution which therefore may not come up at this meeting.

14. I call on the representative of the Soviet Union on a point of order.

15. Mr. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*translated from Russian*): Mr. President, you mentioned the six-Power draft resolution in document S/10425. One of the sponsors is not a member of the Security Council. As far as I am aware, it is not the practice in the Security Council for a non-member of the Council to co-sponsor a resolution. If a representative of a State which is not a member of the Security Council is invited to participate in the work of the Council, he is usually invited without the right to vote and, if he submits a proposal, that proposal should be submitted at his request by a member of the Security Council. I should like to have an explanation on this point.

16. The PRESIDENT: The point of order raised probably relates to rule 38 of the rules of procedure, which I will read for the benefit of members before taking any decision:

"Any Member of the United Nations invited in accordance with the preceding rule, or in application of Article 32 of the Charter, to participate in the discussions of the Security Council may submit proposals and draft resolutions. These proposals and draft resolutions may be put to a vote only at the request of a representative on the Security Council."

It is quite clear that the representative of Tunisia applied for permission to participate and that that application was granted, and in fact he did participate; so it is for members of the Council now to decide.

17. Mr. TOMEH (Syrian Arab Republic): To ensure the correct procedure of our meeting, I would state that the question here is whether a Member of the United Nations can or cannot co-sponsor a draft resolution before the Council. Rule 38, states, in its last sentence:

"These proposals and draft resolutions may be put to a vote only at the request of a representative on the Security Council."

So the question here is, who is the member of the Security Council who, in accordance with rule 38, is acting on behalf of the representative of Tunisia in co-sponsoring the draft resolution? That is my understanding of rule 38 in this particular case.

18. Mr. VINCI (Italy): It is my understanding that if a representative of a Member State takes part in the

discussion on a particular item and is entitled to introduce a draft resolution on his own he can very easily be a co-sponsor of a resolution introduced by members of the Council itself. I think that once he has the right to participate he can do that; but the draft resolution cannot be put to the vote unless that is requested by a representative on the Security Council. We have to wait until that stage. It is only at that stage that the question can be raised whether a Member State which is not a member of the Council can be a co-sponsor of a draft resolution.

19.. Apart from that, I know there are several precedents for Member States not members of the Council co-sponsoring draft resolutions. I may be wrong, but I think that on the question of Jérusalem there were co-sponsors of a draft resolution that were not members of the Council. Perhaps the Secretariat could supply the information.

20. I repeat that in my view the question does not arise at this stage. We have to reach the stage of voting, and at that time any objection could be raised and we could consider it; but we are not at that stage yet.

21. The PRESIDENT: Perhaps I might quote from the repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council, the Supplement of 1964-1965. I read, for the benefit of members of the Council:

"At the 1188th meeting on 30 December 1964, in connexion with the situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the President (Bolivia) called attention to an amendment submitted by eighteen African States to the joint draft resolution under consideration before the Council. The President then explained that under rule 38 of the provisional rules of procedure, the amendment could be put to the vote only at the request of a representative of the Security Council.

"The representative of the USSR after commenting on the draft resolution requested that the amendment of the eighteen African States be put to the vote."

22. The representative of Tunisia has asked to be allowed to speak. I invite him to take a place at the Council table and to address the Council.

23. Mr. DRISS (Tunisia) (*interpretation from French*): I thought that the item on the Council's agenda was the question of the deterioration of the situation between India and Pakistan, but since the Council started these meetings there has been much talk about Tunisia. First, it was a question whether Tunisia had a right to participate in the debate, and now it is a question whether Tunisia has a right to co-sponsor a draft resolution.

24. Tunisia is seeking to facilitate the work of the Council. We do not wish to place obstacles in its path. Accordingly, I wish to state that Tunisia withdraws as a co-sponsor of the draft resolution, in order to facilitate the work of the Council and so that the debate will not be prolonged on a procedural question.

25. I appeal to the Council to consider the grave situation—and I emphasize, grave situation—which exists on the

Indo-Pakistan subcontinent. It is time to take measures. It is time to decide on a cease-fire and the withdrawal of forces from all the occupied territories.

26. I launch this appeal on behalf of my country, my Government and President Bourguiba.

27. The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Tunisia for his willingness to compromise.

28. Mr. SEVILLA-SACASA (Nicaragua) (*interpretation from Spanish*): First I should like to congratulate you most warmly Mr. President as you take over the Presidency of the Security Council for the month of December. We are confident you will be successful as you carry out your mandate, because we are aware of your ability and international experience. As I express my best wishes to you, I am reminded of the outstanding performance of Ambassador Kufala in November which we appreciated and applauded with personal satisfaction.

29. Yesterday the delegation of Nicaragua joined the delegation of Argentina, Belgium, Burundi, Italy, Japan, Sierra Leone and Somalia in submitting to the Security Council for consideration draft resolution S/10423 which, as we know, was not adopted by the Security Council.

30. Nicaragua, its people, its Government and, of course, its delegation to the United Nations intensely regret what has been happening in some of the frontier regions between India and Pakistan, two neighbouring nations which geography and history joined so that they might march forward together in the earnest search for greater progress for their noble peoples.

31. Much blood of both peoples has been shed; much more will flow if they fail seriously to ponder the consequences of the armed conflict on which they have embarked and if the United Nations, either here in the Security Council or in the General Assembly, does not adopt specific measures in accord with the requirements of the gravity of the conflict.

32. My country—which has the smallest population among all the countries now participating in the Security Council but which has very pure ideals and a great sense of responsibility in regard to the duties we assumed when we signed the Charter at the San Francisco Conference—is concerned over the tragedy which overwhelms these friends of ours. We should like to make some contribution to promote understanding between their national Governments and statesmen.

33. Since the Charter of the Organization was adopted, many decisions have been taken in order to preserve peace throughout the world. The leaders of peace-loving countries have taken effective measures reflecting their firm determination to safeguard international order, to guarantee the territorial integrity of States, as well as their political independence, and to protect the rights and fundamental freedoms of man. Let us recall in this connexion General Assembly resolution 377 (V)—the "Uniting for peace" resolution—which was adopted at a historic meeting during the fifth session of the General Assembly, held at Lake

Success, on 3 November 1950, in conformity with the draft resolution which was submitted by the then Secretary of State Dean Acheson—of whom those of us who had the honour to know him and work with him have very fond memories. That resolution contains practical provisions of incalculable value, instilling faith and confidence in all those who, believing in our system of collective security, were disheartened to observe the paralysis which had occurred because of the inexorable provisions of Article 27 of the Charter. Under that resolution the General Assembly, which without a doubt is the most representative and democratic organ within the United Nations, assumes what is only its proper function—to maintain peace and, as the Charter states,

“to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind”.

34. If the Security Council finds itself paralysed because of the continued use of the veto, then the General Assembly can take action in a special session and adopt such measures as it deems appropriate to impose order and maintain international peace and security.

35. I well remember that the “Uniting for peace” resolution was unanimously endorsed by the Foreign Ministers of the Republics of the Americas at their Fourth Consultative Meeting. The American peoples once again expressed their solidarity, thus confirming the prophetic words of President Franklin Delano Roosevelt when he spoke about the faith of the continent in the peace of the world and our ability to offer that faith as a sound hope to our brothers overseas.

36. The Security Council must take action and take action soon. If it does nothing, then the General Assembly must act, for we cannot by any means accept the assumption that it is only this organ—the Security Council—which should concern itself with international peace and security. Neither the Security Council nor the General Assembly can remain idle while machine-guns take thousands of lives in a region where understanding and a sense of brotherhood should flourish.

37. That is all I wished to say at this hour of grave responsibility. Mr. President, let us do something; let us do something and do it soon.

38. The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Nicaragua for the kind words he said about me.

39. Mr. HUANG Hua (China) (*translated from Chinese*): First, I should like to know whether we have started to discuss the draft resolution submitted by Belgium, Italy, Japan, Nicaragua and Sierra Leone [S/10425].

40. The PRESIDENT: Not yet.

41. Mr. HUANG Hua (China) (*translated from Chinese*): Then I do not wish to speak now. However, when we do start to discuss that draft resolution, I should like to speak.

42. Mr. KOSCIUSKO-MORIZET (France) (*interpretation from French*): As the French delegation indicated yester-

day, we have redoubled our efforts to achieve rapidly a solution acceptable to all members of the Council, or at least a solution which would not precipitate any veto. The basis of our effort was the initial draft resolution of our Belgian, Italian and Japanese friends. With our United Kingdom friends we associated ourselves with them. It was natural, after all, for the representatives of this old continent of Europe, which is all too familiar with war and which has been able to overcome its age-old hatreds, to make an effort at peace.

43. We took into consideration not only the initial draft resolution—the eight-Power draft resolution—but, indeed, all the views, without any exception, that have been expressed here by those who have taken part in our debates. It seemed to us in the present state of affairs that a draft resolution largely based upon previous texts could win the greatest support without arousing any unshakable opposition. We have drawn up a text which I am going to read out now because it is important for it to be set down in the Council records. The Council, as a matter of fact, will recognize passages which are not new. They are paragraphs of previous draft resolutions. Our text reads as follows:

“*The Security Council,*

“*Noting the reports of the Secretary-General of 3 and 4 December 1971,*

“*Having heard the statements of the representatives of India and Pakistan,*

“*Gravely concerned that hostilities have broken out between India and Pakistan which constitute an immediate threat to international peace and security,*

“*Recognizing the need to deal appropriately at a subsequent stage, within the framework of the Charter, with the issues which have given rise to the hostilities,*

“*Convinced that a rapid political solution will be necessary for the restoration of conditions of normality in the region of the conflict and for the return of refugees to their homes,*

“*Conscious of the responsibility incumbent upon it under the pertinent provisions of the Charter of the United Nations,*

“1. *Calls upon the Governments concerned to order forthwith, as a first step, an immediate cease-fire, the cessation of all military activities and mutual disengagement;*

“2. *Urges that efforts be deployed to create the necessary conditions for the voluntary return of refugees from East Pakistan in accordance with the Charter;*

“3. *Asks all States to co-operate fully with the Secretary-General with a view to lending assistance to these refugees and alleviating their plight;*

“4. *Requests the Secretary-General to keep the Council promptly and regularly informed of the implementation of the present resolution;*

"5. *Decides* to follow the situation closely and to meet again as soon as necessary."

44. This draft resolution will not be submitted because the consultations that have been held have convinced us that it would meet with objections. But we are not here in order to measure each other's strength, to count heads or to defy each other; we are here to assume, under the Charter, our responsibilities for international peace and security. The only victory we wished to achieve was that of peace. It is, unfortunately, peace which is today blocked and it is the United Nations, perhaps because it has not got the material forces to separate the combatants, which has again failed. Arms will therefore settle a question which we have not been able to solve, and that will add further victims to those which have already aroused strong feelings and indignation throughout the world.

45. We wish on behalf of the French delegation to say that we shall not associate ourselves with, nor be resigned to, this failure.

46. Mr. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*translated from Russian*): The Security Council has before it a draft resolution by five member countries of the Council [S/10425]. The Soviet delegation does not doubt the good intentions and the sincere desires of the sponsors of that draft resolution to contribute to the solution of the problem being discussed by the Council. However that draft, like a number of others so far submitted for consideration by the Security Council, suffers from the same fundamental defect. It deals with only one side of the serious problem that has arisen in East Pakistan, and its international repercussions which have complicated the situation in the Indian subcontinent—the cessation of the hostilities commenced by the Pakistan armed forces against neighbouring India.

47. After two days of tense and comprehensive discussion and in view of the information and obvious facts which the Security Council has now gleaned from the statements and documents, there can be no doubt left in anybody's mind that the main cause of the military conflict that has broken out in the Indian subcontinent is the well-known actions by the Pakistan Government to suppress the lawful demands and aspirations of the East Pakistan population.

48. The military conflict in that region is the direct consequence of the violence, terror and mass repression using sophisticated weaponry conducted over a period of many months to thwart the clearly expressed will of the 75 million inhabitants of East Pakistan. The people of East Pakistan were obliged to respond to this by armed resistance and counteraction. The Government of Pakistan, not being in a position to settle the acute political crisis in East Pakistan by political means or to thwart the will of the population of that part of the country by repression, undertook military action against a neighbouring country—an action which resulted in military conflict and an aggravation of the situation.

49. The purpose of this is quite obvious to everyone. It was to shift responsibility for the actions of the Pakistan military authorities on to a neighbouring country and to

attempt to justify the terror and violence used there, which reached such vast proportions that they caused the death of many thousands of peaceful inhabitants and the flight of almost 10 million people to the territory of a neighbouring country.

50. In his introductory remarks after the opening of today's meeting of the Security Council, the President of the Council vividly reminded us all once more of the sufferings of those many millions of people. As has already been pointed out, if that is not taken into account, it will be impossible to find the right solution to the problem that has arisen or to find an approach towards settling it.

51. In the light of this reality, the approach proposed in the five-Power draft resolution is inadequate and one-sided and cannot contribute to the restoration of peace in the area and the establishment of a state of stability. Without decisive, rapid and effective elimination of the main cause of the serious tension on the Indian subcontinent which has resulted in a military conflict and has already acquired an international dimension, the Security Council cannot adopt a correct and effective decision.

52. Hence, it is absolutely essential that the question of a cease-fire should be inseparably linked with a demand that the Government of Pakistan should simultaneously take effective action towards a political settlement in East Pakistan, giving recognition to the will of the East Pakistan population, as expressed, clearly and definitely, in the elections of December 1970.

53. The Security Council cannot close its eyes to this political reality which exists in that region and try to resolve only one side of the conflict, one side of the problem, leaving unattended the principal source of serious tension, and the main cause and source of the conflict which has developed into an armed clash in the Indian subcontinent and become an international problem. If the Security Council were to close its eyes to that reality and adopt a one-sided course, it would merely create an illusion, a semblance of action and not real action.

54. In questions of such importance and international political significance, the Security Council cannot act without taking into consideration the political reality involved. This is called for by the Charter of the United Nations and in particular the Articles mentioned by the Soviet delegation in its statement yesterday.

55. In the situation that has arisen the right course and the one that the Council must follow can only be the adoption of a decision in which both questions—that of a cease-fire, and that of the recognition by Pakistan of the will of the population of East Pakistan—are indissolubly and inseparably linked. In other words, both questions—the cease-fire and the political settlement—must be most closely and inseparably linked. That is what the delegation of the Soviet Union has been striving for, is striving for and will continue to strive for throughout the discussion of this question. We admit that such an approach may not be to the liking of some people, but that is their business. We are deeply and firmly convinced that our approach is right, just and based on a consideration of the real situation that has arisen on the Indian subcontinent.

56. The people of East Pakistan are free to decide, through their elected representatives, the question of renewing talks with the Pakistan Government and relations with it. As we have already stated, the defect of the five-Power draft resolution is precisely that it does not correlate the question of the cease-fire with that of attaining a political settlement in East Pakistan—one which would take into account the will, the inalienable rights and the lawful interests of the population of that part of the country. The Soviet delegation cannot countenance such an approach.

57. Some representatives, while supporting an immediate cease-fire, at the same time apparently do not notice, close their eyes to or disregard the possibility of a continuation of the bloodshed, reprisals, and killing of the population of East Pakistan by the armed forces of the Pakistan Government. In other words, they are not pursuing a political settlement.

58. The Soviet Union, like any other peace-loving country, cannot remain indifferent to the events that have occurred on the Indian subcontinent. As was emphasized in a TASS statement on 5 December of this year:

“...the Soviet Union calls for a speedy end to the bloodshed and for a political settlement in East Pakistan on the basis of respect for the lawful rights and interests of its people.” [See S/10422.]

59. It is precisely with this in mind and with this realistic approach that the Soviet delegation considers that the Security Council must take the appropriate measures swiftly, taking into account the real nature of the problem under consideration in all its complexity, and considering all its aspects, and principally the two main ones—a political settlement and a cessation of hostilities.

60. The Council must be realistic. The Council must take into account in its decision the organic link between the two questions which constitute the problem under consideration. I repeat once again: the organic link between the question of a cease-fire and the question of a political settlement in East Pakistan, and an appeal to the Government of Pakistan simultaneously to take effective action towards a political settlement, giving immediate recognition to the will of the East Pakistan population.

61. In the light of this approach and taking into consideration the real situation in East Pakistan and on the Indian subcontinent, the Soviet delegation is introducing the following amendments to the five-Power draft resolution:

“1. In operative paragraph 1, replace the words ‘the Governments concerned’ by the words ‘all parties concerned’; at the end of the same paragraph, add the words ‘and cessation of all hostilities’.

“2. Between operative paragraphs 1 and 2, insert the following new operative paragraphs 2 and 3:

“2. Calls upon the Government of Pakistan simultaneously to take effective action towards a political

settlement in East Pakistan, giving immediate recognition to the will of the East Pakistan population as expressed in the elections of December 1970;

“3. Declares that the provisions of operative paragraphs 1 and 2 of this resolution constitute a single whole;”

“3. Renumber the remaining operative paragraphs accordingly.” [S/10426/Rev.1.]

62. Those are the amendments which the Soviet delegation is introducing to the five-Power draft resolution. The adoption of the five-Power draft resolution with these amendments could be a real and effective step by the Security Council to put an end to the bloodshed and to take measures for a political settlement of the complex political problem that has arisen in East Pakistan.

63. In that case, the Soviet delegation would vote for that draft with the amendments it has introduced. Without such amendments, the Security Council resolution would not achieve its purpose and would be unable to serve as an effective instrument for settling the conflict in the Indian subcontinent. Unless the amendments are adopted the Soviet delegation cannot support the five-Power resolution.

64. The PRESIDENT: I call on the representative of Italy on a point of order.

65. Mr. VINCI (Italy): I asked for the floor on a point of order because I thought there were other names on the speaker's list and that it would be best—before the whole Council became involved in a long discussion on the draft resolution introduced by Belgium, Italy, Japan, Nicaragua and Sierra Leone—to make an announcement on behalf of the sponsors.

66. We have decided to withdraw this draft resolution. I shall now explain why. It was my understanding, Mr. President, from your reply to the representative of China, Mr. Huang, that we had not yet started the discussion of this draft resolution. If I did not raise a point of order at that time it was out of respect for the representative of the Soviet Union, since I did not want to prevent him from introducing his amendments and illustrating them.

67. Before explaining why we came to this conclusion I should like to recall once again that the concept of a political solution of which Ambassador Malik has spoken had already been taken into consideration by four of the sponsors of the draft resolution of which I am speaking, who, together with four other delegations, had already sponsored and introduced the draft resolution contained in document S/10423. Of course, the wording was different from that of the amendments introduced by the Soviet Union, but for the record I want to say that we took due consideration of that concept and introduced it into the draft resolution.

68. I now come to our reasons for deciding to withdraw our short draft resolution calling for a cease-fire. They are very simple. We thought yesterday we still had the duty to

try to make a last attempt to stop the fighting, shooting and bloodshed. I am not sure that the timing was good. Unfortunately, we realized yesterday, as we realize today, that that draft resolution could not command support and be adopted. I want to say that unfortunately in the last 24 hours developments and events have been such that the whole situation has radically changed, and in these circumstances I can even accept the judgement of Ambassador Malik that the draft resolution we have placed before the Security Council is inadequate. We have therefore concluded that since the draft resolution is no longer up to date we should not press for a vote but should even withdraw it. That will save the Council's time and give it the possibility of speeding up its work.

69. The PRESIDENT: I now give the floor to the representative of India.

70. Mr. SEN (India): I think I owe it to the Council to report certain developments which have taken place since we adjourned last night. About an hour and a half after that adjournment the Prime Minister of India, Mrs. Gandhi, made a statement in our Parliament, in New Delhi. I think I can do no better in discharging my duty than to read her statement as she delivered it in the Indian Parliament. She said:

✓ "The valiant struggle of the people of Bangla Desh in the face of tremendous odds has opened a new chapter of heroism in the history of freedom movements. Earlier they had reported a democratic victory in their elections, and even the President of Pakistan had conceded the right of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman to become the Prime Minister of Pakistan. We shall never know what intervened to transform this benevolent mood and realistic approach—if it really was that—to destruction and a posture of open hostilities and repression.

"We are told that Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and his party, the Awami League, had planned a non-violent movement of resistance to the Government of West Pakistan but were caught unawares and overtaken by a brutal military assault. They had no alternative but to declare independence. The East Pakistan Rifles and the East Bengal Regiment became Mukti Fauj and later Mukti Bahini, which was joined by thousands of young East Bengalis determined to sacrifice their lives for their freedom and right to fashion their future. The unity, determination and courage with which the entire population of Bangla Desh is fighting have been reported by the world press. These events on our doorstep and the resulting flood of refugees into our territory could not but have far-reaching repercussions on our country. It was natural that our sympathy should be with the people of Bangla Desh in their just struggle, but we did not act precipitately in the matter of recognition. Our decisions were not guided merely by emotion but by assessment of the prevailing and future realities. With the unanimous revolt of the entire people of Bangla Desh and the success of the struggle it has become increasingly apparent that the so-called mother State of Pakistan is totally incapable of bringing the people of Bangla Desh back under its control. As for the legitimacy of the Government of Bangla Desh, the whole world is now aware that it reflects

the will of the overwhelming majority of the people, which not many Governments can claim to represent. In Jefferson's famous words to Governor Morris, the Government of Bangla Desh is supported by 'the will of the nation substantially expressed'."

"Applying this criterion, the military régime in Pakistan, whom some States are so anxious to buttress, is hardly representative of its people even waging war against India. The normal hesitation on our part not to do anything which could come in the way of a peaceful solution or which might be construed as an intervention has lost significance. The people of Bangla Desh battling for their very existence and the people of India fighting to defeat aggression now find themselves partisans in the same cause. I am glad to inform the House that in the light of the existing situation and in response to the repeated requests of the Government of Bangla Desh, the Government of India has, after most careful consideration, decided to grant recognition to the People's Republic of Bangla Desh. It is our hope that with the passage of time more nations will grant recognition and that the People's Republic of Bangla Desh will soon form a part of the family of nations.

"Our thoughts at this moment are with the father of this new State, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. I am sure that this House would wish me to convey to their Excellencies, the acting President of Bangla Desh and the Prime Minister, and their colleagues, our greetings and warm felicitations. I am placing on the table of the House copies of communications which we have received from the Government of Bangla Desh. The Honourable members will be glad to know that the Government of Bangla Desh has proclaimed its basic principles of State policy to be democracy, socialism, secularism and the establishment of an egalitarian society in which there will be no discrimination on the basis of race, religion, sex or creed. With regard to foreign relations the Bangla Desh Government has expressed its determination to follow a policy of non-alignment, peaceful coexistence and opposition to colonialism, racialism and imperialism in all its manifestations. These are the ideals to which India also is dedicated. The Bangla Desh Government has reiterated its anxiety to organize the expeditious return of the citizens who have found temporary refuge in our country and to restore their lands and belongings to them. We shall naturally help in every way in these arrangements. I am confident that in future the Governments and peoples of India and Bangla Desh, who share common ideals and sacrifices, will forge a relationship based on the principles of mutual respect for each other's sovereignty and territorial integrity, non-interference in internal affairs, equality and mutual benefits. Thus, working together for freedom and democracy, we shall set an example of good-neighbourliness which alone can ensure peace and stability and progress in this region. Our good wishes to Bangla Desh."

71. I read this statement in full because I believe it is important enough to be recorded in full and for people to hear it in full. But more important than that, this recognition of Bangla Desh has put the relationship of India to Bangla Desh in a completely different legal, political and

constitutional context; and I would request the Council to realize this new development before any decision is taken.

72. Since we have now recognized Bangla Desh, I think I should take a few minutes of the Council's time to go back—not too much, but a little bit—into the history. It has been said that the autonomy movement led by Sheikh Mujibur Rahman soon became a movement for independence, and that this would have brought about the disintegration of Pakistan. May I just read a very short paragraph from Sheikh Mujibur Rahman's presentation of the six-point programme which is the formula for autonomy? This is what he says:

"Sixthly, let me humbly remind my West Pakistani brothers and sisters that when we demanded Bengali to be made one of the two State languages of Pakistan you condemned it as a move to undo Pakistan. When, again we demanded a joint electorate, particularly in the context of parity in the presentation demanded by you, you condemned that demand as being inspired from across the border. Both of these two demands have now been accepted, but there has been no undoing of Pakistan due to their acceptance. Does it not put you to shame that every bit of reasonable demand of East Pakistan has got to be secured from you at tremendous cost and after bitter struggle, as if snatched from unwilling foreign rulers as a reluctant concession? Does it do you any credit? Please put a stop to such attitude once and for all. Please be brothers instead of rulers."

73. Now, after the military crackdown, as I pointed out yesterday, independence was suddenly declared. And this is what the Prime Minister of the new State of Bangla Desh has to say on that:

"Pakistan is now dead and buried under a mountain of corpses. The hundreds and thousands of people murdered by the army in Bangla Desh will act as an impenetrable barrier between West Pakistan and the people of Bangla Desh. By resorting to pre-planned genocide Yahya must have known that he was himself digging Pakistan's grave. The subsequent massacres perpetrated by his orders, by his licensed killers, of the people were not designed to preserve the unity of the nation. They were acts of racial hatred and sadism, devoid of even the elements of humanity. Professional soldiers, on orders, violated their code of military honour and were seen as beasts of prey who indulged in an orgy of murder, rape, loot, arson, destruction, unequalled in the annals of civilization. These acts indicate that the concept of two countries is already deeply rooted in the minds of Yahya and his associates who would not dare commit such atrocities on their own continent. Yahya's genocide is thus without political purpose. It serves only as the last act in the tragic history of Pakistan which Yahya has chosen to write with the blood of the people of Bangla Desh. The objective is genocide and scorched earth before his troops are either driven out or perish. In this time he hopes to liquidate all political leadership, intelligentsia, and administration, to destroy our industries and public amenities. And, as a final act, he intends to raze our cities to the ground. Already his occupation army has made substantial progress towards this objective. Bangla Desh will be set back

50 years as West Pakistan's parting gift to a people they have exploited for 23 years for their own benefit."

This declaration was made on 17 April 1971. ✓

74. In this context I should like to read an article which appeared in *The New York Times* today. Some of the members may have read it, but perhaps the non-English-speaking members have not. In order to respect the wishes expressed by the representative of the United States, I shall leave out from this article all references to the Nixon Administration, to the President, and so on. I hope, however, he will indulge me if I do include in my reading references to our own Government and to our own Prime Minister, however critical they may be. This is what is said:

"Suppose that Britain, in the 1930s, had responded to Hitler's savagery by the early threat or use of military force instead of appeasement . . .".

"So one must think after the American statement over the week-end blaming India for the hostilities with Pakistan. Few things said in the name of the United States lately have been quite so indecent. The anonymous State Department official who made the comment matched Uriah Heep"—I do not know this gentleman—"in sheer oleaginous cynicism about the facts of the situation and about our own moral position."

"Consider first the immediate origins of this dispute. They are exceptionally clear as international relations go."

75. May I make a diversion? For nine months now the international community has received a large number of reports written by most distinguished civil servants both of this Organization and of its specialized agencies. If the Council is not even prepared to listen to the Bangla Desh representative because of procedural and other political reasons, which I have not understood and against which I have protested, surely these reports could have been made available. But no, that will do harm to whatever interests are being served by this debate. Now I continue the quotation:

"The military junta that rules Pakistan under President Yahya Khan held an election. The largest number of seats was won, democratically, by a Bengali party that favoured effective self-government for East Pakistan. Yahya thereupon decided to wipe out the result of the election by force."

76. Now I should like to call the attention of those gentlemen who still preach democracy to bear this point in mind. I continue reading from *The New York Times*:

"Last March West Pakistan troops flew into the East in large numbers and began a policy of slaughter. They murdered selected politicians, intellectuals and professionals, then indiscriminate masses. They burned villages. They held public castrations."

"To compare Yahya Khan with Hitler is of course inexact. Yahya is not a man with a racist mission but a

spokesman for xenophobic forces in West Pakistan. But in terms of results—in terms of human beings killed, brutalized or made refugees—Yahya's record compares quite favorably with Hitler's early years.

"The West Pakistanis have killed several hundred thousand civilians in the East, and an estimated ten million have fled to India. The oppression has been specifically on lines of race or religion. The victims are Bengalis or Hindus, not Czechs or Poles or Jews, and perhaps therefore less meaningful to us in the West. But to the victims the crime is the same.

"This record has been no secret to the world."

That is why I refer to the reports which are already available in the United Nations but which, for some reason, have not seen the light of day. I continue to read:

"...The refugees were there in India to be photographed in all their pitiful misery." I then leave out a sentence, and go on:

"...not a word about the most appalling refugee situation of modern times. Private diplomacy was doubtless going on, but there was no visible sign of American pressure on Yahya Khan for the only step that could conceivably bring the refugees back—a political accommodation with the Bengalis.

"Pakistan's argument was that it was all an internal affair. Yes, like the Nazi's treatment of German Jews. But even if one accepts as one must that Pakistan was bound to defend its territorial integrity, this issue had spilled beyond its borders. The refugee impact on India very soon made it clear that the peace of the whole subcontinent was threatened.

"It was as if the entire population of New York City had suddenly been dumped on New Jersey to feed and clothe—only infinitely worse in terms of resources available. Yet when Indira Gandhi went to the capitals of the West for help in arranging a political solution in East Pakistan, she got nothing.

"The Indians can be sanctimonious"—I do not mind quoting against my country, my Government or my Prime Minister from a newspaper of repute—"Mrs. Gandhi acts for political reasons, not out of purity of heart. India has helped the Bangla Desh guerrillas and, in recent weeks, put provocative pressure on East Pakistan. All true. But given the extent of her interest and the intolerable pressure upon her, India has shown great restraint."

"After all, India has not intervened in a civil conflict thousands of miles from her own border."

I shall skip the rest of that paragraph.

"American policy towards the Indian subcontinent is as much of a disaster by standards of hard-nosed common sense as of compassion. India may be annoying and difficult, but she does happen to be the largest nation in

the world following our notions of political freedom. In position and population she is by far the most important country of Asia apart from China. To alienate India—worse yet, to act so as to undermine her political stability—is a policy that defies rational explanation."

77. It is not my habit to give quotations either from newspapers or anything else, but since we are coming to the conclusion of the debate I thought I should depend on some other and wiser people and not only on my own statements and conclusions.

78. Here is Senator Church, who has just come back from India. I shall not read the whole of his statement, which he made only this morning, because it would take rather too much time, but I shall read the two brief concluding paragraphs:

"I find it odd to understand why there is such a pro-Pakistani bias in American policies. India's position in the war which has now broken out is not only consistent with her professed ideals but is also the position which is most likely to prevail. By showing such favoritism towards West Pakistan we side with the probable loser and we forfeit the good will of the freedom-fighters in East Pakistan, as well as the people of India.

"Unless one believes that West Pakistan represents the wave of the future on the subcontinent it is impossible to reconcile this Government's bias towards Yahya Khan's Government with the role in regard to the interests of the United States."

79. Of course, we are not interested in, or even concerned with, the interests of the United States. The United States is quite capable of looking after its own interests in a variety of ways. One of the ways has been to cut off economic aid to India recently—yesterday, I think—but we can live with that. We are not frightened by any threats or cuts. But we have to consider what we should do.

80. Before the Council proceeds to the vote—and I hope I may have another opportunity to explain a few more details on the various resolutions and put our point of view once again before the Council—at this stage I shall make a few other comments on our attitude to the resolutions.

81. First, after all we have said, not only now but over the last few months, we cannot expect that any man of reason should equate India with Pakistan in any resolution or decision. We do not expect that, and we certainly do not accept it. We do not expect any reasonable man to do it, and if he does we cannot accept it. We are not in the same category as Pakistan. If, Mr. President, you wish me to elaborate, I can do so; but I think the point is already well known.

82. Secondly, we think it is wrong, illogical, undesirable—disastrous, even—to have to come to a decision without taking into account the point of view of the Bangla Desh representatives, the representatives of the main party involved in these tragic circumstances. However, it is not the first time that the Security Council or the United Nations has taken an unrealistic decision simply to show

that it is up and alive and can act. We are not letting the Council down. Fair enough. We are all faithful Members of the United Nations and we should uphold the dignity and prestige of all its organs. But let us not say that by adopting a purely unrealistic resolution we have done anything except console ourselves. That by itself would not be so bad, but if in the process we give a false hope to the world at large that, I think, will be a disaster.

✓ 83. Thirdly, we shall not, we cannot and we must not accept any resolution or decision which does not go to the root cause of the matter. It is no good saying we think we should cut off a limb here or a limb there to save the life. The fact of the matter is that this body has been rotting for nine months and no one has taken any notice. Now, after all these years, when we come to this extraordinary session of the Council, not to go to the root cause is another shibboleth on which no solid foundation can be built. We are meeting here in an extraordinary session—and how extraordinary it is. Pakistan is shrieking and shouting about aggression and so on, and yet it did not ask for a Council meeting. Has any gentleman at this table stopped to think why it has not? Probably they do not have to think. Probably they know. Over the last nine months, how many attempts have been made to bring the question to the Council or any other United Nations body? All attempts have been frustrated.

84. My friend and colleague, the representative of Italy, was President of the Security Council in the month of August, I think. On 20 July the Secretary-General sent his memorandum. Why was that memorandum not acted upon? We all know why. In the month of July the representative of Pakistan was flying from Geneva to New York to stop any discussions here, to stop any discussions there; and those attempts went on for months. Reports were suppressed; discussions were inhibited; a complete veil of silence and secrecy was thrown over this. Then suddenly we come up and say, "The world is in flames. We must do something. But we must not consider any of the vital problems." That is an approach which we totally deplore and certainly denounce.

85. The PRESIDENT: I now call on the representative of Pakistan.

86. Mr. SHAHI (Pakistan): Only yesterday I quoted for the second time to the Security Council excerpts from an important paper, which has been given the most serious consideration by government circles in India, about India's plan to bring about the dismemberment of Pakistan and to use the Security Council as an instrument to legitimize the creation of the secessionist Bangla Desh state. I am sure that what I quoted must be fresh in the minds of the members of the Council and I shall refrain from quoting it again.

87. Only yesterday and the day before the representative of India stated that these were the views of theoreticians and academicians in India, but now it is finally clear that that plan has been followed with meticulous exactitude and the Government of India has announced recognition of Bangla Desh.

88. The representative of India quoted *in extenso* from Mrs. Gandhi's statement of yesterday giving the reasons for this act of war against Pakistan. She said that it was a valiant struggle which had opened a new chapter in the history of the freedom movement. And let it be noted that this new chapter was inaugurated by subversion and aggression.

89. If the President of Pakistan did designate Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, as the Leader of the majority party in the National Assembly, as the Prime Minister, and if because of the disagreement of political factions within my country his plan for the transfer of power to Sheikh Mujibur Rahman could not materialize, did it justify a neighbouring State's fomenting armed civil strife and launching an armed attack against Pakistan? If a commission is given in a country to the leader of a political party, even a majority party, to form a Government and it is not executed for one reason or another, however right or wrong it may be, does another country embark on aggression and subversion to promote freedom in that country?

90. Now we are told that the Mukti Bahini is fighting and that the Security Council must make an assessment of the realities, and the representative of India talked of the success of the Mukti Bahini. What is the reality? The Mukti Bahini is a mere auxiliary of the 120,000 Indian armed forces which have unleashed armed attacks on Pakistan. It can play only a subsidiary role. It is under the occupation army of India that this Mukti Bahini will function. And it is to that Government, set up by the occupying authority, that this Security Council is expected to extend some kind of acknowledgement, if not recognition.

91. We have been told about the high-sounding proclamations of democracy, secularism, freedoms and what-not. We know that words are not tantamount to actions. In how many constitutions, in how many declarations and proclamations in every country in the world are these words not used? Are we to be guided just by rhetoric and eloquence? In India itself democracy does not function in several of its provinces; they are under direct Presidential rule. And secularism is honoured more in the breach than in the observance. Militant groups let loose murder and slaughter against religious minorities—and we are asked to take the word for the deed.

92. We were also told about foreign relations of Bangla Desh and its policy of non-alignment. The mentor of that Government has set the example of non-alignment by concluding the Indo-Soviet military alliance.

93. The representative of India talks of the freedom of Bangla Desh. In 1905, that same East Pakistan, which was part of Bengal Province, achieved its emancipation from the economic exploitation and domination of the capitalists and caste Hindus of Calcutta and became a separate province within India—that was done by the British Government in 1905. But those same capitalists, industrialists, the caste Hindus of India, carried on a ceaseless agitation of murder, assassination and terror, and forced the British Government to annul the partition. So the separation of East Pakistan—which took place in 1905 because it had been exploited for two centuries, both under British

rule and subsequently by the privileged classes in India—was annulled and East Pakistan was again made a part of Bengal, so that the rule of the privileged classes was reimposed. It is only the Pakistan people and their strength that stand between that kind of reimposition of domination and the development of the people of East Pakistan in freedom and as the dominant partners and the dominant elements in the political life of Pakistan.

94. Then the representative of India went into the history of the movement for autonomy, talked of the six points and quoted from Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. Well, let me tell you something about the six points.

95. On 23 March—two days before the Federal Army had to take action to suppress the massacres of non-Bengali elements that were being perpetrated by the secessionist elements—the leaders of the secessionist movement, or the leaders of the Awami League, presented a draft proclamation to President Yahya Khan stating that it was their last word and that the President of Pakistan could take it or leave it; in it they also said that Pakistan shall be a confederation—from a Federal State it was to transform itself into a confederation. The other political parties believe that confederation is an association of two sovereign States and not a union of provinces or states into one single whole.

96. Surely this was a legitimate point of view with which one may agree or not agree, but how does this become the concern of India? In other words, the Pakistan Government was asked to accept an ultimatum to transform Pakistan into a confederation of two sovereign States. And yet, we have a lecture from the representative of India about how we should conduct ourselves in regard to the ordering of our constitutional and political life. Let him first study his own Constitution and see how much autonomy is given to the provinces. How much autonomy does West Bengal, his own province, have in the Indian federation? To what extent are the resources of Bengal and Assam spent within those provinces?

97. Then again in every forum the Indian representatives repeat that hundreds of thousands of people have been murdered by the Pakistan armed forces. It is a matter of the deepest regret that he shows no human feeling in regard to those murdered by the secessionist elements. There were people here in the so-called delegation of Bangla Desh who set up slaughter-houses in which thousands of people were massacred before 25 March when the army had to intervene and afterwards. And these people come here to represent Bangla Desh. There is living proof of these atrocities and if members of the Security Council want to turn away from propaganda and what the columnists write, and want to find out for themselves, we shall provide them with the means of doing so.

98. The representative of India talked the other day about films shown by his delegation. We have these films but we have spared your feelings. But, you are welcome to come and see them if you so desire. I can understand his relish that Pakistan is dead and buried. Let me tell him, it lives and will survive, in spite of Indian aggression.

99. Then he quotes something from *The New York Times*. This is an article by the columnist Anthony Lewis. I have read many of his articles before. But, that is the opinion of one individual. Did he go to Pakistan to find out the other side of the picture? Did he take care to inform himself of the real facts before he printed his column in this newspaper which is read by half a million people in the United States? Did he compare notes with other correspondents of equally respectable papers like the *Manchester Guardian* who have given a different assessment? This is the kind of propaganda to which the representative of India resorts to divert the attention of the Council from Indian aggression and occupation of our territory. If we begin quoting correspondents where are we going to end? All right, if you want to quote correspondents I shall quote James Reston who said in yesterday's *New York Times*:

“For Prime Minister Gandhi to talk about the ‘wanton and unprovoked aggression’ of Pakistan, when her own Government’s troops have been constantly inside East Pakistan and her colleagues have made no secret of their aid to the East Pakistani insurgents or their desire to see East Pakistan separated from West Pakistan, is really an affront to the intelligence of the world.”

And the representative of India considers the intelligence of this distinguished and august gathering so low that he persists in his misrepresentations. I continue the quotation:

“Mrs. Gandhi did not even consider allowing United Nations observers to see what was going on along the Indian—Pakistani borders, which is interesting, since she is now defending the war as a moral crusade against the Pakistani aggressors.”

100. The representative of India cannot resist referring to the Government of Pakistan as a military junta. Several Member States are ruled—and these are not my words but his words—by military juntas and he went on to say:

“President Yahya Khan decided to wipe out the results of election by force.”

101. If President Yahya Khan did not wish to promote restored democracy in Pakistan in the first place why would he have held elections and why should they have been held in an atmosphere of freedom which he himself hailed afterwards? Was it not far easier for him to crush the aspirations of the Bengali people before the elections, which would not have caused a whimper in the world? Yet good and honest intentions if they are prevented from being realized are denounced and the most vicious motives are ascribed. And from whom do they come? From India. We know that we can expect nothing better from India than permanent hostility.

102. As regards what Senator Church may have said: I regret that Senator Church had nothing to say about subversion and aggression. He expressed himself on a certain aspect of the Pakistan situation but he chose to remain silent on the very issues which we are now considering here in the Security Council.

103. Finally in reply to the representative of India, he alleged that Pakistan shouted about aggression and did not

ask for a meeting of the Security Council. Ambassador Vinci was the President of the Security Council in August and he knows of the efforts made by me under the instructions of my Government to activate the Security Council to exercise a moderating influence, and to promote a reduction of tension. But why was no Security Council meeting called? Because of the opposition of India and the allies of India. And we know now when we come finally before the Security Council what is the result—a veto, a veto. So therefore let us not talk about coming before the Security Council.

104. Turning now from the representative of India to what the representative of the Soviet Union said yesterday and a little earlier today. I shall, of course, not comment on his amendments, because I believe they are no longer before us for the draft resolution to which they were submitted as amendments has been withdrawn. We thank the sponsors of that draft resolution for withdrawing their proposal. But with reference to what Ambassador Malik said in explaining his amendments I cannot allow this opportunity to pass without commenting on one or two points. The representative of the Soviet Union said that action by the Security Council must be in accordance with the real situation in the Hindustan subcontinent. The real situation in the Hindustan subcontinent now is that brought about by India's subversion, support to armed secession, armed intervention and aggression. In other words, is the Security Council going to legitimize this so-called reality, perpetuate occupation and guarantee the fruits of aggression and the illegal use of force?

105. The representative of the Soviet Union said that the cessation of hostilities must be organically linked to a political settlement. In other words, the Soviet amendments as explained by the representative of the Soviet Union mean that Pakistan must immediately agree to the secession of East Pakistan and to Pakistan's dismemberment and that war and military occupation must continue until it does so.

106. I am also constrained to remark that in the statements of the Soviet representative there is a persistent preoccupation with the political situation in Pakistan to the exclusion of every other aspect of the situation prevailing today in the subcontinent and which prevailed in the weeks and months before. And we are most concerned that in addition to the security doctrine to which I referred yesterday the pronouncements of Soviet representatives seem to stake a claim to be the arbiter in the internal political and constitutional life of my country.

107. I shall comment on the draft resolutions later, but I feel I must place on record certain facts. I refrained from doing so yesterday because I did not wish to prolong the time taken by the Council to get to a vote on the draft resolutions before it. First, I should like to draw the attention of the Security Council to a misstatement of fact by India, as contained in the Secretary-General's report [S/10410/Add.1]. According to a message from the Prime Minister of India, which was orally delivered to the Secretary-General, it is claimed therein that Pakistani aircraft attacked the military bases of India at Pathankot and Srinagar—in the disputed territory of Jammu and Kashmir—and at Amritsar on the afternoon of 2 December.

That is totally false. I waited until now to contradict that claim because I was checking the correct facts. On the instructions of my Government, I am now to state that Pakistani aircraft took counteraction against these airfields on 3 December, and only after India, six or seven hours earlier, had launched armed attacks against Pakistan along a 500-mile-long front in the West.

108. I should also like to state on this occasion that I would request Ambassador Malik, when he refers to any remarks I make, kindly to quote them in context. I only wish to say that it is regrettable that he again made a statement yesterday which I had corrected the day before. That was in regard to what I said about the existence of an internal crisis in Pakistan. In the political life of States internal crises are not a rare phenomenon, but it is up to the people of those countries to overcome the crises and not for foreign Powers to exacerbate internal divisions, promote secession and armed rebellion and, finally, launch armed attacks and use an internal crisis as justification for interventionist doctrines in the political life of other States.

109. Further, I should like to bring to the attention of this Council a most deplorable action by India yesterday. On 4 December the Secretary-General, in an urgent telephonic message to me, expressed his concern for the safety of United Nations personnel in East Pakistan and conveyed his decision to evacuate them to Bangkok. He requested that the Pakistan Government be approached to see if a cease-fire could be arranged in Dacca from 10 a.m. to 6 p.m. East Pakistan time on 5 December to enable a transport-plane to land at the airport and evacuate United Nations personnel to safety. The Secretary-General also intimated that he was making a similar request to the permanent representative of India. The Secretary-General's request was conveyed to the Government of Pakistan with all due urgency. It was followed up by the Pakistan Mission with telephonic messages to Islamabad. It is understood that both the Governments of Pakistan and India agreed to a cease-fire in Dacca for a certain length of time to allow the evacuation of United Nations personnel and foreign diplomats. However, the world now knows that the Indian air force chose precisely the moment of evacuation of United Nations personnel to attack the civilian airport at Dacca. The perfidious nature of this attack needs to be condemned in the strongest possible terms. It shows better than we can say what kind of attitude governs India at present. India's air force launches an attack on the territory of Pakistan at the time when it knows that the valiant forces of Pakistan are committed to observing a cease-fire. The innocent victims in this case are the international civil servants and diplomats, and it is a fortunate accident that no lives were lost.

110. Finally, I should like to state that in regard to the question of extending an invitation to a particular entity to come here I have pointed out that it would be not only a violation of rule 39 of the provisional rules of procedure of the Security Council but also a violation of the Charter. That has been brought out with sufficient force by the representative of Argentina, among others. Whatever may have been India's actions yesterday that in no wise alters the force of the arguments that have been urged before the Council, and should the Council act in an unlawful manner

we should have to consider that to be an unfriendly act towards the Government of Pakistan.

111. In order not to take the floor another time, I should like briefly to give my views on the draft resolution proposed by the representative of France, with his characteristic eloquence, precision and lucidity.

112. We are conscious of the concern of his delegation and the British delegation that the Council should achieve some result and not be completely paralysed by vetoes. Therefore, while we appreciate the laudable motives and the concern for peace that have prompted him to put forward a proposal, we are constrained to observe that nothing has been said about the proved fact of aggression and the fact that India has admitted this aggression. Nothing has been said about the cessation of interference in the internal affairs of Pakistan and subversion and the fomentation of armed rebellion by India. Furthermore, this draft resolution does not provide for withdrawal of armed personnel and forces. In other words, occupation would continue and then, by the time the Security Council were to consider the situation further, Pakistan would be called upon to acquiesce in its own dismemberment.

113. We note that the draft resolution contemplates that the Council should meet again to consider what further steps within the framework of the Charter could be taken on the issues which have given rise to the hostilities, but we know very well that any proposal for the withdrawal of occupation forces is likely to attract a veto and the Security Council would not be in a position to deal with the question of withdrawal of forces. By not dealing simultaneously with the question of withdrawal together with that of cease-fire, the Council would legitimize military occupation and perpetuate it.

114. For these reasons we would hope that the Council would ponder the considerations I have urged and also be conscious of the fact that while it has a responsibility for peace and security, the United Nations as a whole cannot absolve itself from that responsibility just because a veto power is being arbitrarily exercised.

115. The PRESIDENT: I invite the representative of France to take the floor on a point of order.

116. Mr. KOSCIUSKO-MORIZET (France) (*interpretation from French*): By way of clarification after what was said by the Ambassador of Pakistan may I make clear the following? We have introduced no draft resolution. The draft which I read, on the responsibility of the French delegation alone, only marks the point at which we stopped in our discussions. It was a draft which seemed to us to be able to supply a basis for agreement with other delegations during later discussions. That was the point at which we stopped and I thought it appropriate to bring this to the notice of the Council, in view of the statements we had made yesterday, so that the Council might be in a position to judge for itself the efforts which some delegations, including ours, had made, but it was solely a basis for discussion which we presented. There has been, as yet, no formal draft drawn up, not to mention a draft formally introduced.

117. Mr. HUANG Hua (China) (*translated from Chinese*): At our meeting, the Soviet and Indian representatives have repeatedly tried to sell us their stuff about the so-called "Bangla Desh". They wanted us to join them in inviting to our meeting the representatives of the so-called "Bangla Desh" with red-carpet honours. What kind of thing is the "Bangla Desh" which the Soviet and Indian representatives have lauded so much? I think it will be useful to recall history in this respect, for there is no lack of similar instances in history.

118. In 1931, the Japanese militarists launched an undeclared war against China and occupied the four provinces of Northeast China. Subsequently, they declared the establishment of a puppet government called "Manchukuo". The leader of that government was none other than a traitor who had been reared over a long period by the Japanese militarists. In so doing, the aim of the Japanese militarists was to split China and perpetuate their occupation of the four provinces of Northeast China. After its establishment, that puppet government won the recognition of the Japanese militarists, Hitler of Germany and Mussolini of Italy. And what did the League of Nations do about the Japanese aggression against China? Under the manipulation of certain powers, the League of Nations tried to curry favour with Japanese militarism at the expense of China's territory and sovereignty, so as to direct the Japanese militarists' spearhead of aggression to the then Soviet Union. Consequently, the League of Nations did nothing in face of Japanese aggression and let them have their own way. It was precisely under these circumstances that Japanese militarism further expanded its war of aggression against China, occupying large expanses of China's territory. This greatly inflated the Japanese imperialists' ambitious design for world hegemony, and at the same time abetted the German and Italian Fascists in their aggression and expansion in Europe. All this finally led to the outbreak of the Second World War. The events thereafter are well known to everyone present here. The Second World War brought untold disaster and devastation to the people of various countries.

119. Japanese militarism created the government of a so-called "Manchukuo" in China; the German Nazis fostered quisling governments in Europe as well. However, the development of history is independent of man's will. Today where has that so-called "Manchukuo" gone? Where are those quisling governments? What has happened to their creators? The grandiose plans of the Japanese militarists, Hitlerite and Mussolini Fascists for world domination went bankrupt. They were severely punished by the people of various countries. These historical facts are perhaps known even to the schoolboys, but the "erudite" Mr. Malik and Indian Ambassador seem to be ignorant of them.

120. Now after launching an undeclared war of aggression against Pakistan with the incitement and support of the Soviet Union, the Indian expansionists, with the collaboration of the Soviet Government, created a government of the so-called "Bangla Desh" for the purpose of dismembering Pakistan and perpetually occupying East Pakistan. That is a neo-quisling government, a neo-"Manchukuo" government. The Indian Government has already openly declared its

recognition of that government. Probably, the Soviet Government will also declare its recognition of that government tomorrow or the day after tomorrow. Whether recognition or not, what people have now seen is that not only has the Soviet Government failed to condemn this neo-quisling government, neo-"Manchukuo" government, but it has shown most solicitous concern and wanted to invite the representatives of that government to the Security Council as angels, to pay homage to the representatives of the so-called "Bangla Desh" as "heroes" of a national liberation movement and even wanted everyone else to take off their hats and salute them.

121. We should be grateful to the Soviet representative, Mr. Malik, for teaching us a very good lesson by negative example. He has enabled people to see all the more clearly the renegade features of the Soviet leaders who have betrayed Marxism-Leninism, the Great October Socialist Revolution, the Soviet people as well as the people of the whole world.

122. Why are the leaders of the Soviet Union so interested in the "Manchukuo" government, the quisling government of today? A reply was given in the TASS statement yesterday, which constitutes a voluntary confession. According to that statement, the "secure boundaries" of the Soviet Union have all of a sudden been extended to the Indo-Pakistan subcontinent and the Indian Ocean. The aim of the Soviet leaders is to gain control over the subcontinent, encircle China and strengthen its position in contending with the other super-Power for world hegemony. What the Soviet leaders of today are frantically seeking is the establishment of a great empire which the old tsars craved but were unable to realize, a great empire controlling the whole Eurasian continent.

123. In conclusion, I wish only to address a few words of good intention to Mr. Malik. Please bear in mind the fate of "Manchukuo", quislings and their behind-the-scenes boss.

124. The PRESIDENT: I invite the representative of India to take the floor.

125. Mr. SEN (India): I simply wanted to speak for two minutes in order not to leave an impression on some of the factual matters brought out by the representative of Pakistan. This impression has been created on the basis of misconception and I thought I would clear it up straight away. I do not believe it would help our deliberations or profit the Council if I were to reply in detail once again to the many charges he brings up from time to time, charges to which I have replied in detail on previous occasions. All these charges are flung, as I said before, without the slightest iota of evidence or a particle of truth. However, he has mentioned three points in which the United Nations is somehow or other involved and I think it is my duty to inform the Council of the exact position.

126. First, he talked about this tragic subject of Bangla Desh being brought up in the United Nations. Of course, the Security Council is one of the many forums where this could be discussed. He did not explain why other organs could not also be considered. However, two factual points. He said that our memorandum contained in document

S/10410/Add.1 is not correct and that it contains a misstatement. He says Pakistani sources have reported that India has launched an attack on West Pakistan. I maintain this is totally false. If there is any doubt about that at least part of the truth is established by the report which is contained in document S/10412, which says in its paragraph 4 (a): "Srinagar airfield bombed at 1745 hours on 3 December." Now, Srinagar is on our side of the frontier and, therefore, it could only be bombed by Pakistani planes. We have suggested the bombing took place at 1730 hours; the United Nations observer reports it was bombed at 1745 hours.

127. The second point is that he said that we had committed some heinous crime in preventing the evacuation of consular corps and United Nations personnel from Dacca. If anyone has any regard for the truth—and I think the Secretariat can bear me out on this, but I shall not ask them to do so because it would be most embarrassing for them—everything was arranged. The plane came from Bangkok and was flying to Dacca. Here is a telegram stating exactly what happened:

"As arranged, Canadian C-13 aircraft, came from Bangkok to Dacca this morning. However, when approaching Dacca airport, Dacca control tower did not accept the aircraft and advised it to turn back. Our Calcutta airport control monitored this talk and invited pilot to divert to Calcutta. Pilot acknowledged offer gratefully, but said he was venturing back to Bangkok. The Air Force authorities confirmed that safe period between 1030 to 12 noon IST promised by us was fully honoured. Our air force stopped air activity in Dacca airfield well before such period."

That is the truth.

128. Mr. FARAH (Somalia): My delegation has in other forums of the United Nations expressed the belief of my Government that the only safe course for a world organization such as ours, charged with the responsibility for international peace and security and composed of States with varying ideological, political, cultural, and economic systems, is to eschew sentiment and expedience and to adhere strictly to the principles of international law which we are pledged to uphold as a basis for world order. Small States like my own have a special interest in ensuring that the United Nations develops its capacity as an effective instrument for world peace. We do not depend on armaments, nuclear or otherwise, for our security. We depend on the provisions of the Charter and all that flows from it. Any rejection of its fundamental principles undermines the authority of the Charter and the source of security of nations, large and small. The United Nations came into being to ensure that war must not be a profitable venture.

129. For almost three days this Council has been seized of a question that affects the peace and security of the Indian-Pakistani subcontinent and of the world at large. For three days we have had a wide exchange of views. We have consulted intensively. We have had a proliferation of draft resolutions all aimed at trying to discover a formula which would be acceptable to the Council as a whole.

130. When my delegation spoke on the first day of this debate I explained that in doing so my Government was anxious to assist in bringing to a halt the open warfare that was being waged between India and Pakistan on several fronts, with the use of air, land and naval forces. I explained then that the Council would have come to grips with some of the issues that had given rise to the conflict, but that its first responsibility was to demand an immediate cease-fire, an immediate withdrawal of Indian and Pakistani forces from each other's territory where penetration had occurred, and a scrupulous regard by both States, without qualification, for each other's territorial integrity. I said at that time that it was a crisis hour in which the Council had met, and that with every hour that passed there was a danger of greater loss of life and of human suffering in a region which had already been afflicted with suffering unparalleled in the history of our times.

131. I explained also in my statement on that day that we could not afford to depart from those principles and that when we adopt a policy of political expediency we must often accept with it a great dose of injustice. I also drew attention to the fact that in such a situation there is perhaps no aspect of the situation which cannot be related to one provision or another of the United Nations Charter and which cannot be settled within the scope of the United Nations Charter.

132. I said that—and on this my Government is most firm—the principle of the withdrawal of enemy troops from the territory of another country could not in any case, in any circumstances be considered, particularly by this Council—unless we wish to turn the whole concept of international peace and security into one great farce—as being subject to negotiation; the principle of unconditional withdrawal is not subject to negotiation. We have seen this in the Middle East situation and it will appear, perhaps with even greater force, in the situation that has now developed between India and Pakistan. I explained that in addition to the purposes and principles set out in the Charter we had only last year, after considerable discussion in the First Committee and the General Assembly, and again this year, elaborated upon those principles and formulated and approved a Declaration, the Declaration on the Strengthening of International Security [*General Assembly resolution 2734 (XXV)*], which, if followed by all Member States, would certainly bring some order to what is at present a world of chaos; and I drew attention to paragraphs 4 and 5 of that Declaration, I shall not read them here. However, I shall read one other paragraph which is most pertinent for our consideration of this question. Paragraph 2 of the Declaration reads as follows:

“Calls upon all States to adhere strictly in their international relations to the purposes and principles of the Charter, including the principle that States shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations; the principle that States shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered; the duty not to intervene in matters within the domestic

jurisdiction of any State, in accordance with the Charter . . .”

133. My Government believes that the tragedy that has overtaken East Pakistan is a problem which primarily concerns the Government and people of Pakistan. It is not for any other State to impose a political solution on East Pakistan by military means. In doing so we would be opening Pandora's Box, and that would mean that the whole world would be turned into a bed of fire.

134. In the course of this debate my delegation associated itself with a number of other delegations in an attempt to formulate a resolution which would not only reflect the concern of the United Nations in this matter but also be predicated upon the purposes and principles of the Charter. The result was the draft resolution which appeared in document S/10423. Unfortunately, as we know, that draft resolution received the negative vote of a permanent member of the Security Council and, as a result, the will of 11 members of this Security Council—and I have reason to believe that even those two States which abstained in the vote on it supported it in spirit—has been frustrated. We have seen, after three days of debate, that it is not possible to arrive at a formula which will satisfy both Pakistan and India, because both hold inflexible positions on certain aspects of the problem. We have also seen that each State is supported by a permanent member of the Council and that any resolution which is contrary to the interests of either India or Pakistan is rejected.

135. What do we do? This Organization cannot remain silent when a conflagration of such dimensions is happening. It must express itself. This Organization cannot be diverted from its main purpose by the negative vote of one, two or three States.

136. The time has come when we must transfer this question to the General Assembly, so that it may receive the collective consideration of the 131 Members of the United Nations, and not just 15. My delegation will therefore introduce a draft resolution under section A of the “Uniting for peace” resolution [*General Assembly resolution 377 (V)*], which reads as follows:

“Resolves that if the Security Council, because of lack of unanimity of the permanent members, fails to exercise its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security in any case where there appears to be a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression, the General Assembly shall consider the matter immediately with a view to making appropriate recommendations to Members for collective measures, including in the case of a breach of the peace or act of aggression the use of armed force when necessary, to maintain or restore international peace and security.”

137. Pursuant to that resolution, my delegation will move the following draft resolution, and it will be processed in due course. It reads as follows:

“The Security Council,

“Having considered the item on the agenda of its 1606th meeting, as contained in document S/Agenda/1606,

"Taking into account that the lack of unanimity of its permanent members at the 1606th and 1607th meetings of the Security Council has prevented it from exercising its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security,

"Decides to refer the question contained in document S/Agenda/1606 to the General Assembly at its twenty-sixth session, as provided for in Assembly resolution 377 A (V) of 3 November 1950." [S/10429.]

138. It is my hope that this draft resolution and the action which my delegation has proposed will be supported by the majority of the members of this Council.

139. Mr. ORTIZ DE ROZAS (Argentina) (*interpretation from Spanish*): The statement of the representative of Somalia, my good friend Ambassador Farah, was so eloquent and brilliant and went so deeply into the heart of the matter that I need not elaborate and will spare the Security Council from having to devote more time to a problem whose discussion is being extended excessively.

140. For three days the Security Council has been examining the problem which gave rise to the outbreak of hostilities between India and Pakistan. As a result of our deliberations several draft resolutions were submitted to this organ. The first draft resolution which was put to the vote was submitted by the United States and won 11 votes in favour, but it could not be adopted because of the negative vote of one of the permanent members.

141. Shortly thereafter the delegation of Argentina, together with the delegations of Belgium, Burundi, Italy, Japan, Nicaragua, Sierra Leone and Somalia, submitted another draft resolution. That draft resolution contained the minimum which was acceptable to try to restore peace to the region. I say it contained the minimum which was acceptable because it contained three essential aspects which I assume nobody will challenge: first, that there must be an immediate cease-fire; secondly, that the armed forces of India and Pakistan return to their respective frontiers; and thirdly, that the necessary conditions be created for the millions of refugees who are now in India to return to their homes. I said it was the minimum which was acceptable also because that draft resolution did not contain some other matters which, in my delegation's view, for example, were essential, such as the need to reiterate complete respect for the territorial integrity of States and another principle—which not only is enshrined in the United Nations Charter and in the Declaration on the Strengthening of International Security but is also one of the fundamental pillars of international law and of relations among States—that is, non-interference in the internal affairs of other States. In a desire to find a prompt solution, my delegation did not insist on having included those two principles to which we adhere unswervingly. Nevertheless, that draft resolution, too—which received 11 votes in favour—was rejected because of the negative vote of the same permanent member who had objected to the adoption of the draft resolution submitted by the United States.

142. From that time on there were constant consultations between all or a major part of the members of the Security

Council and the two parties concerned. It was clear, as was stated so eloquently by Ambassador Farah, that although our efforts were prompted by the best intentions they were doomed to failure because of a clear-cut difference in the views held by India and Pakistan.

143. An effort which was started yesterday, after all other efforts had failed, by the delegations of France and the United Kingdom—as stated here by the representative of the former country—was also destined to fail because it was impossible to win the support of the parties and some members of the Council. So that, prompted by the best intentions, the delegations of Belgium, Italy, Japan, Nicaragua, Sierra Leone and Tunisia offered another draft resolution which merely asked for a cease-fire. We understand the reason why those sponsors submitted that text, but it too failed because, due to its extreme simplicity, it omitted one of the matters which, in the opinion of many delegations, was fundamental, that is, the need for the withdrawal of armed forces from both sides of the frontier.

144. At present we have a draft resolution which has just been distributed, sponsored by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics [S/10428]. The Council will, of course, have to reach a decision on it. However, I very much fear that this too will be defeated for the simple reason, among others and without stating any judgement on any of its fundamental paragraphs, that this draft resolution does not call for the withdrawal of the troops of India and Pakistan to their own sides of the frontier either.

145. If I may be permitted to digress, may I say that I am surprised that that country should submit this draft resolution without this essential requirement, inasmuch as the tragic experience of the Middle East clearly demonstrates the result of a conflict when there is no such provision made by the Security Council?

146. In view of all that I have stated, it is quite obvious that the Security Council, because of the many and complex facets of this conflict, is incapable of taking a decision which will provide immediate peace in the region. Like my distinguished friend, Ambassador Farah, I consider that, in the circumstances, the Council should honestly recognize that it is incapable of taking action and therefore, without any delay whatsoever, transfer responsibility to the General Assembly, which is after all the most democratic and representative organ of our Organization where, fortunately, there is no veto. The United Nations, which has 131 representatives in that great Assembly, could then adopt a resolution making clear the views of the international community in this tragic situation in which two countries of the Asian subcontinent confront each other.

147. As is well known, action by the General Assembly has a moral weight which is beyond challenge. Whatever action the General Assembly takes, after hearing every view and having all the facts before it, will constitute an irrevocable pronouncement. This action must be undertaken at once, without any manoeuvres or delays of any kind whatsoever, because while we are debating this very serious question, hostilities continue on the Asian subcontinent and acquire the characteristics of a widespread war with victims on both sides falling every minute.

148. The representative of Somalia has read out a draft resolution which he intends to submit requesting that action under the terms of General Assembly resolution 377 A (V). My delegation shares his views completely, as well as his concern when he submitted this draft resolution, and we wish to have the honour to be considered a co-sponsor of the draft resolution which Somalia will introduce. And in so doing we appeal to the non-permanent members of this Council to follow this course because ultimately that is what has united us in the quest for a peaceful and immediate solution to the distressing Indo-Pakistani problem.

149. Mr. TERENCE (Burundi) (*interpretation from French*): Mr. President, the voice of reassurance with which you called upon me strongly encourages me to have faith once again in the Security Council and in the United Nations in its entirety.

150. Despairing of this cause, the Security Council seems to be condemned to an alternative solution. And yet I cannot stop myself from paying a tribute, a tribute which is highly deserved, to the non-permanent members who, together with my delegation have striven by every means to arrive at a formula which would immediately put an end to hostilities. Their initiatives are all the more praiseworthy since they are inspired by well known selflessness—that is, the efforts of the non-permanent members and of the small States—which the mass media have rewarded with a silence that is customary. Such initiatives were perfectly in accord with the position of the Republic of Burundi as well as with the sublime ideals contained in the Charter of the United Nations.

151. Thus, it is in compliance with the spirit and the letter of the principles of peace which I stated in the course of the first meeting that we are at all times striving to cover the wide gap between the positions of Pakistan and India. In a desire to reach an honourable compromise, the non-permanent members, including Burundi, have had to shuttle back and forth between the two delegations directly concerned. Despite repeated efforts, and although we combined all our resources, we came up against a wall which remained a wall that we could not cross. The Security Council now faces that wall.

152. In these circumstances, that is to say, there being no solution forthcoming from the Security Council, it seems to us to be imperative for the Council to discharge its duty by transferring the question to another organ which, beyond doubt, cannot be any other than the General Assembly. In this connexion I wish to say that the delegation of Burundi in joint agreement with the delegations of Somalia and Argentina considers it to be imperative and urgent to put the problem, which the Security Council has proved to be impotent to solve, to the General Assembly. This new approach is dictated by our steadfast position of being against any armed conflict and our concern to avoid scrupulously any gesture which might cast oil on the flames. We believe we are contributing to peace by refraining from attributing to one or the other antagonistic States all the blame for the dispute. This straddling attitude, we think we are warranted in believing, will enable us to continue to act freely both within the framework of

this organ and at the level of the General Assembly so as to put an end to the deadly combat and its terrible consequences.

153. The majority of the nations represented in this Council have felt in their hearts and in their flesh the disasters of modern wars. There is no need for any description of the horrifying tragedy which, while I am speaking, is taking place between India and Pakistan. How can one explain that the Security Council should be content to deal with this war, which may annihilate innocent people, as being something far removed, abstract, indeed, mythical? How can one, without trembling, observe with indifference that this calamity is added to the painful natural disasters which only a few months ago so devastatingly struck the people inhabiting the areas of both Pakistan and India? Is it possible for human conscience to sanction a war which is about to strike a death blow to regions which epidemics and recurrent cataclysms of nature had barely spared?

154. Are we without compassion for these women, exposed to intemperate circumstances of every kind, holding their children in their arms, who are the object of the infinite love of mothers in particular and of parents in general? Human and social courtesy and charity only reveal their true faces when those who exercise them empathize with those who have a right to demand them. Along the same line of ideas, what would be our feelings, if our own children, clutched to the hearts of their mothers—hence, our wives—were to be deprived of shelter, threatened with extinction, exposed to shells and grenades, that is to say, fatally condemned to physical destruction at any time?

155. These are striking questions, I agree, which it is our imperative duty to respond to, not only by means of abstractionist imperturbable reason, but also with the participation of the human conscience which can assist us in personifying the tragedy engendered by war.

156. Apart from the painful sufferings imposed on innocent victims, the belligerent States deliberately set themselves to damage economic well-being. If the material progress which is achieved through the edification of their respective nations is destroyed by incendiary bombs, is it not then legitimate to ask whether these twin brothers who are about to destroy each other mercilessly, will be able to bring about an economic resurrection as Japan and Germany have done?

157. The delegation of Burundi has addressed itself to the Security Council in these terms, being moved by our cult of peace, being moved by our genuine friendship for both India and Pakistan, and finally, prompted by our profound veneration for the United Nations which we must at all costs spare future affront.

158. Mr. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*translated from Russian*): The Soviet delegation cannot but express regret that the sponsors of the five-Power draft resolution were unable to maintain their position, even for a period of less than 24 hours, and that they have abandoned that position and withdrawn their draft resolution. Apparently, insurmountable obstacles have arisen for

them. Perhaps even obstacles from two sides: from imperialism and from social treachery.

159. When withdrawing the five-Power draft resolution, Mr. Vinci produced a number of arguments of a kind which confirmed the conviction of the delegation of the Soviet Union as to the correctness of its position on the question under consideration. He said that the five-Power draft did not reflect true reality. That is precisely what we have been saying throughout the whole discussion of this question in the Security Council and we appeal to the Council to take reality into account.

160. Consequently, Ambassador Vinci, speaking on behalf of the sponsors of the five-Power draft resolution, confirmed the rightness and justness of the Soviet Union's position. We have been insisting, we insist and shall continue to insist that reality should be taken into consideration. We were guided by precisely that consideration in introducing our amendments to the five-Power draft resolution. We became firmly convinced, after examining that draft, that it was necessary to make it realistic, to give it a basis of reality. Without the Soviet amendments, the five-Power draft was truly unrealistic. Our amendments gave it reality. Our amendments to that draft provided the close, inseparable and organic link between a cease-fire and cessation of hostilities on the Indian subcontinent, and the elimination of the main cause of the conflict in that region, which has led to a very serious crisis in East Pakistan, whose consequences have acquired an international dimension and significance.

161. The international dimension and significance of the conflict are confirmed by the fact that the Security Council, a principal organ of the United Nations, has already been discussing this important, urgent and serious matter for three meetings.

162. In view of this we express our regret once again that the five-Power draft proved so short-lived, that it lasted less than 24 hours and was hastily withdrawn. But we believe in the justness of our own approach to the settlement of the situation on the Indian subcontinent and so we are formally introducing a separate draft resolution [S/10428] which takes into account the provisions of the five-Power draft resolution and the provisions in the amendments introduced to that draft by the Soviet delegation.

163. In order to save time, I am not going to read out the draft, since the members of the Council are familiar with the five-Power draft and the amendments to it and the United Nations Secretariat has promised to process our draft very quickly as an independent document.

164. In this connexion, we should like to emphasize especially that in that draft the two basic questions, the two basic matters, which must be resolved in connexion with the aggravation of the situation on the Indian subcontinent are closely, inseparably and organically linked. If one were to formulate the two questions briefly, they could be called "cease-fire and settlement". This is to be interpreted as a cease-fire and the adoption of measures for a political settlement. And anyone who approaches with a different yardstick is pipe-dreaming, is divorcing himself

from true reality and is not thereby contributing to the adoption by the Council of the decision which is appropriate and necessary in the present concrete situation.

165. We are profoundly convinced that adoption of our draft resolution by the Council would be the most reasonable, rapid and effective solution for the question under consideration. I have listened with close attention to the statements made by representatives (I should like the representative of Burundi—to listen to me)—including the representative of Burundi—concerning the sufferings of women and children, and, as we know, some 10 million of them have left East Pakistan. If the representative of Burundi and the sponsors of the five-Power draft resolution had voted for our amendments and adopted them, or now, when we introduce our independent draft, if they vote for that, those sufferings would be eliminated and very rapidly. That is the reality, that is life today on the Indian subcontinent.

166. Referring briefly to the comments of the representative of Pakistan, I must draw attention merely to some aspects of his statement. Why are you afraid of the will of the people of East Pakistan? Why, when there was an expression of will in such convincing figures—167 out of 313 seats in the Pakistan parliament—did you decide to deprive those members of parliament of the right to show themselves worthy of the trust and will of the people? Why are you frightened to give them the opportunity to work freely in the legislative body? These are the questions which have not been answered here.

167. Ambassador Shahi attributed to me an intention that does not exist either in my heart or my mind—to be an arbitrator in this matter. I do not pretend to such a role. That would be contrary to my convictions. We want the Security Council to be the arbitrator, to take into consideration the real situation on the Indian subcontinent and to adopt a decision that takes into account the two factors I have mentioned—a cease-fire and cessation of hostilities, and an immediate move towards a political settlement.

168. Why are the Pakistan representative and his lofty supporters frightened of this? This is merely an illustration of the way in which the social traitors distort the concept of democracy.

169. We spoke of a serious political crisis inside East Pakistan. But nobody is denying that. In my statement I did not quote anything from Ambassador Shahi's statement. I merely emphasized, noted and concentrated on the words "serious, internal political crisis". But you spoke of that, you did not deny that, Mr. Shahi, and all the members of the Council who have spoken, who have taken part in the discussion, noted that and stressed it. Why then do you accuse me of misquoting your statement? I see no reason for that.

170. There was some talk of there being no precedent for the Security Council having its own authoritative opinion on the main cause of the conflict in the Indian subcontinent. But since when has the Security Council been denied the right to have an opinion concerning the major cause of the conflict, when considering a conflict which has

acquired an international dimension? No one, in the 26 years that the Security Council has existed, has denied the right and authority given by the Charter of the United Nations to the organ with primary responsibility for the maintenance of peace and security to have an opinion concerning the main cause of a conflict which threatens peace and security. So those who speak with such concepts and objections in mind have no foundation for them whatsoever. There is only one right the Council does not have and that is to ignore reality, to ignore a threat to peace and security. There is only one right the Council does not have and that is to ignore life, to ignore the main reasons which have led to international tension and to international conflict. The Council does not have that right, neither under the Charter nor on the basis of practice during its 26 years of work.

171. Nevertheless, all the draft resolutions which have been introduced so far have been one-sided and did not take into account the main reason for the conflict on the Indian subcontinent. And it is precisely for that reason that the delegation of the USSR could not support such drafts.

172. One of the representatives even embarked on a course of monstrous slander, distortion and falsification. But let that be on his conscience. We have a Russian proverb which says that abuse and slander will not stick to your collar. He can carry on his dirty business.

173. That is how matters stand with the draft resolutions. Therein lies the root cause of the fact that so far the Security Council has been unable to adopt a resolution which would take into account just those two important factors of the international problem under discussion: an immediate cease-fire and immediate measures for a political settlement taking into account the will of the overwhelming majority of the East Pakistan people.

174. I wish to refer once again to the draft which we are now introducing on behalf of the Soviet delegation and which is based, as I have already mentioned, on the provisions of the five-Power draft and those contained in the Soviet amendments to that draft. If all the members of the Security Council could ignore the press of two factors which I have already mentioned, the press of imperialism and the press of social treachery, the adoption of that draft resolution would contribute enormously to the ending of the conflict on the Indian subcontinent, to the stabilization of the situation and to a political settlement. I call on all members of the Security Council who really sincerely desire that to support our draft resolution.

175. As for Mr. Huang Hua's statement, in my first statement I called him "Comrade" and in the plenary meeting of the General Assembly I also called the head of the Chinese delegation "Comrade", but if he wants to call me "Mr." then I am quite ready to call him "Mr." if he prefers to be "Mr.". And as for Mr. Huang Hua's statement, I gave an exhaustive description yesterday of his role and the aims that he is pursuing here in the United Nations and in the Security Council. He has taken on himself the role of chief arch-slanderer of the Soviet Union. I pointed out that now there was nothing for the slanderers from the imperialist camp to do in the field of slandering the Soviet

Union. The Chinese slanderer does all that dirty work. Let him carry on. We believe in the rightness of our cause; our policies and position are well known. We are proud of the fact that we have good, friendly relations with the overwhelming majority, to say the least, of the States Members of the United Nations; we find understanding and common aims and are striving jointly with many States to increase the effectiveness of the United Nations. And we are grateful to many of our colleagues here who maintain the same position and are striving to develop friendship and co-operation with our country and with its delegation and its representatives in the United Nations. I do not think that any of the slanderous fabrications and falsifications of history which one Member of the United Nations engages in so zealously today will have any significance or influence on the future strengthening and development of our friendship, our sincere friendship and co-operation with very many delegations both around this table and in the Assembly, and in the United Nations, no matter how hard the slanderers may try to achieve their purpose.

176. I can brush aside all the fabrications and falsifications. But when history is falsified, I am afraid one cannot remain silent. To provide an argument which the Chinese representative apparently considered to be highly convincing, he mentioned Manchukuo. He reminded us that this integral component part of China was invaded by Japanese militarism and imperialism. But he omitted to say who liberated that part of China from the Japanese militarists. The heroic Soviet army and tens of thousands of our sons, brothers and fathers laid down their lives thrusting, if I may say so, through the Maginot Line, pressing through the Khingan Mountains in the territory of Manchuria, crushing the resistance of the Japanese forces, in order to free the Chinese people from the yoke of Japanese imperialism. This is a fact of history and everyone sitting here knows it. However much the slanderer from the camp of social traitors tries to keep that quiet, he will not succeed in doing so. Indeed, the whole world knows that by its decisive victory, including the victory in the Far East, the Soviet Union, together with other countries, helped the Chinese people to create the People's Republic of China. He also passes over that in silence.

177. Mr. Huang Hua says that Malik has not understood history. I have brought up those two facts to show that Mr. Huang Hua has falsified history. It is he who is pretending that he does not understand history. But what is that—failure to understand or shamelessness? In drawing a comparison between Manchukuo and the serious internal political crisis that has arisen in East Pakistan and has turned into an international problem, he went too far. But that, of course, is an illustration of the shameless practice of falsification of the social traitors, and their complete indifference to the fate of the 75 million inhabitants of East Pakistan.

178. Japanese imperialism and militarism did indeed occupy Manchuria against the wish and the will of the Chinese people—that is a historical fact—and imposed on it Emperor Pu Yi who was some sort of remote offshoot of the Chinese Imperial Family. Pu Yi was installed in Manchuria with the support of Japanese bayonets, and the part of China occupied by the militarists was officially named Man-

chukuo. But what has this got to do with East Pakistan? It must be perfectly obvious to the Security Council, from the discussion of this problem, that in East Pakistan the will of the people has been expressed. The elected representatives of the East Pakistan people obtained 167 out of 312 seats in the Pakistan parliament. But what happened to them? Their powers and rights were trodden underfoot by the iron boot of the military, and the representative of the social traitors is now licking that boot.

179. Those are concrete facts. The Chinese representative is defending terror and repression and covering up his real unseemly position by slandering the Soviet Union and India at the same time. In Manchuria the Chinese did not participate in any elections. And everybody knows that. In East Pakistan there were elections and the chosen representatives of the people were elected. And this is where the falsification occurs. In East Pakistan there was no "Pu Yi"; there no one was enthroned by anyone. But the Chinese representative is trying to tangle up reality and make comparisons. On the contrary, in East Pakistan the leader of the majority party, Rahman, was put in prison and was threatened with a trial. What kind of comparison can there be here between Pu Yi and Rahman? Who would believe that? Who is your anti-Soviet, anti-Indian propaganda intended for, Mr. Huang Hua?

180. Incidentally, about Pu Yi: when he was our prisoner he asked for the complete works of Lenin and Marx. I do not know if he read them but perhaps he did. When we turned Pu Yi over to the Chinese, he had apparently acquainted himself with Marxism and the Chinese got not just an Emperor but a man who had read Lenin and Marx. Such is life. But that is not the point. The point is that there is absolutely no analogy of the kind that Mr. Huang Hua spoke about between these two events. So what is the aim of such comparisons? What is it—failure to understand or shamelessness? Apparently any means are good enough for slandering the Soviet Union. That, gentlemen, is the repulsive face of social treachery.

181. I suppose I might finish here but I am put on my guard by a concept being developed here by Mr. Huang Hua. He says that the plans of the Soviet Union are to control the Indian subcontinent—and he said yesterday—to control the Indian Ocean. You know, the imagination of slanderers is limitless, and that of falsifiers is even greater. The Soviet delegation considers it beneath its dignity to refute or to speak of this stupid invention and slander about the great friendship between the Soviet people and the people of India. But let us consider the concept. As the Chinese see it, it follows that friendship between a stronger country and a weaker one is necessarily evidence that the stronger one wishes to dominate and control the weaker one. That, gentlemen, is a dangerous concept and it exposes the real outlook, thoughts and aims of those who adopt such an approach to the friendship between the Soviet and the Indian peoples. This means that China in its foreign policy considers the friendship of a stronger country with a weaker one, at least in a military sense (in terms of population India is larger than the Soviet Union—we have 240 million people and they have something like 600 million) as a desire on the part of the Soviet Union to control India, the Indian people, the subcontinent and the

Indian Ocean. This is a monstrous fabrication and a monstrous falsification to which we do not even wish to react. Suffice it to think how fictitious and falsified it all is. But the falsification exposes China's real aims. It follows that, if China is friendly with a small country, it wants to control it. That is the real concept and the foreign policy goals of China as regards the third world: to control the third world, and, using it as a support, under a guise of friendship try to become a super super-Power. Such are its aims.

182. But I have already said what great pleasure a certain party is deriving from the Chinese representative's constant slandering of the Soviet Union. That certain party is sitting there, rejoicing, laughing, smiling, smirking and rubbing hands. Well what of it? If he has taken such a role upon himself, let him carry on with it. It will not make any difference to us.

183. Mr. Huang Hua spoke of the inevitable end of the quislings. And who brought the quislings to that end? The Soviet Union, its people and its heroic armed forces, which made a major contribution to the victory over German nazism, over Italian fascism, which has been mentioned here, and over Japanese militarism.

184. But having mentioned the end of the quislings, you should have mentioned the end of the slanderers too. Who, from October 1917, has not slandered the Soviet Union? Well, what of it? It is said, for example, that *The New York Times*, that organ of the United States monopolies, predicted the collapse of Soviet power in Russia some 90 times. But we are alive, we exist, and are flourishing. We coped with the terrible threat hanging over our homeland—Hitlerite fascism; we are fulfilling our economic plans, we are raising the standard of living of our people, we are helping other peoples as much as we can and we are fighting indefatigably for the strengthening of international peace, for security and for disarmament. The slander of *The New York Times* did not stick on our collar. We do not feel it.

185. Who has slandered us? The late Churchill. Everybody knows that. From the very first days of the October Revolution and the notorious "Fulton" speech, when he tried to turn the United States against the Soviet Union, as the mentor and teacher of the United States politicians, whom he called in a conversation with me "newcomers" who had to be taught politics. But Churchill is no longer with us. Churchill not only slandered us, he even organized crusades. We brushed aside the slander and coped with the crusades, and we exist and we are flourishing.

186. Who has slandered us? Hitler, Goebbels, Goering, Ribbentrop. And not only did they slander us, but they advanced on us with their armed forces and with the armed forces of the whole of Europe, subjugated by them.

187. The heroic armed forces of the Soviet Union and the Soviet people coped with that terrible threat. We endured terrible sufferings of the kind that did not fall to the lot of any other people. The quislings perished, and their masters perished: Hitler, Goebbels, Ribbentrop, Keitel and the rest of them. Where are they now! But the Soviet Union is in good health and flourishing! Who ensured victory over the

quislings and their masters? The Soviet Union. Do not forget it, Mr. Huang Hua.

188. The slanderers of today, both from the camp of imperialism and from the camp of social treachery, should draw the appropriate conclusions from that historical fact. No slander is going to lead us off our Leninist path, the path of strengthening international peace, of security, of disarmament and the development of friendship with all peoples of the world who want to be friendly with us in the name of those high ideals and in accordance with the Leninist principle of peaceful coexistence. In the past the quislings and the slanderers had no future and there is no future for them now. That is their fate. Lofty purposes are not achieved by slander. We shall continue in future to strive sincerely for co-operation with other States which are ready for it, even in so far from perfect an organization as the United Nations, in order to achieve, by common efforts the purposes set forth in the United Nations Charter, in whose elaboration we participated, for whose implementation we have striven indefatigably throughout the whole of our presence and participation in the work of the United Nations.

189. Such are the historical facts. And such is the unenviable role of the slanderers and falsifiers who are trying to distort those universally known historical facts.

190. The PRESIDENT: I call upon the representative of Burundi on a point of order.

191. Mr. TERENCE (Burundi) (*interpretation from French*): I asked to speak at this stage in order to assure the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics that during all his statements the delegation of Burundi constantly hangs on his every word; and there is very good reason for that. I have set myself the duty of being present at all times so that I shall never miss a single one of his words. Furthermore I am extremely grateful to him for the attention he has given to the statement made by my delegation.

192. Like the Soviet delegation, members of my delegation discuss among themselves the tenor of each draft resolution; in order to be impartial and it so happened—and this is a coincidence for which no one can be blamed—that I was obliged simultaneously to listen to Mr. Malik while receiving the draft resolution contained in document S/10428, which was submitted by the Soviet delegation. Accordingly, my delegation believes that we deserve a double reward for a double courtesy.

193. Furthermore, if my delegation has been guided by the dictates of humane conscience and morality in pleading for the women and children who have been affected, we believe that at present there are still children both in East Pakistan, which has 75 million inhabitants, and also even more in India, where there are 700 million inhabitants.

194. The PRESIDENT: I now call upon the representative of China on a point of order.

195. Mr. HUANG Hua (China) (*translated from Chinese*): It is extremely clear that Mr. Malik is doing his utmost to

obstruct the proceedings of the Security Council as far as taking a vote on the proposal presented by the representative of Somalia is concerned. He is extremely afraid to face the General Assembly in a plenary meeting. Therefore he has almost attacked most of the representatives in the Security Council. He even went so far as to insult certain representatives. His purpose is—

196. The PRESIDENT: I call upon the representative of the USSR for the purpose of clarifying his statement.

197. Mr. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*translated from Russian*): I should like to draw the attention of the Chinese representative to the fact that he is not keeping to the point. In my statement I did not touch on the question of the draft resolution introduced by the representative of Somalia on behalf of Argentina, Burundi, Japan, Nicaragua, Sierra Leone and Somalia. I shall revert to that question later and he will have an opportunity to speak on it.

198. Mr. HUANG Hua (China) (*translated from Chinese*): Regardless of whether he has touched upon the proposal, the purpose of the Soviet representative is to make as many replies as possible in order to prevent the Security Council from making progress with regard to the proposal of the representative of Somalia. I should like to reserve my right to make a further reply, but I shall not fall into Mr. Malik's trap. That trap consists of delaying tactics.

199. I should like to mention a very simple historical fact. Mr. Malik mentioned Emperor Pu Yi of Manchukuo. The historical fact is that Pu Yi was a war criminal and he was not, as Mr. Malik stated, handed over to China as a Marxist.

200. Emperor Pu Yi, after long prison terms in China, was released and became a librarian for a period of time. He passed away a few years ago. If Mr. Malik admits that Pu Yi is a Marxist, then Mr. Malik can call Pu Yi a comrade, in spite of the fact that that is contrary to historical fact.

201. Mr. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*translated from Russian*): I take note of the fact that the quisling Pu Yi was not punished in China but was made a librarian.

202. Mr. BUSH (United States of America): I should like, first, to make a very brief comment regarding the statement by the Ambassador of India. I appreciate his omitting certain passages from the column that he quoted. In all sincerity, I say that this was most considerate and courteous of him. But I do believe that a brief reply is in order.

203. He insists on deflecting the Security Council's attention from the fire on the subcontinent by using this ageless device of quoting selectively from columns or editorials printed here that are unfavourable to the policy of the United States Government. Let me here and now assure this Council that our people—and that is what counts in this country—support what the United States Government has been trying to do, selective columns to the contrary notwithstanding.

204. Our people, our policy, supported the Secretary-General in his call for help for the refugees, in his call for

observers. Were not those efforts by our Secretary-General even-handed? We think they were. Our people supported the massive relief effort for refugees in Pakistan and the massive relief effort for refugees in India. Our people supported the vigorous private diplomacy in which our President engaged in trying to get the forces of both sides to pull back. And our people supported, happily and proudly, the recent visit of the Indian Prime Minister to our soil. I can also assure our colleague that the American people strongly support the United States draft resolution which received such an overwhelming vote in the Security Council, a resolution to stop killing, a resolution for a cease-fire and withdrawal, a resolution—and let me quote it very briefly:

“... towards the creation of a climate conducive to the voluntary return of refugees to East Pakistan”.

Our people support that, as they did a resolution supporting the Secretary-General's offer for good offices for peace. That is what we support, selective columns to the contrary notwithstanding.

205. This is not a one-sided policy. I hope it is a compassionate policy, a compassionate policy towards a continent in flames. I wish the draft resolution had garnered even more votes than the overwhelming number it did receive. I wish it had received the unanimous support of the world community.

206. In summary, we can find voices of dissent on our policy in this country; we can find editorials. But I do not want this Council to be diverted by this device of shifting the focus to our Government by quoting unfavourable domestic sources. No matter from where those articles come, they will not divert the world's attention from the massive war that has descended upon the subcontinent. And while the war goes on, blame is unimportant. Each of us in this Council can have his views as to who is to blame; and certainly our colleague from India is entitled to his. But at this critical moment in history blame is unimportant; stopping the slaughter, stopping the invasion, somehow seems to our people to be desperately important.

207. At our meeting last night I noted that the Council had been convened because it was faced with a clear and present threat to the peace of the world, because the area and the scope of the fighting had broadened and had intensified and because the Council had a responsibility under the Charter to stop the fighting and to preserve the territorial integrity of Member States. Eleven members of this Council—a clear majority—signified on two separate occasions their desire to exercise the responsibilities of the Security Council under the Charter. They voted in favour of two draft resolutions which called upon the Governments of India and Pakistan to take measures forthwith for an immediate cease-fire and withdrawal of their armed forces from the territory of the other to their own side of the borders. They recognized the need to intensify efforts to bring about speedily and in accordance with the principles of the Charter conditions necessary for the voluntary return of the East Pakistan refugees to their homeland.

208. But unfortunately—as our colleague from Argentina mentioned and as we pointed out last night—one permanent member of this Council did not support that approach and exercised, under the rules, its veto over those two draft resolutions. In the midst of this grave situation the action of that member has rendered the Council unable to act in order to restore peace and security in South Asia and we are not able in this crisis even to call for a halt to the fighting and the return of troops to within their own borders. In these circumstances we are faced with the prospect that the world will conclude that the United Nations is unable to fulfil its Charter obligations to restore international peace and security where they are threatened.

209. This Council must do all within its power to ensure that this does not happen. It must explore every feasible avenue for action. And, to judge by statements made by most members at our last meeting, it is also clear that a large majority is agreed that we cannot leave the matter where it is; the *status quo* is intolerable. The threat to peace is too real and the plight of the refugees and the civilian population in general is too urgent for us to engage in further demonstrations of the inability of this Council to carry out its duties under the Charter. Fortunately, there are additional steps that we can take to permit the full membership of the United Nations to examine this urgent question and bring its influence to bear in favour of restoring peace in South Asia.

210. The “Uniting for peace” resolution of the General Assembly [377 A (V)] provides that:

“... if the Security Council, because of lack of unanimity of the permanent members, fails to exercise its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security in any case where there appears to be a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression, the General Assembly shall consider the matter immediately with a view to making appropriate recommendations...”

211. Accordingly, the United States joins the representatives of Somalia, Argentina, Burundi—and hopefully many more—in supporting the draft resolution which provides for referral of this urgent and important question to the twenty-sixth session of the General Assembly for immediate consideration. We fervently hope that the Assembly will prove itself equal to the task so that the United Nations will have fulfilled these grave responsibilities that it bears under the Charter.

212. The PRESIDENT: I should like to make a statement. I feel that I must remind members of the Security Council of rule 27 of the provisional rules of procedure which states that “the President shall call upon speakers in the order in which they signify their desire to speak.”

213. Accordingly, will those who wish to take the floor kindly add their names to the list of speakers which the Secretariat and I keep. They will then be called upon in the order of their inscription. We cannot conduct orderly debates if representatives who indicate that they wish to raise points of order instead make substantive statements or proceed to exercise their right of reply.

214. Mr. SEVILLA-SACASA (Nicaragua) (*interpretation from Spanish*): It is a pity that the solution of a grave problem which sheds blood among two peoples who are our friends, India and Pakistan, and which threatens peace in the world does not in this case depend on the majority of the members of the Council.

215. I have always believed that Article 27 of the Charter is detrimental to the sovereign equality of States because nobody here is going to discuss the fact that the sovereign equality of States is and must be one of the bastions of peace and international security. In other words, it is not possible to agree that while blood is flowing in torrents in areas of India and Pakistan the noble purpose of so many should be frustrated because of the decision of one.

216. In the General Assembly there is no veto. There are votes, votes which are binding and which, when cast, veto minorities thus characterizing the representative and democratic nature of the General Assembly.

217. If the principal function of this Council is to maintain peace and international security, let it maintain them with the full awareness of that responsibility so as to deserve universal respect. If tomorrow—God forbid—a larger conflict were to break out in Asia in the frontier areas of India and Pakistan because we have taken no decision due to the veto used under Article 27 of the Charter, then I wonder what the world will say about us. What would we be able to reply to all the criticisms which would fall on this Council like a painful whip.

218. And yet I have always believed that the resolution "Uniting for peace" is wise and courageous. Let us do honour to what we decided in 1950. Let Pakistan and India realize that in the United Nations not everything is words and promises, but rather a reality inspired by good faith, that good faith which should be the substance of our international conduct.

219. Consistent with what I said in my initial statement, I support as a co-sponsor the draft resolution to which the representative of Somalia has referred so eloquently. What he has stated is the truth. The opposing views held in regard to this problem by the protagonists, India and Pakistan, and the certainty we feel that texts of one kind or another with pronouncements of various kinds mentioning the two nations which are parties to the conflict, would not be adopted because of the inexorable action of the veto, a right conferred on the great Powers under Article 27 of the Charter, leads us to believe that it is only the forum of the General Assembly which can respond to the desires for peace of the expectant world in which we live.

220. Mr. KULAGA (Poland) (*interpretation from French*): We have already spoken in this debate several times. I shall limit myself now to presenting, in as concise a fashion as possible, the position we hold at this stage of the debate.

221. In the attitude which my Government has constantly maintained, in the interventions which my delegation has made in the course of this debate, a fundamental element has always been repeated: a solution of the conflict on our

agenda must, necessarily and in the first instance, take into account the basic fact—the situation in East Pakistan. We consider also that the situation is extremely complex and difficult. The long negotiations and consultations in this Council have demonstrated as much. A solution, if it is to be judicious, realistic and lasting, must take into account all the essential elements of the situation, their complexity and their interdependence both in time and in space. To deal with these elements separately, independently of each other, independently, in the first instance, of the political settlement of the situation in East Pakistan, cannot lead to the solution of the problem before us.

222. On the contrary—and I have said this in a previous statement, in speaking of the draft resolution of the United States—that can lead to unacceptable solutions: allowing the existence of a situation of military and political repression by Pakistani military forces, which we can under no circumstances do; giving equal weight to the responsibility of India and of Pakistan for this situation, which we cannot accept.

223. Another effort has been made now: the draft resolution of the Soviet Union, which partly reproduces and adds to the draft resolution of five Powers. We approve that draft resolution; we support it, for a reason which I will express in a single sentence: it deals with the root of the evil in order to cure it and eliminate all its external manifestations which are so tragic and so dangerous.

224. The PRESIDENT: I now invite the representative of Saudi Arabia to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

225. Mr. BAROODY (Saudi Arabia): The basic principles on which the United Nations Charter is predicated are at stake. The fundamental principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs of States has no doubt been violated. Any civil conflict inside a country should be resolved by the people of that country themselves and not by the invasion of the troops of one State into the territory of another to support rebellious elements that may serve its own national interests. The tragic situation of the refugees from East Pakistan should not be exploited by anyone—without naming the country.

226. Although the refugees on Indian soil are a burden on India, there is no excuse for championing a separatist movement inside the State of Pakistan. If the Security Council fails to prevail on India amicably to withdraw its troops from the territory of Pakistan, what will prevent other States from exploiting similar tragic situations for their own benefit? Even subversion, not to speak of flagrant intervention, should be considered impermissible in the era of the United Nations—although, unfortunately, *agents provocateurs* are still planted by States to undermine other States.

227. Here, I have to say something in a low voice to my good friend Ambassador Malik. I am sure he will take it in good faith. There is something that has been taking place for several years, but I have not told him about these incidents. I have been approached several times every year by alleged representatives of the three Baltic States—I say

"alleged" because I do not consider them "representatives"—in New York and elsewhere. They have followed me to Paris. They want me to clamour in the United Nations for the right of self-determination. They tell me: "They call you 'Mr. Self-Determination'. Over a period of eight years with your colleagues you elaborated that principle into a right. Help us out." My reply, my good friend, Ambassador Malik, has invariably been that only the people resident in the Baltic States have the right to speak for themselves and not emigrés like them, who live outside the legitimate components of the 16 republics of the Soviet Union.

228. The representative of China mentioned yesterday that there had been attempts to separate Sinkiang from China. I did not know about that. Had he not said it, I should not have known it. Many countries are confronted with various secessionist movements. If we encourage such secessionist movements, we may have to gerrymander many countries and prepare a new map of the world.

229. Self-determination—and I am speaking from my humble experience in having spent several years elaborating the principle into a right—is an inalienable right of peoples and nations, on the sole basis of a community of interests. The other day I mentioned Belgium. There is a so-called Flemish group and a French-speaking group there, but the community of interests made them into a State. If some people in East Pakistan were disgruntled—and we should not set ourselves up here as judges concerning whether they are right or wrong—they should compose their differences with their own Government, without interference from the outside. I submit that there is no State in the world with a so-called homogeneous people. The Soviet Union consists of 16 Republics. Are they ethnologically the same? What is the cohesive force that keeps them together? A community of interests, bolstered by the power of the central Government, and rightly so.

230. I want to tell my good friend, Ambassador Sen, that I have been a student of Asia and I know that India itself has many ethnological groups—apart from a diversity of cultures and languages. Would the Government of India accept any movement that tended to break India into a number of States? Certainly not, and if any attempt is made I will be the first one to stand with it in case there is subversion. The Indian thesis is that it can no longer bear the burden caused by several million refugees from East Pakistan who fled to the soil of India. It seems to me that India has decided to invade East Pakistan for the repatriation of these refugees to their homeland. India may claim that the only way to get rid of these refugees, who are a financial burden, no doubt about it, would be to create a secessionist State, namely, Bangla Desh, and prevail upon the refugees to return to their homeland. However, the United Nations had already been seized of the tragic situation of the refugees, and continuous efforts are being exerted to have those refugees repatriated without undue delay.

231. Let us for a moment visualize what might happen if India persisted in refusing to withdraw its troops from Pakistani soil until a Bangla Desh State was firmly established and that would encourage the refugees to return to their homeland. The Pakistani Government would have

no choice but to fight and fight and keep on fighting until both countries, I submit, would become bankrupt and have to be assisted financially from outside. The Soviet Union would have to extend aid—and I am not specifying what aid—to India, and China would have no choice but to do the same to Pakistan, and international relations in Asia—mostly in Asia—would be exacerbated, some States siding with Pakistan and others siding with India. That would be the situation. There would be fighting, continuous fighting, some States siding with India and other States siding with Pakistan.

232. Is there no solution to such an impasse? I submit that the Council should improvise, at this last minute, urgent action, lest the people of India and Pakistan become the victims of the conflict between two giants, namely, the Soviet Union and China. Neither India nor Pakistan should find comfort in the exchange of vilifications between the two major communist States among us. Invective hurts. It is like putting salt on a wound. How are we to expect any clear thinking on the part of those who indulge in vituperation and incrimination? What have the communist States left for the capitalists if they tangle with them? If this is the type of debate we are to witness, exchanges of recrimination between two sister States, Asian States—to a large extent the Soviet Union is Asian and China is wholly Asian—what are we to expect them to do if this tone is continued in the United Nations, reviving the cold war of the fifties? As I see things, the Ambassadors of China and the Soviet Union have the key to the solution of this sad situation, but of course they have to receive instructions from their capitals.

233. I have watched, throughout, the cool and collected attitude of two of our colleagues in the Council. They are major Powers—the representatives of France and the United Kingdom. They have been quite reticent. Perhaps they saw that the better part of wisdom is to watch this drama and see whether they can lend their good offices between the two major Powers, namely the Soviet Union and China. Of course, I do not expect that the United Kingdom will make headway with the Soviet Union on account of those alleged spies. I have noticed the sagacity of the Soviet representative and the Chinese representative—they are both cool and collected. I notice how placid our Chinese brothers from Asia are, and I have noticed also how cool and collected the British can be, without being ruffled. I have lived amongst them for a decade. Then, relations between France and the Soviet Union are better than ever. Good. So why not have the French use their good offices with the Soviet Union—in Peking, in Moscow and, of course, in New York.

234. So there are these two illustrious representatives, and there is my illustrious friend from the Soviet Union. Although I do not see eye to eye with him all the time, he is a very reasonable man personally. Both he and our Chinese colleague were having a good time and both were laughing. Is it a tragi-comedy, while people are suffering in the millions and there is war going on?

235. I believe that, after tonight, or tomorrow morning, those four colleagues I mentioned could start to do some spade work.

236. I must confess that the intervention of Ambassador Bush of the United States moved me deeply this afternoon. There was no phoney ring about it. I think it came from the heart. The United States has been extending assistance to both India and Pakistan. We should not be so obsessed with the idea that if a great Power has so much weight in the international community we should always treat it with suspicion.

237. Now, may I refer to the question of transmitting the whole situation to the General Assembly under the "Uniting for peace" resolution? When I was writing my notes, I thought that this should be done as a last resort. But it seems to be the trend. May I say, from my personal humble experience, that such a step, although laudable in its motives, would hardly contribute to a speedy solution of the problem? It will not bring comfort to the unabated suffering of the teeming millions of refugees and potential refugees, including Indians and Pakistanis.

238. I am not going to mention the abortive work of the Assembly on matters that should have been the prerogative of the Security Council. In order not to embarrass certain States I shall not name them. But had it not been for a frightful Secretary of State in the United States—frightful, I said, because he adopted the policy of so-called brinkmanship—nothing would have happened in 1956 when a certain question was referred to the General Assembly. Then, without mentioning the problem by name, in 1967, when the Security Council failed to take effective measures, they thought of referring the question to the General Assembly.

239. I was sitting where my Indian colleague is now sitting, and Ambassador Fedorenko of the Soviet Union, who accepted that transmittal, was sitting where my Belgian colleague is now sitting. I looked toward Ambassador Fedorenko of the Soviet Union and I said: "The result will be zero." I did not say it in a whisper. I mentioned this on the record, and I stand to be vindicated. I do not know why the Soviet Union found common ground with the United States at that time and transmitted the problem of Palestine to the General Assembly in 1967. We are still talking a blue streak about it in the General Assembly—year in and year out for the last four or five years.

240. What will happen to the teeming millions who are suffering in the Indian subcontinent, both Indians and Pakistanis? After all, the Indians who are fighting can also be killed, and they have mothers and wives and children; and needless to say, there are millions of suffering Pakistani refugees.

241. As I said, I had a chance to participate in the General Assembly on that question, and I said: "The result now is below zero." Nothing has happened in the Assembly so far. And you want to refer this tragedy to the General Assembly? I have no objection. If I had any objections, I have no vote here, not even the right to abstain. It is only the Security Council which has the mandatory power to act. Each one of us knows that if the Security Council fails repeatedly in its duties and obligations, it had better declare its impotency once and for all and merge with the General Assembly, and perhaps nurture the hope that the General

Assembly may work out some miracles. But the age of miracles is past, I submit.

242. War negates all fundamental human rights. Think, gentlemen of the Council, of the millions who need your help regardless of whether they are Indian or Pakistanis, for in the end the whole population of the subcontinent will find itself in a quagmire of poverty and misery, with the meagre living that each one ekes out reduced even more. How can a person maintain his dignity if his country is torn by war and he is not able to make a living, not to speak of a decent living? Even the big Powers can no longer afford war. The victors usually end up by being losers economically, as we witnessed after the Second World War. The people of the world, whether they belong to the victors or the defeated, have to be taxed heavily. When will our leaders wake up, especially the leaders of the big Powers, and read the writing on the wall: "The young refuse to be thrown into the slaughterhouse"?

243. Have we no mercy for the individual? No compassion? These last words of mine are nothing but an appeal to my good friend Ambassador Malik to relay to the Soviet Union what might happen to the teeming millions of the Asian subcontinent should war trail on. Likewise, I appeal to my brother Ambassador Sen to see whether he may not work out with his own Government a solution in which the dignity of everyone concerned in the area would be preserved. I appeal too to my Asian Chinese brothers to use their wisdom and political sagacity, perhaps accepting that they should talk to our friend Ambassador Malik instead of exchanging accusations and recriminations and forget for a while their strategic difference—freeze it, put it in the refrigerator for a while and concentrate on the misery of the teeming millions. Only when they do may there be a possibility—through the intervention of such illustrious colleagues as the representative of the United Kingdom, Sir Colin Crowe, and the representative of France, Mr. Kosciusko-Morizet—to see a gleam of light that will show us the path to wisdom and comfort those who are suffering and who in the end will curse the United Nations if it cannot find a solution to their problems.

244. The PRESIDENT: I now call on the representative of Pakistan.

245. Mr. SHAHI (Pakistan): It was not my intention to take the floor again, but the Ambassador of the Soviet Union addressed a direct question to me which arises out of the draft resolution contained in document S/10428, which he has circulated. This question was: "Why are you afraid of the expression of the will of the people of East Pakistan?" I believe that he is entitled to an answer and I shall give him an honest answer, but before I do that I should like to make a comment or two on his draft resolution as explained by him.

246. I draw the attention of the Security Council first to the fact that while the Soviet draft resolution attempts to merge the elements of the five-Power draft resolution contained in document S/10425, it also changes that draft resolution, which has been withdrawn. For example, compare paragraph 1 of the five-Power draft resolution with paragraph 1 of the Soviet proposal. The five-Power

draft reads: "*Calls upon* the Governments concerned forthwith, as a first step, for an immediate cease-fire". The Soviet draft "*Calls upon* all parties concerned forthwith, as a first step, for an immediate cease-fire and cessation of all hostilities". This is a basic change because, while one request is addressed to "the Governments concerned", the other is addressed to "all parties concerned". Since we know that the secessionist elements are accompanying the Indian invading forces, the Soviet draft resolution would make them a party to this first step, compel us to negotiate with them and straightaway accord them the status of a party. In other words, it would pave the way for recognition. For us, as one of the parties, this is a most fundamental change introduced by the representative of the Soviet Union.

247. I shall respond to the appeal of Ambassador Malik to examine his draft resolution in the light of life and in the light of reality as it obtains now. There is an element of internal contradiction in the Soviet draft resolution. Paragraph 1 gives status and recognition to the auxiliary secessionist forces accompanying the Indian armed forces by making them a party. Paragraph 2 of the Soviet draft resolution calls for a political settlement, "giving immediate recognition to the will of the East Pakistan population as expressed in the elections of December 1970". The fact is, the reality is, that the auxiliary secessionist elements accompanying the invading Indian forces have repudiated the mandate. They stand for the creation of an independent Bangla Desh State. That was not the will of the population of East Pakistan as expressed in the elections of December 1970. There is a qualitative change in the demand that is now being made. Therefore, the Soviet draft resolution on the one hand accords status to the secessionist elements who demand independence and who have repudiated the mandate of the people of East Pakistan as given in the elections and on the other hand talks of giving expression to the will of the people of East Pakistan. In this situation it is the auxiliary armed secessionist elements which will be given a decisive voice by this draft resolution. I point out this internal contradiction.

248. I earlier expressed the view that the Soviet amendments, on which I commented and which are now part of this Soviet draft resolution, linked a settlement with a cease-fire. That is, as Ambassador Malik explained, there is an organic bond between them: that is, until there is a settlement, hostilities must continue; war will continue.

249. Then there is an element of political negotiation involved for the Government of Pakistan, under the duress of the presence of the invading Indian armed forces. We have been called upon to negotiate under these circumstances—which has never been the practice of the Security Council or the United Nations.

250. Whatever the organs of public opinion may say, whatever columnists may say, whatever intellectuals may say—and many of them do not have a high opinion of the United Nations—we all know that many great intellectuals are political innocents. But here we are working within the framework of the rules and provisions of the Charter, and we have to act in accordance with those principles. The intellectuals and the columnists and the newspaper editors

consider themselves superior; they override the law of the United Nations in moulding public opinion. But we have to conform to the Charter.

251. Therefore, the principle that there can be no political solution to any problem while a country is under invasion and occupation is a fundamental one, and we regret to find that that principle—a United Nations principle—is ignored in the Soviet draft proposal.

252. Further, I should like to point out that in all the draft resolutions that the United Nations has considered it is a sacrosanct practice to couple cease-fire with withdrawal, and we have admired the position of principle of the Soviet Union, until now, that it has always maintained the organic link between withdrawal and cease-fire. But, unfortunately, we do not find a consistent approach by the Soviet Union on the present occasion.

253. As I have said, East Pakistan is a part of Pakistan recognized as such by all Member States. The armed attacks and invasion of East Pakistan from 21 November constituted an armed attack—an aggression—on all Pakistan.

254. The representative of the Soviet Union made the charge that Pakistan started this on 3 December. But we must go back before that date. I should like to point out that the aggression started on 21 November, against Pakistan, which is one single State.

255. Then, in regard to my remarks, let me make clear what I said about our internal crisis. We do have an internal crisis, which is a political crisis. That political crisis is our internal affair. The international aspects of this crisis are the following: there is the humanitarian aspect—the purely humanitarian aspect—and there is the other international aspect created by Indian subversion, promotion of armed rebellion and secession within East Pakistan, and, finally, the invasion of East Pakistan. I should like to make clear once and for all what are the internal aspects of our crisis and what are the international aspects so that there will be no misapprehension whatsoever.

256. Now, coming to the question whether we are afraid of the expression of the will of the people of East Pakistan. No; it is a great tragedy that that will could not be given political expression in the meeting of the National Assembly, in which differences between political parties could perhaps have been resolved. But as a result of a postponement for a short time, the secessionist elements in East Pakistan launched a rebellion involving the non-payment of taxes to the Government, defiance of the authority of the Government, and the release of 18,000 criminals from gaols, who were armed and let loose in an orgy of massacre.

257. That is the truth. If evidence is required one need only consult the newspapers published in East Pakistan from the time of the crisis, from January and February and on 25 March. That was a notorious fact, which is known not only to Members of the United Nations. Those armed criminal elements, thousands of them, were armed and let loose to go and commit massacres; and, regrettably, some of the elected representatives were involved in those crimes. No member of the Assembly has been disqualified for political dissent or for his political views.

258. There is evidence of the organization of slaughterhouses—I do not wish to go into these details—and those responsible were requested to come and clear themselves of the charges. Now, in this situation, while an amnesty extends to political offenders, can the international community demand that it should also be extended to those who have organized murder?

259. Therefore, I should like to point out in regard to the Soviet draft resolution the internal contradiction that the armed secessionist elements are being made a party to certain directives and actions of the Council, and then there is a demand about recognition of the will of the population of East Pakistan. If the secessionist elements were to repudiate secessionist aims and abide by the will of the people of East Pakistan as expressed in those elections, we might perhaps emerge from this dark night and from the gloom which surrounds us. That is a pertinent question which every member of the Security Council must ask himself before he exercises his vote on the Soviet draft resolution.

260. The PRESIDENT: The next speaker on my list is the representative of India, on whom I now call.

261. Mr. SEN (India): Mr. President, we are coming to the end of the debate, and I am grateful to you and to the Council for this opportunity to make a few comments.

262. This debate has shown that selectivity is the order of the day. Now, several principles have been quoted by various delegations: sovereignty, territorial integrity, non-interference in other peoples' affairs, and so on. But I wonder why we should be shy about speaking of human rights. What happened to the Convention on genocide? What happened to the principle of self-determination? What happened to all the other social rights and conventions which you have so solemnly accepted? Are we therefore to be selective in serving what is known as the motto of our era: peace, progress and justice? What happened to the justice part?

263. We cannot proceed on this important and very serious matter in that selective way. The Declaration on the Strengthening of International Security has been quoted. What happened to article 22 of that Declaration? What happened to the other articles? According to your views, you can select as you like, but when I select a particular article, then that is being selective.

264. I should have thought that the normal, civilized course of debate would be for each speaker to support his argument with the best evidence available; and if that is a crime then I have to be taught all the lessons of democracy all over again.

265. I was also glad to hear that the people of the United States support their Government. I should have thought that in an elected government—one elected for at least four years—that is a self-evident truth. But I was glad to have that confirmation.

266. Then I was told that we are here not to apportion blame but to do something to calm down the fire which is

raging. I can recall areas not far from India where warfare had been going on for years. I shall leave history to judge how and at what speed human lives are saved and the flames of conflict put out. Did we not then consider justice and the question of blame? I shall leave it at that.

267. Now, when we started this debate I asked myself and some of my friends what exactly the Council would wish to achieve. When I came here to participate in this important debate, in spite of many reservations—mainly for reasons I will explain briefly in a minute—I had hoped that the Council would proceed on the basis of that threefold motto of peace, progress and justice.

268. Let me not be soft-mouthed about it: those who cry for peace, progress and justice must realize that these principles apply to all areas, not merely to India and Pakistan, not merely to this area or that area, but to all areas. We are all committed to them, and we cannot separate these concepts merely because someone feels something ought to be done quickly after having slept on it for nine months.

269. The second question I asked myself was: can we achieve it? I think we can achieve it. The Security Council has enough power to achieve it, but I rather doubt it will exercise that power. That power could have been exercised a long, long time ago. We are bogged down on the matter of internal jurisdiction, and so on and so forth, and there has been no attempt yet today to have us look at the problem in its entirety and take suitable decisions. No, we are very anxious to get rid of a resolution somehow or other.

270. Then I asked myself: how should we achieve it? Now, here is where my hesitation, reservations and protests come in. I should have thought, I repeat, that any consideration of the question of cease-fire should require the parties who are fighting. I suppose it is not the intention of the Council that fighting between Pakistani soldiers and the people of East Pakistan should not be halted, and that violent massacres should go on all over the place, and that those who resist those massacres should be blamed for resisting them. I should have thought that the intention of all men of goodwill would be to put an end to all hostilities. And we have just heard argued that the secessionist movement—I have again and again explained that aspect of the problem, and we do not have to dwell on it—that the Pakistani army can take whatever action it likes against helpless women, children and men, but they must not resist because that is immoral.

271. That is why I wanted Bangla Desh people to come and give us their view. But that has not happened. In this system of unrealism can the Council really expect to come to any sensible decision?

272. Now, let me explain very briefly what some of these realities are. Refugees are a reality. It is not a question of economic strain alone. I have explained that again and again so I shall not go into that. But anyway, refugees are a reality. Genocide and oppression are realities. The intense desire of people to live their own lives, in their own ways is an overwhelming reality. There is no hope of Pakistan ever controlling these lives. Total collapse of all the administra-

tion of Government is a reality. The extinction of all civil rights is a reality. Armed conflicts of various kinds are realities. Provocation and aggression of various kinds by Pakistan from 25 March onwards is a reality. As a result, retaliation has followed in exercise of the right of self-defence, and we have warned that we shall exercise this right without hesitation. Recognition by India of Bangla Desh is a reality. Bangla Desh itself is a reality. Those who do not accept these realities or the facts on which these realities are based are entitled to do so. We are not here to convince those who do not wish to be convinced. There are those who do not wish to see facts and nobody can make them see facts. As the saying goes, no one is so blind as the man who refuses to see.

✓ 273. If we go against these realities it is not India which will suffer but, I fear, the entire concept of the United Nations. We thank the Soviet Union, not because of the India-Soviet treaty, but because it is one of the countries which has accepted these realities as they are. The realities have also been dawning in various quarters, but much too slowly. After nine months we are still not anywhere near reality.

274. Now, much has been said about the India-Soviet peace treaty, that it is a bond of slavery. Now, those who believe that a country like India today can be controlled and ruled by some other power, however powerful it is, are not lacking in erudition. They do not need erudition, but they need attention in some other field. Pakistan continues to represent that the elections and subsequent wiping out of their verdict by force was inevitable and because of the secessionist elements. Again, I shall leave it at that because we know the facts much too well. I simply wish to make our position quite clear at this stage. We have made it clear before but again, I should read out formally a brief paragraph about our position:

"We have made our position perfectly clear and we shall adhere firmly to it, for what is at stake—perhaps it is difficult for others to understand it—is our national security, is our entire social and economic fabric, and the complex of life of over 500 million people of India, and many others besides. We have faced aggression from a neighbour four times and we are threatened again. The sizes of different countries have little relevance, for small Powers can have powerful allies, expensive and efficient military machines, and strange ambitions. Added to this, we face the mortal danger through the annihilation of 75 million people at our doorstep. This cannot but fail to overwhelm us and we shall not tolerate it."

275. Mr. NAKAGAWA (Japan): My country is very much distressed to see the situation in the Indo-Pakistan subcontinent so much deteriorated that a large-scale war has actually started between two brotherly countries with both of whom Japan has traditional friendship. My delegation, together with a number of other members of the Security Council, has tried very hard to arrive at some solutions which may receive the approval of this Council.

276. However, in the course of the last two sessions it has become clear to everyone that because of lack of unanimity of the permanent members, we are facing an impasse from

which there seems to be no way out. While we are continuing to discuss for hours and days, with no prospect of arriving at any fruitful result, hundreds of thousands of innocent people are dying and suffering in the undeclared fratricidal war. Peoples of the whole world are appalled and distressed at this sight and they are hoping and expecting that the United Nations will take some effective steps to stop this tragedy. The United Nations is the organ specifically created for the purpose of keeping the peace and security of the world. The United Nations cannot resign its duty simply because the Security Council has immobilized it. We must exert every possible effort and endeavour to fulfil this duty. It is only for this reason that my delegation co-sponsored the draft resolution now before us embodied in document S/10429, which would refer the question to the General Assembly, as provided for in General Assembly resolution 377 A (V) of 3 November 1950. In doing so, our only aim and desire is to see peace and brotherly relations restored as quickly as possible between the two great Asian nations.

277. The PRESIDENT: There being no further speakers, I would observe that four draft resolutions have been considered by the Council. The French draft resolution has not been circulated, so members may feel that it is not before the Council. I understand that the draft resolution contained in document S/10428, sponsored by the Soviet Union, may not be pressed. I understand also that the draft resolution sponsored by China may not be pressed.

278. Subject to what members of the Council have to say, I propose to put to the vote draft resolution S/10429 sponsored by Argentina, Burundi, Japan, Nicaragua, Sierra Leone and Somalia.

279. Mr. KOSCIUSKO-MORIZET (France) (*interpretation from French*): First of all I should like to make it clear once again that there is not, and there has never been, any French draft resolution. I quoted from a working document which we had discussed with several delegations and which seemed to be likely to provide the basis for an agreement, but it was no more than that. So there was no French draft resolution to be introduced or distributed, or even talked about. There was an initial text which I simply sought to bring to the attention of the Council.

280. Am I to understand that we shall immediately proceed to the vote on draft resolution S/10429? Or are we to have a discussion prior to the vote?

281. Mr. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*translated from Russian*): The delegation of the Soviet Union does not consider that it would be correct either from a substantive or from a procedural standpoint to refer this question to the General Assembly. This shows a desire to avoid solving the substantive aspect of the question and to avoid taking measures to eliminate the principal cause of the conflict in the Indian subcontinent. That is apparently something needed by those who are trying, in accordance with their former practice, perhaps to use the rostrum for various kinds of insinuations and fabrications against those countries whose views they do not share. But it is quite obvious that the main purpose is to divert attention from the substance of the problem, from the principal cause of

the conflict, to confuse the issue and mislead the United Nations, and to avoid resolving the question.

282. Those who are supporting this draft resolution know that resolutions of the General Assembly are recommendations while Security Council resolutions are mandatory decisions which, according to the Charter, States Members of the United Nations must implement. Since they have no desire to find an effective solution to the question under discussion, they are attempting to toss the matter into the lap of the General Assembly.

283. The Soviet delegation still considers that only a solution of the problem along the lines set out in our draft resolution would ensure an effective settlement of the situation on the Indian subcontinent.

284. You stated quite correctly, Mr. President, that the Soviet delegation is not insisting on a vote on its draft resolution at this moment. It is our intention to consult some of the other delegations, irrespective of whether this item is referred to the General Assembly. We shall continue this work and we shall defend the right cause and our just position.

285. I should like to say a few words about some of the remarks made by my very old friend, the distinguished Ambassador of Saudi Arabia, Mr. Baroody. He informed the Council that he had often been approached by the so-called representatives of the Baltic States. I do not know if Mr. Baroody is here in the Chamber. Do not believe them, they are not the representatives of the Soviet Baltic Republics, they are quislings and betrayers of the people of those Republics. They served Hitler, and now they serve whoever will pay them the most, they serve various imperialist intelligence services and are being used as a labour force to carry out the really dirty jobs against the Soviet Union and against the Baltic Republics. So put an end to your relations with them, Mr. Baroody; they are scum. If you want to make the acquaintance of the real representatives of the Baltic Republics, I can help you and be an intermediary. One of the members of the Soviet delegation to the twenty-sixth session of the General Assembly is a representative of the Latvian people. I can introduce you to him tomorrow. I can even give you his card today—he is the Latvian Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs. I shall be very happy to bring the two of you together and introduce you.

286. One small point of information: there are 15 Union Republics in the Soviet Union and not 16.

287. Finally, I should like to say that, if Mr. Baroody, with his superb erudition, oratorical skill and ability to present his views and proposals had helped to convince certain members of the Security Council to adopt the draft resolution introduced by the Soviet Union, that would have been useful and the sufferings of many people of which he spoke here could have been ended.

288. Mr. VAN USSEL (Belgium) (*interpretation from French*): After three days of almost uninterrupted deliberations and consultations, the Security Council must now note that it has not succeeded in discharging its primary

responsibility of maintaining international peace and security. And yet the great majority of the members of our Council have striven continuously, either here in the course of our meetings or outside this Council Chamber, to agree on a draft resolution likely to win unanimity and which would reflect the points of view of the two parties concerned.

289. Nevertheless, one cannot forget that in our Organization any draft resolution is the result of compromise and of mutual concessions. No country will find in the text of a draft resolution the genuine and original concepts which it would like to see therein. However, my Government could not compromise in regard to certain essential principles which, on the question now before the Council, seem to us to be the minimum prerequisite for arriving at realistic solutions in keeping with the requirements of the situation.

290. Allow me, on behalf of the delegation of Belgium, to pay a particular tribute to the European representatives, as well as to those of Africa, Asia and Latin America, who have given proof of their confidence in us and have assisted us with their counsel from the time when Belgium took the initiative, approximately 10 days ago, of consulting all the members of the Council in order to convene an urgent meeting.

291. We now find that there is a typical breach of the peace which, because of its dimensions and the emotions and passions it arouses, is likely to cause particularly grave political and human consequences.

292. As I have already pointed out in previous statements, the conflict between India and Pakistan by far exceeds the limits of a regional dispute. What is at stake, in the first place, are the lives of human beings who, as in every war, are the innocent victims of the political ambitions of men. But beyond the irreparable losses, the fighting that is now going on will no doubt for many years to come endanger peace and security in one of the most densely populated regions of the world.

293. The most fundamental principles on which the international community is based and which have governed inter-State relations since 1945 are now in jeopardy. Last year during the twenty-fifth anniversary session of our Organization we adopted, as a result of an initiative taken by the Soviet Union, the Declaration on the Strengthening of International Security, in the drafting of which the delegation of India—like the delegation of Belgium—made a major contribution. The commitments to which we subscribed at that time complemented, as it were, the United Nations Charter. I would venture to recall in particular the duties of States as set out in articles 2 and 4 of the Declaration, without forgetting article 24 in regard to respect for human rights. I am, furthermore, grateful to the representative of Somalia for having read out article 2 of the Declaration.

294. At a time when we are bound to recognize our failure, our impotence to act, our inability to restore peace on the Indian subcontinent, there is no choice left to us but to call on the General Assembly to examine the Indo-Pakistani situation immediately so as to make appropriate

recommendations to the world on collective measures to be taken under paragraph 1 of General Assembly resolution 377 A (V), which is called the "Uniting for peace" resolution.

295. My delegation will, accordingly, vote in favour of draft resolution S/10429.

296. Mr. ORTIZ DE ROZAS (Argentina) (*interpretation from Spanish*): I shall not take up the time of this Council unduly. I think we have already lost much of our very valuable time because of statements which were extremely lengthy the purpose of which can have escaped no one. But I am bound to refer to the statements made by the representative of the Soviet Union a few moments ago.

297. I always listen with the greatest respect to all the statements made here because I have respect for the ideas of others, even though I may not share them. I always listen most attentively to all the representatives, and that rule certainly applies to the statements made by the Ambassador of the Soviet Union. But respect is not to be confused with weakness or complacency.

298. In the statement he just made the representative of the Soviet Union referred to those countries which advocate the immediate transfer of this problem to the General Assembly in the following words which I shall try to repeat. He said that the countries which seek that course of action are interested in fabrications—"fabrications" was the word he used—against countries which do not share their ideas; that their purpose is to distract attention, to confuse the United Nations and to prevent a proper solution of the problem by avoiding a realistic decision.

299. I do not think that the representative of the Soviet Union is the best authority on avoiding a realistic decision after vetoing two draft resolutions which were intended to achieve precisely that. It is possible that the representative of the Soviet Union considers that his present draft resolution, like the one which was defeated by a great majority the other day, constitutes an adequate, moderate, realistic and constructive basis; but, in any case, that is not the view of the majority of the Council, and I would hope that the representative of the Soviet Union is not afraid of a decision of the General Assembly.

300. It is true that the great Powers do not have the right of veto in the General Assembly. That is, perhaps, one of the wise provisions of the Charter. But it is obvious that in the General Assembly every country, every sovereign State Member of the United Nations expresses itself on the basis of the draft resolutions submitted. The delegation of the Soviet Union, like any other delegation, has every right to submit a draft resolution to the General Assembly and, in the exercise of its sovereign right, the General Assembly will then further decide which draft resolution deserves its support.

301. If bringing this matter to the General Assembly can be construed as confusing the United Nations, avoiding a solution, or distracting attention, that is simply not to have confidence in the decision of 131 countries. I have such confidence and I maintain our text.

302. Mr. KOSCIUSKO-MORIZET (France) (*interpretation from French*): I should like to make two comments: one a formal one, the other a substantive one.

303. The first comment has to do with General Assembly resolution 377 A (V), the "Uniting for peace" resolution on which it must be said that the procedure for bringing something before the General Assembly is somewhat equivocal. That resolution tells us that:

"If not in session at the time, the General Assembly may meet in emergency special session . . ."—and at that point—"such emergency special session shall be called if requested by the Security Council on the vote of any seven members"—nine now—"or by a majority of the Members of the United Nations."

So that the procedure is very clear when the Assembly is not in session; it is far less clear when the Assembly is already in session. It would be sufficient as a matter of fact—because we do not want to quibble over form—to seize the Assembly under Article 12 of the Charter which says:

"While the Security Council is exercising in respect of any dispute or situation the functions assigned to it in the present Charter, the General Assembly shall not make any recommendation with regard to that dispute or situation unless the Security Council so requests."

Thus it is in fact that we must interpret the draft resolution that is presented to us by Argentina and other sponsors. Accordingly, it is possible for the Security Council to request the General Assembly to take up this matter, not so much in terms of the text of the "Uniting for peace" resolution but under Article 12 of the Charter. But regardless of formal details, what I want to say is that in the French text of "*Decides* to refer the question contained in document S/Agenda/1606 . . ." *renvoyer* for "refer" in English does not appear to me to be appropriate. *Renvoi* in French—referral—is correct when an assembly refers something to a committee, a subordinate organ. There is in French no *renvoi*—or referral—when there is a transmission between two organs that are quite different. The Assembly is not subordinate to the Council any more than the Council is subordinate to the Assembly. They are two different bodies that each have functions and powers that are different, so it would be more correct to say "to bring the question contained" and so on "before the General Assembly". This question of form has, after all, a consequence, and that is that the very fact of bringing the question before the General Assembly in no way implies—and the precedents are numerous—that the Council itself is no longer seized of the question. So that, regardless of the debates in the Assembly, or the results they may yield, the question remains before the Council and therefore consultations may continue. That is a point that I wanted to make quite firmly.

304. And now the substantive comment. We all deplore the failure of the Council. Of course, I have not either the right or the desire to cast blame upon anyone, but it is quite obvious that this debate does no honour to the Council, either by its result or even by the way in which it

was conducted. I do not think that those who watch us or hear us, or read about us will have a very high opinion of the United Nations at the present time, and I regret this profoundly.

305. A consolation, nevertheless, is perhaps that those who were most interested, the Ambassadors of India and Pakistan, have been able, in spite of the trials that their respective countries are going through, to present their interventions both with understandable forthrightness and with a dignity and restraint to which all members of the Council must pay tribute.

306. And now there is a proposal to bring this debate to the General Assembly. We have some doubts about what will happen. We think there will be more delays, more polemics, and to what end? To adopt a resolution which will only be a recommendation. We must not confuse procedures, nor confuse the powers of the organs of the Organization. That is why we shall be unable to associate ourselves with this draft resolution. Nevertheless, we shall not oppose it, in keeping with the position we have taken since the beginning. There are a certain number of members of the Council who believe in all good faith that they can find a solution by bringing the debate to the Assembly. As far as we are concerned, we have doubts, but if it is to be done let it be done. We hope that something will emerge, but we feel nevertheless that unfortunately, the situation is quite likely to deteriorate and that the Council sooner or later will have to face up to its responsibilities.

307. The PRESIDENT: The representative of Saudi Arabia wishes to speak and I shall now invite him to the Council table to make his statement.

308. I call first on the representative of Italy on a point of order.

309. Mr. VINCI (Italy): I understand that we have entered into the stage of voting on the draft resolution and explanations of vote. I think that only the members of the Council may speak at this stage. Of course I do not want to prevent the Ambassador of Saudi Arabia from speaking, but I think that he should do so after we have given our explanations of vote and voted. I think that is the correct order of business.

310. The PRESIDENT: It is my understanding that there is no rule to that effect, but if that has been the practice I am prepared to yield if the members so decide.

311. Since I hear no objection, it is so decided.

312. Mr. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*translated from Russian*): In analysing the reasons for referring this question to the Assembly, I did not have in mind either the Ambassador of Argentina or Argentina as a country, nor the other sponsors of the resolution. I had in mind those who have elevated anti-Sovietism to make it official policy. That does not apply to Argentina. We have the best of relations with Argentina and for our part we are making every effort to develop them further. We, the Soviet delegation and that of Argentina, are not frightened of the General Assembly. On the contrary, we often address it and

we often submit proposals, and the most important items being discussed at the twenty-sixth session—on the convening of a world disarmament conference and on the strengthening of international security—were proposed by the Soviet Union. We shall also defend our position in the Assembly actively and with as much purpose and conviction as we defend it in the Security Council.

313. We had in mind those who were planning this action long before the Ambassador of Argentina introduced his draft resolution. Here is a communiqué published this evening before there was any resolution in the Security Council. The communiqué states:

[The speaker continued in English.]

“Ambassador George Bush and his staff planned a strategy to move the Indo-Pakistan issue from the Council to the General Assembly. This would be done under the resolution called ‘Uniting for peace’”.

[The speaker resumed in Russian.]

That is what we had in mind. We had in mind another party which actively supported that move.

314. Mr. VINCI (Italy): In a statement I made at our meeting last night I said that if the Security Council was unable to take any action, even the minimum indispensable action—at least as we saw it at that time—I was afraid that there would not be any choice left except to bring the conflict between India and Pakistan to the General Assembly. In a few minutes, this will be the result of the deadlock we have reached.

315. It was precisely in order to enable the Council to exercise its primary responsibility that my delegation, together with five other delegations, submitted a very short cease-fire draft resolution. In introducing that text, I said that I knew that it would look unsatisfactory to many delegations. My delegation and the other sponsors were moved only by two main purposes: first, to break the deadlock and at the same time save the Security Council from discredit; and secondly, to take first things first and try to bring the fighting to a halt, to stop the killing, to stop the misery and the bloodshed—and, I added, if it was not already too late. Unfortunately, the events of these last 24 hours have shown that it was too late.

316. We certainly appreciate the fact that the Soviet delegation has today adopted our short “cease-fire” and embodied it in a new draft resolution which Ambassador Malik has introduced. Ambassador Malik said that any resolution should reflect the reality of the situation. Well, there are many sides to this reality; there are many different opinions, as has been very clearly shown from the debate that has taken place. That is why I also said in my statement yesterday that in our attempts to act we were perhaps not well inspired in trying to face and deal with all the crucial aspects of such a complex problem. We now note that the Soviet delegation is not pressing its draft to the vote, and therefore I will not make further comments.

317. I turn now to draft resolution S/10429, sponsored by Argentina, Burundi, Japan, Nicaragua, Sierra Leone and

Somalia. We agree with the sponsors and with previous speakers that if the Security Council is unable to act, the United Nations as a whole must not be allowed to fail and must try to respond to the expectations of the general membership and world public opinion.

318. That is why my delegation supports the six-Power draft resolution and will vote in favour of it.

319. Mr. ORTIZ DE ROZAS (Argentina) (*interpretation from Spanish*): I should like to place on record my gratitude to the representative of the Soviet Union for the clarification which he was good enough to provide in regard to the meaning of what he had said previously. I am glad that this is what he meant because the intention of the sponsors of this draft resolution is constructive. As proof of this it will be observed that there are three African, one Asian and two Latin American countries which have submitted this draft resolution to the Security Council.

320. Indeed, there are excellent relations between the Soviet Union and Argentina and for our part we are completely prepared to continue and strengthen them. Indeed, on many occasions we have found ourselves in agreement with the Soviet Union. For my part, I was totally unaware of the communiqué from which he just quoted—probably it comes from a news agency—in which it is stated that the United States delegation intended to put forward a proposal like the one submitted by the six sponsors. I was unaware of that, but I would like to say how happy I am to learn that the United States supports this proposal, because just as we sometimes agree with the Soviet Union, so too, do we sometimes agree with the United States.

321. Mr. FARAH (Somalia): This is not the first time the Security Council has referred a question to the General Assembly. I would remind the members of the Council that in October 1956 during the Suez Canal crisis the Council referred the question to the General Assembly, and only France and the United Kingdom voted against. In November 1956 the question concerning Hungary was referred to the General Assembly, with only the Soviet Union voting against. In 1958 the Council as a whole voted to refer the question of Lebanon to the General Assembly. So we are guided by precedents. We have now reached a situation where even the most optimistic among us find there is no hope for the present of reaching a formula that would be acceptable to all members of the Council.

322. The PRESIDENT: As there are no further speakers, I take it that the Security Council is now prepared to proceed to the vote on the six-Power draft resolution contained in document S/10429.

A vote was taken by show of hands.

In favour: Argentina, Belgium, Burundi, China, Italy, Japan, Nicaragua, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Syrian Arab Republic, United States of America.

Against: None.

Abstaining: France, Poland, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.

The draft resolution was adopted by 11 votes to none, with 4 abstentions¹

323. The PRESIDENT: I shall immediately communicate this decision of the Security Council to the President of the General Assembly.

324. I now call on the representative of the United Kingdom for an explanation of vote.

325. Sir Colin CROWE (United Kingdom): My delegation abstained on this draft resolution because we are not convinced that to proceed forthwith to discussion of the matter in the General Assembly is really desirable. We agree that the situation is serious and urgent, and it is regrettable that the Security Council has not reached agreement. However, we do not operate in a vacuum. It is the nature of the international situation itself that imposes limitations on us and has so far made it impossible for us to reach agreement. A discussion of the matter in the General Assembly now, with the dissensions we have heard here still fresh in everyone's mind, is not likely to change matters or immediately overcome the limitations. It is concrete results that we want to see, an end to bloodshed and the promotion of reconciliation and peace. Within or outside the Security Council my Government and my delegation will pursue this course with those who want to see a peaceful solution, and it is because we doubt that discussion in the General Assembly will advance the process that we have abstained.

326. The PRESIDENT: Now that the Security Council has concluded its consideration of the six-Power draft resolution in document S/10429, which has just been adopted, I shall call on the representative of Saudi Arabia, whose name is inscribed on the list of speakers. I invite the representative of Saudi Arabia to take a place at the Council table and to address the Council.

327. Mr. BAROODY (Saudi Arabia): Thank you, Mr. President, for being so kind as to grant me permission to speak. I did not mean to interrupt the proceedings of the Council, and my good friend Ambassador Vinci brought to your attention that you were in the process of voting or that the representatives were addressing themselves to the draft resolution that has just been voted upon. But I do not know why I am begrudged the opportunity of taking the floor, with your permission, when many points of order were raised which were not points of order but were points raised in exercise of the right of reply. If there are any irregularities, consider me among the irregulars. I appreciate all the same, Sir, your kindness in giving me an opportunity to exercise the traditional right of reply to none other than my good friend and colleague Ambassador Malik. I thought he understood my statement with regard to the Baltic States, and I must assure him again that I never encouraged any political *émigrés* from that region who contacted me in New York or elsewhere and sought my support for self-determination and secession from the Soviet Union. On the contrary, I told them that the Baltic States were recognized as an integral part of the Soviet Union and that there was no movement for secession from inside the Soviet

¹ See resolution 303 (1971).

Union, and therefore their request for assistance would be out of order in the United Nations, since any such *démarche* on their behalf would be regarded as interfering in the domestic affairs of States.

328. Therefore, I do not see why he qualified his statement by saying that they were my friends. They were never my friends. I have noted that there is a Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Lithuanian SSR who is a member of the delegation to the twenty-sixth session of the United Nations General Assembly, Mr. V. M. Zenkyavichus, and I would be happy to meet him.

329. With regard to the component parts of the Soviet Union, I have noted the correction that there are 15 and not 16 States. That is a slip of the tongue and one should consider this a good omen. Perhaps one day there will be 16 States: it may be that somebody will join the Soviet Union and become the sixteenth State.

330. With your permission, Mr. President, I should like, without embarrassment to any State, to ask whether the representatives of China and the Soviet Union would be willing to freeze, so to speak, their differences on bilateral questions between them, questions that do not pertain to the India-Pakistan conflict, and, hopefully, be willing, graciously, to take into account the humanitarian aspects of the problem and be willing, after getting instructions from their respective Governments, to accept the mediation of such illustrious colleagues as Sir Colin Crowe with regard to China, and the Ambassador of France with regard to the Soviet Union.

331. I believe that Ambassador Malik motioned to me with his hands that the relations between France and the Soviet Union are excellent. I said—not sarcastically—that on account of the alleged spy case between the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union, the efforts and good offices of our good friend and colleague, Sir Colin Crowe, could perhaps be used with regard to our Asian brother. I say "Asian brother" because I come from Asia. For, as has been rightly mentioned by the representatives of the United Kingdom and France, and even the Soviet Union, nothing much will come out of the "Uniting for peace" resolution and referring the question to the General Assembly.

332. Now, what is wrong in asking you, Mr. President—and I am a humble member of the United Nations, not a member of the august body called the Security Council—to use your good offices in seeing that Sir Colin Crowe gets in touch with our brother from China, and in seeing that our illustrious colleague from France tries again to negotiate on the humanitarian aspect of the whole conflict with the representative of the Soviet Union—because all this talk in the General Assembly will get us nowhere, while people are dying.

333. Of course, there is no alternative, you say. What is the alternative? The alternative would be not to hold any more meetings of the Security Council on any question unless the members are assured, beforehand, that no veto will be exercised. At one time we had a consensus. But the consensus covered only narrow areas of agreement that signified nothing. The veto is not the answer to that

question, nor is consensus. A weak agreement or an agreement on very small areas would not be effective. Therefore, you will see, Sir, as President for the month—and it is now only the 6th of the month—that I will be vindicated. Please bear with me. You will find out, Mr. President, that, by the new year, nothing will be resolved by the General Assembly, nothing, because, as was rightly said, the decisions of the Assembly are recommendatory; it is only the Security Council which has the power to decide on questions of peace and security.

334. So whom are we fooling? Are we fooling ourselves or the people of the world by shifting the responsibility from the Council to the General Assembly? You said, Mr. President, that you are new amongst us. But, Sir, you have a strong personality. You fill the Chair majestically. Why not try tomorrow, Mr. President—and I am not saying that the Ambassador of the Soviet Union should kiss and embrace the Ambassador of China—it would be marvellous if they did—to arrange something at the last minute. As was stated by our illustrious colleague from France, this measure has obtained only an abstention, because, as Sir Colin Crowe and indeed as the representative of the Soviet Union indicated, this measure would not accomplish anything because the prerogative of taking decisions here belongs to the Security Council.

335. It is not too late, Mr. President. I think that, without holding an open meeting, you should try and make contact. This is not a proposal and this is not a resolution. I have no right to submit a resolution. It is a simple suggestion—take it in that way—to see whether the Soviet Union and China will freeze their bilateral differences and, strictly on the humanitarian basis, deal constructively on this question, so as to save the lives of millions, and also save both States in the subcontinent from insolvency, should this war go on. When I speak of insolvency, it means that millions upon millions may suffer and be on the brink of starvation and famine. Have we envisaged such a possibility? War today erodes the economies of the wealthiest of countries, and we have witnessed what has happened to currencies as a result of inflation.

336. So what will happen to India and Pakistan should they be embroiled in a war that will last not weeks but several months, and maybe years? And who will pay the price? The people in the street, the common people. They will pay the price while we bicker here in the United Nations, whether it is in this Council or in the General Assembly.

337. The hour is late only by the hands of the clock with regard to a date, 6 December. But tomorrow is another day, another dawn. Let the dawn bring with it some hope, the hope that you, Mr. President—hailing from Africa as one of its sons, who has emerged here in our midst as President of this Council which should decide on questions of peace and security—will exert a last effort, that you will bring about a meeting between Ambassador Malik and our Chinese brother, with the help of the Ambassadors of France and the United Kingdom.

338. I thank you, Mr. President, for graciously allowing me to make this statement in reply, and also an additional statement.

339. The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Saudi Arabia for the kind words he addressed to me.

340. Mr. FARAH (Somalia): Now that we have adopted the resolution to refer the question concerning relations between India and Pakistan to the General Assembly, I wonder whether we could decide upon a time at which the General Assembly can meet to take up the question. After all, there is a great deal of urgency involved and the Assembly should meet tomorrow morning, or at the very latest tomorrow afternoon. I think it important to sound out the views of members on this question.

341. Mr. ORTIZ DE ROZAS (Argentina) (*interpretation from Spanish*): It seems to me that the time for the meeting of the General Assembly must be decided by the President of the General Assembly and not by the Council. However, I understand very well the concern of my friend Ambassador Farah. It is quite obvious that in order to be effective the resolution which we have adopted should receive immediate attention by the General Assembly and we

should have as many meetings as may be necessary, in the morning, the afternoon, the evening or night.

342. I venture to suggest, Mr. President, that you transmit this concern to the President of the General Assembly so that he may take the final decision as to the hour when the Assembly will be convened to consider this urgent and delicate question.

343. The PRESIDENT: There being no further speakers I propose, in view of the lateness of the hour, to adjourn this meeting of the Security Council.

344. May I remind members that a meeting of the Committee on the Admission of New Members has been scheduled for 11 o'clock tomorrow morning to examine the application of the United Arab Emirates, in accordance with the decision taken at the outset of this meeting?

The meeting rose at 11.35 p.m.