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1605th MEETING: 2 DECEMBER 1971

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CONTENTS

NOTE

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SIXTEEN HUNDRED AND FIFTH MEETING

Held in New York on Thursday, 2 December 1971, at 3.30 p.m.

President: Mr. I. TAYLOR-KAMARA (Sierra Leone).

Present: The representatives of the following States: Argentina, Belgium, Burundi, China, France, Italy, Japan, Nicaragua, Poland, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Syrian Arab Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and United States of America.

Provisional agenda (S/Agenda/1605)

1. Adoption of the agenda.

2. Question concerning the situation in Southern Rhodesia:
   (a) Letter dated 24 November 1971 from the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/10396);
   (b) Fourth report of the Committee established in pursuance of Security Council resolution 253 (1968) (S/10229 and Add.1 and 2).

Adoption of the agenda

The agenda was adopted.

Question concerning the situation in Southern Rhodesia:
***(a)* Letter dated 24 November 1971 from the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/10396);**
(b)* Fourth report of the Committee established in pursuance of Security Council resolution 253 (1968) (S/10229 and Add.1 and 2)

1. The PRESIDENT: In accordance with the decisions taken previously by the Council I invite the representatives of Saudi Arabia, the United Republic of Tanzania, Kenya, Zambia and Ghana to participate without the right to vote in the discussion of the present item.

2. In accordance with the usual practice of the Council and in view of the limited number of seats available at the Council table, I invite the representatives of Saudi Arabia, the United Republic of Tanzania, Kenya, Zambia and Ghana to take the places reserved for them in the Council chamber on the understanding that they will be invited to the Council table whenever called upon to speak.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. J. Baroody (Saudi Arabia), Mr. S. A. Salim (United Republic of Tanzania), Mr. J. Odero-Jowi (Kenya), Mr. V. Mwaanga (Zambia) and Mr. R. Akwei (Ghana) took the places reserved for them in the Council chamber.

3. The PRESIDENT: The first name on the list of speakers is that of the representative of Zambia. I invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

4. Mr. MWAANGA (Zambia): Mr. President, I should like to thank you and all the members of the Security Council for granting my request to make a statement on behalf of the Government of Zambia on the all-important question of Southern Rhodesia. But first of all allow me to perform a very pleasant duty, that of conveying to you the warm congratulations of the delegation of Zambia on your assumption of the high office of President of the Security Council for the month of December. You have had a very distinguished career in your own country, having been a senior and respected Minister in the Government of Sierra Leone. During the short time you have been Permanent Representative to the United Nations, you have already proved to be a worthy representative of your great country, which has traditionally and historically maintained the most cordial of relations with mine.

5. I would be failing in my duty if I did not express my gratitude and satisfaction to your outstanding predecessor, Ambassador Kuĺaga of Poland, for the outstanding qualities of leadership he displayed in presiding over the deliberations of the Council during the month of November. He is a gentleman among gentlemen and a truly fine diplomat who represents the very best of everything that is good in our profession.

6. The question of Southern Rhodesia is a matter of immediate concern to the people of Zambia because events in that rebel colony do have a direct bearing on them. On 25 November 1971 *[1602nd meeting]* the Security Council was given details of the so-called agreement which was reached in Salisbury between the British Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, Sir Alec Douglas-Home, and the Rhodesian rebel leader, Ian Smith, guaranteeing Smith's illegal independence and sealing the betrayal of the 5 million African people of Zambabwe.

7. The British Permanent Representative, Sir Colin Crowe, who is a very fine gentleman indeed, did his best to explain

* Subsequently issued as *Official Records of the Security Council, Twenty-sixth Year, Special Supplement Nos. 2 and Corrigendum and 2A.*

what is obviously a clumsy and racist-oriented agreement. The time-table of this immeasurable disaster makes distasteful reading. I shall briefly recount it for the purposes of this important debate:

April 1964: Ian Smith succeds Winston Field as Prime Minister of Southern Rhodesia.

October 1964: Harold Wilson, then Prime Minister of Britain, sends message to Smith warning him not to declare independence but promising to take no action against him if he does.

November 1965: Smith makes a unilateral declaration of independence. Security Council adopts resolutions 202 (1965) of 6 May 1965 and 217 (1965) of 20 November 1965. The latter, among other things,

> "... calls upon the ... United Kingdom to take all ... appropriate measures which would prove affective in eliminating the authority of the usurpers and in bringing the minority régime in Southern Rhodesia to an immediate end."

March 1966: British Navy stops a Greek oil tanker, *Joanna V,* from offloading oil for Rhodesia at Beira. Security Council adopts resolution 221 (1966) of 9 April 1966.

December 1966: Wilson and Smith meet for settlement talks on board *HMS Tiger* off the coast of Malta. Smith rejects Wilson's proposals for settlement.

In the same month Britain imposes sanctions on Rhodesia. Wilson tells delegates to Lagos Commonwealth leaders' conference that sanctions would bring the Smith régime down in weeks rather than months, and the Security Council adopts resolution 232 (1966) of 16 December 1966.

May 1968: The United Nations imposes comprehensive sanctions on Rhodesia. The Security Council adopts resolution 253 (1968).

August 1968: Rhodesian Appeals Court rules that Smith's régime has *de facto* but not *de jure* status. The High Court judge in the rebel colony endorses the legality of the régime when sentencing 32 Africans to death for possession of arms.

October 1968: Wilson and Smith hold second settlement talks—this time aboard *HMS Fearless* off the coast of Gibraltar. Smith again turns down British proposals.

June 1969: Smith wins landslide victory in referendum for *apartheid*-type Constitution and declaration of a republic. Sir Humphrey Gibbs, then British Governor of Rhodesia, resigns.

July 1969: Last members of British diplomatic mission leave Salisbury.

November 1969: Rhodesian Parliament gives final approval for declaration of an *apartheid* republic.

December 1969: The then British Foreign Secretary, Michael Stewart, names 13 countries still having ties with Rhodesia.

January 1970: Rhodesia declares itself a republic, with du Pont as President.

June 1970: The Conservative Government takes power in Britain.

July 1970: Smith warns that there will be no dramatic change in the new Government's attitude towards Rhodesia.

November 1970: Fifth anniversary of the unilateral declaration of independence. Smith announces that he will negotiate settlement from a position of power and will not compromise his "principles". The Security Council adopts resolution 288 (1970) of 17 November 1970 which, among other things, calls upon the United Kingdom as the administering Power in discharge of its responsibility

> "to take urgent and effective measures to bring to an end the illegal rebellion in Southern Rhodesia and enable the people to exercise their right to self-determination, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and in conformity with the objectives of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) ...".

February 1971: Secret discussions start between Salisbury and London.

June 1971: British emissary Lord Goodman flies to Salisbury for talks with Smith régime.

November 1971: British Government votes to continue sanctions against Rhodesia. British Foreign Secretary Sir Alec Douglas-Home flies to Salisbury for talks. General Assembly adopts a resolution calling on Britain not to grant independence before majority rule. Nevertheless, agreement is signed and announced in London and in Salisbury.

8. The Government and people of Zambia were shocked to hear the details of the agreement which was signed in Salisbury by Sir Alec and Smith.[1] What shocked us is not that there was a cheap and shameful sell-out of the African people of Zimbabwe but the extent to which Her Majesty's Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary went in appeasing the rebel leader Ian Smith. It once again demonstrated the British Government's lack of concern and insensitivity for the welfare of the 5 million African people of Zimbabwe.

9. We consider it the height of absurdity for Sir Alec to have begun his political career as Chamberlain's Parliamentary Private Secretary, with a shameful surrender at Munich in 1939 at the hands of none other than Adolf Hitler, and to end it with a shameful surrender at Salisbury in 1971 at the hands of none other than the rebel leader Ian

1 See *Official Records of the Security Council, Twenty-sixth Year, Supplement for October, November and December 1971,* document S/10405.

Smith. We consider the signing of this sell-out agreement by Sir Alec to be a treacherous act, which will produce unpleasant and far-reaching consequences, not only for the British Government, but more so for the white minority régime in Salisbury. This agreement of betrayal, in our opinion, contains, *inter alia*, twelve main elements which need to be stated and analysed briefly. These are:

First, a complicated electoral arrangement which casts grave doubts on the possibility of eventual majority rule;

Second, no specific time-scale defined for movement of Africans towards parliamentary parity, let alone eventual majority rule;

Third, commission appointed by Britain to assess views of all Rhodesia's racial groups on acceptability of such so-called settlement proposals;

Fourth, the rebel régime's so-called intention to make progress towards ending racial discrimination by a review of existing legislation;

Fifth, the so-called independent commission to study racial discrimination and make recommendations to the rebel régime;

Sixth, a development programme with aid up to $120 million over ten years to be provided to promote educational and job opportunities for Africans;

Seventh, no immediate change in the present status of Rhodesia or its illegal 1969 Constitution;

Eighth, the so-called new declaration of rights guaranteeing individual rights and freedoms, including access to the High Court for complainants;

Ninth, promise by the rebel régime not to evict Africans from certain white-designated areas pending a report by the commission;

Tenth, review of cases of all detainees and restricted persons;

Eleventh, steps to enable more Africans to compete on equal terms with white Rhodesians in public service;

Twelfth, the rebel régime's "wish" to revoke the state of emergency after sanctions have been lifted.

10. My very distinguished brother and colleague Ambassador Salim of Tanzania very ably and eloquently analysed the British White Paper entitled "Proposals for a Settlement" in great detail on 30 November *[1603rd meeting]* and explained why it is impossible for us to accept these proposals as falling within the so-called five principles—which, in any case, we have never accepted. Our position on this matter has always been and continues to be that there should be no independence in Southern Rhodesia before majority rule.

11. I propose to deal with some of the points that I have just enumerated. Evaluation of the Rhodesian settlement must indeed be acknowledged as complex, because of the fancy and deliberately vague provisions and complex machinery for constitutional amendment. A group of distinguished economists and constitutional experts at the University of Salisbury in Rhodesia, the University of Zambia and Queen's University in Belfast have estimated that, even assuming that all circumstances will be favourable to the speediest attainment of parity in the Rhodesian Parliament, the earliest this can be achieved is the year 2026. On the same basis the earliest date for the achievement of majority rule will be the year 2035, that is, 64 years from now. These estimates, which have been described as over-optimistic, are based on the following assumptions:

First, that there will be no manipulation of the law and no constitutional changes made by the Smith régime;

Second, that there will be an acceleration in the rate of growth of African secondary educational opportunities to the level rendering African school-leavers eligible for the African higher roll;

Third, that possession by all Africans with educational qualifications will have the requisite financial qualifications for the proposed franchise;

Fourth, that there will be no rise in the level of financial qualification—which is highly unlikely since the Constitution provides for automatic increases proportionate to inflation;

Fifth, that every eligible African will register as a voter—which again is highly unlikely;

Sixth, that there will be no increase in the current net balance and rates of white immigration to Rhodesia—again highly unlikely given the Smith régime's pig-headed determination to bring in as many white immigrants as possible;

Seventh, that the current output and rates of increase of qualified white, Asian and Euro-African school-leavers will remain constant.

12. As regards the qualifications proposed in the White Paper, we are of the opinion that only the proposals for the African higher roll are significant in relation to the vital question of majority rule in Southern Rhodesia. The level of voting qualifications for the lower roll is irrelevant in that Africans already control the lower roll seats and this franchise, however narrow or broad, will not give Africans a larger number of seats in Parliament. For that reason the lower roll is therefore irrelevant to the question of majority rule. The African higher roll qualifications must therefore be considered crucial for the purpose of this mathematical exercise. Here it is disturbing to note that there has been no movement from the 1969 Electoral Act in the British-Rhodesian White Paper. When measured against the pre-unilateral declaration of independence position, the proposals contained in the White Paper are highly retrogressive, to say the least. The 1971 proposals as contained in the White Paper require applicants for enrolment as voters on the African higher roll to have an income of not less than

$1,800 per annum during the two years preceding the date of their claim for enrolment or to own immovable property worth not less than $3,600 net.

13. Alternatively, if voters have four years' secondary education of "prescribed standard" and an income of not less than $1,200 per annum for two years preceding the date of their claim for enrolment or own immovable property worth not less than $2,400 net, they can register as voters. The pre-unilateral declaration of independence position was that the gross value of the property, including mortgages and unpaid instalments of the purchase price, was taken into account in determining the voting qualifications. The required gross value was smaller too: an uneducated person owning property worth $3,360 gross per annum was eligible to vote, while one with four years of secondary education only needed to own property worth $1,100 gross. I ask members of the Council to compare this with the new figure of $2,400 net per annum. This in actual fact means that the property qualification is hardly attainable by Africans. Furthermore, an additional optional qualification consisting of a combination of primary education and either an income of $1,056 per annum or property worth $2,200 per annum has been dropped in the proposed Constitution. So has the provision for chiefs and headmen to acquire higher roll qualifications.

14. The economic prospects for the Africans in Rhodesia are still very bleak. In 1968 the annual average income of the 700,000 African workers in Southern Rhodesia was $288 per annum. It is estimated that the four highest income groups of African workers are those in the fields of communications, banking, education and health. This is where most of the educated Africans are employed. It is estimated that this category of Africans earned in 1968 annual average salaries of $638, $620, $542 and $532 per annum respectively. This must be compared with the annual average salaries of the 280,000 Africans employed in the agricultural industry, who in 1968 earned an average of $144 per annum. This figure should be compared with average incomes in 1968 of white workers in the same industry of $2,836 and $3,102 per annum.

15. In the 10 years before the unilateral declaration of independence African salaries rose from an average of $150 per annum to $256 per annum, representing an average increase of 7.06 per cent per annum. In the two years preceding the unilateral declaration of independence the rate slowed to 4.6 per cent. Although a consumer survey in 1970—based on a sample of 1,000 Africans) showed that 6 per cent of African households had a personal income of $1,320 per annum, this figure gives an exaggerated picture of African incomes for the purposes of the proposed franchise. It is exaggerated because it applies only to African urban households. It is exaggerated because it includes non-indigenous Africans who currently number 320,000 out of the total African labour force of 700,000 workers. It is exaggerated because it also includes all incomings and income of other members of the household which are not taken into account in assessing income for the purposes of the proposed franchise.

16. One of the most limiting factors in the proposed Constitution is undoubtedly the rate of educational progress of Africans. A generous estimate has revealed that there were about 20,000 Africans in Southern Rhodesia with four years of secondary education in 1970. A further 2,600 Africans were expected to complete form IV in 1970 and there were about 1,000 other Africans annually acquiring equivalent qualifications. The African secondary school system in Southern Rhodesia has been expanding at a pathetically low rate. Assuming that the introduction of British aid of $120 million for the next 10 years will expand the African secondary school system by 50 per cent per annum for each of the first five years of aid; that for a further five years it will expand the African secondary school system another 33-1/2 per cent; and that after the aid stops it will expand at varying rates of 15 per cent for 10 years, 10 per cent for another 10 years and 10 per cent for the remaining 10 years, per annum, it would not even meet the requirements of parity, let alone majority rule, in the foreseeable future.

17. We can only draw one conclusion from these proposals, which is that African majority rule has been postponed indefinitely. It is likely on the most favourable assumptions to take 55 years, that is, up to the year 2026, before there are sufficient qualified Africans to achieve parity in the Rhodesian Parliament. Then there will be a further five-year period of delay before the last school-leavers meet the voting age requirement of 21 years. Thereafter it is estimated that it will take four years before the machinery for the introduction of 10 common roll seats can be completed. This makes the year 2035 the earliest possible date for majority rule, assuming that there will be a 10 per cent annual increase in the African secondary school output after British aid is ended, and also assuming that there will be scrupulous honesty on the part of Ian Smith and his successors, which is highly unlikely.

18. These figures could very well be disputed by the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom, but in the absence of any official estimates as to how long it is going to take to achieve parity, let alone majority rule, under the proposed Constitution we are bound to accept these figures as fair. Indeed, only last night Sir Alec Douglas-Home, the British Foreign Secretary, informed the House of Commons that he was not in a position to say how long it would take to achieve either parity or majority rule in Southern Rhodesia. As a matter of fact, at an earlier session he had said that he could not calculate the time on the basis of the clock or the calendar but rather on the basis of what was going to be achieved.

19. Ian Smith, the rebel leader in Southern Rhodesia, told a British television audience last night that he knew that the Africans would not be able to take over power in Rhodesia today because they are not ready to govern themselves. He said he knew that they would not be ready after ten years. He added that he does not know what is going to happen in one hundred or one thousand years because he will not be alive to be able to tell.

20. This is the nature of the terms of the proposals the British Government intends to put to the people of Rhodesia. In a country where the highest courts of law are being used to administer mock justice and to rubber-stamp white oppression it does not console the Africans to know

that they will now have access to the High Court for their complaints.

21. Equally, having examined the provisions in the proposal for a review of existing legislation by an independent commission to make progress towards ending racial discrimination, I should like to highlight a few of its obnoxious elements. First, with regard to the special duty of the commission to scrutinize the provisions of that unmitigated evil the Land Tenure Act, it would indeed be ominous if under the guise of "in the light of the national interest" existing inequalities and discrimination were to be perpetuated. Secondly, the Rhodesian régime, in commending to Parliament the changes that might be suggested by the commission, has at its disposal a convenient loop-hole whereby it need not so recommend if a change suggested by the Commission was subject to considerations "that any Government would be obliged to regard as of an overriding character".

22. The Home-Smith agreement has placed the African people of Zimbabwe in perpetual bondage and at the mercy of white settlers for ever. Sir Alec has now awarded Ian Smith and his fellow white settlers a certificate of respectability while at the same time giving racism an international certificate of respectability which the white racists will fully make use of at the expense of the African majority.

23. The test of acceptability needs to be looked at in its proper perspective. The public debate over the test of acceptability is going to be conducted in Rhodesia under the present state of emergency with the apparatus of a police state fully intact. The press is entirely controlled by the white racists, who obviously favour the proposed settlement. Radio and television time is to be allotted only to the parties now represented in the rebel Parliament, thus denying any opportunities to the two major African nationalist parties, the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) and the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU). These two political parties, which are banned but which genuinely represent African opinion, are therefore automatically excluded from mobilizing African public opinion. What this means in practical terms is that the great mass of Africans who live in the so-called tribal reserves will be paraded before the Pearce fact-finding commission at public meetings where their predictable role will be to applaud what is said in their name by their chiefs, who are paid agents of Ian Smith, and by their tribal councillors. What chance has any commission—no matter how trustworthy its credentials—of establishing the true feelings of the Africans under such carefully manipulated conditions? Given these conditions, the Commission's report will not carry any semblance of conviction in the international community.

24. Contrary to the apparent effort by Sir Colin Crowe in his statement on 25 November 1971 *[1602nd meeting]* to belittle the value and importance of a referendum, we strongly feel that the true test of acceptability of these proposals would be the holding of a nation-wide referendum based on one-man-one-vote under the supervision of the United Nations.

25. We demand the immediate and unconditional release of Mr. Joshua Nkomo, President of ZAPU, and the Reverend Ndabaningi Sithole, President of ZANU and all political prisoners and detainees. We demand the immediate restoration of all political rights to the African people of Zimbabwe. We demand a return to sanity in Southern Rhodesia and respect for the Africans on the basis of equality.

26. Under the prevailing circumstances, the African people of Zimbabwe have no alternative but to take up arms and fight white oppression. This is the only honourable course left for them. We therefore urge the Security Council to make direct financial and military contributions to the people of Zimbabwe to enable them to continue their struggle against the racist thugs led by Ian Smith. The Home-Smith agreement does not guarantee independence before majority rule. It does not alter the status of the unilateral declaration of independence. It is a white man's deal not worked out with the participation of the black majority. It is ridden with the most undisguised form of racism. It guarantees the continued oppression of the African people and it represents a total British surrender of constitutional responsibility for the rebel colony.

27. For those and other reasons it is our considered judgement that this is a British act of betrayal and treachery. We firmly reject it. Finally and most importantly, I wish to state that messages smuggled out of Southern Rhodesia from Mr. Nkomo and the Reverend Sithole have requested the Zambian delegation to inform this Council that they totally reject the Anglo-Rhodesian agreement in no uncertain terms as a cheap sell-out. We are therefore sure that the people of Zimbabwe will accordingly reject this agreement with the contempt it deserves if and when it is put to a genuine test.

28. The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Zambia, Mr. Mwaanga, for his kind remarks and warm words of welcome addressed to me and my country.

29. I invite the representative of Ghana to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

30. Mr. AKWEI (Ghana): Mr. President, I thank you and the members of the Council for acceding to my request to be allowed to participate in this important debate on Southern Rhdoesia. I do so with more than satisfaction, seeing that the Council is meeting under the presidency of a distinguished son of Africa hailing from a neighbouring country, Sierra Leone, with which Ghana has the strongest ties of friendship and fraternal solidarity. Your presidency inspires us with the confidence that this Council will at last grapple with this problem of Rhodesia, which has vexed the African continent for so long, with foresight, resolution, humanity and a sense of commitment to the high purposes of this Organization.

31. There is one principle which must be established first and recognized by all when dealing with this problem of Southern Rhodesia in the United Nations: that is, United Nations responsibility in the solution of the problem. When the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom made his statement on Thursday, 25 November 1971, he seemed anxious to emphasize British responsibility as the first premise of his argument. But, of course, this was a

disingenuous move to give a false setting to the whole debate. Everyone knows the United Nations involvement and, therefore, assumption of some responsibility for the Southern Rhodesian problem did not start with the unilateral declaration of independence in 1965. By resolution 1514 (XV), the General Assembly adopted what has since become known as the Magna Carta of decolonization dealing with the ending of colonization in general.

32. Serious United Nations involvement began in 1961 with the adoption of a constitution which gave rise to African opposition because of fears of independence under minority white rule. By resolution 1747 (XVI) of 1962, the General Assembly declared Southern Rhodesia a Non-Self-Governing Territory and requested the British Government, *inter alia*, to convene a constitutional conference in which all political parties could participate for the purpose of formulating a constitution for Southern Rhodesia in place of the Constitution of 1961 on the basis of "one man, one vote" and majority rule. Resolution 1755 (XVII) dealt with the situation in Southern Rhodesia and urged the speedy release of detained African leaders of ZAPU. Resolution 1760 (XVII) regretted British inaction on the Southern Rhodesian situation and made concrete proposals for the settlement of the issue. Since then, every session of the General Assembly has been seized of the question of Southern Rhodesia, and the Security Council became seized of the matter in 1963 when, on the initiative of Ghana, the Council was requested to prevent the transfer of sovereignty and of arms and military aircraft to the racist régime of Southern Rhodesia on the break-up of the Federation in 1963. That move was, of course, frustrated by the British veto.

33. The question whether the Security Council meeting in 1965 was called on British initiative to buttress British responsibility is a moot point. It is pertinent to recall that when the unilateral declaration of independence was made in November 1965 the General Assembly went into emergency session the same day and recommended urgent consideration of the matter by the Security Council. Requests for a Security Council meeting also came from a number of African States. This Council meeting took place the following day. Thus, despite what the British call their "primary responsibility" in the matter, the whole logic and history of the development of the Rhodesian problem is a recognition of shared responsibility with the United Nations, particularly this Council. Indeed, it would be strange to think that the British Government has submitted the so-called Home-Smith agreement to this Council merely for information purposes, for the Council to take it or leave it. Nor could the Council be invited to look on passively while the British settle agreements about Rhodesia on terms contrary to United Nations decisions and resolutions. It would be extremely odd for the British Government to take such an attitude, for it would be tantamount to the United Kingdom Government dictating to this Council and the United Nations.

34. We hold the view that unless British action is meant to be irresponsible and in flagrant defiance of the international community, that Government has an obligation to take into account the Council's views on the proposed settlement with Ian Smith, and to abide by every decision and recommendation of this Council. Thus, no matter what takes place elsewhere between the British Government and Ian Smith, this Council has a duty to discharge, an obligation to take decisions, a residual responsibility, if I may so describe it, not to abandon the people of Zimbabwe. If this were not so, then we would see little value in continuing to debate the merits and demerits of the Home-Smith proposals. The British Government, therefore, has a duty to this Council to state unequivocally what its attitude is on this point.

35. Our belief that the United Nations has a joint responsibility in solving the Rhodesian problem makes it pertinent to recall the principles which the United Nations, by overwhelming majorities in its various organs and Committees, has decided that a solution of the Southern Rhodesian problem should be based upon. On successive occasions the United Nations has stated that there should be no independence without majority rule; that all detained political leaders should be released; that there should be full freedom of movement and assembly to ensure normal political activity; that there should be a national convention of all political leaders to devise a freely acceptable constitution based on the principle of one man, one vote; that lack of educational, economic or property qualifications should not be a barrier to the franchise; that *apartheid* legislation should be repealed and racial discrimination ended. Above all, the General Assembly has called for all moral and material support to the people of Zimbabwe in their legitimate struggle to overthrow the Smith régime.

36. Most of the above principles have also been adopted by the Organization of African Unity, a sister organization of the United Nations, in formal relations of co-operation with it and bearing special responsibility for the continent of Africa and therefore for Rhodesia, a responsibility which none can deny.

37. Against these principles, what has the British Government proposed as its guidelines? First, it has sought to negotiate with a rebel and illegal régime which it has itself tried to bring down, consistent with a request of the General Assembly.

38. The so-called five principles have been repeatedly stated by successive British Governments as though they constituted an improvement in themselves upon the United Nations principles. Suffice it to say that these five principles have been rejected by the Organization of African Unity, in no uncertain terms, as inadequate and therefore unacceptable. Prime Minister Wilson introduced later a sixth principle to the effect that there should be no oppression of majority by minority or of minority by majority. This sixth principle was repudiated by successive Conservative Governments. The six principles formed the basis of the *Tiger* talks in 1966 and the *Fearless* talks in 1968. The principle of majority rule accepted at the Commonwealth Prime Ministers Conference in 1966, when the application of "one man, one vote" to Southern Rhodesia was adopted, was subsequently, however, dropped by successive British Governments. The question might well be asked, why did the Conservatives reject the sixth principle? The only answer is: they never contemplated a settlement that would ensure this most desirable guarantee.

39. Various proposals for action have been adopted by the United Nations for a solution of the Rhodesian question. All measures, including the use of force by Britain, were recommended by the Organization for the termination of the unilateral declaration of independence. A sanctions programme was adopted at first on a voluntary basis; this was later stepped up to a selective mandatory basis, then later to a so-called comprehensive mandatory basis, although even this was not comprehensive. The legitimacy of the struggle for independence was recognized, and all possible assistance was recommended to be given to the freedom fighters of Zimbabwe. Similar programmes of action were adopted by the Organization of African Unity. Let me state clearly the position the Ghana Government has consistently taken on the question of measures to bring down the Smith régime. We have never believed that sanctions alone could topple the Smith régime. We have argued consistently that sanctions, to succeed, must be backed by force and must be comprehensive without any exception whatsoever.

40. What has been the response of Britain to these recommendations? First as regards the question of force, the British position has been the well-known racist theory of "kith and kin". Britain's defence of its position, as repeated by Sir Colin Crowe in his last statement, is that it was neither "feasible nor desirable" to use force against Southern Rhodesia. It was not feasible because, according to Sir Colin, "Rhodesia had been virtually self-governing and possessed its own forces for nearly half a century", a fact which "would have required an invasion in the middle of a continent" *[ibid., para. 9]*. Britain has been repeating that argument since the early 1960s on the basis of a so-called "parliamentary convention". The claim that in 1923 the British Government signed away its power to control Southern Rhodesia is both historically and legally false. What happened in 1923 was that, on the strength of the plebiscite voted on by the white minority, Britain "annexed" Southern Rhodesia to the British Crown and granted to its Legislative Assembly, elected on an exclusively settler basis, so-called powers of "self-government". The British Government, however, reserved the right to veto any Southern Rhodesian legislation that adversely affected the interest of the African inhabitants, ran counter to Britain's international obligations or affected the remaining rights of the British South African Company.

41. Indeed, Southern Rhodesia in 1923 enjoyed the same kind of "self-government" that Ghana enjoyed in 1956, one year before independence. In the case of Ghana, however, the British Government made it absolutely clear that the new constitution that would come into force on independence would be the responsibility of the British Government. Further, the British insisted that a series of constitutional conferences should be held in an attempt to get universal agreement concerning the type of constitution that should be adopted. When there was no agreement concerning the future form of the State, the British Government insisted that an election should be held. Thus the British Government insisted first on a constitutional conference, and later an election was held on the basis of "one man, one vote". The same line of conduct as was followed in Ghana has been followed in all other British African territories before they obtained independence.

42. The argument that Britain had the right to legislate or control Southern Rhodesia without the consent of the Rhodesian legislature is also firmly established in British constitutional history, where numerous examples can be found. In this respect leading British authorities like Sir Arthur Keith and Halsbury's *Laws of England* have always drawn a parallel between Southern Rhodesia and Malta. The Maltese and Southern Rhodesian Constitutions were enacted by Britain by the same process, letters patent from the Crown, shortly after each other: the Maltese Constitution in 1921 and the Southern Rhodesian Constitution in 1923. Yet in 1936 the British Parliament revoked the Maltese Constitution without regard to any so-called parliamentary "convention" or consent by the local legislature. The British Parliament could, therefore, as late as 1960 still control the Southern Rhodesian Government, and therefore its army, in order to correct colonial injustices or set aside a colonial constitution unsuitable for the conditions of its time. Indeed, as the report of the Committee of Officials on the Review of the Constitution of the Federation pointed out in 1960, Southern Rhodesia had not enjoyed control of its own internal affairs for forty years. The colony in 1960 was legally still subordinate to the British Government and Parliament. The United Kingdom appointed the Governor, who could refuse in law to accept the advice of his colonial Ministers, and this was expressly so stated in his official instructions. Thus there is nothing unique, as Sir Colin claims, about the colonial situation of Southern Rhodesia. What may be unique is the consistent determination of the British Government to depart from the normal practices and principles of its own colonial policy in Southern Rhodesia. Nor can this behaviour be said to be even unique, when one recalls the way in which Britain abandoned the black Africans when handing over power to the South African whites in respect of both South Africa and South West Africa.

43. The Southern Rhodesian Government had in 1960 no armed forces under its control, so it was false to say that the British could not physically enforce their will. During the period of the Federation, the British Government built up a strong army and an air force in the Territory. In practice those forces were under the control of Britain, though in name they belonged to the Federation. In any case, when the break-up of the Federation took place in 1963 it was the British Government which, claiming to have no control over Southern Rhodesian armed forces, actually gave away the bulk of the Federation's army and air force to the racist government of Southern Rhodesia, despite the efforts of Ghana and others in this Council to prevent this move. Thus, having armed the rebels, Britain then turned back to claim inability to control those it had armed.

44. In any case, even after the unilateral declaration of independence Britain still had the power to use force immediately to topple the régime if it had wanted to. This has been the imperial tactic of colonial Britain against other territories which were not white. No considerations of bloodshed or the so-called incalculable consequences of war or violence deterred the United Kingdom Government from taking military action in its erstwhile colonies of Kenya, Cyprus, British Guyana or little Anguilla. No consideration of the incalculable consequences of war deterred Britain from going to war against the Nazi racists. Ghana and

Zambia had indeed offered the United Kingdom military facilities in their own territories if it would take action either to end the rebellion or to protect those African States which were threatened by the rebel Rhodesian régime. All this was ignored. The British plea of inability to use force can, therefore, not be seen in any other light than that of cynicism and unconcern for the human rights of Africans. Indeed this is painfully borne out by the fact that Mr. Wilson, then Prime Minister, declared that the only situation in which he would use force was to "restore law and order" in Rhodesia. Since Britain did not, apparently, consider the invasion of Rhodesia by South African forces in August 1967 the kind of breach of law and order it had in mind, it could only be concluded that British troops, if they were used, would be used only against the African liberation forces. The secret was thus let out that it was not the unfeasibility of the use of force that prevented Britain from using force. On the contrary, Britain could use force but it would use it only against African freedom fighters.

45. Nor is that attitude absent from the general position of the United Kingdom Government on the question of sanctions. Against the protestations of African and Asian States, Britain at first would accept only voluntary sanctions. Only when these failed, as the Africans had warned they would, did the United Kingdom agree to selective mandatory sanctions. Selective mandatory sanctions were also insisted upon for some time before comprehensive mandatory sanctions were accepted by the British. Even then the sanctions programme was not at all comprehensive, the so-called humanitarian exemptions being insisted upon.

46. But the Ghana delegation has consistently argued that sanctions could not possibly achieve anything unless the sanctions-busters were brought to book, unless the racist régimes of Portugal and South Africa, which deliberately aided and abetted the sanctions-breaking, were themselves subjected to sanctions. To this day Britain remains opposed to that common-sense course, hiding behind a strange policy of "no recognition, no force, no confrontation". To this hide-bound policy was added a sanctions policy of too little, too late, till today we have the strange situation of a so-called boom in a supposedly sanctions-ridden economy. We are now told that although sanctions have bitten Rhodesia they have not bitten hard enough and they are hurting the poor Africans more than the whites. We are told that despite sanctions, or rather because of sanctions, *apartheid* is spreading faster and wider into Southern Rhodesia and that it is time now to rescue the Africans from *apartheid*. We are not told by Sir Colin that the reactionary business lobbies of Southern Rhodesia, South Africa, the United Kingdom and the United States are the ones that want sanctions removed so that they can renew their profitable business interests in Southern Rhodesia. Nor are we told that it is the Western representatives on the Council that have aided and abetted these racist and reactionary business interests by their negative votes on this Council. We are not told by Sir Colin that it is Britain and France, permanent members of this Council, which have defied decisions of this Council by selling arms and amunition to the racist régime of South Africa. In about three or so places in Sir Colin's statement, he pleads that Britain had no power to impose its will or prevent this or that result. No, it is not lack of British power to do anything. It is lack of British interest or will to act in accordance with justice and Britain's obligations under the Charter. It is inaction based on unconcern with the fate of blacks in Africa. For this, those responsible cannot escape the harshest judgement of history. They will be condemned. But they should note that the liberation movement in Africa will be intensified with the support of the Organization of African Unity. *Apartheid* will inevitably be crushed and freedom for the African will triumph.

47. Is it not a matter of interest that when Lord Home was negotiating with the rebel régime the United States Congress was passing legislation to end the sanctions on the importation of Rhodesian chrome? Of course, we are concerned that the legislation has received presidential signature even if its implementation will be delayed till there is a settlement of the Rhodesian question. We have noted the denial by Ambassador Bush of collusion between the British and Americans against the black people of Zimbabwe. But surely no one can fail to take note of the strange coincidence of American and British actions in this matter. Nor have we failed to notice that the relevant legislation was initiated and piloted in Congress by racists from the American South.

48. Those who in this day and age still dream of the superiority of the white man, of the so-called mission of Western white civilization, would do well to stop and think before they plunge Africa into racial hatred and conflagration. Those in positions of leadership should ponder in which direction they seek to use their power. It is strange that Sir Colin Crowe believes that the Home-Smith proposals are a serious attempt to halt the deterioration in Southern Rhodesia and provide a solution in terms of Security Council resolution 288 (1970). That resolution calls on Britain:

> "to take urgent and effective measures to end the illegal rebellion . . . and enable the people to exercise their right to self-determination, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and in conformity with the objectives of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV)".

What an irony to claim that the Home-Smith proposals meet the requirements of that resolution. To this irony is added blackmail when Sir Colin Crowe claims that this is "probably the last chance". There is no last chance till self-determination and independence based on majority rule is achieved, no matter what settlements are arranged behind the backs of the people of Zimbabwe.

49. But let us first see how the proposals meet the so-called five principles set by the British themselves. Let me repeat that the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity have not accepted these principles.

50. First, when we examine the manner in which the Home-Smith proposals have been negotiated there is no escaping the fact that these have been negotiated with the rebel régime. It is known that the Reverend Sithole, one of the nationalist leaders, as well as several others at present under detention or serving sentences, were denied access to Lord Home. Hence, it cannot be said that this is an

agreement reached with the leaders of all shades of political opinion in the Territory. We therefore support the request of the Permanent Representative of the Soviet Union, supported by Somalia, that the two nationalist leaders—Mr. Nkomo and the Reverend Sithole—be enabled to address this Council and that any memoranda they may have given to Lord Home be made available for study by this Council. We hope the British delegation will pronounce itself on this request—indeed I think it has already.

51. Secondly, concerning the test of acceptability we are informed that a commission will be appointed to carry out this test. We submit that the responsibility for explaining the terms of the settlement to the people of Rhodesia as a whole is not the proper function of such a commission. It is the function of the political leaders of the people. One cannot exclude the possibility of the commission conducting a propaganda campaign, under the guise of explaining the proposals to the people, designed to get the people to accept an otherwise unacceptable settlement.

52. In this respect the delegation of Ghana notes with dissatisfaction that only political parties "represented in the House of Assembly" will be given radio and television time. Persons in detention or under restriction will be allowed to express their views only to the commission, not to the people of Zimbabwe. Further, political detainees and restrictees will not be considered for release till after the test of acceptability. The claim, therefore, that "before and during the test of acceptability normal political activities will be permitted" is false.

53. It is further claimed that the test of acceptability will be under the control of the British Government. In this respect the question put by the Ambassador of Somalia whether the British Government will be in control of law and order enforcement agencies is pertinent and vital to a full, free and fair ascertainment. Is there any guarantee of such British control?

54. To judge from the complicated nature of the proposals, a time-table of the conduct of the test of acceptability seems called for. How much time will be allowed for normal political activities before the test? And how long will the test last? In our view, nothing useful will be gained by limiting the time allowed for these undertakings. The very method agreed upon of testing acceptability falls far short of the only democratic process acceptable to civilized men in expressing their views, that is, through a vote on the basis of "one man, one vote".

55. Further, who will constitute the commission to test the acceptability of the proposals? So far we have been told only of a British Lord who will be chairman, two vice-chairmen and a number of commissioners whose experience and independence of the Rhodesian authorities can be relied upon. In view of press reports that the composition of the commission will be heavily weighted against the black Africans in Zimbabwe, the international community must know who the commissioners would be, and how many there would be, before satisfaction can be felt about their experience and independence. It cannot be ignored that in the present circumstances hardly any white Rhodesian can be found who can be sufficiently independent of the racist régime.

56. To turn to the constitutional arrangements, it is shocking to find that the basis of these is the 1969 Constitution, which was condemned by this very Council at the time. It is true some modifications have been introduced to the proposals, but we do not consider that these go far enough to make any great difference to the racial balance in the House of Assembly for the foreseeable future.

57. The creation of a higher African roll and the automatic increase of members elected to the point where parity is reached is only a disguised mechanism for actual indefinite delay of the arrival of parity. We know that the Southern Rhodesian Government has been strenuously recruiting white immigrants into the Territory, and there is every reason to expect that the rate of immigration will be stepped up in the future. On this basis, when will the expected increase of registered voters on the higher African roll ever reach the 6 per cent of the European roll to attract the automatic increase? Secondly, the stringent income and property qualifications for both the higher African roll and the lower roll make it almost unbelievable that this parity will ever be reached in the foreseeable future.

58. In any case how is such a provision reconciled with the principles of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) that neither economic, nor educational nor property qualifications should stand in the way of the exercise of the inalienable right of people to self-determination and independence? And how does the British Government guarantee that there will be no retrogressive change in the electoral provisions or even in the whole Constitution to accord with the wishes of the white Rhodesian minority? An independent and sovereign country is free to do what it likes even with its own Constitution and many countries have in fact exercised this right soon after independence. Can it be claimed by any representatives here that voters in their countries are subjected to such income and property qualifications as have been accepted by the British Government for Southern Rhodesia? Can it be denied that in places like the southern States of this country these criteria are often used only as stratagems to deny voting rights to black Americans?

59. Moreover, the proposals provide that before the additional 10 seats are created to advance beyond parity to majority rule an independent commission will have to decide whether the creation of such seats is acceptable to the Rhodesian people as a whole or what other alternatives are acceptable. It is thought that by making a decision not to create these 10 seats tantamount to a constitutional amendment a sufficient guarantee has been won. But, as already stated, any sovereign Government can amend its Constitution or change it completely. There is therefore no guarantee against what the Rhodesian racists can do.

60. What is more serious, legal provision has been created to enable the advance from parity to majority rule to be blocked by allowing for so-called alternatives. What could be justifiable alternatives to the creation of these additional seats if there is a determination to move towards majority rule from parity? It is clear that the racists will use this when the time comes to prevent the creation of the 10 common-roll seats. Thus the first principle of unimpeded

progress towards majority rule is already endangered and compromised.

61. The most bizarre aspect of the proposals is the so-called new declaration of rights enforceable by the High Court. Apart from the pertinent question which the Ambassador of Somalia has put to the British delegation on this matter one might well ask whether the concept is itself credible, bearing in mind the known objectives and behaviour of the Rhodesian Government since 1923. Is it conceivable that the Rhodesian authorities can be depended upon to honour and enforce these rights? Are the Courts not the same ones which after the unilateral declaration of independence were supposed to be loyal to the British Crown but in effect chose to be loyal to the Smith régime? Moreover, these Courts stood by and watched Ian Smith and his collaborators pass a series of discriminatory laws against Africans and are enforcing those laws today. How then can they be depended upon to set up any other object of allegiance other than the racist régime? What is worse, under the proposals the Courts will be prevented from ruling on legislation already passed and it is the bulk of this that has been responsible for the denial of those same rights which are intended to be guaranteed by the declaration.

62. Nor are the provisions relating to the review of racially discriminating laws and land settlement in keeping with the relevant portions of the fourth British principle. There is to be no review of already existing laws, only future ones. The so-called review of the Land Tenure Act by which virtually half of the land is given to 5 million Africans and half to only 25,000 whites, is hedged with so many contingencies as not to deceive anyone as to its true import. One would have expected the British to insist on an immediate repeal of this law. Instead the Africans are promised a commission which will scrutinize the law and make recommendations which are not even binding on the Government. A spurious land board is also envisaged to preside over the long-term resolution of land problems.

63. We have taken note of a proposed development programme that will be financed from a British subsidy of £5 million a year for 10 years to be matched by a contribution from the Southern Rhodesian Government. How much matching the Southern Rhodesian Government will contribute is not stated. Judging from the niggardly provision that that Government has so far made for expenditure on African development and education, how can it be guaranteed that its matching will be substantial? Moreover, who will administer this fund? Does the British Government have the confidence that people who have stated flatly that power will never pass to Africans in their lifetime can honestly administer this fund for the benefit of Africans? We do not share such confidence and it were better that the administration of such development fund were entrusted to an unofficial body in Rhodesia with an African majority.

64. Indeed a careful analysis of the settlement terms seems only to convince the impartial that they not only do not conform in any way to consistently asserted United Nations principles, but are not even reconcilable in any significant way to the five principles set by the British Government itself. Not only has progress to majority rule been impaired, but legal provision has been created for retrogressive amendments to the Constitution to retard African advancement. There is no immediate improvement in the political representation of Africans; perhaps there might be in the distant future, but not now. Nor will racial discrimination end with the inauguration of the Constitutional proposals. How could this be claimed when the validity of all existing legislation, including the notorious Land Tenure Act, is virtually guaranteed. And as for the acceptability of the proposals to the people of Rhodesia as a whole, the dubious method proposed for ascertaining this fact including private meetings and the conditions inside Rhodesia under which the test will be made—and we must remember that the emergency conditions will still obtain—cannot establish the true feelings of the black Africans on the proposals. The result will only be one of intimidation, or at best guess work.

65. Even the British sense of justice and fair play seems to have been outraged by the proposals, judging from press comments and editorials which have appeared recently in Britain, and here I quote from a recent issue of the *Daily Mail:*

> "The new terms will be guaranteed neither by Britain nor by any international body. They will work only if the Rhodesian Government wants to make them work. In our heart of hearts we cannot be happy about a deal which is so fragile and depends so much on the goodwill of the leaders of the Rhodesian front."

66. In fact, the settlement is a sell-out of Zimbabwe. No wonder Mr. Smith was so happy at the conclusion of the agreement. Surely the British must have worked out an approximate time-table by which, under the Home-Smith proposals, the people of Zimbabwe can attain independence by a certain date, other things being equal. We have heard statements made recently by Lord Home that he cannot calculate either by the clock or by the calendar. But surely there must have been some kind of approximate calculations as to how long it was going to take the Africans to reach majority rule, if there had been the British determination to see them advance towards the stage where they would exercise majority rule. What is the time-table—or are the British afraid to tell us? The Ghana delegation is gravely concerned at the prospects for Zimbabwe. Indeed it is our belief that, far from the settlement leading to the dawn of hope, it will rather lead to frustration and despair and constitute therefore an invitation to violence and revolution.

67. In the light of this conclusion, and as I indicated at the beginning of my statement, there is a clear and inescapable duty on the part of this Council not to endorse or accept the settlement proposals nor recommend their acceptance to the people of Zimbabwe. The duty of the United Nations is to maintain sanctions, to strengthen and widen sanctions and to apply them effectively against Portugal and South Africa, to isolate the racist régime of Ian Smith and never to recognize any granting of independence to that Government on the basis of the Home-Smith proposals. To do that would be to condone *apartheid* and its spread and to face the prospect of admitting yet another *apartheid*-ridden State into the ranks of this Organization.

The Organization of African Unity has already, by adopting the Lusaka Manifesto,[2] declared that South Africa should be expelled from this Organization if it refuses to abandon the policy of *apartheid*.

68. Consistency forbids us to envisage the admission of another legalized racist State such as Southern Rhodesia would be. We should hold firm to the principle of NIBMAR—no independence before majority rule—renew our dedication to the brave freedom-fighters of Zimbabwe, and mobilize support both moral and material for their legitimate struggle. However long and arduous the road, our commitment, as a world Organization, is not to the weak and self-seeking Government of the United Kingdom, which is undoubtedly anxious to scuttle Rhodesian freedom on any terms, but to the true independence of Zimbabwe in accordance with the ideals of the United Nations.

69. The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Ghana for the kind remarks which he addressed to me.

70. I invite the representative of Kenya to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

71. Mr. ODERO-JOWI (Kenya): Mr. President, permit me to thank you and the members of the Council for allowing me to participate in this debate on a subject of vital concern to Africa and to my country. Under your able and distinguished guidance, as a true son of Africa and as representative of a country that for long has been anxious about the future of Africans in Southern Rhodesia, my delegation is confident that, with the support of the Council, you will steer this debate to a successful conclusion.

72. Before taking part in the debate may I, on behalf of my delegation, express Kenya's satisfaction at seeing representatives of the People's Republic of China assume their rightful place in this august Council?

73. During his speech in the Security Council last Thursday, 25 November, the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom, Sir Colin Crowe, set out the terms that have since been distributed as a White Paper entitled "Rhodesia: Proposals for a Settlement" which were accepted yesterday by the British Parliament. He described the Douglas-Home-Smith agreement at Salisbury as an "honourable solution" to the problems of Southern Rhodesia.

74. The Kenya Government considers that the proposals contained in the White Paper are not only totally unacceptable, but that they constitute a shameful betrayal of the people of Zimbabwe and a flagrant violation of resolutions of the Security Council and the General Assembly and of the principles and obligations of the Charter of the United Nations.

75. Although Sir Colin Crowe took pains to excuse the refusal of the British Government to topple the illegal racist minority régime at Salisbury by force, my delegation is obliged to draw the attention of the Security Council to the fact that the Council was seized of the question of Southern Rhodesia on the initiative of the United Kingdom, which described itself as the "administering Power" and has been so recognized in all Security Council and General Assembly resolutions every year since 1965. Britain cannot, therefore, at this late hour say that it has never in fact been an "administering Power".

76. Resolution 217 (1965) of the Security Council, recognizing that the United Kingdom as the administering Power, considered the unilateral declaration of independence as an act of rebellion, reaffirmed its resolution 216 (1965), condemned the unilateral declaration of independence, called upon all States not to recognize Smith's illegal racist minority régime; reaffirmed General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) on the Declaration of the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, called on Britain to quell the rebellion of the racist minority; called on the British Government to take all other appropriate measures which would prove effective in eliminating the authority of the usurpers, also called upon the British Government to take immediate measures in order to allow the people of Southern Rhodesia to determine their own future consistent with the objectives of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV), and called upon the Organization of African Unity to do all in its power to assist in the implementation of the present resolution, in conformity with Chapter VIII of the Charter of the United Nations.

77. Security Council resolution 232 (1966) recognized the United Kingdom as the administering Power and, among other things, reaffirmed the inalienable rights of the people of Southern Rhodesia to freedom and independence in accordance with the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples contained in General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960 and recognized the legitimacy of their struggle to secure enjoyment of their rights as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations.

78. Security Council resolution 253 (1968) of 29 May 1968 reaffirmed all previous resolutions, reading in part as follows:

> "*Affirming* the primary responsibility of the United Kingdom to enable the people of Southern Rhodesia to achieve self-determination and independence . . .
>
> "*Recognizing* the legitimacy of the struggle of the people of Southern Rhodesia to secure the enjoyment of their rights as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations and in conformity with the objectives of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960,
>
> "*Reaffirming* its determination that the present situation in Southern Rhodesia constitutes a threat to international peace and security,
>
> "*Acting* under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,
>
> ". . .

[2] See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-fourth Session, Annexes*, agenda item 106, document A/7754.

"2. *Calls upon* the United Kingdom as the administering Power in the discharge of its responsibility to take urgently all effective measures to bring to an end the rebellion in Southern Rhodesia, and enable the people to secure the enjoyment of their rights as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations and in conformity with the objectives of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV);".

79. As late as 18 March 1970, this Council, in its resolution 277 (1970), noted with grave concern that:

"the situation in Southern Rhodesia continues to deteriorate as a result of the introduction by the illegal régime of new measures, including the purported assumption of republican status, aimed at repressing the African people in violation of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) . . .

"*Reaffirming* that the present situation in Southern Rhodesia constitutes a threat to international peace and security,

"*Acting* under Chapter VII of the Charter,

"1. *Condemns* the illegal proclamation of republican status . . . by the illegal régime in Southern Rhodesia;".

It called upon Member States not to recognize the illegal régime, and urged the British Government, as the administering Power, to discharge its responsibility to enable the people of Zimbabwe to exercise their right to self-determination and independence in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and in conformity with General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV), and urged Member States "to increase moral and material assistance to the people of Southern Rhodesia in their . . . struggle to achieve freedom and independence".

80. All Security Council resolutions on Southern Rhodesia—from resolution 216 (1965) of 12 November 1965 right up to resolution 277 (1970) of 18 March 1970—were voluntarily and affirmatively endorsed by the British Government and, under Article 25 of the United Nations Charter, must be held to be binding on the United Kingdom. If the United Kingdom had chosen not to be bound by any of those resolutions the remedy was simple: it could have vetoed them and they would not have come down to us as Security Council resolutions.

81. I have not referred to the relevant General Assembly resolutions, which are in fact more far-reaching than the Security Council resolutions. These are also interesting and leave no doubt in anybody's mind what the world community and nations think about Southern Rhodesia. Read along with Security Council resolutions, they have consistently maintained the following principles:

(a) That Smith's régime is illegal and that Member States should not recognize it or have any dealings with it;

(b) That the people of Zimbabwe have an inalienable right to self-determination and independence, on the basis of one man, one vote, now and not in the vague, undetermined future;

(c) That the future of the people of Zimbabwe should not be discussed except with the full participation of African nationalist leaders, with any proposals thereby resulting being subject to the approval of the people, freely given;

(d) That Britain, having brought about the existing situation in Southern Rhodesia, has a duty and responsibility—in terms of Security Council resolution 217 (1965), which has never been rescinded, and all the relevant Security Council and General Assembly resolutions—to eliminate the authority of the usurpers and to take immediate measures to allow the people of Southern Rhodesia to determine their own future, in accordance with the terms of the Charter of the United Nations and General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV).

82. The secret negotiations between the emissaries of the British Government and the illegal racist minority régime in Southern Rhodesia were held in total disregard of the wishes of the United Nations as expressed long ago in General Assembly resolution 2138 (XXI) of 22 October 1966, and as recently as 22 November 1971 in resolution 2769 (XXVI). The British Government could not have been in any doubt that what its emissaries were doing was contrary to its obligation under the Charter of the United Nations.

83. The British Foreign Secretary, having decided—again, contrary to the wishes of the United Nations—to hold talks with the illegal racist minority régime at Salisbury, must be left in no doubt whatsoever that the United Nations would not recognize any settlement not based on the principle of no independence before majority African rule, or concluded otherwise than with majority African nationalist leaders.

84. On those grounds, my delegation finds the terms of the so-called negotiated settlement unacceptable. As my Minister said on 26 November 1971, the acceptance of those terms by the Foreign Secretary constitutes "capitulation to the wishes of the rebel leaders". I regard this as a privilege—if I may so call it—not accorded to any other rebel in British colonial history.

85. The objections of my Government to the proposals contained in the British White Paper—that is, Command Paper 4835—entitled "Rhodesia: Proposal for a Settlement" can be summarized as follows.

86. First, the negotiations, both secret and otherwise, between the British Government and the Southern Rhodesian rebels must be considered null and void, having been in violation of all relevant Security Council and General Assembly resolutions.

87. Second, although the British Foreign Secretary received a delegation of Africans who put their views to him at Salisbury, and although he saw Mr. Joshua Nkomo and received a smuggled document from imprisoned Reverend Sithole, it cannot be held that there was the fullest consultation between the British Foreign Secretary and all nationalist leaders within the terms of General Assembly resolution 2769 (XXVI).

88. Third, the proposals contained in the White Paper constitute a denial of the right of self-determination and independence to the people of Zimbabwe in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and all relevant Security Council and General Assembly resolutions. Those proposals do not even give the moral guarantee of African majority rule in the foreseeable future.

89. Fourth, the so-called guarantees embodied in the proposals of the White Paper are illusory and worthless for the following reasons:

(a) It is unrealistic to expect a European majority of two-thirds to be restrained from abrogating any provision of a constitution in the same manner in which unilateral independence was declared in 1965;

(b) The proposed constitution does not guarantee the abolition of racial discrimination or the repeal of existing discriminatory legislation now or in the foreseeable future;

(c) The power to detain without trial is allowed in the proposed constitution, and that makes a mockery of the right of personal liberty and means that all or any opposition members can be detained;

(d) The freedoms of assembly, association and expression are qualified by the so-called interests of defence, public safety and public order—of course, those will be determined by rebel Smith and his henchmen;

(e) Freedom from arbitrary search or entry is also qualified by the so-called interests of defence, public safety and public order; and

(f) Forced or communal labour is retained under the pretext of "normal communal or other civic obligations".

90. Since the Security Council recognizes the situation in Rhodesia as a threat to world peace and security, the British Government could easily have obtained access to Southern Rhodesia through the co-operation of Zambia and other African countries. Zambia has at all times expressed its readiness to make a base in its territory available for the use of any British forces on their way to Southern Rhodesia. The British Government, having refused to establish a physical presence in Southern Rhodesia, is not now in a position to ensure that the terms of any settlement will be implemented after sanctions have been lifted and the racist minority régime given independence.

91. Security Council resolution 217 (1965) and all relevant Security Council and General Assembly resolutions require the British Government to re-establish a physical presence in Southern Rhodesia.

92. My delegation, therefore, considers that the proposals contained in the White Paper not only violate, but have no bearing whatsoever on, Security Council and General Assembly resolutions. As far as the question of whether the proposals meet the test of the so-called five principles is concerned, the views of my Government on these are well known. And as the Security Council is aware, these so-called five principles are a unilateral creation of the British Government, having at no time been adopted either by the General Assembly or the Security Council. But even using these five principles as a test the proposals, in the view of my delegation, fail to meet the test of any of them.

93. The Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom, in the course of his speech, gave what my delegation considered an unfortunate impression, namely, that owing to changes of Government in the United Kingdom, the present British Government was not bound by the obligations freely assumed by the former Government. Is this the only basis upon which the British Government can justify going back on its international obligations? We trust that the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom does not wish to give this Council such an unfortunate impression.

94. The Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom also gave this Council the impression that, in deciding to capitulate to the traitor, Smith, the British Government was motivated by concern over the plight of the African people of Zimbabwe who, according to the British Government, do not know what is good for them. This pretended solicitude over the interests of Zimbabwe Africans by the British Government is an insult to the African people of Zimbabwe and to the intelligence of representatives in this Council. Instead of shedding crocodile tears at the prospect of Africans in Zimbabwe coming under the hated régime of *apartheid*, the British delegation should have been straightforward and admitted to the pressures of the ruling Conservative Party interest concerned with economic costs of sanctions to Britain.

95. The Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom tried to convince this Council that the terms of the Douglas-Home-Smith agreement were in conformity with the so-called five principles invented by the British. My delegation wishes to reaffirm most categorically that the Kenya Government rejects and has never accepted the five principles. In any case, my delegation maintains that the Douglas-Home proposals do not stand the test even of the five principles.

96. I shall now turn to each of the so-called principles. The first principle relates to unimpeded progress towards majority rule. The so-called principle of progress towards majority rule is not satisfied by the Douglas-Home proposals. Progress in this connexion is so intertwined with so many checks and balances as well as delaying tactics that every impediment has been placed in the way of African majority rule. The voting system has been made unnecessarily complicated to ensure that parity between Africans and white Rhodesian members of the House of the Assembly is reached only after an arduous and lengthy process. According to the London *Sunday Times* of 28 November 1971, experts estimate that assuming the agreement is implemented in good faith by Smith and his gang, it may take 64 years or more to achieve only a small African majority. Even this estimate may be upset if Smith embarks on a large scale white immigration policy. The Douglas-Home-Smith proposals, therefore, cannot be regarded in any way as guaranteeing unimpeded progress towards majority rule and, having regard to all other circumstances, cannot be regarded as just or equitable.

97. The second principle relates to the guarantee against retrogressive constitutional amendment. There is no guarantee that once Smith has obtained recognition of his régime as an independent republic he will allow himself to be obstructed by the so-called blocking mechanisms of only at most 10 elected African members in the House of Assembly of 68. As the London *Observer* commented in an editorial, there is "no straightforward way of guaranteeing any constitution against abuse once the instrument of independence has been signed unless the British army is willing and able to rule the country". In 1965 Smith already abrogated the 1961 Constitution by his unilateral declaration of independence. There is no guarantee that he will not scrap any new constitution in the future if he finds it inconvenient. In this regard, the so-called "civilized" white minority in Southern Rhodesia cannot be exempt from prevalent political or army coups after independence is granted to that colony. It may be noted that the army and security forces in Southern Rhodesia are predominantly white.

98. The third principle relates to the immediate improvement in African political status. The idea that the "settlement" provides for the immediate improvement of the African political status is an illusion. British propagandists use the so-called 1969 Constitution as a yardstick and yet the British Government got the Security Council in 1965 to declare that the world community did not recognize that illegal racist Smith régime and in 1969 the Security Council declared that it did not recognize Smith's declaration of a republic. How can an illegal act be used as a yardstick to measure anything? The fact is that there has been no change in the status of the African in Southern Rhodesia. His status still remains one of inferiority in his own country. He is still not trusted to decide as an individual what he wants or what is good for him. He is not considered civilized. The whole basis of the so-called settlement is that the African is not an equal of the European in dignity and worth and will never be in the foreseeable future. Yet the African, already unequal in political, administrative and economic terms, is expected to be nursed by his oppressor to acquire equality of status. Could anything be so remote when measured against reality?

99. I shall now take the fourth principle, progress towards ending racial discrimination. Unless possible marking time can be regarded as progress, there is nothing in the agreement which guarantees where even a start on the actual ending of discrimination will be made. In fact the Land Tenure Act, which is manifestly discriminatory, is not to be repealed forthwith but will merely be reviewed by a commission whose recommendations will not be binding. The so-called bill of rights will not affect the existing administrative or legislative measures that are racially discriminatory. In fact, the proposed new section 84 B reads as follows:

> "No court shall declare any provision of an Act enacted or statutory instrument made before the fixed date as defined in paragraph 14 of the Declaration of Rights to be *ultra vires* on the grounds that the provision is inconsistent with the provisions of the Declaration of Rights set out in Chapter VI of the Constitution of Rhodesia, 1961, or Chapter VII of the Constitution of Rhodesia, 1965, as the case may be."

100. The fifth principle is the test of acceptability. The test of acceptability "by the people of Rhodesia as a whole" is bogus and illusory. The people of Zimbabwe are not to be given any alternative to the Douglas-Home-Smith proposals. All Sir Colin Crowe had to say in the Security Council was:

> "If the evidence—which will be fully, freely and fairly collected—is to the effect that the Rhodesian people as a whole do not accept these proposals, then they will have been made in vain" *[1602nd meeting, para. 54]*.

101. The phrase "the Rhodesian people as a whole", if it is meant to be a genuine test, should have read "acceptable to the majority of the people of Southern Rhodesia" or "acceptable to the majority of all sections of the population of Southern Rhodesia"—under a referendum based on one man, one vote. The Commission which it is proposed would look into the question of acceptability is virtually given a mandate to sell the proposals to the people of Southern Rhodesia on the pretext of explaining them. This commission is in fact virtually being encouraged to ignore any views the British Government may find embarrassing. As the Nairobi newspaper *Daily Nation* stated on 27 November 1971,

> "Let the agreement be put to the people in the country with 'one man to one vote' applied. White Rhodesians and the British Government know what the outcome of this would be and what they are really telling us right now is that they dread the verdict of the majority."

My delegation therefore submits that the so-called test of acceptability is but mere window-dressing to camouflage blackmail.

102. In today's *New York Times* Smith is reported to have said in a television interview that black Africans will not be in power in Rhodesia for at least 10 years and to have added that he believes they will not be fit to be in control. That was Smith's attitude yesterday, and we have no reason to believe it has changed. As long as Smith holds power in Rhodesia the Africans do not stand a chance of ensuring their rights to govern the country.

103. I am sure the British Government is aware of this. In view of this, my delegation cannot avoid drawing the conclusion that the so-called settlement is nothing but a sell-out.

104. At the commencement of the debate my colleague Ambassador Malik of the USSR put forward the suggestion that the detained national leaders Mr. Nkomo and Mr. Sithole be invited to appear before this Council to give evidence. I am happy to note that that suggestion has been accepted by the British delegation. My delegation hopes that the arrival of these two nationalists will now be speeded up so that within the next week or so we can sit here and listen to them.

105. It is impossible for us to take comfort in the British White Paper and the arrangements the British have worked out with the rebel Smith. There is enough evidence to indicate that the so-called arrangements are merely a series

convenient steps the British have resorted to in order to ray the people of Zimbabwe in the same manner they rayed Africans in South Africa in 1910. That being the e, my delegation is of the opinion that this Council must seized of this matter and that the international commu- y must bring pressure to bear on the United Kingdom to ure that justice is done. The yardstick for that justice as has been reiterated repeatedly in this Council and in neral Assembly resolutions, and as it must be—no lependence before majority African rule in Zimbabwe.

5. That is what my delegation stands for and those are views of my country.

7. The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of nya for the kind remarks he addressed to me.

3. Sir Colin CROWE (United Kingdom): As I men- ned this morning, I do not want to interrupt the broad ep of this debate, still less to interrupt the expression of ws by other delegations on the agreed proposals and the newhat lengthy exposition I gave of them in the Council week. I shall not at this stage, therefore, attempt to wer each and every point that has been raised so —even though some of them represent misunderstandings ich have been given currency but which have been rected elsewhere. The answers to some of them can in t already be found in the text of the proposals, and some ers are unanswerable—for example, because they con- n the very nature of the responsibilities which everyone ees are primarily a matter for the British Government. some points I still await information from my Govern- nt. But there are some questions I can answer now, and as the representative of Somalia suggested at the uncil's meeting on 30 November *[1603rd meeting]*, it uld help the debate to proceed, I can give one or two rifications, particularly about the test of acceptability.

). On the test of acceptability, the specific point raised Ambassador Farah in this connexion was whether it was firm intention of the United Kingdom Government to ahead with the test of acceptability. I confirm that this o.

). Then we were asked, "What if the answer to the test acceptability is 'no'? " What would we do if the test of eptability demonstrated that the people of Rhodesia ected the settlement? That, I am afraid, is a good mple of an unanswerable question, because we cannot ke commitments about hypothetical situations.

1. We have also been asked about the timing of the test acceptability. On that I can say that the Commission has en appointed and has already started organizing itself h a view to starting work in Rhodesia as soon as ssible. The chairman, as I informed the Council last ek, is Lord Pearce. In answer to the representative of ana I can add that the two additional commissioners so named are Lord Harlech, who was known to many here ne years ago as Mr. Ormsby-Gore when he was Minister State in the Foreign Office, and Sir Maurice Dorman, a mer Governor-General of your own country, Mr. Presi- nt. The commissioners will take whatever period of time y need to do the job to their satisfaction. Their first task will be to ensure that the proposals are as fully understood throughout Rhodesia as possible. They will ensure that any written explanations of the proposals, including those in the vernacular, are clear and unbiased.

112. Another set of questions concerns the consultations with African political leaders and parties during the Secretary of State's visit to Salisbury. I have sought the necessary information and the following is a list of the groups of Rhodesians whose views the Secretary of State sought in Salisbury on the dates indicated. There were in all 97 such persons involved.

113. On Tuesday, 16 November, he saw 10 members of African businessmen's associations; 3 members of African teachers' association; 5 African journalists; 7 from the Rhodesian Asian Association; 8 indirectly elected Members of Parliament—that is all of them; 6 from the National Association of Coloured Peoples; 4 from the medical profession; 2 from the National Peoples' Union; 2 from the Christian Council of Rhodesia; 6 from the Centre Party; that is a total of 53 for Tuesday, the 16th.

114. On Wednesday, the 17th, he saw 2 from sport organizations; 2 from the University of Rhodesia; 4 ex-detainees—Mr. Edison Sithole, Josiah Chinamo, Cephas Msipa, and Michael Maweme; 1 trade union representative; 3 from the African Student Board; 10 Senators; and 3 wives of detainees—Mrs. Stella Madzimbamute, Mrs. Nyandoro and Mrs. Mutasa, a total of 36 for that day.

115. On Friday, 19 November, he saw 7 citizens of Salisbury, including the President of the YWCA, the Chairman of the Harare—which is a township—Advisory Board, a hostel director and business men. And on Saturday the 20th, he saw Mr. Joshua Nkomo for an hour and a half. That is a grand total of 97.

116. A further question was whether it was our intention to make available the written and other communications received during these contacts? The answer to that is no. These discussions were confidential and they did not constitute the test of acceptability. The range of opinions expressed in them was a wide one. It included at one extreme the view that Britain ought to have used force and that force was still the only answer. At the other extreme it included the views of some Europeans who said they wished to retain the right to use additional discrimination and to perpetuate minority rule. As the proposals show, Sir Alec Douglas-Home rejected each of these extreme views. But these opinions were submitted to Her Majesty's Government and we could not make them individually available without the agreement of those who submitted them. The fact that some of the information found its way into the press obviously does not alter this, in the interests of the people concerned.

117. Then the Ambassador of Burundi asked the question, which was subsequently repeated by others, whether there were any guarantees that the development funds to be provided by the British Government would in fact be used in accordance with the decisions contained in the agreement? The answer is that there will be comprehensive discussions with the Rhodesians about the development

programme before any projects are selected or money disbursed. The British Government will therefore be in a position to ensure that the funds are in fact used for the purposes described in the proposals.

118. Before I close if I may now turn to comment on another aspect. A proposal was made this morning—or two days ago in the first place—that the Secretariat legal experts should undertake a comparison of the proposed new Rhodesian Declaration of Rights with the texts of relevant United Nations instruments. No doubt consultations will take place in the usual manner about this proposal and about the exact terms in which any requests to the Secretariat might be formulated. Of course, we shall all need to seek instructions from our Governments. Meanwhile I have no wish to suggest any unnecessary addition to, or complication of, what would in any event be a formidable task for the Secretariat. Indeed, I am inclined to feel that if the Security Council were to decide to pursue the proposal at all it would be putting a disproportionate burden on the shoulders of the legal experts—disproportionate to the value we could extract from the resultant study, thorough and painstaking though we know it would be. But should a study be requested I must say now, as a preliminary and personal view, that if it is to be really meaningful it will have to include a comparison with the provisions for the protection of human rights which are embodied in the legal systems of Member States. Surely we would need a comparison with what actually exists elsewhere—not just with an ideal situation? Only in this way would the study help us to make an assessment of the way in which the protection of their rights to be enjoyed by the people of Rhodesia would compare with that available elsewhere, in law and in practice, among the membership of the United Nations.

119. The PRESIDENT: In accordance with usual practice, may I be permitted to read a short statement? Although comment has already been made on it by the representative of the United Kingdom, perhaps other representatives may wish to say something now—or perhaps wait until after consultation. But may I crave the Council's indulgence to read this statement:

> "Members of the Council will recall that in the course of his statement made earlier this morning the representative of Somalia proposed that the Declaration of Rights contained in the United Kingdom White Paper on Rhodesia be referred to the Legal Counsel of the United Nations for examination and evaluation as to whether the provisions of the Declaration of Rights are fair and equitable and provide those safeguards necessary for preserving human rights and fundamental freedoms on an equal basis for all the inhabitants of the Territory, regardless of race and colour, and whether those provisions compare favourably with the standards set in this field by the United Nations. The representative of the Syrian Arab Republic supported this application."

Unless representatives wish to speak further on this statement, may I suggest that an adjournment be taken to allow for further consultation before another meeting some time next week?

120. Mr. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) *(translated from Russian):* I had in mind not that question but the question which I raised during my first statement on the first day of the consideration of the question of Rhodesia. I refer to the memoranda which according to information which has appeared in the press, the Foreign Secretary of the United Kingdom received from two leaders of political parties in Southern Rhodesia. At that time I expressed the wish, and introduced a proposal to that effect, that the Security Council should be informed of the contents of those memoranda.

121. I have still not received a reply. I should like to reiterate that proposal and return once again to the question: it would be very important to the Security Council to be aware of the contents of those memoranda in order that it should have an idea of the opinion which the representatives of two Southern Rhodesian political parties which are well known throughout the world have of the Smith-Home agreement.

122. The reference to the fact that the British side is unable to do this does not convince the Security Council. If such documents exist, why does the British side consider it possible to present to the Security Council, in both spoken and written form, documents signed by Home and Smith, and why should the memoranda presented to Home by the representatives of Southern Rhodesian parties be concealed from the Security Council and remain secret? Such an approach to the consideration of such an important problem in the Security Council cannot be regarded as normal. For that reason, I, for my part, insist that the British side should reflect once again on this problem and not leave the Security Council in ignorance.

123. Sir Colin CROWE (United Kingdom): If the representative of the Soviet Union had listened to what I had to say, I did in fact answer the question and gave the reasons why these memoranda cannot be made available. But I shall not weary the Council by repeating what I said.

124. Mr. FARAH (Somalia): I should like to thank the representative of the United Kingdom for the information which he has imparted to the Council. I must confess that I am not happy with the information which he has given us. I would have felt that in an exercise of this dimension the very least that the British Government could do would be to let the people of Southern Rhodesia know the alternatives, so that they would know what to do. If they say "yes", the White Paper clearly sets out the course they will travel. But if they say "no", then naturally the United Kingdom should be in a position to let them know what the Government would decide to do then.

125. I trust that the United Kingdom Government will, in due course perhaps, ponder a little further on this point and not proceed with what appears to my delegation to be indecent haste, in trying to get this test of acceptability launched without effecting and implementing the necessary preparations for such an important exercise. One would have thought that if a Government had decided to send a commission of this importance to a Territory with such crucial and delicate problems, it would have set a time-table for its work.

126. We are told that the commission will leave shortly. We are not told how long the preparations will take, how long the actual exercise will take. Now, around this table there are several delegations that represent countries which have had experience of African affairs. We have France, we have Italy, we have Belgium, we have the United Kingdom. We know that in their relations with African Territories they have found it necessary, whenever embarking upon an exercise involving constitutional progress, to proceed not with indecent speed but with care and with deliberation, so that the people of the Territories know exactly what is at stake.

127. As I pointed out this morning, it would be wrong to think that a commission composed entirely of expatriates, without a knowledge of the language of the people of the Territory, could be expected to perform, in a matter of weeks, or maybe two months or three months at the most, the task of trying to explain a paper to an illiterate population of 5 million persons scattered over a large area, predominantly rural, or to think that it would be able to acquit its task properly without the aid of the recognized political leaders of the Territory.

128. I would have thought that it would be possible for the representative of the United Kingdom to let us know exactly what part will be played by the African political leaders of Southern Rhodesia, those who are currently interned or prevented by law from contacting their own people.

129. The representative of the United Kingdom spoke about my proposal of an examination of the declaration of rights or bill of rights, whatever one calls it. Rather than have 15 different assessments of the paper, I suggest that the legal experts of the United Nations—in whom all of us have the greatest confidence—should be asked to perform this task on our behalf, so at least we will have an idea as to how badly or how well the provisions of the bill of rights compare to the standards which the United Kingdom has been trying to enunciate and which, indeed, have found expression in the Constitutions of many countries since the acceptance of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

130. But in this case, the position is unique, because we are dealing now with a problem placed within a framework of racism. It is within this context that my delegation hopes that it will be possible for the Council formally to endorse my request that the Office of Legal Affairs assess and evaluate this bill so that we may know exactly the pitfalls in it.

131. The PRESIDENT: There are no more names on the list of speakers. Unless some other representative wishes to speak at this stage, I propose to adjourn the meeting.

132. Mr. FARAH (Somalia): Mr. President, you did refer to my proposal and you mentioned that the representative of Syria had supported it. I am wondering whether, if there is no serious objection to it, we could consider it acceptable.

133. The PRESIDENT: Does any other member of the Council wish to comment on that question at this stage?

134. Sir Colin CROWE (United Kingdom): Mr. President, I thought you had suggested that there was going to be an adjournment, that we were going to consult about this. I shall have to get instructions from my Government on this matter.

135. Mr. FARAH (Somalia): Naturally, we proceed by consultations, and my delegation would have no objection to that course of action on this particular proposal. However, in view of the haste with which the United Kingdom Government intends to dispatch this commission to Rhodesia, I hope that the consultations will not be unduly prolonged, nor that the Office of Legal Affairs of the United Nations will find itself unable to conduct such an assessment before the test of acceptability is actually under way.

136. The PRESIDENT: In the circumstances, I would propose to hold the usual consultations with representatives without delay in order to ascertain their view. After the usual consultations, it appears that there is no objection to our holding the next meeting on Monday next, 6 December, at 3.30 p.m.

The meeting rose at 6.20 p.m.

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