

UNITED NATIONS




# SECURITY COUNCIL OFFICIAL RECORDS

TWENTY-SIXTH YEAR

# 1604<sup>th</sup>

MEETING: 2 DECEMBER 1971

NEW YORK



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#### NOTE

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Documents of the Security Council (symbol S/. . .) are normally published in quarterly *Supplements* of the *Official Records of the Security Council*. The date of the document indicates the supplement in which it appears or in which information about it is given.

The resolutions of the Security Council, numbered in accordance with a system adopted in 1964, are published in yearly volumes of *Resolutions and Decisions of the Security Council*. The new system, which has been applied retroactively to resolutions adopted before 1 January 1965, became fully operative on that date.

## SIXTEEN HUNDRED AND FOURTH MEETING

Held in New York on Thursday, 2 December 1971, at 10.30 a.m.

*President:* Mr. I. TAYLOR-KAMARA (Sierra Leone).

*Present:* The representatives of the following States: Argentina, Belgium, Burundi, China, France, Italy, Japan, Nicaragua, Poland, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Syrian Arab Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and United States of America.

### Provisional agenda (S/Agenda/1604)

1. Adoption of the agenda.
2. Question concerning the situation in Southern Rhodesia:
  - (a) Letter dated 24 November 1971 from the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/10396);
  - (b) Fourth report of the Committee established in pursuance of Security Council resolution 253 (1968) (S/10229 and Add.1 and 2).

### *Expression of thanks to the retiring President and statement by the President*

1. The PRESIDENT: In accordance with the usual practice of the Council I, as President, would wish on behalf of the Council to pay a tribute to Ambassador Kułaga of Poland, President of the Council for the month of November.
2. It is with the greatest delight that I assume the very high office of President of the Security Council for the month of December 1971. This is indeed a most memorable occasion for my delegation and my Government. It is probably also a most memorable occasion for representatives here because on or about the 31st day of December 1971 I am expected not only to relinquish this high office of President of the Security Council but also to retire for a time from this august body in which my country has had the honour of being represented for practically two years, since January 1970.
3. It is on the last day of this last month of the current year also that a man with an able and most distinguished international career is expected to retire after ten years of excellent service with the United Nations. I refer to no other than our revered Secretary-General, U Thant. We note

with relief that he has now been discharged from hospital and we all wish him further improvement in his health. I shall crave members' indulgence to defer to a more appropriate occasion further comments about this international peace-making and peace-keeping officer and to pay a tribute to him.

4. In the circumstances I would request that members give to me the usual co-operation and support which they so kindly and so willingly gave to my predecessor, Ambassador Kułaga of Poland. In this connexion may I venture to pay a deserving tribute to this out-going President for the most able, tactful and experienced manner in which he chaired the Council for the month of November? The very good pace set by Ambassador Kułaga, especially in holding consultations of considerable length, will, if followed or emulated, make possible the achievement of considerable success during my tenure of office. This wise step of his has made me realize that it is not holding very many meetings of the Security Council that matters. What matters most is the considerable consultations with colleagues and all those interested on certain issues which are to be debated. On behalf of my delegation and my country I extend sincere and happy greetings to all distinguished colleagues in this Council. Perhaps my distinguished colleague on my right, Ambassador Kułaga, may wish to say a few words in reply.

5. Mr. KULAGA (Poland) (*interpretation from French*): Mr. President, very briefly but also most cordially I wish to thank you for the very generous words—indeed too generous I would say—which you have been so good as to address to me in your statement. I should also like to extend to you my most cordial congratulations and good wishes on your accession to the presidency for the month of December.

6. The relations which I have had the honour and pleasure to maintain and strengthen with you, your qualities and the experience you have already demonstrated during your participation in the work of the Council make us certain that you will fulfil honourably the very difficult tasks which await you this month. I wish to assure you of the complete co-operation of my delegation and mine in particular.

7. The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Poland, Ambassador Kułaga, for all he said.

### Adoption of the agenda

*The agenda was adopted.*

Question concerning the situation in Southern Rhodesia:

- (a) Letter dated 24 November 1971 from the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/10396);
- (b) Fourth report of the Committee established in pursuance of Security Council resolution 253 (1968) (S/10229 and Add.1 and 2)\*

8. The PRESIDENT: At the 1602nd and 1603rd meetings of the Council the representatives of Saudi Arabia, the United Republic of Tanzania and Kenya were invited at their request to participate without the right to vote in the debate of the Council on this item. I wish now also to inform the Council that I have received letters from the representatives of Zambia and Ghana requesting that they be invited to participate without the right to vote in the discussion of the present item. If I hear no objection I shall invite the representatives of Zambia and Ghana to participate in the debate.

9. In view of the limited number of seats available at the Council table, I invite the representatives of Saudi Arabia, the United Republic of Tanzania, Kenya, Zambia and Ghana to take the places reserved for them at the side of the Council chamber on the understanding that they will be invited to the Council table whenever called upon to speak.

*At the invitation of the President, Mr. J. Baroody (Saudi Arabia), Mr. S. A. Salim (United Republic of Tanzania), Mr. J. Odero-Jowi (Kenya), Mr. V. Mwaanga (Zambia) and Mr. R. Akwei (Ghana) took the places reserved for them in the Council chamber.*

10. Mr. FARAH (Somalia): Before speaking on the substance of the question before this Council, I should like to associate my delegation with the well-deserved remarks which you, Mr. President, have addressed to our distinguished colleague, Mr. Kulaga of Poland, for the outstanding work which he performed during his term as President of this Council last month. To you, sir, I would say that it is a privilege to have this meeting of the Council led by an African of great standing and considerable eminence. I know that with your great qualities you will be able to steer the deliberations of the Council along a calm and constructive course.

11. My delegation has taken the floor on two occasions in the course of this debate and has directed a series of questions to the representative of the United Kingdom in the hope that it would have been possible to obtain further information on the nature and ramifications of the proposals which have been agreed upon between his Government and the Smith régime in Rhodesia.<sup>1</sup> My remarks today will be confined to a study of these proposals. But naturally, when the information I have sought is forthcoming, my delegation will reserve its right to speak again on the matter.

\* Subsequently issued as *Official Records of the Security Council, Twenty-sixth Year, Special Supplement Nos. 2 and Corrigendum and 2A.*

<sup>1</sup> See *Official Records of the Security Council, Twenty-sixth Year, Supplement for October, November and December 1971*, document S/10405.

12. My delegation made some preliminary comments on the first day of the debate on the proposal for a settlement of the Rhodesian problem. Those comments and the comments which were made at the subsequent meeting were an immediate reaction to some of the details of the proposal, and our intention was to obtain clarification of the implications of some of its terms. A careful study of the proposal has strengthened our original impression that its provisions are not in accordance with stated United Nations goals with regard to Southern Rhodesia, goals which are based on a regard for the imprescriptible rights of all the people of that Territory. For example, the General Assembly, by its resolution 2022 (XX), warned the administering Power that it would oppose any declaration of independence not based on universal adult suffrage without distinction as to race or colour. The Security Council in its resolution 217 (1965) of November 1965 called upon the Government of the United Kingdom to take immediate measures in order to allow the people of Southern Rhodesia to determine their own future consistent with the objectives of resolution 1514 (XV). I am sure that no one would question the fact that the Security Council envisaged all the people of Southern Rhodesia determining the future of the country and not a situation where the minority continued to prescribe the future for the majority. In these resolutions, which have been subsequently reaffirmed and strengthened, it is clear that the United Nations main concern was that independence for Southern Rhodesia be equated with equal rights for all its people. The Organization of African Unity gave this same concern practical expression with its support for the slogan: no independence without majority rule.

13. The United Nations has sought all along to make the principles of the Charter, of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and of the Declaration on independence for colonial peoples relevant to the Rhodesian question. It did so not only because the political and human rights established in these declarations exist, but also because the political leaders of the African majority have claimed these rights on behalf of their people. The United Nations has a special responsibility for the protection of the rights of the people of Southern Rhodesia, both in so far as it concerns itself with the rights of peoples in accordance with General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) and because of the fact that the United Kingdom requested the Security Council—and indeed the whole international community—to associate itself with measures aimed at bringing about a just and equitable solution to the problems of that Territory.

14. My point in emphasizing United Nations goals and United Nations involvement in the question of Southern Rhodesia is that neither the goals nor the special role of the Organization with regard to Southern Rhodesia have been taken into account in the negotiations that preceded the proposals and in the proposals themselves. The United Nations should be closely associated with any initiative aimed at a settlement of the Southern Rhodesian problem and it should be involved not after but before the fact. Instead, it is being asked to accept a bilateral proposal that has been worked out not with all the people of Rhodesia, but with the rebel régime. Furthermore, it is a proposal drawn up within the existing framework of minority privilege and racial discrimination against the African

population—a framework long ago rejected by the United Nations.

15. It has been pointed out by the United Kingdom representative that the terms of the agreement have been presented as proposals and that the British Government intends to ascertain whether these are acceptable to the people of Rhodesia as a whole. But my delegation finds it hard to understand how any British Government could be prepared to offer these terms in the first place. They are much more retrograde than those of the 1961 Constitution which was rejected by Conservative and Labour Governments alike on the grounds that it did not go far enough in according and guaranteeing the rights of the African majority; and they do not even conform with the five points of principle that the British Government has always maintained it would use as the minimum basis for a settlement. In the proposals, progress towards majority rule is impeded at every stage; the guarantees against retrogressive amendment of the Constitution are inadequate, completely unsatisfactory; improvement in the political status of the African population, far from being immediate, depends on an incalculable factor—the economic progress of Rhodesia's African majority; there are no firm guarantees of progress towards the ending of racial discrimination, and the modalities for determining the acceptability of the proposals by the people of Rhodesia as a whole leave much to be desired.

16. The proposals we are asked to approve are based on the premise that it is for the white minority to hold back or to accord, in any manner or at whatever speed it chooses, the political and social rights of the black majority. The black people are not going to be asked "What do you want?", they are going to be told "This is what you may get if you are good and do as you are told".

17. What is it that the African majority may get? Let us examine what it is they are being offered under the various headings. Under the heading "the test of acceptability" we are told that the British Government will appoint a commission to ascertain directly from all sections of the population whether or not the proposals are acceptable. I have already pointed out that any determination of the wishes of the people of Southern Rhodesia should be held not only in co-operation with the United Nations but also on the basis of United Nations objectives for Southern Rhodesia.

18. We are also told under this heading that radio and television time will be made available to political parties represented in the House of Assembly. I asked the question on the opening day of the debate—and I repeat it now—would the two main African political parties, now proscribed because they had the temerity to ask for equal rights for black and white people in Southern Rhodesia, be given the opportunity to take part in normal political activities? Without their participation the test of acceptability will hardly be a valid one.

19. Under the heading "the Constitution" one is immediately struck by the fact that the new proposals are to be set up within the framework of the blatantly racist Constitution of 1969, which not only the United Nations but also

the administering Power, the United Kingdom, refused to accord any legal recognition. A sincere approach to the search for justice in Southern Rhodesia demands that that constitution be disregarded, as it has in the past by the international community and by the United Kingdom Government, and a completely new one promulgated for the Territory on the basis of equality. It will not do to offer a glossed over version of a constitution whose expressed purpose was to remove the possibility of majority rule and which is phrased in terms, and construed in a spirit, that attack the dignity and humanity of the African people of Rhodesia.

20. The continuation of the racist assumptions of the 1969 constitution is evident in the fact that in the proposal the voter rolls are to remain segregated. There is to be an African higher roll and a European roll, even though the qualifications of voters on both rolls will be the same. In other words, the arrangement entrenches the separation and segregation of the races and, by preventing cross-voting, denies the intrinsic value of a man regardless of his race or colour.

21. It must be noted too that many objectionable provisions of the constitution have not been modified. For example, while the proposal goes into great detail about the provisions for voters, it does not mention the candidates, whose qualifications have not been changed. As the constitution stands, anyone who has been detained or restricted for six months cannot be a candidate for five years after his restriction or detention. The proposal published by the United Kingdom Government makes no mention of that very important aspect. What are its implications? It means that the majority of the African leaders who have worked for justice for the African people would be eliminated from political life at a time when their experience and dedication are most needed.

22. The steps by which majority rule can be implemented must lie at the heart of any attempt at a settlement of the Rhodesian question. However, when one considers the length and the difficulties of the obstacle course that the black majority must run before it can even hope to gain political parity with the white minority, and the additional difficulties that could postpone majority rule indefinitely, one must indeed question the sincerity of those who framed or approved the proposal. In the context of the white minority's clearly stated prejudices and its open determination to retain its privileged status, it is easy to see why Ian Smith was able to say, with regard to the proposal, that no European need harbour any anxiety about the security of his future in Rhodesia.

23. These proposals have generated considerable debate among responsible sections of the British public and also in the British Parliament. On this particular matter of parity, I should like to read a most pertinent letter which appeared in *The Times* of London of 29 November 1971, written by Professor Roland Oliver. He says:

"In order to achieve parity of representation, the African community has to find roughly the same number of qualified electors as the European community, and essentially the test is to be four years of secondary

education. But whereas four years of secondary education is provided compulsorily for every white child in Rhodesia, it is provided for perhaps 2 per cent of black children, and the number of black children reaching this level in the future remains squarely in the control of the Rhodesian Government with its overwhelming majority of white electors, who will not be inclined to hurry things along towards their own political extinction.

“Furthermore it is to be noted that the stages in the increase of African representation are to take place, not when the African community succeeds in producing certain absolute numbers of qualified electors, but when it achieves certain percentages of the number of European electors. This means that every additional European immigrant attracted to Rhodesia will raise the number of qualified Africans necessary to secure an increase in African representation. When one recalls how far the policies of past Rhodesian governments have been designed to promote white immigration, this must be a cause for great concern.”

That is the text of a letter written by Professor Roland Oliver, pinpointing some of the problems and some of the obstacles which are involved in the so-called concept of parity rule.

24. Another unacceptable premise of the 1969 Constitution that has not been changed is the premise that Africans can achieve political rights only to the extent that they are able to improve their economic status. The principle on which this arrangement is based was rejected by the British people for themselves as far back as 1867. Why should the United Kingdom Government consider it suitable for Africans in 1971? Furthermore, the economic standard already achieved by the Europeans is used as the yardstick for African achievement. In view of the history of exploitation of black people by Europeans in Rhodesia and in view of the written and unwritten laws that have restricted the African in any attempt to better himself, it must be concluded that, even with the help of the projected development programmes to increase the job and educational opportunities for Africans, hope for the kind of economic parity on which political parity must be based lies in the very far distant future.

25. If the proposal falls far short of what is just politically, it is completely lacking in provisions to ensure social justice. The independent commission that would examine the question of racial discrimination can only make recommendations with the vague goal of making progress towards ending racial discrimination. The infamous Land Tenure Act remains as a giant step towards the South African model of *apartheid*, and we are apparently expected to consider that acceptable progress has been made because the racist régime has given verbal assurances that the land division will not become more inequitable than it is at present.

26. At the last meeting of this Council my delegation suggested, and now it wishes to make a formal proposal, that the bill of rights that has been drawn up by the British Foreign Secretary and the Smith régime be examined carefully, assessed and evaluated by the legal experts of the

United Nations to see how well it compares with the standards the United Nations has established for itself over the past twenty-five years.

27. In this connexion it is pertinent for my delegation to draw the Council's attention to another interesting letter which appeared in *The Times* of London of 29 November, this time from Mr. Anthony Lester. He concentrates entirely on the bill of rights. The letter states:

“The proposed ‘Declaration of Rights’ defines the fundamental rights and freedoms which the citizens of Rhodesia will enjoy during the next 50 or 60 years of white minority rule. In the absence of normal democratic safeguards, such a Declaration will be the only guarantee protecting the individual against tyrannical government. Unfortunately, careful scrutiny of its fine print reveals the document as a grotesque parody of a Bill of Rights, which will actually reinforce and legitimize racial discrimination and arbitrary action by the State.

“The Declaration will not affect any existing law—except for the benefits of earlier constitutional guarantees. It enables the Government to make exceptions to the rights and freedoms guaranteed, on a racially discriminatory basis; to prohibit racially mixed marriages; or indeed to impose any racial disability which is ‘reasonably justifiable . . . in order to secure the protection in an equitable manner as between the various descriptions of persons affected of their respective interests’.

“It allows a minister to authorize preventive detention for up to six weeks without judicial review. It permits police searches, seizures, and arrests without a warrant. It exempts inhuman or degrading punishment or treatment if it is authorized by an existing law. It fails to provide for legal aid for persons accused of serious crimes punishable by death or long imprisonment. In the guise of ‘protection’, it contemplates sweeping encroachments on freedom of expression, conscience, assembly and association (including participation in trade unions).

“The British Government apparently regards it as an important safeguard that the Declaration will be enforceable in the Rhodesian High Court. But not even the United States Supreme Court could breathe life and meaning into this shabby, shoddy, document, and, in one sense worst of all, for the first time in our history, a British Government has expressly approved a constitutional framework for a racist police State.”

28. I trust that in due course the Council will formally take up my proposal that this draft bill of rights be examined carefully by our legal experts.

29. I think I have said enough to indicate that both in its basic assumptions and in its details, the Lord Home-Smith proposals are irrelevant to the aspirations of the African majority of Southern Rhodesia. But even if one were to accept its provisions as providing a valid improvement of the situation in Southern Rhodesia, the nagging question still remains—the question I asked on the opening day of this debate—who is to guarantee the guarantees which the British Government claims are built into the proposed

constitution? What if an even more racist and reactionary Government than the Smith régime came into power after Britain had granted Rhodesia what it might term legal independence and relieved itself of all responsibility for the affairs of the Territory? What redress would the African people then have if it were to be subjected once more to a full-fledged system of white political and social privilege?

30. A similar question was raised in the British Parliament by a representative of the opposition Party. He said there was no safeguard against legislation to annul the agreement outside the Rhodesian Parliament itself; the agreement imposed no obligation from any external authority, British Commonwealth or international, on the Rhodesian Government to carry out whatever promises it made.

31. My delegation has considered very carefully the proposition set forth by the representative of the United Kingdom that, although these proposals are limited in scope and in guarantees of good faith, it represents a foothold from which progress can be made and that it is an acceptable alternative to the steadily deteriorating situation in Southern Rhodesia. We believe it is more practical to view the agreement as an opportunity for the white minority to shake off the last vestige of Britain's control and to develop Southern Rhodesia on the South African model.

32. We feel strongly that the present proposal does not represent sufficient grounds for Britain to claim that it has done all that it is possible for it to do in the fulfilment of its responsibilities towards the people of Southern Rhodesia. Simply put, to grant independence to Southern Rhodesia while a white racist minority régime still holds all the reins of power is to betray the African majority. Far from preventing a downward slide into a South-African-type society, such action by Britain could finally give the powerful and obviously determined minority the opportunity to entrench its power, its privileges and its prejudices.

33. It is legitimate to ask what is the alternative to the course of action we have been asked to approve. My delegation would propose to the United Kingdom that it continue to act in concert with the world community and on the basis of the objectives set and established by this Organization; that it continue to apply the force of moral, political and economic pressure which, as has been admitted, has had a considerable effect on the rebel régime. The economic sanctions imposed by the United Nations must not only be continued but intensified. The fact that the sanctions have not been as effective as they should have been and that they are presently threatened further by a course of action proposed by a Member State of this Organization is another question to which we must give our most determined and sincere effort. But the central fact that must determine United Nations actions and, I would hope, Britain's actions towards Rhodesia is this: that the only sure guarantee of justice for the African majority of Southern Rhodesia lies in their being able to control their destiny through the full exercise of all their political and human rights.

34. Because the stake involved is the future of 5 million people threatened by the cancer of an *apartheid*-type

society, my delegation has been frank in its criticism of the agreement reached between the British Government and the Smith régime. We have placed on record our view of the nature and implications of the agreement and we believe that it is a view which accords with the facts. But because of our deep concern for the preservation of the civil liberties and fundamental rights of our brother Africans in Southern Rhodesia, and because of our desire to be as constructive as possible in the pursuit of justice for the people of that Territory, we should like to add what might be described as a second line of approach. Since this agreement has already been signed and since the United Kingdom, by the vote in the British Parliament last night, has accepted it and intends at all costs to set in motion the machinery for a test of acceptability, my delegation would like to make some concrete proposals which, if accepted, would at least ensure that the consultation with all the people of Rhodesia is a valid one, that the black majority of Rhodesia would have a fair opportunity of understanding the issues involved in this set of proposals, their ramifications and the alternatives open to them.

35. My country at one stage in its history—in fact, not more than 15 years ago—underwent a process of trying to inform a largely illiterate population of the ramifications involved in constitutional proposals affecting it. We were also involved in an exercise of trying to explain to a largely illiterate people the intricate system of electoral laws. It was our experience—as it has been the experience of every African State represented in this Organization—that unless you allow an adequate period of education on this fundamental aspect of political life the results may be disastrous.

36. My delegation proposes:

(a) That the period during which the test of acceptability is carried out should be of sufficient length so that the African population of Southern Rhodesia, which is largely illiterate and which is to be found largely in the rural areas, can have the benefit of a thorough educational campaign on the crucial issues involved in the set of proposals;

(b) That during this critical period the apparatus of the police State—which everyone knows exists in Southern Rhodesia—should be removed, that responsibility for the maintenance of public order should be taken over by the United Kingdom Government, and that there should be normal political activity, including political activity by the African political parties which are currently proscribed. It is not sufficient to send a team of expatriates to try to explain an intricate constitution—a constitution that is much more complicated than any kind of constitution which an African country has had to contend with—believing that by such a process the team will be able to enlighten the black majority on many of the complex issues involved. The people have to be approached through their political leaders;

(c) That for this purpose it is necessary for the United Kingdom to arrange for the release of all political prisoners, detainees and restrictees in Southern Rhodesia, so that they can take part in this important exercise;

(d) That the initial contribution of the United Kingdom Government to African education, which it has announced, should be applied immediately and specifically to adult education on the political issues involved in the agreement, and that it be augmented by international contributions and by the co-operation of African States, Recognized African political leaders should also be allowed to make full use of the mass communications media and the audio-visual aids. Such facilities are essential in any programme of adult education in a largely illiterate population, particularly on a matter as crucial as this one where the political destiny of a people is at stake.

(e) That the United Kingdom Government should arrange for a team of observers from the United Nations to observe preparations for the conduct of the test of acceptability and also to observe its actual exercise.

37. These are some of the basic conditions for allowing a fair expression of public opinion on the proposals in Southern Rhodesia. Anything short of those conditions would be regarded by my delegation as being contrary to all the goals that the United Nations has established for itself and would certainly be contrary to the interests of the African people.

38. This Council should therefore approach this matter in two ways: it must first express itself on the proposals and see whether they fall short of or conform to the expectations which we have set ourselves. We should decide firmly and speedily so that our position can be conveyed to the people of Southern Rhodesia. They must be informed where the United Nations stands on this matter. Secondly, it is the hope of my delegation that countries neighbouring Southern Rhodesia will allow their radio facilities to be used so that programmes of public enlightenment on the issues involved in the set of proposals are adequately carried to the Southern Rhodesian people.

39. The PRESIDENT: I should like to thank the representative of Somalia for the kind words he said about me.

40. I call on the representative of the Syrian Arab Republic on a point of order.

41. Mr. TOMEH (Syrian Arab Republic): During the very brilliant statement we have just heard from the Ambassador of Somalia, to the best of my understanding he made a formal proposal to the effect that the draft bill of rights concluded between the United Kingdom and the Government of the minority régime of Southern Rhodesia be examined by the Legal Department of the United Nations in the light of the resolutions adopted both by the General Assembly and the Security Council in order to ascertain whether there is any conformity between this draft bill of rights and the relevant United Nations resolutions.

42. If I am correct in understanding that that is a formal proposal, my delegation would like to support it.

43. The PRESIDENT: In accordance with the usual practice of the Council, may I, as President, intervene at this stage and make the following short statement?

44. In the course of the Security Council meeting on Thursday, 25 November 1971 [1602nd meeting], Ambassador Malik of the Soviet Union made a proposal, which was supported by Ambassador Farah of Somalia, that the leaders of the two main political parties in Southern Rhodesia, Mr. Joshua Nkomo, who I think is now under detention, and Mr. Sithole, who I think is now serving a sentence of imprisonment, be invited to appear before the Council to state their views on the proposals on Southern Rhodesia.

45. The President then promised to hold consultations with his colleagues. These consultations have continued; they have almost reached a conclusion. Up to this date I have heard no objection to the proposal. If, as I have stated, there is no objection to this suggestion to invite Mr. Joshua Nkomo and Mr. Sithole, as indicated, the suggestion may be regarded as adopted.

46. Mr. DE LA GORCE (France) (*interpretation from French*): Mr. President, I should just like to point out that my delegation was not consulted.

47. Mr. CARSALES (Argentina) (*interpretation from Spanish*): Mr. President, my delegation, too, wishes to point out that it was not consulted on this subject.

48. The PRESIDENT: There appears to be some misunderstanding on whether consultations were held with the two delegations whose representatives have just spoken. Before assuming the presidency I had the impression that those two delegations had been consulted. I do not know whether it would be out of place for them to state here in a few words whether they have any objection to this suggestion. I apologize for the misunderstanding, but I had the impression that they had been consulted. Unless they have any objection, the suggestion will be adopted.

*It was so decided.*

49. The representative of Somalia, Ambassador Farah, rightly posed some questions on Southern Rhodesia, which the representative of the United Kingdom said were pertinent and very useful. I think that one of those questions related to the bill of rights. Is the representative of the United Kingdom now in a position to answer the questions?

50. Sir Colin CROWE (United Kingdom): I am in a position to answer a certain number of the questions; some of them, of course, will have been taken care of in the White Paper that has now been circulated.<sup>2</sup> I am ready to answer the ones that I can answer—perhaps at the end of this morning's meeting. I am at the disposition of the Security Council. If the Council wishes me to give the answers at the end of this morning's meeting I shall be glad to do so, or perhaps it should be left to the beginning of the next meeting as I see that there are a number of representatives who wish to speak at this meeting.

51. The PRESIDENT: If there is any time available towards the close of the meeting this morning, we may ask

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*



the representative of the United Kingdom to answer the questions. If there is no time, then we may hear him at a later date.

52. Mr. FARAH (Somalia): The Council has now formally adopted a request that an invitation be extended to the two leaders of ZANU and ZAPU respectively. I was wondering whether that request should be communicated to the administering Power.

53. The PRESIDENT: That will be done. Once decisions are taken here, I understand that action is taken on them by the Secretariat.

54. The next name on the list of speakers is that of the representative of Saudi Arabia, whom I now invite to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

55. Mr. BAROODY (Saudi Arabia): It augurs well that the second part of my intervention on the question of Southern Rhodesia is being made when such an illustrious son of Africa as you, Mr. President, is in the Chair. I thank you and members of the Council for graciously allowing me to address myself again to this difficult problem with which the Council has been confronted for several years.

56. In my last statement I promised that I would unfold to the Council a set of points which might constitute the basis for a not-too-distant solution to the question of Southern Rhodesia. But before doing so, I should like to recapitulate what I already made clear at the last meeting of the Council.

57. First, I established the fact that the whites in Southern Rhodesia are obsessed by a genuine fear that if they pursue a liberal policy in so far as the indigenous people of that country are concerned, the whites will lose their identity by being submerged in the ocean of a black majority. That there is such a fear is incontestable.

58. Secondly, I mentioned that it was not expected that the five major Powers, individually or collectively, would use force to overthrow the Ian Smith régime in order to establish majority rule in Southern Rhodesia; nor, as far as I can see, would any one of those major Powers want a confrontation in case there were serious difference amongst them in the Council.

59. Thirdly, I mentioned that no British Government, whether Labour or Conservative, would survive if it adopted force or stringent measures, short of war, against the Ian Smith régime for the simple reason that the people of the United Kingdom consider the whites of Southern Rhodesia to be their kith and kin.

60. Fourthly, I stated that the African States are in no position to wage war against the Ian Smith régime because Southern Rhodesia is armed to the teeth and I am afraid that they are no match for it.

61. Fifthly, I said that it was most unlikely that African States—and Asian States for that matter—would seriously boycott those Western European and other countries trading with Southern Rhodesia because the African and

Asian countries, in their state of economic development, need capital and technological know-how which the Western European and other States, regardless of their ideologies, are currently providing.

62. Sixthly, I established the fact that sanctions against Southern Rhodesia were ineffective, as had been evident in the past and also in recent times.

63. Seventhly, I mentioned that economics shape the policies of States, big and small, and for that reason it is most unlikely that the Western European and other Powers will cause their economies to suffer, even slightly, by any action against Southern Rhodesia if they have no interest in doing so.

64. Eighthly—last but not least—I brought to the attention of the Council that the Ian Smith-Douglas-Home plan, even if ratified by both parties, would be tantamount to “tea and sympathy” which would neither nourish the bodies of millions of blacks in South Africa nor nurture their socio-political aspirations.

65. Hence, unless the Security Council resorted to creative measures, it would be stymied and the result would be perhaps another resolution with no teeth in it; oratory and rhetoric interspersed with harsh terms such as “condemn” and “deplore” would wind up the item under consideration. It is like an alarm clock. Yes, it would wind up the item under consideration like an alarm clock to which a somnolent United Nations would not respond, as has happened to other difficult problems of which the Council has been seized. These are the facts. This is what would happen: another resolution with no teeth in it. Then, those who had submitted the resolution, if it was adopted by consensus or by majority, would perhaps not congratulate one another, but feel content that they had accomplished something. Ink on paper, that is what it would amount to. Can anyone challenge this statement of mine after witnessing what the Council has been doing for the last 25 years?

66. Is there any way out of such an impasse? I submit that nothing is insurmountable in inter-human relations except death. Thank God for death. Only death is insurmountable—and we should consider ourselves alive in the United Nations lest the people of the world completely lose confidence and faith in us, as they did when the League of Nations foundered in the late 30s.

67. Before I submit for the Council's consideration the set of points to which I have referred, allow me to comment on what may be considered the highlights of the statement delivered here by my illustrious friend the representative of the United Kingdom, Sir Colin Crowe. I would not wish to be in his shoes for I have known him to be an honest gentleman, like most of us, I presume, in the United Nations. Suffice it to say that a large segment of the British press considered the Ian Smith-Douglas-Home agreement a “sell-out”. This is what the headline of the *Observer* said: “A sell-out”. To put it mildly, this so-called solution reminds the Africans and Asians of an Arabic proverb. It is like trying to cure a patient's high fever with poultices of watermelon rind. In the age of antibiotics you want, by

that agreement, to treat the patient's high fever by putting on his skin a watermelon poultice.

68. The British proposals for a settlement in Rhodesia are not too dissimilar to those used by successive British Governments whenever they were faced with what they considered to be insurmountable difficulties. It is the approach of "muddling through", hoping, rightly or wrongly, that time will be on their side. I remember that in 1939 I asked a prominent English friend of mine how it was that the United Kingdom expected to win the war when Hitler's Germany was armed to the teeth and Britain was unprepared. He replied, "You know, we British will muddle through and time will always be on our side." Had it not been that Hitler got entangled with the Soviet Union and those now in the United Nations were rail-roaded into the Second World War, the policy of muddling through would never have worked out and time would not have been on the side of the United Kingdom.

69. But in spite of all that happened in the Second World War, was time really on the side of the British? I wonder. Was the United Kingdom able to preserve the British Empire? It vanished in the aftermath of the war and it crumbled, to the chagrin of such war leaders as Churchill, Duff Cooper, Anthony Eden and other colonialists. "We shall muddle through with this agreement", and Ian Smith thinks that time will be on his side. But will time be on his side and on the side of the British? That is the question.

70. I should now like to comment on the proposals for a settlement in Rhodesia as presented by our illustrious friend Sir Colin Crowe. The United Kingdom issued a very, very useful and instructive document to the press, and I have based my comments on it. It states that Southern Rhodesia is not an ordinary colonial situation. Well, of course it is now an ordinary colonial situation. Therefore, it needs extraordinary measures. Do they consider this agreement between Ian Smith and Sir Alec Douglas-Home less than ordinary or extraordinary? We shall find out. They say that force could not be used. I have said that for them and I do not need to elaborate. Violent actions are incalculable—that is true. Nobody can contest that point.

71. Then the British speak of the effect of sanctions. Sir Colin Crowe said: "I feel sure that this has played its part in making the Rhodesian authorities more willing to negotiate on a satisfactory basis" [1602nd meeting, para. 10]. I beg to disagree with him. It was not the sanctions that made the white Rhodesians more willing to negotiate; it was rather the other way around. The United Kingdom was under constant criticism from African and other States. That is why it sent a very, very capable intermediary, Lord Goodman, to negotiate secretly with Ian Smith. If I were the British, I would have done the same thing. After all, the British were subjected to a continuing barrage of criticism. It was not the sanctions but the pressures to which the Ian Smith régime and the British Government had been subjected that caused them to negotiate.

72. Then Sir Colin Crowe tabulated the five principles which are pre-conditions for the granting of legal independence. That is the first time that I have heard of "legal" independence, as though independence could be qualified.

"Juridical" independence, "legal" independence—what is this term, my good friend Sir Colin Crowe, "legal" independence? Independence is independence, *de facto*. We do not want *de jure* independence. Do you want to bring in the lawyers? Lawyers thrive on the interpretation of terms—legal or illegal, or what have you.

73. I shall read out the first principle: "the principle and intention of unimpeded progress to majority rule, already enshrined in the 1961 Constitution, would have to be maintained and guaranteed." The 1961 Constitution is antiquated. It is from the time before the deluge. They are referring to 1961 in 1971, in the age of computers and in the age of efforts that are snowballing.

74. The second principle is the following: "There would also have to be guarantees against retrogressive amendment of the Constitution." Who is the guarantor? When they say "there would also have to be guarantees", who is the guarantor? This is like those watermelon poultices in trying to treat the fever of the patient. Will the Council guarantee it? The members of the Council will bicker among themselves as to how those guarantees should be spelt out and who would implement them in the face of any infringement on the part of any Southern Rhodesian Government. Let us face the facts.

75. The third principle is the following: "There would have to be immediate improvement in the political status of the African population." We all want that, but who is going to pave the way for it? Suppose somebody—to put it mildly—more conservative succeeds Ian Smith. Then this would be like ink on paper. They are acting like the proverbial scrap of paper, the remark which they attributed at one time to the Kaiser: "What is that treaty? A scrap of paper." In fairness, I must say that I have learned from my research that the Kaiser never said that. They attributed it to the Kaiser for propaganda reasons during the First World War. It was his Chancellor who said it. How do we have the assurance that this agreement would not be viewed as a scrap of paper by the Governments that will succeed Ian Smith's régime?

76. The fourth principle is the following: "there would have to be progress towards ending racial discrimination." That is a "big order", as they say in the United States. "There would have to be . . .". Who is going to enforce it? That is the question. I am questioning the validity of these principles in the light of what is happening every day in Africa.

77. The fifth principle is the following: "The British Government would need to be satisfied that any basis proposed for independence was acceptable to the people of Rhodesia as a whole." That reminds me of Joha, who is a character in Arabic folklore—a sort of joker. Some people saw Joha running towards the palace. They asked him, "Why are you running towards the palace?" He said, "I am going to ask for the hand of the King's daughter in marriage." They smiled; Joha was up to one of his pranks. After half an hour he emerged from the palace beaming and happy. They said, "Joha, what happened?" He said, "Everything is all right. The offer was 50 per cent accepted." They asked, "By whom?" He answered, "I

accepted, but she has not accepted yet." And this fifth principle is a Joha joke.

78. I repeat, the fifth principle says, "The British Government would need to be satisfied that any basis proposed for independence was acceptable to the people of Rhodesia as a whole". What does that "as a whole" mean? Suppose the whites should say "We reject it"; it would be like the King's daughter who rejected the proposal of Joha. That is what it amounts to. That is why I began by saying that I would not want to be in the shoes of Sir Colin Crowe. He is really an honest man who is familiar with my region and I have the greatest respect for him, but, after all, he is under the instructions of Sir Alec Douglas-Home or Lord Home—his alias when he sits in the House of Lords.

79. Then we come to the test of acceptability, which was handled very ably by my colleague Ambassador Abby Farah. So why repeat it? There is one thing, really, which does not worry me, but rather confuses me. It is that there are such terms used in that memorandum of Sir Colin Crowe as "the African higher roll" and the "African higher rolls"—as if the word "higher" would impress us. What is the "African roll"? Is it a Rolls-Royce? Rolls-Royce is bankrupt. The "existing African roll"—not "role", but roll. It rolls, it has wheels. And the wheels turn to give more and more authority to the Africans. That is what I believe it means. I do not know; I am confused by it.

80. Then, with reference to the development programme, it is mentioned here that "the British Government will provide up to £5 million per year for a period of 10 years . . .". I feel sorry for the British taxpayer, even if he were to pay only £500,000 per year. If it were to be applied to any programme like this, it would be like sweetening the sea with a pound of sugar. Have members heard of that proverb about sweetening the sea with a pound of sugar? What will that £5 million do? Nothing.

81. Development should come from within after independence. Of course, the blacks are developing, but the whites are highly developed. They should provide the money, and not the poor British taxpayers. There are one million unemployed in the United Kingdom, victims of the vestiges of colonialism. And this is a vestige of colonialism.

82. I am defending here taxpayers everywhere, including those of the United Kingdom, because they are human beings like us. They sweat and then they are exploited in order that, in their name, £5 million should be contributed to a régime that is tyrannical, that is lording it over the Africans. And that is parliamentary government, a democratic Government. In the name of democracy, a lot of tyranny is perpetrated on the individual.

83. Then we come to the conclusion of the British memorandum. I am glad that Sir Colin Crowe mentions here that there is an "increasingly unhealthy trend" [*ibid.*, para. 53]. But then I also laud him for his honesty, on behalf of his Government, in saying: "...we do not pretend to have the last word. We leave that to the Rhodesian people themselves" [*ibid.*]. Here there is no distinction between the blacks and whites when he speaks

of the "Rhodesian people". Who are the Rhodesian people? To the Rhodesian people as a whole?

84. I must not forget to bring to the attention of my good friend Sir Colin Crowe the matter of the British Government having appointed a Commission headed by Lord Pearce. We are not impressed by lords any more. They sent many lords to our area in Palestine. There were several lords. There was Lord Peel and the Peel Commission. There were so many Commissions during the Mandate, between 1920 and 1938 or 1939—the last time they sent a Commission. They also sent a Royal Commission to investigate the question of Jerusalem. There were reports, and I remember how we pored over those reports and studied them, reams of them. And what happened? Nothing.

85. The United Kingdom threw the question of Palestine into the lap of the United Nations after it had lost the war economically. The British were victorious, so to speak, militarily, but they could not afford to be the Mandatory Power. They were supposed to prepare the people of Palestine for independence—94 per cent of them.

86. And in the light of what happened during the time of the Mandate, between 1920 and 1939, how can we have confidence in Commissions such as that headed by Lord Peel? They used to be called "Royal Commissions". I do not know why they do not call them "Royal Commissions" any more.

87. This is in effect what the British Government is doing: throwing the question into the lap of the United Nations and the Security Council to boot. And here, gentlemen, you sit helplessly trying to elaborate draft resolutions, thinking that they will be the panacea for that question of Southern Rhodesia.

88. It was rumoured and whispered that this agreement involves from 25 to 30 years. Who is young here? I will not be here to witness what will happen in 30 years, but I can envision what will happen—not in 25 years, but in 10 years, knowing from statistics how the black population of Rhodesia is on the increase. The birth rate of the whites is meagre compared to that of the blacks. The poor blacks, they have nothing to do except copulate and procreate because all the work is in the hands of the whites. They have a very low standard of living and it is a good thing that they are copulating and procreating. I thought there were only 4 million but now I am told there are 5 million and there is an increase of 250,000 per year.

89. How does the British Government want to deal with this situation? How does it expect with that meagre £5 million to try to improve the economic and social situation of the blacks? They will probably have to indoctrinate the blacks and give them birth control pills. And how do we know that, with modern medical progress, they will not put something in the water that the blacks drink—beware, I am a chemist and I know something about these things—to make them sterile? But you cannot do these things. By sheer force of numbers, before the end of the century we will have possibly 15 million blacks in Rhodesia—12 to 15 million statistically speaking. And how

will you apply those five principles of the Ian Smith-Douglas-Home agreement in the light of that?

90. I come now to my three principal sets of points. I have been leaving them to the end—as when Antony referred to Caesar's will, and people wanted to know the contents of the will. I shall now state what I meant by those sets of points which I mentioned in my last statement and to which I referred earlier in my intervention today.

91. There should be an open approach to the question. Will Sir Alec Douglas-Home, who represents the British Government as Foreign Secretary, and Mr. Ian Smith agree to suggestions that are made by some Members of the United Nations? First, I presume—I have made inquiries about this—that the blacks live in quarters of their own. You see, the whites are afraid that if they lived amongst them some charcoal would come off and change their complexions. So they have to live in quarters of their own all over Southern Rhodesia. I do not know, but no doubt there are some whites—very small numbers—interspersed. Will Mr. Ian Smith accept cantonments and municipal rule by the blacks? After all, every municipality has its own political structure regarding social and economic affairs. It is more or less autonomous, within the framework of the State of course. If I were black myself I would not want to mix with the whites but I would want the right to organize in that peculiar situation on an autonomous municipal basis or, if you prefer the word “cantonment”, on that basis. Because how can the blacks develop their political institutions if they are left under the pressure of Ian Smith and his white Government. That is my first point, which also I pose as a question.

92. My good friend Sir Colin Crowe referred to education, and rightly so, because education is the key to the door of knowledge and there is a lot of ignorance that prevails amongst the blacks because they have been kept down as serfs in order to be exploited by the white minority. At one time in the Fourth Committee—that was several years ago—I put my good friends the Americans on the spot when I said “Why don't you send a U-2 plane?” That was at the time when such a plane had been sent over the Soviet Union, in the days of the late President Eisenhower, and then the Americans had to exchange Mr. Powers for Mr. Abel. I used to see him on the street. I never knew that he was a spy. You all spy on one another, you big Powers. I said in the Fourth Committee that a U-2 plane or some U-2 planes should be sent over the skies of Rhodesia and that they should carry educational leaflets for the blacks—and for the whites; I pity the whites there, they are so bigoted, so self-righteous and holier-than-thou about human rights and about what is going on in this world. At one time I thought that parachutists should come from above and put Ian Smith and his Government in straitjackets and bring them to an asylum or to a psychiatrist who could treat them for having such antiquated ideas in the twentieth century. But they will not do that. Now I will settle for something less and perhaps better.

93. My second point is this: under the educational development programme of the whites UNESCO would go there and propagate the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenants on Human Rights, not

only amongst the blacks but also amongst the whites. Will Ian Smith accept the presence of the United Nations for the enlightenment of black and white alike in Southern Rhodesia? UNESCO is one of the most successful agencies of the United Nations. Will he dare? Or is it all sugar pills which we are supposed to swallow? That is the second point.

94. The third point is novel in its application there but it is not new. Is the United Nations prepared to establish a fund and then, in case everything fails with Mr. Ian Smith and his régime, to use that fund for putting into action *satyagraha*—civil disobedience as applied by the late Mahatma Gandhi, which I witnessed in my earlier days? The whites are using the blacks, and they are more developed economically and socially, and in knowledge. What if everything fails in accelerating those institutions that are a pre-condition for the independence of the blacks? What if all our efforts, all our appeals, all our cajoling and all our persuasion fail? This is the plan: we will preach civil disobedience so that the blacks who work for the whites will boycott the whites. They will strike, and then the whites will be brought to their knees. The whole thing is economic.

95. “Now,” you say, “who will feed those workers who live from hand to mouth?” From the funds that we will provide, just as unions provide the funds for their strikers. What is wrong with that? In the late twenties I was in England. They were very worried about civil disobedience. Gandhi was not the initiator. It had begun with one of the kings in India in the third or fourth century. Asoka was a mighty king who was saddened by the human suffering and tribulation caused by war and conflict. This *satyagraha* is an Asian way of doing things against tyranny, not by force of arms but by civil disobedience and boycott.

96. Why does not the United Kingdom initiate such a fund and contribute to it in order to make Ian Smith and his régime think clearly and be more sagacious politically? They do not say it but this is what it amounts to: they are afraid that they will be submerged in the African ocean, the black ocean.

97. Those were the three points that I wanted to make. They may be radical; they may set precedents. But something should be done. We should not content ourselves with passing resolutions that will signify nothing.

98. Thank you, Mr. President, for being so patient with me; and I also thank the members of the Council for having graciously listened to me.

99. The PRESIDENT: I think this would be a most convenient time to adjourn since we shall meet again this afternoon. So we will adjourn until 3.30 p.m., if there is no objection.

100. I call on the representative of Poland on a point of order.

101. Mr. KUIAGA (Poland): I have no objection to our meeting this afternoon. I just want to raise a very brief

point of order in connexion with the question of the invitation of Mr. Nkomo and Mr. Sithole. I wish to say that after the 1602nd meeting, when we undertook consultations with members of the Council, we did approach all members of the Council. I made an interim report at the 1603rd meeting of the Security Council on these consultations. I did not wish to interrupt the proceedings this morning, but I thought it would be appropriate for me to raise that point of order.

102. If I may, Mr. President, I would like to thank the representative of Somalia for the very kind words he addressed to me today.

103. The PRESIDENT: The representative of Poland will remember that I cautiously stated that I had the impression that all representatives had been consulted. And I further stated that up to this morning, up to the time of my speaking, no representative had objected, and that if there was no objection, the suggestion would be adopted. So if anybody had wanted to object, he could have done so. Anyway, I thank the two representatives in question for their co-operation.

104. Mr. DE LA GORCE (France) (*interpretation from French*): I apologize for speaking on this question of consultations. I would like to express my regret to the representative of Poland if some misunderstanding has arisen in this connexion. Some representations may have been made which one interlocutor regarded as a consultation, which another might not have regarded as a consultation. It is a question of the level and of the form, about which it can sometimes happen, of course, that certain difficulties of interpretation arise. In all good faith and sincerity, we considered that we had not been consulted. But I recognize that there may be some doubt in the mind of my interlocutor.

105. In any event, Mr. President, my understanding from your preliminary statement was that you were announcing that these consultations had not been quite concluded. For all I know, the last country to be consulted was Sierra Leone, perhaps. Be that as it may, we placed ourselves in the category of those who perhaps still had something to say, but I do not believe that this will in any case create any difficulty.

*The meeting rose at 1 p.m.*

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