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TWENTY-SIXTH YEAR

1568th MEETING: 26 MAY 1971

NEW YORK

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NOTE

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Documents of the Security Council (symbol S/ . . .) are normally published in quarterly *Supplements of the Official Records of the Security Council*. The date of the document indicates the supplement in which it appears or in which information about it is given.

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FIFTEEN HUNDRED AND SIXTY-EIGHTH MEETING

Held in New York on Wednesday, 26 May 1971, at 4 p.m.

President: Mr. Nsanzé TERENCE (Burundi).

Present: The representatives of the following States: Argentina, Belgium, Burundi, China, France, Italy, Japan, Nicaragua, Poland, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Syria, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and United States of America.

Provisional agenda (S/Agenda/1568)

1. Adoption of the agenda.
2. Letter dated 26 December 1963 from the Permanent Representative of Cyprus to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/5488):
Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations operation in Cyprus (S/10199 and Corr.1).

Adoption of the agenda

The agenda was adopted.

Letter dated 26 December 1963 from the Permanent Representative of Cyprus to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/5488):
Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations operation in Cyprus (S/10199 and Corr.1)

1. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): Pursuant to the decision taken at the previous meeting, I invite the representatives of Cyprus, Turkey and Greece to take places at the Security Council table.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Z. Rossides (Cyprus), Mr. U. H. Bayülken (Turkey) and Mr. D. Bitsios (Greece) took places at the Security Council table.

2. Mr. OGISO (Japan): Mr. President, I should like to congratulate you warmly as the President of the Security Council for the month of May. I can assure you of my delegation's full co-operation. There is no doubt that under your wise and experienced guidance the discussions in the Security Council will be successful.

3. I also wish to express my tribute to Ambassador Ortiz de Rozas of Argentina and Ambassador Longerstae of Belgium for their services as Presidents of the Council in March and April, respectively. Although the Council was not convened in the course of those months, all of us know the remarkable statesmanship displayed by both repre-

sentatives in conducting a series of useful informal consultations on various important matters.

4. May I express our very sincere appreciation to the Secretary-General for preparing an elaborate and objective report to the Security Council, to the Special Representative, Mr. Osorio-Tafall, the Force Commander, Major General Prem Chand, and to the United Nations personnel of all categories, military or civilian, who are under the direction of the Secretary-General, for their devotion, high discipline and efforts in performing the duties and functions assigned to them by the Security Council in this matter.

5. In the introductory part of the present report of the Secretary-General [S/10199 and Corr.1], we take note that the situation in the last six months has remained generally calm, but there is a lack of progress in the intercommunal talks and in efforts towards a return to normal conditions. Also, we are disheartened by the Secretary-General's observation in paragraph 79 of his report, that the communal situation is all the more hazardous because of the persistent confrontation of two well-armed military forces which continue to improve in operational capability with the passage of time.

6. In view of such prevailing conditions in Cyprus, my delegation supports the approach recommended in the Secretary-General's report that the mandate of the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus should be extended for a further period of six months. We continue to share the conviction that the United Nations Force in Cyprus has a vital role to play in maintaining calm between the two Cypriot communities and that it has succeeded in preventing the delicate situation in Cyprus from worsening and has contributed to maintaining international peace.

7. However, our support for the resolution adopted by the Council this morning [293 (1971)] is not without some feeling of reluctance. We know that there is a criticism directed against the United Nations that the apparently indefinite prolongation of the Mandate of the United Nations Force in Cyprus has produced a tendency to perpetuate a potentially explosive situation and to serve as a pretext for the indefinite postponement of the essential compromise between the parties concerned. I should particularly like to draw the attention of those parties concerned to the last part of operative paragraph 3 of the resolution which approves the extension of the stationing of the United Nations Force in the expectation that by then—which means by 15 December 1971—sufficient progress towards a final solution will make possible a with-

drawal or substantial reduction of the Force. Our support for this resolution is based exactly on the strong expectation that the parties concerned will make most sincere efforts in a spirit of co-operation and compromise to accomplish sufficient progress towards a negotiated solution of the underlying problems of the island by the end of this year.

8. Past experience shows that the greatest obstacle to achieving this objective has been the mutual mistrust and the depth of feeling which divides the two communities. In the opinion of my delegation, in order to alleviate the antagonism and recover the mutual trust between them the following steps are imperative.

9. First, the parties and Governments concerned should be urged to exercise utmost restraint and moderation, and especially to avoid threats, verbal or otherwise, or the use of drastic retaliatory measures, and also to refrain from making provocative public statements which tend seriously to undermine mutual trust in the ultimate objective of each other.

10. Second, the parties should continue more intensively their intercommunal talks by tackling, first of all, such practical problems of social life as the question of the return of Turkish Cypriot displaced persons, the freedom of movement through Turkish Cypriot controlled areas for unarmed Greek Cypriot civilians, or the promotion of economic co-operation between the two communities. If we could achieve some break-through in such spheres of daily life, I believe that it would accelerate the return to normal conditions in other spheres.

11. Third, further intensive efforts should be made by the parties concerned for de-confrontation and de-escalation of military forces, especially in the more sensitive areas. If this can be achieved, it could further lead to mutual reduction and withdrawal of the national contingents of the Governments concerned. In this connexion, it should be emphasized that the Special Representative of the Secretary-General will be able, upon request of the parties, to play a more positive catalytic role in the exercise of his good offices between the two communities.

12. If an atmosphere of mutual trust is restored between the two communities by this pragmatic approach, the door will be open to further negotiation for a lasting settlement founded upon an independent and sovereign State of Cyprus in which the two communities participate.

13. It should be recalled that operative paragraph 7 of Security Council resolution 186 (1964) of 4 March 1964—the original resolution on the question—recommends that the Secretary-General designate a mediator, in agreement with the Governments directly concerned. So far this means of achieving a settlement has been faced with an impasse, mainly because of mutual mistrust between the parties concerned. When the necessary atmosphere of mutual trust is recovered, the time will be ripe for the Council, as well as for the parties and Governments concerned, to consider the possibility of reactivating the important concept of the mediator envisaged in the original Council resolution.

14. It can be also expected, at that stage, that the size of the United Nations Force in Cyprus could, as a result of such improvement in the communal and military situation, be gradually reduced to a nominal presence.

15. In conclusion, I wish to reiterate our desire that a peaceful solution to the Cyprus question be found promptly, in a spirit of compromise on both sides. It has been on this understanding that Japan has continued to support the peace-keeping operations in Cyprus by voluntary contributions. We wish to take this opportunity of expressing our gratitude to the Governments that have patiently shouldered the burden of providing the contingents for the peace-keeping operation. We sincerely hope that future developments in Cyprus will not disillusion any of us here today.

16. Before ending my statement, may I join the previous speakers in expressing our deep sympathy to the Turkish people for the disaster caused by the recent earthquakes in Turkey?

17. Mr. TOMEH (Syria): Mr. President, I wish to congratulate you on your assumption, for the second time, of the high office of President of the Security Council. Important decisions were adopted when the Council met under your presidency before, and we have thus come to know the great qualities of tact, universal culture and perseverance with which you discharge your duties.

18. We wish also to congratulate the outgoing President, the permanent representative of Belgium, Ambassador Longestaey, and also the Ambassador of Argentina, Ambassador Ortiz de Rozas. Although the Council did not meet formally during their presidencies there were important meetings for consultation, and committee meetings also. They both displayed genuine and great qualities of refinement, deep understanding of the problems of which we are seized and a great sense of responsibility concerning the work of the Security Council.

19. We certainly regret the absence of Under-Secretary-General Rolz-Bennett, who served the United Nations with loyalty and devotion, and we welcome the new Under-Secretary-General, Mr. Guyer, a former distinguished Ambassador of Argentina with long experience and intimate knowledge of the problems of the United Nations.

20. The Security Council is meeting today to discuss the report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations operation in Cyprus for the period 2 December 1970 to 19 May 1971. In our view this report is outstanding in its frankness. Our Secretary-General, U Thant, sets forth for the international community the very difficult problems that beset the people of Cyprus. Every one of us who has read this report cannot but be impressed with the straightforward account of the mounting aspects of the crisis now besetting Cyprus and the realistic proposals submitted by the Secretary-General for its solution.

21. Those of us who have known our Secretary-General, U Thant, for a number of years know that he has always been motivated by the highest ideals of universalism and humanism. Not content with outside, ever-changing and

deceiving appearances, he delves—as is characteristic of profound contemplative thinking—into the deeper causes of problems, probing into the bedrock of humanity. All this stems from a legacy of thousands of years of accumulative culture, humanism and tolerance. Thus in the very introduction to the report under review, he sets forth the situation we are dealing with in very straightforward terms:

“The situation in the last six months with regard to the prevention of a recurrence of fighting has remained generally calm. However, the marked lack of progress in the intercommunal talks and in efforts towards a return to normal conditions has resulted in an increase in tension and a deterioration of the political atmosphere.” [S/10199 and Corr.1, para. 2.]

The report ends with this solemn warning:

“Such a crisis would not only have the gravest consequences for the people of the island, but might well also constitute a serious threat to peace and security in the eastern Mediterranean.” [Ibid., para. 81.]

22. Needless to say, we are part and parcel of that area, the eastern Mediterranean, whose history—and I mean the history of the whole area—has been marked by great human tragedies and unspeakable suffering for the masses of the peoples. Hence it is our imperative duty to approach that grave situation with all the devotion and objectivity it requires of us. Furthermore, as I have had occasion to say before, my own country, Syria, and indeed all the Arab countries, have with all the parties concerned—Turkey, Greece and Cyprus—the most intimate economic, political and cultural relationship, apart from the historical ties of neighbourliness and friendship that bind us all together. And I wish on this occasion to convey to our colleague the representative of Turkey the sincere condolences of the delegation of the Syrian Arab Republic and the Government and people of Syria on the great tragedy that befell Turkey as a result of the earthquake of a few days ago.

23. The report of the Secretary-General, while dealing with the derivative aspects and manifestations of the Cyprus problem with which the Council is now so very well acquainted, does not ignore the basic fundamental issue. To mention some of the aspects of the now grave situation, the Secretary-General informs us that “the situation continued to be . . . calm on the surface” and adds:

“While the level of tension has fluctuated, the atmosphere of mutual trust and confidence, so essential to achieving an improvement of the situation, is still noticeably lacking. Instead, there have been periods of considerable military display and acute sensitivity.” [Ibid., para. 26.]

But thanks to the efforts of the personal representative of the Secretary-General, Mr. Osorio-Tafall, and thanks to the United Nations Force Commander and all the officers and men and civilian staff of the United Nations Force, they were able, according to the report, to bring about a relaxation in areas of direct confrontation.

24. We are also told, in chapter III, that “there have been no significant changes in regard to a return to normal

conditions, with the exception of some developments towards a restoration of public services and in the field of economic co-operation”. [Ibid., para. 38.]

25. The tendency towards separate economic development has not been reversed. There is one hopeful note, however: we are told that there has been more co-operation in agricultural projects undertaken by the Government with the assistance of the World Food Programme and the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations.

26. One very sensitive problem is that of the displaced persons; but we are told of a new development in the report: “The Government, through its representative at the intercommunal talks, has put forward a programme for their return to their villages.” [Ibid., para. 51.] It is our earnest hope that through the continuation of the intercommunal talks greater progress can be made for all displaced persons to return to their villages and farms. This we believe could lead to a lessening of tension in the area. We equally hope that the intercommunal talks will keep the question of displaced persons as well as the freedom of movement—which remains unchanged—under continuous review. The good offices of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General is a positive factor in the situation; he is available to the parties directly concerned and continues to maintain close contact with the leadership of the two communities, Greek and Turkish.

27. We voted this morning on the resolution extending for the nineteenth time the stationing of the United Nations Peace-keeping Force. I wish as a commentary on the extension of the Force to quote two of our experienced colleagues among the permanent members of the Security Council. In their respective statements delivered at the meeting held on 10 December 1970, and in the order in which they were delivered, the representative of France had this to say:

[The speaker continued in French.]

“In these conditions, it seems to my delegation that the maintenance of the United Nations Force for a further period of six months could, by avoiding fresh confrontation, help to facilitate what the report describes as an arduous road with a view to finding a reasonable and practical compromise.

“But it should again be emphasized that the presence of the United Nations Force is justified only to the extent that it can facilitate such a development. The quasi-automatic prolongation in difficult financial circumstances of an operation decided upon almost seven years ago could not be viewed favourably if its only effect was to crystallize a dangerous situation and to serve as a pretext for the indefinite postponement of the necessary compromise.” [1564th meeting, paras. 125 and 126.]

[The speaker resumed in English.]

28. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, speaking on the same aspect, said:

“The report contains a recommendation that the stationing of United Nations Forces in Cyprus should be

extended once again for a further period of six months. In this connexion it should be noted that almost seven years have already elapsed since the United Nations forces first appeared in Cyprus, for reasons which are well known. Such a lengthy stay in the island cannot in any way be regarded as normal. The Soviet delegation still maintains that this United Nations operation cannot, and should not, continue indefinitely." [*Ibid.*, paras. 161 and 162.]

29. Indeed, many of the speakers who spoke today reiterated such impressions. And those words, true as they were when they were pronounced, still remain true today, and they will be true six months, or one year, or one year and a half from today if another extension is required or asked for.

30. While the United Nations forces have played and continue to play a salutary and beneficial role, they can never take the place of intercommunal talks especially since in Cyprus the two communities have coexisted and will continue to coexist.

31. Finally, we fully share the view of the Secretary-General that it is "essential to preserve the present calm in an effort to foster a genuine improvement in the relations between all the people of the island." [*S/10199 and Corr.1, para. 80.*]

32. The intercommunal talks remain not only the best but in the present circumstances probably the only way to an agreed settlement. We also express our earnest hope that everything will be done to help reduce the now existing and mounting tension so that all the people of Cyprus and their genuine friends can look forward to a brighter future in the whole eastern Mediterranean.

33. Mr. KOSCIUSKO-MORIZET (*interpretation from French*): First of all, I should like to add my voice to those voices of the speakers who have preceded me and who have communicated to our colleague from Turkey their deep feelings and sympathy because of the cataclysm which has so painfully struck his country. In fact these natural and, therefore, inevitable scourges should have priority in the collective efforts of nations and of men so as to alleviate the sufferings engendered for the population. They should in any case make us look into ourselves and realize how ridiculous the artificial scourges often are as constituted by divisions in the world, conflicts, wars, and which, nevertheless, absorb most of our activities. They should also assist us in understanding that the solution is perhaps to be found in showing more reasonableness and more human solidarity.

34. Mr. President, I shall follow with discipline the rule which was adopted by the Council on the proposal of Ambassador Yost. Accordingly, I shall refrain from comments on yourself, on our colleagues who preceded you and on the new arrivals, but I would wish you—and all of them to know—that the silence is a sophisticated eulogy or, if you prefer, an understatement brought to its extreme limit.

35. Speaking in the Council on 10 December last [*1564th meeting*] after the vote on the resolution which, for the eighteenth time, extended the stationing of the United

Nations forces on Cyprus, the delegation of France wished to state that it was concerned by the perpetuation on the island of a precarious and threatening situation.

36. It is that same feeling of anxiety that is expressed today in the report of the Secretary-General submitted for our consideration.

37. Certainly, as the document notes, the last six months have been calm, at least on the surface, and the number of incidents giving rise to gunfire have not increased noticeably as compared with the previous six months. It is true that some modest progress has been registered in a few sectors, particularly in bringing certain public services back to normal. Definitely, as we wished last year, the Government has taken some initiatives so as to resolve the grievous problem of displaced persons and the programme which it has prepared on the subject has been the subject of an exchange of views between the representatives of the two communities.

38. Nevertheless, the communities remain profoundly divided. Mutual suspicion creates a general atmosphere of insecurity and leads to "the persistent confrontation of two well-armed military forces" which are constantly being strengthened and trained in anticipation of possible confrontations. Recourse to force rather than to conciliation in these conditions becomes a formidable temptation. So far the vigilance and prudence of Mr. Osorio-Tafall and his assistants, the permanent surveillance carried out by the United Nations officers and soldiers, under the authority of General Prem Chand, their prompt intervention wherever it has been proved to be necessary, their devotion and their spirit of discipline which they have evinced in the exercise of their delicate mission have enabled them to maintain a fragile *status quo*. It suffices to read the report submitted to us to realize how precarious the situation is. In the overheated atmosphere of Cyprus, clearly the slightest spark could cause a general conflagration, and our Secretary-General has emphasized that this not only would have tragic consequences for the population of the island but also could constitute a serious threat to peace and security in the eastern Mediterranean.

39. How are we to respond to the rise in such dangers? How, in particular, can the United Nations, taking into account its responsibilities, facilitate the restoration of real peace?

40. In the present circumstances the Secretary-General informs us: "I have no alternative but to recommend the extension of UNFICYP's mandate for a further period of six months..." [*S/10199 and Corr.1, para. 86*]. The Force, he assures us, maintains good working relations with the principal parties concerned and they seem to be agreed to maintain it for an additional period. In these circumstances my delegation has once again supported the resolution which we have just adopted. But once again we would, as did the representative of Syria a few minutes ago, express doubts and apprehensions. The almost automatic renewal of the mandate of the Force has enabled us until now certainly to avoid the worst. We hope that this will continue to hold true for the next six months. But, and we have said this repeatedly, this runs counter to the well

understood interests of the United Nations and also counter to the interests of the inhabitants of the island themselves if it seems to the parties who are mainly concerned to be the means to delay indefinitely the necessary meeting of minds and the conclusion of an indispensable compromise. Through the years, as many speakers have also emphasized the tendency towards separate economic development has been strengthened, while a part of the population has come to consider it natural to prohibit the other part of the population from having access to certain public roads. Military preparations are increasing. Such a development obviously does not lead to peace and cannot but render the situation more difficult.

41. The Secretary-General continues:

"The prospect of an apparently indefinite commitment for the United Nations in Cyprus poses fundamental problems for the Organization in facing its responsibilities for the maintenance of international peace and security. I do not believe that it would be either possible or wise to postpone for very much longer a comprehensive review of this problem." [*Ibid.*, para. 87.]

That is the warning which the Secretary-General in his last report has invited us to ponder. We hope that this will be taken seriously in Cyprus also.

42. Whatever may be the practical difficulties on the island which hinder and delay the conclusion of an agreement between the two parties, it is clear that the main obstacle is a psychological one, due to patterns of thought and behaviour which will therefore have to change.

43. As the Secretary-General has said: "What is lacking, and needs to be restored, is the parties' mutual confidence in each other's good faith and ultimate political objectives." [*Ibid.*, para. 82.] How in these circumstances could our Secretary-General, U Thant, fail to deplore the fact that recent statements by responsible personalities of both parties seem to give rise to serious misunderstandings and to contribute to undermining mutual confidence? We cannot fail to hope with him that the leaders of all the parties concerned will restate publicly their determination that the problem of Cyprus must be solved by arriving, through peaceful means, at a lasting agreement.

44. The most promising course, in spite of any vicissitudes they are undergoing, remains that of negotiations between the two communities. These were started in 1968 and should be continued. We hope that they will lead to a general agreement in a reasonable time because, as was recognized recently by one of the parties, any useless prolongation is harmful to the extent that the appearance of new elements might increase the difficulties.

45. The latter must be surmounted, and surmounted without further delay. We are told that this can only be done if the two parties prove themselves to be bold, imaginative and sincere. Nobody doubts that they are capable of this. But, being aware of the tragic consequences of a possible failure and perhaps encouraged to follow the course of reason by the Governments of those countries to which they so willingly turn, they must also have the firm will to reach agreement.

46. Mr. NUR ELMI (Somalia): Allow me first of all to express to the Turkish delegation the sincere sympathy of the delegation of the Somali Democratic Republic on the natural disaster caused by the recent earthquake which devastated parts of its country.

47. Mr. President, it is with great pleasure that I extend to you on behalf of the delegation of the Somali Republic my sincere congratulations on your assumption of the Presidency of the Security Council for the current month. I need not dwell at length on my satisfaction that the task of guiding our deliberations today has fallen to a colleague and a personal friend.

48. I also wish to extend my congratulations to your predecessors, the Ambassadors from Argentina and Belgium, for the quality of statesmanship they showed during their tenure of office.

49. The Secretary-General of the United Nations and his collaborators should be congratulated for the clear and up-to-date report covering the activities of the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus and for the efforts they have made to implement the mandate they received from this Council. The report of the Secretary-General indicates, however, that there has been little improvement in the situation on this troubled island. Indeed such a lack of improvement in the situation does not stimulate a return to normal conditions, especially when all the parties concerned are reported to have adopted uncompromising attitudes.

50. We had hoped that after years of conflict and confrontation, the people of Cyprus themselves would make more serious efforts in their intercommunal talks towards the achievement of a return to normal conditions in the island. We realize, however, that the situation involves difficulties which cannot be solved overnight, but the leaders of both communities must show the will and determination to take the future of their country into their own hands and find a *modus vivendi* among their people. If both these communities have coexisted for the past four centuries, under the rule of one or other foreign Power that has dominated the eastern Mediterranean, we see no reason why they cannot coexist today as citizens of an independent sovereign State. We believe that a lasting solution to this unhappy situation lies squarely with the leaders of this island whose people have already suffered from the torments and tensions resulting from the civil strife in this divided small nation since 1963.

51. It is in the light of these brief considerations that we stress here the necessity for the leaders of all the parties concerned in the island of Cyprus to have the determination and courage to set to work with all their strength and their resourcefulness to solve their problems if they want to preserve and enjoy the independence and nationhood they obtained with the great sacrifice of their people from a colonial tyranny lasting for generations.

52. This, in our view, should be the mainspring of their efforts, because we believe—and here I should like to address myself directly to the representative of Cyprus—that unless the people of Cyprus accept this truth, no

amount of outside help or words of thoughtful resolutions will ever solve the problems of their country.

53. It is for the same considerations so clearly expressed by the Secretary-General in the last chapter of his report, that my delegation voted in favour of the resolution unanimously adopted today by the Council, which extends the presence of the United Nations Force in Cyprus for a further period of six months until 15 December 1971, since it appears to us that the political as well as other aspects of the island's life still rest, unfortunately, on a precarious basis.

54. Mr. VINCI (Italy): In respecting the commitment I also made at the 1565th meeting of the Security Council in February last not to spend our time in congratulatory remarks, I shall abstain, as the representative of France has done, from addressing myself to you, Mr. President, and to the previous Presidents of the Council, Ambassador Ortiz de Rozas and Ambassador Longerstae, as well as to new colleagues. But I can assure you, Mr. President, that this does not mean any lack of regard, respect or esteem, nor does it diminish our sincere appreciation of the consultations and useful work that has been conducted during the tenure of that high office by all of you.

55. I should also like to express to Ambassador Bayülken the sincere sympathy of my delegation for the heavy losses in human lives and property which the recent seismic disaster has produced in Turkey. My country, which has often been subject to the same natural calamities, can understand perfectly the human suffering and the problems which they produce. I am sure that I speak for the Italian Government and people in saying that we share with compassion the feelings of grief of our Turkish friends.

56. The positive vote which I have cast on behalf of my delegation on the draft resolution submitted for the approval of the Security Council testifies to the unswerving support of the Italian Government for the United Nations peace-keeping operations in Cyprus. That support stems from two basic considerations: the first, of a general nature, is connected with my Government's view of the functions of the world Organization; and the second, of a more specific nature, is related to the situation on an island which, I need hardly recall, is geographically and historically very close to my own country.

57. I should like to make some general remarks on the first point. For years it has been the consistent policy of my Government to advocate an ever increasing peace-keeping capability for the United Nations. To ensure international peace and security represents the main *raison d'être* of this Organization's existence. Its authority and, in the long run, its very survival as an active political factor in the world arena will depend on its capacity to respond and arise to the expectations of public opinion and of governments in this field.

58. The Secretary-General recalled those expectations at the meeting of the Special Committee on Peace-keeping Operations held on 1 April of this year [49th meeting]. And all of us certainly have in mind the strong appeal of the Heads of State and Government who, at the twenty-

fifth commemorative session, emphasized the urgency and importance of strengthening the peace-keeping machinery of the world Organization. In the Declaration solemnly adopted on 24 October 1970 [see resolution 2627 (XXV)], the General Assembly re-affirmed its determination to take concrete steps to reach agreement on more effective procedures for carrying out United Nations peace-keeping functions consistent with the Charter. Later on, by adopting the Declaration on the Strengthening of International Security [resolution 2734 (XXV)], the Assembly unanimously urged all Members to respond to the immediate need to agree on guidelines for more effective peace-keeping operations in accordance with the Charter and to support the efforts of the Special Committee to reach agreement on all questions relating to such operations as well as on provisions for their appropriate and equitable financing.

59. On the second specific point, let me start by stating that the Italian Government has from the beginning supported, and continues to support, the United Nations operation in Cyprus for two reasons: first, because it is consistent with the position my country has taken on the over-all problem of peace-keeping as well as on previous operations like those in the Congo and in the Middle East, where the Italian contribution in men and means is on record; secondly, because the Organization on this specific occasion could prove, as it has done, its capacity to restore peace and to avoid a situation in which a local feud might become a hotbed of international tension and insecurity.

60. This is once more confirmed by the lucid and comprehensive report for which we feel indebted to the Secretary-General. It is gratifying that a recurrence of fighting has been prevented during the last six months, and I wish to associate myself with the tribute paid to the Secretary-General's Special Representative in Cyprus, Mr. Osorio-Tafall, and to the Commander of the UNFICYP, General Prem Chand. These men, together with all the members of the United Nations operation force, have continued to implement a most worthwhile task at the cost of personal sacrifice; they fully deserve the acknowledgement and gratitude of us all. We think that their presence in Cyprus is still necessary and that the Secretary-General was right to recommend a further six-month extension of the mandate of UNFICYP. We welcome the fact that the Security Council has agreed to that recommendation. I am confident that my Government will not fail to provide its financial contribution, in the same amount it did in the past, to the cost of maintaining UNFICYP for another period of six months.

61. Since I have mentioned the invaluable contribution made by so many to the United Nations operation in Cyprus, I wish to recall, with gratitude, the important and fruitful role played by José Rolz-Bennett in this as well as in other significant United Nations activities. We regret that reasons of health have deprived us of his invaluable co-operation and we wish our good and cherished friend the best.

62. I wish at the same time to give a warm welcome to the new Under-Secretary-General, Roberto Guyer, who has already shown his great capacity, his skill and his foresight

63. Peace-keeping, however successful, will never be a substitute for peace-building. I cannot, therefore, refrain from voicing deep concern for the lack of progress denounced by the Secretary-General in the intercommunal talks and in efforts towards a return to normal conditions—the more so, as U Thant warns that a new crisis might well constitute a serious threat to peace and security in the eastern Mediterranean.

64. One reason why my delegation had it in mind to request a minor change in the resolution we have just adopted [293(1971)]—that is, the deletion in operative paragraph 2 of the words “the present auspicious climate and opportunities”—was because the report of the Secretary-General reflects, unfortunately, rather different conditions. If we have not put forward this request, it is because we hope that these more favourable conditions will soon be re-established.

65. We need, indeed, to see the precarious conditions prevailing in Cyprus transformed into a situation of enduring stability. We certainly recognize the complexity of the issues involved, but we do not think that the rights and interests of the two communities living in the island are irreconcilable.

66. On the basis of our own experience, however different, my delegation holds the view that no problem is intractable provided there is a sincere joint will to settle it, that the main parties concerned focus their attention on the real interests, on the well-being of their peoples, and that they concentrate their efforts on what they have in common rather than on what divides them. In other words, the intercommunal talks in Cyprus can lead to a lasting solution provided that both sides engage in an earnest search for a fair and just compromise based on the principles of independence and unity of the Republic of Cyprus, of full respect for the freely-expressed will of the two ethnic groups and for their respective rights and interests. Of course, it is essential to restore confidence in these talks and, in order to build confidence, nothing could help more than if each side refrained from pursuing advantages to the detriment of the other side. We all, I think, realize that today public opinion is so alert that whatever one says or does not say, people know or sense exactly what is going on in the minds of those who make public statements. In other words, we all know that delaying tactics in a world which moves at supersonic speed are outdated and anachronistic.

67. We would like, in concluding, to add our appeal for sincere efforts to be made towards an early and satisfactory settlement through peaceful means. And in any dispute the best solution can always come from direct talks and understanding between the main parties concerned, which for Cyprus means the two communities. However, in the unfortunate event that these talks should not produce the results for which I am sure we all wish, the Italian delegation would be prepared to take up a comprehensive view of this problem, as suggested by the Secretary-General in paragraph 87 of his report. Whoever has at heart, we have the irreplaceable functions of the Security Council in the maintenance of international peace and security cannot fail to face the responsibilities entrusted to

us. The appeal addressed to us by the Secretary-General makes our duty more incumbent.

68. Mr. KULAGA (Poland): One of the motives of our meeting today seems to be brevity. I shall try to adapt myself to this trend of our discussion. But I hope you will allow me, Mr. President, to congratulate you warmly on your assumption, for the second time, of the functions of President of the Security Council and to reiterate to you the feelings of friendship that my delegation and I hold for your country and for you personally.

69. Making a brief incursion back into March and April, one is naturally led to thank most sincerely Ambassador Ortiz de Rozas of Argentina and Ambassador Longerstae of Belgium, in particular for the guidance that they provided to us in the exchanges of views on the most vital issues of international peace and security that they initiated and arranged.

70. The Security Council has undertaken the discussion today of the situation in Cyprus with an evident sense of preoccupation. The length of time during which this question has been on the agenda of the Council, the regularity and frequency of the Council's meetings devoted to the mere adoption of measures of a provisional character, on the one hand, and the fact that the problem remains unresolved, that no progress is being achieved and that in some respects we have to note a deterioration of the situation, on the other hand, cannot but give rise to serious concern. This concern is reflected in the report of our distinguished Secretary-General. It has clearly emerged during the debate.

71. Many speakers who have preceded me have quoted at length from the report of the Secretary-General. I shall therefore refrain from repeating these quotations. When discussing the problem of Cyprus, our delegation has always stressed the fact that normalization of the situation in Cyprus can be achieved only through the full recognition and respect of the independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of the Cypriot State and based on the mutual understanding and agreement of the whole Cypriot people. Such a normalization would be in the interest of the people of Cyprus, of the lessening of tension in the sensitive region of the world, of the role of Cyprus as an independent peace-loving people pursuing a policy of non-participation in military alliances.

72. This requires, as an external framework, respect for the sovereign right of the people of Cyprus to decide on its internal affairs. It therefore requires the elimination of all imperialist, military influences which stand in the way of a solution of the problem.

73. We look at the negotiations conducted between Greek and Turkish communities as the internal factor of normalization in the situation in Cyprus. We share the preoccupations voiced here today in the debate that these talks should proceed unhindered. We hope for their earliest possible fruitful completion. We have always supported and continue to support the aspirations of the people of Cyprus for the strengthening of its independence and sovereignty, for a peaceful solution to the problem, consistent with the

interests of all Cypriot nationals, consistent with the interests of international peace and security. We have voted for the draft resolution presented to the Council this morning for the further extension by six months of the mandate of the United Nations Forces in Cyprus, as proposed by the Secretary-General with the concurrence of Cyprus and the parties concerned, and on the basis of standing arrangements.

74. We wish, however, to state our belief that the presence of United Nations forces in Cyprus for more than seven years now certainly cannot be considered by us as a normal phenomenon. When speaking in the debate last June [1543rd meeting], our delegation already drew attention to this fact. We also said that we should like to express our belief that the opportunity will soon arise for the United Nations troops to be withdrawn from Cyprus. That is what we said in June last year, and that is what we wish to emphasize today.

75. Before ending I should like to add a few words to express to the Ambassador of Turkey our deeply felt sympathy on the tragic occasion of the earthquakes a few days ago in Turkey.

76. Mr. LIU (China): Mr. President, may I first of all join in the tributes that have been expressed to you and to your distinguished predecessors in the Chair by other speakers before me? This is not the first time you have presided over our deliberations and, if I may say so, you have earned our admiration for the dynamic and dedicated manner in which you discharged the responsibilities of the presidency.

77. I would also take the opportunity to associate my delegation with the expressions of sympathy for the victims of the recent earthquakes in Turkey.

78. My delegation welcomes the unanimous decision of the Council to extend the mandate of the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus for an additional period of six months. In our view such extension is called for by the conditions prevailing on the island.

79. My delegation notes that in the period covered by the present report of the Secretary-General from 2 December 1970 to 19 May 1971, the situation in Cyprus continues to be relatively calm. Breaches of the cease-fire have been of a minor character and shooting incidents have not been frequent or serious enough to disturb the general state of tranquillity. It is none the less regrettable, as the Secretary-General pointed out in the introduction to his report, that "the marked lack of progress in the intercommunal talks and in efforts towards a return to normal conditions has resulted in an increase in tension and a deterioration of the political atmosphere." [S/1099 and Corr.1, para. 2.]

80. This does not mean, of course, that in the last six months there has not been any significant progress. As was emphasized by the representative of Cyprus in his statement, the contacts between Greek and Turkish Cypriots have been maintained in the economic field, especially in the private sector and in a number of semi-autonomous and non-governmental institutions. There has also been further progress towards normalization of public services.

81. So long, however, as there is no general political settlement, progress in the economic field must necessarily be of a limited nature. The United Nations Force has in the past seven years succeeded in keeping the communal conflicts from degenerating into chaos and interminable bloodshed. But in the last analysis the role UNFICYP can play is no more than preparing the ground for a final and lasting settlement. Political settlement can come about only through direct negotiations by the parties concerned. I think this has been made clear by the statements of the representatives of Turkey and Greece this morning. The intercommunal talks that have been going on are of crucial importance to the future of Cyprus. As long as they continue, there is hope. The consequences would be serious and far-reaching indeed if they were to break down. It is the earnest hope of my delegation that these talks will be speeded up in the months to come so that a constructive and workable solution may be found.

82. The Cyprus operation of the United Nations, in the view of my delegation, has implications for the whole question of peace-keeping. On the success or failure of UNFICYP will to a large extent depend the future of similar undertakings. It is utterly necessary, I think, to avoid the impression that once a peace-keeping operation has been started, it is more likely than not to become a permanent one.

83. Before concluding I should like to take this opportunity to express my delegation's appreciation to the Secretary-General, as well as to former Under-Secretary-General Rolz-Bennett and all the military and civilian officers in Cyprus for their meritorious service in carrying out with efficiency and devotion the arduous duties assigned to them on behalf of the United Nations.

84. Mr. NICOL (Sierra Leone): Mr. President, it is a very pleasant duty for me to congratulate you, on behalf of my delegation, on your assumption of the office of President of this Council for the current month. Having worked with you in close association for some time now, I have no doubt whatever that your personal qualities will enable you to carry out your important tasks to the satisfaction of all. I should also like to associate my delegation with the tribute which you so ably paid to Ambassador Longerstae of Belgium and Ambassador Ortiz de Rozas of Argentina, who, as Presidents of the Council for March and April respectively, gave us important and useful leadership. We all remember the keenness they showed in their application to duty and the excellent briefings they gave us about matters concerning international peace and security.

85. We should like to offer our profound sympathy, through Ambassador Bayülken, to the Government of Turkey for the repeated earthquake disasters which have cost so many lives and caused such great damage to property recently and during the past few years.

86. I now come to the subject of today's meeting. In the view of the delegation of Sierra Leone, the Council's draft resolution of 25 May 1971 [S/10209], to extend the life of the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus for another six-month period is very reasonable, and it was therefore supported by us. The introduction to the Secre-

tary-General's report leaves us with no illusions. The general situation in the island is now one of relative calm, but it is a calm which might erupt very quickly into a storm. The report notes that "the marked lack of progress in the intercommunal talks and in efforts towards a return to normal conditions has resulted in an increase in tension and a deterioration of the political atmosphere" [S/10199 and Corr.1, para. 2].

87. The report is very informative and provides us with a balanced assessment of the existing situation. But this evaluation, compared with that of the previous six-month period, shows a deterioration in the island's intercommunal relationship. We would have expected a general easing of tension, especially as seven years have already elapsed since the presence of the United Nations was first established in Cyprus.

88. The intercommunal talks between Mr. Denktash and Mr. Clerides offer much hope and constitute at present the main path towards a peaceful settlement. We have found—and this is true not only in Cyprus but also in all other parts of the world—that political leaders in such a situation should be given strength and encouragement by their friends to be bold when making statements to their own followers.

89. The principle of loving thy neighbour as thyself is embedded in the traditions of both Greece and Turkey. This should be preached more vigorously by the leaders of both sides in Cyprus. We know that in doing so they will face accusations of betrayal from extremists from their own side, and mistrust and disbelief from the other side. But there can be no other way if leadership is to be courageous, productive and lasting. We thus appeal for conciliation between all the communities concerned, and a speedy correction of ancient wrongs and humiliations.

90. We support the Secretary-General's appeal for both sides to continue with the intercommunal talks in a genuine spirit of give and take. Unless all parties are willing and determined to make concessions, little progress can be achieved.

91. My Government concurs with the Secretary-General's concern that should the talks break down grave consequences will result not only for the people of the island but also for the peace and security of the eastern Mediterranean which will be seriously threatened.

92. The problems which face Cyprus are not unique. Perhaps this knowledge might help the various communities towards a solution when they realize that the problems they are facing have been faced elsewhere before and are now being faced elsewhere, including Africa, sometimes with a considerable degree of success.

93. We look forward to the day when a citizen of an independent and united Cyprus can say, "I am a Cypriot", without reference to the country of origin of his or her ancestors.

94. We do not underestimate for a moment the difficulties inherent in such an approach, since both their motherlands

are so temptingly near for both communities. Because of this we would appeal to the Governments of Greece and Turkey to use all their powers of persuasion towards bringing about a reconciliation between the two main communities in the island.

95. The positive side of the report, which marks the increased co-operation in economic matters among various sections of the Cyprus population and a progressive extension of the public service to Turkish Cypriot areas, is one which gives my delegation great satisfaction. It appears to us that an improvement in the economic development of the population is an absolute necessity for improved relations and peaceful co-operation between the communities.

96. In conclusion, we should like to congratulate and praise the Secretary-General for the tireless leadership he has given over the past seven years in such difficult and trying circumstances. Our great appreciation goes also to his Special Representative, Mr. Osorio-Tafall, his military commander, Major-General Prem Chand, and the new Under-Secretary-General, Mr. Roberto Guyer, as well as to the civilian and military staff whose contributions have averted a war in the island. We extend our deep sympathy to Mr. Rolz-Bennett, the Under-Secretary-General charged with this mission, for his untimely retirement.

97. The figures in the report speak for themselves of the achievements of the Secretary-General and his staff. The steady decline in shooting incidents in the past three years to a figure which is now almost 90 per cent less than that of three years ago is most encouraging. Although there is much yet to be done in this situation, no one can deny that the maintenance of this peace-keeping operation has been one of the major successes of U Thant's administration.

98. Mr. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*translated from Russian*): Mr. President, the delegation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics would like to add its voice to the congratulations and good wishes addressed to the President of the Security Council, the representative of Burundi, and to the Presidents for the months of March and April, the Ambassadors of Argentina and Belgium. I should also like to congratulate our new colleague, Ambassador Bush, who is taking part for the first time in the work of the Security Council, on his appointment to the important post of Permanent Representative of the United States of America to the United Nations. At the same time I should like to express the hope that his active participation in the work of the Security Council, along with its other members, will help to strengthen the international political effectiveness of the United Nations and of the Security Council as the organ bearing the primary responsibility within the United Nations system for the maintenance of peace and security. I should also like to express the hope that the participation of Ambassador Bush in the work of the Security Council will contribute not only to the adoption by the Council of decisions relating to the strengthening of peace and security but also—and I should like to lay particular stress on this—to the implementation in their entirety of decisions taken by the Council.

99. I have already had occasion to express to the Permanent Representative of Turkey to the United Nations

our condolences and heartfelt sympathy in connexion with the natural disaster that has befallen his country. On this occasion I should like once again to offer our deepest sympathy on the occasion of the disaster suffered by a neighbouring country which has caused many deaths among the Turkish people and considerable material damage.

100. Turning now to the question under discussion, the USSR delegation considers it essential to begin by stressing the fact that the Soviet Union has invariably approached matters debated in the Security Council and the United Nations as a whole from the standpoint of the need to strengthen international peace and security. This approach is fully in keeping with the main purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter.

101. The Twenty-fourth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, held recently in Moscow, adopted a comprehensive programme concerning the struggle for peace, the strengthening of security and international co-operation, and the freedom and independence of peoples. This programme reflects the organic link in the Soviet Union's foreign policy between implacable opposition to aggression, arbitrary action and the intrigues of the imperialist forces, constructive proposals concerning ways of solving pressing international problems, and the consistent defence of the Leninist principle of peaceful coexistence between States having different social systems.

102. The tasks set forth in Mr. L. I. Brezhnev's report and in the decisions of the Congress encompass the basic problems of international relations at the present stage in history. Their solution would be in the interest of all peoples and all States, no matter what social system they belong to or where they are situated on the earth's surface. The tasks set by the Congress are realistic ones, since they are based on the results achieved or the measures planned in recent years in the struggle for peace and international co-operation. They constitute a practical and promising programme of action for the next few years. The fulfilment of the tasks, set by the Congress for the defence of peace and the strengthening of international security would ensure a change in international relations from tension to *détente* and a lasting peace. This is how those tasks were understood by a large number of States and by world opinion.

103. In seeking to fulfil these tasks, the Soviet Union will act in a principled, consistent and at the same time flexible manner, with due regard for the legitimate rights of all States whose interests are at stake in any particular issue. The Congress accorded pride of place in the struggle for peace to the task of eliminating existing hotbeds of war and preventing others from appearing. This is undoubtedly the most pressing task, since international relations can never be normalized as long as acts of aggression continue.

104. Under present circumstances the Soviet Union considers it a realistic and feasible task to prevent the emergence of further hotbeds of war, provided all States interested in maintaining peace unite their efforts. Conditions must be created in which the refusal to resort to force or the threat of force for the settlement of disputes becomes an immutable law of international life.

105. In the interests of strengthening peace the Soviet Union is also in favour of making the fullest possible use of the resources of the United Nations, which was set up a quarter of a century ago in order to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war. The United Nations can and must do much more to strengthen international security. This fundamental attitude of the Soviet Union towards the solving of contemporary international problems also governs its approach to the Cyprus question.

106. The Soviet Union's position on the Cyprus question has been repeatedly set forth in statements by the Soviet Government and by USSR representatives in the Security Council and elsewhere. This position remains fully valid and in force. The Soviet Union has always based and still bases its position on the fact that the Cyprus question must be settled by peaceful means in the interests of the people of Cyprus and in order to reduce tension in that important area of the world. Any such settlement must be based on respect for the freedom, independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus which, as a sovereign State and a Member of the United Nations, is conducting a policy of peace and non-alignment with military blocs. There is and can be no doubt that the solution of the internal problems of Cyprus is a matter for the Cypriots themselves, citizens of a sovereign State Member of the United Nations.

107. The question of Cyprus must be settled without external interference. The lawful rights of all citizens, of both Greek and Turkish origin, must be respected by all. The Soviet Union is resolutely opposed to any attempt to encroach upon the sovereignty of the Republic of Cyprus or to settle the Cyprus question behind the backs of its people, to the prejudice of their vital interests and to the advantage of the selfish imperialist aims of outside forces.

108. It is our profound conviction that in order to ensure the full independence, integrity and sovereignty of the Republic of Cyprus all foreign forces must be withdrawn from its territory and all foreign military bases removed.

109. The Soviet delegation would also like to stress the need, in strict accordance with resolution 186 (1964) adopted by the Security Council on 4 March 1964, for all States to refrain from any action contrary to that resolution which might complicate the situation in Cyprus.

110. It should also be noted that Cyprus is situated in the immediate vicinity of Europe and that the state of affairs on that continent has a most direct bearing on the situation in Cyprus. The recent trend towards an easing of tension in Europe can therefore only be welcomed. For its part, the Soviet Union, together with other socialist countries, has consistently advocated the implementation of further measures for the strengthening of peace and security in Europe, the most important of them being the rapid convening of an all-European conference on matters relating to security.

111. Today, the Security Council is once again considering the question of Cyprus in connexion with the report by the Secretary-General on the United Nations operation in Cyprus for the period 2 December 1970 to 19 May 1971.

On reading this report, one cannot fail to be struck by the statement that talks are still going on in Cyprus between representatives of the Greek and Turkish communities with a view to solving their mutual problems. We take the view that these talks are an internal matter of the Republic of Cyprus. We sincerely hope for a successful, speedy and positive conclusion to these talks in the interests of the Republic of Cyprus and all its citizens. There can be no doubt that it is only through such negotiations, based on mutual understanding and goodwill, without interference and above all without any pressure from outside, that conditions can be created under which all Cypriots, all citizens of the sovereign State of the Republic of Cyprus, can lead peaceful and secure lives.

112. The USSR delegation would particularly like to emphasize that it shares the concern expressed in the Secretary-General's report at the lack of progress towards a solution of the underlying problems. The report also contains a recommendation to extend once more the mandate of the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus for a further six-month period. In this connexion it must be pointed out that many years have elapsed since foreign military contingents, under the name of United Nations forces, were first sent to Cyprus in circumstances which are well known to us all. The fact that they have stayed on the island for such a long time, as my delegation and many others have already pointed out, cannot be regarded as normal. Such a protracted United Nations peace-keeping operation cannot serve as a model for operations of that kind, no matter how certain delegations have tried to praise it. The Soviet delegation continues to believe firmly that this particular United Nations operation cannot and should not continue indefinitely. In itself, the presence of foreign troops on the territory of an independent sovereign State, even under the auspices and in the name of the United Nations, can only be a short-term extraordinary measure that must be terminated as rapidly as possible.

113. The USSR delegation hopes that such an occasion will present itself before the expiry of the next six-month extension of the stationing of these forces in Cyprus. In the meantime, those responsible could usefully think the matter over and take measures to reduce the numbers of these forces. The idea of reducing and withdrawing forces is a popular one at the present time and could well be applied to Cyprus. On this understanding, and also considering the position on this matter of the parties concerned and above all of the Government of the Republic of Cyprus, the Soviet delegation will not now raise the question of the complete withdrawal of these forces from the territory of Cyprus.

114. With regard to the resolution just adopted or, to be more exact, adopted at our first meeting today [293 (1971)], the USSR delegation considers it particularly essential to stress that this resolution concerning the proposal to extend the stationing of the United Nations forces in Cyprus for a further six-month period confirms the principal provisions of Security Council resolution 186 (1964) of 4 March 1964 and also subsequent decisions of the Council on the Cyprus question. The USSR delegation regards this circumstance as a decisive, key

element in determining the attitude of the Soviet Union towards the resolution adopted today.

115. The USSR delegation is at the same time authorized to state that, for well-known reasons and because of the circumstances to which I have referred, the Soviet Union did not oppose the adoption today by the Security Council of the resolution on this subject, on the understanding that the extension of the stationing of these forces on the territory of the sovereign Republic of Cyprus will be in full conformity with the provisions of that first resolution and subsequent decisions of the Security Council on the Cyprus question, that is to say that these forces will retain their present functions and the current procedure for financing them, namely on a voluntary basis, will be retained.

116. Mr. LONGERSTAEY (Belgium) (*interpretation from French*): Mr. President, allow me first of all to express to you our most cordial congratulations on your accession to the Presidency of the Security Council. Since my arrival in New York I have been able to appreciate your remarkable diplomatic qualities as well as your keen sense of responsibility. I need hardly add that I feel particularly moved to see an eminent ambassador of Burundi, a country with which Belgium maintains relations of friendship which are as close as they are fruitful, directing with so much talent and authority the work of the organ of our Organization charged with the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. I should also like to thank the many representatives for the kind words that they have addressed to me.

117. Before stating the point of view of my Government regarding the item on the agenda for this meeting, I should like to express to the representative of Turkey the sad feelings of sympathy of the people of Belgium in regard to the many families who are in mourning because of the disastrous earthquakes which have devastated several places in eastern Turkey.

118. Once again the Security Council has been called upon to pronounce itself on the question of the extension, for another six-month period, of the stationing on Cyprus of the United Nations Peace-keeping Force. My delegation voted in favour of the resolution which endorsed the decision of the Council because we share the reasoning and arguments which are developed in the chapter on observations in the report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations operation in Cyprus for the period 2 December 1970 to 19 May 1971.

119. While it is true that the latest report submitted by the Secretary-General contains certain positive elements in comparison with the previous one—the fact, for example, that there are no deaths to be deplored because of incidents between the two communities, the reduced number of incidents, the new progress registered in trying to restore public services—nevertheless it is no less true that essentially it reflects the concern and apprehensions of impartial observers who see the deterioration of the political and economic situation in Cyprus. Paragraphs 78 and 79 leave no doubt about the grave and serious character of the dissensions which divides the two communities. After carefully examining the developments which have occurred

in many sectors of the various national activities, the Secretary-General arrives at the following observation: "there has been little perceptible improvement in the situation in Cyprus and no indication of progress towards a negotiated solution of the underlying problems of the island. On the contrary..." [see S/10199 and Corr.1, para. 78] and later:

"the situation in the island remains apparently calm,..." but there is a "depth of feeling which still divides the two communities. The continuation of this situation is all the more hazardous because of the persistent confrontation of two well-armed military forces..." [ibid., para. 79].

120. Accordingly my delegation unreservedly supports the two immediate conclusions of the Secretary-General after analyzing the situation, namely, first, the present calm must be maintained so as to promote a real improvement in the relations between all the populations of the island; and, secondly, that it is in the interest of all the parties to continue the intercommunal talks in a real spirit of conciliation.

121. Regarding the maintenance of calm, my delegation places its confidence in the tact, spirit of discipline and general behaviour of the officers, non-commissioned officers, and soldiers of the United Nations Force which, since 1964, has so decisively contributed to the restoration of public order and has done everything in its power to prevent incidents from degenerating into combat.

122. On the other hand, the efforts for the maintenance of order cannot bear fruit unless there are continuous parallel intercommunal talks between the representatives of the two communities. My Government firmly hopes that Mr. Clerides and Mr. Denktash will continue their talks, and have an exchange of constructive proposals and replies so as to arrive at an over-all solution. My delegation took note with satisfaction of the statements made by these two personalities, according to which they will continue their negotiations so as to arrive at a peaceful solution, despite the disagreements which divide them in regard to fundamental principles. In that process it is important to allow quiet diplomacy to take its course. We know from experience that in a tense atmosphere public statements further complicate matters, and we feel sure that the responsible leaders will understand this. My delegation supports the appeals of the Secretary-General to the leaders of all the parties concerned to evince statesmanship. I would furthermore take this opportunity to pay tribute to the uninterrupted and wise action of the Secretary-General and of his representative on the spot, Mr. Osorio-Tafall, assigned to bring peace and to mediate among the representatives of the two communities. Only the maintenance of national cohesion within a realistic and positive conception of national interests can contribute to restoring a climate of confidence in a country which has suffered too long.

123. My Government has taken note of the growing financial implications of the United Nations operation on Cyprus. As it has in the past, Belgium will not fail to make a voluntary contribution to cover the operating expenses of

the Force. At the same time, however, we hope that the suggestion contained in paragraph 87 of the report will lead to a constructive exchange of views, in which my country will participate. My delegation considers that the legal bases for this operation are too empirical and therefore too fragile.

124. I should not wish to end this statement of the attitude of my Government on the question of Cyprus without paying a sincere tribute to the tireless efforts made by the officers, non-commissioned officers and soldiers of the United Nations Force in the execution of the mandate conferred on them by the Security Council in its resolution 186 (1964) of 4 March 1964. We can proudly affirm that in Cyprus the United Nations has introduced a factor of order and peace.

125. Mr. DE LA GUARDIA (Argentina) (*interpretation from Spanish*): First of all, on behalf of my delegation I should like to express to the representative of Turkey, and through him his entire people, our sincere condolences on the earthquake which recently devastated a part of his country, a country which has so often suffered similar catastrophes.

126. May I next congratulate you, Mr. President, because you are once more conducting the work of the Council. We also wish to express our gratitude to the Secretariat for the work they have done in everything pertaining to the item we are dealing with. In this connexion, we warmly remember and appreciate Mr. Rolz-Bennett for having done exceptional work in this field. To his successor, Mr. Roberto Guyer, with whom I have an old friendship, I augur the greatest success, as I am convinced that he will brilliantly continue the work he started after his trip to Cyprus. To the representative of the Secretary-General, Mr. Osorio-Tafall and to Major-General Prem Chand who commands the United Nations Forces on Cyprus, we express our moral support, in the certainty that they are discharging a vital role for the attainment of our set objectives.

127. More than once on past occasions when this same question was debated in the Security Council and when my country had the honour to be one of its members, that is, in 1966 and 1967, the delegation of Argentina expressed its opinion with a feeling of combined optimism and discouragement. This is the fourth year since then and we see no change, no reason to show greater optimism or greater discouragement.

128. But this in itself is dangerous and should trouble us. If the situation has not improved in four years, this in itself indicates that it has become worse and in truth the excellent and complete report of the Secretary-General clearly shows this.

129. We do believe that there is one positive fact, a very positive one, on Cyprus; it is positive for our Organization and positive in its results for the entire world. The presence of an international peace-keeping force, a United Nations Force, has made a decisive contribution towards a cessation of violence. This is very important.

130. However, it would be more important if that force—whose material sustenance entails considerable cost—could withdraw at some time, to leave the inhabitants of Cyprus in the full enjoyment of a well-earned peace. Regrettably the conditions for this have not been forthcoming. The report of the Secretary-General is frank on this point, as on all others, and leaves no room for any doubt whatever in this regard.
131. The presence of the international force can bring an end to violence but not to a disarmament of minds. The officers of the army, the navy and the air force of my country know this well; for some time they have been making their effective contribution in another United Nations peace-keeping force elsewhere.
132. Paragraphs 2 and 26 in particular and all of chapter VIII of the report furnish abundant and alarming proof of such a state of mind. In one of these we even are told that there is "an increase in tension and a deterioration of the political atmosphere" [see S/10199 and Corr.1, para. 2] and in paragraph 81 we are warned that:
- "It seems more than likely that if the intercommunal talks were to break down or to end in complete and admitted failure, a new and major crisis would shortly erupt in Cyprus. Such a crisis would not only have the gravest consequences for the people of the island, but might well also constitute a serious threat to peace and security in the eastern Mediterranean."
133. In fact, maintenance of that international force is not and could never be an objective in itself if no progress is made on substantive solutions.
134. Yet today we are considering only that first task which is certainly limited, although we recognize its importance. Accordingly, my delegation voted in favour of the resolution which we adopted this morning, being fully convinced that we thereby co-operated in a good cause, the cause of peace.
135. Our agenda for today does not contain a discussion on the substance of the question, and we shall not discuss it; my delegation will not. But let us not wear a blindfold to the potential dangers of the situation.
136. We all know the fears and distrust which regrettably the two Cypriot communities feel and the report before us exposes them openly. In our opinion, the remedy for these ills is indicated in paragraph 83 of the same document when it counsels the leaders of the communities who are the only and essential parties to the problem to solve the problem of Cyprus: "by arriving, through peaceful means, at a lasting agreement based on the independence and sovereignty of a unitary State of Cyprus."
137. Let it be clearly understood that we are convinced that each of these ideas carries a certain weight and meaning in a delicate balance which would doubtless be affected if more emphasis were placed on one than on the other.
138. My delegation fervently hopes that we shall reach that substantive solution as early as possible.
139. Mr. ROMAN (Nicaragua) (*interpretation from Spanish*): At this late hour I shall endeavour to be as brief as possible. However, I cannot fail to express my gratitude to the delegations of Argentina and Belgium for their good offices during the months of March and April, and congratulate you, Mr. President, on your brilliant second Presidency of the Council.
140. Nor, could I fail to express our deepest sympathy to the Ambassador of Turkey in connexion with the serious earthquake which so devastated his country.
141. With respect to the draft resolution which was before the Council, we voted in favour of it. Since the delegation of Nicaragua previously expressed its views at length on the problem of Cyprus and because of the urgency of time, we now consider it to be unnecessary to repeat them and because, furthermore, they appear in the verbatim records of the Security Council. May I confirm them again now.
142. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): I shall now speak as representative of BURUNDI.
143. First of all it is the duty of the delegation of Burundi to express its feelings of compassion to the Government of Turkey, through its representative, in connexion with the natural disasters which have recently struck that country.
144. Secondly, I am pleased on behalf of the delegation of Burundi to express my gratitude to the civilian and military authorities who represent the Secretary-General on the island of Cyprus, for their outstanding devotion and service throughout their mandate.
145. Thirdly, with respect to the Secretary-General, my delegation is pleased to express to him our feelings of admiration for the very comprehensive, frank report on the present situation in Cyprus. Along the same lines, it is a pleasure to see that I have seated next to me the Under-Secretary-General, Mr. Roberto Guyer, who has so greatly assisted us by providing us with a report on short notice. I should therefore like to thank him and to express our best wishes for a brilliant career in his new post. I should also like to wish his predecessor a speedy and complete recovery and hope that he will long enjoy good health.
146. To turn now to the problem which has concerned the Council throughout the day, I must first of all state that the categorical imperative for Cyprus is to build a nation based on harmony and brotherhood among its citizens.
147. As Montesquieu wrote in *The Spirit of Laws*: "The right of peoples is based naturally on this principle: the different nations, in peace, must do for each other the greatest good, and in war the least evil that is possible".
148. If this moving appeal is applicable to all foreign nations, is it not, therefore, all the more valid for the compatriots of a single State, Cyprus?
149. I come now to the unity and identity of the human destiny. Situated almost at the crossroads of three continents, Europe, Africa and Asia, which are brilliant centres

of refined civilizations and cultures which complement each other, the island of Cyprus is the outstanding symbol of the unity and identity of human destiny. Indeed, the drama taking place in that country, as described in the report of the Secretary-General of 20 May, bears witness to the inability of man to triumph over his inclination to dislocation and dissociation.

150. These tendencies are unfortunately also widespread in Asia, the Middle East, Europe, Africa and Latin America. They generate civil wars, wars of secession, religious conflicts and racial and colonial wars. The case of Cyprus cannot be dissociated from the general virus which afflicts man on our planet.

151. For my part, I believe that the only viable solution to the dispute which divides the two communities resides in their final determination to work together for the consolidation of one and the same Cypriot identity. In that undertaking, the leaders and spokesmen of the two parties have the responsibility to create a national atmosphere which is in every way favourable to fraternization.

152. However, such an atmosphere will be conceivable only when the recriminations of one side against the other are banished forever. Recriminations would only worsen a situation, which already contains the seeds of a new conflagration. A vast campaign for reconciliation and pacification designed to eliminate rancour and resentment should be on the programme to build an independent and sovereign Cypriot State. To reach such a stage, the vital reciprocal interests must be safeguarded and taken into account. The two sides equally claim the right to live and to citizenship and to all the privileges flowing therefrom. No pretext, either numerical or historical, should deprive either of the two communities of the enjoyment of civil rights. The monopoly of powers must be excluded in relations between Greeks and Turks. Since the allegiance to their respective ancestral origins diverts the two columns of the same society from patriotic dedication, it is destined to yield before the requirement to devote themselves body and soul to their only homeland, Cyprus.

153. Prompted by the principles which I have mentioned above and inspired by the intentions which I have expressed, the Government of the Republic of Burundi, consistent with itself, has instructed its delegation to the Security Council to support the resolution which was adopted this morning in the light of the report of the Secretary-General and in accord with it, and which corresponds to a maxim of Aristotle's—one of the ancestors of one of the interested communities—in his *Ethique à Eudème*: "The main purpose of politics is to create friendship between the members of a city."

154. One of the primary concerns of the United Nations should be the firm resolve to bring about a profound human, cultural, economic and political osmosis between the races.

155. The situation prevailing among the Cypriot citizens as well as among many others in other countries at present requires us to renounce obsolete myths, so long devised regarding Africa, whose prestige and destiny are still

mortgaged by those who measure the continent by their own standards and who decree that the Africans are monopolizers of ethnic antagonisms.

156. These developments are common to all races and need an implacable coalition of the world community against racial psychosis with its double sequela, making some men divine and others less than human. There is a postulate: under equal conditions, races are equal; the only difference is between individuals. Africa will inevitably attain the apogee of its history and of its general flourishing.

157. We perceive old theories in new forms, according to which Africa, forever struck by a congenital powerlessness, is incapable of looking after itself. On the one hand, the political proselytism of African leadership, on the other hand, tribalism, jeopardize everything according to those theories. They reflect in a servile way ancient conceptions stigmatized by Descartes, who, in his *A Discourse on Method*, describes the governors of the ancient régime as those who by birth or fortune are called upon to manage public affairs.

158. It appears clearly that those who hold such ideas try to divide mankind into different camps, one of which supposedly has a race endowed with native and acquired political omniscience while the other only includes beings who are forever deprived of any skill for national or international public affairs. Being exposed to a strong dose of racial psychosis, the advocates of these doctrines are characterized by an ingenuity which is in every way pitiful.

159. The Organization of African Unity (OAU) is not a giant with feet of clay and is not ready to crumble before a faint breeze. Indeed, if that vast continent enjoyed global homogeneity, then one might question the need for the OAU. We must exorcise from our minds the artificial and ingenious spectre. This is a fundamental mistake: a mechanical uniformity; cultural, religious and political would not be desirable, nor healthy, nor beneficial, because it would not be effective due to its very monotony. Based on the variety of respective national characteristics, the continental organization will find its fulfilment in its heterogeneity and in its diversity, which is the basis for being complementary and definite unity. Accordingly it would be chimerical to try to be overly attached to an identity of views, of positions in the African institutions or on all problems pertaining to Africa.

160. Assuming that tribalism is indeed at the root of some failures in Africa, at least one should recognize that this is not the monopoly of Africans alone. In any case, are not the gravest wrongs caused by racial characteristics tame in comparison with the monumental harm inflicted on mankind by nazism in the past and by *apartheid* its plagiarist today? Are not *apartheid* and racial discrimination exotic products imported into Africa? Need I add that Africa has valiantly resisted the contagion of those exotic separatisms and that, in so doing, it has the right to propose itself as a model of harmony and cohesion at the continental level and on the international scene.

161. Speaking again as PRESIDENT, I have on my list of speakers the name of the representative of Cyprus, who has

asked to be allowed to speak in exercise of his right of reply. I now call on him.

162. Mr. ROSSIDES (Cyprus): Mr. President, I wish, in the first place, to thank you for your constructive statement on this problem and also to thank all the other members of the Council who brought a constructive contribution in a positive approach to the problem. Many of the things that have been said by members here are identical to what I have been repeating in this Council many times, particularly in the recent sessions of the Security Council.

163. I was very satisfied to hear the representative of Italy, Ambassador Vinci, say that the problem is not intractable—that there should be goodwill and a spirit of realizing that what is important is what unites the people and not what divides them. That is the identical phrase I have used at previous meetings—that the people should look to the important things that unite them and not to the artificial ones that divide them. I shall quote from the record of one meeting at which I said: “One thing is required to solve the question of Cyprus: understanding and conciliation on the basis that Cyprus is and will remain an integral unit, undivided and unpartitioned . . .” [1564th meeting, para. 184].

164. That is the problem. Once there is a recognition from all sides that Cyprus is an integral unit that is and will remain as such, then the whole problem will find its way to solution. But if we want to partition it, we naturally must keep up division; we must whip it up; we must create differences where there are none, and where there are some, magnify them.

165. That is the usual way of leading people to division, from some or other political motivation that lies behind that move. This has been the case all through the history of the policy of division: to find some kind of little hole through which to inject the division, or, if you see that division is waning, to reinforce it by some means or other.

166. Now, the instances in Cyprus are so numerous that I would not have time to explain them all. But some few might serve as an indication of what is happening in Cyprus. I said this before. The whole problem in Cyprus lies in the opposition of a policy of a united State and a consolidated people, a people who wish to co-operate and live together, and another influence, another force trying to keep them separate, trying to prevent them from conciliating, trying to make it unpatriotic for them to conciliate, trying to make them feel that they are guilty because they have spoken to a Greek, trying to make them realize that their duty to the mother country is to hate the Greeks, and to keep that hate up so that it will lead to ways aimed at the partition of Cyprus.

167. Is this true or is it not true? If we look, we will find—we have quoted them before—statements by Heads of State of Turkey, by Foreign Ministers of Turkey, saying that the solution for Cyprus is to break it in two and have a part go to Greece and another part to Turkey. And how can one do that? One must keep up the spirit of hatred. I do not want to raise these things, but it has to be understood.

We have to arrive at a point where the solution must come and must be on the basis of the people of Cyprus sharing together and living together. Everybody here spoke about this and I was satisfied and gratified to hear that everyone realizes what the problem in Cyprus is, and this indicates the way the problem can be solved.

168. Now, let me see. The representative of Turkey, Ambassador Bayülken, for whom I have great regard, insinuated that there were some statements made about the feelings of the people of Cyprus for Greece—for union with Greece—and that this is a new issue preventing a solution.

169. Now, with respect to what was said about these statements, I should like to point out that traditional ethnic speeches on national celebratory occasions do not interpret official policy and cannot be set against official declarations of policy and concrete actions consistent with that policy.

170. Therefore, that policy for an independent unitary State has been officially declared on repeated occasions, and every action of the Government of Cyprus is towards obtaining that independence in a unitary State. I repeat “in a unitary State”, because first of all that was the agreed basis of the talks, and, secondly, that is what the Secretary-General asks us to do. The call of the Secretary-General—and I am so glad to hear some of the delegations here refer to that call, to which I myself have referred—says very clearly that “the problem . . . must be solved by arriving, through peaceful means, at a lasting agreement based on the independence and sovereignty of a unitary State of Cyprus”. [S/10199 and Corr.1, para. 83.]

171. Can we serve that unitary State and the solution for independence otherwise than by having conciliation? It might be said: “Well, but it is difficult to have conciliation. The people may not want to conciliate.” It is completely the reverse. As the Secretary-General pointed out in a number of his reports, the people are ready to conciliate if they are allowed to do so. In his report of 9 March 1968, the Secretary-General noted that the ordinary Greek and Turkish Cypriot people “desire to live in peace and harmony and seem already prepared to accept and support reasonable compromises [S/8446, para. 153].

172. In his observations in another report, he said how gratifying it was to observe the ease with which ordinary people of both communities were beginning to resume their former amicable relations.

173. But how can the solution of the problem be reconciled with the attitude of the Turkish Cypriot side? I have already quoted in the Security Council—but I have to refer to it again—a document presented to the Liaison Committee, which is composed of Greek Cypriots, Turkish Cypriots and the United Nations Force; they look into problems between the communities. In this, the complaint was made that the Turkish people were not allowed to conciliate—not allowed to have any contacts with Greeks—and that those in the enclaves were kept there and not allowed to go out of them unless they had permits—permits allowing them so many hours, and given to those whom they knew would be fanatic and would not conciliate. So, as the people were eager to get together, the Turkish

military régime in the enclaves imposed punishments on those who showed a tendency towards any form of conciliation. I quote here:

"Those who disobey the order with a view to having trade connexions with the Greek Cypriots shall pay £25 5s., or shall be punished with imprisonment. A fine of £1 will be imposed on: 1. Those who converse"—just converse—"or enter into any negotiations with the Greek Cypriots or accompany any stranger into our sector. 2. Those who come into contact with Greek Cypriots for any official work. 3. Those who appear before Greek Cypriot Courts. 4. Those who visit the Greek Cypriot hospitals."—The Greek Cypriot hospitals are the hospitals of the Republic. These people are not allowed to visit the hospitals—"A fine of £20 will be imposed on those who have any dealings with Greek Cypriots or those who buy from Greek Cypriots goods which they could get from the Turkish Cypriot sector. A fine of £25, or severe punishment and one month's imprisonment, or whipping, shall be imposed on those who enter the Greek Cypriot sector for the following purposes: 1. a promenade"—not allowed—"punishment: severe whipping; 2. friendly association with Greek Cypriots; 3. amusement; 4. conveyance of information."

174. It was a great satisfaction to hear everybody say that the problem is solved by conciliation. But will the members face the problem that is faced by my Government and the vast majority of the people of Cyprus when the minority community of Turkish Cypriots are so emboldened from outside as to keep an imposed *apartheid* based on racial apartness to the extreme—no contacts, no relations, no buying, no entering a Greek shop.

175. A letter I sent to the Security Council the other day [S/10187] cited what Mr. Küçük has said in this regard. Of course, he denied it. But we have what he said word for word, exhorting the Turkish Cypriots not to have any relations with the Greeks. Now, how can this be consistent with the idea that the Turkish Cypriots and those who guide them, the Turkish Government, really want an independent State? How can there be a viable independent State if the people are kept apart. How can they co-operate without contact? That is why they prevent any move towards normalization. Anybody who would like to see the problem of Cyprus and who looked through a number of the Secretary-General's reports would find that the problem of deconfrontation, that is, the way of solving the problem of confrontation, is the most important problem.

76. The Secretariat survey team that went to Cyprus, sent by the Secretary-General to see what could be done with the Force—whether it could be withdrawn or reduced—made a long report after careful examination and said that the one problem, the greatest difficulty standing in the way of the withdrawal of UNFICYP is the close confrontation. The confrontation is so close, those who are armed are so near each other, that any kind of provocation is likely to occur.

77. It is a matter of psychology. So the United Nations Force says: "If you do not want to eliminate the confrontation, if, in spite of all this period of calm among

the people you keep up the tension by having the confrontation, at least separate those who are armed so that they will be looking at each other from a distance".

178. No, the Turkish side will not accept it. This can be seen in the reports. I need not refer to them; anybody can take any report on confrontation. As a matter of fact, I made reference to them in my main speech; I do not want to spend any additional time on them now. So on one of the main problems of confrontation the Turkish side will not give in, thus maintaining the enmity and the division.

179. Next is freedom of movement: freedom of movement is essential to having the necessary contacts and association. My colleague Ambassador Bayülken said—and I agree with him—that what is needed is trust. Surely there can be no solution of the problem if there is no trust. That is why we have had disarmament negotiations for twenty-five years, and before that, for another twenty, because there was insufficient trust. Any problem, without trust, is insoluble. Therefore, what is needed is trust.

180. But trust needs a spirit of friendliness—association—to overcome suspicion. The more you separate people, the more suspicious they become; the more you put them into separate camps, the more they think that the people in the other camp are the enemy. Any study of mass psychology will bear that out.

181. Therefore, to have trust you must have conciliation; and to have conciliation you must have association. And to have association you must have freedom of movement, and not walls of separation. You cannot have association if people are punished the moment they are seen talking to Greeks. Moreover, one cannot see the people with whom one wants to conciliate if the military régime in the enclave forces them not to conciliate by punishment. When I stated this before in the Council, the representative of Turkey, Mr. Eralp, did not deny it. He said: "That is correct; you are not supposed to have contacts with the enemy". There you are.

182. Therefore, I had some mixed feelings when I heard all the various speakers in this Council. My heart was going out to them. Yes, we want conciliation and peace and harmony. But at the same time I was thinking: "But how can we do that if normalization is prevented—if deconfrontation is prevented by the Turkish attitude?"

183. Now, the representative of Turkey said something which might be true or might be false. Let us examine it. He said that normalization could come only when there was a restitution of the Constitution—when everything was agreed. Therefore, normalization must follow the solution. But that is completely upside-down; it is the same thing as was said just now—that we cannot have a cease-fire until we have signed a peace treaty. But a cease-fire serves only to help towards signing a peace treaty. The Secretary-General answered that view by saying that if we want a normalization we must have agreement on the Constitution and have everything restored. The Secretary-General stressed that there has been all along and continues to be what he considered to be a misunderstanding on the part of the Turkish community in Cyprus and of the Turkish Govern-

ment as to the function and duty of the United Nations Force in Cyprus.

184. By "return to normal conditions" the Security Council did not mean, in the view of the Secretary-General as he explained it there, a restoration of the situation in Cyprus exactly as it was before December 1963, including the constitutional situation.

185. Therefore I think this is a very important meeting because it stresses the need for normalization as a step towards solving the problem and helping the talks. We have to help the talks. Everybody has said the talks are so important; everybody is agreed that this problem must be solved by the talks—that the Cyprus problem must be solved by the Cypriots themselves. And I say here very solemnly that the Cypriots from both sides are ready to solve their problem if they are not prevented from outside.

186. Now, it is not enough to speak words: words may be empty; words may be uttered in a moment of passion, in a moment of enthusiasm, in a moment when a word does not reflect what we can see the actions are.

187. What have been the actions towards strengthening the independence of Cyprus? The Government of Cyprus, as I have already said, has made very constructive proposals, particularly in the last proposals. At three stages the Cyprus Government made concessions, and more concessions, towards meeting the other side. It went so far as to divide the State merely to accept the views of the other side so long as it did not destroy the State; and in the "package deal" it made such proposals. But the Turkish Cypriot side—not the Turkish Cypriot people, but those who deal in their name—came not only without any concession on the question of local government, but with more intransigent claims, claims that would split the State in two and that would make it unworkable. For example, to give just one idea that I mentioned before. In a State in which there is a majority and a minority, a Greek majority and a Turkish minority, where the villages are interspersed, every town and district having a proportion of both, and not a single district having a predominance of Turkish people, can one imagine the possibility of saying, "We are going to have local government in this island; we shall divide the island into local governments, not on the basis of geographical areas but by ethnic criteria. Wherever there is a Turk, no matter where he lives, he will come under one administration, and wherever a Greek lives, even if it is at one extreme end, he will come under another local administration?" And from there one proceeds to a second stage where again there is a separate chamber, up to the very top separate, at no time linking with the central Government.

188. This is unprecedented in the history of all constitutional problems. Therefore, that is our problem. And therefore if that difficulty could be overcome there would be no question about solving the problem; it could be solved within the next few months. But I do not want to project pessimism. No, we are optimistic. We know about those difficulties, but life is full of difficulties. Difficulties are there to be overcome. If one follows the line one believes is the straightforward and proper one—and I believe that in all my statements it can be seen that I have followed

the same line followed in the statements made here—we believe we shall be able to obtain agreement and conciliation. All we want is that Cyprus should be conciliated and a centre of unity between Greece and Turkey, not a focus of trouble. But we believe that all these difficulties will be overcome, and they will be overcome in an atmosphere of conciliation.

189. What I am saying here is not intended as a reflection on anyone—not on the Turkish Government nor on the Turkish Cypriots. Situations arise and people take that attitude. I am speaking thus only to see how we can overcome the problems, how we can get them solved without having the difficulty I have already mentioned.

190. Now, another part of the report that is relevant to this matter is paragraph 80, which has been quoted by a number of representatives, in which the Secretary-General says that he and his collaborators "have repeatedly urged all the parties concerned in the Cyprus problem to exercise restraint and moderation and especially to avoid the threat, or the use, of drastic retaliatory measures". Now, this part of the report refers to Security Council resolution 186 (1964) of 4 March 1964, which says

"Having in mind the relevant provisions of the Charter of the United Nations and . . . its Article 2, paragraph 4, which reads . . ."

and then it cites the whole Article concerning Members refraining in their international relations from the threat or use of force. In its first operative paragraph the resolution states the following:

"Calls upon all Member States, in conformity with their obligations under the Charter of the United Nations, to refrain from any action or threat of action likely to worsen the situation in the sovereign Republic of Cyprus, or to endanger international peace".

Now, that is a clear call to the Members of the United Nations not to threaten to use force against Cyprus for any reason, as this be a violation of the Charter.

191. On this matter I sent a letter to the Security Council [S/10185] referring to exactly that point: the threat of intervention in respect of retaliation, the use of force. That is another problem that creates tension in Cyprus—the threat of foreign intervention, the continuous threat of danger in that regard.

192. So we have first a threat of danger from outside that is constantly returning. Then we have the difficulty of getting the Turkish Cypriots to be allowed by their leadership to get together. Those are the problems we face. But I hope and trust that with goodwill—and we have shown a great deal of it in the normalization measures the Government has taken—we shall reach a moment when that goodwill will meet with a response.

193. Now there are a few matters I must mention in reply to my colleague. I said that one thing that disturbs my Government is the very feverish activity of the Turkish Cypriots mentioned in the report—their military parades

and the heavy weapons in their possession. The representative of Turkey said that was not true. So I shall give him the details so that he can verify them. Maybe he is right; maybe he is wrong. But let us have the details. We know the information is very positive, but let us see: sub-machine guns, 530; machine guns, A-4 and A-6, 500; machine guns, Hotchkiss, 40; light machine guns, 40; anti-aircraft machine guns, 30; mortars, 60-81 mm., 130; anti-tank guns, bazookas, 236-305 mm., 104; recoilless rifles, 57 by 75, 32. Recoilless rifles are the ones the Turdyk has, but I must say that those weapons are even much heavier than the Turdyk is allowed to have. The Turdyk is the Turkish contingent. I pass that information to my colleague for him to check so that we can see what is happening.

194. Secondly, the Turdyk, through the alliance under which the Treaty was terminated by Cyprus—but under that Treaty they have the Turdyk in Cyprus—has 50 officers, 503 men and 47 non-commissioned officers. They are rotated, and this last rotation was half. Therefore, the number of officers rotated should have been about 25. There were not 25; there were 46. If 46 were rotated the total could not be 50. And according to our information there are 152 officers instead of 50; there are 98 non-commissioned officers instead of 47; and there are 1,200 men instead of 650. Now, again, that may be wrong. But those are the figures in our possession. I mention those details because it is necessary to clear up this matter and to have an idea of what the Turdyk is and what it is not.

195. Another point I must answer concerns economic assistance to the Turkish Cypriots. There is a whole book listing the assistance given. Because of the kind of rebellion they had started the Turkish Cypriots refused to pay for electricity, refused to pay for water, refused to pay for everything. But for the sake of peace and quiet they are supplied with everything without charge. Perhaps there are a few cases of their paying, but on the whole they do not. The Welfare Insurance Fund is losing at least £331,000 annually because the Turks do not pay. And yet £120,000 is paid to them each year.

196. Another point concerns the repairing of Turkish houses: we have done everything to repair them, but, as I said before, they are not allowed to return in all cases. Two hundred and eighty seven houses have been built and repaired. Almost £48,000 has been spent on those houses and we are going on. So let us hope that—not in the years to come, but that by the next meeting of the Security Council on this question—we may have some better reports to give with regard to the situation in Cyprus. And those better reports can only come in the way that it was mentioned in this Council, through the solution of the problem by the people of Cyprus themselves looking to what unites them and by putting aside what divides them.

197. I think there is one other thing I ought to mention: the representative of Turkey said that three Turkish Cypriots residing in the enclaves were assaulted by the Police in Famagusta. I have the statement issued on this matter.

198. At about 12.45 on Sunday, 23 May, a police patrol carrying out normal traffic duties at the village of Lef-

koniko signalled to a passing car to stop. The driver of the car failed to respond to the police call. The car was followed by the police car to the outskirts of Famagusta and was stopped there. This is something that would happen anywhere that the police called upon a car that did not stop. It was ascertained there that the passengers of the car were Ismet Kotak of Nicosia, Ali Ozzeal from Famagusta and Hussein Zapri and Ali Genograd. They were asked why they did not stop when they were called by the police. Their answer was that they did not know it was a police signal. The Turkish Cypriots were searched. There was nothing incriminating in their possession except a switch-blade knife which was confiscated by the police. The Turkish Cypriots were left free to go on their way.

199. As I said in my statement before, the report of the Secretary-General mentions that there has been transportation of arms from one side to the other by the Turkish Cypriot armed elements from the time that freedom of movement was given to them. Therefore, it was not wrong for the police, when they signalled to the car and it did not stop, to suspect that the occupants were armed and therefore they were searched. But there was no assault, nothing happened to them at all; it was a natural stop and search in the car.

200. But why do these Turkish Cypriots object to being stopped and searched; this was done regularly before the complete freedom of movement. If it had been Greeks who entered the enclave from which they came, they would not be stopped by the police for a traffic light; they would be stopped, immediately arrested, and put in custody merely because they were Greeks and were in the Turkish quarter.

201. It is stated in the report that UNFICYP has to go and free men who by mistake stray into the Turkish quarter. The fact is that when a Greek Cypriot strays by mistake into a Turkish quarter he is arrested and put into custody until UNFICYP intervenes. Why should they do this? The reason is simple: to prevent contact, to make it understood that the Greeks cannot get into this part of the island, and that the Turks on the other side should not go there unless it is for some very special reason. Meanwhile, in the rest of Cyprus there is the other half of the Turkish population who live together with the Greeks and there are no problems. The problems arise with regard to those Turks who live in the enclaves. Therefore, we see that the division and the separation by walls in the enclaves creates not security but the opposite. It does not create a State but destroys a State. We hope that this attitude will change. When this attitude changes—and there is every reason for it to change, because the people's feelings are friendly—then we will have solved the problem.

202. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): The representative of Turkey has asked to be allowed to speak. I am very happy to call upon him.

203. Mr. BAYÜLKEN (Turkey) (*interpretation from French*): At this late hour I have no intention of delaying the members of the Council concerning points which have just been explained by Ambassador Rossides and which, I think, in no way reflect reality. I feel sure that my statement of this morning has shed light on all the matters which he touched on once again.

204. I understand very well the difficulty in which Ambassador Rossides finds himself; he strives to explain the points he made in such a way as to regain the sympathy of the members of the Council—a sympathy which, in my opinion, did not exist during the debate this morning. I shall not try to reply to every point. But I wonder above all whether, in this detailed exposition, Mr. Rossides was not really trying to prepare a new report or submitting a new report on the situation in Cyprus covering the six months' period, instead of the Secretary-General's report which has been submitted to us, of which the Council was seized, which we have discussed and in regard to which we have even adopted a resolution.

205. A great deal is said, but I would say that, as has been proved in several documents which I had the honour to draw to the attention of the members of the Council, it is always *enosis* which is at the heart of the problem. One can find solutions to other problems. So as not to delay the members of the Council, I should like to ask Mr. Rossides one question which might perhaps facilitate matters in a really striking manner. I should like to refer to the letter of the Vice-President of the Republic of Cyprus, Mr. Küçük, in document S/10200. And there, after having explained the main points and essential conflicts of the question, he asks Ambassador Rossides whether he is ready to make a statement here in the Council, renouncing *enosis* as a policy of the Greek Cypriot community and to work towards a compromise solution which would safeguard the legitimate interests and rights of both parties.

206. I am curious to see whether there will be a reply from Ambassador Rossides. The objectives are always grossly referred to when it constitutes a negation of the legal rights of the Turkish community and when in fact there is nothing but silence and rather are pretexts sought.

207. As I have said, I shall not try to reply point by point. I simply wish to clarify some points which perhaps I did not touch on in my statement this morning.

208. First, I should like to say that I never stated in the Council that there is no need for contact between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots. I am deeply sorry that Ambassador Rossides could think that I would ever make such a statement.

209. At times, there are situations in which the excuse is worse than the explanation. Indeed, such is the case when Mr. Rossides tries to give explanations on the Turkish Cypriots who were arrested in Famagusta.

210. In my statement this morning I referred to the treatment of three members of the Turkish community and said that they were visiting a mixed village, Greek and Turkish—this means that there are contacts—and that on their return from this mixed village they were not treated in a civilized manner by the Greek police. Imagine, these three members of the community, who play an active part in the politics of that community: accompany the Vice-President of the Republic of Cyprus, Mr. Küçük, during his visit and on returning they are arrested and are taken to the police station for not having seen a traffic light. I am sure that they showed their identity cards, but, this was not enough.

Even in Mr. Rossides' version of the incident the admission is there that the Turkish Cypriots were searched simply because they did not see the police signalling to them. This very patently shows the manner in which Turks are treated in the part controlled by the Greek Cypriots.

211. I believe I explained quite clearly this morning that the Turkish enclaves are far more limited in size than the "sensitive" military regions, regions controlled by the Greek Cypriots. I also mentioned the statement of the Vice-President of the Republic of Cyprus that unarmed Greeks who have a legitimate reason to do so can enter the Turkish enclaves.

212. Rotation is mentioned so are munitions, the artillery, the officers, etc. But I shall not waste your time. There was a great effort on the part of Ambassador Rossides to prepare a new report for the Security Council. Yet I believe he has no special mandate to present us such a report now. We already have a comprehensive and detailed report. So I shall not dwell on this; but I can say that I reject all the allegations he has made which, I feel sure, are not based on facts. In any case, I believe that Ambassador Rossides will have ample opportunity to ascertain the real facts in the next report of the Secretary-General.

213. Although at the United Nations it happens that a speaker announces he will be brief and then makes a long speech. I hope that I shall adhere to my custom and be brief.

214. The debate which has been taking place since this morning in the Security Council very clearly demonstrates that an atmosphere of insecurity and tension exists in Cyprus at present. This is a serious matter, as the report of the Secretary-General has emphasized. Members of the Council, in the statements they made this morning, set forth the reasons for this situation. As for myself, having stated the views of my Government on the subject in my main statement this morning, I shall refrain from going back to this once again. What I should like to say, however, is that it is with mixed feelings of regret, at the situation existing at present in Cyprus, and of hope, that in the next months things may improve there, that I have participated in the debate today. In spite of all, it was a relief, a pleasure for me to perceive at this meeting of the Council a message of encouragement for the representatives of the two communities in Cyprus, the Turkish and Greek communities, in their arduous task, namely, to work with all good will and in a spirit of mutual accommodation so as to arrive at a substantive agreement for a constitutional régime which would insure for them a harmonious and prosperous life as well as relations based on mutual respect for their legitimate rights and interests, while safeguarding the security they need.

215. The express and sincere abandonment of the policy of *enosis* is doubtless at the source of any progress to be made in the intercommunal talks. I would venture to say that a message of this kind emerged today from the discussions in the Security Council. I should like to express my gratitude and appreciation to the representatives seated around this table who, in their statements, contributed to such an atmosphere.

216. Before concluding my statement, I should like to say that my delegation and I have been very moved by the expressions of sympathy and condolences expressed by you, Mr. President, by the members of the Security Council and by my colleague from Greece on the occasion of the disastrous earthquake which struck my country recently.

217. I want to express my thanks and gratitude. I shall not fail to communicate to my Government the expressions of sympathy of my colleagues, imbued with friendship and understanding. I am sure that these expressions of sympathy will be deeply appreciated by my Government and by the Turkish nation.

218. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): I call on the representative of Cyprus for the second time.

219. Mr. ROSSIDES (Cyprus): I know it is very late and I should not keep the members here, but I wish to say a few words with regard to the question put to me by the representative of Turkey, namely, whether, as it is put in the letter, we are willing to renounce *enosis* and work for the independence of Cyprus on the basis of a compromise solution which should include both political and economic elements and protect the vested rights and the legitimate interests of both communities. Well, we know what are the legitimate interests of both communities. All that is linked together. We have to agree with all those things. The legitimate interests of both communities, as they put them, is to have a divided State—as I said. They say that the legitimate interests of the Turkish community in Cyprus is to divide the State. We do not accept that division of Cyprus, and therefore we cannot accept any of those suggestions. Nor is this the place to make renunciations. However, it is the place to heed what the Secretary-General said in his report. He pointed the way to the solution of the problem in paragraph 83, and I accepted that indication very clearly and very emphatically in my statement. I said that we are for that solution, and take the statement of the Secretary-General to be a reaffirmation that that solution is the proper solution of the problem. We said that we are going to follow that line, as we have been following it, which can be seen.

220. But I have not heard one word from the representative of Turkey about that paragraph. Most of the members of the Security Council did speak about that paragraph, which is the important paragraph. It is not what happens, but what the Secretary-General in his wisdom suggests in the report. And therefore the side that does not want independence and wants *enosis* is the side that accepts it and the other side that is working for independence is the one that does not accept it. Why? Because it makes it clear that it must not be a partitionist kind of independence, which will divide the State and partition it under the guise of that State. Therefore, would the representative of Turkey agree not to talk of renunciation but to accept what the Secretary-General proposes here—or does he reject it? That is my question to him. And that, I think, should require nothing more to be said about this issue.

221. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): I now call on the representative of Turkey.

222. Mr. BAY ÜLKEN (Turkey): I shall speak for only one minute. It was clear in my mind that Ambassador Rossides

could not answer and could not renounce the policy of *enosis*. Possibly if he did, we would not see him at this table at the next meeting. It was clear to me, and it is good that it is now clear to the Council also.

223. Ambassador Rossides now turns to the report of the Secretary-General. I think that to take phrases of an important document out of context and try to obtain some advantage from doing so is the worst possible way to succeed in conciliation. One should never allow the perversion of words. I know very well that in his report the Secretary-General states things in order to help the two parties. In fact, in his report of 2 December 1970 the Secretary-General of the United Nations said—and let me add *en passant* that Mr. Rossides seemed to pin so much of his hopes to this phraseology and tried hard to have something on these lines in the document which the Council adopted today—as follows: "The two sides have also indicated that a settlement can be worked out on the basis of an independent, sovereign and unitary State of Cyprus in which the two communities participate." [S/10005, para. 120.]

224. So, in the context of all the events and documents, any suggestion of the Secretary-General is made only to help the parties, and that is in consonance, as many members of the Council have made clear, with Security Council resolution 186 (1964) of 4 March 1964.

225. If Ambassador Rossides would kindly refer to that resolution, he would understand that the Secretary-General's suggestion is not a suggestion to make him happy. Instead, it is a suggestion which is intended to be helpful to the parties, and one should not look at one word or at another word, but should look at the problem. As one of the members of the Security Council said today, no amount of resolutions can settle the question. The parties should try to have the feeling of nationhood and try to have the consciousness of belonging to Cyprus. I do not see any answer to that. I knew that the answer would not be forthcoming.

226. I repeat what I said at the morning meeting, with this difference: the Turkish community wants to be helpful in the solution of the problem; seemingly Ambassador Rossides wants very much to find a solution here right now. We think that the representatives of the communities are trying to do that.

227. As I said in the General Assembly:

"The Turkish community is one of the partners in the State of Cyprus and in its independence and sovereignty. Cyprus is the homeland of the Turkish and Greek Cypriots, and not an extension of any one country. Cyprus is a unity where the two communities can continue to live with each other within their traditional and constitutional personalities; Cyprus is disunited when one of the two communities brushes aside the integral personality and security of the other. It is only in that manner that the democratic principles as well as the precepts of our Charter can prevail."¹

¹ Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-fifth Session, Plenary Meetings, 1882nd meeting, para. 268.

That is what I said at the twenty-fifth anniversary of the United Nations, and I repeat it here.

228. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): I have the impression that the representative of Cyprus feels the need to speak a third time. If so, I call on him.

229. Mr. ROSSIDES (Cyprus): Our statements are becoming shorter and shorter until they will get down to one word. The one word here will be that I knew the representative of Turkey was not in a position to accept the distinct suggestion made by the Secretary-General. I do not know what other things have appeared in his other reports, but they did not contain a call. This is a call which is made and it is the call we are concerned with. We are not concerned with other parts. Ambassador Bayülken insists that I answer the call of Mr. Küçük. That is not my

business, nor is this the forum to deal with what Mr. Küçük wants to put in his letters. What we have here is the Secretary-General's call. That is the call, and not the other statements. We are not going to take all the statements. We are going to take his call, and his call is clear. I knew Ambassador Bayülken would not accept it.

230. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): In turn, the representative of Turkey seems to feel the same need to speak, and I call on him.

231. Mr. BAYÜLKEN (Turkey): I can say that I do agree to the suggestion of the Secretary-General in the context of all his reports and all the documents and in the context of the resolution of 4 March 1964.

The meeting rose at 7.30 p.m.

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