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SIXTEEN HUNDRED AND SIXTH MEETING

Held in New York on Saturday, 4 December 1971, at 5 p.m.

President: Mr. I. B. TAYLOR-KAMARA (Sierra Leone).

Present: The representatives of the following States: Argentina, Belgium, Burundi, China, France, Italy, Japan, Nicaragua, Poland, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Syrian Arab Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and United States of America.

Provisional agenda (S/Agenda/1606)

1. Adoption of the agenda.
2. (a) Letter dated 4 December 1971 from the Permanent Representatives of Argentina, Belgium, Burundi, Italy, Japan, Nicaragua, Somalia, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/10411);
(b) Report of the Secretary-General (S/10410).

Statement by the President

1. The PRESIDENT: Today I have received a request from the representatives of Argentina, Belgium, Burundi, Italy, Japan, Nicaragua, Somalia, the United Kingdom and the United States [S/10411] to convene immediately an urgent meeting of the Security Council to consider the recent deteriorating situation which has led to armed clashes between India and Pakistan. I have received a letter from the representative of Tunisia [S/10413] supporting the request for a meeting of the Security Council.

Adoption of the agenda

The agenda was adopted.

- (a) Letter dated 4 December 1971 from the Permanent Representatives of Argentina, Belgium, Burundi, Italy, Japan, Nicaragua, Somalia, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/10411);
(b) Report of the Secretary-General (S/10410)

2. The PRESIDENT: I have received a letter from the representative of Tunisia [S/10414] requesting that his delegation be allowed to participate in the present debate without the right to vote. If I hear no objection, I shall invite the representative of Tunisia to participate in the

debate in accordance with rule 37 of the provisional rules of procedure of the Council.

3. Mr. VINCI (Italy): I understand the very deep concern of so many delegations and countries about the question with which we are confronted and which we are going to discuss today. But I do believe that, owing to the urgency of the crisis we are facing, we should restrict the deliberations to the members of the Council and to the main parties concerned. In this connexion, Mr. President, I would ask you to convey invitations to the representatives of India and Pakistan to come to our table and present their views. I repeat: I think we should restrict our deliberations to the members of the Council and to the two main parties concerned.

4. Mr. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*translated from Russian*): I agree with the suggestion of the representative of Italy that it would be desirable for the Security Council to hear the representatives of India and Pakistan, if, of course, they wish to be heard. In the Russian interpretation I heard the word "propose". But that is too strong a word. In the Security Council at least, it is not the practice to "propose", i.e., to issue orders. But if those two delegations really do wish to speak, the Council must, of course, hear them.

5. One further question arises in this connexion. The members of the Council have had distributed to them a letter from the representative of Bangla Desh. I assume that the members of the Council have made themselves familiar with that document. It is dated 3 December. It raises a very large number of important questions concerning the item included in the Security Council agenda and now under discussion. A study of this letter about the events in East Pakistan shows why the situation arose which has led to today's meeting of the Security Council.

6. In this connexion, I should also like to draw attention to the letter from nine members of the Security Council, which indicates that there is a deterioration of the situation in the Indian subcontinent. It is that very cause which the signatories of the letter put forward as grounds for their proposal to convene the Security Council. It is directly stated in the letter that they request the President of the Security Council to convene immediately an urgent meeting of the Security Council to consider the recent deteriorating situation.

7. Consequently, both the cause of the current situation and the fact that the deterioration of that situation has been noted in an official document are well known. It

would, therefore, be appropriate to hear not only the representatives of India and Pakistan, but also the representatives of Bangla Desh.

8. The Soviet delegation has two proposals to make: first, that the document from the Bangla Desh mission be issued in the form in which documents are customarily published in the United Nations and the Security Council and, secondly, that the representatives of Bangla Desh be invited to and heard at a meeting of the Security Council. That concludes the first part of the Soviet delegation's remarks on the proposal made by the representative of Italy.

9. I cannot, unfortunately, agree with the second part of the Italian representative's proposal, which I consider to be restrictive, all the more so as it followed our receipt of an official request from the delegation of Tunisia that it be allowed to participate in the discussion of this matter and to express its opinion. We cannot say that there are not other delegations which, with equal right and justification and in strict accordance with the provisional rules of procedure of the Security Council, might express a wish to take part in the discussions on the question on the Security Council's agenda. There have not normally been any limitations or obstacles in the Security Council to participation by any delegation or representative of any State Member of the United Nations in the work of the Security Council, and I do not think it would be appropriate for us to create such a precedent in the system and working practice of the Security Council as to impose restrictions on the participation by representatives of States Members of the United Nations in the discussion of matters at meetings of the Council. Therefore, on the basis of these considerations, the Soviet delegation will be unable to support the restrictive proposal made by the Italian delegation.

10. Mr. VINCI (Italy): I fully agree with the representative of the Soviet Union on the first point, namely, that we can only invite the representatives of India and Pakistan to take part in our deliberations without the right to vote, in accordance with the provisional rules of the Security Council. As a matter of fact, I only proposed that you, Mr. President, convey an invitation to those parties on behalf of the Security Council. Of course, it is up to the representatives of India and Pakistan to accept that invitation or not.

11. On the second point, I would refer to the communication Ambassador Malik cited. I believe that you, Mr. President, have acted in accordance with the appendix to the provisional rules of procedure, which reads, in part, as follows:

"A list of all communications from private individuals and non-governmental bodies relating to matters of which the Security Council is seized shall be circulated to all representatives on the Security Council."

As a matter of fact, my delegation and, I am sure, all other delegations have received a copy of that communication.

12. It was my understanding, after the consultations that took place this morning—and we had already had some consultations with you, Mr. President—that we would con-

tinue with consultations on this particular subject so as not to raise some problem that would delay the Security Council's work.

13. I agree with the Soviet representative that we can certainly have very interesting views and assessments and perhaps even suggestions from Members outside this body, but I believe that at this preliminary stage, at this first meeting, we should try to restrict deliberations to members of the Council and the main parties concerned, if they wish to join us at this table. Later on, we can decide whether we will accept participation of non-members of this Council in our deliberations.

14. I am sure that we shall be seized of this question for a long time to come, so there will be no harm in not accepting any requests at this stage; and when I say "at this stage", I mean at this very first meeting.

15. I wish to take this opportunity to express our gratitude to the representative of Tunisia, who supported our initiative, and to address an appeal to him. If I am making this suggestion at this stage I am sure he understands our deep concern at this time that we should not only discuss the question before us but should also act promptly. With all my respect for his views and his dedication to the principles and purposes of our Organization, I would appeal to him and to others not to request to be allowed to participate in our debate at this meeting.

16. Mr. NAKAGAWA (Japan): I should like to associate myself with the remarks of the representative of Italy and his proposal that we extend invitations to the representatives of both India and Pakistan to participate in the Council's discussion.

17. I would also support the view expressed by my Italian colleague that, in order to expedite the discussion and in view of the urgency of the matter before us, at least at this stage the participation of other Members of the Organization and representatives of outside bodies be restricted.

18. Mr. KUIJAGA (Poland) (*interpretation from French*): My delegation does not wish to prolong this discussion, but it seems to me that we are discussing a most important question. We all agree and none of us can deny that the problem inscribed on our agenda is a most complex and serious one. We all need to obtain maximum elucidation on an issue in which positions are not only different but often diametrically opposed. Quite briefly, that is why we favour extending invitations to the delegations of India and Pakistan to participate in the debate—obviously on the condition that they wish to do so. I too would like to say that, according to the documents we have received from Bangla Desh, we believe that there exist data the Security Council will need in order to have the best picture of the situation and to be able to reach the best solution. To that end, it should hear the representatives of Bangla Desh.

19. I would add that in my delegation's opinion the Council should consider extending an invitation to the delegation of Tunisia, which has requested an invitation to participate without the right to vote.

20. Mr. HUANG Hua (China) (*translated from Chinese*): The Chinese delegation is of the view that inviting the so-called representatives of Bangla Desh—that is, the representatives of rebellious elements within East Pakistan—to participate in the deliberations of the Security Council and distributing the documents of this rebellious so-called organization would be tantamount to asking the Security Council to interfere in the internal affairs of a sovereign State, Pakistan. That is totally contrary to the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations with regard to non-interference in the internal affairs of Member States. Therefore, the Chinese delegation is opposed to the proposal of the Soviet delegation. We cannot agree to the participation of the so-called representatives of Bangla Desh in the deliberations of the Security Council, nor can we agree to distribution in the Security Council of the so-called documents of Bangla Desh.

21. We deem it regrettable that at the very beginning of the deliberations in the Security Council on the question of the situation between India and Pakistan, the Soviet delegation has seen fit to make a proposal which is tantamount to interference in the internal affairs of a Member State by the United Nations or by the Security Council. I believe that that will not be of any help to the progress of our work. It can only obstruct our progress.

22. Mr. ÓRTIZ DE ROZAS (Argentina) (*interpretation from Spanish*): I shall refer to the proposals in the order in which they have been submitted.

23. I shall refer first to the proposal made by the representative of Italy that the Council should invite the two parties directly concerned in this question, that is to say, the delegations of India and Pakistan, to participate in our debate if they so desire. My delegation supports that proposal.

24. I shall now refer to the proposal made by the representative of the Soviet Union, namely, that the document which has been xeroxed and distributed to the members of the Council should be circulated as a Security Council document. I should like to recall that this type of document is circulated to members for consideration when a request to do so is submitted in writing by a Member of the United Nations. That has always been the practice followed by the Council. Since the representative of the Soviet Union wishes to observe our practice with regard to the participation of other delegations, I take it that he would wish to observe the Council's practice also with regard to this document.

25. With respect to the third proposal, namely, to invite representatives of the so-called Bangla Desh, I should like to remind the Council that, since its inception, it has addressed 18 invitations to 10 persons in the years 1946, 1948, 1965, 1967, 1968—and the two most recent cases concerned Namibia and, a few days ago, the situation in Southern Rhodesia. All those cases have, along general lines, referred to colonial situations. I wish to emphasize this point strongly, because the proposal put to us now affects a sovereign State Member of the United Nations. If the Council were to accept this proposal, it could constitute a very delicate and dangerous precedent, which could be

invoked in the future by any group from any country which is a Member of the United Nations, whether the group resides in that country or is in exile. Perhaps even groups which are in exile from the country which presented the proposal could ask to be allowed to participate in the debates of the Security Council. My delegation considers this to be a most dangerous practice. As the representative of China has indicated, this could well be tantamount to interference in the internal affairs of a sovereign State Member of the United Nations. Apart from this question of substance, I am not at all sure that this would be in accord with the provisions of rule 39 of the provisional rules of procedure.

26. With respect to the request of the representative of Tunisia, I agree with the views expressed by Mr. Vinci. While I do believe that the Council should be open to hearing constructive points of view, because of the urgency of the situation with which we are dealing it would perhaps be better, as Mr. Vinci suggested, to invite the representative of Tunisia to address the Council at a later stage in our deliberations.

27. Mr. BUSH (United States of America): As I understand the proposal made by our colleague from Italy, it is to invite the delegations of India and Pakistan to the Security Council table, if they desire to appear, and because of the urgency of the situation to defer extending an invitation to Tunisia or to this Bangla Desh delegation. We share our colleague's sense of urgency about this matter. I hope that the Council can vote promptly on the Italian proposal. Our delegation supports that proposal, and I would hope that we could move forward to the substance of the matter, because we view it with the utmost seriousness. I repeat that we support the proposal of the representative of Italy, as we understand it, and we would strongly urge that it be put to the vote immediately.

28. The PRESIDENT: I wish to state at this juncture that just before the meeting started the permanent representative of India sent me a letter in which he asked that that letter and an attached communication addressed to me by the delegation of Bangla Desh be circulated as a document of the Security Council. I have given instructions that the letter and its annex shall be circulated. I would suggest that the Council defer consideration of this aspect of the problem before us until the document containing the letter and its annex is before the Council.

29. In addition, representatives will remember that we had exhausted the discussions in connexion with the question of inviting both India and Pakistan to address us in the event that they did not ask to intervene. I am sorry that my intention was prejudged, and if two more minutes had been allowed me to read what I have been saying the Council would have realized that I have some further information, which I may also wish to read out. I never had the intention of ignoring what the consensus had been after all the deliberations—that is, that both Pakistan and India should be invited to speak if they had not asked to be allowed to do so.

30. Thus if, with the Council's permission, I read this, the question of voting may not arise. This is what I was going to read:

"I wish to inform members of the Council that neither of the two States mentioned [that is India and Pakistan] in the matter of requests for this meeting has so far asked to participate in the discussion.

"The members of the Council are aware that any Member of the United Nations which is not a member of the Security Council may participate without vote in the discussion of any question whenever the Security Council considers that the interests of that Member are especially affected."

And I was going to ask whether any member wished to comment on this matter. If I had been allowed to reach this juncture I would easily have imparted the view that India and Pakistan should be invited to participate, because we know that they are not members of the Security Council and have to apply to be allowed to speak. And if they have not applied it is at the Council's request that I would ask them to participate.

31. Mr. NAKAGAWA (Japan): Mr. President, may I be permitted to remind you that, under Article 32 of the Charter, "Any Member of the United Nations which is not a member of the Security Council . . . , if it is a party to a dispute under consideration by the Security Council, shall be invited to participate, without vote, in the discussion relating to the dispute." So it is the view of my delegation that in this case, since both India and Pakistan are direct parties to the problem which we are now considering, it is mandatory for the Security Council to extend invitations to the two countries. Of course, if both or either of them should wish not to participate, they are free not to do so. But I think that the invitations should be extended.

32. Mr. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*translated from Russian*): I listened carefully to the argument repeated in the second statement by Mr. Vinci, the representative of Italy. If I understood the interpretation correctly, he employed in his statement the somewhat unusual term "a preliminary meeting of the Security Council". This is something new and original. It has not so far been the practice of the Security Council to hold preliminary, subsequent and concluding meetings; there has been only one category: meetings of the Security Council. For this reason I would not be in favour of introducing novelty into the work of the Security Council and of creating a new, special, and what I would call unprecedented category of meetings, namely, "preliminary" meetings. Thus, if this is advanced as an argument against inviting other delegations, it is the type of argument with which I cannot agree. The Soviet delegation cannot support a position which consists of considering today's meeting on such an important matter as a preliminary meeting and of refusing on that basis to invite delegations to participate in the work of this preliminary meeting of the Council if they wish to do so. That is my first comment.

33. The second concerns the support for Bangla Desh. Rule 39 of the Security Council's provisional rules of procedure states:

"The Security Council may invite members of the Secretariat or other persons, whom it considers com-

petent for the purpose, to supply it with information or to give other assistance in examining matters within its competence."

That is stated very clearly and specifically and is readily intelligible. Use was made in one of the speeches here of the terms "rebel" and "rebel forces". But who has determined the existence of a rebellion and of rebel forces? In order to have a better idea about this, it would be useful for the Security Council to hear the representatives of Bangla Desh. I am talking of the representatives of the 75 million inhabitants of East Pakistan, of the 10 million people who have left their own country and fled to a neighbouring State. To call all these people who have undergone intolerable and unbelievable suffering rebels would be, to say the least, premature without having heard from their representatives at a Security Council meeting.

34. In addition, the whole world knows, and it has even been mentioned in the United States press, that one of the parties in East Pakistan, the Awami League, won a majority in the parliamentary elections: it obtained 167 seats out of 313. But as a result of measures taken by the military authorities against the majority party a situation has arisen which, as I have already said, was actually recognized in an official document signed by nine members of the Security Council, including people who now object to hearing the representative of Bangla Desh. They officially recognized the recent deteriorating situation. What is that situation? Where is that situation?

35. If we decide to follow the policy of the ostrich and hide our head in the sand, we can avoid thinking about this. But if we take note of reality, of the true state of affairs, the main and fundamental reason, officially recognized by the nine members of the Security Council, for the recent deteriorating situation that has led to armed clashes between the two States becomes quite obvious. Those are the facts, that is the reality of the situation. That being so, we could approach this reality in different ways. We could speak of rebellion, rebels and rebel forces, but there is another conception of this situation which frequently figures in the work of United Nations organs, namely, that of national liberation forces and a national liberation movement. There are various possible interpretations and approaches to these questions.

36. It is, however, an actual fact that there are approximately 10 million refugees. I am profoundly convinced that not one of the 15 members of the Security Council who are present in the chamber at this meeting, not one of the many ambassadors, of the permanent representatives of States Members of the United Nations who are present here today, would want his Government and his people suddenly to find on its own territory within such a short space of time such a huge number of refugees, forced to flee from their own country to the territory of a neighbouring State. These are actual facts. And when the representatives of these people, of an enormous number of people of the 75-million-strong population of East Pakistan and of approximately 10 million refugees, ask to be heard, an attempt is made, under the pretext that they are rebels, to deprive them of the opportunity to speak.

37. In the opinion of the Soviet delegation, such an approach is not fitting when considering a concrete question. Moreover, the question of these refugees and the situation which gave rise to this fearful event, together with the difficulties caused to the country to which they have gone, have been and are being discussed in numerous organs of the United Nations. This too is a reality; this too is a fact. In addition, the question is being discussed there in its fullest context. But, of course, the main aim of the discussion is to provide aid and assistance to the Government of India, which has found itself in a difficult situation because it has allowed such a vast number of foreign refugees into its territory.

38. Why should the Security Council not get to the heart of the matter, to the essence of the problem and of that situation which, as the nine members of the Security Council recognized in their official document, has recently begun to deteriorate and has brought about the consequences which we see today?

39. Thus, in the light of all these considerations and bearing in mind the fact that the United Nations is already dealing with this problem and dealing with it in earnest, bearing in mind also the fact that many States Members of the United Nations, including the Soviet Union, have already provided some kind of aid, to a greater or lesser degree, to alleviate the situation of the Government and the people of the country where these 10 million "rebels" (to use the terminology employed here) have appeared, we see why the Security Council must not side-step this question. Moreover, it should be stressed that in this case Bangla Desh, its mission and representatives speak in the name of the 75 million inhabitants of East Pakistan, and not only in the name of 10 million people, although even that would be sufficient.

40. That is the true situation, and it was in the light of this situation that the delegation of the Soviet Union proposed not only that the letter from Bangla Desh should be distributed amongst the members of the Security Council, but also that the representatives of Bangla Desh should be heard here.

41. I have only one remark to make about the request from the delegation of Tunisia that it should be heard at the meeting of the Security Council. There is an inaccuracy in the letter. It is stated in the letter from the Permanent Representative of Tunisia, Mr. Rachid Driss, that his delegation requests permission to participate, without the right to vote, in the Security Council's consideration of the deteriorating situation between India and Pakistan. That is not accurate. There is no such question on the agenda. On the agenda approved by the Council today there are two other questions and two titles, so it would be desirable for Ambassador Driss to make some corrections to his letter.

42. Those are the additional remarks which the Soviet delegation felt it necessary to make on the matter under discussion and, for its part, it considers it appropriate and desirable that the representative of Bangla Desh be given a hearing—if, of course, he so desires—at a Security Council meeting in order that the members of the Council as individuals and the Council as a whole may have a clearer

idea of the cause which has led to the deteriorating situation on the Indian subcontinent.

43. The PRESIDENT: May I now ask the members of the Security Council whether they agree that the representatives of Pakistan and India should be invited to participate, as indicated in my statement?

44. There being no objection, I invite the representatives of Pakistan and India to participate in the debate in the Council without the right to vote.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. A. Shahi (Pakistan) and Mr. S. Sen (India) took places at the Council table.

45. The PRESIDENT: I call on the representative of Pakistan to make a statement.

46. The representative of the Soviet Union has asked to speak on a point of order.

47. Mr. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*translated from Russian*): A proposal has been made to invite the representatives of Bangla Desh and the Permanent Representative of Tunisia to participate in the Security Council meeting. The Soviet delegation supports this proposal and insists that a decision should be reached on this matter forthwith, prior to the statement by the representative of Pakistan.

48. The PRESIDENT: I had craved your indulgence earlier to allow this matter of Bangla Desh to be deferred until the next meeting. The application reached me only a few minutes before I came to this meeting. I immediately took action by handing it over to an officer of the Secretariat to have the application copied and circulated to members. Up to now I have not received a copy of the application, and it appears that many other representatives do not have copies. It will take some time to have these copies made. In the circumstances, unless representatives wish to proceed with the matter further, I would ask that it be deferred until a later date.

49. Mr. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*translated from Russian*): Am I correct in understanding that the question of an invitation to the representative of Bangla Desh will be considered after the statement by the representative of Pakistan?

50. The PRESIDENT: I call on the representative of India.

51. Mr. SEN (India): I should not like to make substantive comments at this stage, but it is most important for us to have a decision on this request of Bangla Desh to participate in the Council's debate, because anyone who is familiar with this problem—and I like to think that all the members around this table, and many besides, are familiar with it—would know that to discuss this problem without hearing the voice of Bangla Desh is like playing Hamlet without the Prince of Denmark. They are the basic sufferers. They are the people who have been victimized. Unless we know what their view is, I do not really know what we are going to discuss.

52. Secondly, my delegation—and we are most grateful to you, Sir, and to the Council for the invitation that has been extended to us—will find it difficult to make our comments, even to know how far we can speak on behalf of Bangla Desh. Indeed we cannot speak for them; we can only guess what their views are. Therefore, for a realistic assessment of the situation and in order to get to the root of the problem, it is essential in our opinion to listen to the voice of Bangla Desh.

53. Mr. VINCI (Italy): I have the greatest respect for the representative of India, but I am sorry to say that it was not in order for him to speak on this particular subject. He is not allowed to speak on such a subject.

54. Secondly, may I make it clear that there was a proposal, which was made into a ruling by you, Sir, that this question should be deferred.

55. Since I am speaking, I should like to address some brief remarks to the representative of the Soviet Union. I certainly did not mean to say that there were preliminary meetings of the Council and other sorts of meetings. There are only meetings of the Security Council. My linguistic knowledge is not so wide as to enable me to know what is interpreted into Russian. Next time I shall ask one of my collaborators who knows Russian well to follow the interpretation so that I may be sure what is being said. What I said—and I think I should emphasize this—was that I felt that at this first meeting on the item under consideration, in order to move ahead with our work and reach, hopefully, a positive decision, we should restrict our discussions to the members of the Council and the representatives of the main parties concerned, if they wished to take part in the discussion and were invited to do so. They have indeed now been seated at the table. To revert to what I said at the outset: you have made a ruling, Sir, which I support.

56. The PRESIDENT: I want to repeat the statement I made which was in writing. There may have been some difficulties in the interpretations. There was never any intention that, as soon as the two parties had spoken, Bangla Desh would come to the table and speak. The application was given to me only a few minutes before I entered the Council Chamber. According to the usual practice, the application has to be copied and circulated to members for consideration. The copies have not yet been made; it will take some time to do so. If the copies are not before us it is rather difficult to take a decision or to ask me to say whether I intend to call them. I repeat for the benefit of all members what I have written, so that there will be no difficulty in hearing it and interpreting it. I said this:

“I wish to state at this juncture that just before the meeting started the permanent representative of India sent me a letter in which he asked that that letter and an attached communication addressed to me by the delegation of Bangla Desh be circulated as a document of the Security Council. I have given instructions that the letter and its annex shall be circulated. I would suggest that the Council defer consideration of this aspect of the problem before us until the document containing the letter and its annex is before the Council.”

I read that out a few minutes ago and I think it is quite clear.

57. Mr. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*translated from Russian*): Could we not overcome the formal and technical reasons, in order not to postpone consideration of the question of the invitation to the representative of Bangla Desh?

58. The point is that in the work of the Security Council there has been a large number of cases where a request for the granting of an opportunity to participate at a meeting of the Security Council without the right to vote has immediately been brought to the notice of the Council and where a decision has been taken—even prior to the distribution of the official document, of the piece of paper setting out this request.

59. There have been such cases. If I am mistaken, the Secretariat will correct me.

60. As a result, it may be possible, bearing in mind the seriousness and importance of this matter and the fact that these representatives might be able to give the Council useful information, to solve the question of their being given a hearing without delay. A situation has arisen which has attracted the attention of many United Nations organs and with which they are already dealing by arranging for aid to the millions of refugees. Incidentally, it is somewhat strange that, when discussing the question of aid to the refugees they are called “refugees”, but when a request is made to the Security Council they are called “rebels”; it is difficult to understand the logic of this and to tie the two things together. But that is not the point; it may be possible to overcome these technical and formal reasons and to reach a decision on the matter now. If these reasons are insuperable, then it might be possible to do this after the first statement at the meeting; and if it is impossible after that to overcome the technical and formal reasons and to distribute the letter, this could be done after the second statement, and if not then, after the third. But we should not defer taking a decision until the next meeting.

61. The PRESIDENT: The representative of the Soviet Union has, on a point of order, raised the question of permitting the representative of Bangla Desh to speak at this time. I have made a statement which I regarded as a ruling, and the further request made by the representative to take the floor I consider a challenge to that ruling. In the circumstances, as required by rule 30 of the provisional rules of procedure, I am now appealing to the representatives for a decision.

62. I made a statement, asking that this matter be deferred, but the representative of the Soviet Union has repeated that it cannot be deferred. I regard this as a challenge to my ruling, and in the circumstances rule 30 provides that:

“If a representative raises a point of order, the President shall immediately state his ruling. If it is challenged, the President shall submit his ruling to the Security Council for immediate decision and it shall stand unless overruled.”

Therefore, unless representatives feel otherwise, I am referring my ruling to them for an immediate decision.

63. Mr. FARAH (Somalia): We have spent a considerable portion of our time on the procedural aspect of this important question and, while we have been discussing the question of who shall address this Council, the war on the India-Pakistan border continues. My delegation proposes that, under rule 33, we postpone the consideration and discussion of whether the representatives of Bangla Desh, or of any State Member of the United Nations, should participate in this meeting of the Council until we first hear from the representatives of Pakistan and India.

64. Mr. TOMEH (Syrian Arab Republic): I wish to support the proposal made by the representative of Somalia, because it is our understanding that the matter that has thus far caused such a controversy is the subject of consultations.

65. Mr. VINCI (Italy): Mr. President, unless you stand on your ruling, I would support the proposal of the representative of Somalia, seconded by the representative of Syria, with one small addition—that after the statements of the representatives of India and Pakistan, the statements of the members of the Security Council who are already on your list be heard first.

66. The PRESIDENT: I regret that I shall have to stand on my ruling. I appeal to representatives to decide on it, as it has been challenged. I now request the representatives to make an immediate decision.

67. There being no objection, my ruling stands.

68. I call on the representative of Pakistan.

69. Mr. SHAHI (Pakistan): I thank you, Mr. President, and the members of the Security Council, for inviting the Pakistan delegation to this Council meeting to be heard.

70. This meeting of the Security Council is being held in one of the most extraordinary situations in the history of the United Nations. A State Member of the United Nations, India, has not only launched aggression on the territory of another Member State, Pakistan, but has openly demanded that Pakistan dismember itself and give up that part of its territory which contains the majority of its population.

71. This is not just an allegation that I am making before the Council. The world knows about the statement of the Prime Minister of India, made on 1 December, that Pakistan should withdraw its troops from its eastern part. The world also knows that Indian troops entered the territory of Pakistan and have been there since 21 November at least. The two facts are undeniable and are acknowledged by India.

72. These are the two cardinal facts of the situation, on which its consideration by the Security Council has to be based. Nothing like this has happened before in the contemporary age.

73. There is no other example of a State Member of the United Nations which has recognized and had normal

diplomatic relations with another Member State demanding that the latter withdraw its troops from its own territory and thus yield possession and control over it. India has not only made the demand but, in pursuance of it, has escalated its aggressive activities to bring about the disintegration of Pakistan. A challenge was thus hurled at Pakistan, and Pakistan has decided to meet it resolutely.

74. From this point of view, the situation that has been brought before the Security Council is not one which involves Pakistan alone. It involves every State that believes in the principle of territorial integrity of States, which is fundamental to the Charter of the United Nations. It concerns all who are in danger of being overrun by larger, more powerful and predatory neighbours.

75. As far as Pakistan is concerned, I can pledge that we will not surrender. Whatever tomorrow may bring, it will not be capitulation by Pakistan. Our freedom is too precious for us to bargain it away. Our stake in our national integrity is so great that we cannot possibly falter or fail. However, should the Security Council temporize with the situation, should it equivocate, should it become paralysed, should it fail to suppress the aggression, one thing will certainly happen. The Charter of the United Nations will have been shattered. The basic understanding behind the very functioning of the United Nations will have been demolished. A damage will have been done to the international order symbolized by the United Nations which can never be repaired.

76. Since it is India which, after having resorted to large-scale use of force against the territorial integrity and political independence of Pakistan in total violation of the United Nations Charter, is now talking of defending itself against Pakistan's full-scale attack, the sequence of events of the past two weeks, since 21 November, needs to be kept clearly in mind.

77. Pakistan's eastern province has been under a massive attack, since 21 November, by India's regular troops, tanks and aircraft. The attack was launched simultaneously at half a dozen points along three sides of India's land frontier around East Pakistan.

78. The Indian attack was unprovoked; it was on a large scale; it was co-ordinated; it was preceded by heavy artillery fire; and it was made under air cover. It was definitely not, as the Indians initially tried to maintain, only a stepping up of activity by the secessionist guerrillas. In the engagements that have taken place between the Pakistan and Indian armed forces, several of the Indian army units have been identified through Indian soldiers killed or captured.

79. On 21 November the Indian armed forces launched the following attacks. On the south-eastern sector of East Pakistan, an Indian army brigade group, supported by armed helicopters, entered the Chittagong Hill Tracts district of East Pakistan, overran our border outposts and penetrated approximately 10 miles into our territory. To the north of this sector, another brigade group of the 23rd Indian Division, supported by the rest of the Division, launched an attack in the Belonia salient of the Noakhali district of East Pakistan, pushing eight miles deep into

Pakistan territory. In the Brahmanbaria sub-division, to the north-west of Belonia, attacks were launched by a battalion each from the 57th Indian Division against two of our border posts at Mukandpur and Saldanadi, which were overrun. Further north, on the eastern front of East Pakistan, the Indians made repeated attacks against our border outposts at Karitola, in the Mymensingh—also known as Mominshahi—district. These attacks were repulsed. In the north-east corner of East Pakistan, two Indian battalion groups attacked and overran our border outposts at Dhalai, Atgram and Zakigang in the Maulvi Bazar sub-division of the Sylhet district. These Indian forces included two companies of Gurkhas. In the north-western area of East Pakistan, the Indians launched another attack in the Rangpur district. This was in the Burangmari salient, where an Indian brigade group penetrated 15 miles into Pakistan territory up to Nageshwari. In the south-east sector—completing the three-sided front—in the Jessore district, a major offensive was launched by a brigade group of the 9th Indian Division, supported by armour and air cover, opposite Chaugacha. Indian tanks penetrated about eight miles into Pakistan territory. An Indian air attack was challenged by the Pakistan Air Force. One Indian aircraft was destroyed, and we lost two over Pakistan territory. Six Indian tanks were destroyed in the engagement, and eight of ours were disabled. The Jessore air field was shelled by Indian artillery. All these attacks were synchronized and launched at widely separated parts of the frontier on 21 November last.

80. As many as 12 Indian divisions were reported on 21 November to have been deployed around East Pakistan. In addition, there were 38 battalions of the Indian Border Security Force. The 2nd and 5th Indian Mountain Divisions, which were previously stationed in India's North-East Frontier Agency, were also moved towards East Pakistan. The 8th Mountain Division, consisting of six brigades, was brought to the East Pakistan border towards Sylhet from Nagaland, where only one brigade was left. Twelve squadrons of the Indian Air Force were placed around East Pakistan. A sizable Indian naval force comprising an aircraft carrier, frigates, landing ships and two submarines was standing by, near Vizagapattam, in the Bay of Bengal, posing an amphibious threat to the ports of Chittagong and Chalna. The approaches to the port of Chalna were mined by the Indian forces. As a result, two merchant ships, chartered for carrying food grains and other essential supplies, were damaged, seriously disrupting food supplies to East Pakistan.

81. That was the position on 21 November. Since then the Indian armed forces have continued their aggressive actions against Pakistan, including the crossing of our international borders and hostile action on our soil. In the past two weeks the Pakistan armed forces have continued to resist Indian aggression in all sectors.

82. To understand the nature of the present hostilities, it is necessary to bear in mind the details of the fighting that preceded and culminated in the full-scale war on 3 December.

83. I shall refer first to the Jessore sector. On this south-western front of East Pakistan since 21 November the

Indians have used tanks and heavy artillery fire. Some of the attacks were in brigade strength. The Indians had some successes, against thinly-held Pakistani positions, and captured Chaugacha, six miles inside our territory, and also Jibannagar. Their attacks were blunted in the Buinda, Simulia, Krishanpur, Jamalpur and Nabgram areas. Indian casualties in the Jessore sector were estimated at about 150 killed and over 500 wounded. Several Indian tanks were destroyed. Units of the Indian armed forces, identified in the Jessore sector, included those belonging to the 14th Punjab Regiment and the 1st Jammu and Kashmir Battalion of the 350th Brigade of the 9th Indian Infantry Division.

84. In the Dinajpur-Rangpur sector, Indian pressure on this north-eastern front was concentrated for several days in the Hilli area of Dinajpur district. Other areas in which fighting took place were Pachhagarh, Nageshwari, Aurpara, Bantara and Mirzapur.

85. Indian tanks and aircraft were used in these attacks. Units of the Indian armed forces identified in the Dinajpur-Rangpur sector included the 165th Mountain Brigade of the 10th Indian Mountain Division, the 4th Rajput Regiment, the 7th Marhatta Light Infantry and the 9th Indian Mountain Division.

86. The Sylhet sector, which is in the north-east, was subjected to heavy Indian pressure from the very first day of the attack against East Pakistan. Heavy fighting continued near Atgram, two miles inside Pakistan, and at Zakigang, Radhanagar, Kanairghat, Gauripur, Chanderpur, Lakshmipur, Latamura and Shamshearnagar. Indian casualties were estimated at over 225 dead and 100 wounded. Indian units were identified in the Sylhet sector, including the 4th Kumaon Rifles of the 81st Mountain Brigade and the 85th Indian Border Security Force.

87. In the Comilla sector, the Indians in this part of East Pakistan exerted pressure on Kasba, Akhaura, Angadar Bazar, Phatabanagar, Gazipur, Chuddagram and Morachale. In one battle alone 197 Indian soldiers, belonging to the 19th Punjab Battalion of the 57th Indian Mountain Division, were killed. Other Indian army units identified in the Comilla sector included a Dogra battalion, raised in Jammu. Elements of a new Indian division have been moving into this sector in the last few days.

88. In the Mymensingh district, also known as Mominshahi, on the eastern front of East Pakistan, Indian forces, including a battalion of the 13th Guards, fought in the Kamalpur area. Fresh Indian troops arrived in this sector on 2 December.

89. In the Chittagong Hill Tracts, which are the south-eastern segment of the East Pakistan front, the fighting has been mainly in the Chota Harina area. The 9th Gurkha Battalion was identified as being in action in this area.

90. That is a brief record of direct Indian aggression, in the last two weeks, against the eastern part of Pakistan, and of the continued presence of Indian armed forces inside our borders on that front. Thus the fact is established beyond denial or dispute that the Indian Army, backed by its air force, has been committing aggression against Pakistan from

at least 21 November. Governments which have their own independent means of information about developments in the India-Pakistan subcontinent have been aware of these unprovoked large-scale armed attacks.

91. On the afternoon of 3 December, India opened new fronts, this time against the western part of Pakistan. This action was launched by India's ground forces operating under air cover, and followed four days of aggressive aerial reconnaissance by the Indian Air Force over West Pakistan. Early in the afternoon, the Indian army moved towards border posts manned by the Pakistan Rangers. On being challenged, the Indians opened fire with small arms, wounding our men. The Rangers fired back on the Indians in self-defence. Incidents took place simultaneously in the Shakargarh salient, Kasur, Hussainiwala and Rahimyar Khan, opposite the Rajasthan province of India.

92. Indians also mounted a military action in the Poonch area in the disputed state of Jammu and Kashmir. Two hours later the Indians began major attacks with massive artillery support. Those major attacks were directed towards Chamb in the disputed state of Jammu and Kashmir, and across the international frontier in the Sialkot area, also in an area between Jassar Bridge and Lahore, and on the Rajasthan front opposite Rahimyar Khan. The Indian army attack was supported by the Indian Air Force.

93. In the face of this obviously pre-planned and large-scale offensive along a 500-mile front, the armed forces of Pakistan could not but fight back. The air force, therefore, struck the forward airfields, close to the Pakistan border, at Srinagar and Awantipura in Indian-occupied Kashmir and at Pathankot and Amritsar.

94. The perfidious nature of the Indian aggression is clear from the outright and irresponsible falsehood perpetrated by India. The falsehood lay in India's denial that its forces were involved in the serious fighting which began in the territory of Pakistan on 21 November. On 22 November, a spokesman for the Defence Ministry of the Government of India stated: "Our troops are under strict instructions not to cross the border."

95. That statement was made when those troops had already crossed the border and when fighting was taking place inside the territory of Pakistan. On 24 November, however, a Reuter's dispatch reported as follows:

"An Indian Government spokesman admitted today that Indian tanks had crossed the border into East Pakistan last Sunday [that is, 21 November], when they destroyed 13 Pakistani tanks. The spokesman said that the Indian forces had acted under modified instructions which allowed them to cross the frontiers in self-defence. He confirmed that 'our [that is, Indian] tanks have been in action in self-defence on Sunday'. Asked whether they had gone into East Pakistan, he replied, 'Naturally; they had to cross the border'."

96. I would appeal to you, Mr. President, and to the members of the Security Council, to keep this square contradiction between a denial and an admission of the same fact on the part of India clearly in view.

97. When it had to admit that it was directly participating in the fighting in Pakistan territory, India cited the right of self-defence. But since when is it permissible under the Charter of the United Nations for a Member State which is not attacked to enter the territory of another Member State in the name of self-defence?

98. It would be fantastic to allege that Pakistan, which is one fourth India's size, whose armed forces are vastly outnumbered by India's in both manpower and equipment, and which at present is grappling with a severe internal crisis, launched—or even contemplated—an armed attack on India in November. The territory of Pakistan in the East is surrounded on three sides by India and separated by the whole width of northern India from our territory in the west. The direct air link between the two parts of Pakistan was severed in February this year by the Indian Government through an illegal act banning overflight by Pakistan's aircraft. Moreover, only a small part of our army is stationed in the east. In the face of these facts, what could be more mythical than a plan of armed attack on India by Pakistan in November? Indeed, hardly any situation is conceivable where the plea of self-defence would be more grotesque.

99. It was, of course, to be expected that India should have contrived an excuse for launching an armed attack on Pakistan by alleging that Pakistan's forces intruded into Indian territory at a certain time and place. When listening to these allegations, regardless of their falsehood, the Security Council has to bear in mind the principle that a State which is the victim in its own territory of subversive and/or terrorist acts by irregular, volunteer or armed bands organized by another State, is entitled to take all reasonable and adequate steps to safeguard its existence and its institutions. This principle, recognized in international law, has been well stated by Member States of different continents and political alignments in their proposed definitions of aggression. Pakistan by no means exceeded this right in suppressing armed and terrorist bands which aimed to bring about a dismemberment of the State.

100. The facts of the situation prior to 3 December which are beyond controversy are first, that Pakistan has been the victim of acts of sabotage, subversion and terrorism committed by armed bands organized by India; second, that these acts have involved incursions into Pakistan by those bands operating from Indian territory and having their bases in India; and third, that even the most elementary considerations of internal security for Pakistan demanded the capture or expulsion of those bands from Pakistan.

101. I can state with a full sense of responsibility that at no time and place did the armed forces of Pakistan stationed in the east take any steps beyond those which were adequate to safeguard the borders of the State and to maintain internal security in Pakistan.

102. Even if it could be assumed, contrary to the facts, that some excess in the form of a local encroachment across the border might have occurred somewhere, there was no warrant for India's claim that the invasion of Pakistan was justified by recourse to the right of self-defence.

103. No less frivolous and unwarranted was the Indian claim that Indian attacks on Pakistan were justified because they were in support of insurgent forces in Pakistan. Even if these insurgent forces were not stationed in Indian territory and were not operating from it, the acknowledgement by India that it was giving them arms and other support would amount to an admission not only of interference in the affairs of Pakistan but also of indirect aggression. Since the incontrovertible fact is that these forces are trained, organized, financed, given arms and equipment and furnished bases by India, and that their operations are directed by India, they are nothing but irregular Indian forces. Their continuing sabotage and incursions, accompanied and supported by the military activity of the regular Indian armed forces, constitute aggression by India as much as does an assault by an unmixed regular Indian force.

104. I need hardly cite any evidence here of the fact that the insurgent forces are organized, supported and directed by India. The fact is self-admitted. On 20 July the Foreign Minister of India stated in the Indian Parliament that "India is doing everything possible"—I repeat "everything possible"—"to support the liberation army".

105. The situation that has been brought before the Security Council is, as I submitted at the outset, one of a breach of the peace. This is but a culmination of a series of menacing acts of interference in Pakistan's internal affairs committed by India. The nature of Pakistan's internal crisis is outside the Security Council's concern. I shall not walk into the trap laid by the New Delhi Government, which seeks to justify its interference and aggression by dwelling on Pakistan's internal crisis. I hope and trust that the Security Council will similarly guard against the debate ranging over areas outside the jurisdiction of the United Nations. The Security Council is concerned with international peace, not with the internal peace and political life of a Member State. Whatever be the private evaluations of the happenings inside Pakistan, whatever judgement may be made by individuals and groups of the rights and wrongs of the situation in Pakistan, there can be no valid ground for India's interference in it.

106. One principle is basic to the maintenance of a peaceful world order, and it is that no political, economic, strategic, social or ideological considerations may be invoked by one State to justify its interference in the internal affairs of another State any more than they can be cited as a ground for aggression, direct or indirect. We all know the many declarations of the General Assembly which have affirmed this principle. I shall not refer to all of them here because recognition of this principle and its incorporation into the law of the United Nations is not dependent on those declarations. It is enough to refer to the Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States and the Protection of Their Independence and Sovereignty, adopted by the General Assembly in 1965 [*General Assembly resolution 2131 (XX)*]. Paragraph 1 of that Declaration states:

"No State has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the internal or external affairs of any other State. Consequently, armed intervention and all other forms of interference or

attempted threats against the personality of the State or against its political, economic and cultural elements, are condemned."

Paragraph 2 states:

"... no State shall organize, assist, foment, finance, incite or tolerate subversive, terrorist or armed activities directed towards the violent overthrow of the régime of another State, or interfere in civil strife in another State."

Paragraph 4 states:

"... the practice of any form of intervention not only violates the spirit and letter of the Charter of the United Nations but also leads to the creation of situations which threaten international peace and security."

107. I may recall here that India was a member of the Committee which prepared that Declaration. It is well known that India has been prominent at the United Nations for its advocacy of the principle of non-interference. What has motivated this advocacy is ill-concealed, and we in Pakistan know it very well. Oblivious of the fact that Jammu and Kashmir is not, and cannot be, recognized as part of India unless an impartial plebiscite in that state returns a verdict in favour of its accession to India, India has vainly sought to close all avenues for Pakistan giving moral and political support to the people of Jammu and Kashmir in their struggle for self-determination. But I shall leave that aside for the moment. What is interesting is that India's motivation has been strong enough to prevail over its relations even with those Powers with whom it professes to be friendly. Speaking at the 1441st meeting of the Security Council on 21 August 1968, which had developments in Czechoslovakia on its agenda, the Indian representative read the statement made that day by the Prime Minister of India. Here is part of that statement:

"The principle of non-interference by one country in the internal affairs of another constitutes the very basis of peaceful coexistence. We have always believed that international relations should be governed by respect for the sovereignty and independence of nations, big and small. We have always stood for the right of every country to develop its personality according to its own traditions, aptitudes and genius. India has always raised her voice whenever these principles have been violated."
[1441st meeting, para. 125.]

108. That was the statement of the Prime Minister of India against interference in the internal affairs of other States.

109. In startling contrast to those pronouncements, India's interventionist role in Pakistan's affairs has been blatant from the beginning of this year. This role has preceded and caused Pakistan's internal crisis. The object has been nothing else than to ensure that the outcome of political and constitutional developments in Pakistan should be the dismemberment of Pakistan.

110. To avoid undue length I shall only briefly list these major acts of interference in the internal affairs of Pakistan by India.

111. First, even before elections were held in Pakistan in December 1970, a pipeline for the supply of arms and ammunition by India to certain elements which were plotting the disintegration of Pakistan had been set up.

112. Second, in February 1971, India engineered the hijacking to Pakistan of one of its aircraft flying from Jammu and Kashmir. The hijackers were Indian intelligence agents. From this incident India obtained a pretext to ban overflights by Pakistan aircraft from West Pakistan to East Pakistan over Indian territory. This ban was totally illegal, but it cut the direct air link between the two parts of Pakistan. Indian official sources even said that the restoration of the air link would be viewed with deep misgivings by the people of East Pakistan.

113. Third, immediately after the negotiations towards a political consensus in Pakistan with regard to the future constitution of the country broke down, the Indian Parliament adopted a resolution pledging support to one of the parties. I put it to the members of the Security Council here: would any of your Governments ever think of such action in relation to an internal crisis in a neighbouring country?

114. Fourth, the upheaval in East Pakistan was accompanied by, and gained in malignancy from, the propaganda barrage unleashed by India. It was the vastly exaggerated and sensationalized reports published by the Indian press and picked up by foreign news media which produced the panic in East Pakistan that resulted in a large-scale exodus.

115. Fifth, India exploited the refugee problem for military, political and diplomatic purposes. Militarily, it created an irregular army from among the displaced persons. Politically, India cultivated the belief among the displaced persons that they would go back not to Pakistan as constituted, but to a new sovereignty in East Pakistan. There are on record numerous statements to this effect made by Ministers of the central Government of India. Diplomatically, India made use of the refugee situation for its campaign to secure the stoppage of all economic assistance to Pakistan.

116. Sixth, whatever the nature of the crisis in Pakistan, it posed no military threat to India. But India immediately massed a force of over five divisions on or near the borders of East Pakistan soon after the internal crisis broke out. What other motive than that of intimidating Pakistan and encouraging saboteurs and subversionists could have moved India to make this demonstration of its military might at the time that the garrisons in East Pakistan were hard pressed in overcoming armed insurgency?

117. This is a mere summary of India's interference in Pakistan's internal affairs, which has now culminated in aggression against Pakistan territory. There is only one result of the internal crisis in Pakistan which is truly international in its nature, and we readily acknowledge it to be so. That is the problem of a large number of people who left East Pakistan and are at present on Indian soil. But this problem, while international in nature, is not political. It would have been a political problem if Pakistan had denied the right of these uprooted people to return to their homes,

to be restored their properties and to live in their own country in perfect security of life and honour. Since, far from denying their right, Pakistan is most anxious to receive them back, since Pakistan has welcomed the assistance of the United Nations in facilitating their voluntary repatriation, since Pakistan is anxious to arrange this rehabilitation as speedily as possible, the problem is purely a humanitarian one. It is a problem which can be solved with compassion and understanding. It is a problem whose solution demands co-operation between India and Pakistan and the co-operation of both countries with the United Nations. Of all problems, it is the one where playing politics is totally indefensible.

118. But that is what India did. In fact, by blocking the return of the displaced persons to Pakistan as constituted, India tried to link the fate of this mass of human beings with the dismemberment of Pakistan.

119. It is being said that a climate of confidence is necessary for the return of the displaced persons. The statement is unexceptionable, if the phrase "a climate of confidence" is understood in its normal sense. The Government of Pakistan has done its utmost to restore such a climate. Would these efforts not have been much more effective if India had also co-operated? Would India's co-operation with the United Nations not have greatly strengthened the Organization and its presence in East Pakistan? Would this not have furnished another element of reassurance and thus itself contributed to restoring the climate conducive to the repatriation of the refugees? I leave it to the members of the Security Council to judge how vastly different the present situation would have been but for India's intransigence.

120. In short, the present situation, now gravely threatening international peace and security, is nothing but an outcome of India's sustained hostility towards Pakistan. This hostility did not begin with Pakistan's internal crisis. It merely found in that crisis a potent means for the execution of its designs, an occasion and opportunity unlike any that had been presented before. The head of the Indian Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses stated: "What India must realize is the fact that the break-up of Pakistan is in our own interests, an opportunity the like of which will never come."

121. An Indian political publicist, Mr. S. Swamy, wrote in *Motherland*, New Delhi, on 15 June:

"The break-up of Pakistan is not only in our external security interests but also in our internal security interests. India should emerge as a super-Power internationally and we have to nationally integrate our citizens for this role. For this the dismemberment of Pakistan is an essential pre-condition."

122. Yet another publicist, Mr. J. A. Naik, saw in Pakistan's disintegration the road to great Power status for India in the region. The consensus at a political symposium held in New Delhi, as reported in the *Hindustan Times* of 1 April—that is, immediately after the outbreak of the internal crisis in Pakistan—was that India must "make the best of what was described as the opportunity of the century".

123. Lest it be thought that these are merely the pipedreams of political theoreticians, let me quote here some official pronouncements made from India. Addressing the Rotary Club in New Delhi on 11 August, as reported in the *Statesman* of New Delhi the next day, Mr. Jagjiwan Ram, the Defence Minister of India, said: "Bangla Desh has got to become a reality and it will become so, otherwise there would be an imminent danger to India."

124. This clearly means that India considers the preservation of Pakistan's territorial integrity as an "imminent danger" to it. In fact, the Prime Minister of India said on 1 December that the presence of Pakistan troops in East Pakistan—that is, in Pakistan territory—constituted a threat to India's security.

125. On 18 September, as reported in the *Statesman* of 19 September, the Defence Minister of India further said: "It is inconceivable that Pakistan would grant independence to Bangla Desh, but we shall have to work towards a situation in which Pakistan will be left with no alternative."

126. What that situation would be was spelled out by the Indian Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, to which I referred a moment ago. Its head, writing in the *Illustrated Weekly of India* of 15 August under the heading "Must we go to war?", stated that "A war with Pakistan would be a brief affair."

127. In the event of such a brief war, the sequence was visualized as follows by the Institute, and I am sure the quotation will be of interest to the members of the Security Council:

"There is no doubt that the Security Council would meet to call upon both nations to end the fight. Whether the fight should be ended immediately or continued for a period of time is a matter for India to consider. At this stage it should be India's endeavour to get Bangla Desh as one of the recognized parties to the dispute. In fact, that is the appropriate way to win international recognition for Bangla Desh. It should be made clear that the cease-fire cannot be signed in the Bengal sector unless the Bangla Desh commander is recognized as an independent sector commander for the purposes of cease-fire, and the Bangla Desh government is recognized as a party to the dispute as a whole."

128. The paper from which that quotation was an excerpt was fully reported in *The Times* of London on 13 July. Again, there is no room for doubt that this thinking was consistent with official policy.

129. In October Mr. Jagjiwan Ram, the Indian Defence Minister—and I apologize for quoting him again and again, but though his volubility furnishes some useful material it cannot be supposed that he does not express the thinking of the Government of which he is a prominent member—stated that any war with Pakistan would be fought on its soil and India would not vacate the territory occupied during the conflict. He added, "We shall go right up to Lahore and Sialkot and shall not come back whatever be the consequences."

130. It is thus clear that it was India's belligerence which gave a dimension to Pakistan's internal crisis that it would never have had otherwise. To say this is not to make light of our domestic situation. The crisis we have faced this year has been a supreme tragedy for our country. But may I not ask this: have not other nations—nations which are models of cohesion now—gone through similar traumatic experiences in the past? One difference is that they escaped the distortions of international publicity of which Pakistan has been a victim. Another and much greater difference is that they did not have a hostile and bigger neighbour that had first fomented their civil strife and exacerbated it and then committed aggression, as India has done in our case.

131. The Secretary-General rightly pointed out in his memorandum of 20 July to the President of the Security Council that "the crisis is unfolding in the context of the long-standing and unresolved differences between India and Pakistan—differences which gave rise to open warfare only six years ago". [See S/10410, para. 3.]

132. The India-Pakistan question has been on the agenda of the Security Council since 1948. The outstanding dispute between the two countries relating to the disposition of the State of Jammu and Kashmir is one which has been discussed at more than a hundred meetings of the Security Council and has been the subject of as many as 22 resolutions and two statements of consensus of the Security Council. Let me make it clear that there will never be real peace between India and Pakistan—and I use the word "peace" in the sense of something more than an absence of fighting—unless this dispute is resolved in accordance not with India's or Pakistan's wishes, nor with the interests of any foreign Power or group of Powers, but with the will of the people of Jammu and Kashmir. An international agreement exists—concluded under the auspices of the United Nations—that the disposition of the State should be determined by an impartial plebiscite under the auspices of the United Nations.¹ India has persistently refused to implement that agreement. The strain thus caused in relations between India and Pakistan has never been relaxed during the last 23 years, for the simple reason that while the rest of the world may at times forget the Kashmir dispute neither the people of Kashmir themselves nor their brethren the people of Pakistan can ever be oblivious to it, even if the dispute is nothing but a manifestation of India's chauvinism and its refusal to arrive at an equitable settlement with Pakistan that would establish neighbourly relations between the two countries on a lasting basis.

133. The root cause of the hostilities between India and Pakistan is therefore not the occurrences of this year but the policy so far pursued by Indian rulers—the policy of denying Pakistan's international rights and refusing to resolve outstanding issues between the two countries according to the recognized means of pacific settlement. Normalcy in relations between the two neighbours in South Asia will come not by waving a magic wand, nor with declarations, nor with no-war pacts, but with the readiness of both parties to resolve situations of friction and to settle disputes in the only way that that can be done—namely,

¹ See *Official Records of the Security Council, Fourth Year, Special Supplement No. 7*, document S/1430, para. 143.

employing the means listed under Article 33 of the Charter of the United Nations.

134. How anxious Pakistan has been to avert the eruption of hostilities is amply borne out by the fact that the Government of Pakistan responded affirmatively to every proposal that would bring about the peaceful resolution of the present India-Pakistan situation. The President of Pakistan some months ago declared his readiness to meet with the Prime Minister of India anywhere, at any time. The response from India was totally negative. On 20 November the President of Pakistan extended a hand of friendship to India. India's answer was the major armed attack on Pakistan launched the next day.

135. Lastly, the Security Council is aware that on 20 October the Secretary-General addressed a letter to the President of Pakistan and the Prime Minister of India, in which he said:

"In this potentially very dangerous situation, I feel that it is my duty as Secretary-General to do all that I can to assist the Governments immediately concerned in avoiding any development which might lead to disaster. I wish you to know, therefore, that my good offices are entirely at your disposal if you believe that they could be helpful at any time." [*Ibid.*, para. 5.]

136. The President of Pakistan promptly welcomed the offer, and invited the Secretary-General to visit India and Pakistan to discuss ways and means for the withdrawal of forces of both sides from their borders. But what was India's response? The Prime Minister of India answered the Secretary-General's letter on 16 November, 27 days later, in a situation of daily increasing tension, and in her letter made the allegation that Pakistan was "seriously preparing to launch a large-scale conflict with India". [*Ibid.*, para. 7.]

137. Now, if that allegation were correct it would have been all the more reason for India to invite the Secretary-General to visit the subcontinent and help to defuse the situation. But the Prime Minister of India laid such conditions on the exercise of his good offices by the Secretary-General as would make him far exceed his competence. She demanded, politely but unmistakably, that the Secretary-General "view the problem in perspective" and that he interfere in Pakistan's affairs by making efforts "to bring about a political settlement in East Pakistan" [*ibid.*]. Needless to say, the message was that the Secretary-General would be welcome if he executed India's political designs; otherwise, not.

138. For some weeks the refrain in Indian pronouncements was that Pakistan was planning a large-scale conflict with India. But in October the President of Pakistan suggested a mutual pull-back of the forces of both countries from their borders. If the Indian leaders believed in their own propaganda they would have welcomed the offer. But the Prime Minister of India summarily rejected it on the grounds that Pakistan's lines of communication to the borders were shorter than those of India.

139. Wishing to avoid controversy, the President of Pakistan modified his earlier suggestion and said that if

withdrawal to peace-time stations was not possible then at least the troops, along with armour and artillery, could be pulled back to a mutually agreed safe distance on either side of the border to provide a sense of security to both sides. Could anything be more fair? Could any guarantee better prove Pakistan's desire to avoid war with India? In brief the present situation confronting the Security Council is one in which one Member State has resorted to every means, including the classical form of aggression, namely, an armed attack, to break up another Member State. Since India's aggression could have succeeded if not firmly opposed, Pakistan could not abdicate its right to take appropriate countermeasures. It is now for the Security Council to find the means to make India desist from its war of aggression. Only those means devised by the Security Council which are consistent with our independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity and with the principle of non-intervention in the domestic affairs of Member States will command my Government's support and co-operation.

140. Before I end, I feel compelled to make a few observations on the debate which arose in this Council from the proposal of the representative of the Soviet Union to invite the representatives of a so-called entity. The representative of India was out of order when he intervened on this question, because only members of the Security Council can participate in a procedural debate.

141. Rule 39 of the provisional rules of procedure of the Council was quoted in favour of extending the invitation. But let me remind the Security Council that the rules of procedure must be subordinate and subservient to the Articles of the Charter of the United Nations and one of the fundamental principles of the Charter is that of the territorial integrity of Member States. Any move under rule 39 of the Council's rules of procedure which runs counter to this fundamental principle of the Charter is outside the competence of the United Nations and of the Security Council because the Security Council must interpret its rules in consistence with the fundamental provisions of the Charter.

142. The proposal to invite the so-called delegation in question is only seemingly innocent. We have been told that the Council would benefit from the information that may be given in regard to the deteriorating situation leading to the armed clashes between India and Pakistan.

143. But with regard to such information, all members of the Security Council and those of the General Assembly and of the Non-Governmental Organizations have been deluged with material submitted by the so-called representatives of a particular entity, and so much has appeared in the press that no further purpose could be served by giving it official recognition and circulating its documents to the members of the Security Council.

144. I said that this proposal is only seemingly innocent because fundamentally it would mean that at one stroke, by seating such so-called representatives, the Security Council would have struck at the territorial integrity of a Member State, and sought to dismember Pakistan by according this kind of recognition.

145. What is this entity on behalf of which the representative of India has circulated a document and which it now demands be seated at this Council table and be given a hearing? It is a group of men contrived, organized and established by India, a country which has carried out subversion, has aided secession and rebellion against Pakistan, has engaged in aggression against Pakistan and is now at war with Pakistan. And this group of men has its seat in Calcutta. We know that right here in New York there are a number of organizations and entities which claim to speak in the names of certain legitimate Governments, or so-called legitimate Governments, and they deluge us with material and request us to have it circulated as official documents of various organs of the United Nations. Should we begin to adopt this practice of complying with their request in contravention of the principles of the Charter?

146. It has been contended that the letter of the nine delegations asking for a meeting of the Security Council refers to "the recent deteriorating situation which has led to armed clashes between India and Pakistan" [S/10411].

147. What is the situation that occasioned the request for this meeting by the nine delegations? The situation in Pakistan was brought to the attention of the members of the Security Council by the Secretary-General in his memorandum of 20 July [see S/10410, para. 3], and again in November [*ibid.*, para. 13]; the members of the Security Council refused to meet on the basis of the information that was supplied by the Secretary-General, when he was in fact, though not explicitly, exercising his functions under Article 99 of the Charter. For there is no other provision of the Charter under which the Secretary-General can bring a situation affecting peace and security to the knowledge and attention of the members of the Security Council. The situation which occasioned the letter from the nine delegations is that which erupted yesterday because of full-scale hostilities between India and Pakistan. I would submit that the Security Council should interpret this document strictly and not with retrospective effect because it had not thought it fit to meet to consider the situation when certain aspects were brought before the members of the Security Council by the Secretary-General.

148. Finally, we believe that the refugee problem is a humanitarian one. We are ready to do anything that the international community requests us to do on the basis of a humanitarian approach to ensure the repatriation of these refugees in conditions of honour, security of life and restoration of property. And to say now that in a situation in the subcontinent when the flames of war threaten to envelop 700 million people the refugees who are in India should be accorded a kind of representation in and before the Security Council is something which is so unprecedented that the Security Council would have to ponder deeply the consequences of its actions. I would make an appeal that the Security Council act with every sense of responsibility and respect for the fundamental principles of the Charter; and should a dangerous precedent be set, then Pakistan would have to reappraise seriously its co-operation with the Security Council and the United Nations.

149. The PRESIDENT: I now call on the representative of India.

150. Mr. SEN (India): I am grateful to the Council for the invitation to India to participate in this important debate, but I should like to make it quite clear, at the beginning, that we are not here under Article 31 of the Charter. We are here under rules 37 and 38 of the provisional rules of procedure of the Security Council. This point is most important for us, and I shall elaborate on it somewhat.

151. We have heard a long statement from the Ambassador of Pakistan, which tells the story from 21 November, and quickly—and I thought rather casually—brushes aside much that had happened before. We do not represent a military régime and I do not wish to go into many military details now. But I would, however, suggest that it is neither right nor proper that we should start our discussion on any particular date. The history which lies behind this great tragedy has been reported by many people, but I shall only quote a few paragraphs from the Secretary-General's report which is part of the agenda item. The Secretary-General says:

"It is for these reasons that I am taking the unusual step of reporting to the President of the Security Council on a question which has not been inscribed on the Council's agenda. The political aspects of this matter are of such far-reaching importance that the Secretary-General is not in a position to suggest precise courses of action before the members of the Security Council have taken note of the problem. I believe, however, that the United Nations, with its long experience in peace-keeping and with its varied resources for conciliation and persuasion, must, and should, now play a more forthright role in attempting both to mitigate the human tragedy which has already taken place and to avert the further deterioration of the situation." [*Ibid.*, para. 3.]

152. Therefore, the first problem we are facing, the particular situation we are confronting today, has a long history behind it. This history is essentially a history between the West Pakistan régime and the people of Bangla Desh. Therefore, without the participation of the people of Bangla Desh, it would be impossible for us to obtain a proper perspective of the problem.

153. The Ambassador of Pakistan brushed aside these people as groups of either refugees or rebels. They are nothing of the sort. They are the elected representatives of 75 million people. There is neither normalcy nor peace in East Pakistan, and as a result, we have suffered aggression after aggression. Now, in order to come to a solution which would be acceptable to the Council and acceptable to those who are responsible for running the country, it is essential, in our opinion, that the representatives of Bangla Desh should be present here. I am most grateful to the representative of Italy for having mentioned that I was perhaps out of order in bringing up this question but, as the representative of Pakistan has already pointed out, this is a substantive matter.

154. Now, the Ambassador of Pakistan starts the story from 21 November. I have here a report which has just come in:

"On 3 December 1971, the Chief Military Observer, on the basis of reports from United Nations Military Observers, reported as follows:

- "(a) Srinagar airfield bombed at 1745 hours on 3 December.
- "(b) United Nations Military Observers at Field Station Punch reported at 2020 hours that Pakistan troops had crossed the cease-fire line at the Punch crossing point . . . at 1910 hours. At 2140 hours, the station reported that shelling had commenced from the Indian side of the line towards the Pakistan side, and at 2256 hours it reported that the area of Punch was under fire from Pakistan artillery.
- "(c) Field Station Kotli reported at 2145 hours that small-arms fire from Pakistan pickets towards Indian pickets had commenced at 1930 hours and was continuing.
- "(d) Field Station Jammu reported at 2245 hours that heavy artillery fire from both sides had commenced at 2215 hours and was continuing.
- "(e) Field Station Sialkot reported at 2250 hours that rounds of artillery were landing in their vicinity.
- "(f) Field Station Rajouri reported at 2250 hours that they had been informed by the local military authority that fighting was taking place along the cease-fire line from Punch to Naushera.
- "(g) The Chief Military Observer considers that hostilities along the cease-fire line have commenced, and he will instruct the Military Observers to remain at their stations." [S/10412, para. 4.]

155. Therefore, to begin with, the whole picture given by the Ambassador of Pakistan is a build-up for military action. Now, he asked the question, why is it necessary for Pakistan to take military action against India, which is so much more powerful, has a more numerous population, and so on? The answer to that question is very simple. Pakistan, for the last 23 years, has not been broken up by India. Pakistan has been ruling its own people by military might and at one stage, when they had the opportunity to say what kind of government they wanted, the Pakistan military machine was put into operation to suppress the wishes of the people. So it is not India that is breaking up Pakistan; it is Pakistan that is breaking up Pakistan itself and, in the process, creating aggression against us.

156. The first stage of this problem was that when Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, the elected leader of Pakistan, held his election on the basis of a six-point programme, there was not a single complaint, even from the military rulers of Pakistan. They accepted that programme and, as a basis of it, the elections were held. When the elections were held and it was found that Sheikh Mujibur's party had won 167 seats out of a total House of 300, what was the response of the Pakistan military rulers? They negotiated all over the place. Nothing was known of these negotiations until

Mr. Bhutto produced his book, which is now known as *The Great Tragedy*.

157. I shall not weary the Council by reading this book, but it will show what machinations, what intrigues, had gone on in order to hold East Pakistan by force. We had repeatedly told United Nations Members, bilaterally and in various United Nations forums, that one cannot hold 75 million people by force of arms. Did anybody listen then?

158. We are most grateful that the concern of the Council has been shown over the recent events, but it still is a matter of great surprise and infinite regret to us that when so many men, women and children were butchered, raped, massacred, no action was taken. We cannot forget this background if we are to consider the problem seriously.

159. After the elections were held, Mujibur Rahman was then described as a future Prime Minister of Pakistan. Today he is rotting in gaol. No one knows what has happened to him. I have not met any man, woman or child who can come here and say "I have seen Mujibur Rahman in person." After that, military repressions were unleashed in a manner and in a way that would shock the conscience of mankind. Villages were burnt, children killed, women raped. And those of you who have seen the films of these incidents can bear testimony to them.

160. It is not good enough to say that Pakistan has gone through a great tragedy and therefore we must all sympathize with it and forget these incidents. These incidents happened and, as a result, 10 million people came to India as refugees.

161. Now, was that not a kind of aggression? If aggression against another foreign country means that it strains its social structure, that it ruins its finances, that it has to give up its territory for sheltering the refugees, if it means that all its schools have to be closed, that its hospitals have to be closed, that its administration is to be denuded, what is the difference between that kind of aggression and the other type, the more classical type, when someone declares war, or something of that sort?

162. But that is not enough. The Ambassador of Pakistan gives details showing that we went into Pakistan territory after 21 November. We did; I do not deny it.

163. We did this because we had no option. The Pakistan Army put its cannons on the frontier and started shelling our civilian villages. They have been accustomed to killing their own people. I do not believe that is their privilege. I think this is a barbaric act. But after having killed their own people they now turn their guns on us. Eight hundred and ninety complaints of border violations have been made to Pakistan since 25 March. What was the response to these? They rejected them all. They continued to shell our villages, kill our civilians. What is the remedy left to us? To kill their villagers with guns on our side, or to go and silence their guns? We decided to silence their guns, to save our civilians.

164. Pakistan made a great rhetorical statement that it had not taken any military actions, that President Yahya Khan

offered to withdraw, and so on and so forth. What are the facts? Pakistan moved its troops to the frontier long before we did. We responded by moving our troops. Pakistan declared a national emergency on 23 November 1971. We declared it on 3 December 1971. Pakistan has launched a campaign to "crush India", "conquer India", and has engaged in a completely orchestrated campaign of war mentality. As a response, we have said that we are not going to start a war; we shall not fight a war; but if anyone starts a war, we shall defend ourselves.

165. The question arises: "Why is Pakistan doing all this?" The answer again, as I said, is simple; but I had to give this little background. After having failed totally to suppress the Bengali rebellion, as they call it—the Bengali liberation front, as we call it—they have to find some device to justify their peculiar dilemma. They have sought to justify this dilemma by making rather fantastic proposals for inviting India to join and co-operate with them in repressing and punishing the Bengalis. In other words, we should enter into a partnership with Pakistan for carrying out the unspeakable deeds that they are perpetrating against the Bengali people. Well, we refused. We still refuse.

166. Then there was a great hue and cry to internationalize the problem: diplomatic moves, various moves in the United Nations through these proposals for observers, and this, that and the other—all designed to make it into an Indo-Pakistan dispute. Once it is turned into an Indo-Pakistan dispute, people will forget what the Pakistan army is doing in East Pakistan. They can go on burning their villages, raping their women and so on. People will then forget and say that it is an Indo-Pakistan dispute. It is extraordinary, therefore, to find that today, when pressure for action is so great in some quarters, this background is forgotten.

167. Here we have three or four main factors, none of which has been properly considered by the Security Council. What happened to the campaign of genocide? Did the United Nations respond? What happened to the total elimination of all democratic rights? Did the United Nations respond? What happened to the millions of people who had been driven from their homes and who are creating such a burden on India? Was any solution found? After this position has been reached, a large number of appeals are made. All kinds of unreal statements of "normalcy" having returned to Pakistan are put out. To what extent normalcy has been restored can be judged by the fate of the United Nations relief programme in East Pakistan itself. Time and again assurances were given that this relief equipment—trucks, vehicles, boats—would not be used by the Pakistan Army. But this is precisely what has happened. Time and again assurances were given that relief operations would reach the victims for whom they were intended. Only the other day, Mr. Paul-Marc Henry explained in great detail before the Third Committee [1877th meeting] that this was almost impossible. So there is no normalcy; there is only butchery. As a result of butchery more people have come over to our areas.

168. Much has been said about the return of the refugees. It would be interesting to know why the refugees are still coming if such normal, heavenly conditions exist in

Pakistan. They are coming because they are being terrorized, they are being butchered. That is why they are coming. And we cannot take any more. We have told the international community time and again that we have come to the end of our tether. The situation is intolerable. We cannot go on paying \$3 million a day to look after the refugees. And still they come—not because we are looking after them well; in fact, we are looking after them extremely badly with our limited resources. There are bad sanitary conditions and many other evils. The refugees are living in most horrible conditions. None the less they come. Nobody wants to leave his home to live in such conditions unless there are compelling reasons for doing so. These compelling reasons are the brutalities of the Pakistan Army, the denial of the rights of 75 million people, the total negation of everything that human life stands for, the deliberate attempt to hold under colonial rule 75 million persons whom they have exploited for 23 years. I have all the statistics here. I shall make a fuller statement to establish all these points. There is complete domination, complete subjugation, complete military butchery. Against that, the people revolted.

169. We hear a great deal about the revolutionary doctrine: peoples' rights. I do not know how these revolutionaries will behave when Bangla Desh becomes independent, as it certainly will. It will become independent, not merely because India helps it—India will continue to help it—but because the spirit of man in 75 million persons cannot be crushed. They have tried everything. They have tried military means. They have tried fictitious administration. They have tried phantom elections. They have put out bulletins, declarations. Nothing has any effect.

170. Now the Security Council is meeting and we are regaled with a long tirade about Indian wickedness for breaking up Pakistan in our selfish interests, to become a great Power—quotations from various books and jurists and academicians. They have broken themselves up. We are facing the consequences.

171. The only question now is: how do we stop this? It is not a Pakistan representative that we have heard today; it is half a Pakistan representative that we have heard today. The other half is waiting somewhere in the wings to be called. If the Security Council, in its wisdom, does not do it, the situation will not get better; it will get worse.

172. Much has been said about a cease-fire. I have looked at some of these documents about a cease-fire that are floating around. A cease-fire between whom and whom? Shall we release the Pakistan soldiers by a so-called cease-fire so that they can go on a rampage and kill the civilians in Dacca, in Chittagong, and in other places? Is this the kind of cease-fire we desire? Are the soldiers meant to fight and die for whatever cause they believe in, whether it is the cause of civilization or the cause of darkness, or are they to be relieved from this particular duty for which they have taken an oath so that they can go and butcher women and rape young girls of 19, 17, 15, 13, 11 and even less?

173. I hear some jocular comments from the gallery. Perhaps we are privileged to hear this humour, but I do not find it humorous at all. The Pakistan delegation has probably arranged all this. Thank you.

174. I do not find it at all humorous that women should be raped. And this raping is not because of lust, but because of a deliberate campaign to humiliate people. In our part of the world, if a woman is raped it has various social consequences of an unbearable nature, and many people, rather dramatically perhaps, say that it is better to be killed than to be raped. The Pakistan army knows that, and this campaign of rape is on a systematic basis so that the people of East Pakistan can be humiliated.

175. This is the situation in which Pakistan finds itself. How to extricate itself? The only way to extricate itself is to involve India, and this has been done, as I said, first through refugee aggression, and now through military aggression. We have suffered at the hands of Pakistan four aggressions, and we are not going to take it any more. I wish to give a very serious warning to the Council that we shall not be a party to any solution that will mean continuation of oppression of East Pakistan people, whatever the pretext, whatever the ground on which this is brought about. So long as we have any light of civilized behaviour left in us, we shall protect them. We shall not fight their battle. Nobody can fight other people's battles. There are great Powers seated around this table that have found out to their own cost that people cannot fight other people's battles, that they have to fight them themselves. But whatever help we can give, whether in the form of aid to the refugees, in the form of medicines, or in any other form, we shall continue to give it. Secondly, we shall continue to save our own national security and sovereignty. If Pakistan, by bombing our villages, by raising a hue and cry of internal interference or crossing the frontier, believes that we shall just quietly take all these killings, I think they should think again. We will not permit our national security, our safety or our way of life, to be jeopardized by any of these means. Let there be no doubt about that.

176. I should also make it quite clear that this build-up of military attack has been accompanied by the most absurd statements. Pakistan now comes up and says, "Why do you not shake hands and be friends?" Yet President Yahya Khan made a statement in *Le Monde* of Paris in which he described our Prime Minister in such offensive terms that, in spite of all my bad training, I cannot bring myself to say those words. This is the kind of people we are dealing with. They have neither a solid base nor any civilized standards nor any political wisdom at all.

177. Pakistan is saying "We offered to have observers; we offered withdrawal", and so forth. Why are the situations first created and then all these offers made? But about one thing they could do, not a word is said. They could come to a political settlement with the elected leaders. That could be quite peaceful. But no, that is not to be done. All our friends tell us that great pressure has been brought to bear on President Yahya Khan to come to a political settlement. And what is the result? Nil, absolutely nil. The great General does not listen to the other great generals, perhaps.

178. So there is no way open for Pakistan now except to heat up the military situation—which it has done, as I explained, first on the eastern front by bombing our villages, and on the western front by a wanton attack on our cities, by suddenly, on the second night, sending several

planes. The Ambassador of Pakistan says, "We bombed only a few cities and villages near the frontier." But they came as far and as deep down as Agra—300 miles.

179. Is that a picture of premeditated armed intervention on the part of India? Would the Prime Minister of India go to Calcutta to see the refugee camps if she was thinking of launching an attack on Pakistan on that day? If the Security Council believes that, let it believe it, but I would warn again that nothing will stop us from protecting our own territory, integrity and sovereignty and our national security and our human values.

180. Without taking too much time, I wish to say that I hope I shall be able to reply to all the little details which the Pakistan Ambassador gave; but today I want to put this broad picture in front of the Security Council and to hear what the others have to say before I come back again. My purpose is again to say that the main parties to this dispute, whether militarily, politically, civilly or any other way we look at it are East Pakistan and West Pakistan—East Pakistan as represented by Bangla Desh—who were elected, as I said, with the army's full consent.

181. Incidentally, the army had the full authority to cancel the Constitution, even after it had been drawn, but then got cold feet, according to Mr. Bhutto. If such a request is made, President Yahya Khan will find it very difficult to reject the proposal.

182. So there was no alternative left but to crush. And how was that process of crushing carried out? Negotiations were carried on in Dacca in most extraordinary circumstances, and at the same time the Pakistan army was reinforcing itself. Today we are told that some plane which was hijacked was hijacked by Indian agents. If it was done like that, if it was done by Indian agents, why was the hijacking incident, the blowing-up of a plane, greeted with parades in the Lahore streets and televised as if it were some kind of civilized conduct that any State should be proud of? And if anyone knows anything about Pakistan—and I do know a little—none of these things could happen without direct Government approval.

183. Now again we are told that all these massacres were necessary because something had happened before 25 March. If anything did happen, the world did not know about it. Thirty-five foreign correspondents were bundled out, on the night of the 28th, from the Lahore Hotel and the Dacca Hotel. They were there, they did not write. They are not worried about reprisals in West Pakistan. In fact, nothing of the sort happened. It is one of the many afterthoughts that have been built up on the propaganda front of Pakistan over the last nine months.

184. Over the last nine months the struggle of the weaponless, defenceless people of East Bengal has been going on against the régime of military men in West Pakistan. It is not West Pakistanis who are involved; it is the military régime that is doing all this, and there is already a murmur of protest even in West Pakistan, little as they have heard of what has actually gone on. They have little wish to believe all this. They are decent human beings. They do not believe that their own army—of which, I think, they are

quite rightly proud—could stoop to these low deeds, these massacres and these barbaric attempts to suppress a population of 75 million people.

185. Under the resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly there are certain criteria laid down concerning how and when an area can be regarded as non-self-governing. If we applied those criteria to East Bengal, and if we had a little more morality, we could declare East Pakistan a non-self-governing territory. Let it not be said that because I talk of morality I am self-righteous—although I think that, between Pakistan and India, we are so right and they are so wrong that I have every right to be self-righteous. This is treated as if it were some kind of monstrous charge to be right. It is not a monstrous charge to be right. We are glad that we have on this particular occasion absolutely nothing but the purest of motives and the purest of intentions: to rescue the people of East Bengal from what they are suffering. If that is a crime, the Security Council can judge for itself. However, if a crime is to be perpetrated by actions such as some of the proposals for resolutions today envisage and India is to be made a partner to that crime, we shall resolutely and stoutly say no. No one can remove us from our path by mere resolutions and mere exhortations. The question of a cease-fire, as I have already mentioned, is one not between India and Pakistan but between the Pakistan Army and the Bangla Dosh people. Therefore let us hear them before we go further into this debate.

186. Mr. BUSH (United States of America): From reports that we have all received today it appears that a state of open hostilities exists between India and Pakistan. There is a grave threat to the peace and stability of Asia. This recourse to war by the nations of south Asia is tragic and unnecessary.

187. In the months since last March we have all been witnesses to the unfolding of a major tragedy. Coming on the heels of the cyclone last year, one of the greatest natural disasters of modern times, civil strife in East Pakistan has caused untold suffering to millions of people, has created a new and tragic refugee community in India of unparalleled dimensions and has brought India and Pakistan to open hostilities. It is time for the United Nations to act to bring the great moral authority of this body effectively and quickly to bear to preserve the peace between two of its largest Members.

188. These events of recent months have been profoundly disturbing to the United States. As the President made clear in his report to Congress earlier this year, our aim in south Asia has been to build a structure of peace and stability within which the great economic and social problems of the region can be addressed. The effectiveness of our efforts in this task is necessarily determined by the ability of the nations of the area to solve their mutual political problems and to build domestic political and economic systems within which orderly change is feasible. The deteriorating military situation with which we are now confronted makes it increasingly impossible for us to contribute to the economic development and political stability of the area, to which we are committed.

189. My Government is therefore deeply concerned by the hostilities which are now taking place along the borders of India and East Pakistan. Hostilities have intensified in East Pakistan. There have been admitted incursions of Indian troops across the border of East Pakistan. It is now clear that the forces of both countries are involved in military actions along the frontier between West Pakistan and India. It is of the utmost urgency that there be an end to these hostilities, which could escalate into all-out conflict.

190. We are not oblivious of the complex factors that are at the root of this tragic and dangerous situation. But the United States cannot over-emphasize its conviction that nothing can come out of a resort to force except greater tragedy for the peoples of south Asia.

191. The United States Government has made a major effort in south Asia to ease the human suffering caused by the present crisis, to prevent war and to facilitate a political solution to the problem. The United States early recognized the need to assist refugees in India and to help avert famine in East Pakistan and promptly responded by providing major assistance to United Nations efforts in both countries. We have already committed \$245 million to these international humanitarian efforts. The danger of famine has been averted, but large relief requirements remain in both countries. The President, therefore, has requested the Congress to appropriate an additional \$250 million to which would be added further food shipments if necessary.

192. The United States Government, which values its close relations with both India and Pakistan, has made a vigorous effort to avert war, which would increase human suffering and delay the return of refugees to their homes. We have called on both India and Pakistan to avoid actions which would increase military tensions. Specifically, the United States Government has proposed that both sides withdraw their military forces from their borders. Pakistan accepted this proposal. Regrettably, India did not. The United States has repeatedly made clear its view that increasing military tensions prevent progress towards resolution of the political problems that caused the refugees to leave their homes and provided the stimulus for guerrilla war. The United States Government has sought to facilitate negotiations leading to a political settlement of the East Pakistan problem. The United States pointed out to the Indian Government that an increase of military tensions could only stand in the way of necessary progress towards a peaceful political settlement and the return of refugees.

193. We recognize that a fundamental political accommodation still has not been achieved in East Pakistan. While we continue to feel that the only proper solution is a political one, we do not find justification for the repeated violation of frontiers that has taken place in East Pakistan. The immediate cessation of hostilities and the withdrawal of forces are essential conditions for progress towards a political solution in East Pakistan.

194. This body cannot accept recourse to force to solve this problem. Indian officials have now announced that regular Indian forces have been instructed to move into East Pakistan in what the Indian Defence Secretary is quoted in the press as calling a "no-holds-barred" opera-

tion. The very purpose which draws us together here—building a peaceful world—will be thwarted if a situation is accepted in which a Government intervenes across its borders in the affairs of another with military force in violation of the United Nations Charter.

195. We ask this world body to join us now in calling upon the Governments of India and Pakistan to terminate their military confrontation by agreeing to an immediate cease-fire and to the immediate withdrawal of forces from foreign territories. Surely this Council, in this troubled situation, can ask no less.

196. The Secretary-General has endeavoured on several occasions to impress upon all of us the gravity of the situation in south Asia. He has offered his personal good offices to assist in a solution of these problems. Regrettably, the Government of India has not welcomed his initiatives. Most recently, on 20 October, he warned, in letters to the Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan that the situation could all too easily be disastrous to the two countries principally concerned, but might also constitute a major threat to the wider peace. While both Governments have professed a continuing commitment to peace and a determination not to initiate hostilities, the situation has continued to deteriorate until now regular forces are engaged at various points.

197. It is time all of us heeded the Secretary-General's call. It is time both countries accepted an immediate cease-fire and agreed on immediate steps to withdraw their forces from foreign territory. It is time the Government of India joined the Government of Pakistan in heeding the Secretary-General's offer of his good offices to assist in the process of reconciliation that must then begin.

198. We have all seen too much of war. We have all seen and heard too much of a resort to force to resolve the problems that divide us. The time is past when any of us could justifiably resort to war to bring about change in a neighbouring country that might better suit our national interests as we see them. All of us know—certainly the leaders of India and Pakistan know—that the human needs of our people are not met through the terrible cost of war.

199. Let us then all, and quickly, agree that a cease-fire in this tragic hour is essential and that a withdrawal of forces from foreign territories must take place without delay so that progress can be made in building the conditions in East Pakistan—political, economic and social—in which the refugees will return and in which peace can be ensured. The United States is prepared to support appropriate and effective measures by the Council to bring about a cessation of hostilities and a withdrawal of forces so that conditions may be created for progress towards a political solution conducive to a lasting peace in the area.

200. In an effort to end the bloodshed, to save lives, to reduce the untold suffering, we are introducing a draft resolution which, if promptly enacted, offers the world a chance to escape another ghastly war. On behalf of my Government, I have the honour to submit this draft resolution [S/10416], which, in our view, meets the

requirements of the situation before us. I should like very briefly to read it.

"The Security Council,

"Having heard the statements of the representatives of India and Pakistan,

"Convinced that hostilities along the India-Pakistan border constitute an immediate threat to international peace and security,

"1. Calls upon the Governments of India and Pakistan to take all steps required for an immediate cessation of hostilities;

"2. Calls for an immediate withdrawal of armed personnel present on the territory of the other to their own sides of the India-Pakistan borders;

"3. Authorizes the Secretary-General, at the request of the Government of India or Pakistan, to place observers along the India-Pakistan borders to report on the implementation of the cease-fire and troop withdrawals, drawing as necessary on UNMOGIP personnel;

"4. Calls upon the Governments of India and Pakistan and others concerned to exert their best efforts towards the creation of a climate conducive to the voluntary return of refugees to East Pakistan;

"5. Calls upon all States to refrain from any action that would endanger the peace in the area;

"6. Invites the Governments of India and Pakistan to respond affirmatively to the proposal of the Secretary-General offering good offices to secure and maintain peace in the subcontinent;

"7. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council as soon as possible on the implementation of this resolution."

201. Mr. VINCI (Italy): Most distressing news from the Indian subcontinent has been reaching us with increasing intensity in the last few days: news of suffering and death, involving the populations of India and Pakistan, as well as their armed forces—news that has prompted the Secretary-General to state, in his report circulated today, that there has been "a further grave deterioration in the situation along the borders of East Pakistan and elsewhere in the subcontinent" and that "this situation constitutes a threat to the maintenance of international peace and security". [S/10410, para. 1.]

202. In the light of the menacing events of the last few days I hardly need to explain why my delegation, together with the delegations of Argentina, Belgium, Burundi, Japan, Nicaragua, Somalia, the United Kingdom and the United States, has decided to submit to you, Mr. President, an immediate request to convene an urgent meeting of the Security Council in order to consider the recent deteriorating situation which has led to armed clashes between India and Pakistan. I am most grateful to you, Sir, for having

acted so expeditiously in response to our request. You have thus confirmed the great sense of responsibility you have shown since your assumption of the Presidency of the Council and your talents, on which we are relying this month—a month in the course of which our deliberations will have far-reaching effects on the international situation and on the future of the United Nations.

203. For the last few months my Government has been following the development of the events in the Indian subcontinent with increasing anxiety. The plight of the population involved in a civil strife and the tragedy of millions of refugees has evoked deep concern and emotion, both among political leaders and public opinion in my country, as well as elsewhere. We had, therefore, taken due note of the memorandum submitted by the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council on 20 July to draw the attention of the members on the consequences of developments in East Pakistan and in the adjacent Indian States. We were gratified by the action taken by Ambassador Kosciusko-Morizet of France as President of the Council in July, on the basis of which I myself, during the Italian presidency in August, held extensive consultations.

204. Acting as President of the Security Council I had put three questions to my colleagues: should we exchange informal views about the problem? If so, should we try to see if the Security Council is in a position to do something? In case there is something we can do, how do we do it?

205. I should like to place on record that all members—none excluded—had agreed to move from the first to the second stage of consultations. At the same time, I wish to express my gratitude to all my colleagues for having responded so positively to my suggestion, and also to the representatives of India and Pakistan, who have shown such good understanding throughout all those elaborate consultations.

206. Unfortunately, in such a complicated and complex situation, raising, as it does, constitutional and juridical as well as political problems of all sorts, we could not discover one course of action among the several we discussed that would at that time have commanded the full support of the Council. Nevertheless, members of the Council were all willing to help—at least in materially assisting the populations involved, in facilitating the voluntary repatriation of the refugees, and in preventing further deterioration of the political situation in the subcontinent.

207. Since then, the course of events—certainly not unexpected by us—has led us to the situation which the Secretary-General and we had feared from March on; and I should like to seize this opportunity to pay a tribute to the Secretary-General for his sense of responsibility and for his political foresight.

208. The most recent events indicate that the situation, unfortunately, is now deteriorating more rapidly. In fact, official statements from both parties have referred to armed clashes and to acts of war; further measures are announced by both sides, which speak openly about all-out war. I have in front of me a list of such statements and of other

information from which I was ready to quote only a few words, but since the representatives of Pakistan and India have given more detailed information in their statements today—statements which were most impassioned and moving in some parts and which we followed with great attention and some emotion on our side; since we have an addendum to the report of the Secretary-General [S/10410/Add.1] and a full report by the Secretary-General on the situation along the cease-fire line in Kashmir, which has just been circulated as document S/10412—since all this information is now in front of us, I will abstain from going through my own list in order to spare the time and patience of my colleagues around the table.

209. These official statements and documents and these reports of the Secretary-General justify abundantly and more than ever, we believe, this meeting and prompt action from the Council. They show that we were right in feeling that our action could not possibly be delayed. We were strengthened, besides—and still are strengthened in our decision—by a humanitarian concept of the populations involved.

210. May I add immediately in this connexion that we should be most grateful to the Secretariat if we could receive assurances that the personnel, equipment and supplies sent for the relief of the populations in East Pakistan and the refugees in India will continue to be used for such a noble purpose. We know that we place a heavy burden on the United Nations staff involved, but we do believe that international civil servants, material circumstances permitting, are no less prepared than their national counterparts fully to carry out their duties where emergencies occur, even if these entail dangers for them personally. Our aim at this stage is very simple and clear. Our starting-point the principles and purposes of the Charter, which request Members to refrain from coercive actions, as well as the deep conviction that no situation, however serious it may be, lies beyond the possibility of a successful solution through peaceful means, provided all the parties concerned act in good faith and with the earnest aim of achieving such a solution.

211. Our objective, therefore, is for the Governments concerned to agree as a first step to an immediate cease-fire, to the cessation of all military activities and to reciprocal disengagement. Furthermore, we think that the Governments concerned should intensify their efforts to bring about conditions necessary for the speedy and voluntary repatriation of the refugees and that all States should fully co-operate with the Secretary-General in rendering assistance to and relieving the distress of those refugees.

212. Considering the complexity of the problem confronting us, we feel, moreover, that the Secretary-General should keep the Council promptly and currently informed on the further course of events and that the Council itself should closely follow the situation and meet again as soon as necessary.

213. Mr. President, I am confident that all the members of the Security Council will share the deep concern of the nine delegations that requested you, Sir, to convene this meeting and that they will recognize that it is our immediate duty

to take the first necessary step to stop the bloodshed and turn away the frightening spectre of an over-all war from hundreds of millions of innocent people.

214. The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Italy for the kind words he said about me.

215. Mr. FARAH (Somalia): My Government and the people of the Somali Democratic Republic value highly the close and traditional ties that bind our country with India and Pakistan. For that reason and for reasons of international peace and security, the tragedy that has overtaken relations between those two countries has caused my country considerable concern and anxiety.

216. We have witnessed with anguish the steady deterioration in relations ever since the Secretary-General drew attention to the situation in his letter of 20 July 1971 to the President of the Security Council. In recent days the situation has deteriorated to such an extent that in the view of my delegation the Council would have reneged on its responsibilities and on its duties had it not been called upon today to consider the threat to international peace and security which the situation on the Indian-Pakistan sub-continent currently poses.

217. In associating itself, therefore, with the request of several Member States to have this meeting of the Security Council convened, my delegation had one immediate purpose: to assist in bringing to a halt the open warfare now being waged between India and Pakistan on several fronts and with the use of air, land and naval forces. The Council will surely have to come to grips with some of the issues that have given rise to this conflict. But its first responsibility is to demand an immediate cease-fire, an immediate withdrawal of Indian and Pakistan forces from each other's territories where penetration has occurred and a scrupulous regard by both States for each other's territorial integrity. This is a crisis situation where every hour means great loss of life and an additional tragedy for a region already undergoing suffering beyond the bounds of human imagination.

218. My delegation appreciates the fact that there are complex issues involved in this great tragedy, which will require of the Council the most careful and objective exercise of its duties and responsibilities under the Charter. But my delegation does not believe that the Council at this stage should attempt to link the call for an immediate end to hostilities with a solution of these complex issues.

219. My delegation reserves its right to speak on the substantive issues of the situation later in this debate, as soon as the preliminary stage—the cessation of hostilities—has been accomplished.

220. Mr. KOSCIUSKO-MORIZET (France) (*interpretation from French*): In speaking now we are discharging a twofold duty: that of contributing as a permanent member of the Council to the restoration of peace by every means and that which is dictated to us by the ties of friendship which bind us with both India and Pakistan, by the great esteem which we feel for these two countries and peoples and our desire to see them devote in peace all their resources to development.

221. No Power can itself alone resolve an infinitely serious crisis which the ethnic and political geography of the region renders even more complex. But when war exists—and, tragically, it does exist—it is up to the entire international community, and particularly the Security Council and its members, upon whom the Charter confers special duties, to unite so as to shoulder their responsibilities to bring an end to acts of war and to find a basis of understanding between the parties concerned.

222. The present situation has two aspects. One is at the root of the crisis and is political in nature. It affects relations between the Government of Islamabad and the population of East Pakistan. It is subject to a political solution susceptible of receiving acceptance by both sides. The second aspect is derived from the first, by reason of the influx of refugees to India. It affects relations between that country and Pakistan. It has created a state of tension which after much violence has eventually reached the stage of open acts of hostility. A civil war has thus been transformed into a war between nations.

223. This dual aspect of the crisis gives rise to a dilemma. If we were to consider only the first aspect of the crisis, our action risks being considered as interference in internal affairs, and we appreciate the fact that Pakistan is attached both to its sovereignty and its integrity. But if we were to consider only the second aspect, our action risks being considered as partial and as not going to the root of the matter, and we appreciate the fact that India cannot feel satisfied with superficial solutions when it has millions of refugees under its care.

224. It is this dilemma which explains the difficulties confronting the United Nations, the warnings of the Secretary-General and the hesitation of the Security Council for three months to be seized of the question. But we think that it is no longer permissible for us to remain in the grip of this dilemma. We consider that the crisis requires a global approach to which all the interested parties must contribute. If they do so in this spirit, we feel sure that a just and reasonable solution can be found.

225. My Government has, since the beginning of the crisis and during the last few days, intensified its efforts to convince those with whom it is dealing on both sides and to avoid a bloody conflict which could only add additional burdens to a population that has already been decimated and severely devastated. With the necessary discretion we have made suggestions in order to lay the basis for a peaceful settlement, which of necessity must be political and which must be based on the consent of the populations concerned. Other States which share our concern to avoid a catastrophe have acted in the same direction, and we have not ceased to let it be known that we are prepared to join in our efforts to prevent, in the words of our Minister for Foreign Affairs, "the supreme injustice, namely, war, from completing the martyrdom of millions of people who seem to be the victims of so many cataclysms".

226. While these bilateral efforts have not so far brought about the desired results, it is now the duty of the international community to issue an appeal to these two Powers, our friends, so that arms will be silenced, so that a

remedy will be brought to the distress, so that the courageous work of the United Nations East Pakistan Relief Operation (UNEPRO) will be resumed, work which has just been halted by the growing insecurity of the area, thus adding to the sufferings of the people. It is therefore necessary for the solidarity of our community to be affirmed and organized first to put an end to the fighting, but also to alleviate the most immediate sufferings of the people and to deal with the causes of the crisis, and with the consent of the parties, by negotiation, to promote a just and peaceful settlement, because only a generous and peaceful settlement can bring to the expectant people a response which the latest events have rendered even more urgent, a political response commensurate with the scope and diversity of the problem. We are deeply convinced that we have to make a great effort to rise above our own differences, an effort because division can only perpetuate the conflict.

227. For all these reasons, we hope that a substantive draft resolution will be submitted, which will be capable of receiving the unanimous support of the Council. It is in this spirit that we shall continue consultations with the various delegations so as to endeavour to reach a solution. It is with these considerations in mind that we shall vote in due course on the draft resolutions that will be submitted.

228. Mr. NAKAGAWA (Japan): My delegation strongly believes that the Security Council should take effective steps to discharge its responsibility for the maintenance of peace and security in the Indo-Pakistan subcontinent, which now seems to be on the precipice of a full-scale war. We have for months followed with deep apprehension the fact that an immense number of refugees has been flooding from East Pakistan to the adjacent state of India, thus creating a tremendous burden for the economy of the latter country. Recent reports of armed clashes on an increasing scale along the border of India and Pakistan have stirred widespread anxiety among the friends of India and Pakistan. Japan, as an Asian country, has been seriously concerned with the aggravation of the situation of the subcontinent, which will have a vital impact on the peace of Asia and of the world at large.

229. Mr. Sato, the Prime Minister of Japan, sent messages last month to the Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan expressing deep concern about the situation and the wish that the tension should be eased.

230. However, in view of the recent escalation of hostilities, such bilateral appeals must now be reinforced by the concerted efforts of the Members of the United Nations. My delegation believes that the Security Council should take steps to effect an immediate cease-fire and the cessation of all military activities by the armed forces of India and Pakistan.

231. We have here a report submitted by the Secretary-General on the humanitarian efforts launched under his initiative to alleviate the difficulties of the East Pakistan refugees in India and the distressed people of East Pakistan. Japan, for its part, has made a modest contribution to this humanitarian programme. My country will continue to co-operate with other States and the United Nations in

rendering necessary assistance to the suffering people, and wishes to urge other countries to intensify their efforts to co-operate with the Secretary-General in his noble and laudable endeavours. Such humanitarian measures may alleviate the suffering of the distressed people, but they will not cure the cause of such suffering.

232. The Third Committee of the General Assembly recently adopted a draft resolution, with the concurrence of both India and Pakistan, which called for the creation of conditions conducive to the speedy and voluntary repatriation of the millions of refugees to their homes in East Pakistan.² My delegation believes that the principles embodied in that draft resolution should be reaffirmed, especially in view of the further aggravation of the situation in the subcontinent.

233. I have underlined the basic position of my Government vis-à-vis the item now under discussion. In this connexion, the draft resolution submitted a short time ago by the representative of the United States [S/10416] is certainly worthy of careful study. My delegation is prepared to give it sympathetic consideration.

234. In conclusion, I wish to reiterate that my country will do whatever possible within its capacity to collaborate with the United Nations, and the Security Council in particular, to restore peace and stability in the Indo-Pakistan subcontinent.

235. Mr. HUANG Hua (China) (*translated from Chinese*): Recently the Government of India openly dispatched troops to invade East Pakistan, thus giving rise to a large-scale armed conflict and thereby aggravating tension in the India-Pakistan subcontinent and in Asia as a whole.

236. The Chinese Government and people wish to express deep concern about this, and are paying close attention to the development of the situation.

237. The question of East Pakistan is purely the internal affair of Pakistan. No one has the right to interfere in it. The Government of India, using the question of East Pakistan as a pretext, has committed armed aggression against Pakistan. That is not permissible. The Government of India says its dispatch of troops into East Pakistan is purely for purposes of self-defence. That is the law of the jungle. The facts prove that India has committed aggression against Pakistan, not that Pakistan is threatening India's security.

238. According to the logic of the Indian Government, any country can use self-defence as a pretext for invading other countries. What kind of guarantee is there of a State's sovereignty and territorial integrity, then? The Government of India says it is sending troops to invade East Pakistan to help with the repatriation of East Pakistan refugees. That is completely untenable. At present in India there are a large number of so-called Chinese Tibetan refugees. The Government of India is grooming the chief-tain of the counter-revolutionary rebels, the Dalai Lama. Using the Indian Government's logic, is it going to use that as a pretext to invade China?

² Subsequently adopted as General Assembly resolution 2790 (XXXI).

239. The Government of Pakistan proposed that the armed forces of both sides withdraw from the front, disengage and solve the question of the refugees of East Pakistan through negotiations between both Governments. That is completely reasonable. But the Indian Government has most unreasonably rejected that proposal. That shows that the Government of India has not the least intention of settling the question of the East Pakistan refugees but intends to capitalize on the question as a pretext for committing further subversion and aggression against Pakistan.

240. The Chinese delegation is of the view that in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations the Security Council should surely condemn the act of aggression by the Government of India and demand that the Indian Government immediately and unconditionally withdraw all its armed forces from Pakistan.

241. Lastly, on behalf of the Chinese Government I should like to state that the Chinese Government and people resolutely support the Government and people of Pakistan and support their just struggle against the Indian Government and its aggression.

242. I should also like to point out to the Security Council, the United Nations and the people of the entire world that this act of aggression of the Indian Government was launched with the support of social imperialism. Countless facts have proved that.

243. That is all I wish to say now. I reserve my right to say more at a later time.

244. Mr. TOMEH (Syrian Arab Republic): The hour is too late and the situation is too grave and too solemn to justify a long statement on my part. There is a large-scale war going on. It must be stopped. Otherwise its dimensions will be catastrophic. It arose out of the plight of the East Pakistani refugees but it now involves the whole subcontinent. We are bound equally to India and Pakistan by the strongest ties of friendship and goodwill. In the name of those ties we appeal to both friendly States to stop the fighting.

245. Our position is this. First, there should be an immediate cessation of military operations and the immediate withdrawal of troops from beyond their positions, and any agreed-upon United Nations machinery should supervise both the cease-fire and the withdrawal. Second, Pakistan should immediately take all efficacious and comprehensive measures so that the right of the refugees to pacific and voluntary return will be fully respected and confidence that they will enjoy their full rights will be created—this taking into consideration the fact that the plight of the refugees from East Pakistan, which deeply moves us all in the Council, was brought to the attention of the members of the Security Council by the Secretary-General in his memorandum of 20 July 1971 [see S/10410, para. 3], which, among other things, gave the background to the tragic plight of those refugees from East Pakistan. Third, the unity and territorial integrity of Pakistan should be respected. Fourth, there should be massive international support for India to alleviate its burden and help the return

of the refugees. Fifth, there should be a complete and effective implementation of the general amnesty decreed by Pakistan, so that no refugees can be subjected to duress or humiliation.

246. It is in that spirit that we hope the Council will act. We are confident that within that framework India and Pakistan will not find it impossible to engage in a pacific process of solving the problem which constantly strains their relations, in a spirit of co-operation and in the common interest of a prosperous subcontinent.

247. Finally, to echo what the Ambassador of France said at the conclusion of his speech, with his usual brilliant logic and eloquence, our stand on any draft resolution or resolutions will be conditioned by the adequate treatment of the dual aspect of the problem that saddens us all. I reserve the right of my delegation to intervene at a later stage in the debate.

248. Mr. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*translated from Russian*): We cannot but express our profound concern and alarm in connexion with the problem which is the subject of discussion at today's meeting of the Security Council. We have deep respect for both India and Pakistan. The Soviet Union has developed, is developing and will continue to develop friendly relations with both these States, which are worthy of all respect. We are proud that at one stage, when conflict arose in the past on the Indian subcontinent between these two countries which are friendly to us, the Soviet Union itself acted as a mediator; the Soviet Union and the head of the Soviet Government, Mr. A. N. Kosygin, devoted all their efforts to achieving an agreement at Tashkent between the two sides and to averting the serious threat of the spread of the conflict. We are proud that the spirit of Tashkent has gone down in history as an example of the noble efforts of the Soviet Union, the Soviet people and the Soviet Government to settle the bitter conflict which has arisen between the two States on the Indian subcontinent and to establish stability and peace.

249. In the light of these facts, any nonsense about "social imperialism" is simply playing into the hands of imperialism. It is precisely this tittle-tattle and demagoguery about "social imperialism" which are protecting imperialism and its policy of aggression, defending its policy of creating aggressive military blocs and of retaining within them countries including Pakistan; such talk justifies military dictatorship, terrorism and violence, it hides the crushing of democracy and of democratic forces, and aids those who are fighting against the national liberation movement.

250. Because it is interested in peace and tranquillity throughout the world, including the Indian subcontinent, the Soviet Union approaches the situation which has arisen there objectively and impartially. What is the cause of that situation, which, as I have already pointed out, nine members of the Security Council recognized in their official letter as a "deteriorating situation"? And who would dare to declare again, at this table, that the deterioration of the situation dates from 3 December, and that all was well before that? I submit that not one of the people now here would be so bold as to say such things. That is why the

attempt of some speakers to close their eyes to the past, and to what has been happening at least since the beginning of this year or even since the month of March would be an ostrich-like policy, a policy of closing one's eyes to reality, a policy of hiding one's head in the sand. We disapprove of such a policy.

251. It is clear to all of us that the subject of discussion in the Security Council, as has already been pointed out more than once, is the situation which has arisen in East Pakistan as a result of the actions of the Pakistan military authorities. We must be objective and call things by their proper names. We have a right to do so. And this right was confirmed by history when we acted as impartial mediator between the two countries, in our capacity as a country which has been and is striving and will continue to strive for further improvement in relations with both these highly respected States and their peoples. It is nothing other than the result of the use of violence and terrorism against the population of East Pakistan of which the representative of India, Mr. Sen, so convincingly informed the Council today. Millions of people were forced to leave their homeland, to forsake their land and property and to flee to the neighbouring country of India, to become political refugees. That is a reality, and those are the facts. And anyone who closes his eyes to reality will have difficulty in finding the right way out of the situation.

252. The worsening of the situation on the Indian subcontinent was the direct consequence of the events in East Pakistan, which are known to all. A serious political crisis arose in that country, and its timely settlement by peaceful political means would have eliminated complications on the subcontinent.

253. It is known that as long ago as December 1970 Pakistan held its first general elections to the National Assembly, the Parliament, in the history of its independent development. Among other political parties in Pakistan, the Awami League took part, under the leadership of the important political figure, Mujibur Rahman, whom the Indian representative has already mentioned in his statement. The Awami League went into the elections with slogans calling for implementation of a six-point programme, which provided in particular for the granting to East Pakistan of political and economic autonomy within the framework of a Pakistan State. I emphasize that it was to be within the framework of a Pakistan State. The programme also called for progressive socio-economic changes in Pakistan. On the foreign front, the political platform of this League provided for the development of friendly relations between Pakistan and all countries, including its neighbour, India. The programme called for efforts to withdraw Pakistan from the aggressive military blocs, the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) and the South-East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO). This is the essence of the problem. This is something that not a single member of the Security Council can ignore, even those who are trying to divert attention from it. In the elections this party won an absolute majority of the seats. As the representative of India has already confirmed in his statement, it obtained 167 of the 313 seats in the Parliament. According to the logic of things, it had the right to form a government. However, that did not happen.

Under various pretexts, the Pakistan authorities prevented this party from participating in the Government. Moreover, Rahman was arrested on a charge of betraying the interests of his country, and mass repression began of his supporters and the population of East Pakistan, using guns, tanks and aircraft. The East Pakistan crisis, which began within the geographical confines of East Pakistan as a result of the oppressive actions of the military authorities, subsequently became a source of tension on the whole subcontinent because of the scope of its development and intensification.

254. From the very beginning of the serious political crisis in East Pakistan and of the tragic events which followed, the Soviet Union pursued a consistent policy designed to settle by political means, without the use of force, the problems which had arisen in East Pakistan. The Soviet Union and its Government made frequent appeals to the Government of Pakistan to take the most urgent measures to cease its repression of the population of East Pakistan and to avert any further complication and aggravation of the situation. The continuation of the repressive measures and bloodshed in East Pakistan, as was to be expected, merely complicated and rendered more difficult the solution of the problems which had arisen there.

255. In connexion with the events in East Pakistan, the President of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Mr. N. V. Podgorny, addressed to the President of Pakistan, Mr. Yahya Khan, in April of this year, an "earnest appeal to take the most urgent measures to put an end to bloodshed and the repression of the population in East Pakistan and to turn to methods of peaceful political settlement". It was also stated in that appeal that "We are convinced that this would be in the interests of the entire Pakistan nation and of the preservation of peace in the region. A peaceful solution to the problems which have arisen would be welcomed with satisfaction by the whole of the Soviet people."

256. Unfortunately, however, the events in East Pakistan took quite another turn. The Government of India, for its part, also made numerous appeals both to the United Nations and to other States in the world for measures to solve the problem of East Pakistan. Yet despite these appeals no measures were taken to solve this problem. On the contrary, certain allies of Pakistan in the military blocs insisted on putting Pakistan and India in the same position and in attributing equal responsibility to the country where the serious internal crisis had occurred and to the country which subsequently became the victim of that crisis. That is the main and basic reason why no measures were taken at the appropriate time. The people who approached the problem from those positions prevented the taking of timely and just measures and delayed the solution of the problem.

257. Nor did the Government of Pakistan take any active steps to settle the problems which had arisen in East Pakistan. As a result of this, the population of East Pakistan finds itself as before in a position where it is persecuted and lives in fear and uncertainty for the future. This is shown by the unceasing flow of East Pakistan refugees to India.

258. Let each of us imagine the situation of India, into whose territory there flowed a stream of foreigners—10

million people. Ten million—that is an entire State. The population of one State was mixed with that of another on a huge scale. Why do I make a comparison with the size of a State? Let us take the United Nations. It has 131 Member States. Of them, according to information derived from the Demographic Yearbook of the United Nations Secretariat, 88 States have a population of less than 10 million. Therein lies the concrete reality.

259. Eighty-eight States Members of the United Nations have a population which is smaller than the population that moved as refugees, for reasons which are known, from East Pakistan to the territory of India. I am profoundly convinced that not one of the representatives of the States present at this table would ever wish such a misfortune upon his own country as to have 10 million foreigners move into the territory of his own State. But in this case that is reality, and those are facts. Or else it is "social imperialism", as one of the previous speakers tried to make out.

260. The existence of a serious internal crisis in Pakistan was even recognized by the Ambassador of Pakistan, Mr. Shahi, when he spoke here. He acknowledged and stated here that a serious internal crisis is in progress in East Pakistan. That is the first point. Secondly, he recognized and stated in his speech that this crisis had acquired an international character. Thus, the official representative of Pakistan has officially recognized in his statement in the Security Council these two important and decisive factors: first, that there is a serious internal crisis in the country, and secondly that this crisis has now acquired an international character. It is true that Ambassador Shahi was not entirely consistent when he objected to the Security Council dealing with the reason for that crisis. He presented the matter as though that would mean interference in Pakistan's internal affairs. And that same thesis was repeated by another speaker after him.

261. But we all know that under the Charter the Security Council unquestionably has the right to study the causes for the emergence of dangerous situations which threaten international peace and security. The Security Council also has the right to call upon a State or States to take measures to remove those causes and to ensure that those causes do not aggravate the international situation and create a danger of armed conflict.

262. The deteriorating situation on the Indian subcontinent has been officially recognized in a letter from nine members of the Security Council. But after stating point A, they did not state point B. They recognized the existence of a deteriorating situation, but remained silent about its cause. And so once again in their proposal, in their statements and in their draft resolutions we see they have dragged in the idea—which is typical of SEATO and CENTO and, I would say, of NATO—of placing on an equal footing both the country where the cause originated and the country which has become a victim of that cause and of the deterioration in the situation. That method has been used more than once by a certain group of States when matters are being considered in the Security Council.

263. Yet the right of the Council to take measures and to draw the attention of States to the need to eliminate the

causes of deterioration in the international situation is directly derived from Articles 39, 40 and 41 of the Charter. Article 40, for example, specifically provides that the Security Council, in order to prevent an aggravation of the situation, "may . . . call upon the parties concerned to comply with such . . . measures as it deems necessary or desirable".

264. In other words, the Security Council has discretionary, i.e. unlimited, authority to select measures to prevent an aggravation of the international situation.

265. Thus, the Council does not have the right to close its eyes to the main cause for the existence and aggravation of a situation and to the effective cause of a conflict. But the events which have occurred and which are still going on in East Pakistan, those very events have outgrown their national boundaries, have aggravated the situation on the Indian subcontinent and, as a result, have acquired an international character. And that must now be recognized by all on the basis of the statement by the representative of Pakistan.

266. The complete absence of grounds for the accusations by Pakistan and its powerful protectors that India is "inspiring" the struggle of the people of East Pakistan against the Pakistan authorities is entirely obvious. It is perfectly clear that the flood of refugees has not been caused by the "plotting" of India or by its "intrigues"—why should it intrigue in order to receive 10 million foreigners and assume such a heavy burden as that of feeding and clothing them, providing them with shelter from the cold and the rain and with a roof over their heads? Why should India "plot" to bring such disaster upon itself? For this is a real disaster. Yet someone here, in the Security Council, has been spinning tales to the effect that it is India which, by its plots, has created the situation in East Pakistan.

267. In actual fact, it is the inhuman acts of repression and terrorism being perpetrated there which are the main cause. They are continuing on a massive scale. It is as a direct consequence of this that nearly 10 million East Pakistan refugees have appeared on Indian territory and that a most serious problem has arisen which is, perhaps, without parallel in the extent of the personal suffering of millions of people. Why should we close our eyes to this reality and to this actual state of affairs?

268. We all know what difficulties have been caused for India by this flood of refugees into its territory. This has placed a serious strain on the social, economic and political life of India and made it difficult to implement the social and economic programmes designed and intended for that country. Some speakers have said here that India has moved a certain portion of its forces towards the frontiers of East Pakistan. But what self-respecting Government which cares for its country, for its security, would not move a part of its armed forces to the territory whence came a flood of as many as 10 million refugees? Any Government which did not do that would simply be ignoring its fundamental obligations. Ten million foreigners can do all kinds of things in the territory of another State. To accuse India of transferring part of its armed forces to a spot where there

were 10 million foreigners is, to say the very least, inventing pretexts for trumped-up charges against that country.

269. At the current session of the General Assembly, during the Third Committee's consideration of the question of the East Pakistan refugees, the representatives of many States have already given high praise to the humanitarian approach of India to the problem of these refugees. They spoke with understanding of the difficulties which face this country as a result of this massive flood of refugees. The Indian side has on numerous occasions showed its goodwill towards the refugees, and has spoken of its determination to take all the necessary measures to stop them flooding into India and to provide for the speedy return to their homeland of those refugees who have entered Indian territory. The leaders of the Indian Government have indicated that India cannot take the responsibility for the upkeep of the millions of East Pakistan refugees in its territory, and have justly demanded their speedy return to their homeland, where the refugees should be guaranteed security and normal living conditions.

270. The objective facts demonstrate, however, despite the widely proclaimed amnesty in East Pakistan, that, judging by reports in the international press, only an insignificant number of prisoners have been released. The majority of the active members of the Awami League, including the lawfully elected representatives to the National Assembly and the legislative assembly of East Pakistan, continue to languish in prisons and a trial of Mujibur Rahman has been organized.

271. Judging from press reports, as a result of such conditions in East Pakistan, the already great dissatisfaction among the population is growing and they are speaking out in defence of their fundamental rights and freedoms and their human dignity. Those are the facts and that is the reality. In the light of this, anyone who tries to place equal responsibility for the situation which has arisen on Pakistan and India is making a serious mistake.

272. It is perfectly obvious that, if the military administration in Pakistan had not broken off negotiations with the lawfully elected representatives of the East Pakistan people and if it had not carried out acts of mass repression, the Security Council and the international community would not have had to consider the question of the internal crisis in East Pakistan and its international repercussions.

273. Much has been said here about who started the hostilities. In this respect an attempt was made completely to shift the blame from the guilty to the innocent party. Some people are unaware of the official comments contained in the Secretary-General's report of 4 December [S/10412]. Apparently, some people find it inconvenient to note or turn their attention to these documents, but none the less in paragraph 4 (b) of that report it is clearly stated that:

"United Nations Military observers at Field Station Punch reported at 2020 hours that Pakistan troops had crossed the cease-fire line at the Punch crossing point (NR 0567) at 1910 hours. At 2140 hours, the station reported

that shelling had commenced from the India side of the line . . ."

—in other words, after Pakistan troops had crossed the cease-fire line.

274. That is from the official report of the United Nations Observers. Let anyone who does not believe this try to disprove it. Reference has also been made to this by the representative of India. There is also a statement by the Prime Minister of India, Mrs. Indira Gandhi, made in Parliament on 4 December. In that statement we read the following:

"Today, 4 December, the Government of West Pakistan declared war on us. On the evening of 3 December, the West Pakistan Air Force deliberately violated our air space and attacked many of our airfields."

275. You may say that this is the statement of one side. But this statement is confirmed by an official document—by the report of the Secretary-General with a reference to the report of the United Nations Military Observers.

276. The dangerous trend of events on the Indian subcontinent demands an immediate political settlement in East Pakistan which would take into account the desires, the inalienable rights and the lawful interests of its population. It is essential to reach the kind of political settlement which would create safe conditions for the return of the refugees to their homes and places of birth and would provide them with every guarantee from the Pakistan authorities that the refugees would not be persecuted but would be given a chance to live and work peacefully in East Pakistan, in an atmosphere of security.

277. The Soviet delegation listened with great care to the statement by the representative of the United States. The first thought which occurs to us after listening to this statement is that it would be good if all those wishes and proposals to which the representative of the United States referred, or at least a part of them, could be applied in Indo-China and, above all, in respect of the immediate withdrawal of troops.

278. The Soviet delegation is studying the draft resolution submitted by the delegation of the United States from the standpoint which I mentioned in my statement. We shall have occasion to make our views known, but our first impression is that it is a one-sided and unacceptable draft, reflecting precisely that approach which is peculiar to those who try to shift blame from the guilty party to the innocent.

279. Mr. VAN USSEL (Belgium) (*interpretation from French*): As a co-signatory of the letter which was addressed to you this morning, Mr. President, in which nine members requested an immediate meeting of the Security Council to consider the grave situation which prevails in the Indian subcontinent, my delegation wished to reflect the concern which all Belgium feels at the tragic developments which have occurred in the last few days between India and Pakistan.

280. My Government not only fears the possibility of irreparable damage and accumulated sufferings of which peaceful people would be the victims, but we perceive, too, the danger that peace and security may be jeopardized on a far vaster scale.

281. On 4 October last, addressing the United Nations General Assembly [1950th plenary meeting], the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Belgium emphasized that every effort should be made to bring the two parties to conciliation and arbitration.

282. Our firmest desire and hope at that time was that humanitarian action, together with diplomatic efforts, might prevent that which we feared: the unleashing of a real conflict.

283. Actually, for several months the Government of Belgium has followed anxiously the events in the Indian subcontinent. We felt that the deterioration of the situation would be inevitable if no effective diplomatic action were taken.

284. On several occasions my delegation has drawn the attention of members of the Council to the threats and dangers entailed in the persistence of the crisis in that part of the world. Furthermore, Belgium has constantly joined the consultations and initiatives on this matter within the Security Council. In this connexion, I would wish to pay a particularly cordial tribute to Ambassador Kosciusko-Morizet and to Ambassador Vinci for their efforts and initiatives to bring peace during the months of their respective presidencies—that is, during July and August.

285. I also recall with appreciation the attempts made by the Secretary-General of the United Nations to come to the assistance of the millions of refugees who have had to leave their homes, and the offer of his good offices to ease the situation and prevent the irreparable.

286. Since then, the situation has worsened, and Belgium has multiplied its contacts, appeals and consultations with its European partners, first of all, within the framework of European political co-operation, through diplomatic channels, with the Governments of India and Pakistan, and finally, in New York, with members of the Security Council.

287. Today, hostilities have broken out, and the Council, mindful of the specific mandate which the international community had entrusted to it for the preservation of the cause of peace, has met without further delay. It has the imperative duty to do everything to discharge that responsibility. It must immediately put an end to the incidents which have become open hostilities, carrying with them the real danger of an escalation. The Council cannot remain passive or indifferent, nor can it overlook any effort to prevent, with the co-operation of the parties concerned, the horrors of a war.

288. At the same time, we express the sincere hope that conditions will be created soon, and without harmful delay, which will permit the voluntary return of millions of refugees to their homes.

289. As I said a few moments ago, the Council has before it a task of extreme urgency. It is peace and security in the Indian subcontinent which are at stake for peoples who have already had to suffer so much from under-development, famine and natural disasters. Only a state of peace, or at least the absence of hostilities, will make it possible to create conditions for a settlement of the fundamental problems, that is to say, the search for a political solution in East Pakistan which in turn must facilitate the rehabilitation and return of the refugees.

290. May I be permitted to launch an appeal to the Governments of India and Pakistan—two loyal Members of the United Nations which have made such valuable contributions to the work of our Organization and, more particularly, to the strengthening of international peace and security—immediately to cease all acts of hostility. No country is more devoted to the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other States, which is enshrined in our Charter, than is Belgium. My appeal is therefore also addressed to the authorities of Rawalpindi to consider, within the framework of their sovereignty and their jurisdiction, the necessary measures for solving the political crisis which broke out some months ago.

291. My country maintains relations of the utmost trust with noble Pakistan; we know of its generosity of spirit and the peaceful ideals which inspire its leaders. We are confident that faithful to its traditions it will do everything to bring about normality in the situation in East Pakistan.

292. The Security Council has a duty to act, and to act promptly. It cannot disappoint the international community, which has placed its hopes in action by the Council. The clash of arms must be silenced so that the appeal to peace may be heard.

293. Mr. TERENCE (Burundi) (*interpretation from French*): The reasons which led the delegation of Burundi to join in the request for an urgent meeting of the Security Council can be summarized in one phrase: our unswerving devotion to peace. In this imperative undertaking, my delegation is inspired by the constant and immutable principle which governs the policy and diplomacy of the Government of Burundi, namely, a conciliatory neutrality at all costs. This impartial conduct seems to us all the more imperative since the countries involved have established with the Republic of Burundi mutually appreciated and reciprocally beneficial ties. The representatives of India and Pakistan are both placed in the category of our closest and most esteemed friends. Their talents and their dynamism have on many occasions made a major contribution to the cause of Africa and to the task of the United Nations.

294. In view of the facts and the principles that I have just enunciated, the position of the delegation of Burundi at every level of the debate on the Indo-Pakistani crisis—from beginning to end—will be totally devoid of all partiality or partisan approach. Accordingly, our efforts will be exerted toward a twofold objective: on the one hand, ruthlessly to eliminate anything which might lead to antagonism between the twin belligerent Republics and, on the other, to work for the achievement of an immediate cease-fire.

295. It is in that perspective that the delegation which I have the privilege of leading will co-operate fully with all the members of this Council that are prepared to work for the restoration of peace between India and Pakistan, without any regard to ideological criteria.

296. While it is true that the political neutrality of Burundi, as an ardent champion of peace, can stand any test, we are nevertheless at all times the unswerving allies of peace. That is why we cannot fail to be in solidarity with peace, whatever its protagonist or its origin.

297. From sporadic clashes, border incidents and limited conflicts, the Indian subcontinent is becoming a powder-keg. Why is this so? For months on end, despite periodic warnings—even S O Ss issued by the Secretary-General—the Security Council has limited itself only to informal consultations, as if these would suffice to remedy the underlying causes of troubles which each day were assuming more tragic dimensions.

298. Since July the Security Council has contented itself with delaying tactics. Today this organ of the United Nations is confronted with a heart-rending human tragedy, since 10 million refugees are languishing in indescribable misery. War has broken out on several fronts. This is the twofold harvest by which the Security Council had distinguished itself. Having unfortunately been unable to prevent tragedy, will the Security Council now permit itself to procrastinate when it is its imperative duty immediately to put an end to the hostilities?

299. For our part we are in favour of urgent measures which would first put an end to the war so that an over-all solution may be considered afterwards.

300. Mr. KUŁAGA (Poland) (*interpretation from French*): It is with growing concern that we have followed these last few months the development of the situation in East Pakistan. This concern grew as the crisis which prevailed there produced an unceasing flow of millions of persons seeking refuge in neighbouring India, thereby causing that country—and in particular the State of West Bengal—numerous problems and immense difficulties.

301. The number of refugees from Pakistan on the territory of India is enormous. The figure of 10 million illustrates the scale of the numerous and different implications that this problem has for India.

302. First and foremost—and as far as we are concerned this is of special importance for the Security Council—we note how this problem is contributing to the deterioration of the situation in the border regions of East Pakistan and India. Nevertheless, the problem is not limited to this question, however complicated it may be. The disturbances which took place in East Pakistan in the spring of this year and which engendered this great flood of refugees have also caused a military conflict which has been growing in gravity and which today has extended to virtually the whole of the territory and the whole of the population of East Pakistan.

303. The conflict, the situation of internal war near the very borders of India, if not on the borders themselves,

which were crossed by an unceasing flow of refugees from East Bengal, was bound to endanger India's security. This danger and also the actual violation of India's borders during and following military action inside East Pakistan has led to fighting with Indian forces on the border between India and East Bengal.

304. What is worse is that there has also been military action from West Pakistan, action which constitutes a further and dangerous escalation of the conflict, leading to its expansion to the whole of the Indian subcontinent. The development of the situation has gone quite far, and everybody is aware of the dangers created by the present situation.

305. Our delegation is of the opinion that the Security Council, since it is examining this question, must consider it in all its aspects, especially if it wishes to recommend the adoption of measures that would make it possible to overcome the present crisis and eliminate the roots of the conflict. Our delegation has always been of the opinion that the situation in East Bengal constituted the principal source of the present crisis. That attitude was expressed in the intervention of the head of the Polish delegation, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, during the general debate at the present session of the General Assembly [1953rd plenary meeting]. Speaking of our concern resulting from the aggravation of the situation in the Indian subcontinent and the problem of the refugees, our Minister for Foreign Affairs appealed to the Government of Pakistan to take steps to achieve a political settlement of the critical situation in East Pakistan, a settlement which would make it possible for the refugees to return to their homes, thereby contributing to the easing of tension in relations between India and Pakistan. Unfortunately, the situation has evolved in an entirely different fashion.

306. We know that the situation is now marked by new elements which relate to the marked alienation of the Pakistan authorities and to a broad military and political movement which is actively opposing and fighting it. This is the result of the action of massive repression, the details of which were presented to us today. The Pakistan authorities are clearly attempting to overcome and stifle the resistance movement of the population of East Pakistan solely by military means, by oppression and force. This, it seems to us, is a basic mistake. We are firmly convinced that only a political settlement which would take into account the aspirations and demands of the people of East Bengal could be effective and could ease the tension and overcome the crisis with its implications in the international sphere.

307. It might be said that these opinions go beyond the competence of the Security Council, since they relate to the domestic affairs of another country. But it is not possible to consider the external phenomena and the consequences of this conflict without speaking of the main causes of the conflict and without considering the need and the measures to eliminate those causes and their roots. We should like to repeat that the source of the conflict cannot be eliminated and peace restored in the Indian subcontinent except through a political settlement in East Pakistan, a settlement which would take into account the will of the people of East Bengal, which found its expression both in

the result of the elections of December 1970 and in the massive political emigration, as well as in the development of the present resistance and the armed struggle inside East Pakistan.

308. We are deeply convinced that if these fundamental problems were resolved, the question of the deterioration of the military situation between India and Pakistan would not present any serious difficulties. On the contrary, we believe that to limit oneself to the elimination of consequences without taking into account the actual essence of the problem cannot produce any positive results and cannot bring lasting peace to the subcontinent.

309. The position of our delegation is determined solely by our desire to see peace and security prevail in this highly important region, a region which is faced by so many problems of development. Poland has been developing and maintaining with the countries of this region political, economic and cultural relations. For many years we have been developing such relations on an increasingly extensive and fruitful basis with the Republic of India, and especially over the last few years we have developed our co-operation in the economic field with Pakistan. We wish to intensify and expand our co-operation with these countries as well as with other States of that region. That is why any wish to recriminate is alien to us. Our position is based exclusively upon goodwill and, at the same time, upon sincerity. It is guided by our concern to see peace maintained, to serve peace which is the fundamental element of our foreign policy. We are convinced that disputes and conflicts fomented among the nations of the Indian subcontinent can only serve the interests of the imperialist forces which, in the past, in practising their insidious policies under the slogan of divide and rule, brought so much suffering and material loss to the peoples of this region.

310. These were the comments that my delegation wished to make at this stage.

311. Mr. ORTIZ DE ROZAS (Argentina) (*interpretation from Spanish*): For several months now we have followed with concern the events which regrettably have led to the explosive situation necessitating the convening of the Security Council today. At all times we have participated in the consultations between members of this organ and also with the two parties directly concerned so as to find an adequate solution to the problem we are considering.

312. Our concern was all the greater when we read the realistic report provided by the Secretary-General in his memorandum of 20 July 1971 addressed to the President of the Security Council.

313. Unfortunately the pessimistic forecast of an aggravation of the situation on the Asian subcontinent has been confirmed by events with the open initiation of hostilities between India and Pakistan.

314. We are not confronted with a minor conflict. The territorial extension and the hundreds of millions of persons involved give a clear and alarming idea of the proportions the conflict can reach unless the measures necessary to put an end to the hostilities are adopted at

once. It is for that reason that, together with eight other members of the Security Council, we requested an urgent meeting of the Security Council.

315. Our action was inspired by a single purpose: avoidance of the prolongation and extension of an armed conflict between two countries, India and Pakistan, with which Argentina maintains the best relations of friendship.

316. The question we are considering has many and complex facets. One has been repeatedly recalled here—the grave problem which the exodus of 9 million refugees means, with the consequences of every kind which this mass influx has caused and continues to cause for India. The tragic fate of that large human conglomerate and its return to Pakistan must command the greatest and promptest attention to this Council.

317. Argentina's solidarity in the face of this grave situation has been reflected in material assistance within the measure of our possibilities. But, without setting aside or at all forgetting the need to solve this acute problem of the refugees as quickly as possible, it is obvious that what is most urgent and indispensable is the restoration of peace in the area.

318. We therefore support the proposals that have already been mentioned in the course of the debate that a decision be taken in favour of an immediate cease-fire. That cease-fire cannot constitute an end in itself; it can be but a first step towards an over-all solution in the preparation of which India and Pakistan must participate.

319. On 29 November last the President of Pakistan, General Yahya Khan, requested consideration of "stationing a force of United Nations observers on our side of the East Pakistan border immediately, to observe and report upon violations of our territory" [S/10410, para. 12].

320. My delegation considers that that proposal could be an additional safeguard against the resumption of hostilities as soon as the cease-fire has been agreed upon and complied with by the parties concerned. At that time it will also be necessary to consider the Secretary-General's offer to exercise his good offices to find a peaceful solution, and in this connexion, in view of our ties of friendship with India, we appeal to it to accept that offer, which the Secretary-General has made with full responsibility and which already has the approval of the Government of Pakistan.

321. Tonight, we shall certainly not find a complete solution to the many and delicate issues that have been brought out in the course of our discussion. The Council will have to keep this item under constant review and weigh different possible courses of action. But we trust that no one will oppose the Council's now taking the most elementary and urgent decision in favour of a cease-fire so as to safeguard peace—that peace which is the fundamental objective of the United Nations Charter.

322. Mr. ROMAN (Nicaragua) (*interpretation from Spanish*): The delegation of Nicaragua signed the letter dated 4 December addressed to you, Mr. President, request-

ing that you immediately convene this urgent meeting of the Security Council to consider the recent and deteriorating situation which has led to armed clashes between India and Pakistan.

323. The delegation of Nicaragua was prompted to be a signatory of that request out of humanitarian feelings and because of the special affection we feel for the people of both India and Pakistan. We hope that those two great countries will heed the call of reason and accept the peaceful mediation the Security Council offers them to avoid a cruel war that will lead to nothing but suffering and wretchedness.

324. The delegation of Nicaragua reserves its right to speak again in the course of this debate.

325. Sir Colin CROWE (United Kingdom): My delegation is one of the signatories of the letter requesting you, Mr. President, to convene immediately an urgent meeting of the Security Council to consider the recent deteriorating situation which has led to armed clashes between India and Pakistan. We are grateful to you for having acted so promptly on that request.

326. We have listened with care to the debate so far, and it is clear that we are nearly all of us inspired by an urgent desire to stop hostilities, to stop the flow of blood. My delegation's purpose in joining in the request to you to convene this meeting was to ensure that the Security Council became seized of the situation.

327. Over the last few months, as other representatives have pointed out, efforts have been made through informal consultations to see if the Security Council could take useful action to avert a crisis, to develop the possibility of a peaceful solution. Similarly, many Governments, including my own, have tried through direct contacts with both sides to achieve the same purpose. Unfortunately these efforts have all so far failed.

328. My delegation realizes that the mere fact that the Security Council has now met and been seized of the matter does not of itself make a solution any easier. It is a complex matter, and for that very reason requires a comprehensive solution. This will require careful thought, and we are in no position to apportion blame, to pass quick judgements on the present or on the past. We must exert every effort to find a satisfactory, peaceful solution in accordance with the Charter. But the recent outbreak of large-scale hostilities has brought us up short.

329. We cannot evade our responsibilities. What must we do now? Our task, as members of the highest world body charged with responsibility for the maintenance of world peace and security is to exert our influence to restore peace, to bring the fighting to a stop and to secure the relief of suffering. My delegation will be guided by that criterion.

330. I suggest that any proposals made should be considered in the context of whether or not they are likely to help us towards a satisfactory solution, and in this connexion I share the view of the representative of France that unanimity is of the essence. It is in this spirit that my delegation will examine all draft resolutions submitted here.

331. The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of the United Kingdom for his special reference to me.

332. I call on the representative of Pakistan.

333. Mr. SHAHI (Pakistan): At this moment when the Security Council is confronting the most urgent task of trying to extinguish the conflagration that threatens to consume 700 million people of the subcontinent, I shall not take up the time of the Security Council in exercising my right of reply; there will be another time for that. At this moment I shall content myself with drawing attention to particular points of my statement which perhaps were not correctly interpreted and may therefore not have been correctly understood.

334. When I said that Pakistan has an internal crisis I said nothing which has not been acknowledged in Pakistan. I clearly stated that in this crisis our neighbour found a potent means for the execution of its designs as the opportunity of a century to break up Pakistan.

335. Turning now to my statement that the problem of the displaced persons is international I also made it clear that it was not of a political nature because Pakistan had not denied the right of the displaced persons to repatriation. It is only in its humanitarian aspects that the refugee problem is international, because a large number of Governments have made contributions in response to the appeals of the Secretary-General for humanitarian assistance enabling the international community to launch the United Nations East Pakistan Relief Operation and relief operations through the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees as the focal point. I wish it to be clearly understood that it is only in this humanitarian sense that I said that the problem of the displaced persons is international.

336. At this moment, when the people of West Pakistan are united in their determination to undergo the same peril and sacrifice that their brothers in East Pakistan have faced for all these months from outside aggression, when they are laying down their lives in the defense of East Pakistan, a new unity of hearts and minds is being forged among our people to defend every part of our homeland. At this moment the people of West Pakistan are braving death and destruction by deflecting the weight of Indian armed attacks from East Pakistan to themselves. I feel that I am in duty bound to state this because I have heard several speakers talk of the divisions between the people of East and West Pakistan.

337. The PRESIDENT: The list of speakers is now exhausted. First I wish to make a statement at this stage as the PRESIDENT of the Security Council and later in my capacity as the representative of Sierra Leone.

338. I wish to clarify a situation which came up during the earlier stages of our meeting this afternoon. It is my understanding that when the representative of Italy requested that, in view of the urgency of the situation on the Indian subcontinent and the necessity, generally recognized by all, for a swift end to be put to the conflict, only the two parties to the conflict should be invited to speak on the

subject at today's meeting. In a ruling on the consideration of the procedural matter as to whether or not to invite the representative of the Bangla Desh at this stage, we do not for one moment include the request made by the representative of Tunisia who, as a Member of the United Nations, falls under a completely different category. I might perhaps at this point add that although the representative has, in his letter contained in document S/10414, dated today, requested an opportunity to address the Council, he has not in any way indicated an intention to speak on the matter during this meeting. Under the circumstances, therefore, my ruling does not apply to the request of the representative of Tunisia.

339. I should now like to make a statement in my capacity as the representative of SIERRA LEONE. The deteriorating situation in the Indian subcontinent, which has given rise to this meeting today, has been of very serious concern to my Government. The present grave situation now existing in that area, where untold destruction to life and property is being inflicted, is a matter for deep regret. My Government has already addressed an appeal to both India and Pakistan, the parties directly involved in the dispute, to exercise restraint and to desist from the use of force to settle their dispute.

340. As we speak here the war continues. My delegation is anxious to see an immediate end to the hostilities and would therefore support any genuine move by the Council which seeks to achieve that objective. It is important for the members of the Council to act now and with unanimity.

341. I reserve the right of my delegation to speak again during any further consideration of this item.

342. Mr. BUSH (United States of America): As there are no further speakers in this debate, the next order of business on the agenda is to vote on the draft resolution which we have submitted [S/10416]. It seems to our delegation that the Security Council must act tonight. If it does not, it is going to look weak and it will be failing to live up to its obligation. The world is going to be looking at us and we ought to do something. My suggestion at this point would be that we should take a 20-minute recess which would give the various delegations time to consult on the draft resolution that is before the Security Council. Perhaps we could have prompt action by the Council after the reconvening of the meeting at the end of 20 minutes, if that length of time would suit the convenience of the Chair and the rest of the Council. The United States delegation requests a 20-minute recess with a prompt reconvening of the Council so that it can act with the eyes of the world upon it.

343. Mr. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*translated from Russian*): When discussing such acute international situations I am always envious—a human failing—of our United States colleague. He has his State Department so close at hand. All he has to do is to pick up the telephone, wake up the Secretary of State, report on the situation which has arisen in the Council and ask for further instructions. Unfortunately, no one else amongst us is so privileged.

344. In view of the seriousness of the matter under discussion and of the existence of substantial differences of opinion on the draft resolution submitted by the United States representative [*ibid.*], which the Soviet delegation cannot accept because we consider it a highly one-sided document, I propose that we postpone the vote until tomorrow.

345. Mr. BUSH (United States of America): I believe that under the provisional rules of procedure our motion for suspension of the meeting takes priority. I believe that our motion for a short suspension should be disposed of before the motion of the representative of the Soviet Union. Therefore, I would ask the President to act so as to accord us the brief suspension we have called for under the rules of procedure; and I would hope that others would concur in this.

346. The PRESIDENT: The representative of the United States has asked for a 20-minute suspension of the meeting before the vote is taken on the draft resolution.

347. Mr. BUSH (United States of America): Technically, we would be acting under rule 33, subparagraph 1, which would be a suspension, and we would like to set the time of the suspension at 20 minutes, or 30 minutes if representatives so desire.

348. The PRESIDENT: The representative of the United States has asked for a suspension of the meeting for 20 minutes.

349. Mr. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*translated from Russian*): Under the rules of procedure, I have the right to make an amendment to that proposal. I suggest an addition to the proposal of the representative of the United States: namely, that we adjourn the meeting for 24 hours instead of 20 minutes.

350. Mr. BUSH (United States of America): Mr. President, under rule 33 of the rules of procedure, the motion to suspend the meeting takes precedent over an amendment. We are entitled to a decision by the Council on our request for a suspension. An amendment is subordinate to the motion for suspension. We would like to get a ruling and the decision of the Council on whether we might suspend the meeting, in accord with the priority motion that we have offered here.

351. Mr. FARAH (Somalia): My delegation would like to make an appeal—in which I hope we will be joined by the other non-permanent members of the Council—to the permanent members of the Council to refrain from making this issue a platform for political rivalries or differences. The issue is complex and tragic enough without having another dimension added to it.

352. A war is raging on the frontiers of Pakistan and India. The Council has a duty at least to call for an immediate cease-fire. Otherwise, if we delay it for 24 hours, or for 12 hours, whatever deaths result will surely be on the conscience of all of us. I would therefore ask that any draft resolutions that might be in hand, which members might wish to submit for consideration by the Council, be

presented here and that we have an opportunity of exchanging views on their content. I think it would be against the procedure of the Council to have a draft resolution presented to us and to go to an immediate vote without having an opportunity of exchanging views on the content.

353. The PRESIDENT: May I refer the Council to rule 33 of the rules of procedure. The motion to suspend the meeting, as requested by the representative of the United States, takes precedence over the request for an amendment by the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. In the circumstances, I would suggest, there being a motion for suspension, that a vote be taken immediately.

354. I shall now put to the vote the motion of the representative of the United States to suspend the meeting for 20 minutes to allow discussions outside.

A vote was taken by show of hands.

In favour: Argentina, Belgium, Burundi, Italy, Japan, Nicaragua, Sierra Leone, Somalia, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America.

Against: None.

Abstaining: France, Poland, Syrian Arab Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

One member (China) did not participate in the vote.

The motion was adopted by 10 votes to none, with 4 abstentions.

The meeting was suspended at 11 p.m. and resumed on Sunday, 5 December, at 12.05 a.m.

355. Mr. BUSH (United States of America): I should like formally to move that we take a vote at this time on the United States draft resolution contained in document S/10416. We are prepared to vote—and I think the speakers' list has been exhausted—and we should now like to move for a vote on that draft resolution.

356. Mr. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*translated from Russian*): I have already stated on behalf of the Soviet delegation that we find the draft resolution submitted by the United States representative unacceptable. I also drew attention to the fact that it is easier for him to reach an immediate agreement on any draft with the State Department. It is not so easy for other representatives.

357. I submitted a specific proposal, but the United States representative insisted on his own. We have wasted approximately an hour on this point, but the results are still the same: the United States representative still insists on a vote being taken on his draft resolution. That is up to him.

358. The Soviet delegation is formally introducing its own draft resolution [S/10418], which states:

"The Security Council,

"Having considered the letter of nine members of the Security Council [S/10411] and the report of the Secretary-General [S/10410],

"1. Calls for a political settlement in East Pakistan which would inevitably result in a cessation of hostilities;

"2. Calls upon the Government of Pakistan to take measures to cease all acts of violence by Pakistani forces in East Pakistan which have led to deterioration of the situation."

359. If there is to be a vote today, the delegation of the Soviet Union will insist that a vote is also taken today on that draft resolution.

360. The PRESIDENT: I call on the representative of India.

361. Mr. SEN (India): Mr. President, I know that you are very tired and we have taxed your patience beyond endurance, but I think I should be remiss if I did not make a short statement before the vote is taken tonight.

362. I should like to take this opportunity to make a few comments and state my Government's views on the proposals as frankly and as fairly as I can. The main concern shown during the debate is to arrest any further fighting immediately. That is in our view quite understandable but quite unrealistic. It is unrealistic in the sense that it would not stop the Mukti Bahini from fighting or the Pakistan Army from continuing its oppression and sending more and more refugees into India. As I have already explained, we cannot take any more refugees.

363. I should like to say that had this concern for saving lives been matched with a similar concern for saving countless lives during the last nine months, it would have been a source of some comfort to my Government and the Indian people. What, indeed, has happened to our conventions on genocide, human rights, self-determination, and so on?

364. It is in this context that we find it very regrettable—indeed most deplorable—that a decision of this nature, which concerns 75 million persons, should be taken without listening to their own representatives.

365. I therefore state again that, while we shall make a fuller statement later, we do protest and resent the fact that this kind of decision is being taken without consulting the people who are most deeply and intimately concerned.

366. Secondly, I should like to say—as I have said before—that this is the fourth time Pakistan has committed aggression against India. On previous occasions India has not had a proper discussion of this problem, and certainly not a proper solution, and we have a strong sense of grievance in this respect. We are therefore not going to submit to any pressures or threats from any quarter. We reserve our right to take, and to continue taking, all appropriate and necessary measures to safeguard our security and defence against aggression from Pakistan. We should be failing in our duty if we did not make it

absolutely clear that any interference in India's right of self-defence or any encouragement or cover to Pakistan's aggression would have grave consequences for the peace and security of this whole region; let the United Nations and all the members of the Security Council not fail to take full note of this warning. We should be extremely sorry if they failed to pay heed to our considerations, as they have done on previous occasions.

367. Lastly, we deeply regret that Pakistan has been encouraged over these last nine months to commit all kinds of atrocious deeds and aggression against India because it has been supported by several countries—for whatever reasons, and I shall not go into those reasons. We are absolutely convinced that, but for this encouragement, such an attitude on the part of Pakistan would not have been evident.

368. The PRESIDENT: The Council now has before it two draft resolutions: one submitted by the United States delegation and the other by the Soviet delegation. If there are no further speakers, we shall proceed to the vote.

369. Mr. FARAH (Somalia): I should like to introduce on behalf of the delegations of Argentina, Burundi, Nicaragua and Sierra Leone, and my own delegation, a draft resolution which will appear in document S/10419. I should like that draft resolution to be placed before the Council at the appropriate time so that it may be given the consideration which it deserves.

370. Mr. VINCI (Italy): I should like to announce to the members of the Council that, after the voting has taken place on the two draft resolutions which have been submitted, my delegation and two other delegations are prepared to introduce our own draft resolution. Indeed I would suggest that after the first vote we should be allowed to introduce our draft resolution in order that the different proposals may be before the members of the Council. The draft resolution submitted by the delegation of Somalia and other sponsors is now before the Council, and the Council should also have before it our draft resolution.

371. The PRESIDENT: As there are no other speakers at this time, the Council will now proceed to vote on the draft resolution submitted by the United States, which is contained in document S/10416.

A vote was taken by show of hands.

In favour: Argentina, Belgium, Burundi, China, Italy, Japan, Nicaragua, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Syrian Arab Republic, United States of America.

Against: Poland, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

Abstaining: France, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.

The result of the vote was 11 in favour, 2 against, with 2 abstentions.

The draft resolution was not adopted, one of the negative votes being that of a permanent member of the Council.

372. Mr. HUANG Hua (China) (*interpretation from Chinese*): In the opinion of the Chinese delegation, this draft resolution has failed to condemn the armed aggression against Pakistan committed by the Indian Government with the support of the Soviet Union and it has failed to express support for Pakistan's just struggle against aggression. At the same time, the Chinese delegation has reservations in principle against the practice of sending observers by the United Nations.

373. The Chinese delegation voted for this draft resolution and at the same time would like to make the above-mentioned two points of reservations.

374. Mr. TOMEH (Syrian Arab Republic): My delegation voted in favour of the draft resolution for the following reasons. We are fully aware that it is not perfect; indeed, it is far from being perfect. If we had had the time to devote to it and if the gravity of the situation had not imposed on us the obligation to act urgently, there would have been room for a great deal of improvement. We voted affirmatively because the draft tied together what we believe to be the three main aspects of the problem: the solution of the refugee problem immediately, without any risk to the refugees and without discrimination; cease-fire; and immediate withdrawal. Those three aspects, in our view, are intertwined. They are of great concern and of great gravity and have great repercussions and vital importance for everybody—so much so that any deficiency of language or shortcoming of expression in the draft must yield to the higher consideration of stopping the bloodshed, preserving territorial integrity and fulfilling the human rights of the distressed East Pakistan refugees in India. It was that consideration which compelled us to cast an affirmative vote.

375. Mr. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*translated from Russian*): The delegation of the Soviet Union firmly rejects the usual slanderous statement made by one of the delegations at this meeting. In connexion with the results of the vote, the Soviet delegation notes that three permanent members of the Council did not support the United States draft resolution. Only two permanent members of the Security Council voted for it. The duet continues.

376. Mr. VINCI (Italy): We have now voted on the first draft resolution. As I announced earlier, three delegations would like to present their own draft resolution.

377. The PRESIDENT: I call on the representative of the Soviet Union on a point of order.

378. Mr. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*translated from Russian*): You stated that the Security Council was about to vote on the two draft resolutions that have been submitted, one by the United States and the other by the Soviet Union. A vote has been taken on the United States draft. Under the rules of procedure and in accordance with established practice, voting should continue; only after it has been completed can new proposals be submitted or views be expressed. I would therefore request you to proceed with the vote.

379. The PRESIDENT: The representative of the Soviet Union has always asked members to be realistic in everything they do. Now, earlier the representative of Italy requested that as soon as the first vote had been taken he be allowed to intervene and present his own draft resolution before another was voted on. There was no objection then, and in the circumstances I thought everything was in order.

380. I call on the representative of the Soviet Union on a point of order.

381. Mr. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*translated from Russian*): There has clearly been a misunderstanding. When you spoke of the first vote, you mentioned the two draft resolutions and had in mind the first round of the voting on both drafts on an equal footing. You had put one to the vote and I understood that you would proceed immediately to a vote on the second draft resolution. I understood that, after completion of the first round of voting on these draft resolutions which have already been submitted, we would then turn to the proposal by the representative of Italy.

382. The PRESIDENT: Unfortunately, there has been a misunderstanding. After announcing that there were two draft resolutions to be voted on, I called on the representative of Italy, and he indicated—before the vote—that he wished after the first vote to present his draft resolution. No member of this Council objected or said anything. Under the circumstances, I took it that his request was acceptable to the Council.

383. I call upon the representative of Italy to make his statement, following which the Soviet draft resolution will be voted on.

384. Mr. VINCI (Italy): Mr. President, you very correctly interpreted my request, and I believe that you are correct also in saying that since no members objected to my request I am allowed to speak and introduce a new draft resolution. I would ask Ambassador Malik's indulgence while I introduce this draft resolution.

385. We certainly feel the Council should not adjourn without making a further attempt—if possible tonight—to take some decision in order to stop the fighting that is going on and to take a first step towards the final political solution of the problem confronting us. It is a most complex problem, as has clearly emerged from our debate this evening. In this spirit, and with this purpose in mind, on behalf of the delegations of Belgium, Japan and Italy I introduce the draft resolution that has just been circulated as document S/10417.

386. May I just read out the draft without making too many comments because I think it is self-explanatory:

"The Security Council,

"Noting the reports of the Secretary-General of 3 and 4 December 1971 [S/10410 and Add.1, S/10412],

"Having heard the statements of the representatives of India and Pakistan,

"Gravely concerned that hostilities have broken out between India and Pakistan which constitute an immediate threat to international peace and security,

"Mindful of its responsibility under the relevant provisions of the Charter of the United Nations,

"1. Calls upon the Governments concerned forthwith, as a first step, for an immediate cease-fire and for a cessation of all military activities;

"2. Urges the Governments concerned, in accordance with the principles envisaged in the United Nations Charter, to intensify their efforts to bring about conditions necessary for the speedy and voluntary repatriation of the millions of refugees to their homes;

"3. Calls for the full co-operation of all States with the Secretary-General for rendering assistance to and relieving the distress of those refugees."

I should like to insert a very simple comment on operative paragraphs 2 and 3. They reflect exactly the contents of a draft resolution that had been adopted by the Third Committee of the General Assembly.³

"4. Requests the Secretary-General to keep the Council promptly and currently informed on the situation;

"5. Decides to follow the situation closely and to meet again as soon as necessary."

387. I would add that the sponsors of this draft resolution are flexible and indeed ready to consider suggestions and amendments that could in the view of members of the Council improve the text and finally bring about a consensus or at least agreement wide enough to allow the Security Council to adopt a final text, which, as the representative of France pointed out in his statement, could show that the Security Council is making a joint effort and taking a united position on this very crucial and important question.

388. I think that if this would be too difficult to achieve very speedily, we could consider postponing the vote on this draft resolution, provided—and that is what I should like to suggest—that the voting on the other draft resolutions which have been submitted or are going to be submitted is also subjected to a postponement.

389. The PRESIDENT: The Council will now proceed to vote on the draft resolution submitted by the delegation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics [S/10418].

390. I call on the representative of Argentina on a point of order.

391. Mr. ORTIZ DE ROZAS (Argentina) (*interpretation from Spanish*): Mr. President, I wish to request an explanation from you because you have just said that you would put to the vote the draft resolution of the USSR. On the

³ *Idem.*

basis of the numbering of those documents the draft resolution submitted by Belgium, Italy and Japan has precedence, since it is numbered S/10417: the Soviet proposal is numbered S/10418. I should like to know if there is any special reason why we should abandon the order established in our rules of procedure.

392. The PRESIDENT: According to the order of presentation and receipt, the first draft resolution received by the President was that of the United States, the second was that of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the third was the draft resolution just explained by the representative of Italy, and the fourth was the one mentioned recently by the representative of Somalia. That is the order in which they were received and presented. I am not responsible for the numbering.

393. Mr. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*translated from Russian*): Bearing in mind the fact that we have three draft resolutions before us, I was ready to support the reasons given by the representative of Italy for postponing a vote on them. If there is agreement on that point, the Soviet delegation is prepared not to press for a vote on its own draft resolution, subject to the proviso that votes on all three resolutions will be postponed. This will give delegations the possibility to study these draft resolutions more carefully and, perhaps, to find some mutually acceptable solution.

394. Mr. ORTIZ DE ROZAS (Argentina) (*interpretation from Spanish*): Mr. President, I am very grateful to you for the information that you have just given me concerning the order in which the documents were presented. For my part, I have no objection whatsoever to the Council's voting first on the draft resolution submitted by the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, I think that in order to comply with the rules and regulations we should alter the numbering and we should assign to the USSR draft resolution the number S/10417 and to the draft resolution submitted by Belgium and other countries the number S/10418. Otherwise we should be acting against the rules.

395. As regards the motion to postpone the vote so as to make it possible for further consultations to take place, I myself, being a sponsor of a draft resolution, have no difficulty at all in accepting that because, as was pointed out by the representative of Somalia, I think that the Security Council cannot afford the luxury of adjourning without having adopted a draft resolution while the lives of thousands of people are involved. So I would insist on a vote this evening in any case.

396. Sir Colin CROWE (United Kingdom): If we are going to look at these three draft resolutions together, I might make the point that I did mention earlier in my speech, that I am afraid that my delegation finds itself in a position of great difficulty over these draft resolutions. As I made clear in my statement, we attach the highest importance to our achieving unanimity. Indeed, unless we can do so, whatever resolution we may adopt would be wasted breath. It is evident from the discussion so far that none of these draft resolutions is going to achieve unanimity or going to avoid a veto. I also note that the Italian and Argentine delegations in relation to their draft resolutions are flexible

towards possible amendments and I therefore wonder whether a further effort should not be made and whether we should not ask you, Mr. President, to see whether you can achieve a consensus so that at least an effective and united message can go out from here.

397. Mr. VINCI (Italy): I do understand the feelings of the representative of Argentina. Of course it would have been desirable and even better if we could have come to some positive outcome in our deliberations this evening. But I do share the view expressed by the representative of the United Kingdom that we are hardly likely to come to a final decision this evening. In this connexion I should like to express the appreciation of my delegation for the spirit of conciliation which has been shown by the representative of the Soviet Union in not pressing his draft resolution to the vote. I agree with and support the suggestion made by the representative of the United Kingdom that we should postpone the vote on these three draft resolutions in order to give time to all members of the Council to consult and to attempt to come to some decision which would command the unanimous support of this body.

398. Mr. KOSCIUSKO-MORIZET (France) (*interpretation from French*): I whole-heartedly support the proposal made by the representative of the United Kingdom. Naturally, like every member of the Council, we feel a sense of urgency. We wish to put an end as quickly as possible to a painful and bloody conflict. After all, casualties have been occurring for months now. What really counts is effectiveness and effectiveness is unanimity; unanimity means consultations among ourselves. It will not be possible to reach agreement within the next few minutes. We will end up, as we have begun, with a hash of resolutions, and this will add nothing to the prestige of the Council.

399. That is why I support the proposal of the representative of the United Kingdom. I believe it is possible—at any rate, an effort must be made—to obtain the agreement of all. This will take some time, but this is better than salving our consciences cheaply. What will be the use of a resolution which may have a majority but which will not have the agreement of the main parties concerned and which will turn out to be completely ineffective and lead nowhere? I very firmly support the proposal made by the representative of the United Kingdom.

400. The PRESIDENT: The proposal before us now is that the Council should have a postponement with a view to engaging in further consultations on the three draft resolutions that are before us.

401. Mr. BUSH (United States of America): I should like to ask for some clarification on what is meant by "postponement". Are we talking about a matter of hours? Are we talking about a short period of time? There is a serious crisis. The Security Council is going to look impotent; it is going to look weak. The world is watching what we are doing. I should like to ask our colleagues what they mean by "postponement". Are we dealing with a matter of a few hours? Are we dealing with a matter of minutes? Are we dealing with a matter of days?

402. Our delegation feels that we should exert every bit of energy and stay awake just as long as we possibly can to try

to reach some kind of an agreement, though it might not be total agreement. I would disagree with the representative of France, because I think something has been accomplished by the fact that we stayed here and by the fact that 11 nations did indeed feel that a draft resolution, imperfect though it may have been, was proof that we were trying to address ourselves to the problem of a cease-fire and of withdrawal in that troubled subcontinent.

403. I should simply like to ask, without being argumentative about it—perhaps our Government can indeed support this motion—what the proposers of the motion have in mind in terms of the length of postponement. This is a most serious, urgent matter, and business cannot go on as usual with this serious crisis in the subcontinent. Therefore, I should like to have some clarification from the President, or from the sponsors of the proposal for postponement, with regard to the length of time we are talking about.

404. Mr. VINCI (Italy): I certainly share the concern expressed by the representative of the United States. We certainly would have liked to end our meeting with some positive conclusion, and certainly the eyes of the whole world are focused on what we are doing here. But I should just like to indicate some facts. First of all, it is a quarter to one in the morning, which, if I am not wrong, means that it is about 11 o'clock in the area with which we are concerned. I am afraid that we will not be able to agree in a few hours on some final text. That means that we certainly would require a postponement of about 12 hours.

405. I say this because I also have in mind the fact that some delegations are not in a position to obtain instructions or a final clearance on any text on which we might be able to agree. I therefore appeal to Ambassador Bush. We do need to have some time to come to some final and fruitful conclusion.

406. I believe that we have no other choice, because if we do not proceed along the lines which have been suggested by the representative of the United Kingdom, and supported by the representative of France and by me, I am afraid that we will come out of this chamber without any positive conclusion. Thus, I would suggest that we postpone the meeting for about 12 hours and resume this afternoon.

407. Mr. FARAH (Somalia): If we postpone this matter for 12 hours, that means that we will meet at 1 o'clock this afternoon. We would then begin our consultations, which should carry us on into the night. If we reached some kind of formula, delegations would say, "We wish to refer it to our Governments". That means to say that the following morning we would have to take up the matter further.

408. I think that all this is showing a complete disregard for the inhuman suffering which is going on in this situation, and I believe that if we are going to tackle this matter at all, we should try to sit down here and reach a formula within 12 hours. We have a duty to the world, and my delegation is prepared to stay for another 12 hours in the hope that we can hammer out a formula acceptable to the majority of the delegations.

409. If, however, there are irreconcilable views, then of course we will sit here until something freezes over. I would

suggest that the draft resolution submitted by the representatives of Italy and two other States [S/10417] and the draft resolution submitted by the representatives of Argentina, Somalia and three other States [S/10419] can be reconciled. It is in this spirit of reconciliation that I think that we should try to make our approach—not keep on deferring the matter.

410. We have delayed the matter for nine months. When are we going to stop? The representative of the United Kingdom made the suggestion. Can he think of a formula that would be acceptable to the Council? Has he been able to detect any common thread? There is one common thread, I think, in the situation, and that is the cease-fire. I challenge any delegation here to say that it supports the killing and maiming which are taking place in the regions of India and Pakistan as a result of armed action by the armed forces of those Governments. Are we against a cease-fire?

411. I think that we also have to be realistic. There are two approaches to this problem. One is the first phase, which is the preliminary phase of a cease-fire and withdrawal to the territories from which the armed forces originally came.

412. My delegation has taken a stand in the Middle East problem, which started like this. The Security Council called for a cease-fire but did not ask for a withdrawal of troops. What is the result? After four years, we are now trying to negotiate on the question of withdrawal. This is contrary to the very principles which we have tried to establish for ourselves: that the question of a withdrawal of enemy forces from the territory of a country should not be subject to negotiation. It must be an immediate demand of this Council. Here we must respect the question of principle. We support that principle for the Middle East. We support this principle on the question of India and Pakistan.

413. In the view of my delegation, it is intolerable for Pakistan armed forces to be on the territory of India, and vice versa. If we have any respect for the principles which we have tried to shape over the 25 years, surely we should have no fear, no misapprehensions, no qualifications about stating these principles.

414. My delegation is opposed to an adjournment of the Council meeting at this stage.

415. Mr. ORTIZ DE ROZAS (Argentina) (*interpretation from Spanish*): I totally endorse what the representative of Somalia has just said. Indeed, were there any possibility of arriving at a common formula, I would be in favour of it. But, as I said, I would have asked that we find that formula here and now.

416. However, on listening to Ambassador Farah, and having before me the draft resolution sponsored by Burundi, Nicaragua, Sierra Leone, Somalia and Argentina, I wonder what substitute formula can be found for this minimum which we are submitting to the Council for consideration?

417. Can it be that the Security Council will not take note of the report of the Secretary-General? Will the Council

deny that it has heard the statements of the representatives of India and Pakistan? Is the Council not gravely concerned about the outbreak of hostilities along the borders of India and Pakistan? Is not the Council convinced that hostilities along the India-Pakistan border constitute an immediate threat to international peace and security? Will the Council not recognize the need to deal appropriately at a subsequent stage, within the framework of the Charter, with the issues which have given rise to hostilities? Will not the Council further recognize the need to take preliminary measures to bring about an immediate cessation of hostilities and effect a withdrawal of armed forces to their own side of the India-Pakistan borders? Is the Council not prepared to call upon the Governments of India and Pakistan to take forthwith the necessary measures for an immediate cease-fire and withdrawal of their armed forces on the territory of the other to their own side of the India-Pakistan border? Lastly, does not the Council intend to request or does it have no interest in requesting the Secretary-General to keep the Council promptly and currently informed of the situation?

418. Can a more acceptable minimum be found than the one presented by three African delegations and two Latin American delegations? What basis for consultation will there be to arrive at a positive draft resolution within a few hours?

419. I support the proposal made by the representative of Somalia. I believe that we must, tonight, unless we abdicate our responsibilities, reach an agreement on the situation. I would wish to believe that an agreement can be reached on the basis stated by these five delegations. Anyone who votes against this will assume a responsibility which is his alone.

420. Mr. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*translated from Russian*): I begin to have the impression that some representatives have a desire to play at voting and to vote at all costs. But that is not the way out of the situation, especially with draft resolutions which bypass the main cause and follow the same line as the previous draft resolution submitted by the United States delegation. It is entirely reasonable, therefore, that a significant number of delegations should have expressed a desire to postpone the vote. There is no certainty that we shall be able to do anything at all in the hour remaining before midnight. If the representative of Argentina has extensive powers to take decisions here on his own and to act in one way or another, it is apparent that not all representatives have the same powers. I have already pointed out how convenient it is for the United States representative only to have to pick up his telephone to settle everything. Other reasonable considerations have been put forward. But none the less, certain representatives have such a desire and a wish to vote that, apparently, they simply like voting. A realistic approach to the matter is called for.

421. Since both draft resolutions on which certain of their sponsors are insisting a vote should be taken go in the same direction as the United States draft resolution, we cannot consider them as acceptable. That being so, the Soviet delegation supports the well-founded and reasonable proposals of those delegations which propose postponement of

the vote for a minimum of 10 hours. We suggested postponement for 24 hours, but our position is flexible and we are prepared to accept the proposal for a 10-hour postponement. In the light of those circumstances, the delegation of the Soviet Union considers that to be a more reasonable course of action than to vote at all costs.

422. Mr. TERENCE (Burundi) (*interpretation from French*): My delegation has felt some apprehension since the debate was opened on this question. It is obvious that unanimity among members of the Security Council would be ideal. Nevertheless, to judge from the turn that the discussions have taken, my delegation remains skeptical about finding a solution to which all members would adhere. I am not saying that it is impossible; for the time being we are rather skeptical about reaching any unanimity within a few hours.

423. This is why, bearing in mind the extreme gravity of the situation and the respective positions taken, we believe that it should be possible for the delegations that have sponsored the draft resolution in document S/10419 to accept a suspension of the meeting, as would seem to be required. This has been done on previous occasions.

424. We recognize that the draft resolution has certain deficiencies and that it could therefore be subjected to amendments through the consultations that seem indicated.

425. In my statement before the suspension, my delegation stressed the primary objective of this debate, namely an immediate cease-fire. Also, in view of the nature of the situation, for a cease-fire to be effective it must be accompanied by withdrawal of troops by both sides. This position is not in the least a partisan one. It is inspired by what I have described as our unswerving attachment to the cause of peace. We would not at this time wish to delay matters by seeking to determine who are responsible for the situation. Whatever the causes of and whoever is to blame for these troubles, what we are seeking is an immediate restoration of peace. For the attainment of that objective, it would seem that everyone should consent to any kind of sacrifice. Are we once again to give the impression of total impotence on the part of the Security Council?

426. I should like to conclude by saying that, so far as we are concerned, even a single paragraph that could be drafted here around this table could suffice if it contained an immediate cease-fire and an immediate withdrawal of troops by both sides. Although I am not seeking to present these considerations as a formal proposal, I would wish all delegations to bear them in mind.

427. Mr. FARAH (Somalia): In the Declaration on the Strengthening of International Security [*General Assembly resolution 2734 (XXV)*], two appropriate paragraphs deal very much with the problem with which we are seized. Paragraph 4:

“Solemnly reaffirms that States must fully respect the sovereignty of other States and the right of peoples to determine their own destinies, free of external intervention, coercion or constraint, especially involving the threat or use of force, overt or covert, and refrain from

any attempt aimed at the partial or total disruption of the national unity and territorial integrity of any other State or country.”

428. Paragraph 5, *inter alia*,

“*Solemnly reaffirms* that every State has the duty to refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity and political independence of any other State, and that the territory of a State shall not be the object of military occupation resulting from the use of force in contravention of the provisions of the Charter . . .”

429. The Security Council must be consistent with the principles which the Organization sets up for itself. The draft resolution which I have submitted on behalf of Somalia and four other States is built primarily on principles that we all recognize. There can be no compromise with those principles; otherwise we shall be turning the whole Council into a farce. We are not staging a drama—at least we should not stage a drama; we should try to reach a decision that will end the suffering in Pakistan. Naturally, however, since the non-permanent members cannot amongst themselves make a decision that is binding upon the Council, and since the permanent members have the prerogative of saying how successful or unsuccessful a resolution will be, it would appear, regrettably, that in view of the statements made here by the permanent members we shall adjourn until 10 o'clock tomorrow morning. But I would certainly hope one thing could happen before we adjourn: that the delegations here who find difficulties with any of the provisions of our draft resolutions could pinpoint them now, so that when we meet tomorrow we shall be able to take them into account in our consultations and not have to start afresh tomorrow. It is important that we know how near to or how far from an agreement we are.

430. Mr. TOMEH (Syrian Arab Republic): In order to have the real perspective of time, I would point out that various speakers after 12 o'clock tonight have been referring to “tomorrow”; actually it is now tomorrow. Therefore, since it is tomorrow and we are continuing our deliberations, and in answer to the question put by the representative of Somalia, whose concern I fully share, I would like to say the following.

431. First of all, with regard to the draft resolution submitted by the five delegations—Argentina, Burundi, Nicaragua, Sierra Leone and Somalia—there is something lacking, and that is the basic problem which every one of the speakers tonight has recognized to be a basic problem—that is, the problem of the refugees. As I said in the explanation of my vote on the United States draft resolution, there are three problems intertwined that cannot be separated one from the others, and any resolution which disregards one of those three is, in our view, incomplete. Those three are: the immediate cease-fire, the withdrawal of the armies, and the problem of the refugees. If we disregard the problem of the refugees, we are in fact disregarding one basic factor in the whole situation. And we cannot claim for ourselves that by voting on one draft resolution today we have achieved what the Council should achieve, because we shall still be faced with a problem

which to my Government and my delegation is a basic, fundamental one, and that is the problem of the refugees.

432. Should consultations be engaged in, my delegation will contribute its humble best towards the formulation, in co-operation with other delegations, of a fully adequate, fully comprehensive draft resolution that would take care of those three intertwined factors.

433. Mr. KUI/AGA (Poland): I had the impression, after the last intervention of the representative of Somalia, that there was an agreement—perhaps reluctant but an agreement—to adjourn for some time, 10 or 12 hours, in order, mainly, to try to arrive at some new proposal which could be submitted to the Council tomorrow and, secondly, to clarify the attitudes of our Governments, and I must say that I should like to clarify the position of my Government before a vote is taken on the remaining draft resolutions. I am in favour of this proposal and I think that, since there seems to be agreement on those lines now, perhaps the best we could do now would be to adjourn so as to leave as much time as possible to achieve the aims we want to achieve during those 10 or 12 hours of adjournment.

434. Mr. VINCI (Italy): From the last statements we have heard, I think we are coming close to some agreement, and I should like to express the appreciation of my delegation for the understanding shown by the representatives of Burundi, Somalia and Syria. On behalf of the sponsors of our draft resolution [S/10417], I can assure them that we are ready to consult in order to see whether we can arrive at a text which will command the support of all members.

435. The representative of the Syrian Arab Republic rightly pointed to the question of refugees. As a matter of fact we had the same concern in mind, and that is why we introduced into our draft resolution two paragraphs which are the same as the paragraphs of the resolution adopted by the Third Committee, with the agreement also of the main parties concerned in this case, that is, India and Pakistan. So I think that, if the sponsors of the other draft resolution pay some attention to this and consider those two paragraphs, they might also be duly taken into account when we draft a final text.

436. Mr. ORTIZ DE ROZAS (Argentina) (*interpretation from Spanish*): I wish to explain briefly, in reply to the concern expressed by Mr. Tomeh of the Syrian Arab Republic, that in our draft resolution we did not intend to forget the very grave problem of refugees, which is a matter of anxiety for the five sponsoring delegations. I wish to draw his attention to the fact that these are preliminary measures and that we also maintain that there is a necessity at a later stage to deal with all the questions which led to the hostilities. That is to say, we are not overlooking or neglecting any of the problems of this multifaceted question. Our purpose, because of the urgency of events, was as a first step a cease-fire and the withdrawal of the armed forces to both sides of the border, without prejudice to our considering the other questions later. I simply wished to make this clear, because I should not wish the representative of the Syrian Arab Republic to feel that we gave no thought to the grave problem of the refugees.

437. Mr. TOMEH (Syrian Arab Republic): I wish to thank the representative of Argentina for his clarification. I have always admired his logic and his balanced statements. However, apparently sometimes—and perhaps this is the fault of human nature—when a resolution is drafted by a number of delegations some imbalance can occur, as is the case here. For instance, in the draft resolution of the five Powers [S/10419], there are six preambular paragraphs but actually only one or perhaps two operative paragraphs. So I would say about this draft resolution that its operative paragraphs do not have the balance and harmony they should have with regard to the long preambular part. This draft resolution would not lack harmony or balance if one more operative paragraph were added to it, such as, for instance, the following operative paragraph 2:

“Calls upon the Government of Pakistan to exert its best efforts towards the creation of a climate conducive to the voluntary return of refugees to East Pakistan.”

438. As I said previously, I believe every speaker in the Council tonight has expressed very grave concern about the problem of refugees. If another draft resolution should emerge from these two draft resolutions, the paragraph I have suggested or something close to it would make the five-Power draft resolution more balanced, in our view.

439. Mr. TERENCE (Burundi) (*interpretation from French*): Following the statement of the representative of Syria, I would like to say that it goes without saying that the delegations that sponsored the draft resolution could not object to an amendment of that kind, since we have ourselves on several occasions expressed our concern for the fate of the refugees and since therefore the refugee question, or the solution of the problem of the refugees, is an integral part of what I myself earlier called an over-all solution.

440. So we are prepared to accept an amendment of that kind concerning the refugees, because this is a fundamental problem.

441. As far as the delegation of Burundi is concerned, I believe it can quite properly speak of that problem, because one might compare my country to a country of asylum, since we had received 100,000 refugees at one time in a population of 5 million in a territory which is well known to be tiny. We therefore do not ignore the problem. We give it priority.

442. Mr. ORTIZ DE ROZAS (Argentina) (*interpretation from Spanish*): I simply wish to thank the representative of the Syrian Arab Republic for his suggestion, which my delegation is very happy to accept. We consider it very constructive and relevant to the draft resolution which we have sponsored with other delegations.

443. Mr. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*translated from Russian*): I have a definite impression that we are, as it were, reaching a general understanding about the advisability of adjourning the meeting. At the same time, as we sit at this table we are carrying on consultations about what can be included and what can be excluded and how texts can be combined. But this is no way of holding

consultations: to occupy ourselves at such a late hour, and during the course of a meeting, with consultations, and with inclusion and exclusion of points in two draft resolutions without mentioning the third. That is not the way out of the situation.

444. It would therefore be appropriate to find some way of reaching a more rapid agreement on the adjournment of the meeting.

445. My second comment is that I think the sponsors of all draft resolutions should consult with the parties involved or, more correctly, with the representatives who took part in today's debate. They are being passed over in silence, and the discussion about mutual understanding and consultations, about the exclusion of one point and the inclusion of another, is taking place only among the sponsors. I submit that we should not overlook those representatives who were invited by the Council to participate in its work at today's meeting and that they must not be overlooked in our consultations on the draft resolutions.

446. Some of those who spoke in defence of their positions said that we must solve first one question, and then all the others. Experience shows that such a solution is not effective. Reference was made to the Middle East, to the Security Council resolution on the Middle East. We all know that in certain provisions of that resolution there is a lack of precision which is now being exploited by the aggressors and by those who have encouraged aggression and are concealing its continuation; it is being exploited in order not to implement the resolution. Hence, in view of this sorry experience, the resolution should be clear and precise, without taking the approach that other questions should be postponed until later. What are these other questions? The main, the fundamental question is that of a political settlement in East Pakistan. There is silence on this point. But that is the main cause for the tense situation, and that must be borne in mind.

447. Finally, I would urgently request the sponsors of the two draft resolutions not to forget the third, the Soviet draft.

448. Mr. FARAH (Somalia): Having heard the statement of the last speaker, may I suggest formally that we adjourn but that we meet at least no later than 12 hours hence, and that meanwhile—say, at half-past ten—all the sponsors of the draft resolutions before the Council meet in consultation so that we could have at least two hours to try to reach an agreeable formula.

449. The PRESIDENT: In accordance with the usual practice, may I make this short statement: we have heard the statements of several members of the question of adjourning, and it seems quite clear to me, and to us all, that an agreement has been reached for the Council to adjourn for about 12 hours; and according to my calculations, that would be an adjournment to 2.30 p.m. today, 5 December. If I hear no objection, the meeting will be adjourned until then.

The meeting rose on Sunday, 5 December 1971, at 1.25 a.m.

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