

REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

APPENDIX III

VOLUME I

Index by subject and country of the
Verbatim Records of the Committee
on Disarmament in 1983

INDEX BY SUBJECT AND COUNTRY OF THE VERBATIM RECORDS
OF THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT IN 1983

List of Subject Headings

- I. Organization and Procedures
 1. General and Organizational Work
 2. Participation of Non-Member States
- II. Nuclear Test Ban
- III. Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament; prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters
- IV. Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons
- V. Chemical Weapons
- VI. New types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons; radiological weapons
- VII. Comprehensive programme of disarmament
- VIII. Prevention of an arms race in outer space
- IX. Consideration of other areas dealing with the cessation of the arms race and disarmament and other relevant measures
 1. Annual Report of the Secretary-General
 2. United Nations role in disarmament
 3. Disarmament Commission
 4. Special Sessions of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament
 5. Nuclear-weapon-free zones
 6. Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons
 7. Peaceful uses of nuclear energy
 8. Bacteriological (Biological) Weapons
 9. Geneva Protocol of 1925
 10. Environmental Modification Techniques
 11. Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons
 12. Conventional Weapons
 13. Regional disarmament
 14. Zones of Peace
 15. Sea-bed and Ocean Floor
 16. Reduction of military budgets
 17. Confidence-building measures
 18. Disarmament and international security
 19. Economic and social consequences of the arms race
 20. Disarmament and development
 21. Scientific and Technological Aspects of the Arms Race
 22. General and complete disarmament
 23. Research studies and training
 24. Public Information/World Public Opinion

Chronological			Alphabetical		
PV	Page	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV	Page
<p>I. <u>Organization and Procedures</u></p> <p>1. <u>General and Organizational Work</u></p>					
189	8-11	Mongolia (the Chairman)	Algeria	194	43-45
	20-22	Canada		198	25-27
	25-26, 29	USSR	Argentina	193	19-22
	31	Czechoslovakia		198	29-31
	32-38	Kenya		225	7
				233	13-18
				236	40
190	8, 13-14	Germany, Federal Republic of	Australia	192	25-29
191	10-11, 14	United States of America		198	15-16, 38
192	8-12	Belgium		237	23-24
	13-16	United Kingdom	Belgium	192	8-12
	20-23	German Democratic Republic		206	8
	25-29	Australia		209	27
	30-33	China	Belgium (on behalf of western group)	217	11-12
	34-37	Cuba		237	7
	37-38	Kenya	Bulgaria	193	29-32
193	8-9	Italy		214	6-7
	11-14	Japan	Burma	223	27
	15-17	Peru		195	19-20
	19-22	Argentina		200	29
	25-26	Hungary	Canada	224	14
	29-32	Bulgaria		189	20-22
	39-40	Nigeria		198	13-14
	42-44	Ethiopia		216	9-12
				236	44-45
194	8, 11-12	The Secretary-General of the United Nations	China	192	30-33
	14-17	Norway (non-member State)		198	32
	19-21	Pakistan		237	7
	22-27	Czechoslovakia		237	17
	28-30, 32	Sri Lanka	Cuba	192	34-37
	35-38	France		196	8
	40-41	Hungary		198	36-37
	43-45	Algeria	Czechoslovakia	189	31
				194	22-27
				220	5, 7
			Egypt	195	41, 43-44
			Ethiopia	193	42-44
				221	17
				234	24

Chronological			Alphabetical		
PV	Page	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV	Page
I. <u>Organization and Procedures</u> 1. <u>General and Organizational Work</u>					
195	8-10	Morocco	France	194	35-38
	11, 13-16	Romania		198	16-17, 38
	19-20	Burma		202	7
	28	India		216	31
	37-39	Poland	German Democratic Republic	238	28
	41, 43-44	Egypt		192	20-23
	49	Sweden	German Democratic Republic (on behalf of a group of socialist States)	198	22-23
196	8	Cuba		200	28
197	8-10	Indonesia	Germany, Federal Republic of	205	18-19
	10	Hungary (on behalf of a group of socialist States)		206	20, 23-24
	24-26	Kenya		190	8, 13-14
	28	Mexico	Hungary	198	28-29
	29	Mongolia (the Chairman)		203	30-31
198	6-7	Italy	Hungary (on behalf of a group of socialist States)	231	16
	7-10	Hungary (on behalf of a group of socialist States)	India	238	7
	11	Japan		193	25-26
	13	United States of America	Indonesia	194	40-41
	13-14	Canada	Islamic Republic of Iran	203	13-14
	15-16, 38	Australia	Italy	193	8-9
	16-17, 38	France		198	6-7
	18-20	USSR	Japan	193	11-14
	21	Poland		198	11
	22-23	German Democratic Republic	Japan (on behalf of western group)	202	29-31
	23-25	Kenya (on behalf of Group of 21)	Kenya	189	32-38
	25-27	Algeria		192	37-38
	28-29	Germany, Federal Republic of		197	24-26
	29-31	Argentina	Kenya (on behalf of Group of 21)	207	27
	32	China		212	31-32
	32-36	Mexico	Mexico	198	23-25
	36-37	Cuba		197	28
	38-39	Mongolia (the Chairman)		198	32-36
				202	32
				203	32
				216	28
				238	6

Chronological			Alphabetical		
PV	Page	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV	Page
<u>I. Organization and Procedures</u>					
<u>1. General and Organizational Work</u>					
199	7	Morocco (the Chairman)	Mexico (on behalf of Group of 21)	208	6
200	9-11	Yugoslavia	Mongolia	204	17
	19	Pakistan		216	24
	28	German Democratic Republic (on behalf of a group of socialist States)	Mongolia (the Chairman)	189	8-11
				197	29
				198	38-39
	29	Burma	Morocco	195	8-10
201	19-21	Romania	Morocco (the Chairman)	199	7
202	7	France		206	21
	12, 14	United Kingdom		207	26,27
	28	USSR		208	12,15
	29-31	Japan (on behalf of Western Group)	Netherlands	207	9-10
				235	25-26
	32	Mexico	Netherlands (the Chairman)	216	40-41
203	13-14	Hungary	Nigeria	193	39-40
	15-22, 31-32	USSR		205	12
				236	37-38
				237	24-25
	27-28	Islamic Republic of Iran	Nigeria (the Chairman)	217	7-8, 33
	30	United States of America		221	19-20
	30-31	Germany, Federal Republic of	Pakistan	194	19-21
				200	19
	32	Mexico	Pakistan (the Chairman)	222	7
204	17	Mongolia		224	6
205	12	Nigeria	Pakistan (on behalf of Group of 21)	237	7
	18-19	German Democratic Republic (on behalf of a group of socialist States)	Peru	193	15-17
				236	50
206	8	Belgium	Peru (the Chairman)	233	33
	20, 23-24	German Democratic Republic (on behalf of a group of socialist States)		234	28-29
				236	6
				237	6-7
				238	6, 35-37
	21	Morocco (the Chairman)	Poland	195	37-39
207	9-10	Netherlands		198	21
	26, 27	Morocco (the Chairman)	Romania	212	7
	27	India		195	11,13-16
	27	Kenya		201	19, 21
				237	7

Chronological			Alphabetical		
PV	Page	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV	Page
I. <u>Organization and Procedures</u> 1. <u>General and Organizational Work</u>					
208	6	Mexico (on behalf of Group of 21)	Sri Lanka	194	28-30,32
	12-15	Morocco (the Chairman)	Sweden	195	49
209	27	Belgium	USSR	189	25-26,29
212	7	Poland		198	18-20
	31-32	Kenya		202	28
214	6-7	Bulgaria		203	15-22
215	30	United States of America		220	12-16
216	6	Venezuela		233	32-33
	9-12	Canada		238	22-23
	24	Mongolia			
	28	Mexico	USSR (on behalf of a group of socialist States)	237	6
	31	France	United Kingdom	192	13-16
	38-39	Senegal (non-member State)		202	12,14
	40-41	Netherlands (the Chairman)		237	12,16
217	7-8, 33	Nigeria (the Chairman)	United States of America	191	10-11,14
	11-12	Belgium		198	13
218	6-7	The Secretary of the Committee		203	30
220	5, 7	Czechoslovakia		215	30
	12-16	USSR		237	6
221	17	Ethiopia		238	20
	19-20	Nigeria (the Chairman)	Venezuela	216	6
222	7	Pakistan (the Chairman)	Yugoslavia	200	9-11
	8-9, 13	Yugoslavia		222	8-9,13
223	27	Bulgaria		237	19,20
224	6	Pakistan (the Chairman)			
	14	Burma	<u>Non-member States</u>		
225	7	Argentina	Norway	194	14-17
229	6	Norway (non-member State)		229	6
231	16	Germany, Federal Republic of	Senegal	216	38-39
233	13-18	Argentina	<u>The Secretary-General of the United Nations</u>	194	8, 11-12
	32-33	USSR	<u>The Secretary of the Committee</u>	218	6-7
	33	Peru (the Chairman)		236	50
				238	35

Chronological			Alphabetical		
PV	Page	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV	Page
I. <u>Organization and Procedures</u> 2. <u>Participation of Non-Member States</u>					
190	21	Sweden	France	194	33
192	16	United Kingdom	German Democratic Republic	196	14
194	17	Norway (non-member State)	German Democratic Republic (on behalf of a group of socialist States)	208	11
	33	France			
195	7	Mongolia (the Chairman)	Mongolia (the Chairman)	195	7
	16	Romania	Morocco (the Chairman)	199	16
	49	Sweden		201	23
196	14	German Democratic Republic		208	7-10
199	16	Morocco (the Chairman)	Netherlands (the Chairman)	212	26-27
200	12	Spain (non-member State)		213	6
201	23	Morocco (the Chairman)	Peru (the Chairman)	231	18
208	7-10	Morocco (the Chairman)	Romania	232	6
	11	German Democratic Republic (on behalf of a group of socialist States)	Sweden	195	16
			United Kingdom	190	21
212	26-27	Netherlands (the Chairman)		195	49
213	6	Netherlands (the Chairman)		192	16
216	38-39	Senegal (non-member State)	<u>Non-member States:</u>		
217	32	The Secretary of the Committee	Finland	220	16
			Norway	194	17
220	16	Finland (non-member State)	Senegal	216	38-39
231	18	Peru (the Chairman)	Spain	200	12
232	6	Peru (the Chairman)	<u>The Secretary of the Committee</u>	217	32

Chronological			Alphabetical		
PV	Page	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV	Page
II. <u>Nuclear Test Ban</u>					
189	9-10	Mongolia (The Chairman)	Algeria	194	44
	13-14	Mexico		209	31-33
	20-22	Canada	Argentina	198	31
	24,29	USSR		201	7
	31	Czechoslovakia		212	42-43
	34-35	Kenya	Argentina (on behalf of Group of 21)	209	29-30
190	13-14	Germany, Federal Republic of	Australia	192	26,27,29
	19-20	Sweden		196	16-17
191	8-9,13-14	United States of America		209	25-27
	15	USSR		221	6-8
192	11,12	Belgium	Belgium	228	9-10
	14	United Kingdom		237	21
	20-21	German Democratic Republic		192	11,12
	26,27,29	Australia		209	28-29
	35,37	Cuba	Brazil	217	11,13
193	7-9	Italy		236	17
	12-13	Japan		200	17-18
	15	Peru		209	41-42
	30-31	Bulgaria	Bulgaria	212	46
	40	Nigeria		220	19
	42-43,45	Ethiopia		223	24-27
194	11	The Secretary-General of the United Nations	Bulgaria (on behalf of a group of socialist States)	193	30-31
	14-15	Norway (non-member State)	Burma	199	11-14
	19	Pakistan		209	19-20
	22,23-24,25	Czechoslovakia		214	10
	29-30	Sri Lanka		220	7,9-10
	37	France		204	14
	44	Algeria		195	19
195	9-10	Morocco	Canada	209	44-45
	14	Romania		212	47
	19	Burma		224	15
	29-34	USSR		189	20-22
	37-38	Poland		212	47
	41-43	Egypt		216	9-10
	46	Finland (non-member State)		236	46,47,48

Chronological			Alphabetical		
PV	Page	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV	Page
II. <u>Nuclear Test Ban</u>					
196	15-16	Sweden	Cuba	192	35,37
	16-17	Australia		209	23-24
	22-23	United States of America		212	28-29
197	8-9	Indonesia	Czechoslovakia	221	13-14
	10	Hungary (on behalf of a group of socialist States)		189	31
	11-12	Czechoslovakia		194	25
	12-13	Germany, Federal Republic of		197	11-12
	18-21	USSR	Egypt	205	20-24
	22	Japan	Ethiopia	209	21-22
	25	Kenya		220	6
	29,30	Mongolia (The Chairman)	France	195	41-43
	29-30	Sweden	German Democratic Republic	193	42-43,45
198	12-13	United States of America		221	18
	19	USSR		234	24-25
	31	Argentina		194	37
	39	Mongolia (The Chairman)		192	20-21
199	11-14	Bulgaria	German Democratic Republic (Chairman, Ad Hoc Working Group on a Nuclear Test Ban)	200	25-27
200	12	Spain (non-member State)		222	28
	17-18	Brazil	German Democratic Republic (on behalf of a group of socialist States)	231	6-9
	21-22	Pakistan		232	12
	25-27	German Democratic Republic	Germany, Federal Republic of	236	8-9
201	7	Argentina		236	6-7
202	17-18	United Kingdom		205	19
203	16-17	USSR	Hungary	190	13-14
	30	United States of America		197	12-13
204	14	Bulgaria (on behalf of a group of socialist States)	Hungary (on behalf of a group of socialist States)	210	6-7
	17,20-21	Mongolia		224	13
	22	Sweden		235	7
205	10	India		197	10
	15	Nigeria			
	19	German Democratic Republic (on behalf of a group of socialist States)			
	20-24	Czechoslovakia			
206	19	USSR			

Chronological			Alphabetical		
PV	Page	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV	Page
II. <u>Nuclear Test Ban</u>					
207	9-11	Netherlands	India	205	10
209	7-9	United States of America		209	36-39
	10-12	Mongolia	Indonesia	197	8-9
	13	Mongolia (on behalf of a group of socialist States)	Italy	193	7-9
	13-14	Poland	Japan	209	47-48
	15-18	USSR		193	12-13
	19-20	Bulgaria		197	22
	21-22	Czechoslovakia		224	23-25
	23-24	Cuba		232	9
	25-27	Australia	Kenya	189	34-35
	28-29	Belgium		197	25
	29-30	Argentina (on behalf of Group of 21)	Mexico	227	14-15
	31-33	Algeria		189	13-14
	33-35	Pakistan		209	40
	36-39	India		212	44-45
	40	Mexico		216	28
	41-42	Brazil		234	16
	42-44	United Kingdom	Mongolia	204	17, 20-21
	44-45	Burma		209	10-12
	46	Sweden		210	12-13
	47-48	Italy		212	41
	48	Netherlands (The Chairman)		216	24
			Mongolia (the Chairman)	223	8
				189	9-10
				197	29, 30
				198	39
			Mongolia (on behalf of a group of socialist States)	209	13
			Morocco	195	9-10
				217	28-29
210	6-7	Germany, Federal Republic of	Netherlands	207	9-11
	12-13	Mongolia		235	27-29
	13	Netherlands (The Chairman)	Netherlands (the Chairman)	209	48
	13	USSR		210	13
				212	27-28, 29
212	27-28, 29	Netherlands (The Chairman)			43, 45
	43, 45				
	28-29	Cuba			
	41	Mongolia			
	42-43	Argentina			
	44-45	Mexico			
	46	USSR			
	46	Brazil			
	47	Canada			
	47	Burma			
	47	Pakistan			

Chronological			Alphabetical		
PV	Page	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV	Page
II. <u>Nuclear Test Ban</u>					
214	10	Bulgaria	Nigeria	193	40
215	31	United States of America		205	15
216	9-10	Canada	Nigeria (the Chairman)	224	7-8
	16	USSR		217	8
	24	Mongolia		218	6
	28	Mexico	Pakistan	220	19
	38	Senegal (non-member State)		194	19
217	8	Nigeria (The Chairman)		200	21-22
	11,13	Belgium		209	33-35
	16-22	Sweden	Pakistan (the Chairman)	212	47
	28-29	Morocco		237	8-11
218	6	Nigeria (The Chairman)	Peru	227	37
219	7-9	United Kingdom		228	5,9,11
220	6	Czechoslovakia	Peru (the Chairman)	229	23
	7,9-10	Bulgaria		193	15
	14	USSR		225	20-21
	17	Finland (non-member State)		230	8,14
	19	Brazil	Poland	236	6,12-13
	19	Nigeria (The Chairman)		238	36
221	6-8	Australia	Romania	195	37-38
	9-10	Poland	Sri Lanka	209	13-14
	13-14	Cuba	Sweden	221	9-10
	18	Ethiopia		195	14
222	13	Yugoslavia		194	29-30
	23-24	USSR	Sweden (Chairman, <u>Ad Hoc</u> Group of Scientific Experts)	190	19-20
	28	German Democratic Republic		196	15-16
223	8	Mongolia		197	29-30
	17	United States of America		204	22
	24-27	Brazil		209	46
224	7-8	Nigeria		217	16-22
	13	Hungary		231	9-11
	15	Burma		228	7-9
	23-25	Japan			
225	20-21	Peru			

Chronological			Alphabetical		
PV	Page	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV	Page
II. <u>Nuclear Test Ban</u>					
227	14-15	Kenya	USSR	189	24,29
	37	Pakistan (The Chairman)		191	15
228	5,9,11	Pakistan (The Chairman)		195	29-34
	7-9	Sweden (Chairman, <u>Ad Hoc</u> Group of Scientific Experts)		197	18-21
	9-10	Australia		198	19
	10-11	United States of America		203	16-17
229	6-7	Norway (non-member State)		206	19
	23	Pakistan (The Chairman)		209	15-18
230	8,14	Peru (The Chairman)		210	13
	11-13	United Kingdom	USSR (on behalf of a group of socialist States)	212	46
231	6-9	German Democratic Republic		216	16
	9-11	Sweden	United Kingdom	220	14
	12-15	USSR		222	23-24
232	9	Japan		231	12-15
	12	German Democratic Republic		238	21,23
234	9	Venezuela	United States of America	192	14
	16	Mexico		202	17-18
	24-25	Ethiopia		209	42-44
235	7	Hungary		219	7-9
	27-29	Netherlands		230	11-13
236	6,12-13	Peru (the Chairman)		237	14-16
	6-7	German Democratic Republic (Chairman, <u>Ad Hoc</u> Working Group on a Nuclear Test Ban)	Venezuela	191	8-9, 13-14
	8-9	German Democratic Republic	Yugoslavia	196	22-23
	17	Belgium		198	12-13
	46,47,48	Canada	<u>Non-member States</u>	203	30
237	8,11	Pakistan	Finland	209	7-9
	14-16	United Kingdom	Norway	215	31
	20	Yugoslavia		223	17
	21	Australia		228	10-11
238	15	United States of America		238	15
	21,23	USSR (on behalf of a group of socialist States)	<u>The Secretary-General of the United Nations</u>	234	9
	36	Peru (the Chairman)		222	13
				237	20
				195	46
				220	17
				194	14-15
				229	6-7
				216	38
				200	12
				194	11

Chronological			Alphabetical		
PV	Page	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV	Page
III. <u>Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament; prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters</u>					
189	9, 11	Mongolia (the Chairman)	Algeria	194	43-44
	13-17	Mexico		198	25-27
	18-20	Canada	Argentina	193	18-21
	23-29	USSR		198	29-31
	31	Czechoslovakia		201	7-12, 23
190	8-9, 11-13	Germany, Federal Republic of		215	9
	15-19, 22	Sweden		225	6-11
	22-23	USSR	Australia	233	15
191	8-11, 13, 15	United States of America		236	40
	15	USSR		192	24, 26, 28-29
192	7-8, 11-12	Belgium		198	15-16
	13, 15	United Kingdom		237	22
	17-22	German Democratic Republic	Belgium	192	7-8, 11-12
	24, 26	Australia		216	13-15
	28-29			217	9, 11, 14-15
	30-32	China	Belgium (on behalf of Australia, Belgium, Germany, Federal Republic of, Italy, Japan and Netherlands)	234	27-28
	35-37	Cuba		236	17
	37-38	Kenya		233	31-32
193	7, 9-10	Italy	Brazil	200	14-17
	11-12, 14	Japan		226	27
	15-17	Peru		234	23
	18-21	Argentina	Bulgaria	238	34
	24-26	Hungary		193	28-31
	28-31	Bulgaria		214	6-10
	40-41	Nigeria	Burma	220	7-11
	42, 44-45	Ethiopia		223	28-31
	45-46	German Democratic Republic	Canada	195	17-20
				200	29-31
				224	14-17
			China	189	18-20
				198	13-14
			China	192	30-32
				198	32
				215	10-13
				237	17
			Cuba	192	35-37
				196	7-9
				198	36-37
				221	15-16

Chronological			Alphabetical		
PV	Page	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV	Page
III. <u>Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament; prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters</u>					
194	8-11	The Secretary-General of the United Nations	Czechoslovakia	194	22, 25-27
	13-14	Norway (non-member State)		189	31
	18-21	Pakistan		211	6-11
	22, 25-27	Czechoslovakia		220	5-6
	29-32	Sri Lanka	Egypt	226	17-20
	34-35, 37	France	Ethiopia	238	33-34
	43-44	Algeria		195	40-43
195	9	Morocco	France	193	42, 44-45
	12-15	Romania		221	17
	17-20	Burma		234	24
	21-25, 27-28	India		194	34-35, 37
	29	USSR		198	16-17, 38
	35-38	Poland		202	8-11
	40-43	Egypt		206	24
	45	Finland (non-member State)		216	34-35
196	7-9	Cuba	German Democratic Republic	227	36
197	7-8, 10	Indonesia		238	26
	17-18	India		192	17-22
	24-26	Kenya		193	45-46
	27, 28	Mexico		198	22-23
198	6-7	Italy		200	23-24
	7-10	Hungary (on behalf of a group of socialist States)		205	15-16
	10-11	Japan		216	19-23
	12-13	United States of America		222	25-28
	13-14	Canada		225	12-15
	15-16	Australia		230	9-10
	16-17, 38	France		232	11-12
	18-19	USSR		205	16-19
	21	Poland		190	8-9, 11-13
	22-23	German Democratic Republic		198	28-29
	23-25	Kenya (on behalf of Group of 21)		207	23-25
	25-27	Algeria		223	18-23
	28-29	Germany, Federal Republic of		238	9-13
	29-31	Argentina		193	24-26
				203	9-10, 13
				212	17, 19
				224	12
				235	6-13
				198	7-10
				195	21-25, 27, 28
				197	17-18
				205	10-11
				214	11-14
				226	12-16
				236	30-34

Chronological			Alphabetical		
PV	Page	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV	Page
		<u>III. Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament; prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters</u>			
	32	China	Indonesia	197	7-8, 10
	33-35	Mexico		211	21
	36-37	Cuba		217	23-27
	38-39	Mongolia (the Chairman)	Islamic Republic of Iran	203	25-28
200	7-8, 10	Yugoslavia	Italy	193	7, 9-10
	14-17	Brazil		198	6-7
	19-21	Pakistan	Japan	193	11-12, 14
	23-24	German Democratic Republic		198	10-11
	29-31	Burma	Japan (on behalf of Western Group)	232	7-10
201	7-12, 23	Argentina		202	30-31
	22-23	United Kingdom	Kenya	192	37-38
202	8-11	France		197	24-26
	12-14	United Kingdom	Kenya (on behalf of Group of 21)	227	14-16
	23, 25	USSR		198	23-25
	30-31	Japan (on behalf of Western Group)	Mexico	189	13-17
	32-33	Mexico		197	27, 28
203	9-10, 13	Hungary		198	33-35
	15-16	USSR		202	32-33
	25-28	Islamic Republic of Iran	Mexico (on behalf of Group of 21)	203	32
	29	United States of America		216	28
	32	Mexico	Mongolia	226	24-25
204	15-20	Mongolia		234	15-22
205	10-11	India		208	6
	12-14	Nigeria	Mongolia (the Chairman)	204	15-20
	15-16	German Democratic Republic		216	25-26
	16-19	German Democratic Republic (on behalf of a group of socialist States)	Morocco	223	6-10
206	13, 23	USSR		224	27-29
	22	United States of America	Morocco (the Chairman)	189	9, 11
	24	France		198	38-39
207	7-9, 11-12	Netherlands	Netherlands	195	9
	20-23	Poland		215	14-15
	23-25	Germany, Federal Republic of		217	29-31
208	6	Mexico (on behalf of Group of 21)	Nigeria	208	13
	13	Morocco (the Chairman)		207	7-9, 11-12
				235	26
				193	40-41
				205	12-14
				224	6-7
				236	35, 36
				217	8

Chronological			Alphabetical		
PV	Page	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV	Page
III. <u>Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament; prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters</u>					
211	6-11	Czechoslovakia	Pakistan	194	18-21
	21	Indonesia		200	19-21
				237	8, 10-11
212	8-10	Poland	Pakistan (the Chairman)	222	6-7
	17, 19	Hungary		223	32
				227	36
213	6	Viet Nam (non-member State)		229	24, 25
214	6-10	Bulgaria	Peru	193	15-17
	11-14	India		225	16-18, 20
215	9	Argentina	Peru (the Chairman)	230	7
	10-13	China		236	40-41
	14-15	Morocco		238	6
	31	United States of America	Poland	195	35-38
				198	21
				207	20-23
216	13-15	Belgium		212	8-10
	16-17	USSR		221	9-12
	19-23	German Democratic Republic	Romania	227	29-30
	25-26	Mongolia		195	12-15
	28	Mexico		226	6-11
	34-35	France	Sri Lanka	194	29-32
	37-38	Senegal (non-member State)	Sweden	190	15-19, 22
				231	9
217	8	Nigeria (the Chairman)	USSR	189	23-29
	9, 11, 14-15	Belgium		190	22-23
				191	15
				195	29
	23-27	Indonesia		198	18-19
	29-31	Morocco		202	23, 25
				203	15-16
219	7	United Kingdom		206	13, 23
220	5-6	Czechoslovakia		216	16-17
	7-11	Bulgaria		220	13
	13	USSR		222	18-24
	17	Finland (non-member State)	USSR (on behalf of a group of socialist States)	224	17-22
				225	22-28
221	9-12	Poland	United Kingdom	238	21, 22, 23, 24
	15-16	Cuba		192	13, 15
	17	Ethiopia		201	22-23
222	6-7	Pakistan (the Chairman)		202	12-14
	10-13	Yugoslavia		219	7
	18-24	USSR		237	12
	25-28	German Democratic Republic			

Chronological			Alphabetical		
PV	Page	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV	Page
III. <u>Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament; prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters</u>					
223	6-10	Mongolia	United States of America	191	8-11, 13,
	11-17	United States of America			15
	18-23	Germany, Federal Republic of		198	12-13
	28-31	Bulgaria		203	29
	32	Pakistan (the Chairman)		206	22
224	6-7	Nigeria		215	31
	12	Hungary	Venezuela	223	11-17
	14-17	Burma	Yugoslavia	238	17-19
	17-22	USSR			
	27-29	Mongolia	<u>Non-member States</u>		
225	6-11	Argentina	Finland	234	6-9
	12-15	German Democratic Republic		200	7-8, 10
	16-18, 20	Peru	Norway	222	10-13
	22-28	USSR	Senegal	237	19-20
226	6-11	Romania	Vietnam		
	12-16	India	<u>The Secretary-General of the United Nations</u>	195	45
	17-20	Czechoslovakia		220	17
	24-25	Mexico	<u>The Secretary of the Committee</u>	194	13-14
	27	Brazil		216	37-38
	28	The Secretary of the Committee		213	6
227	14-16	Kenya		194	8-11
	29-30	Poland			
	36	France			
	36	Pakistan (the Chairman)			
228	7	The Secretary of the Committee			
229	24, 25	Pakistan (the Chairman)			
230	7	Peru (the Chairman)			
	9-10	German Democratic Republic			
231	9	Sweden			
232	7-10	Japan			
	11-12	German Democratic Republic			
233	15	Argentina			
	31-32	Belgium (on behalf of Australia, Belgium, Germany, Federal Republic of, Italy, Japan and Netherlands)			

Chronological			Alphabetical		
PV	Page	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV	Page
		III. <u>Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament; prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters</u>			
234	6-9	Venezuela			
	15-22	Mexico			
	23	Brazil			
	24	Ethiopia			
	27-28	Belgium			
235	6-13	Hungary			
	26	Netherlands			
236	17	Belgium			
	30-34	India			
	35, 36	Nigeria			
	40	Argentina			
	40-41	Peru (the Chairman)			
237	8, 10-11	Pakistan			
	12	United Kingdom			
	17	China			
	19-20	Yugoslavia			
	22	Australia			
238	9-13	Germany, Federal Republic of			
	17-19	United States of America			
	21, 22,	USSR (on behalf of a group			
	23, 24	of socialist States)			
	26	France			
	33-34	Czechoslovakia			
	34	Brazil			
	36	Peru (the Chairman)			

Chronological			Alphabetical		
PV	Page	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV	Page
		IV. <u>Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons</u>			
189	10	Mongolia (the Chairman)	Algeria	194	43-44
	29	USSR	Argentina	193	20
	31	Czechoslovakia		198	31
	34, 36-37	Kenya		201	7, 11, 23
				225	11
192	28	Australia	Australia	192	28
193	20	Argentina	Brazil	232	14-18
	26	Hungary	Bulgaria	193	32
	32	Bulgaria		227	33-35
194	20	Pakistan	China	227	17-18
	29	Sri Lanka	Czechoslovakia	189	31
	37	France	Egypt	195	42, 43
	43-44	Algeria	France	194	37
				232	22
195	14	Romania	German Democratic Republic	225	12
	42, 43	Egypt	Germany, Federal Republic of	207	25
197	24	Kenya	Hungary	193	26
198	19	USSR	India	205	10
	31	Argentina	Indonesia	211	21-23
200	12	Spain (non-member State)	Kenya	189	34, 36-37
201	7, 11, 23	Argentina		197	24
205	10	India		227	16
	14-15	Nigeria	Mongolia	216	25
207	9, 11	Netherlands	Mongolia (the Chairman)	189	10
	22	Poland	Morocco	215	15-18
	25	Germany, Federal Republic of	Netherlands	207	9, 11
210	8-11	Romania	Nigeria	205	14-15
211	21-23	Indonesia		236	35-37
215	15-18	Morocco	Pakistan	194	20
	31	United States of America	Pakistan (Chairman, <u>Ad Hoc Working Group on Negative Security Assurances</u>)	237	8-9, 11
216	18	USSR		236	49
	25	Mongolia	Pakistan (on behalf of Group of 21)	232	6-7
220	17	Finland (non-member State)	Peru (the Chairman)	236	50
225	11	Argentina	Poland	207	22
	12	German Democratic Republic			

Chronological			Alphabetical		
PV	Page	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV	Page
		IV. <u>Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons</u>			
226	10	Romania	Romania	195	14
227	16	Kenya		210	8-11
	17-18	China		226	10
	33-35	Bulgaria	Sri Lanka	194	29
232	6-7	Pakistan (on behalf of Group of 21)	USSR	189	29
	14-18	Brazil		198	19
	22	France	United States of America	216	18
234	8	Venezuela		215	31
			Venezuela	238	14
			<u>Non-member States</u>	234	8
236	35-37	Nigeria	Finland	220	17
	49	Pakistan (Chairman, <u>Ad Hoc Working Group on Negative Security Assurances</u>)	Spain	200	12
	50	Peru (the Chairman)			
237	8-9, 11	Pakistan			
238	14	United States of America			

Chronological			Alphabetical		
PV	Page	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV	Page
V. <u>Chemical Weapons</u>					
189	10	Mongolia (the Chairman)	Algeria	194	45
	22	Canada	Argentina	193	21
	29	USSR		198	30
	31	Czechoslovakia		199	9-10
	34, 37	Kenya		225	6
				227	21-25
190	9, 13	Germany, Federal Republic of	Australia	233	17
	21	Sweden		192	25, 26, 27-28, 29
191	8-13	United States of America		209	26
	15-16	USSR		214	15-18
192	9-10	Belgium		225	29-32
	13-14	United Kingdom	Belgium	237	21-22
	18, 22-23	German Democratic Republic		192	9-10
	25, 26	Australia		206	7-12
	27-28, 29,			217	12
	32	China	Brazil	236	17
193	7-8	Italy		202	19-22
	13	Japan		226	26
	17	Peru	Bulgaria	193	31
	21	Argentina		204	10-14
	31	Bulgaria		220	7
	33-37	United States of America	Burma	195	20
	40	Nigeria	Canada	189	22
	43	Ethiopia		195	47-48
194	11	The Secretary-General of the United Nations	Canada (Chairman, Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons)	216	9, 11-12
	15-16, 17	Norway (non-member State)		236	45-46, 47, 48
	20-21	Pakistan	China	237	25
	22, 24-25	Czechoslovakia		236	41-44
	29	Sri Lanka		192	32
	35-36	France		199	14-16
	40	Hungary		212	27
	45	Algeria		214	22-24
	46	United States of America		227	18-21
				237	17

Chronological			Alphabetical		
PV	Page	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV	Page
V. <u>Chemical Weapons</u>					
195	10	Morocco	Cuba	196	9
	15	Romania		201	22
	20	Burma		221	14
	38-39	Poland	Czechoslovakia	189	31
	43-44	Egypt		194	22, 24-25
	45, 46-47	Finland (non-member State)		211	11
	47-48	Canada		220	6
196	9	Cuba		229	11-14
	10-14	German Democratic Republic	Egypt	238	33
	17-22	USSR		195	43-44
197	9-10	Indonesia	Ethiopia	232	19-21
	13-16	Germany, Federal Republic of		193	43
	24-25	Kenya	France	234	25
198	20	USSR		194	35-36
	30	Argentina		201	16-18
199	9-10	Argentina	German Democratic Republic	202	11
	14-16	China		216	31-34
200	11	Yugoslavia		238	27
	12-14	Spain (non-member State)		192	18, 22-23
	22	Pakistan		196	10-14
	23	German Democratic Republic	German Democratic Republic	200	23
	28	German Democratic Republic (on behalf of a group of socialist States)	(on behalf of a group of socialist States)	212	14
201	13-15	Sweden	Germany, Federal Republic of	222	28
	16-18	France		230	9
	21-22	German Democratic Republic (on behalf of a group of socialist States)		238	34
	22	Cuba		200	28
	23	Morocco (the Chairman)		201	21-22
202	11	France		205	19
	14-17	United Kingdom		190	9, 13
	19-22	Brazil	Hungary	197	13-16
	25-28	USSR		233	27-30
	27-30	Japan (on behalf of Western Group)	India	238	7-9, 32-33
				194	40
				224	13
				205	11
				232	12-14

Chronological			Alphabetical		
PV	Page	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV	Page
<u>V. Chemical Weapons</u>					
203	19-21	USSR	Indonesia	197	9-10
	23-25	Poland	Italy	193	7-8
	30	United States of America		227	6-10
204	7-10	United States of America	Japan	193	13
	10-14	Bulgaria		224	25-27
	22	Sweden	Japan (on behalf of Western Group)	202	27-30
205	11	India	Kenya	189	34, 37
	14	Nigeria		197	24-25
	19	German Democratic Republic (on behalf of a group of socialist States)	Mexico	227	16
			Mongolia	216	29
206	7-12	Belgium		213	29-30
	15	USSR		216	24, 26-27
207	7, 9, 12-13	Netherlands	Mongolia (the Chairman)	189	10
	15-19	Yugoslavia	Morocco	195	10
209	26	Australia	Morocco (the Chairman)	201	23
211	11	Czechoslovakia	Netherlands	207	12-13
	12-14	United States of America		235	29-30
	15-20	USSR	Nigeria	193	40
212	10-11	Poland		205	14
	14	German Democratic Republic	Nigeria (the Chairman)	215	26-27
	27	China	Pakistan	236	34
213	7-10	Viet Nam (non-member State)		217	8
	29-30	Mongolia		194	20-21
214	15-18	Australia		200	22
	22-24	China		237	9, 11
215	26-27	Nigeria	Peru	193	17
	30	United States of America		225	18
216	9, 11-12	Canada	Peru (the Chairman)	236	50
	17	USSR		237	25
	24, 26-27	Mongolia		238	36
	29	Mexico		195	38-39
	31-34	France	Poland	203	23-25
217	8	Nigeria (the Chairman)		212	10-11
	12	Belgium		221	12
				227	29, 31-32

Chronological			Alphabetical		
PV	Page	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV	Page
<u>V. Chemical Weapons</u>					
219	6	United Kingdom	Romania	195	15
220	6	Czechoslovakia	Sri Lanka	194	29
	7	Bulgaria	Sweden	190	21
	14	USSR		201	13-15
	18	Finland (non-member State)		204	22
				227	26-29
221	12	Poland	USSR	189	29
	14	Cuba		191	15-16
				196	17-22
222	13	Yugoslavia		198	20
	15-17	United States of America		202	25-28
	28	German Democratic Republic		203	19-21
				206	15
224	13	Hungary		211	15-20
	25-27	Japan		216	17
				220	14
225	6	Argentina		235	17-24
	18	Peru		236	50-53
	29-32	Australia	USSR (on behalf of a group of socialist States)	238	24-25
226	21-23	Yugoslavia			
	26	Brazil	United Kingdom	192	13-14
				202	14-17
227	6-10	Italy		219	6
	11-14	Spain (non-member State)		236	18-22
	16	Kenya		237	12
	18-21	China	United States of America	191	8-13
	21-25	Argentina		193	33-37
	26-29	Sweden		194	46
				203	30
	29, 31-32	Poland		204	7-10
				211	12-14
229	7-10	Norway (non-member State)		215	30
	11-14	Czechoslovakia		222	15-17
				236	25-29
230	9	German Democratic Republic		238	14
232	12-14	India	Venezuela	234	9
	19-21	Egypt	Yugoslavia	200	11
				207	15-19
233	17	Argentina		222	13
	27-30	Germany, Federal Republic of		226	21-23
				237	19
234	9	Venezuela			
	25	Ethiopia			
235	17-24	USSR			
	29-30	Netherlands			

Chronological			Alphabetical		
PV	Page	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV	Page
V. <u>Chemical Weapons</u>					
236	17	Belgium	<u>Non-member States</u>		
	18-22	United Kingdom	Finland	195	45, 46-47
	25-29	United States of America		220	18
	34	Nigeria	Norway	194	15-16, 17
	41-44	Canada (Chairman, <u>Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons</u>)		229	7-10
	45-46, 47, 48	Canada	Spain	200	12-14
	50	Peru (the Chairman)		227	11-14
	50-53	USSR	Viet Nam	213	7-10
237	9, 11	Pakistan	<u>The Secretary-General of the United Nations</u>	194	11
	12	United Kingdom			
	17	China			
	19	Yugoslavia			
	21-22	Australia			
	25	Canada			
	25	Peru (the Chairman)			
238	7-9, 32-33	Germany, Federal Republic of			
	14	United States of America			
	21	USSR (on behalf of a group of socialist States)			
	24-25	USSR			
	27	France			
	33	Czechoslovakia			
	34	German Democratic Republic			
	36	Peru (the Chairman)			

Chronological			Alphabetical		
PV	Page	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV	Page
		VI. <u>New types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons; radiological weapons</u>			
189	10	Mongolia (the Chairman)	Algeria	194	45
	25,29	USSR	Argentina	193	20
	31	Czechoslovakia		198	30
	34,37	Kenya	Australia	225	6,11
190	14	Germany, Federal Republic of		192	28
	20	Sweden		221	7,8
191	14	United States of America	Belgium	237	22
192	10	Belgium		192	10
	14	United Kingdom		217	13
	28	Australia		236	17
193	13-14	Japan	Brazil	226	26-27
	20	Argentina	Bulgaria	193	31-32
	31-32	Bulgaria		220	7
	43	Ethiopia		228	5-7
194	21	Pakistan	Bulgaria (on behalf of a group of socialist States)	204	14
	29	Sri Lanka	Canada	236	48
	37	France	China	198	32
	39	Hungary (on behalf of a group of socialist States)	Czechoslovakia	189	31
	45	Algeria		220	6
195	15	Romania	Egypt	195	43,44
	43,44	Egypt	Ethiopia	193	43
198	20	USSR		234	26
	30	Argentina	France	194	37
	32	China		238	27
200	12	Spain (non-member State)	German Democratic Republic	212	12-14
202	24-25	USSR		230	9
203	20	USSR	German Democratic Republic (on behalf of a group of socialist States)	205	19
	30	United States of America	Germany, Federal Republic of	190	14
	31	Germany, Federal Republic of		203	31
204	14	Bulgaria (on behalf of a group of socialist States)		234	10-14
	22	Sweden	Hungary	212	16
			Hungary (on behalf of a group of socialist States)	194	39
			Japan	193	13-14
			Kenya	189	34,37
			Mongolia	216	25
				223	6
			Mongolia (the Chairman)	189	10

Chronological			Alphabetical		
PV	Page	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV	Page
VI. <u>New types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons; radiological weapons</u>					
205	19	German Democratic Republic (on behalf of a group of socialist States)	Netherlands	235	27
			Pakistan	194	21
212	12-14	German Democratic Republic		237	9-10
	16	Hungary	Peru	225	18
	40-41	United Kingdom	Peru (the Chairman)	236	6,13
215	30	United States of America	Poland	221	12
216	25	Mongolia	Romania	195	15
217	13	Belgium		229	15-16
220	6	Czechoslovakia	Sri Lanka	194	29
	7	Bulgaria	Sweden	190	20
	15	USSR		204	22
				229	20-22
221	7,8	Australia	Sweden (on behalf of the Chairman, <u>Ad Hoc Working Group on Radiological Weapons</u>)	236	9-10
	12	Poland			
223	6	Mongolia	USSR	189	25,29
225	6,11	Argentina		198	20
	18	Peru		202	24-25
226	26-27	Brazil		203	20
228	5-7	Bulgaria		220	15
229	15-16	Romania	USSR (on behalf of a group of socialist States)	229	17-20
	17-20	USSR		238	22
	20-22	Sweden	United Kingdom	192	14
230	9	German Democratic Republic		212	40-41
234	9	Venezuela		237	13-14
	10-14	Germany, Federal Republic of	United States of America	191	14
	26	Ethiopia		203	30
235	27	Netherlands		215	30
236	6,13	Peru (the Chairman)	Venezuela	238	16-17
	9-10	Sweden (on behalf of the Chairman, <u>Ad Hoc Working Group on Radiological Weapons</u>)	<u>Non-member States</u>		
	17	Belgium	Spain	234	9
	48	Canada			
237	9-10	Pakistan		200	12
	13-14	United Kingdom			
	22	Australia			

Chronological			Alphabetical		
PV	Page	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV	Page
		VI. <u>New types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons; radiological weapons</u>			
238	16-17	United States of America			
	22	USSR (on behalf of a group of socialist States)			
	27	France			

Chronological			Alphabetical		
PV	Page	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV	Page
<u>VII. Comprehensive programme of disarmament</u>					
189	10	Mongolia (the Chairman)	Algeria	194	44
	12-14	Mexico	Argentina	193	20
	34-35	Kenya		198	30
190	21	Sweden	Australia	192	28
192	15	United Kingdom		236	14
	28	Australia		237	22
	33	China	Belgium	236	15-16
193	17	Peru	Burma	195	20
	20	Argentina		236	16
	44	Ethiopia	China	192	33
194	11	The Secretary-General of the United Nations		237	17
	16	Norway (non-member State)	Cuba	221	14-15
	19-20	Pakistan	Czechoslovakia	194	22,25
	22,25	Czechoslovakia	Egypt	195	43,44
	29	Sri Lanka	Ethiopia	193	44
	37	France	France	194	37
	44	Algeria		238	28
195	10	Morocco	German Democratic Republic	222	28
	16	Romania		236	8
	20	Burma	Germany, Federal Republic of	236	15
	39	Poland	Hungary	235	6
	43,44	Egypt	India	205	11
	49	Sweden	Indonesia	236	14
198	20	USSR	Japan (on behalf of Western Group)	202	30
	30	Argentina	Kenya	189	34-35
	39	Mongolia (the Chairman)	Mexico	189	12-14
200	10-11	Yugoslavia		216	28-29
	22	Pakistan	Mexico (Chairman, <u>Ad Hoc Working Group on a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament</u>)	236	11-12,14
201	20	Romania	Mongolia		
202	18	United Kingdom	Mongolia (the Chairman)	236	13-14,15
	30	Japan (on behalf of Western Group)		189	10
205	11	India		198	39
			Morocco	195	10
				217	31-32
			Nigeria (the Chairman)	217	8

Chronological			Alphabetical		
PV	Page	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV	Page
<u>VII. Comprehensive programme of disarmament</u>					
215	31	United States of America	Pakistan	194	19-20
216	18	USSR		200	22
	28-29	Mexico	Peru	237	10
217	8	Nigeria (the Chairman)	Peru (the Chairman)	193	17
	31-32	Morocco		230	8
221	14-15	Cuba		236	6,13
222	13	Yugoslavia		238	36
	28	German Democratic Republic	Poland	195	13
230	8	Peru (the Chairman)	Romania	195	16
231	9	Sweden		201	20
235	6	Hungary	Sri Lanka	194	29
236	6,13	Peru (the Chairman)	Sweden	190	21
	8	German Democratic Republic		195	49
	11-12,14	Mexico (Chairman, <u>Ad Hoc Working Group on a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament</u>)		231	9
	13-14,15	Mongolia	USSR	198	20
	14	Indonesia	USSR (on behalf of a group of socialist States)	216	18
	14	Australia	United Kingdom	238	23
	15	Germany, Federal Republic of		192	15
	15-16	Belgium		202	18
	16	Burma		237	13
237	10	Pakistan	United States of America	215	31
	13	United Kingdom		238	14
	17	China	Yugoslavia	200	10-11
	22	Australia		222	13
238	14	United States of America	<u>Non-member State</u>		
	23	USSR (on behalf of a group of socialist States)	Norway	194	16
	28	France	<u>The Secretary-General of the United Nations</u>	194	11
	36	Peru (the Chairman)			

Chronological			Alphabetical		
PV	Page	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV	Page
VIII. <u>Prevention of an arms race in outer space</u>					
189	10	Mongolia (the Chairman)	Algeria	194	45
	22	Canada		213	23-25
	29	USSR	Argentina	193	20-21
	31	Czechoslovakia		215	6-9
	36	Kenya		233	15
			Australia	192	28
				237	23
190	14	Germany, Federal Republic of	Belgium	192	11
	20-21	Sweden		217	13
191	8,14	United States of America		236	17
192	11	Belgium	Belgium (on behalf of Australia, Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Federal Republic of, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, United Kingdom and United States of America)	235	31
	18,23	German Democratic Republic			
	28	Australia			
	30,33	China			
	35,37	Cuba	Bulgaria	193	31
193	7-8	Italy		220	9
	14	Japan	Canada	189	22
	20-21	Argentina		216	9,10
	31	Bulgaria		236	48
	41	Nigeria	China	192	30,33
	44	Ethiopia		233	10-12
				237	17
			Cuba	192	35,37
194	15	Norway (non-member State)		221	15-16
	21	Pakistan	Czechoslovakia	189	31
	31-32	Sri Lanka		233	18-21
	37-38	France	Egypt	195	42-43
	45	Algeria		214	19-21
195	10	Morocco	Egypt (on behalf of Group of 21)	236	22-24
	16	Romania			
	39	Poland			
	42-43	Egypt			
197	10	Indonesia			
	26	Kenya			

Chronological			Alphabetical		
PV	Page	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV	Page
VIII. <u>Prevention of an arms race in outer space</u>					
198	20	USSR	Ethiopia	193	44
				234	26
200	10	Yugoslavia	France	194	37-38
	12	Spain (non-member State)		202	10
				238	27
202	10	France	German Democratic Republic	192	18,23
203	7-12	Hungary		222	27,28
	16	USSR		236	9
	29	United States of America	Germany, Federal Republic of	190	14
			Hungary	203	7-12
205	11	India		224	13
207	9,13-14	Netherlands	India	205	11
212	20-25	Sri Lanka	Indonesia	197	10
213	11-15	Sweden	Italy	193	7-8
	23-25	Algeria	Japan	193	14
	26-29	Mongolia	Kenya	189	36
	32	Netherlands (the Chairman)		197	26
214	19-21	Egypt	Mexico	216	29
	24	Netherlands (the Chairman)	Mongolia	213	26-29
				216	25,27
215	6-9	Argentina		233	6-9
	27-29	Nigeria		235	33
	31	United States of America	Mongolia (the Chairman)	238	31-32
216	9,10	Canada	Mongolia (on behalf of a group of socialist States)	189	10
	17	USSR		238	30-31
	25,27	Mongolia	Morocco	195	10
	29	Mexico			
217	8	Nigeria (the Chairman)			
	13	Belgium			
219	7	United Kingdom			
220	9	Bulgaria			
	15-16	USSR			
221	15-16	Cuba			
	20	Nigeria (the Chairman)			

Chronological			Alphabetical		
PV	Page	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV	Page
VIII. <u>Prevention of an arms race in outer space</u>					
222	13	Yugoslavia	Netherlands	207	9,13-14
	27,28	German Democratic Republic		235	26
223	32-33	Pakistan (the Chairman)	Netherlands (the Chairman)	213	32
224	13	Hungary		214	24
225	18	Peru	Nigeria	193	41
233	6-9	Mongolia		215	27-29
	10-12	China		236	34-35
	15	Argentina	Nigeria (the Chairman)	217	8
	18-21	Czechoslovakia		221	20
	22-26	USSR	Pakistan	194	21
			Pakistan (the Chairman)	223	32-33
			Peru	225	18
			Peru (the Chairman)	238	36
			Poland	195	39
				235	14-17
			Romania	195	16
			Sri Lanka	194	31-32
				212	20-25
			Sweden	190	20-21
				213	11-15
			USSR	189	29
				198	20
				203	16
				216	17
				220	15-16
				233	22-26
				236	39-40
			USSR (on behalf of a group of socialist States)	238	21,23

Chronological			Alphabetical		
PV	Page	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV	Page
VIII. <u>Prevention of an arms race in outer space</u>					
234	9	Venezuela	United Kingdom	219	17
	26	Ethiopia		237	13
235	14-17	Poland	United States of America	191	8,14
	26	Netherlands		203	29
	31	Belgium (on behalf of Australia, Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Federal Republic of Italy, Japan, Netherlands, United Kingdom and United States of America)	Venezuela	215	31
	33	Mongolia	Yugoslavia	238	19
				234	9
				200	10
				222	13
				237	20
			<u>Non-member States</u>		
			Norway	194	15
236	9	German Democratic Republic	Spain	200	12
	17	Belgium			
	22-24	Egypt (on behalf of Group of 21)			
	34-35	Nigeria			
	39-40	USSR			
	48	Canada			
237	13	United Kingdom			
	17	China			
	20	Yugoslavia			
	23	Australia			
238	19	United States of America			
	21-23	USSR (on behalf of a group of socialist States)			
	27	France			
	30,31	Mongolia (on behalf of a group of socialist States)			
	31-32	Mongolia			
	36	Peru (the Chairman)			

Chronological			Alphabetical		
PV	Page	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV	Page
		IX. <u>Consideration of other areas dealing with the cessation of the arms race and disarmament and other relevant measures</u>			
		1. <u>Annual Report of the Secretary-General</u>			
194	8-12	The Secretary-General of the United Nations	Burma	224	16
202	13,14,18	United Kingdom	German Democratic Republic	222	25
213	16	Kenya	Kenya	213	16
222	25	German Democratic Republic	Peru	225	20
223	13	United States of America	Romania	226	11
224	16	Burma	United Kingdom	202	13,14,18
225	20	Peru	United States of America	223	13
226	11	Romania	<u>The Secretary-General of the United Nations</u>	194	8-12

Chronological			Alphabetical		
PV	Page	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV	Page
		IX. <u>Consideration of other areas dealing with the cessation of the arms race and disarmament and other relevant measures</u>			
		2. <u>United Nations role in disarmament</u>			
189	12	Mexico	Bulgaria	220	10
	24,26	USSR	Czechoslovakia	194	22
	34-35	Kenya		220	6
190	11	Germany, Federal Republic of	Egypt	195	41
194	9,10,12	The Secretary-General of the United Nations	Ethiopia	234	24
	14,16	Norway (non-member State)	France	194	33,34
	18,19,21	Pakistan		202	9
	22	Czechoslovakia	Germany, Federal Republic of	190	11
	33,34	France		207	25
195	41	Egypt	Hungary	235	9-11
197	23	Kenya	India	205	11
202	9	France		226	16
205	11	India	Japan	232	8,9
207	25	Germany, Federal Republic of	Kenya	189	34-35
213	19-22	Kenya		197	23
220	6	Czechoslovakia	Mexico	213	19-22
	10	Bulgaria		189	12
222	12,14	Yugoslavia	Pakistan	226	24
226	8	Romania		234	21
	16	India	Romania	194	18,19,21
	24	Mexico	USSR	226	8
232	8,9	Japan	Yugoslavia	189	24,26
...		...	<u>Non-member State</u>	222	12,14
234	21	Mexico	Norway	194	14,16
	24	Ethiopia	<u>The Secretary-General of the United Nations</u>	194	9,10,12
235	9-11	Hungary			

Chronological			Alphabetical		
FV	Page	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	FV	Page
		IX. <u>Consideration of other areas dealing with the cessation of the arms race and disarmament and other relevant measures</u>			
		3. <u>Disarmament Commission</u>			
190	10	Germany, Federal Republic of	Germany, Federal Republic of	190	10
190	16	Sweden		223	20
223	20	Germany, Federal Republic of	Romania	226	8
226	8	Romania	Sweden	190	16

Chronological			Alphabetical		
PV	Page	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV	Page
<p><u>IX. Consideration of other areas dealing with the cessation of the arms race and disarmament and other relevant measures</u></p> <p><u>4. Special Sessions of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament</u></p>					
189	9	Mongolia (the Chairman)	Algeria	198	26-27
	13	Mexico	Argentina	193	18,21
	24-25	USSR		198	29-30
	34-35	Kenya		201	11
190	13	Germany, Federal Republic of	Belgium	192	9,11
	16	Sweden	Bulgaria	193	30
192	9,11	Belgium	Burma	195	18,20
	15	United Kingdom	Canada	195	48
	19,23	German Democratic Republic		198	14
	32	China	China	192	13
	37	Kenya		215	13
193	11	Japan	Cuba	196	7,8
	17	Peru	Czechoslovakia	194	22
	18,21	Argentina		226	17
	30	Bulgaria	Egypt	195	40
	44	Ethiopia	Ethiopia	193	44
194	9	The Secretary-General of the United Nations	France	202	8
	16	Norway (non-member State)	German Democratic Republic	192	19,23
	19	Pakistan		198	22
	22	Czechoslovakia	(on behalf of a group of socialist States)	222	27
	29	Sri Lanka		225	15
195	8,10	Morocco	Germany, Federal Republic of	190	13
	14	Romania		197	15
	18,20	Burma	Hungary	235	7
	27	India	India	195	27
	40	Egypt		214	11
	48	Canada		236	30
196	7,8	Cuba			
197	15	Germany, Federal Republic of			
	28	Mexico			

Chronological			Alphabetical		
PV	Page	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV	Page
<p>IX. <u>Consideration of other areas dealing with the cessation of the arms race and disarmament and other relevant measures</u></p> <p>4. <u>Special Sessions of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament</u></p>					
198	6	Italy	Italy	198	6
	11	Japan	Japan	193	11
	12	United States of America		198	11
	14	Canada	Kenya	189	34-35
	22	German Democratic Republic		192	37
	26-27	Algeria	Mexico	189	13
	29-30	Argentina		197	28
199	7	Morocco (the Chairman)		216	28
201	11	Argentina		226	24
202	8	France	Mongolia	204	15-16
203	16	USSR	Mongolia (the Chairman)	189	9
204	15-16	Mongolia	Morocco	195	8,10
208	11	German Democratic Republic (on behalf of a group of socialist States)	Morocco (the Chairman)	199	7
			Pakistan	194	19
214	11	India		237	10
215	13	China	Pakistan (the Chairman)	222	7
216	28	Mexico	Peru	193	17
	38	Senegal (non-member State)		225	19
221	9	Poland	Peru (the Chairman)	230	7
222	7	Pakistan (the Chairman)	Poland	221	9
	14	Yugoslavia	Romania	195	14
	27	German Democratic Republic		226	9
223	12,14	United States of America	Sri Lanka	194	29
225	15	German Democratic Republic	Sweden	190	16
	19	Peru	USSR	189	24-25
226	9	Romania		203	16
	17	Czechoslovakia	United Kingdom	192	15
	24	Mexico	United States of America	198	12
230	7	Peru (the Chairman)		223	12,14
235	7	Hungary	Yugoslavia	222	14
236	30	India	<u>Non-member States</u>		
237	10	Pakistan	Norway	194	16
			Senegal	216	38
			<u>The Secretary-General of the United Nations</u>	194	9

Chronological			Alphabetical		
FV	Page	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	FV	Page
IX. <u>Consideration of other areas dealing with the cessation of the arms race and disarmament and other relevant measures</u>					
5. <u>Nuclear-weapon-free zones</u>					
189	17	Mexico	Argentina	201	7-12, 23
	36-37	Kenya		225	9-10
190	19	Sweden	Brazil	232	17-18
192	20	German Democratic Republic	Bulgaria	193	28
	35	Cuba		214	7
193	26	Hungary	Cuba	192	35
	28	Bulgaria	Czechoslovakia	194	27
	43	Ethiopia		211	11
194	27	Czechoslovakia	Egypt	195	42
195	13	Romania	Ethiopia	193	43
	37	Poland	German Democratic Republic	192	20
	42	Egypt		200	23-25, 31
197	16	Germany, Federal Republic of	Germany, Federal Republic of	225	12
	24	Kenya		197	16
200	8	Yugoslavia	Hungary	200	31
	23-25, 31	German Democratic Republic		193	26
	31	Germany, Federal Republic of	Hungary	224	12
201	7-12, 23	Argentina	Indonesia	211	23
	22-23	United Kingdom		217	26
207	21-22	Poland	Kenya	189	36-37
210	10-11	Romania		197	24
211	11	Czechoslovakia	Mexico	189	17
	23	Indonesia		195	37
214	7	Bulgaria	Poland	207	21-22
217	26	Indonesia	Romania	195	13
220	18	Finland (non-member State)		210	10-11
222	13	Yugoslavia	Sweden	226	9-10
224	12	Hungary		190	19
225	9-10	Argentina	United Kingdom	201	22-23
	12	German Democratic Republic	Yugoslavia	200	8
226	9-10	Romania		222	13
232	17-18	Brazil	<u>Non-member State</u>		
			Finland	220	18

Chronological			Alphabetical		
FV	Page	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	FV	Page
IX. <u>Consideration of other areas dealing with the cessation of the arms race and disarmament and other relevant measures</u>					
6. <u>Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons</u>					
189	13	Mexico	Algeria	194	44
189	21	Canada	Belgium	217	11
190	13	Germany, Federal Republic of	Brazil	200	16-17
193	8	Italy		223	24, 26-27
	12	Japan		232	15-16
	43, 45	Ethiopia	Bulgaria	199	11
194	19	Pakistan	Canada	189	21
	31	Sri Lanka		198	14
	44	Algeria	Czechoslovakia	205	20
195	9	Morocco	Egypt	195	42-43
	42-43	Egypt	Ethiopia	193	43, 45
197	8	Indonesia	German Democratic Republic	198	23
198	12	United States of America	Germany, Federal Republic of	190	13
	14	Canada		207	25
	23	German Democratic Republic	Indonesia	197	8
199	11	Bulgaria		211	22-23
200	16-17	Brazil	Italy	193	8
203	18	USSR		209	47
205	20	Czechoslovakia	Japan	193	12
207	8-9	Netherlands		232	9
	25	Germany, Federal Republic of	Mexico	189	13
209	35	Pakistan		234	16
	47	Italy	Morocco	195	9
211	22-23	Indonesia		215	17-18
215	17-18	Morocco	Netherlands	207	8-9
217	11	Belgium	Nigeria	236	35-36
223	24, 26-27	Brazil	Pakistan	194	19
225	20-21	Peru		209	35
232	9	Japan	Peru	225	20-21
	15-16	Brazil	Sri Lanka	194	31
234	16	Mexico		203	18
236	35-36	Nigeria	USSR	237	14-15
237	14-15	United Kingdom	United Kingdom	198	12
238	18-19	United States of America	United States of America	238	18-19

Chronological			Alphabetical		
PV	Page	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV	Page
<p>IX. <u>Consideration of other areas dealing with the cessation of the arms race and disarmament and other relevant measures</u></p> <p>7. <u>Peaceful uses of nuclear energy</u></p>					
189	24	USSR	Algeria	194	45
190	14	Germany, Federal Republic of	Argentina	198	25
	20	Sweden	Australia	225	10-11
192	10	Belgium		221	7
	14	United Kingdom		237	22
	37	Cuba	Belgium	192	10
193	13-14	Japan		217	13
	32	Bulgaria	Brazil	226	27
	44	Ethiopia	Bulgaria	193	32
194	21	Pakistan		228	6
	37	France	China	198	32
	39-40	Hungary (on behalf of a group of socialist States)	Cuba	192	37
	45	Algeria	Czechoslovakia	215	24-26
195	43	Egypt	Egypt	195	43
198	12	United States of America	Ethiopia	193	44
	25	Algeria	France	194	37
	32	China	German Democratic Republic (on behalf of a group of socialist States)	206	24
	39	Mongolia (the Chairman)	Germany, Federal Republic of	190	14
202	23-25	USSR		207	25
203	13	Hungary		234	10-14
	20	USSR	Hungary	203	13
206	24	German Democratic Republic (on behalf of a group of socialist States)	Hungary (on behalf of a group of socialist States)	194	39-40
207	25	Germany, Federal Republic of	Japan	193	13-14
215	24-26	Czechoslovakia	Mongolia (the Chairman)	198	39
216	17	USSR	Netherlands	235	27,28
217	13	Belgium	Pakistan	194	21
219	8-9	United Kingdom		237	10
220	15	USSR	Sweden	190	20
221	7	Australia		229	21-22
			Sweden (on behalf of the Chairman, Ad hoc Working Group on Radiological Weapons)	236	9-10

Chronological			Alphabetical		
FV	Page	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	FV	Page
IX. <u>Consideration of other areas dealing with the cessation of the arms race and disarmament and other relevant measures</u>					
7. <u>Peaceful uses of nuclear energy</u>					
225	10-11	Argentina	USSR	189	24
226	27	Brazil		202	23-25
228	6	Bulgaria		203	20
229	17-19	USSR		216	17
	21-22	Sweden		220	15
234	9	Venezuela	USSR (on behalf of a group of socialist States)	229	17-19
	10-14	Germany, Federal Republic of	United Kingdom	238	22,23
235	27,28	Netherlands		192	14
236	9-10	Sweden (on behalf of the Chairman, <u>Ad hoc</u> Working Group on Radiological Weapons)	United States of America	219	8-9
			Venezuela	237	13-14
237	10	Pakistan		198	12
	13-14	United Kingdom		238	16-17,19
	22	Australia		234	9
238	16-17,19	United States of America			
	22,23	USSR (on behalf of a group of socialist States)			

Chronological			Alphabetical		
PV	Page	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV	Page
IX. <u>Consideration of other areas dealing with the cessation of the arms race and disarmament and other relevant measures</u> 8. <u>Bacteriological (Biological) Weapons</u>					
190	9	Germany, Federal Republic of	Australia	192	26
191	11	United States of America	Belgium	206	11
192	26	Australia	China	227	19-20
206	11	Belgium	Germany, Federal Republic of	190	9
210	6	Germany, Federal Republic of	210	6	
227	19-20	China	United States of America	191	11

Chronological			Alphabetical		
PV	Page	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV	Page
IX. <u>Consideration of other areas dealing with the cessation of the arms race and disarmament and other relevant measures</u>					
9. <u>Geneva Protocol of 1925</u>					
190	8	Germany, Federal Republic of	Argentina	199	9-10
191	11	United States of America		227	22-23
	16	USSR	Australia	192	26
192	26	Australia		214	18
			Belgium	206	11-12
193	34, 35	United States of America		217	12
196	18-22	USSR	Brazil	202	19
199	9-10	Argentina	Bulgaria	204	12
	14-16	China	China	199	14-16
200	14	Spain (non-member State)		214	22-24
201	14	Sweden		227	19-20
	16-18	France	France	201	16-18
				216	33-34
202	14-15	United Kingdom	Germany, Federal Republic of	190	8
	19	Brazil		233	30
204	10	United States of America	India	232	13
	12	Bulgaria	Italy	227	10
206	11-12	Belgium	Japan	224	27
211	16	USSR	Pakistan	237	9
214	18	Australia	Sweden	201	14
	22-24	China		216	40
				227	27
216	33-34	France	USSR	191	16
	40	Sweden		196	18-22
217	12	Belgium		211	16
224	27	Japan	United Kingdom	238	25
227	10	Italy		202	14-15
	11	Spain (non-member State)	United States of America	236	19
	19-20	China		191	11
	22-23	Argentina		193	34, 35
	27	Sweden	<u>Non-Member States</u>	204	10
229	7	Norway (non-member State)	Norway	229	7
232	13	India	Spain	200	14
233	30	Germany, Federal Republic of		227	11
236	19	United Kingdom			
237	9	Pakistan			
238	25	USSR			

Chronological			Alphabetical		
PV	Page	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV	Page
		IX. <u>Consideration of other areas dealing with the cessation of the arms race and disarmament and other relevant measures</u>			
		10. <u>Environmental modification techniques</u>			
191	14	United States of America	Australia	192	26
192	26	Australia	German Democratic Republic	196	11
196	11	German Democratic Republic	Germany, Federal Republic of	210	6
210	6	Germany, Federal Republic of	United States of America	191	14

Chronological			Alphabetical		
PV	Page	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV	Page
		<p>IX. <u>Consideration of other areas dealing with the cessation of the arms race and disarmament and other relevant measures</u></p> <p>11. <u>Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons</u></p>			

Chronological			Alphabetical		
PV	Page	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV	Page
IX. <u>Consideration of other areas dealing with the cessation of the arms race and disarmament and other relevant measures</u>					
12. <u>Conventional Weapons</u>					
189	21	Canada	Algeria	198	27
	27	USSR	Australia	192	24
	31	Czechoslovakia		198	15
190	11-13	Germany, Federal Republic of	Belgium	192	7-9
	18, 22	Sweden		217	10, 11
191	10	United States of America	Bulgaria	193	28
192	7-9	Belgium		214	9
	18	German Democratic Republic	Burma	220	9
	24	Australia		195	18
	30	China	Canada	200	30-31
193	11	Japan	China	189	21
	28	Bulgaria		236	48
	41	Nigeria	China	192	30
194	10	The Secretary-General of the United Nations	Cuba	198	32
	14	Norway (non-member State)	Czechoslovakia	215	11-12
	31	Sri Lanka		196	8
195	18	Burma	France	189	31
	37	Poland		211	10
196	8	Cuba	German Democratic Republic	238	33
197	10	Indonesia		198	17
	18	India	Germany, Federal Republic of	202	9,11
198	11	Japan		192	18
	15	Australia	Hungary	198	23
	17	France		222	26
	18	USSR	India	190	11-13
	23	German Democratic Republic		198	28
	27	Algeria	Indonesia	223	20-22
	28	Germany, Federal Republic of	Islamic Republic of Iran	203	26-27
	32	China	Japan	193	11
	33-34	Mexico		198	11
200	7-9	Yugoslavia	Mexico	232	8
	21	Pakistan	Netherlands	198	33-34
	30-31	Burma	Nigeria	207	7,9

Chronological			Alphabetical		
PV	Page	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV	Page
IX. <u>Consideration of other areas dealing with the cessation of the arms race and disarmament and other relevant measures</u>					
12. <u>Conventional Weapons</u>					
202	9, 11	France	Pakistan	200	21
	13, 14	United Kingdom	Pakistan (the Chairman)	222	6
203	9	Hungary	Peru	225	19
	26-27	Islamic Republic of Iran	Peru (the Chairman)	230	8
206	15, 18	USSR	Poland	195	37
207	7, 9	Netherlands		212	10
211	10	Czechoslovakia	Sri Lanka	194	31
212	10	Poland	Sweden	190	18, 22
214	9	Bulgaria	USSR	189	27
215	11-12	China		198	18
217	10, 11	Belgium	USSR (on behalf of a group of socialist States)	206	15,18
220	9	Bulgaria		238	24
222	6	Pakistan (the Chairman)	United Kingdom	202	13, 14
	10	Yugoslavia	United States of America	191	10
	26	German Democratic Republic		223	12,14
223	12, 14	United States of America	Venezuela	234	7
	20-22	Germany, Federal Republic of	Yugoslavia	200	7-9
224	12	Hungary		222	10
225	19	Peru	<u>Non-member State</u>		
226	13-14	India	Norway	194	14
230	8	Peru (the Chairman)	<u>The Secretary-General of the United Nations</u>	194	10
232	8	Japan			
234	7	Venezuela			
235	7-9,11-12	Hungary			
236	48	Canada			
238	24	USSR (on behalf of a group of socialist States)			
	33	Czechoslovakia			

Chronological			Alphabetical		
PV	Page	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV	Page
<u>IX. Consideration of other areas dealing with the cessation of the arms race and disarmament and other relevant measures</u>					
<u>13. Regional disarmament</u>					
204	18-19	Mongolia	Japan	193	12, 14
205	18-19	German Democratic Republic (on behalf of a group of socialist States)	Mongolia	198	10-11
206	14, 16-17	USSR	Mongolia (the Chairman)	204	18-19
	19		Morocco	223	6, 9-10
207	22	United States of America	Netherlands	189	11
	8-9	Netherlands	Nigeria	195	9
210	22-23	Poland	Pakistan	207	8-9
	8, 10-11	Romania	Peru	193	40-41
211	9, 11	Czechoslovakia	Poland	194	18-19
212	8-11	Poland	USSR	225	19-20
	18	Hungary	Romania	195	35-37
214	45	United States of America	Romania	207	22-23
	6, 9	Bulgaria	Romania	212	8-11
216	34-35	France	Romania	221	11-12
217	9-10, 14	Belgium	Sri Lanka	195	12-13
	26	Indonesia	Sweden	210	8, 10-11
220	6	Czechoslovakia	USSR	226	7, 9
	8-9	Bulgaria	USSR	194	31
221	11-12	Poland	USSR (on behalf of a group of socialist States)	190	15-17, 19
	17	Ethiopia	United Kingdom	191	15
222	10, 13	Yugoslavia	United States of America	206	14, 16-17, 19
	18-19, 23	USSR	United States of America	222	18-19, 23
223	26-27	German Democratic Republic	Venezuela	224	22
	6, 9-10	Mongolia	Yugoslavia	238	21, 23
224	16	United States of America	Non-member States	202	12-13
	20	Germany, Federal Republic of	Finland	191	10
225	31	Bulgaria	Norway	206	22
	11-12	Hungary	The Secretary-General of the United Nations	212	45
226	22	USSR		223	16
	12	German Democratic Republic		234	8
227	19-20	Peru		200	8
	7, 9	Romania		222	10, 13
228	19-20	Czechoslovakia			
	9	German Democratic Republic			

Chronological			Alphabetical		
PV	Page	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV	Page
		<p>IX. <u>Consideration of other areas dealing with the cessation of the arms race and disarmament and other relevant measures</u></p> <p>13. <u>Regional disarmament</u></p>			
231	16	Germany, Federal Republic of			
234	8	Venezuela			
	26	Ethiopia			
235	8	Hungary			
238	11-13	Germany, Federal Republic of			
	21, 23	USSR (on behalf of a group of socialist States)			
	26-27	France			
	33-34	Czechoslovakia			

Chronological			Alphabetical		
PV	Page	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV	Page
		IX. <u>Consideration of other areas dealing with the cessation of the arms race and disarmament and other relevant measures</u>			
		14. <u>Zones of peace</u>			
189	36	Kenya	Algeria	194	42
192	35	Cuba	Bulgaria	193	28
193	28	Bulgaria	Cuba	192	35
194	31	Sri Lanka	German Democratic Republic	222	27
	42	Algeria	Kenya	189	36
200	8	Yugoslavia	Sri Lanka	194	31
222	13	Yugoslavia	Yugoslavia	200	8
	27	German Democratic Republic		222	13

Chronological			Alphabetical		
PV	Page	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV	Page
		IX. <u>Consideration of other areas dealing with the cessation of the arms race and disarmament and other relevant measures</u>			
		15. <u>Sea-bed and Ocean Floor</u>			
190	22	Sweden	France	231	17
203	18	USSR	Pakistan (the Chairman)	225	33
225	33	Pakistan (the Chairman)	Peru (the Chairman)	231	16,
231	16, 17-18	Peru (the Chairman)		232	17-18
	17	France			6
232	6	Peru (the Chairman)	Sweden	190	22
			USSR	203	18

Chronological			Alphabetical		
PV	Page	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV	Page
IX. <u>Consideration of other areas dealing with the cessation of the arms race and disarmament and other relevant measures</u>					
16. <u>Reduction of military budgets</u>					
189	37	Kenya	Belgium	217	13-14
190	11	Germany, Federal Republic of	Czechoslovakia	211	11
195	13	Romania	Germany, Federal Republic of	190	11
	25-27	India	India	195	25-27
200	6-7	Yugoslavia	Kenya	189	37
211	11	Czechoslovakia		212	33-34
212	33-34	Kenya	Romania	195	13
217	13-14	Belgium		226	8
222	19	USSR	USSR	222	19
226	8	Romania	Yugoslavia	200	6-7

Chronological			Alphabetical		
PV	Page	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV	Page
<p>IX. <u>Consideration of other areas dealing with the cessation of the arms race and disarmament and other relevant measures</u></p> <p>17. <u>Confidence-building measures</u></p>					
190	9-12	Germany, Federal Republic of	Australia	192	25
192	11	Belgium	Belgium	192	11
	19	German Democratic Republic		217	14-15
	25	Australia		234	27
	34-35	Cuba	Cuba	192	34-35
193	26	Hungary	France	194	34
				198	17
194	12	The Secretary-General of the United Nations		202	11
	34	France	German Democratic Republic	192	19
				232	12
195	25	India	Germany, Federal Republic of	190	9-12
				207	25
198	17	France		223	20, 22
202	11	France	Hungary	193	26
	16	United Kingdom		235	8-9
206	19	USSR	India	195	25
207	25	Germany, Federal Republic of	Japan	215	20
				232	8,9
215	20	Japan	Mexico	234	16
217	14-15	Belgium	Mongolia	223	7
222	13	Yugoslavia	Romania	226	10-11
223	7	Mongolia	USSR	206	19
	17	United States of America		225	28
	20, 22	Germany, Federal Republic of	United Kingdom	202	16
225	28	USSR	United States of America	223	17
226	10-11	Romania	Venezuela	234	9
232	8, 9	Japan	Yugoslavia	222	13
	12	German Democratic Republic	<u>The Secretary-General of the United Nations</u>	194	12
234	9	Venezuela			
	16	Mexico			
	27	Belgium			
235	8-9	Hungary			

Chronological			Alphabetical		
PV	Page	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV	Page
<p>IX. <u>Consideration of other areas dealing with the cessation of the arms race and disarmament and other relevant measures</u></p> <p>18. <u>Disarmament and international security</u></p>					
189	11	Mongolia (the Chairman)	Algeria	194	42, 45
	18-19	Canada	Belgium	192	7
	26-29	USSR	Canada	189	18-19
190	9	Germany, Federal Republic of		216	9-10
	16	Sweden		236	47
			France	194	35
191	9-10	United States of America		202	7-8, 9
192	7	Belgium	German Democratic Republic	192	19
	19	German Democratic Republic	Germany, Federal Republic of	190	9
193	10	Italy		197	16
	11	Japan	Hungary	193	26
	16, 17	Peru		212	15-16 18-19
	26	Hungary	Hungary (on behalf of a group of socialist States)	198	8
194	9, 12	The Secretary-General of the United Nations	India	195	21-26
	14	Norway (non-member State)		197	18
	18, 19	Pakistan	Indonesia	197	7-8
	35	France	Italy	193	10
	42, 45	Algeria	Japan	193	11
195	12	Romania	Kenya	197	23
	21-26	India		213	16-22
	36	Poland	Kenya (on behalf of Group of 21)	198	24
197	7-8	Indonesia	Mexico	202	32
	16	Germany, Federal Republic of	Mexico (on behalf of Group of 21)	208	6
	18	India	Mongolia (the Chairman)	189	11
	23	Kenya	Netherlands	207	8
198	8	Hungary (on behalf of a group of socialist States)	Pakistan	194	18, 19
	24	Kenya (on behalf of Group of 21)		237	11
			Peru	193	16, 17
200	7	Yugoslavia		225	19
202	7-8, 9	France	Poland	195	36
	32	Mexico	Romania	195	12
207	8	Netherlands		226	7, 10
			Sweden	190	16

Chronological			Alphabetical		
PV	Page	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV	Page
IX. <u>Consideration of other areas dealing with the cessation of the arms race and disarmament and other relevant measures</u>					
18. <u>Disarmament and international security</u>					
208	6	Mexico (on behalf of Group of 21)	USSR	189	26-29
212	15-16, 18-19	Hungary	United States of America	191 223	9-10 12, 14
213	16-22	Kenya	Venezuela	216 234	7-8 6-7
216	7-8	Venezuela	Yugoslavia	200	7
	9-10	Canada		222	12
222	12	Yugoslavia	<u>Non-member State</u>		
223	12, 14	United States of America	Norway	194	14
225	19	Peru	<u>The Secretary-General of the United Nations</u>	194	9, 12
226	7, 10	Romania			
234	6-7	Venezuela			
236	47	Canada			
237	11	Pakistan			

Chronological			Alphabetical		
PV	Page	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV	Page
		IX. <u>Consideration of other areas dealing with the cessation of the arms race and disarmament and other relevant measures</u>			
		19. <u>Economic and social consequences of the arms race</u>			
189	37	Kenya			
190	15	Sweden			
192	31	China			
193	16-17	Peru			
194	10	The Secretary-General of the United Nations			
	20	Pakistan			
195	13	Romania			
	25-27	India			
200	7	Yugoslavia			
212	33-39	Kenya			
213	19	Kenya			
222	6	Pakistan (the Chairman)			
223	14	United States of America			
225	17-18	Peru			

Chronological			Alphabetical		
PV	Page	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV	Page
IX. <u>Consideration of other areas dealing with the cessation of the arms race and disarmament and other relevant measures</u>					
20. <u>Disarmament and development</u>					
189	37	Kenya	Algeria	194	45
190	15	Sweden	China	192	31
192	31	China	Ethiopia	234	27
193	16-17	Peru	France	202	7
194	10	The Secretary-General of the United Nations	India	195	24-27
	20	Pakistan	Kenya	189	37
	45	Algeria		212	32-39
195	13	Romania		213	18-19, 21-22
	24-27	India	Pakistan	194	20
200	7	Yugoslavia	Pakistan (the Chairman)	222	6
202	7	France	Peru	193	16-17
212	32-39	Kenya	Romania	195	13
213	18-19, 21-22	Kenya		226	7
222	6	Pakistan (the Chairman)	Sweden	190	15
226	7	Romania	Yugoslavia	200	7
234	27	Ethiopia	<u>The Secretary-General of the United Nations</u>	194	10

Chronological			Alphabetical		
PV	Page	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV	Page
IX. <u>Consideration of other areas dealing with the cessation of the arms race and disarmament and other relevant measures</u>					
21. <u>Scientific and Technological Aspects of the arms race</u>					
190	19	Sweden	Brazil	200	16
192	21	German Democratic Republic	China	192	30
	30	China	Egypt	195	40
193	14	Japan	Ethiopia	193	43
	43	Ethiopia	German Democratic Republic	192	21
194	31	Sri Lanka		212	13
195	15	Romania		222	27
	40	Egypt		230	9
	45	Finland (non-member State)	Hungary	203	8
				212	17, 18
200	16	Brazil		235	12
203	8	Hungary	Japan	193	14
207	9	Netherlands	Netherlands	207	9
212	13	German Democratic Republic	Romania	195	15
	17, 19	Hungary		229	15-16
	25	Sri Lanka	Sri Lanka	194	31
222	27	German Democratic Republic		212	25
229	15-16	Romania	Sweden	190	19
230	9	German Democratic Republic	<u>Non-member State</u>		
235		Hungary	Finland	195	45

Chronological			Alphabetical		
PV	Page	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV	Page
<u>IX. Consideration of other areas dealing with the cessation of the arms race and disarmament and other relevant measures</u>					
<u>22. General and complete disarmament</u>					
189	8-9	Mongolia (The Chairman)	Algeria	194	41,42,45
	17	Mexico	Argentina	193	18-19
	22	Canada	Australia	192	24-26
	30-31	Czechoslovakia	Belgium	192	7-8
190	8-14	Germany, Federal Republic of		217	9-10
	15-16,19,22	Sweden	Brazil	236	17-18
191	8-11,14-15	United States of America	Bulgaria	200	15
192	7-8	Belgium		193	27-29
	17-18	German Democratic Republic	Burma	214	6
	24-26	Australia	Canada	220	8,11
	30-31	China		223	28
	34	Cuba	China	195	17-18
193	7,9-10	Italy		189	22
	11-12	Japan	Cuba	236	44,47,48
	16-17	Peru		192	30-31
	18-19	Argentina	Czechoslovakia	236	39
	23-26	Hungary		237	18
	27-29	Bulgaria	Ethiopia	192	34
	38-40	Nigeria		221	13
	42	Ethiopia	France	189	30-31
194	8,12	The Secretary-General of the United Nations		194	26
	13	Norway (non-member State)	France	220	5,7
	20	Pakistan		193	42
	26	Czechoslovakia	Germany, Federal Republic of	234	24
	31	Sri Lanka	Hungary	194	33,35
	33,35	France		202	7,31
	41-42,45	Algeria	India	238	29
195	8-9	Morocco		192	17-18
	12	Romania	Germany, Federal Republic of	222	25
	17-18	Burma		190	8-14
	25,28	India	Hungary	193	23-26
	35	Poland		203	13-14
	46	Finland (non-member State)	India	224	9
				195	25,28
				197	18
				205	9-11
				197	7
				193	7,9-10
				193	11-12
				215	19-23

Chronological			Alphabetical		
PV	Page	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV	Page
IX. <u>Consideration of other areas dealing with the cessation of the arms race and disarmament and other relevant measures</u> 22. <u>General and complete disarmament</u>					
197	7	Indonesia	Kenya	197	23-24
	18	India		212	30-31
	23-24	Kenya		213	17
199	6-8	Morocco (The Chairman)	Mexico	189	17
200	6-7	Yugoslavia	Mongolia (the Chairman)	189	8-9
	15	Brazil	Morocco	195	8-9
202	7,31	France		217	27-28
203	13-14	Hungary	Morocco (the Chairman)	199	6-8
	17-20	USSR	Nigeria	193	38-40
	29	United States of America		205	12
205	9-11	India		236	37
	12	Nigeria	Pakistan	194	20
212	7-8	Poland	Pakistan (the Chairman)	222	6
	30-31	Kenya	Peru	193	16-17
	45	United States of America	Peru (the Chairman)	230	6-7
213	17	Kenya	Poland	195	35
214	6	Bulgaria		212	7-8
215	19-23	Japan	Romania	221	9,11
216	7-8	Venezuela	Sri Lanka	194	31
	16	USSR	Sweden	190	15-16,19,22
	36-37	Senegal (non-member State)	USSR	203	17-20
217	9-10	Belgium		216	16
	27-28	Morocco	USSR (on behalf of a group of socialist States)	220	12-13
219	6	United Kingdom		238	21,24
220	5,7	Czechoslovakia	United Kingdom	219	6
	8,11	Bulgaria	United States of America	191	8-11,14-15
	12-13	USSR		203	29
221	9,11	Poland		212	45
	13	Cuba	Venezuela	216	7-8
222	6	Pakistan (The Chairman)		234	6-7
	9-14	Yugoslavia	Yugoslavia	200	6-7
	25	German Democratic Republic		222	9-14
223	28	Bulgaria		237	19
224	9	Hungary			
230	6-7	Peru (The Chairman)			

Chronological			Alphabetical		
PV	Page	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV	Page
		IX. <u>Consideration of other areas dealing with the cessation of the arms race and disarmament and other relevant measures</u>			
		22. <u>General and complete disarmament</u>			
234	6-7	Venezuela	<u>Non-member States</u>		
	24	Ethiopia	Finland	195	46
236	17-18	Belgium	Norway	194	13
	37	Nigeria	Senegal	216	36-37
	39	China	<u>The Secretary-General of the United Nations</u>	194	8,12
	44,47,48	Canada			
237	18	China			
	19	Yugoslavia			
238	21,24	USSR (on behalf of a group of socialist States)			
	29	France			

Chronological			Alphabetical		
FV	Page	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	FV	Page
		IX. <u>Consideration of other areas dealing with the cessation of the arms race and disarmament and other relevant measures</u>			
		23. <u>Research studies and training</u>			
194	16	Norway (non-member State)	Cuba	221	16
195	15	Romania	Ethiopia	221	17
217	26	Indonesia	Indonesia	217	26
	32	The Secretary of the Committee	Japan	232	8
221	6	Nigeria (The Chairman)	Nigeria (the Chairman)	221	6
	16	Cuba	Romania	195	15
	17	Ethiopia	<u>Non-member States</u>		
232	8	Japan	Norway	194	16
			<u>The Secretary of the Committee</u>	217	32

Chronological			Alphabetical		
PV	Page	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV	Page
<p>IX. <u>Consideration of other areas dealing with the cessation of the arms race and disarmament and other relevant measures</u></p> <p>24. <u>Public Information/World Public Opinion</u></p>					
189	9	Mongolia (The Chairman)	Argentina	193	18,21
	20	Canada		233	15
	23-24	USSR	Belgium	192	8
	38	Kenya	Bulgaria	193	29-30
190	15-17,22	Sweden	Burma	195	20
192	8	Belgium	Canada	189	20
	31	China	China	192	31
193	7,10	Italy	Cuba	196	8-9
	14	Japan		198	37
	14-16	Peru		221	13
	18,21	Argentina	Czechoslovakia	194	22
	29-30	Bulgaria		220	5-6
	38-39	Nigeria	Egypt	195	40
	42,45	Ethiopia	Ethiopia	193	42,45
194	8-9	The Secretary-General of the United Nations		221	17-18
	13,17	Norway (non-member State)	France	234	24
	21	Pakistan		194	34
	22	Czechoslovakia		202	8-9
	34	France	German Democratic Republic	225	15
195	12	Romania	Hungary	224	9-11
	20	Burma	India	195	21-22, 25,28
	21-22,25,28	India	Indonesia	217	23
	36	Poland	Italy	193	7,10
	40	Egypt	Japan	193	14
	45	Finland (non-member State)	Kenya	189	38
196	8-9	Cuba	Mexico	197	98
197	28	Mexico	Mongolia	235	33
198	37	Cuba	Mongolia (the Chairman)	189	9
199	7	Morocco (The Chairman)	Morocco (the Chairman)	199	7
200	8-9	Yugoslavia		208	13
202	8-9	France	Netherlands	235	25
			Nigeria	193	38-39
			Nigeria (the Chairman)	217	7
			Pakistan	194	21
			Peru	193	14-16
			Peru (the Chairman)	236	16

Chronological			Alphabetical		
PV	Page	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV	Page
IX. <u>Consideration of other areas dealing with the cessation of the arms race and disarmament and other relevant measures</u>					
24. <u>Public Information/ World Public Opinion</u>					
206	13-19	USSR	Poland	195	36
207	22	Poland		207	22
208	12	The Secretary of the Committee	Romania.	212	19
	13	Morocco (The Chairman)	Sweden	195	12
212	9	Poland	USSR	190	15-17,22
216	18	USSR		189	23-24
	37	Senegal (non-member State)		206	13-19
217	7	Nigeria (The Chairman)	United States of America	216	18
	23	Indonesia	Yugoslavia	224	17-18
220	5-6	Czechoslovakia	<u>Non-member States</u>		
221	13	Cuba	Finland	223	15
	17-18	Ethiopia	Norway	200	8-9
223	15	United States of America	Senegal	195	45
224	9-11	Hungary	<u>The Secretary-General of the United Nations</u>	194	13,17
	17-18	USSR	<u>The Secretary of the Committee</u>	216	37
225	15	German Democratic Republic		194	8-9
228	7	The Secretary of the Committee		208	12
233	15	Argentina		228	7
234	24	Ethiopia			
235	25	Netherlands			
	33	Mongolia			
236	16	Peru (the Chairman)			

COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

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FINAL RECORD OF THE ONE HUNDRED AND EIGHTY-NINTH PLENARY MEETING
held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva, on
Tuesday, 1 February 1983, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman:

Mr. D. IRDEMBILEG

(Mongolia)

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Algeria: Mr. A. TAFFAR

Argentina: Mr. J.C. CARASALES
Mr. R. VILLAMEROSA
Miss N. NASCIMBENE

Australia: Mr. D. SADLEIR
Mr. R. STEELE
Mr. T. FINDLAY
Mr. S. FREEMAN

Belgium: Mr. A. ONKELINK
Mr. J.M. NOIRFALISSE
Mr. H. DE BISSCHOP

Brazil: Mr. C.A. DE SOUZA E SILVA
Mr. S. DE QUEIROZ DUARTE

Bulgaria: Mr. K. TELLALOV
Mr. I. SOTIROV
Mr. P. POPTCHEV
Mr. C. PRAMOV
Mr. N. MIKHAILOV

Burma: U MAUNG MAUNG GYI
U TIN KYAW HLAING
U THAN TUN

Canada: Mr. A.J. MacEACHEN
Mr. D.S. McPHAIL
Mr. G.R. SKINNER
Mr. R.J. ROCHON
Mr. A. DUDOIT

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Mr. TIAN JIN
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Mr. LI CHANGHE
Mr. PAN ZHENGLIANG
Mrs. GE YUYUN
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Mr. T. ARAI

Kenya:

Mr. D.D.C. DON NANJIRA

Mexico:

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Mr. J.J. HOGAN
Mr. J. MARTIN
Mr. R. MIKULAK

Venezuela:

Mr. A. LOPEZ OLIVER
Mr. T.L. RUBIO
Mr. O.G. GARCIA

Yugoslavia:

Mr. K. VIDAS
Mr. M. MIHAJLOVIC
Mr. D. MINIĆ

Zaire:

Mr. BAGBENI ADEITO NZENGEYA
Mrs. ESAKI-EKANGA KABEYA

Director-General of the
United Nations Office at
Geneva:

Mr. E. SUY

Secretary of the
Committee on Disarmament:

Mr. R. JAIPAL

Deputy Secretary of the
Committee on Disarmament:

Mr. V. BERASATEGUI

The CHAIRMAN: I declare open the 1983 session and the 189th plenary meeting of the Committee on Disarmament.

[Speaking in Russian] Distinguished delegates, ladies and gentlemen, this year, the honour and duty of taking the Chair at the opening of the session of this multilateral disarmament negotiating forum have fallen to the lot of the representative of the Mongolian People's Republic. In assuming the office of Chairman, I should like to express my confidence that our delegation can fully count on the assistance and support of all participants in this forum in the discharge of this responsible mission. I should also like to assure my distinguished colleagues that the Mongolian delegation will make every effort to contribute to businesslike and constructive work at the present session.

I should like to take this opportunity, both on my own behalf and on that of this Committee, to offer warm congratulations to Mrs. Alva Myrdal of Sweden and Ambassador García Robles of Mexico on their being awarded the Nobel Peace Prize.

I would ask the delegation of Sweden kindly to transmit our heartfelt congratulations to Mrs. Alva Myrdal.

Ambassador García Robles is well known to us as one of Mexico's outstanding diplomats.

The great efforts of Ambassador Robles, who devotes his wealth of experience and his knowledge to the cause of disarmament, are held in high esteem in our Committee. Permit me from the bottom of my heart to wish distinguished Ambassador Robles, one of the honoured veterans of our influential forum, further great success in his noble work.

Allow me also to express to Ambassador García Robles sincere gratitude for his skilful and wise guidance of the Committee's work during the closing stage of its last year's session.

I should like warmly to welcome our new colleagues, the representatives of Algeria, China, India, Japan, Kenya, Sweden, the United Kingdom and Venezuela. We look forward to their close co-operation and businesslike participation.

It is a pleasure to us to see among us and to welcome the distinguished Director-General, Mr. Erik Suy.

I should also like to extend the most cordial welcome to my long-standing colleague, the distinguished Secretary of the Committee and Special Representative of the United Nations Secretary-General, Ambassador Riki Jaipal, who has always contributed to the utmost in his responsible duties and is ever ready selflessly to assist us in the furtherance of our common, very difficult tasks. I should like, too, to welcome his deputy, Mr. V. Berasategui, and all the members of the secretariat.

Distinguished delegates, we are meeting once again today for another session of this multilateral disarmament negotiating body in a difficult international situation in which the arms race, and especially the nuclear arms race, is constantly gaining in intensity.

(The Chairman)

I should like to remind you that, in the Final Document of its first special session devoted to disarmament, the United Nations General Assembly emphasized that the removal of the threat of a world war — a nuclear war — is the most acute and urgent task of the present day. Mankind is confronted with a choice: it must either halt the arms race and proceed to disarmament or face annihilation.

It is precisely for this reason that broad strata of world public opinion, people of the most varying convictions, are speaking out with new strength against the danger of war, the threat of nuclear war. Such concepts and doctrines as those of a "limited nuclear war", "a first disabling nuclear strike", "protracted nuclear conflict" and the like are alien to the will and minds of peoples.

Distinguished delegates, over two decades have elapsed since this negotiating body was created. As we know, this body has undergone a number of organizational and structural changes during that period. Today, all the nuclear-weapon Powers that are permanent members of the Security Council are represented here, together with other militarily significant States.

In the period following the conclusion of the Moscow Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in three environments, and in the 1970s, when there was tangible progress in the improvement of international relations, a number of important multilateral treaties and agreements in the sphere of the limitation of the arms race and disarmament were drawn up and signed within the framework of this Committee. This played an important role in the strengthening of universal peace and security. Our Committee deservedly earned thereby the approval and gratitude of world public opinion.

It seems to me that it is the task of this Committee now to redouble its efforts to secure the speediest possible elaboration of appropriate agreements on the vital issues on its agenda.

I think you will agree with me when I say that the main criteria for our negotiations should be that they are genuine negotiations and that they achieve results.

There can be no doubt that the question which should have priority in our negotiations is that of the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament.

A general and complete nuclear-weapon test ban would be of exceptional importance in the resolution of that issue.

The question of the conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty has been on the agenda of the Committee on Disarmament for many years now. A few years ago tripartite negotiations were being held on this subject, but most regrettably these were broken off.

From the day of its entry into force, the 1963 Treaty has served as an important instrument of arms limitation. As you know, 20 years ago the parties to that Treaty undertook to seek to achieve the adoption of a comprehensive set of measures in this sphere. Since then, the urgent need to achieve agreement on the cessation of underground nuclear tests has constantly been stressed at sessions of the General Assembly and in numerous international forums.

(The Chairman)

I should like to remind you that 10 years ago, in his message to the Committee on Disarmament, the Secretary-General of the United Nations expressed the hope "that the year 1973, which marks the tenth anniversary of the Partial Test Ban Treaty, will also mark a turning point in the efforts to achieve a comprehensive nuclear-test ban".

Unfortunately, there has still been no positive decision on this vitally important issue, the solution of which would contribute to the limitation of the nuclear arms race and the halting of the qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons.

Naturally, negotiations on this matter, as on other pressing disarmament issues, are complex and involve many difficulties. They call for persistence, patience and time. However, the key factor in this extremely important matter must be the demonstration of political will and resolve on the part of all participants. Self-isolation would be a disservice to this important cause.

Let us, then, demonstrate greater will and willingness so that this forum may, right from the outset of this session's work, begin without delay concrete negotiations on the substance of the matter, with a view to the earliest possible elaboration of an international treaty on the prohibition of all nuclear weapons tests.

It seems to me that positive results of work on the elaboration of such an international instrument would be an important contribution by our Committee to the over-all credit balance for 1983, the year of the twentieth anniversary of the Treaty banning nuclear weapons tests in three environments.

With your permission, I should also like to underline the importance of the resumption of the tripartite negotiations on this matter, which would undoubtedly serve as a stimulus to the work of the Committee on Disarmament.

Distinguished delegates, as regards the question of the prohibition and elimination of chemical weapons, the world expects concrete results from our Committee. I think that, as is shown by the outcome of our work at the last session, the conditions necessary for the achievement of agreement exist. As I see it, the important thing now is to proceed as rapidly as possible to agreement on the text of the basic provisions of a future convention, taking into account all the existing proposals and future initiatives.

The problem of preventing an arms race in outer space has recently become particularly pressing and urgent.

The approach to the consideration of this question must be constructive, aimed at the prevention of the further militarization of space and the use of contemporary scientific and technical achievements for peaceful purposes.

I think it would not be superfluous to recall that the General Assembly also recognized the value of the resumption of bilateral negotiations between the USSR and the United States of America on the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

Those, I believe, are the highest priority items on the agenda for the Committee's present session. In saying this, I in no way intend to minimize the importance of such issues as those of a comprehensive programme of disarmament, the prohibition of radiological weapons and the strengthening of security guarantees for non-nuclear-weapon States, on which negotiations have already begun and may be

(The Chairman)

continued in the respective subsidiary bodies with an appropriate mandate. At its last session, the United Nations General Assembly also adopted resolutions on these items, containing specific recommendations to the Committee on Disarmament.

The peoples of the world today pin high hopes on the successful conclusion of the Soviet-United States talks on the limitation of nuclear weapons in Europe and on the limitation and reduction of strategic weapons. It is, indeed, true that the answer to the question whether there will or will not be a new spiral in the arms race is directly dependent on the results of those talks.

Distinguished delegates, in the present difficult period in international life, we take heart from the fact that an active dialogue and negotiations are now in progress on the most urgent problems of the day.

Some important proposals have been put forward with the specific aim of eliminating distrust, lowering the level of military confrontation and thereby ensuring peace and security throughout the world.

I believe that this is precisely the object of the proposal made in the recent Prague Declaration for the conclusion of a treaty on the mutual non-use of military force and the maintenance of peaceful relations between the States parties to the Warsaw Treaty and the States parties to the North Atlantic Treaty — a treaty which should be open to all other States also.

In my opinion, this initiative is designed to meet the goals of preventing military confrontation and building confidence between States, and is not merely in the interests of the States belonging to the two alliances and of the other European States but also reflects the aspirations of the States in the other regions of the world.

As I see it, this new proposal is again closely related to the concrete initiatives of the Governments of States in various regions of the world that are calling for the achievement of agreement on the questions of the prevention of military confrontation, the non-use of force and non-aggression, and the implementation of regional measures for the maintenance of peace and stability.

In my capacity as the representative of the Mongolian People's Republic, I should like to point out that, in its statement of 17 January 1983, our Government fully supported the proposals by the States parties to the Warsaw Treaty as a genuine alternative to a thermonuclear catastrophe endangering the life and civilization of mankind.

Distinguished delegates, in conclusion, permit me to express the hope that at its 1983 session the Committee on Disarmament will do everything in its power to commence effective negotiations on the priority issues on its agenda and to make a tangible contribution to the general cause of halting the arms race and achieving disarmament, and especially nuclear disarmament.

[Resuming in English] I have on my list of speakers for today the representatives of Mexico, Canada, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Czechoslovakia and Kenya. Before giving the floor to the first speaker, I would like to welcome in the Committee the Deputy Prime Minister and Secretary of State for External Affairs of Canada, the Honourable Allan J. MacEachen, who will address the Committee today. I am sure that all members of the Committee welcome his presence at the opening of our annual session.

I now give the floor to the representative of Mexico, Ambassador García Robles.

Mr. GARCIA ROBLES (Mexico) (translated from Spanish): My delegation is pleased that the alphabetical order of the names of our countries means that it is you who are succeeding me today as Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament. The proximity of the seats which we two always occupy in this negotiating body has placed me in a privileged position to appreciate the constructive and wise part which you have played since we began our work four years ago. I am certain that your chairmanship will be distinguished by those same qualities during this month of February, in which you will have the important task of guiding our discussions.

While offering you my sincere congratulations, I should at the same time like to express my gratitude to you for your very kind words concerning the award of the Nobel Peace Prize for 1982, an honour which I shared with Alva Myrdal at the end of last year. As I already had occasion to say at the start of the work of the First Committee of the General Assembly on 13 October last year, although the Prize is usually awarded on a personal basis, it must be borne in mind that people do not live or act in a vacuum, especially in the case of activities like those believed to contribute to the promotion and strengthening of peace. Consequently, as I stated then and wish to repeat today, I am firmly convinced that in this case it should be considered that the Prize has been awarded, albeit indirectly, to a number of recipients in addition to myself, including in particular this multilateral disarmament negotiating body and its predecessor from 1962 onwards, which had successively two different names, as well as the First Committee of the General Assembly.

This is also substantiated by the reasons specifically mentioned by the Nobel Committee when explaining the grounds for its choice for 1982. These were given as follows:

The Committee considered that the two recipients had "for many years played a central role in the United Nations disarmament negotiations" and had contributed "to opening the eyes of the world to the threat which humanity faces through the continuing nuclear arms race".

Mr. Chairman, my delegation wishes to associate itself with the warm words of welcome you addressed to those of our distinguished colleagues who are taking part in our work for the first time today as well as to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of the Committee.

The increased number of resolutions relating to disarmament (no less than 58) which have come to us from the thirty-seventh session of the United Nations General Assembly, the largest number in the annals of the Organization, creates a risk of our being unable to see the wood for the trees.

In order to help avoid that, I should like to confine this statement to two of the issues dealt with in those resolutions, namely, the comprehensive programme of disarmament and the bilateral negotiations on nuclear weapons. Naturally, this does not mean that I am unaware of the importance of a number of other issues with which I hope to have the opportunity of dealing in later statements, such as a nuclear-weapon test ban, the prevention of nuclear war, the prevention of the arms race in outer space, and the elimination of chemical weapons.

I have chosen the subject of a comprehensive programme of disarmament because it seems to me that of all the items on the agenda of this negotiating body this is perhaps the one which, by reason as much of its history as of its prospects, may be considered as capable of full realization during the course of this year, and of incalculable significance as regards its effects.

(Mr. Garcia Robles, Mexico)

As you will recall the Committee, as the result of two years' continuous work by an ad hoc working group, was able to submit to the General Assembly, at its second special session devoted to disarmament, a draft containing all the necessary material for a comprehensive programme, in the form either of unanimously agreed texts or of alternative texts (with the exception of the introduction, which it was agreed, should be drafted later, and for which the Chairman of the Working Group subsequently submitted a draft to the General Assembly.

Unfortunately, as all the distinguished representatives in this Committee will doubtless recall, the General Assembly was unable to bring to a successful conclusion the preparation of a comprehensive programme of disarmament that would faithfully reflect the requirements set forth in paragraph 109 of the Final Document of the first special session devoted to disarmament. I shall not review here the reasons for that failure: I did so at sufficient length in the statement I made just six months ago at the Committee's 175th meeting, held on 3 August 1982, the text of which may easily be consulted by anyone so wishing. I shall confine myself to repeating what I said then, that the decisive element which led to that failure was the negative attitude of one of the two nuclear superpowers towards nuclear disarmament and in particular towards a total nuclear-weapon-test ban.

This attitude is in flagrant contradiction with the commitment made under the Partial Test Ban Treaty nearly 20 years ago, the preamble of which expresses the determination to achieve "the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time". This undertaking was explicitly reiterated five years later in the preamble to the non-proliferation Treaty, and is certainly also implicit in article VI of that Treaty.

The responsibility that the superpower in question would bear if it persisted in its negative position would certainly be much greater this year than it was in 1982. For it should not be forgotten that at its second special session devoted to disarmament the General Assembly, after regretting that it had not been able to adopt a comprehensive programme of disarmament, stated that it "was encouraged" by "the unanimous and categorical reaffirmation by all Member States of the validity of the Final Document" of the first special session devoted to disarmament, as well as "their solemn commitment to it and their pledge to respect the priorities in disarmament negotiations as agreed to in its Programme of Action". It then went on to say:

"Member States have affirmed their determination to continue to work for the urgent conclusion of negotiations on and the adoption of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, which shall encompass all measures thought to be advisable in order to ensure that the goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control becomes a reality in a world in which international peace and security prevail, and in which a new international economic order is strengthened and consolidated. To this end, the draft Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament is hereby referred back to the Committee on Disarmament, together with the views expressed and the progress achieved on the subject at the special session. The Committee on Disarmament is requested to submit a revised draft Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament to the General Assembly at its thirty-eighth session."

That is a quotation from the declaration adopted by consensus at the General Assembly's second special session devoted to disarmament, last year.

(Mr. Garcia Robles, Mexico)

It is absolutely clear from the statement which I have just quoted that the General Assembly expects the Committee to transmit to it, not next year nor still less in 1985 but at its thirty-eighth session, to be held in the course of this year which is just beginning, a draft comprehensive programme which is wholly or virtually free of brackets. Since the outcome of the Committee's work on this issue will, in the last resort, depend on whether the superpower to which I have already made several references finally decides to act in accordance with the legally binding commitments it gave some time ago with respect to a test ban, we should like to stress that a declaration to that effect would unquestionably be one of the most effective means of ensuring that the statement to be made in the Committee next Friday by one of the highest officials of the administration of the State in question will be a memorable one. What is more, this would not entail any obligation for that State additional to the one freely accepted by it in paragraph 51 of the Final Document of 1978, which, as I recalled a moment ago, was "categorically reaffirmed" last year by its Government, which also promised to respect "the priorities in disarmament negotiations" agreed to in that Document.

The second issue which, as I said earlier, I wish to discuss today forms part of the item on our agenda entitled "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament", an item on which, regrettably, it has not yet been possible even to set up an ad hoc working group.

However, for the past year and two months in the one case and seven months in the other, the United States and the Soviet Union have been holding, here in Geneva, two sets of bilateral negotiations, the first on the so-called intermediate-range nuclear weapons, which began on 30 November 1981, and the second on strategic nuclear weapons, which began on 29 June 1982.

On 9 December 1982 the General Assembly adopted, by 114 votes in favour and only one against, resolution 37/78 in which, after recalling the commitment approved by consensus at the first special session in 1978 and reiterated at the second special session in 1982, requiring that the United Nations should be kept appropriately informed of all negotiations relating to disarmament, whether bilateral, regional or multilateral, it went on to make two specific requests of the Governments of the two above-mentioned negotiating States:

First, to transmit to the Secretary-General, not later than 1 September 1983, "a joint report or two separate reports on the stage reached in their above-mentioned negotiations, for consideration by the General Assembly at its thirty-eighth session";

Secondly, "To bear constantly in mind that not only their national interests but also the vital interests of all the peoples of the world are at stake in this question".

In order to realize how fully justified are these requests by the General Assembly, it is enough to recall some of the main declarations approved by consensus in 1978, which were the subject of "unanimous and categorical reaffirmation by all Member States" in 1982. These proclaimed, inter alia, that "enduring international peace and security cannot be built on the accumulation of weaponry by military alliances nor be sustained by a precarious balance of deterrence or doctrines of strategic superiority"; that "existing arsenals of nuclear weapons alone are more than sufficient to destroy all life on Earth", and that therefore "the increase in weapons, especially nuclear weapons, far from helping to strengthen international security, on the contrary weakens it"; and that "the existence of nuclear weapons and the continuing arms race" pose an alarming "threat to the very survival of mankind", and therefore "all the peoples of the world have a vital interest in the success of disarmament negotiations".

(Mr. Garcia Robles, Mexico)

In the light of the foregoing, it is very easy to understand why my delegation feels obliged, at this opening meeting of the Committee's 1983 session, to express its deep concern at the course followed so far by the negotiations between the two superpowers.

With respect to strategic weapons, it is our view that the seven months of bilateral talks should not be seen as something isolated but rather as a supplement to the 10 years of the so-called SALT I and SALT II talks and that it should therefore be considered that the talks have gone on more than long enough for it to be possible to move on from exploratory sparring and public relations or propaganda statements (the two terms have been used without distinction) to a period of genuine and fair negotiation, as befits the two superpowers whose security certainly cannot be in danger as they are both armed to the teeth; besides, in the opinion of all observers who are both competent and objective, there is between them a state of "parity" or "dead heat" -- whichever you prefer -- with respect to their nuclear military capacity.

As regards intermediate-range nuclear weapons, also known as long-range theatre weapons, we cannot disguise the fact that our alarm is greater still, since it appears that if the negotiations do not bear fruit within a relatively short period, 572 new nuclear missiles will be deployed in Europe, 464 of them of the guided "cruise" type, and the other 108 of the Pershing II type.

With regard to the former, it is generally agreed that verification of these would be virtually impossible, which would make the negotiations on nuclear arms limitation and nuclear disarmament infinitely more difficult. However, the harm that would result from the deployment of these seems of small account compared with the danger inherent in the deployment of Pershing II missiles, in the context of confrontation between the two nuclear superpowers. It is easy to understand why, in the leading article of its latest issue, dated 31 January, one of the most widely circulated United States weeklies asks whether arms control will be achieved "now or never", stresses that "the time for empty words is fast running out" and points out that for the Soviet Union the deployment of Pershing II missiles would be the equivalent of "a Cuban missile crisis in reverse".

The relevant facts of the matter are as follows: it is calculated that inter-continental missiles would take about half an hour to reach their targets, whether in the Soviet Union or in the United States. On the other hand, the Pershing II missiles, which would remain United States missiles although installed on European territory, would take only six minutes to reach their destination on Soviet territory. In a book published last year by Times Books entitled Russian Roulette: the superpower game, Arthur Macy Cox recalls that Mr. Fred Iklé (who spoke a number of times at the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament as Director of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and is now an undersecretary in his country's Defense Department) in June 1980 wrote an article in the Washington Post entitled "The Growing Risk of War by Accident". In that article he wrote:

"The more we rely on 'launch-on-warning' (or, for that matter, the more the Soviets do), the greater the risk of accidental nuclear war. Anyone who tries to explain that this tactic could be implemented in a totally reliable and safe way is a fool. He does not even know how little he knows. No one can understand in sufficient detail all the possible malfunctions, unanticipated events and human errors that might interact some day to confound the "redundant" warning systems or to bypass the 'safeguards' against an unintended release of the command to launch a missile salvo.

(Mr. Garcia Robles, Mexico)

The crux of the matter is that the more important it becomes to 'launch on warning,' the more dangerous it will be. The tightening noose around our neck is the requirement for speed. The more certain one wants to be that our missile forces could be launched within minutes and under all circumstances, the more one has to practice the system and to loosen the safeguards. And remember: As in June, 1980, there will be false alerts."

To assess the terrible consequences that alerts of this kind could have in the case of nuclear missiles requiring only six minutes to reach their targets, it is worth recalling the following information given in the New York Times concerning the two alerts which took place in 1980:

"In the incidents of 3 June and 6 June, about 100 B-52 bombers carrying nuclear weapons were prepared for take-off because the officer on duty of the Strategic Air Command received data from a computer indicating that a Soviet missile attack was under way. In each of these two cases, as competent officials revealed, the command aircraft of the President of the United States, a specially adapted 747 full of telecommunications equipment, normally based very close to Washington, at Andrews Air Force Base, was also prepared for take-off".

To supplement this information, and with the same purpose I mentioned earlier, that of bringing out the full significance of the "launch-on-warning" strategy or tactic in the case of missiles taking six minutes to reach their targets, I shall also quote the opinion expressed by Robert C. Aldridge, a space engineer and expert in submarine military technology, as well as author of several books, in an article published on 26 July 1980, in which he wrote the following:

"Three times in seven months the strategic nuclear forces of the United States have been placed on alert due to errors of electronic equipment. On 9 November 1979 the NORAD computer announced an attack by submarine-launched missiles. On 3 June 1980, it reported a mass attack also including submarine-launched missiles. Three days later, it indicated that missiles from submarines lying some thousand miles from the coasts of the United States could reach their targets in about 10 minutes. The November scare lasted six minutes, and the June alerts lasted three, which represents a considerable portion of the time available for making decisions. It is terrifying to think of the consequences which these alerts could have had if they had lasted only a few crucial minutes more".

Reflecting on these facts and on this reasoning it is very easy to understand why we are convinced of the need for the two superpowers which have been negotiating on nuclear weapons "to bear constantly in mind that not only their national interests but also the vital interests of all the peoples of the world are at stake in this question", as the General Assembly so rightly put it. We fully understand that, as is customary in all international negotiations, each of the parties should put forward as its original proposal something going considerably further than what the proponent himself considers, in his heart of hearts, to be reasonable and fair. However, we cannot grasp how, after more than a year of talks, there is still a party clinging to its original proposal and seeking to present it not only as beyond improvement but even irreplaceable. We prefer the behaviour of those who have already shown signs of sufficient flexibility, putting forward alternatives containing elements which are not unreasonable or unfair, and hope that it will soon be imitated by the other party.

Mexico's position on nuclear weapons is well known, and it may be summed up as follows: it is our conviction that either the world will put an end to nuclear weapons or nuclear weapons will put an end to the world. In essence, this

(Mr. Garcia Robles, Mexico)

position coincides with the conclusion reached by the experts of 12 different nationalities who worked for a year, under the auspices of the United Nations and in implementation of a General Assembly resolution, in their report entitled "Comprehensive Study on Nuclear Weapons" which they adopted unanimously. That conclusion reads as follows:

"Even if the road to nuclear disarmament is a long and difficult one, there is no alternative. Peace requires the prevention of the danger of a nuclear war. If nuclear disarmament is to become a reality, the commitment to mutual deterrence through a balance of terror must be discarded. The concept of the maintenance of world peace, stability and balance through the process of deterrence is perhaps the most dangerous collective fallacy that exists."

It was because we are convinced of this great truth, and because we like to practise what we preach that, some 20 years ago, Mexico took the initiative which led to the creation of the nuclear-weapon-free zone which, as you know, exists in Latin America. It would perhaps not be a bad idea if a similar zone could be established in Europe, in the interests of the peace and tranquillity of the peoples of the world. It seems to us that one country or one region should not, in seeking to guarantee its own security, endanger that of the entire planet. In this interdependent world in which it is our lot to live, clearly there can be no greater illusion than to believe that a nuclear war could be a "limited" war. We think that the only choice open to mankind in the event of such a conflagration would be the one described by Einstein and Russell nearly 30 years ago when they said that there would be "sudden death for a minority and slow death for the majority subjected to the torture of disease and gradual disintegration".

Two months ago, on 1 December 1982, a new Constitutional President of Mexico, Miguel de la Madrid Hurtado, took possession of his high office, as has occurred regularly every six years in the civil process of more than half a century of democratic stability.

In this connection, I should like to close this statement with two quotations both of which, I believe, clearly and concisely illustrate the continuity of Mexico's foreign policy on issues such as those which I have dealt with today.

In his inaugural address, the President of Mexico stated:

"We shall continue to uphold, with unwavering conviction, the self-determination of peoples, non-intervention, the peaceful settlement of conflicts, the legal equality of States, disarmament for the preservation of peace, and just and effective international co-operation.

"Isolation is not merely an anachronism but an impossibility. Co-operation among free peoples is the only road to peace in an interdependent world. With greater internal co-ordination of our actions and strategies, we shall take part in international forums and bilateral actions to enhance the effectiveness of our objectives and principles."

Two weeks later, on 17 December, speaking on behalf of the Mexican Head of State in an address to the diplomatic corps, his Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Bernardo Sepúlveda Amor, stated:

"Mexico is in favour of a peace which implies, without any reservations or shadows, full recognition of the inescapable common destiny of all mankind."

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the representative of Mexico for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the Deputy Prime Minister and Secretary of State for External Affairs of Canada, the Honourable Allan J. MacEachen.

Mr. MacEACHEN (Canada): Mr. Chairman: may I first extend to you my congratulations on your assumption of the Chair for the first month of this year's session of the Committee on Disarmament. I should also like to extend to Ambassador García Robles my congratulations on his receiving the Nobel Peace Prize. The peace prize is much more than a personal honour; it is a symbol of the devotion to peace that must be at the heart of our collective work.

I recall the message of the late Lester B. Pearson, a friend and cabinet colleague of mine, when he accepted the Nobel Peace Prize in 1957. He said that in the nuclear age nations face a choice between peace and extinction. In the twenty-five years since then, nuclear war has been avoided, but at the cost of an awesome build-up of nuclear arms. The horrible instruments of destruction, so terrifying in the 1950s, have been replaced by new and more deadly successors. The threat of a sudden, total collapse into nuclear suicide has been overlaid with an equally chilling prospect of suicide by stages, of nuclear war that could never be "won".

The Government of Canada believes that 1983 must be a crucial year in reviving the momentum of arms control and disarmament negotiations.

Just a little over a year ago there were no negotiations on nuclear weapons. Since then, the United States and the Soviet Union have begun negotiations on intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) and more recently have resumed talks on strategic nuclear arms (START). The emphasis not just on limitations but on reductions is most welcome.

Recently, there have been signs that the negotiating process is beginning to work. The leaders of both superpowers have publicly reaffirmed their commitment to serious negotiations. Proposals have been made by both sides, some of which have been vigorously promoted in public. A greater sense of urgency appears to be developing. In the meantime, both superpowers continue to agree informally to abide by the main provisions of the SALT agreements.

This is not the forum for those negotiations, though we all realize that unless concrete progress is achieved in those talks, our collective fate will be at risk no matter how much may be achieved in this forum. What we can draw from past experience is a fundamental conclusion that must apply if arms control and disarmament negotiations -- bilateral or multilateral -- are to succeed.

An increase in mutual security is the only sound basis for effective arms control and disarmament. As Prime Minister Trudeau stressed at the second United Nations special session on disarmament, security in today's world cannot be achieved on a purely national basis. Attempts by one side to make gains at the expense of the security of the other ultimately will not work. Security is a matter of weaponry but also of perception and confidence. Action by one side which is perceived by the other to be threatening creates or widens a gulf of suspicion. Action produces reaction, and in the end neither side achieves a long-term gain.

(Mr. MacEachen, Canada)

Both suffer from the effort and the political relationship is poisoned. Arms control negotiations offer an escape from this danger only if the parties accept as their fundamental objective increased mutual security rather than unilateral advantage. It follows from this that an attempt by any power to develop a policy which assumes that nuclear war can be winnable contributes to mutual insecurity.

While this may be a home truth, it is directly relevant to the current situation. The origins and evolution of the INF talks illustrate the point.

In 1977, the Soviet Union began to deploy the SS-20 missile. The North Atlantic alliance was understandably concerned by this new threat to the territory of several European member States. Moreover the Soviet Union and the United States were at that time working towards codification of a balance in intercontinental nuclear weapons.

Thus, in December 1979, NATO members, including Canada, took what has become known as the "two-track" decision. We agreed to deploy Pershing II missiles and ground-launched cruise missiles, beginning in late 1983. Canada has since been asked to help test the cruise missile guidance system. Secondly, NATO proposed negotiations between the Soviet Union and the United States to limit land-based intermediate-range missile systems on both sides. So began the dynamic leading to the INF talks.

Since 1979, progress has been made, but much too slowly. The Soviet Union was sharply critical of the NATO decision to deploy new intermediate-range missiles in response to the SS-20 missiles, and initially was reluctant to take part in negotiations. Subsequently, the Soviet Union agreed to preliminary discussions in the autumn of 1980. Formal negotiations began in November 1981.

The period since November 1981 has been marked by exchanges of concrete proposals. The negotiations have been conducted seriously and have made some progress. Given the underlying need to take into account the legitimate security concerns of both sides, NATO ministers have agreed that this requirement could best be met through the elimination of all existing Soviet and planned United States missiles in this class. We have also confirmed our earlier decision to begin deploying the missiles at the end of 1983 unless there are concrete results from the negotiations. We are willing to give full consideration to any serious Soviet proposals that would enhance the chances for effective and verifiable agreements.

Recently, the Soviet Union made a proposal concerning possible reductions of intermediate-range nuclear weapons. While the proposal is unacceptable in many respects, it appears to recognize that NATO Governments have a legitimate concern about the number of SS-20 missiles aimed at the European member States, and that a reduction is necessary.

This in itself is progress. However, it is not yet clear if both sides have accepted that mutual security must be the basis of the negotiations. That is why 1983 is crucial.

Canada has a large stake in the negotiations. We intend to press vigorously the following basic approach:

Canada places its full weight behind the negotiations. We strongly support a negotiated solution that will make deployment of the missiles in Europe unnecessary;

(Mr. MacEachen, Canada)

Likewise, in the absence of concrete results in the negotiations, Canada considers that there is no viable alternative to deployment of the missiles;

Every serious proposal must be seriously examined. By the same token, propaganda ploys must not be permitted to undermine serious negotiations;

Statements aimed at public opinion cannot be a substitute for genuine willingness to reach an agreement;

Increased mutual security must be accepted as the fundamental consideration in the negotiating process.

Despite the obstacles, the Canadian Government is convinced that these negotiations can demonstrate in 1983 that the arms control and disarmament process can be made to work.

1983 is also a year of opportunity for the Committee on Disarmament. Public concern about the issues is high. The need for early action is clear, and mutual security is also the foundation for our work here.

I see encouraging signs in this Committee since I was first responsible for Canadian foreign policy some seven years ago.

The presence now of China and France along with the other three nuclear-weapon States is the most striking and hopeful development.

The growth in size of this negotiating body, while at first glance sobering, is also encouraging. More widespread representation from all parts of the world in a body devoted to arms control and disarmament is a positive development despite the complications this inevitably introduces for a negotiating forum. Governments in all regions have a direct interest -- and a corresponding responsibility -- in contributing to the global quest for a more secure world.

Working groups have been established on certain key subjects. The increasing participation of technical experts is another significant development.

These have been positive steps, but we must demonstrate to the world that this is a serious negotiating body which can produce concrete results.

How can we ensure that the real work of negotiation is pressed with vigour? The negotiating table is full of proposals, but they must be translated into agreements. The recent Prague Declaration referred to the work of this Committee in an extended way. As I said in Ottawa last week, any aspects of these proposals which would lead to progress towards concrete and verifiable arms control and disarmament agreements will receive our support. Today, in Geneva, I want to single out particular issues on which Canada believes progress should be made in 1983.

The pursuit of a comprehensive nuclear test ban is a fundamental nuclear issue before this Committee. We were pleased by the establishment last year of a working group in the Committee on a nuclear test ban, but we were disappointed that, having waited so long for consensus, the Committee did not move quickly to begin substantive work. I urge that this new working group begin to discharge its mandate as a matter of urgency in 1983.

(Mr. MacEachen, Canada)

Another promising avenue is the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts on seismic events. Since its inception in 1976, it has been developing an international seismic data exchange system which will be an international verification mechanism forming part of the provisions of an eventual comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty. At the second United Nations special session on disarmament last year, Prime Minister Trudeau called for it to become fully operational at an early date and in advance of a treaty. Canada has committed resources to enable us to become a full participant in the exchange. We are convinced that the early entry into operation of the data exchange would be an effective way to make progress towards the objective of a comprehensive test ban.

This step-by-step approach can ensure that key elements of a treaty are in place even before the final political commitment to a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty. This process can develop a momentum toward the conclusion of a treaty and can be complementary to the necessary negotiations among nuclear-weapon States.

I take this opportunity of drawing to the attention of this Committee an equally high Canadian priority for 1983, the prevention of the further spread of nuclear weapons through the evolution of an effective non-proliferation regime based on the non-proliferation Treaty. The NPT emphasizes the non-discriminatory transfer of peaceful nuclear technology. It also provides for the de-escalation of the arms race on the part of nuclear-weapon States and for the rapid and effective movement towards disarmament. More States have adhered to the non-proliferation Treaty. However, such voluntary renunciation has not been matched by corresponding action by the nuclear-weapon States to halt the build-up of nuclear weapons. Only tangible moves by the superpowers will demonstrate the sincerity of their commitment to non-proliferation. Those of us with nuclear technology and those without must seek to persuade the nuclear-weapon States to live up to the bargain to which they are committed by the non-proliferation Treaty.

Canada is prepared to seek international consensus on the development of principles which would result in a more universal and effective approach to non-proliferation. Such principles should include a formal renunciation of nuclear explosive devices and an agreement to permit the safeguarding of all nuclear activities throughout the entire range of the nuclear fuel cycle. This is fundamental to the creation of a stable and permanent non-proliferation regime. Under such conditions, bilateral nuclear commitments could then be subsumed into a truly equitable and responsible international order.

I suggest that the time has come for genuine movement towards the realization of these objectives.

Arms control and disarmament must also extend to non-nuclear-weapon systems, some of which are as potentially horrifying as nuclear weapons.

(Mr. MacEachen, Canada)

The time is right for progress this year towards a treaty on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and the destruction of existing stocks. We intend to participate vigorously along with others in seeking to realize the maximum from the present opportunity.

Continuing Canadian research on defensive measures enables us to put forward suggestions on such aspects as the verification provisions of a treaty banning chemical weapons. Canada has contributed working papers. We have allocated funds to enable Canadian technical experts to participate here in Geneva for longer periods, beginning with the 1983 session. Expertise from many countries, including non-members, has been brought to bear in this Committee on the complex issues involved. The achievements of the Working Group on Chemical Weapons again illustrate that work in this body can complement bilateral negotiations.

Another area for progress is the subject of weapons for use in outer space. This issue has been described as the first arms control problem of the twenty-first century. I urge the Committee to begin as soon as possible its essential task of defining the legal and other issues necessary to build upon the outer space legal regime. Canada contributed to this objective in a working paper tabled here last summer. Verification is likely to loom large, as it does for a nuclear test ban and a chemical weapons ban. The expanding programme of verification research in Canada will seek to identify possible solutions. We intend to participate actively in this work. It is the view of the Government of Canada that it is time to establish a working group on this subject.

I have focused on four important issues, four Canadian priorities for 1983, on which I wished to put Canada's position strongly:

Canada will press for progress toward the objective of a comprehensive nuclear test ban;

Canada will press for a more effective non-proliferation regime;

Canada will press for a convention to prohibit chemical weapons;

Canada will press for progress towards the objective of prohibiting all weapons for use in outer space.

These are issues where there are prospects for genuine progress and where progress can make a direct contribution to mutual security.

Recent years have not been propitious for negotiating on arms control and disarmament. Yet the process has continued and is again beginning to show hopeful signs. Public statements by world leaders have underlined that the arms spiral is a major world-wide danger and that the negotiation of arms control and disarmament agreements is vital. There is room for optimism if arms control and disarmament negotiations are based on realism. Mutual security is our common goal and objective.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the Deputy Prime Minister and Secretary of State for External Affairs of Canada for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair.

[Speaking in Russian] I now give the floor to the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Ambassador Issraelyan.

Mr. ISSRAELYAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): Comrade Chairman, allow me first of all to congratulate you on your assumption of the honourable and responsible post of Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament. The Mongolian People's Republic, which is linked with the Soviet Union by relations of fraternity and friendship that have been tested by time, relations based on the principles of socialist internationalism, rightfully enjoys prestige and respect among all peace-loving States. We are particularly pleased that it is you, Comrade Erdembileg -- one of the veterans of the single multilateral disarmament negotiating body and representative of socialist Mongolia, which consistently pursues a policy of peace and co-operation among States -- who has the privilege of being the first Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament this year. We hope that under your leadership a good foundation will be laid for the successful work of the Committee.

Allow me also to associate myself with your words of congratulation addressed to Ambassador A. García Robles of Mexico, your predecessor in the office of Chairman of the Committee, in connection with the Nobel Peace prize awarded to him in 1982. Of course, there are differing views about the objectivity of some of the decisions of the Nobel Prize committee. In this case, however, scarcely anyone will dispute the fact that Ambassador Robles really is truly a distinguished fighter for the ending of the arms race and for disarmament, and worthily represents peace-loving Mexico in international forums. We all, colleagues and friends of Ambassador Robles, wish him great success in his further efforts on this path.

His important contribution to the creation of a nuclear-free zone in Latin America, his position of principle on the questions of a complete and general nuclear weapons test ban and a freeze on nuclear arsenals and his desire to help promote the success of the bilateral talks being conducted in Geneva have won him respect all over the world. Ambassador García Robles is renowned in the Soviet Union also.

The Soviet delegation would also like to transmit through the delegation of Sweden its congratulations to Mrs. Myrdal in connection with the Nobel Peace prize awarded to her. Mrs. Myrdal is well known to everyone, and particularly to those who have linked their professional activity with the struggle for disarmament, as a person who has devoted her life to the strengthening of peace among the peoples.

I should also like to welcome the new representatives in the Committee on Disarmament and to wish them success in their endeavours.

Last year was, like no other, filled with the active struggle against the threat of nuclear war and for the halting of the arms race. Throughout the world the powerful movement of the peoples is mounting; they are demanding the adoption

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

of concrete measures to lessen the danger of war that is threatening mankind. Such manifestations have taken place in Europe, in America and in other continents too. The Soviet people at numerous meetings, rallies and manifestations have joined their voice to those of the fighters for peace all over the world. In 1982 alone more than 20,000 rallies were held in the Soviet Union, in which more than 60 million Soviet people took part.

The second special session of the United Nations General Assembly on disarmament, as well as the thirty-seventh regular session, which also devoted considerable attention to the problems of disarmament, were marked by the concern of the overwhelming majority of delegations at the serious aggravation of the international situation, the continuing arms race and the deadlocks in the disarmament talks resulting from the obstructionist position of a certain group of States. What should be done in order to turn the course of events in the direction of détente and peace -- that was the theme of most statements. In this connection, the statement of the Soviet Union made in the summer of 1982, which contained an undertaking not to be the first to use nuclear weapons gained wide support all over the world. It was rightly emphasized, at the United Nations General Assembly, that if those nuclear-weapon States which have not so far done so were to follow the example of the USSR, that would, in effect, be tantamount to the total prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons.

It is significant that almost half of the resolutions on disarmament issues that were adopted by the United Nations General Assembly at its thirty-seventh session concerned the problems of preventing nuclear war, nuclear arms limitation and nuclear disarmament. Another important factor should be noted. The participants at the General Assembly session insistently and firmly urged and called for the achievement of concrete results in one of the main directions that would lead to the real elimination of the threat of nuclear war -- that is, at the talks between the USSR and the United States on nuclear arms limitation in Europe and strategic arms limitation and reduction. We ought also to regard as important practical proposals designed to lessen the threat of nuclear war two new initiatives that were put forward at the thirty-seventh session of the United Nations General Assembly by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, Andrei Gromyko, on the immediate ending and prohibition of nuclear weapons tests and on multiplying efforts to remove the threat of nuclear war and to guarantee the safe development of nuclear energy. In accordance with the decision of the General Assembly, the Soviet document, "Basic provisions of a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear weapons tests", was referred to the Committee on Disarmament. We hope that it will help the Committee to embark on business-like, concrete negotiations on one of the most high-priority disarmament issues.

Last year the Soviet Union and its allies and friends actively pursued a policy of taking the initiative in every forum whose agenda included disarmament problems. The Soviet Union's proposals put forward by Yuri Andropov, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, in his statement of 21 December 1982, are of particular importance.

The Soviet Union and other socialist countries have entered 1983 with a clear-cut programme to struggle for peace, security and disarmament. In the political declaration of the States parties to the Warsaw Treaty that was adopted at

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

the beginning of January in Prague, the top-most leaders of the countries of the socialist community proposed a broad range of urgent and effective measures designed to ensure the stability of the military and strategic situation, the limitation of the arms race and the preservation and continuation of détente and of everything positive that was achieved in international relations during the 1970s. In Prague the socialist states put forward a new and important proposal -- for the conclusion between the States parties to the Warsaw Treaty and the NATO member countries of a Treaty on the mutual non-use of military force and the maintenance of peaceful relations, which would be also open to other States.

The core of such a treaty would be the mutual commitment of the member States of the two alliances not to be the first to use against each other not only nuclear weapons but military force in general.

The Soviet Union and other fraternal socialist countries have addressed similar proposals to the NATO countries in the past also, but they have been rejected under various pretexts.

The present situation in the world urgently demands that the West should adopt a very responsible approach to the proposals of the socialist countries, which take into account the interests of all sides.

It is impossible to deny, however, that in spite of the consistent efforts of the USSR and other socialist countries, the international situation remains tense; the arms race is spiralling anew, and all the efforts to restrain and limit it are proving fruitless. Nor do the results of the work of the Committee on Disarmament justify any optimism. Since 1976 this body has made no headway, in spite of the fact that after the first special session of the United Nations General Assembly on disarmament its membership was expanded and all the States possessing nuclear weapons began to take part in its work. For nearly seven years now it has not elaborated any treaty or agreement. Of course the mere fact that it has set up various working groups could be regarded as a great achievement on the part of the Committee. But of course the setting up of such groups cannot be an end in itself. The important thing is the attainment of positive results, which unfortunately so far not one of the working groups has managed to achieve. It is not without reason, therefore, that there is a growing feeling in the Committee that many drafts and proposals are "buried" in the working groups, and some even jokingly say that the Committee's initials stand for "Cemetery of Disarmament"!

Can this be explained by the lack of initiative of delegations or the absence of proposals and drafts? Of course not. We have repeatedly drawn attention to the proposals by the USSR and the group of socialist States which have been submitted to the Committee. But other States, too, have put forward a variety of proposals. For example, the Indian delegation's proposal for the discussion in the Committee of appropriate practical measures to prevent nuclear war merits serious consideration. This initiative has been supported by a draft international legal instrument put before the thirty-seventh session of the United Nations General Assembly and approved by it. There is also in the Committee the Soviet-American proposal on the basic elements of a treaty on the prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons, around which sterile debates have been conducted for more than three years now, with virtually no prospect of a successful outcome.

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

The list of proposals which have not been considered and implemented could be continued. What I have said, however, is enough to make clear to each one of us the obvious bitter truth of the weakness and powerlessness of the Committee. The situation cannot be described as anything other than scandalous, when even decisions adopted by consensus by the General Assembly have not been implemented by the Committee.

It is often said that the main reason for the stagnation in the disarmament talks is the lack of political will of States to achieve such agreements. There is no doubt that if the political will existed, then any difficult questions arising in the course of the arms race limitation talks could be resolved. The history of disarmament negotiations offers many examples confirming this. In this connection it is sufficient to recall the Soviet-American agreements achieved in the 1970s in the field of arms race limitation. But of course the political will alone is not enough for the achievement of success.

Another key prerequisite for the success of the disarmament talks is that they should be based on the principle of the undiminished security of States. This principle is at the basis of many international agreements. It is also embodied in the Final Document of the first special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

Undoubtedly, this principle is of particular importance in the relations between the USSR and the United States, between the NATO and Warsaw Treaty countries. In the 1970s the principle of equality and equal security received wide recognition in the Soviet-American documents signed at the highest level. It has been recognized by at least three earlier United States Administrations, both Republican and Democrat.

Today, unfortunately one cannot but note that the present United States Administration has taken a different course. It flatly refuses to deal with the USSR on the basis of the principle of equality and equal security. Speaking at the thirty-seventh session of the United Nations General Assembly, the Director of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency called the principle of equal security "a claim to hegemony rather than to equality".

The USSR bases its policy on a recognition of the political realities of the present-day world -- the existence of an anti-Soviet, anti-socialist military and political bloc, which includes three nuclear-weapon States, the relationship of forces in the international arena as a whole and the entire complex of threats to the security of the USSR wherever they may come from.

The essence of the assault on the principle of equality and equal security is the attempt on the part of the United States to obtain for itself unilateral advantages, to secure in fact the unilateral disarmament of the USSR. In this connection it is appropriate to recall the words of Yuri Andropov, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union: "Let no one expect from us unilateral disarmament. We are not naive people. We do not demand the unilateral disarmament of the West. We are in favour of equality, of taking account of the interests of both sides, of fair agreement".

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

The Soviet point of view is that the application in practice of the principle of equality and equal security presupposes an objective assessment of the existing balance of world forces, taking into account primarily its military aspects, an unprejudiced analysis of the armaments and armed forces of the parties to the negotiations and other States, a realistic approach to the international situation as a whole.

The security of a State is not an abstract notion. The security of States comprises the following elements: the joint elaboration by them of such principles of their mutual relations as could become a political and legal basis for the security of each one of them; collective inter-State machinery for maintaining general security, and mutually beneficial ties in the trade, economic, scientific and technological realms, creating a kind of fabric of their mutual interest in long-term peaceful relations. There is another side of the security notion, which under certain conditions may become decisive for the destiny both of individual peoples and of mankind as a whole. We have in mind the military aspects of security. Undoubtedly, concern for its national security is the direct responsibility of each State before its people; it is its duty and its right. The inalienable right of States as regards individual or collective self-defence, and consequently as regards the possession of the necessary means of defence is recognized in the United Nations Charter. Within these limits, the concern of States for their national security cannot have any negative effect on international security.

The essence of the matter, however, consists in the rational determination of these limits. Experience shows that it is precisely in the matter of determining the limits of measures sufficient to provide for security that a sense of proportion is often lacking in the statesmen and politicians of the West, and primarily the United States. Frequently, military programmes are adopted which can in no way be justified by their security interests and which only destabilize the strategic situation in the world.

One of the manifestations of this tendency is the myth about the so-called "Soviet military threat" and "Soviet military superiority". To justify it, fabricated figures, the evidence of "experts" and the conclusions of "analysts" are put forward in the West. Numerous channels of information, or more precisely, misinformation, are very active in exaggerating this myth. At the same time the statements and the practical steps of the USSR and its allies aimed at disarmament and the strengthening of international security are indiscriminately qualified as propagandistic while the measures of the United States Administration designed to initiate new military programmes are represented as a response to the actions of the USSR. In accordance with this logic, the unilateral pledge of the USSR not to be the first to use nuclear weapons is being deliberately ignored, while the MX missiles, the decision on the deployment of which is being imposed on the United States Congress by the military and industrial complex, have been named the "peace-keepers".

But if we start from the hard facts -- and there is not and cannot be any other basis for an objective assessment of the relationship of forces -- then it has to be recognized that in respect of the strategic nuclear weapons, the medium-range nuclear weapons in Europe and the conventional armaments and armed forces of the NATO and Warsaw Treaty countries, there is in all cases an approximate

(Mr. Israelyan, USSR)

equilibrium between the two sides. There is no "Soviet superiority" at all. This has been recognized, moreover, by many authoritative persons in the West.

Of course, the approximate balance of military forces that exists between the USSR and the United States cannot be determined with pharmaceutical precision. It does not mean that there is a complete coincidence between the two sides, quantitatively and qualitatively, as regards all types of armed forces and armaments. It is only natural that the military potential of each side consists of items determined by a whole complex of different factors, each of them having its own specific character.

The comparison of even equivalent items of the military capabilities of the different sides is sometimes an extremely difficult matter. Therefore, when the word "equilibrium" is used with respect to the correlation of forces between two States, or two groups of States, it means that from the point of view of the general military and strategic balance the two sides are in an approximately similar position, neither of them having military superiority over the other.

With respect to the adoption, particularly recently, by the United States of programmes for the building-up of its armaments, it should be noted that this compels the other side to adopt appropriate measures to strengthen its defense capability so as to ensure the maintenance of a military balance.

In the nuclear age it is a fundamental truth that the higher the level of military confrontation, even where strategic balance is maintained, the less stable is this balance, the larger the number of elements of uncertainty in it and consequently the greater the possibility of a nuclear conflict. The Soviet Union has repeatedly drawn attention to the fact that with a new round in the arms race, nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction will become even more sophisticated, which will make it all the more difficult to elaborate international agreements on arms limitation and reduction, and peace will become even less stable and more fragile.

In the refusal of the United States to reach agreements with the USSR on the basis of the principle of equality and equal security lies the root of the difficulties now facing all the talks in the field of disarmament, including the bilateral Soviet-American talks. Andrei Gromyko, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, noted recently in connection with these talks: "American attempts to present the situation at the talks in a rosy light are certainly false. This 'optimism' is apparently designed to reassure their allies, which are displaying concern about the prospects of the talks, so as to gain time in order to implement their militaristic plans".

At the Geneva strategic arms limitation and reduction talks, the United States has singled out ballistic missiles from the whole complex of strategic systems as the basis for the negotiations, with primary emphasis on ground-based ICBMs. Gambling on the structural differences in the strategic forces of the USSR and the United States, the American side has put forward a proposal, the implementation of which would mean that the Soviet strategic nuclear potential, according to the number of charges, would be little more than a third of the American.

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

The Soviet Union rejects such a selective approach; it firmly and honestly follows the principle of equality and equal security, the observance of which requires that strict account should be taken of all the components of strategic forces, since a selective consideration of them in view of the substantial basic differences between them, will inevitably lead to a disturbance of the existing balance between strategic potentials and damage the security interests of one of the sides.

The position of the USSR is also based on a strict respect for the principle of equality and equal security in the talks with the United States on the limitation of nuclear weapons in Europe. Evidence of this is the new Soviet proposals put forward by Yuri Andropov, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union on 21 December 1982.

Explaining these Soviet proposals, Andrei Gromyko, Foreign Minister of the USSR, emphasized recently in Bonn: "The USSR does not wish to put itself in an advantageous position, but the principle of equality and equal security is the holy of holies, which it cannot abandon. We believe that other States should not abandon this principle either."

The Committee on Disarmament has before it many different and very difficult tasks. The Soviet Union is ready to help accomplish these tasks on the basis of the undiminished security of every State. We are in favour of achieving results in the work of the single multilateral disarmament negotiating body. It is necessary to put an end to the stagnation in its activity.

The Committee cannot and should not leave unresolved the main problems of today -- the prevention of nuclear war and the achievement of progress in the elaboration of a stage-by-stage programme of nuclear disarmament.

The Soviet Union and other socialist countries believe that it is essential to speed up the achievement of agreements on a number of specific issues and in this connection call upon all States to give a new impetus to the negotiations with a view to: working out as soon as possible a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear weapons tests; speeding up the elaboration of an international convention on the prohibition and elimination of chemical weapons; embarking upon the elaboration of a convention on the prohibition of the neutron weapons; starting without delay negotiations on the prohibition of the stationing in outer space of weapons of any kind; completing as soon as possible the drafting of an international convention on the prohibition of radiological weapons, and speeding up the solution of the question of strengthening security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States.

The year 1983 could become a turning point in the development of the international situation, away from an increasing danger of war and towards an affirmation of peace. The Committee on Disarmament can make a contribution to this end. The Soviet delegation will do everything in its power to help the Committee finally to justify the confidence of the international community and contribute to the solution of the cardinal present-day problem -- the prevention of nuclear war.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from Russian): I thank the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of Czechoslovakia, Ambassador Vejvoda.

Mr. VEJVODA (Czechoslovakia): Comrade Chairman, it is a great pleasure for the Czechoslovak delegation to see the representative of socialist Mongolia chairing the deliberations of our Committee during the month of February. As an experienced long-time negotiator in the field of disarmament you will undoubtedly contribute significantly to the smooth and constructive launching of this year's session of the Committee on Disarmament.

We also note with deep satisfaction that one of our dear colleagues, Ambassador García Robles of Mexico, has been awarded the Nobel Prize for peace. We congratulate Ambassador Robles once more most sincerely on this important and fully deserved award.

His unceasing efforts to help disarmament negotiations move forward, his lion's share in the establishment of the first nuclear-free zone in the world through the now already famous Treaty of Tlatelolco, his bold speeches in this Committee, in the General Assembly of the United Nations and in many other forums form many proofs of his dedication to the cause of peace and disarmament. Ambassador Robles's achievements in the field of disarmament are highly valued by the Czechoslovak Government.

Allow me also to add a few words of congratulations, through the Swedish delegation, to Mrs. Myrdal, another holder of the Nobel Peace Prize and a former colleague of ours. I remember her well from my previous assignments in the Geneva Committee and I always admired Mrs. Myrdal's enthusiasm and skill, with which she was striving for disarmament. Finally, allow me to welcome here in the Committee all the numerous heads of delegations whom you have just enumerated. I am certain that they will do their utmost to contribute to badly needed positive results of this Committee's work. My delegation is going to study very carefully the speech delivered here a few minutes ago by the Deputy Prime Minister and Secretary of State for External Affairs of Canada.

I would now like to draw the attention of the distinguished representatives to an important political event which took place right at the beginning of the year. The capital of my country, Prague, hosted a meeting of the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Treaty Organization. At the end of the meeting, on 5 January, the political declaration of the WTO member States was adopted. My delegation requested that this declaration should be issued as an official document of the Committee on Disarmament and it is my intention now to introduce very briefly this document, numbered CD/338, which contains the said declaration.

In recent years the WTO member States have drawn the attention of all countries and nations to the growing threat to peace and to the need for preventing the international situation from deteriorating. In the Prague Declaration they note with concern that the course of world events has been becoming even more dangerous as a result of a further activation of the aggressive forces. Increasingly insistent are those forces wishing to upset the only reasonable basis of relations among States with different social systems — peaceful coexistence. The tendency toward détente which has brought positive results to nations is suffering serious damage. Co-operation is being replaced by confrontation; attempts are being made to undermine the peaceful foundations of inter-State relations. The development of political contacts as well as mutually advantageous economic and cultural ties among States are called into question.

(Mr. Vejvoda, Czechoslovakia)

The arms race is advancing into a qualitatively new and much more dangerous stage, involving all kinds of both nuclear and conventional weapons and all types of military activities and affecting in fact all parts of the world. The international situation is becoming even more complicated; international tension is mounting, and the threat of war — particularly nuclear war — is increasing.

The States represented at the session of the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Treaty Organization considered that no matter how complicated the situation in the world may be, possibilities still exist of surmounting the dangerous stage in international relations. The present course of events must and can be halted and diverted in a direction which would be in harmony with the aspirations of mankind. Proceeding from an analysis of the international situation the WTO member States, in adopting the political declaration, put forward an alternative to nuclear disaster and called for broad international co-operation in the name of preserving civilization and life on earth.

It is not my intention to give a detailed description of the Prague Declaration. In our opinion this document should be thoroughly studied and, as a matter of fact, we hope that the majority of delegates have already done so. I would simply like to remind distinguished colleagues that the WTO member States reaffirmed their earlier disarmament initiatives and introduced new proposals designed to bring about an improvement in the present international situation and the resolution of the pressing questions of today's world. Let me underline the proposal for the conclusion of a treaty on the mutual renunciation of the use of military force and the maintenance of peaceful relations between the WTO and NATO member States. The core of the proposed treaty could be a mutual commitment by the member countries of the two alliances not to be the first to use nuclear or conventional arms against one another, and thus not to be the first to use military force against one another at all. The conclusion of such a treaty could contribute substantially to the improvement of the political climate in Europe and other regions of the world also. And this would undoubtedly be reflected in the creation of a possibility for the halting of the arms race and the conclusion of useful disarmament agreements.

The declaration re-emphasizes that the principle of equality and undiminished security must be observed in the solution of questions of disarmament. This principle also underlies the Soviet proposals announced in Moscow on 21 December 1982 in connection with a new initiative to resolve the issues of medium-range missiles which makes for the successful conduct and conclusion of the Soviet-United States negotiations on the limitation of nuclear weapons in Europe and the prevention of a new round of the nuclear arms race in Europe.

Let me also note that, as has already been noted by the distinguished Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of Canada, the political declaration stresses the important role of the Committee on Disarmament in dealing with specific questions, namely, a nuclear test ban, the prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons, the prohibition of neutron weapons, the prohibition of the stationing of weapons of any kind in outer space, the prohibition of radiological weapons and the issue of strengthening the security of non-nuclear-weapon States.

In conclusion, let me emphasize the constructive nature of the political declaration of the Warsaw Treaty countries and the concrete way in which its proposals are formulated. We believe that, given a business-like approach, the Prague declaration has a potential to boost the negotiations we have started today. In the sense of the Prague Declaration, the Czechoslovak delegation is ready to take an active part in our common work and to do its utmost to help achieve a positive outcome at this year's session of the Committee on Disarmament.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from Russian): I thank the representative of Czechoslovakia for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair.

Mr. DON NANJIRA (Kenya): With great pleasure, Mr. Chairman, I take the floor first to express the happiness and congratulations of the Kenyan delegation on your assumption of the chairmanship of the Committee on Disarmament for the month of February — the first month of the spring session of the Committee on Disarmament for 1983. As they say, "Well begun is half done", and thus I have no doubt in my mind that your vast experience and expertise in diplomatic work, your wide knowledge of disarmament matters and your firmness and principled approach to the business of the Committee on Disarmament will enable you to guide our deliberations in an impartial manner, and to make a valuable contribution to the advancement of our work and of the negotiating process of this forum.

To this end, Mr. Chairman, you can rely on the fullest co-operation and support of the Kenyan delegation; and, on a personal note, I should say I have looked forward rather impatiently to this occasion since last April. I sincerely believe that your country, Mongolia, could play an important role in East-West and North-South relations. We wish you, therefore, every success in the challenging tasks lying ahead of you, as we begin another year of difficult negotiations in the field of disarmament.

Permit me also to express the great appreciation of my delegation to your predecessor, Ambassador Alfonso García Robles, for the most able manner in which he has guided the discussions of the Committee on Disarmament since September last year. During that intersessional period, a number of important events have taken place, including the adoption by the General Assembly at its thirty-seventh session of not less than 21 resolutions on disarmament issues which fall directly under the competence of this august body. As for Ambassador García Robles himself, his winning of the 1982 Nobel Peace Prize, together with Mrs. Alva Myrdal of Sweden, was by no means a minor event or achievement. I reiterate my personal congratulations and those of the Kenyan delegation to the Nobel Peace Laureates whose valuable contributions to the cause of disarmament have thus been rightly and properly recognized. Let me also express my appreciation of the contributions made in this forum by the Ambassadors who have left the Committee on Disarmament for other assignments elsewhere. Ambassadors Anisse Salah-Bey of Algeria, Panchapakesa Venkateswaran of India, David Summerhayes of the United Kingdom and Yoshio Okawa of Japan, to mention just a few of them, will be remembered for their sincere dedication to the work of the Committee on Disarmament, and it is gratifying to note that they have been or will be replaced by experienced and highly knowledgeable Ambassadors, such as their Excellencies the new Ambassadors of China, Venezuela and the United Kingdom, as well as Ambassadors Rouis of Algeria, Dubey of India and Imai of Japan. My delegation welcomes these distinguished Ambassadors to the Committee on Disarmament and looks forward to working closely with them.

At this juncture, Sir, I wish to inform you that the head of the Kenyan delegation to this session of the Committee on Disarmament and Permanent Representative of the Republic of Kenya to the United Nations, His Excellency Ambassador Wafula Wabuge, is expected to arrive in Geneva later in the course of this month. Ambassador Wabuge is currently in Nairobi attending to other important matters which have necessitated his presence in our capital. I am sure the Ambassador will be happy to express his personal congratulations to you when he arrives.

Mr. Chairman, your Excellencies, distinguished delegates, ladies and gentlemen, my delegation would welcome the designation of the Committee on Disarmament as a conference on disarmament, in accordance with General Assembly resolution 37/99 K

(Mr. Don Nanjira, Kenya)

adopted by consensus on 13 December 1982. We agree with and fully subscribe to the conditions under which this change of name has been agreed upon, namely, that the new status, which actually is only being restored to this multilateral negotiating forum on disarmament issues, will not change either the membership of the Committee on Disarmament or its rules of procedure, nor will it introduce any financial implications or affect in any way paragraph 120 of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

Procedural issues before the Committee on Disarmament at its spring session, 1983

It is time to look again at the Committee's permanent "Decalogue" and select from it items for our consideration in 1983, and during this spring session of the conference. In this regard, my delegation would endorse fully both the draft provisional agenda and the work programme proposed by the distinguished Secretary of this conference in his informal working paper dated 30 November 1982. I am grateful to Ambassador Jaipal for the paper and I would like to thank him, his deputy Mr. Berasategui and all the members of his staff for the good work they have done and will be doing for us in the coming three months. I use the term "staff" to encompass everybody who will be participating in the provision to us of the Conference services during this session of the Committee on Disarmament.

The informal working paper has been available to delegations for eight weeks already. Moreover, the paper has been the subject of informal consultations for some time now. I say all this because we should this time resolve not to waste any time on procedural issues. Disarmament is certainly going to be the single most difficult and sensitive political issue facing humankind in the next quarter of a century. We already have too many hot soups on hot plates to swallow at the same time, and the sooner we start tackling the issues substantively the better. We must avoid the procedural wrangles of last year, when we actually worked illegally, without an adopted work programme, for 17 days (from 2 - 18 February 1982).

Thus, as far as the procedural questions before us are concerned, I have the following practical proposals to make:-

One: we should dismiss, i.e. decide on, procedural issues as soon as possible and adopt our work programme for this session of the Committee this week. This we can do immediately if we endorse the draft programme proposed by the distinguished Secretary of the Committee. The question of time frames for the discussion of given agenda items, or even for the closure of this session, should not at all worry any delegate or delegations assembled here, for the simple reason that the Committee on Disarmament is the master of its own house and ceremonies since, under the Committee's rules of procedure, any delegate can speak on any item and at any time in plenary.

Two: we should spend very little time on procedural discussions pertaining to subsidiary bodies of the Committee. I hold the view that the existing subsidiary bodies should be re-established on an automatic basis at the beginning of every session of the Committee unless a decision is taken to the contrary prior to the convening of the session, which decision would, for instance, call for the suspension or abolition of a given subsidiary body of the Committee.

(Mr. Don Nanjira, Kenya)

Three: consequently, the working groups on a comprehensive programme of disarmament, chemical weapons, radiological weapons, a nuclear test ban and negative security assurances should be re-established under their former mandates, except for the Working Group on a Nuclear Test Ban, whose current mandate is inadequate and should hence be reformulated to make it comprehensive and more suitable and appropriate. Once these existing working groups have been re-established, consultations should be held to finalize the allocation among the various regional groups of the chairmanships of these subsidiary bodies. Again, action to this end should not consume too much of the Committee's time. No delegation which seriously wants to see a comprehensive test-ban treaty signed would disagree with the argument that the terms of reference of any working body charged with the responsibility of negotiating a CTBT, or an NTBT, must include, apart from verification, such questions as the scope of the future treaty and its final clauses. The mandate of the Working Group on a Nuclear Test Ban should thus be elaborated accordingly.

Four: there is an imperative need to establish other subsidiary bodies with appropriate and comprehensive mandates to tackle the other priority disarmament issues within the Committee on Disarmament, such as:

- (a) The cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament;
- (b) Prevention of nuclear war, and
- (c) Prevention of the arms race in outer space.

Five: the rule of consensus within the Committee on Disarmament should not be abused. The majority of delegations seated around this table have expressed this wish and the General Assembly of the United Nations both in the Concluding Document of its second special session devoted to disarmament and in a resolution of its thirty-seventh regular session of 1982 has endorsed this view.

Substantive issues before the Committee on Disarmament at its spring session, 1983: priorities should not be misplaced

Agreement on the above-mentioned procedural issues should be reached soon, and should be separated from the substantive issues for our negotiation. Granted that our permanent "Decalogue" contains items which are all-important, we must systematically tackle them on a selective basis. Our priorities should not be misplaced. We must be careful lest the priority issues for our substantive negotiation be replaced by general debates on procedural issues. Whether as historians measure time, or as negotiators measure success, we have not at all come a long way on the road to general and complete disarmament under effective international control. This forum is still in the process of learning how to negotiate the language of disarmament, and if this procedural tempo is maintained it is unclear whether the disarmament language will be elaborated and translated into disarmament treaty language. All of us, without exception, would like to witness the coming to fruition of our current efforts -- the achievement of general and complete disarmament under effective international control. I wonder, though, how many of us will witness that occasion! We still have a long way to go!

(Mr. Don Nanjira, Kenya)

I believe that during this session of the Committee on Disarmament we should concentrate our energies on a few issues which should be selected, bearing in mind the decisions and recommendations of the Committee itself and of the second special session devoted to disarmament and the thirty-seventh regular session of the United Nations General Assembly. On the short list of such priority items, I would include the following:-

(a) The comprehensive programme of disarmament (CPD). On this item the General Assembly, at its second special session, in paragraph 63 of its Concluding Document (A/S-12/32) stated:

"Member States have affirmed their determination to continue to work for the urgent conclusion of negotiations on and the adoption of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, which shall encompass all measures thought to be advisable in order to ensure that the goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control becomes a reality in a world in which international peace and security prevail, and in which a new international economic order is strengthened and consolidated. To this end, the draft Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament is hereby referred back to the Committee on Disarmament, together with the views expressed and the progress achieved on the subject at the special session. The Committee on Disarmament is requested to submit a revised draft Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament to the General Assembly at its thirty-eighth session."

In its resolutions 37/78 G and 37/78 F dated 9 December 1982 respectively, the General Assembly requested the Committee on Disarmament to continue, as from the beginning of its 1983 session, its intensive work on the elaboration of a comprehensive programme of disarmament, and called upon members of the Committee, particularly the nuclear-weapon States, to show a greater measure of readiness and flexibility in further negotiations on the elaboration of a draft comprehensive programme of disarmament and thus enable the Committee to submit a revised draft programme to the General Assembly at its thirty-eighth session. In the light of the foregoing, I strongly recommend that the Working Group on a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament be reinstated and start working at once, under the chairmanship of Ambassador García Robles;

(b) A nuclear test ban

(A priority item on the "Decalogue" of the Committee on Disarmament and under General Assembly resolutions 37/72, 73 and 85 of 9 December 1982);

(c) Prevention of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament

(A priority item on the "Decalogue" and under General Assembly resolutions 37/78 G and 37/78 I of 9 December 1982);

(d) Prevention of nuclear war

(A priority item on the "Decalogue" and under General Assembly resolutions 36/81 B of 9 December 1981 and 37/78 I);

(Mr. Don Nanjira, Kenya)

(e) Prevention of an arms race in outer space. Here, the onus is on the shoulders of the States with major space capabilities and the objective of preventing such an arms race cannot be attained unless the powers concerned refrain from competitive military activities in outer space. The best way to stop and prevent that race would be through the negotiation and conclusion of verifiable and effective agreements on the subject.

As you know, the Group of 21 has already proposed a mandate for a working group on the prevention of an arms race in outer space (CD/329). The urgency and significance of concluding agreements or a convention in this field necessitates the establishment of such a working group at the earliest time possible, preferably during this session of the Committee. The urgency and priority nature of this issue was recognized by the General Assembly in its resolution 37/83 of 9 December 1982.

The report of the Second United Nations Conference on the Exploration and Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, held in Vienna, Austria, from 9 to 21 August 1982, is contained in document A/CONF.101/10, and should be regarded and used as an important document in this regard.

(f) Negative security guarantees. In its resolution 37/80 of 9 December 1982, the General Assembly requested the Committee to continue, during its 1983 session, the negotiations on the issue of the strengthening of the security guarantees for non-nuclear-weapon States like my own, Kenya. This is a priority item for us, and we believe that there is an urgent and imperative need to reach agreement on this question and evolve an international convention on the subject. The main obstacle, as we see it, is the unwillingness of some of the nuclear-weapon States to demonstrate the political will and firm commitment necessary for reaching agreement on a common approach and a common formula, which could be included in an international instrument of a legally binding character. The same nuclear-weapon States have also continued to obstruct the convening of an international conference on the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace, which would consider ways of implementing the General Assembly's 1971 Declaration and its other decisions and resolutions adopted on the subject since then. My delegation fully subscribed to the proposal of the non-aligned Members of the Committee that such a conference be held not later than the first half of 1983. But, most regrettably, the exact dates for such a conference are still unknown, even though the General Assembly's resolution 37/96 talks about the possibility of such convening, "not later than the first half of 1984". We believe it is high time the great powers co-operated fully in the implementation of the General Assembly's Declaration which, most regrettably also, has been defied for too long. In that Declaration (General Assembly resolution 2832 (XXVI) J), the General Assembly stated, inter alia, that "the Indian Ocean within limits to be determined, together with the air space above and the ocean floor subjacent thereto, is hereby designated for all time as a zone of peace". Then there is the question of the denuclearization of Africa - the subject of General Assembly resolution 37/74 -- which the same Assembly took up for the first time thirteen long years ago, at the request of 34 African States. The same resolution 37/74 includes a section on the nuclear capability of South Africa. As with the build-up in the Indian Ocean, the hinterland and littoral States of Africa are gravely concerned at the massive military build-up in South Africa with the full collaboration, including nuclear collaboration, of certain great powers and their corporations. Any State, corporation, institution

(Mr. Don Nanjira, Kenya)

or even individual who engages in such activity is in effect working against the cause of disarmament and thereby endangering international peace and security by encouraging the racist regime of South Africa to intimidate the neighbouring African countries and blackmail the African continent as a whole.

The item on negative security guarantees is thus a very important one for countries like my own, Kenya. However, we as a delegation would not be prepared to waste time on the repetition of well-known positions. Should such a situation arise — and I hope that it will not — then we would recommend that a procedural way out of the impasse be worked out as soon as possible. The same would apply to the radiological weapons question.

On the other important issues before the Committee for deliberation at its current session, I would have the following to say.

1. On chemical weapons, it is most regrettable that the discussions in the Working Group on Chemical Weapons, which convened here in Geneva on 17 January last and worked for two weeks, were a mere reaffirmation of the positions the various delegations had adopted during the second part of the Committee's 1982 session. The deliberations of the contact groups created by Ambassador Sujka of Poland have, however, been useful and the adoption of a similar work programme for the Working Group on Chemical Weapons during the Committee's present session might be very worthwhile. The Working Group itself should convene as few formal meetings as possible in order to allocate most of its time to discussions in smaller units which have proved to be better forums for negotiations than larger ones — provided, of course that such smaller working units are open-ended and announced for all delegations to participate in if they should so wish. I take this opportunity to express my genuine thanks to Ambassador Sujka and his team of co-ordinators who have done an outstanding job in the past two weeks within the Working Group on Chemical Weapons.

2. The items on the relationship between disarmament and development (the subject of General Assembly resolution 37/84), economic and social consequences of the arms race, and the reduction of military budgets, are quite interconnected, and hence the documentation submitted on them, such as A/8496/Rev.1, A/36/356 and A/37/386, should be studied and comparatively analysed together. As a delegation, we attach, and will no doubt continue to attach, the greatest importance to the relationship between disarmament and development, especially the socio-economic development of the developing countries.

3. Under the subject of institutional arrangements for disarmament, two aspects are particularly important. One is the necessity to strengthen or improve the effectiveness and status of the Committee on Disarmament as the single multilateral negotiating forum for disarmament. I have already touched on the question earlier. Recognition of the negotiating rather than debating character of the Committee is still wanting in practice, especially in those quarters of the Committee which still prefer limited negotiating forums to the Committee on Disarmament. To them we say, as we have often said before, that disarmament negotiations conducted in limited forums should supplement rather than contradict those that are supposed to be conducted within the Committee.

(Mr. Don Nanjira, Kenya)

The other aspect is the question of the World Disarmament Campaign which the General Assembly launched at the beginning of its second special session devoted to disarmament — on 7 June 1982. The mobilization of public opinion and education of the masses in favour of disarmament is a very heavy responsibility which, as we all know, is starting to make some governments "behave more sensibly" in matters of disarmament. That process thus requires systematic organization and encouragement if the Campaign's primary purposes of informing, educating and generating public understanding and support for the objectives of the United Nations in the field of disarmament, are to be realized. The idea of a world disarmament conference is a noble one and that is why it has received the widest support of the international community. Such a conference should, therefore, be convened in the near future, and this is another issue that the Committee should address itself to.

Thus, at the beginning of the 1983 session, we have many hot plates and soups around us, and we need to study again most seriously the resolutions of the General Assembly — some of which I have touched on above in passing — adopted at its thirty-seventh session, which relate to our work here and which the Secretary-General has kindly transmitted to us in document CD/336. There are other important issues which, though not brought to us for consideration, should be of direct interest and concern to us. I have in mind such issues as co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, which will be the topic of an international conference scheduled for this coming August here in Geneva.

Mr. Chairman, distinguished delegates, let us, as representatives of Governments which adopted the resolutions I have referred to above, start now translating them into concrete action.

Yes indeed: "Well begun is half done ...", and let us begin our work for 1983 earnestly and with the determination to attain tangible results on the substantive issues before us for consideration.

Thank you for your patience and I thank you for having given me the floor so late, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the representative of Kenya for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of Sweden, Mr. Hyltenius.

Mr. HYLTEINIUS (Sweden): Mr. Chairman, before you adjourn the meeting I should like to respond very briefly to the warm congratulations expressed by you and by the representatives of the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia and Kenya to the two winners of the 1982 Nobel Peace Prize, Ambassador Alfonso García Robles of Mexico and Mrs. Alva Myrdal of Sweden. I shall, of course, not fail to transmit the congratulations to Mrs. Myrdal.

I know that she regards the fact that the Nobel Peace Prize was awarded to two disarmament negotiators as a recognition of the importance of the disarmament efforts in the quest for peace and as an encouragement for those broad popular movements which protest against the insanity of the nuclear arms race. I also know that she considers it a great honour and pleasure to share the award with her old friend and colleague, Ambassador García Robles

(Mr. Hyltenius, Sweden)

Finally, I am sure that she will be most grateful for the warm congratulations which have been expressed here today in the Committee on Disarmament. As you know, Sir, Alva Myrdal worked for 11 years as Chairman of the Swedish delegation to the disarmament Conference in Geneva.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the representative of Sweden for his statement.

That concludes my list of speakers for today. Does any other member wish to take the floor?

Before adjourning this plenary meeting I would like to take up two organizational questions.

First, a communication has been received from the representative of the United States of America, informing us of the desire of the Vice-President of the United States to address the Committee on 4 February 1983. I have consulted with the members of the Committee on the convening of an additional plenary meeting on that date, at 10.30 a.m., and I believe that there is general agreement.

It was so decided.

The CHAIRMAN: We shall therefore hold a plenary meeting on Friday, 4 February, at 10.30 a.m.

Secondly, I would like to propose that the Committee hold informal consultations in this Conference Room tomorrow, Wednesday, 2 February, at 3.30 p.m., to consider the organization of our work.

It was so decided.

The CHAIRMAN: The next plenary meeting of the Committee will be held on Thursday, 3 February, at 10.30 a.m.

The meeting stands adjourned.

The meeting rose at 1.35 p.m.

FINAL RECORD OF THE ONE HUNDRED AND NINETIETH PLENARY MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 3 February 1983, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman: -

Mr. D. Erdembileg

(Mongolia)

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Algeria:

Mr. B. OULD ROUIS

Mr. A. TAFFAR

Argentina:

Mr. J.C. CARASALES

Mr. R. GARCIA MORITAN

Australia:

Mr. D. SADLEIR

Mr. R. STEELE

Mr. T. FINDLAY

Mrs. S. FREEMAN

Belgium:

Mr. A. ONKELINX

Mr. J.M. NOIRFALISSE

Mr. H. DE BISSCHOP

Brazil:

Mr. C.A. DE SOUZA E SILVA

Mr. S. DE QUEIROZ DUARTE

Bulgaria:

Mr. K. TELLALOV

Mr. P. POPCHEV

Mr. C. PRAMOV

Burma:

U MAUNG MAUNG GYI

U TIN KYAW HLAING

U THAN TUN

Canada:

Mr. D.S. McPHAIL

Mr. G.R. SKINNER

China:

Mr. TIAN JIN

Mr. LI CHANGHE

Mr. PAN ZHENGIANG

Mr. PAN JUSHENG

Cuba:

Mr. L. SOLA VILA
Mr. P. NUÑEZ MOSQUERA

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. M. VEJVODA
Mr. A. CIMA
Mr. J. FRANEK

Egypt:

Mr. S.A.R. EL REEDY
Mr. I.A. HASSAN
Miss W. BASSIM
Mr. E. EZZ
Mr. S. SULTAN

Ethiopia:

Mr. T. TERREFE
Mr. F. YOHANNES

France:

Mr. F. DE LA GORCE
Mr. J. DE BEAUSSE
Mr. M. COUTHURES

German Democratic Republic:

Mr. G. HERDER
Mr. H. THIELICKE
Mr. F. SAYATZ
Mr. M. NOTZEL

Germany, Federal Republic of:

Mr. H.D. GENSCHER
Mr. F. RUTH
Mr. H. WEGENER
Mr. K.T. PASCHKE
Mr. J. PÖHLMANN
Mr. F. ELBE
Mr. W.E. VON DEM HAGEN
Mr. W. ISCHINGER
Mr. W. RÖHR

Hungary:

Mr. I. KOMIVES

Mr. F. GAJDA

Mr. T. TOTH

India:

Mr. M. DUBEY

Mr. S. SARAN

Indonesia:

Mr. N.S. SUTRESNA

Mr. I.H. WIRAATMADJA

Mr. F. QASIM

Iran:

Mr. M.J. MAHALLATI

Italy:

Mr. M. ALESSI

Mr. B. CABRAS

Mr. C.M. OLIVA

Mr. E. DI GIOVANNI

Mr. R. DI CARLO

Japan

Mr. R. IMAI

Mr. M. TAKAHASHI

Mr. K. TAKANA

Mr. T. ARAI

Kenya:

Mr. D.D.C. DON NANJIRA

Mexico:

Mr. A. GARCIA ROBLES

Mrs. Z. GONZALEZ Y REYNERO

Mongolia:

Mr. D. ERDEMBILEG

Mr. L. ERDENECHULUUN

Mr. J. CHOINKHOR

Mr. S.O. BOLD

Morocco:

Mr. A. SKALLI
Mr. M. CHRAIBI

Netherlands:

Mr. F. VAN DONGEN
Mr. R.J. AKKERMAN
Mr. A.J.J. OOMS

Nigeria:

Mr. G.O. IJEWERE
Mr. A.N.C. NWAZOMUDOH
Mr. J.O. OBOH
Mr. L.O. AKINDELE
Mr. A.A. ADEDOJU
Miss I.E.C. UKEJE

Pakistan:

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Mr. T. ALTAF

Peru:

Mr. P. CANNOCK
Mr. V. ROJAS

Poland:

Mr. B. SUJKA
Mr. J. ZAWALONKA
Mr. J. CIALOWICZ
Mr. T. STROJWAS

Romania:

Mr. I. DATCU
Mr. T. MELESCANU
Mr. L. TOADER

Sri Lanka:

Mr. A.T. JAYAKODDY
Mr. H.M.G.S. PALIHAKKARA

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Mr. C.M. HYLTIENIUS
Mr. B. SKALA
Mr. G. EKHOLM
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Mrs. A. LAU-ERIKSSON
Mr. N. ELIASSON
Mr. J. PRAWITZ

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

Mr. V.L. ISSRAELIAN
Mr. B.P. PROKOFIEV
Mr. M.F. TREPIKHALIN
Mr. G.V. BERDENNIKOV
Mr. V.F. PRIAKHIN
Mr. G.N. VASHDZE
Mr. V.A. EVDOKOUSHIN

United Kingdom:

Mr. R.I.T. CROMARTIE
Mr. B.P. NOBLE
Mrs. J.I. LINK
Mr. G.H. COOPER
Miss J.E.F. WRIGHT

United States of America

Mr. L.G. FIELDS
Mr. M.D. BUSBY
Mr. H.L. CALHOUN
Mr. P.S. CORDEN
Ms. K. CRITTENBERGER
Mr. R.L. HORNE
Mr. W. HECKROTTE
Mr. J.J. HOGAN
Mr. J. MARTIN
Mr. R. MIKULAK

Venezuela:

Mr. A. LOPEZ OLIVER
Mr. T. LABRADOR RUBIO

Yugoslavia:

Mr. K. VIDAS
Mr. M. MIHAJLOVIC
Mr. D. MINIC

Zaire:

Mrs. ESAKI-EKANGA KABEYA

Under-Secretary-General for
Disarmament Affairs:

Mr. J. MARTENSON

Director-General of the
United Nations Office
at Geneva:

Mr. E. SUY

Secretary of the Committee on
Disarmament and Personal
Representative of the
Secretary-General:

Mr. R. JAIPAL

Deputy Secretary of the
Committee on Disarmament:

Mr. V. BERASATEGUI

The CHAIRMAN: I declare open the 190th plenary meeting of the Committee on Disarmament.

At the outset, may I welcome the presence in the Committee of the distinguished Vice-Chancellor and Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany, Mr. Hans-Dietrich Genscher. He is a well-known personality, for he has been his country's Vice-Chancellor since May 1974. I am sure that all members of the Committee join me in welcoming him.

May I also welcome Mr. Jan Martenson, Under-Secretary-General who is in charge of the new Department of Disarmament Affairs, and who is present today in our midst.

I have on my list of speakers for today the representatives of the Federal Republic of Germany and Sweden.

I now give the floor to the representative of the Federal Republic of Germany, the Vice-Chancellor and Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Hans-Dietrich Genscher.

Mr. GENSCHER (Vice-Chancellor and Foreign Minister of the Federal Republic of Germany) (translated from German): Mr. Chairman, may I first of all extend to you my congratulations on your assumption of the chairmanship of this important Committee for the current month. I should also like to extend to your predecessor, Ambassador García Robles of Mexico, my sincere congratulations on his receiving the Nobel Peace Prize. We are all aware that this distinction does honour not only to him but also to the noble cause of disarmament for which he has so tirelessly worked.

Ladies and gentlemen, Mr. Chairman, it is a special honour for me to address, during my visit to Geneva, this important forum in whose work the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany has participated actively and intensively ever since its accession in 1975. My visit occurs at a time when this Committee envisages changing its designation to "Conference on Disarmament". I welcome this intention because I regard the new name not only as due recognition of the practical work this Committee has performed so far but also as recognition of the growing importance of this forum, which is laying important foundations for the long-term process of arms control and disarmament by negotiating new generally acceptable agreements.

I wish you, Mr. Chairman, and all the participants every success in this work that concerns us all.

The city of Geneva is a universal symbol of negotiations aimed at strengthening peace and at banishing the horrors of war. Ever since the Geneva Protocol of 1925 banning the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons in wartime, this city has been inextricably linked with international arms control and disarmament negotiations. Today it is the site of several highly important arms control negotiations which people throughout the world are watching with growing expectations, this year in particular, and which they expect to yield tangible results as soon as possible.

In this context, there is an inner link between the work of the world-wide forum represented by the Committee on Disarmament and the simultaneous United States-Soviet negotiations on substantial reductions in nuclear weapons. Together with the negotiations in Vienna and Madrid, they combine to form a comprehensive dynamic negotiating process of unprecedented intensity.

(Mr. Genscher, Federal Republic of Germany)

The Federal Government therefore has great expectations with regard to further developments during 1983.

It is determined to contribute to ensuring that genuine progress occurs on the way to co-operation, dialogue and disarmament.

Only if this is achieved can governments and peoples devote themselves to the great tasks facing humanity: world-wide development, the struggle against hunger and poverty and protection of the environment.

The policy pursued by the Federal Republic of Germany has from the very outset been a policy for peace. This precept is enshrined in the Basic Law, our Constitution.

Disarmament and arms control are integral parts of our security policy and that of the alliance. As early as 1954 the Federal Republic of Germany gave its allies a contractual assurance that it would not manufacture nuclear, bacteriological or chemical weapons. So that its renunciation of the manufacture of chemical weapons can be verified, the Federal Republic has ever since then accepted international on-site inspections, which can be carried out without impairing the legitimate interest in preserving business secrets.

The peace note of 1966 by the then Federal Government proposed, inter alia, the exchange of observers at manoeuvres -- this was nine years before such a confidence-building measure was agreed upon in the Helsinki Final Act.

The Federal Republic of Germany is committed to a consistent policy of the renunciation of force. As early as 1954, 19 years before joining the United Nations, it stated that it would frame its policy in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter and committed itself to the obligation to observe the ban on force embodied in Article 2 of the Charter.

This ban on the threat or use of force was the guiding principle of the aforementioned German peace note of 1966. It is also a fundamental element of the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe and our treaties with Moscow, Warsaw and Prague as well as the Basic Treaty with the German Democratic Republic.

But it is not sufficient to demand a policy forswearing the use of force, embodied in solemn declarations of principle. What matters is whether the ban on the use of force is observed in practical policy. I cannot conceal my deep concern at the fact that, especially in the past few years, this principle has been seriously violated. A major task incumbent upon everyone responsible is to settle existing conflicts by means of political solutions -- here I have in mind Afghanistan in particular.

The ban on the use of force is comprehensive. It must apply between all countries and regions. It must include the use of force of every type, that is to say, it must prevent not only nuclear war but every kind of war. For my densely populated country at the interface of the two alliances in East and West, the policy of preventing war is a matter of life and death.

(Mr. Genscher, Federal Republic of Germany)

The principle of a comprehensive ban on the use of force enshrined in the United Nations Charter is the fundament of the security policy pursued by the Atlantic alliance. This comprehensive ban on force must be applied in relations between all countries and regions.

At its summit meeting held in Bonn on 10 June 1982, the Western alliance solemnly reaffirmed that none of its weapons will ever be used except in response to attack.

We welcome the fact that, in their Prague declaration, the Warsaw Pact countries took up certain points of the solemn statement by the alliance. The North Atlantic defence alliance is ready to examine whether the Warsaw Pact declaration opens possibilities for applying the principle of the ban on force embodied in the United Nations Charter even more consistently in relations among all States. A renewed binding reaffirmation of the ban on force could constitute a contribution to improving the international situation if it is observed by every State with regard to every other State without reservation and if, at the same time, practical steps are taken to put an end to the use of force where it still prevails. A consistent policy for peace requires the renunciation of the threat of force for the attainment of foreign-policy objectives. In addition, the ban on force must be given concrete substance by achieving tangible results at arms control negotiations.

Our aim is to obtain stability both in Europe and worldwide at the lowest possible level of armaments: peace with ever fewer weapons. Arms control and disarmament are the means of achieving this aim. Everyone making serious efforts to achieve progress at the current negotiations, be it in Geneva, Vienna, Madrid or New York, knows how difficult it is to eliminate distrust and reconcile conflicting interests. New efforts are needed to create confidence. Concrete measures must be agreed on that make the military conduct of States calculable and thus systematically reduce distrust.

We noted with satisfaction that the idea of confidence-building measures again met with general support at the thirty-seventh session of the United Nations General Assembly. The resolution on this subject sponsored by the Federal Republic of Germany together with 36 other countries was unanimously adopted. We regard this as an encouraging sign. The principles and guidelines for confidence-building measures, which already enjoy extensive support by the international community, must now be discussed in the United Nations Disarmament Commission. We are supplementing these efforts by an international symposium to be held in the Federal Republic of Germany in May 1983, which will afford scientists from all over the world an opportunity to elaborate the concept of confidence-building measures and in particular to consider their application in individual regions.

Confidence-building is conditional upon maximum mutual openness. The more progress we make in this field, the more we oblige countries to confine themselves to an armament level really needed for self-defence.

(Mr. Genscher, Federal Republic of Germany)

We advocate transparency with regard to world-wide expenditure on armaments and to the relationship between arms spending and expenditure on economic and social development. For this reason, I proposed to the General Assembly several years ago that the United Nations establish a twofold register showing how much each industrial country spends per capita, on the one hand, on armaments and, on the other, on development aid. I also suggested setting up a register on world-wide weapons exports and imports so as to be able to make this "grey area" of world-wide armaments activities more transparent. The Federal Republic of Germany has up to now contributed data in three successive years to the register that already exists at the United Nations in the form of a standardized reporting system on defence expenditure. However, this system can only prove a success if the Warsaw Pact countries participate as well in future. At its thirty-seventh session the General Assembly therefore adopted a resolution calling upon all States once more to participate in this first major step towards the reduction of defence spending.

Confidence-building measures are not an end in themselves; they considerably facilitate progress towards the attainment of tangible and balanced results in the field of disarmament and arms control.

In particular, this also applies to verification of the observance of treaties. If countries that sign a treaty do not possess the national means of monitoring its observance, the treaty must provide for an impartial body of experts to examine any doubts or unclarified incidents. If necessary, the countries must also be willing to grant this independent body of experts access to their territory for the purpose of its examinations.

The Federal Republic of Germany has urged reliable verification simply for the purpose of placing arms control agreements on a firm basis and hence contributing to the success of the respective treaty and of the subsequent disarmament and arms control efforts in general. I therefore welcome the remark in last month's Prague declaration to the effect that the Warsaw Pact countries proceed on the understanding that all arms control agreements must, where necessary, provide for international verification of their implementation.

I cherish the hope that this remark will soon be reflected in concrete steps in the ongoing negotiations.

The efforts undertaken by the Federal Republic of Germany serve in particular the cause of arms control and disarmament between East and West. In the past few years the Warsaw Pact has made enormous efforts to increase its conventional and nuclear forces. This deeply disturbs us because the balance has been greatly shifted, to the disadvantage of the West. Imbalance creates distrust and has an adverse impact on the endeavours for co-operation and détente.

We are especially concerned at the Soviet Union's continuous build-up of modern land-based intermediate-range missiles, the SS 20s. The West does not yet have an equivalent capability. The Atlantic alliance, including the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany, has in past years repeatedly drawn attention to this development. In the end it was forced to react by means of its dual-track decision of December 1979. With this decision the Western alliance embarked on a completely new course: it was ready from the outset to make the necessary modernization of its weapons the subject of negotiations. The alliance proposed negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union aimed at their mutual, world-wide renunciation of land-based intermediate-range nuclear missiles.

(Mr. Genscher, Federal Republic of Germany)

We regard this zero solution for both sides as the best and most desirable outcome of these negotiations. It would mean that, in an important area of nuclear arms, agreement would be reached not merely on limiting but on eliminating an entire category of weapons, in other words, genuine disarmament.

The United States, supported by its allies, will continue to make every effort to achieve as soon as possible in these negotiations concrete, balanced and verifiable results. Let there be no doubt that the West cannot accept the Soviet Union acquiring a monopoly in land-based intermediate-range nuclear missiles. I emphasize: we are firmly determined to achieve concrete negotiated results. Every suggestion made by the Soviet Union at the negotiating table indicating readiness substantially to reduce, that is to say eliminate, modern Soviet land-based intermediate-range nuclear missiles would be a step in the right direction. Such a reduction in Soviet potential would make possible a reduction in Western modernization, based on the principles of equality and parity. This means that the West is prepared, as envisaged in NATO's double-track decision, to review its modernization requirement in the light of concrete negotiating results.

The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany also attaches great importance to the United States-Soviet negotiations on the reduction of strategic weapons. The United States has proposed making deep cuts in the arsenals of both sides with a view to establishing a stable balance at a lower level. We welcome the remark made by General Secretary Andropov in his speech on 21 December 1982 to the effect that the Soviet Union, too, is ready to agree on reductions going beyond SALT II.

At the United States-Soviet START and INF negotiations, confidence-building measures in the nuclear field are also being discussed. We hope that the aim of creating more trust and transparency and thus preventing misunderstandings and wrong assessments can soon be translated into binding and verifiable agreements.

Concern at the ever-increasing growth of nuclear arsenals should not blind us to the dangers posed by conventional arms.

It is imperative that -- parallel to the envisaged increasing control over and reduction of nuclear potentials -- all ways and means should be exploited for intensifying the dialogue on arms control in the conventional field and checking and reversing the world-wide build-up of conventional armaments: every year they deprive peoples of immense resources which are urgently needed for tackling vital development tasks.

The only forum existing at present on arms control in the conventional sphere are the Vienna negotiations on mutual and balanced force reductions.

Now it is essential to concentrate in Vienna on the key questions that are still unsettled: finding a solution to the problem of starting data on forces and reaching agreement on associated measures doing justice to the requirement of adequate verification and to the goal of confidence-building and stabilization.

(Mr. Genscher, Federal Republic of Germany)

We realize that, since they are confined in scope to Central Europe and in substance to force strengths, the MBFR negotiations can render only a limited contribution towards stabilizing the relationship of conventional forces in Europe. The need to complement MBFR by means of an arms control forum covering the whole of Europe, from the Atlantic to the Urals, is met by the project of a Conference on Disarmament in Europe within the CSCE framework. This opportunity should be taken advantage of. In an initial phase the Conference should negotiate confidence-building measures that are militarily significant, binding, verifiable and applicable to the whole of Europe, from the Atlantic to the Urals.

We are convinced that these measures could make an important contribution to greater transparency and calculability in the military sphere and reduce the danger of surprise attacks.

At the CSCE follow-up meeting in Madrid we are therefore striving -- within the framework of a balanced and substantive final document -- for a precise mandate for convening the Conference on Disarmament in Europe.

The year 1983 holds out great opportunities for the Committee on Disarmament as well. The impulses provided by the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament last year need to be translated into practice.

New opportunities exist for the Committee, I feel, particularly in a field to which my country attaches no less importance than to the nuclear disarmament talks between the two Superpowers and to the MBFR negotiations in Vienna. My country wishes a treaty on the complete and verifiable elimination of all chemical weapons to be concluded soon. It is high time that mankind be freed from the threat posed by chemical weapons. A comprehensive and verifiable chemical weapons ban is all the more imperative now because there have recently been increasing signs of chemical and toxic weapons being used in various crisis areas on the Asian continent. I therefore appeal to the Committee to expedite its work in this field and draw up a treaty banning these weapons as quickly as possible.

I note with satisfaction that the negotiations on a chemical weapons ban have been greatly intensified during the past year. This affords a good basis for the Committee's work this year.

The indispensable prerequisites for such a ban are reliable verification procedures. As we all know, national technical means are absolutely insufficient for verifying a weapons ban. Consequently, decisive importance attaches to an international committee of experts with autonomous competence, including the right to carry out on-site inspections.

My country is the only one to have directly experienced international inspections in connection with the renunciation of the production of chemical weapons. Proceeding from this experience, we presented specific, practical suggestions in 1982 both at the second special session devoted to disarmament and in the Committee on Disarmament. I appeal to the Committee to examine these proposals carefully and to use them as a basis for its subsequent deliberations so that the negotiations can be brought to a successful conclusion as soon as possible.

As regards a comprehensive nuclear test ban, the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany welcomes the fact that a working group is now dealing with questions of verification and observance of such a treaty. Great importance attaches to a comprehensive nuclear test ban in connection with article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty dealing with the obligation of nuclear disarmament.

(Mr. Genscher, Federal Republic of Germany)

Precisely because a test ban is particularly sensitive in both military and security terms, its strict observance by all contracting parties must be ensured by means of reliable verification. We advocate an exchange of data from existing seismological stations; the seismological institutions in the Federal Republic of Germany are fully available for this purpose.

There is another area in which the Committee's work is well advanced and in which speed is advisable. I am referring to the prohibition of radiological weapons. We still have the opportunity to ban, for the first time ever, a category of weapons of mass destruction even before they are ready for deployment. My country's delegation, which chaired the working group on radiological weapons in 1982, will continue to strive for the early conclusion of such an agreement.

We sympathize with the proposal by a number of non-aligned countries to incorporate in an agreement banning radiological weapons a provision that prohibits attacks on civilian nuclear facilities and thus enhances the protection afforded to the facilities above and beyond the provisions of the Geneva Protocol. However, this proposal creates so many technical and legal problems that it is questionable, in my view, whether this subject should be combined with the subject-matter of an agreement on radiological weapons.

Finally, great importance also attaches, in my Government's view, to arms control measures designed to prevent an arms build-up in outer space. The Committee on Disarmament will have to pay particular attention to this field as well in the future.

I wish the Committee on Disarmament and all its participants every success at this session. Here where nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States, where industrial and developing countries, where members of the world's two large military alliances and non-aligned countries sit at the same table, the joint responsibility that we bear becomes apparent: we must avert the dangers posed by the arms build-up, eliminate confrontation and reconcile opposing interests by a mutual readiness for compromise. In short, we must undertake every effort to make this world safer and more peaceful. We must endeavour to create peace with ever fewer weapons.

May 1983 bring us nearer to this great goal.

The work of the Committee on Disarmament can make a major contribution.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the Vice-Chancellor and Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chairman and this multilateral negotiating forum. I welcome the presence of the leader of the Swedish delegation and I give her the floor.

Mrs. THEORIN (Sweden): Mr. Chairman, It is a great pleasure for me on behalf of the Swedish delegation to extend a warm welcome to you, Ambassador Erdembileg of Mongolia, as Chairman of this Committee for the month of February. I am confident that during your chairmanship this Committee will achieve substantive progress in its endeavours.

I should also like to express our deep appreciation to your predecessor in the chair, Ambassador Alfonso García Robles of Mexico.

Allow me on this occasion, Mr. Chairman, also to thank you for the kind words of welcome you addressed to me personally at our opening session last Tuesday.

The last few years have been an extraordinary period of popular and political awakening to the dangers of war. The strong call for peace and disarmament reflects the deeply rooted concern of many millions of people. It is a genuine expression of the anxiety they feel about the danger of a war of a magnitude never experienced before. Statesmen and political leaders must listen carefully to the voices raised with increasing strength in support of disarmament. I am convinced that the peace movement is emerging as an important political factor in many countries. And it will in the long run prove to be bad politics to underestimate the knowledge and the wisdom of enlightened citizens and voters.

Mankind may finally become united in its fear of a nuclear war, and united in a common effort to avert such a war. A new dialogue is starting over political and ideological boundaries, as shown by religious movements and professional groups, such as physicians and medical students.

Governments will have to respond to the demands of ordinary people, who protest against the continuing arms race, with its inherent and growing dangers for our survival and the colossal waste of limited resources so badly needed for economic and social development. It is, however, not only a moral dilemma; it is a political necessity to move from words to deeds in the field of disarmament.

The arms race is no law of nature; it is possible to stop and reverse it. It is a question of political will. The arms race is the result of tensions, suspicion, injustice and the quest for power. At the same time the arms race is also the cause of its own causes, which creates a vicious circle. It is a cause of the world economic crisis, of the widening gap between rich and poor countries and of the morally upsetting abuse of vast economic and intellectual resources, desperately needed for human development. Common sense tells us that armaments are an economic burden for the peoples.

Disarmament and peace must be seen not only in an East-West perspective but also in a North-South dimension. It is not an exclusive affair for the two military blocs or for the Superpowers. The growing capability for military power projection over long distances poses a real threat to all countries. The arms race is a concern for mankind as a whole. It is literally a matter of survival for millions -- not only in a threatening future.

As a European I share the concerns and the fears of the peoples of our continent. We have suddenly begun to realize what a war in Europe would mean and also that another devastating war may be fought here. Not that there are any current conflicts between European States which are likely to escalate into full-scale war overnight. But Europe is a potential battlefield. It is prepared for war and is constantly becoming more so, primarily through the nuclear build-up on

(Mrs. Theorin, Sweden)

both sides. The latest phase is the deployment of SS 20 missiles and the planned deployment of Pershing II and land-based cruise missiles. It is the most thoroughly prepared battlefield in history, with thousands of nuclear weapons on each side aimed at densely populated areas. No wonder that people are frightened.

It is my conviction that political and national leaders who are not responsive to public concern over the arms race will soon lose the confidence of their own peoples. I am furthermore convinced that this will prove to be true for all States, irrespective of their political and social systems.

At the first special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament, the nations of the world agreed to seek security in disarmament. They further agreed that balanced reductions of armaments should be carried out on the basis of the principle of undiminished security.

The Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues concluded, in full harmony with these principles, that common security rather than mutual deterrence based on armaments should be the prime basis for security in the world. Common security is based on the conviction that in this modern nuclear age, peace cannot be achieved through military means. Peace is basically a political concept and must be sought by political means. It must be sought in a tireless process of negotiation and rapprochement, with the aim of removing mutual suspicion and fear. We face common dangers and must also promote our security in common.

The United Nations has an important role to play in the efforts to promote, to develop and to implement the concept of common security. My Government finds it gratifying that the General Assembly has requested the United Nations Disarmament Commission to consider those recommendations and proposals in the report of The Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues which relate to disarmament and arms limitation. We are confident that the Disarmament Commission will reach agreement on how to ensure an effective follow-up to those parts of the report.

A central conclusion contained in that report is that the two major power blocs can only survive together. Security cannot be achieved against the adversary but together with him. There is no other option for long-term survival. This insight has not sufficiently characterized the relations between the Superpowers in the field of arms limitation and disarmament.

It is true, of course, that disarmament negotiations by their very nature are influenced by different international events. It is obvious that a certain measure of trust and confidence among States is necessary for successful disarmament negotiations. Such a climate can be created in particular when the major powers demonstrate both in word and deed that they are prepared to agree on real disarmament measures. But even if my Government fully recognizes that a favourable international climate is important for progress in disarmament efforts, linkages between arms negotiations and political events should be avoided.

This year -- 1983 -- will be crucial in the history of disarmament. It is, therefore, essential not to allow the current climate of confrontation to prevail and to lead to a continued unbridled escalation of the arms race, in particular as regards nuclear weapons. But this year also offers an historic opportunity to prevent the final establishment of a new generation of Eurostrategic nuclear weapons.

(Mrs. Theorin, Sweden)

The two Superpowers hold the fate of the earth in their hands. They have incomparably the largest weapon arsenals. They bear the primary responsibility for assuring that a change of direction takes place.

It is no longer possible for them to come to a well-informed public opinion with empty rhetoric asking people to accept a further increase in nuclear arms. People demand constructive proposals and concrete results from ongoing negotiations. Proposals of a progandistic nature will be unmasked by an enlightened public opinion, which will hold their governments responsible for the future developments in this field.

I seize this opportunity to repeat emphatically the call on the two Superpowers to initiate a disarmament process now.

The outcome of the bilateral negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union on nuclear arms will be of decisive importance for the prospects in general for arms limitation and disarmament. A breakthrough in these negotiations would be of utmost importance also to the work in other negotiation forums.

Many people find it hard not to despair when speaking about the arms race. The attempts to stop it have had no breakthroughs in the last few years. Many signs point to a continued escalation of the arms race, despite some brief moments of hopeful rhetoric. Yet we must not choose to despair. The conditions for hope, however, must be clearly set forth.

Unless some real progress is made within the next few months, the nuclear arms race will enter into a new and dangerous phase. My Government, therefore, anxiously awaits a first decisive step to be taken in the field of nuclear disarmament.

As a European country, Sweden is particularly concerned about nuclear weapons which are deployed and intended for use in Europe and its adjacent sea areas. The Swedish Government does not believe that the deployment of SS 20 missiles on the one side and the deployment of Persning II and cruise missiles on the other has been, is or will be necessary to maintain an equilibrium of nuclear forces in Europe. Instead, my Government considers that these deployments constitute another series of tragic mistakes which will leave both sides even more insecure and vulnerable than before.

The Superpowers are now negotiating bilaterally on a wide range of nuclear weapons. The ongoing negotiations to limit the Eurostrategic nuclear forces are of crucial importance. The nuclear arms spiral is most likely to have serious negative effects on mutual confidence and might increase the risk of nuclear war breaking out.

We welcome the far-reaching proposals made by the United States and the Soviet Union to reduce the number of such weapons in or aimed at Europe. Although many points in their respective offers remain to be clarified, my Government hopes that they will constitute a substantive opening which could pave the way for agreement. This opportunity should not be lost.

(Mrs. Theorin, Sweden)

It is the basic view of the Swedish Government that all categories of Eurostrategic weapons should be completely eliminated. For practical and political reasons, first agreements between the United States and the Soviet Union -- which we would welcome -- might fall short of this goal and thus permit the continued or future deployment of some of these weapons. If such partial agreement is reached, it should, in our view, be seen as an interim agreement, which should later lead to a comprehensive agreement banning all relevant categories of nuclear weapons systems for Europe.

The SALT II Treaty, which never entered into force, offers a good basis for negotiations on the reduction of strategic weapons. According to the limited information available about the START negotiations, it seems that the positions of the parties are still far apart. It goes without saying that every effort must be made to avoid the emergence of new generations of strategic weapons, which will merely increase the dangers and contribute to a further destabilizing of the present situation.

The Swedish Government has on numerous occasions stressed the need for disarmament and arms limitation measures regarding the tactical nuclear weapons in Europe and its adjacent sea areas. My Government has inter alia in this Committee suggested that a particular effort should be made in order to lower the number of these weapons, with the aim of their ultimate abolition.

Negotiations must now be initiated also concerning these weapons. In the course of such negotiations it would be necessary to ensure that nuclear disarmament is accompanied by appropriately balanced reductions also in conventional military forces.

The Swedish Government has approached the members of NATO and the Warsaw Pact as well as European neutral and non-aligned States in order to solicit their views on the idea of withdrawing in a first phase tactical nuclear weapons from an area 150 km wide on each side of the East-West border, running through Central Europe. The idea of such a withdrawal has been developed in the report of The Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues. The purpose of this sounding is primarily to find out how the governments most directly concerned view the idea of such a nuclear withdrawal in Central Europe.

It is too early to make any general assessment of the responses received so far. The Swedish Government expects in the near future to be in a position to evaluate how this matter can best be pursued. It is our hope that the proposal made by the Commission will initiate a process of debate on the role and importance of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe which will gradually lead to their withdrawal and elimination.

The Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe is conditioned by the situation in general as regards East-West relations. Although many difficulties remain, my Government has the impression that a possible solution is within reach. This would, however, require that a certain degree of rapprochement takes place between the Superpowers and the military alliances. Together with the other neutral and non-aligned countries in the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, Sweden intends to exert every effort in order to bring a positive outcome of the Madrid meeting, in particular as regards the convening of a European disarmament conference. Sweden has declared itself prepared to host such a conference.

(Mrs. Theorin, Sweden)

The Swedish Government considers that in the present situation the highest priority must be given to concrete measures to reduce and finally eliminate the nuclear arsenals. As a complement to such measures, efforts should be made to establish security-promoting arrangements susceptible of lowering tension and of reducing the risk of the outbreak of nuclear war. In this context, my Government takes keen interest in the current debate on the non-first-use of nuclear weapons. We believe that as part of a realistic disarmament policy it should be possible to achieve mutual obligations not to be the first to use nuclear weapons.

The Swedish Government is furthermore convinced that determined efforts should be made to improve the possibilities of achieving agreements on nuclear-weapon-free zones. As a Nordic country Sweden is actively pursuing a policy in support of efforts to create a Nordic nuclear-weapon-free zone. In our view such a zone and the process leading to it would reduce the nuclear threat confronting the Nordic region. It would also constitute a substantial confidence-building measure in Europe.

It has often been said that in the long run war can be prevented only if the underlying causes of tension and conflict are eliminated. But it is also true that the arms race is in itself a factor in increasing tensions and conflicts. One of the most important expressions of this phenomenon is the present trend in military research and technology. These are currently moving in directions which may, unless checked, render disarmament virtually impossible. The quest for technological superiority in the military field, as well as military superiority in general, is a dead-end. Individual nations and the international community must make a determined effort to come to grips with military research and development. Ways must be sought in international co-operation to curtail the utilization of military research and development for offensive military purposes. That is why my delegation took the initiative of proposing a resolution on military research and development requesting the Secretary-General to carry out an expert study on the subject.

I shall now discuss some of the items on our agenda and I will indicate what my delegation sees as the main tasks of this Committee in the course of the session it has just begun.

Efforts for at least a quarter of a century to achieve a comprehensive test ban have so far not yielded the results hoped for. The obstacles of both a technical and a political nature have been tremendous. I believe it is fair to say that to a very large degree the technical problems have been solved as regards the methods for monitoring a test ban, although further progress is still possible. It is now mainly the lack of sufficient political will which is preventing the Committee on Disarmament from elaborating the complete text of a comprehensive test-ban treaty.

It has been Sweden's persistent view that a comprehensive test ban is of vital importance as a means to slow or stop the further development of nuclear weapons systems. It would constitute a commitment by the nuclear-weapon States to initiate an era of mutual nuclear restraint. Such a ban should also constitute an element in a general freeze on nuclear armaments. We strongly urge all the nuclear-weapon States to demonstrate at this session of the Committee that they are prepared to conclude a comprehensive test-ban treaty as a starting point for nuclear disarmament.

(Mrs. Theorin, Sweden)

This is a matter of the utmost importance. In the view of my delegation the Working Group on a Nuclear Test Ban should be formally empowered to negotiate on all relevant substantive aspects of a comprehensive test-ban treaty.

Sweden intends this year to present a revised version of its draft CTB treaty submitted to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament in 1977.

My Government deeply regrets that the nuclear-weapon testing continues unabated. According to figures from the Hagfors Seismic Observatory in Sweden, no less than 55 nuclear explosions took place in 1982, compared to 49 during the preceding year. The Soviet Union increased the number of explosions from 21 to 31, whereas the United States carried out 16 explosions in 1981 and 18 in 1982. The number of explosions carried out by France diminished from 11 in 1981 to 5 in 1982. No Chinese explosion was observed either in 1981 or in 1982. The United Kingdom carried out one explosion per year in the last two years. These figures further stress the importance of a complete test ban in order to prevent the development of nuclear weapons by the present nuclear powers and to prevent a proliferation of such weapons to additional countries.

This Committee should continue the negotiations on a treaty on radiological weapons. Sweden has proposed that such a treaty should include a ban on attacks against nuclear facilities containing radioactive substances.

Next to a nuclear explosion this would be the most effective method of dispersing radioactivity. This possibility must obviously be foreclosed, if such a treaty is to be meaningful. The protection of nuclear facilities is important -- not least for the civilian population -- but the main purpose of the Swedish proposal is to prevent any release of radioactivity, including military exploitation of this possibility, as an act of radiological warfare. When attacked, such a nuclear facility could be turned into a radiological weapon. Such a prohibition should consequently be included in a treaty on radiological weapons.

My delegation notes with satisfaction the growing support for our proposal both here in the Committee on Disarmament and in the United Nations. The number of negative or sceptical voices is diminishing as the importance of the issue becomes clearer. The question of the prohibition of attacks on nuclear facilities is generally acknowledged as a legitimate matter for negotiations. A growing number of delegations share our view that the matter should be dealt with in the context of a treaty on radiological weapons.

Recent events have drawn our attention to a special space problem. We are informed that nuclear power reactors are used on board certain satellites. We are concerned that the malfunction of such satellites can pose hazards to the population and the environment. The use of nuclear power sources in orbit should therefore be subject to the same kind of regulations as those adopted for the use of nuclear power on earth. Such regulations must be internationally accepted since the malfunction of a space craft with a nuclear power source may affect almost any country. It is, therefore, important that the work on international safety regulations which has been going on for some years in the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space be completed expeditiously.

(Mrs. Theorin, Sweden)

The military utilization of outer space has assumed increasing importance. In fact the majority of the satellites launched in the last two decades have had a military mission. It is known that considerable efforts are being made to develop anti-satellite systems and such systems have already been tested in outer space. Important resources have also been committed to studying and developing technologies for space-based ABM systems. The extension of an arms race into outer space is a matter of grave concern to the international community. This concern was clearly reflected at the Second United Nations Conference on the Exploration and Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (UNISPACE 82).

If unchecked, developments in this field will accelerate into another ruinous and destabilizing arms race. The international community and the space Powers themselves should -- before it is too late -- make a determined effort to further limit the military use of outer space and to prohibit anti-satellite and ABM warfare.

The General Assembly has, in two resolutions (37/99 D and 37/83), requested the Committee on Disarmament to consider taking up the question of the military utilization of outer space for substantive consideration. The Committee should, therefore, as a matter of urgency establish a working group on this subject at the very beginning of this session.

Last year the negotiations in the Committee on Disarmament again confirmed that there exists a broad political consensus on the need to ban the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons. The Ad Hoc Working Group was able to make substantial progress on a number of technical and scientific issues relating to a possible convention on a complete ban on chemical weapons. On issues of a more political nature there was some progress with regard to the question of on-site inspection. This matter should be explored further, as the question of verification is one of the greatest problems in the negotiations. It is imperative that all delegations demonstrate the political will that is required in order to ensure such concrete progress that brings us closer to a generally acceptable agreement.

Considerable efforts were made in the Committee to elaborate a comprehensive programme of disarmament before the convening of the second special session devoted to disarmament. As the General Assembly was not able at that session to reach consensus on a comprehensive programme of disarmament, the matter has been referred back to this Committee for further consideration. We must not forget that the main reason why we failed to reach agreement on a comprehensive programme of disarmament was that the United States could not again agree on the priority which had been given to the conclusion of a comprehensive test ban in the Final Document of the first special session. My delegation is particularly interested in knowing whether there has been any progress in the position which blocked our previous efforts.

At our last session, extensive discussions were held concerning the membership of the Committee. No objection in principle was raised to a limited expansion of the membership, but no consensus was detected on how such an expansion could be carried out. Sweden favours a limited expansion without prejudice to the existing balance in representation. Preference should be given to those countries which have demonstrated an active interest in the work of the Committee on Disarmament and to those which are in a position to make a valuable contribution through their competence in the field.

(Mrs. Theorin, Sweden)

You may recall that at the very end of last year's session the Swedish delegation proposed that the Committee, in preparing its agenda for 1983, should make provisions for consideration of the major technological developments which affect the operation of the Sea-Bed Treaty. This proposal was made with a view to fulfilling the recommendations adopted in 1977 by the Review Conference of the Parties to the Sea-Bed Treaty. The need for discussing this with the assistance of experts within the framework of the Committee on Disarmament is obvious. An enormous civilian exploitation of the sea and the sea-bed is continuously taking place on a global scale. These developments may lead to an increased military use of the sea-bed and the subsoil thereof, be it within the present or an enlarged scope of the Treaty.

There is an urgent need to discuss what can be done to compile the necessary information about recent developments in this field. The Swedish delegation believes that the expertise gathered within this Committee is well fitted to further this process. I therefore wish to express the hope that members of the Committee will give their support to the proposal to include this item in the programme of work for the spring session of the Committee.

This is my first experience of the Committee on Disarmament. I have come here with the firm intention of giving voice to Sweden's strong commitment to real disarmament, both nuclear and conventional. I wish to believe that this is a negotiating body where tangible progress can be made. A continued absence of results would on the other hand cause great frustration and would confirm the increasing impression that this and other disarmament forums are more talk-shops than efficient negotiating bodies.

In concluding my speech I want to stress a few points. This year, 1983, will be crucial for disarmament. The increasing public commitment to disarmament and peace gives us hope for the future. It emphasizes the demands on negotiating bodies to take substantial steps forward. It underlines the impatience many peoples and governments -- including my own -- feel with the stalemate in the negotiations between the two Superpowers.

Public opinion is in harmony with common sense, basic values and sound politics. Time is more than ripe for concrete actions in the field of disarmament. The leading politicians in every country must realize that the world cannot afford another year of lost opportunities.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the representative of Sweden for her statement and for the kind words she addressed to the Chair.

[Speaking in Russian] The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics wishes to make a statement. I give the floor to Ambassador Issraelyan.

Mr. ISSRAELYAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): Comrade Chairman, in view of the great interest which, as has been shown by the discussion taking place in the Committee on Disarmament, is being attached to questions connected with the bilateral Soviet-United States talks on the limitation of nuclear weapons in Europe and on the limitation and reduction of strategic weapons, and bearing in mind also the fact that the subjects of these talks affect the vitally important interests of all peoples of the world, the Soviet delegation

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

has transmitted to the secretariat for distribution as an official document of the Committee on Disarmament the replies of Y.V. Andropov, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, to questions from a Pravda correspondent. In these replies, Y.V. Andropov explains in detail the USSR's position of principle on the questions that are being considered at the Soviet-United States talks, and also on certain other important international issues and in particular the role of summit meetings. The Soviet delegation hopes that the delegations of States members of the Committee will study this document carefully.

The CHAIRMAN: (translated from Russian): I thank the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics for his statement.

[Speaking in English] That concludes my list of speakers for today. Does any other representative wish to take the floor?

Before I adjourn this plenary meeting, may I recall that the Committee will hold today at 3.30 p.m. an informal meeting to consider the draft agenda and programme of work, and any other organizational matter.

There will be an additional plenary meeting of the Committee tomorrow, Friday, 4 February, at 10.30 a.m.

The meeting stands adjourned.

The meeting rose at 12.05 p.m.

FINAL RECORD OF THE ONE HUNDRED AND NINETY-FIRST PLENARY MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Friday, 4 February 1983, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman:

Mr. D. Erdembileg

(Mongolia)

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Algeria: Mr. B. OULD ROUIS

Argentina: Mr. J.C. CARASALES
Mr. R. GARCIA MORITAN

Australia: Mr. D. SADLEIR
Mr. R. STEELE
Mr. T. FINDLAY
Mrs. S. FREEMAN

Belgium: Mr. A. ONKELINX
Mr. J.M. NOIRFALISSE
Mr. H. DE BISSCHOP

Brazil: Mr. C.A. DE SOUZA E SILVA
Mr. S. DE QUEIROZ DUARTE

Bulgaria: Mr. K. TELLALOV
Mr. D. KOSTOV
Mr. P. POPCHEV
Mr. C. PRAMOV

Burma: U MAUNG MAUNG GYI
U TIN KYAW HLAING
U THAN TUN

Canada: Mr. D.S. McPHAIL
Mr. G.R. SKINNER

China: Mr. LI LUYE
Mrs. WANG ZHIYUN
Mr. LI CHANGHE
Mr. PAN ZHENGLIANG
Mrs. GE YUYUN
Mr. PAN JUSHENG
Mrs. ZHOU YUNHUA

Cuba: Mr. P. NUÑEZ MOSQUERA

Czechoslovakia: Mr. M. VEJVODA
Mrs. M. SLAMOVA
Mr. A. CIMA
Mr. J. FRANEK

Egypt: Mr. S.A.R. EL REEDY
Mr. I.A. HASSAN
Miss W. BASSI
Mr. E. EZZ
Mr. S. SULTAN

Ethiopia: Mr. T. TERREFFE
Mr. F. YOHANNES

France: Mr. F. DE LA GORCE
Mr. J. DE BEAUSSE
Mr. B. d'ABOVILLE
Miss L. GHAZERIAN
Mr. M. COUTHURES

German Democratic Republic: Mr. G. HERDER
Mr. H. THIELICKE
Mr. F. SAYATZ
Mr. M. NOTZEL

Germany, Federal Republic of: Mr. H. WEGENER
Mr. F. ELBE
Mr. W.E. VON DEM HAGEN
Mr. W. RÖHR
Mr. J. PFIRSCHKE

Hungary: Mr. I. KOMIVES
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Mr. T. TOTH

India: Mr. M. DUBEY
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Italy:

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Mr. L.O. AKINDELE
Mr. A.A. ADEDOKU
Miss I.E.C. UKEJE

Pakistan:

Mr. M. AHMAD
Mr. T. ALTAF

Peru:

Mr. P. CANNOCK
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Romania:

Mr. I. DATCU
Mr. T. NELESCANU
Mr. L. TOADER

Sri Lanka:

Mr. A.T. JAYAKODDY
Mr. H.M.G.S. PALIHAKKARA

Sweden:

Mrs. M.B. THEORIN
Mr. C.M. HYLTIENIUS
Mr. G. EKHOIM
Mr. S. ASK
Mr. H. BERGLUND
Mr. J. LUNDIN
Mr. P.O. GRANBOM
Mrs. A. LAU-ERIKSSON
Mr. N. ELIASSON
Mr. J. PRAWITZ

Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics:

Mr. V.L. ISSRAELYAN
Mr. B.P. PROKOFIEV
Mr. V.M. GANJA
Mr. V.V. LOSHCHININE
Mr. G.V. BERDENNIKOV
Mr. Y.V. KOSTENKO
Mr. V.A. KROKHA
Mr. V.F. PRIAKHIN
Mr. G.N. VASHDZE
Mr. V.A. EVDOKOUSHIN

United Kingdom:

Mr. R.I.T. CROMARTIE
Mr. L.J. MIDDLETON
Mr. B.P. NOBLE
Mrs. J.I. LINK
Mr. G.H. COOPER
Miss J.E.F. WRIGHT

United States of America:

Mr. G. BUSH
Mr. J. TOWER
Mr. L.G. FIELDS
Mr. M.D. BUSBY
Mr. H.L. BROWN
Mr. H.L. CALHOUN
Mr. P.S. CORDEN
Ms. K. CRITTENBERGER
Mr. R.L. HORNE
Mr. W. HECKROTTE
Mr. J.J. HOGAN
Mr. J. MARTIN
Mr. R. MIKULAK

Venezuela:

Mr. A. LOPEZ OLIVER
Mr. T. LABRADOR RUBIO
Mr. H. SUAREZ-MORA
Mr. O. GARCIA-GARCIA

Yugoslavia:

Mr. K. VIDAS

Mr. M. MIHAJLOVIC

Mr. D. MINIC

Zaire:

Mr. B. ADEITO NZENGEYA

Mrs. ESAKI-UKANGA KABEYA

Under-Secretary-General for
Disarmament Affairs:

Mr. J. MARTENSON

Director-General of the
United Nations Office at Geneva:

Mr. E. SUY

Secretary of the Committee on
Disarmament and Personal
Representative of the
Secretary-General:

Mr. R. JAIPAL

Deputy Secretary of the
Committee on Disarmament:

Mr. V. BERASATEGUI

The CHAIRMAN: I declare open the 191st plenary meeting of the Committee on Disarmament.

I wish to welcome today the presence among us of the distinguished Vice-President of the United States of America, the Honourable George Bush, who will address the Committee today. I am sure that all members of the Committee join me in welcoming him. I now give the floor to the Vice-President of the United States of America, the Honourable George Bush.

Mr. BUSH (Vice-President of the United States of America): It is a great pleasure and a personal privilege for me, Sir, to address this Committee. I am mindful that the Committee is meeting in a special plenary in order to afford us this opportunity to convey to you the views of my Government on the very critical issues of arms control, and I am grateful to the Committee for this favour and deeply honoured. As I look around this table I see so many people with whom I have worked in various capacities in the past. I must say that I feel at home. Let me express, Mr. Chairman, my personal satisfaction in seeing a former colleague from New York in the Chair, and in renewing your acquaintance. I am also delighted to see so many other friends and colleagues from New York who represent their governments now in this important work.

No city has done more than Geneva to advance man's oldest, yet seemingly most elusive dream -- to live at peace with his neighbours. This is the city of Rousseau, who taught us that man is born both free and good, a concept that has had the most profound effect upon my country, and on so many others as well. It was near here that Voltaire made his home when his incisive but often irreverent mind brought down upon him the displeasure of his king. After the calamity of the First World War, the League of Nations was established and housed in this very building, in the hope that here in the free city of Geneva this embodiment of man's best intentions might prosper.

Today, the world's hopes for peace are once again focused on Geneva. Two vital bilateral negotiations are under way here, both with a single aim: to make significant reductions in the nuclear arsenals of the United States and the Soviet Union and thereby to strengthen international stability and to increase the security of all States. And, in this Committee, multilateral efforts are in train to deal with other urgent arms control issues: how to eliminate chemical weapons from the world's arsenals; how to effectively verify limitations on nuclear testing; how to approach the question of possible further arms control measures affecting outer space.

My message to you is simple and unequivocal: the United States will do all that it can to create a foundation for enduring world peace through arms control and through agreements that enhance international stability and security. This task is the highest priority of our President, and he has asked me to tell you that: that we will pursue sound and workable arms control initiatives with the utmost determination. But we will not hesitate -- nor should we -- to differ with approaches which are not sound, or do not hold out the prospect of effective, verifiable agreements. What are the prospects for progress here in Geneva? I would like to set forth the views of the United States on the status of our efforts -- both bilateral and multilateral -- to advance the cause of peace by reaching agreement on effective arms control measures.

(Mr. Bush, United States)

President Reagan assumed office at a time of increasing concern among the American people over the behaviour of the Soviet Union and its allies. In its foreign policy, as well as in a relentless build-up of military forces, the Soviet Union has appeared determined to advance its own interests at the expense of everyone else's. This determination was reflected in the invasion of Afghanistan, in the suppression of human rights in Poland, in the use of chemical and toxin weapons in south-east Asia and Afghanistan in violation of customary international law and existing international conventions, and in the steady accumulation of vast amounts of modern weaponry, far beyond any reasonable requirements for defence.

Clearly, this behaviour required a revitalization of our own defences, which in many measures of military power had been outstripped. The United States has undertaken this effort, not with a view toward conquest or intimidation, but rather to maintain our ability to deter aggression and thus to defend our vital interests and those of our friends and allies against the threat of coercion. I know that President Reagan would much prefer to spend our resources on other pursuits. But we will do -- we must do -- what is necessary to defend our interests and preserve the peace.

But providing the means of defence is only one aspect of ensuring one's security. The Reagan Administration believes that arms control measures can be a vital part of our national security, and that equitable and effectively verifiable arms control agreements can increase that security. One of the first actions taken by our President was to launch the most thorough review of arms control policy ever undertaken by a new administration. And a new approach to arms control was necessary to deal with the changed situation in which the United States found itself as a result of Soviet actions over a decade. Arms control had not become less important. Indeed, effective arms control had, if anything, become more important, since the military balance, at all levels, had become more unstable.

President Reagan announced the general principles which guide our arms control efforts in a statement on 18 November 1981. And they are, I think, worth repeating here:

First, the United States seeks to reduce substantially the number and destructive potential of nuclear weapons, not just to freeze them at high levels, as has been the case in previous agreements.

Second, we seek agreements that will lead to mutual reductions to equal levels in both sides' forces. An unequal agreement, like an unequal balance of forces, can only encourage aggression.

Third, we seek agreements that will enhance the security of the United States and its allies, and that will reduce the risk of war. Arms control is not an end in itself but a vital means toward ensuring peace and international stability.

Fourth, we will carefully design the provisions of arms control agreements and insist on measures to ensure that all parties comply. In other words, we will insist that agreements must be verifiable. Otherwise, the parties cannot have confidence -- the world cannot have confidence -- that all are abiding by the provisions of an agreement. This is particularly important in the nuclear area, where we have proposed deep cuts in both the United States and the Soviet arsenals. It is also vital to our efforts in this Committee to ban chemical weapons and to develop effective limitations on nuclear testing.

(Mr. Bush, United States)

Based on these objectives, my Government has since then advanced a dynamic programme of arms control initiatives -- in our bilateral negotiations with the Soviet Union, in the work of this Committee, and -- together with our allies -- in the negotiations at Vienna on MBFR -- Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions in Europe. Now let me deal with those which are of particular interest to the members of this Committee.

The problem of achieving a reduction in the world's nuclear arsenals is our most important challenge. The United States has met this challenge by developing what President Reagan has called the most comprehensive programme of nuclear arms control ever proposed by my country. These proposals are on the negotiating table here in Geneva -- in the intermediate-range nuclear forces, or INF negotiations, and in the START talks on reducing strategic nuclear forces.

The point I want to stress here is that the United States' proposals in the START negotiations entail deep and significant cuts in the United States and in the Soviet nuclear arsenals -- a 50 per cent cut in our strategic ballistic missiles. In the intermediate-range nuclear forces negotiations, we have proposed the elimination of an entire class of weapons. We propose doing so in a way which is balanced and which reduces the risk of war. This is, after all, what these negotiations are all about. Stability and security could be greatly enhanced if both sides thus reduced their arsenals, and it is precisely because of this that we are proposing major reductions.

In the INF negotiations, there is now on the table a far-reaching United States proposal which would at a stroke ban this entire class of United States and Soviet longer-range INF missiles, the systems of greatest concern to both sides. The Soviet Union now has over 600 such missiles, with some 1,200 warheads, while the United States has none -- zero. Under our proposal, the Soviet Union would be required to eliminate all of its ground-launched missiles of this type. These missiles -- of the type referred to in the lexicon of the West as SS-4s, SS-5s and SS-20s -- are in place now. The United States would be required to forgo agreed-upon deployment of its roughly comparable missiles. As you know, they are scheduled to be deployed in Europe beginning this year under the decision -- the unanimous, jointly-taken decision -- of the NATO Alliance.

The United States believes that any such agreement on nuclear forces must be effective and balanced; it must genuinely reduce the nuclear threat to both sides; it must enhance stability; and it must lessen the risk of conflict. Our proposal meets these criteria. Indeed, it strikes to the very heart of the problem.

Thus far, the proposals advanced in the negotiations by the Soviet Union have been designed to leave one side, in this case their side, with significant advantages, indeed with a monopoly over the United States and its allies in the longer-range INF missiles. Indeed, the ideas recently advanced by General Secretary Andropov continue to have this as their aim. We will of course continue to give the most serious consideration to any constructive Soviet proposal. Ours is not a take-it-or-leave-it proposition. However, we think the Soviet Union must recognize the legitimate security concerns in these talks.

We think ours is a moral position. What is wrong with eliminating from the face of the earth an entire class of new, deadly missiles? The only argument that I have heard as to why we cannot eliminate this generation of INF missiles is that the Soviet Union opposes it, is simply against it. Well, I do not believe that

(Mr. Bush, United States)

in this awesome nuclear age this argument is good enough. Our challenge to the Soviet leadership is: come up with a plan to banish these INF missiles and let us consider, openly, in frank dialogue, initiatives that will achieve that moral goal.

As in the case of intermediate-range missiles, we are emphasizing in the START negotiations real and significant reductions on both sides in the levels of strategic armaments, down to equal ceilings. As President Reagan has pointed out, our proposals in these negotiations would eliminate some 4,700 warheads and 2,250 missiles from the combined nuclear arsenals of the United States and the Soviet Union.

We have been encouraged by the fact that the Soviet Union is negotiating seriously -- we have said that publicly and I am pleased to repeat it today -- and has accepted the concept of reduction, although we do not find its proposals sufficient. Its proposal fails to focus on the more destabilizing elements of strategic forces, ballistic missiles and particularly ICBMs, and it does not go far enough, in our view, in making the kind of deep reductions in ballistic missile forces that we believe to be necessary. However, we believe that the approaches do provide a basis for negotiation, and we intend to explore avenues for achieving such reductions and to pursue the negotiations seriously and constructively. Indeed, our President, upon hearing of the proposal of Mr. Andropov, recognized this seriousness of purpose and I think that is appropriate. People here should understand that.

I will be meeting during my visit here in Geneva with the United States and Soviet delegations to both these critical negotiations. My purpose in doing so is to emphasize the importance which we and our President attach to a successful outcome in both of them. I will convey to the negotiators the President's hope that they will press forward with speed and energy, and his wishes that their efforts will meet with success. I know that all of you deeply share this hope.

I will also, as I have in other stops on this trip, make it clear that I am not the negotiator. The negotiators are here in Geneva, seriously talking with their Soviet counterparts now.

Let me now turn, Mr. Chairman, to the work directly before this Committee, to which we also attach the highest importance.

The Committee is confronted with numerous important issues. None has a higher priority for the United States than the efforts to ban for ever an entire and different class of weapons from the world's arsenals. As the President has stated, the goal of United States policy is to eliminate the threat of chemical warfare by achieving a complete and verifiable ban of chemical weapons.

The nations of the world have already prohibited the first use of chemical and biological weapons in the Geneva Protocol, and have outlawed the possession of biological and toxin weapons in the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention. Like most other nations at the table, the United States is a party to these treaties, and, like most others, we are in full compliance with these provisions. Beyond the provisions of these treaties, there is an even broader moral prohibition against the use of these weapons. President Franklin Roosevelt perhaps expressed it best when he said that their use "has been outlawed by the general opinion of civilized mankind".

(Mr. Bush, United States)

All forms of warfare are terrible. But these weapons are particularly to be feared because of the human suffering that they inflict. That is why the civilized world has condemned their use. Sadly, mankind has, nonetheless, had repeated demonstrations of the cruelty and horror wrought by the use of these weapons. And now, chemical and toxin weapons are being used in Afghanistan and south-east Asia in violation of international law and international arms control agreements. These violations are made all the worse by the fact that the victims do not have the means either to deter the attacks against them or to defend or protect themselves against these weapons.

The United States presented conclusive evidence to the world community of the facts surrounding the use of chemical and toxin weapons. Others have presented evidence as well. We did not come to these conclusions seeking confrontation or rashly, but only after the most exhaustive study. The implications that flow from the use of these weapons are so serious that many would prefer to disbelieve them, simply to ignore them. In our view we just have to face the facts.

The world's progress toward more civilized relations among States has been doggedly slow; and beset at every turn by fears, ambitions, rivalry among nations. We cannot, therefore, allow the progress which we have made in civilization to be destroyed. To do so would be to begin a relentless slide back to a new dark age of mindless barbarism. This is what is at stake here, and this is what we must prevent.

What must now be done? We have called upon the Soviet Union and its allies to stop immediately the illegal use of these weapons. I strongly repeat that call here today. And I urge the Soviet Union, and all other members of the Committee, to join the United States in negotiating a complete and effective and verifiable ban on the development, production, stockpiling and transfer of chemical weapons, a ban that will ensure that these horrors can never occur again.

A complete, effective and verifiable ban on chemical weapons is really long overdue. My Government, therefore, would like to see the work of this Committee accelerated, and negotiations undertaken on a treaty to eliminate the threat that is posed by chemical weapons.

A number of key issues, of course, must be resolved if we are to be successful in negotiating such a treaty. In the coming days, our delegation will present to this Committee a new document that contains our detailed views on the content of a convention that we believe could effectively — more specifically, verifiably — eliminate the chemical weapons threat. We undertake this initiative with the aim of further advancing the work of the Committee, and to encourage contributions and co-operation from others as well.

(Mr. Bush, United States)

The key to an effective convention — one that could eliminate the possibility of chemical warfare for ever — is the firm assurance of compliance through effective verification. I think we would all agree that this principle is absolutely fundamental. Effective verification, as the world's recent experience with the use of chemical and toxin weapons shows, is an absolute necessity for any future agreement that could be entered into. This is why we seek a level of verification that will protect civilization, our allies, and indeed humanity itself from this terrible threat. For today, the threat of chemical warfare has increased. And until an effective agreement can be achieved, the United States, just as others, must continue to ensure that it can deter the use of chemical weapons against its citizens and friends. If we are to expect nations ever to forgo the ability to deter chemical warfare, those nations must have confidence that others who accept the prohibition cannot circumvent their obligations and later threaten the peace with chemical weapons. They must be certain that they will not be attacked with such weapons by any State which has likewise forsworn chemical warfare. In short, for us, the verification and compliance provisions of a comprehensive chemical weapons treaty have got to be truly effective.

We know that most of the members of this Committee, like ourselves, are dedicated to accomplishing this important task. To do so will require more than our dedication. It will require greater willingness and flexibility on the part of the Soviet Union and its allies to work seriously and constructively on resolving these key outstanding issues — especially those pertaining to the verification and compliance side. And such issues must be resolved if we expect to make progress. For although some may argue that progress could be made by concentrating on the "easier" issues, or even by drafting treaty texts on them, this would be a fruitless exercise if the verification issues cannot be addressed, cannot be resolved. We will not support a diversion of effort here.

I urge all members of this Committee to begin negotiation in this session to resolve the key issues that face us in this area, and to join with us in achieving a complete and **verifiable ban on chemical weapons**.

The Committee is faced with a number of nuclear arms control issues. The elimination of the threat of nuclear war is clearly of paramount importance to all of us, and the United States fully accepts its special responsibilities in this area. We are recognizing this responsibility in the most effective way that we know — here in Geneva, in good faith, across the negotiating table from the Soviet Union.

At the same time, this Committee has its role to play in the area of nuclear arms control. One of the major issues before it is that of a comprehensive ban on nuclear tests. Such a ban remains a long-term goal of United States policy, and we will continue to work toward its achievement. The work already done in the Committee by the Group of Scientific Experts on developing a world-wide system for monitoring of nuclear explosions has been very valuable. Moreover,

(Mr. Bush, United States)

at the suggestion of the United States, this Committee formed a working group last year to study issues of verification and compliance surrounding a nuclear test ban. Verification is one area, in particular, in which we believe greater progress must be made if we are to make progress towards a ban on nuclear tests. Therefore, we would hope that the Committee will continue its work in this area this year.

My Government believes that the negotiations in this body on a convention to ban radiological weapons offer the prospect of a modest, but real, genuine step forward, a step that could eliminate a potentially very dangerous type of weapon. Mr. Chairman, we should take it as a cardinal rule of this Committee that when there is the prospect for real progress toward an agreement, we should pursue it to its conclusion. While there are a number of issues yet to be resolved, we believe that an agreement is within the grasp of this Committee and that we should move ahead with all due speed to conclude the negotiations on this treaty.

I should also like to say a brief word about further arms control measures affecting outer space. The United States has been the leader in the peaceful exploration and use of outer space. We intend to continue this leadership role. Some of these activities in outer space are important to our national security and that of our allies. They help to monitor the peace, to warn of the threat of war, to ensure proper command and control of our armed forces world-wide, to preserve our deterrent capability, and to assist in the verification of arms control agreements. The limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, the Environmental Modification Convention, and the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, which is one of the SALT I agreements, all have important arms control provisions affecting outer space. Some are now asking of us all whether additional measures might be called for and if so of what kind? The United States does not have a simple answer to that question, and we are continuing to study this issue. Clearly, the conditions do not exist which would make negotiations appropriate. We are, however, prepared to exchange views with other members of this Committee, and believe the Committee should address the matter in a very systematic way, a more systematic way than it has done in the past.

Finally, I would like to use this occasion to pay tribute to one among us here today whose tireless efforts over a **lifetime** of service were recently recognized when he was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. I am **proud that** Ambassador García Robles and I were colleagues in the United Nations in New York. His accomplishments are far too numerous for me to mention, but let me just say that I assure you, Sir, of the full co-operation of the United States delegation in efforts to finish work on a realistic comprehensive programme of disarmament.

There is one more **thought** which I would like to leave with this Committee, a thought which underlies our approach to arms control, and to the issues before this Committee, and that is that the achievement of effective arms control agreements is difficult work. We all know that. **It requires dedication, persistence,**

(Mr. Bush, United States)

tolerance, a respect for the views of others, and above all, a faith that conflict can be prevented, and that no matter how difficult it is, solutions can be found. The most dangerous view, the most dangerous view for mankind, particularly in this nuclear age, is that war is inevitable. I reject this view entirely, because such a belief merely increases the inclination to make a self-fulfilling prophecy. And so let us then rededicate ourselves in this Committee, in every other available forum to the hard and serious work which is absolutely essential to prevent war.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the Vice-President of the United States of America for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the members of the Committee.

The representative of the Soviet Union has asked for the floor. I give the floor to Ambassador Issraelyan.

Mr. ISSRAELYAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): Comrade Chairman, in connection with the statement of the Vice-President of the United States, the Soviet delegation would like to say the following.

The Soviet Union's position on questions concerning the bilateral Soviet-United States negotiations on the limitation of nuclear weapons in Europe and the limitation and reduction of strategic weapons, based on the principle of equality and equal security, has been repeatedly stated by the Soviet Union's leaders. I should like, in this connection, to refer once again to the statement made by Yuri Vladimirovich Andropov, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, on 21 December 1982 and to his recent replies to a Pravda correspondent, which have today been circulated as a document of the Committee. I should like to quote the following extract from this document:

[speaking in English] "The best thing of all, and this we suggest, is not to have in the European zone any nuclear weapons at all, either medium-range or tactical weapons. Since the United States will not agree to this, we are also prepared to accept a solution whereby the Soviet Union would have no more missiles than there already are in Europe on the side of NATO. At the same time, an agreement should be reached on the cutting by both parties to equal levels of the numbers of aircraft capable of delivering medium-range nuclear weapons. In that way there would be complete parity both in missiles and in aircraft, and parity on an incomparably lower level than at present."

[resuming in Russian] As regards the questions that are being discussed here in the Committee on Disarmament, our position on those, too, has been repeatedly stated, and not only in a general way but also in the form of concrete proposals and in particular in the form of a draft convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons and a draft treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests.

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

With respect to the Vice-President's assertions about violations of the Geneva Protocol of 1925, I should like to remind him, and others as well, that the Geneva Protocol has indeed been violated. The facts are well known: in 1935-1936, poison gases were used by Fascist Italy against Ethiopia; they were used by Hitlerite Germany against my country, especially in the Crimea, in 1942: both before the Second World War and during it, as President Roosevelt said, chemical substances were used by Japan against China. Lastly, poisonous chemical substances were widely used for a long time during the period of the American aggression against Viet Nam, and this, too, is well known. As to the lies about the Soviet Union's use of chemical weapons in Afghanistan and south-east Asia, well, a lie will never be anything but a lie, however many times it is repeated.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the representative of the Soviet Union for his statement.

I have no other member inscribed on my list of speakers for today. This being the case, I intend to adjourn this plenary meeting.

The next plenary meeting of the Committee on Disarmament will be held on Tuesday, 8 February, at 10.30 a.m.

The meeting stands adjourned.

The meeting rose at 11.30 a.m.

FINAL RECORD OF THE ONE HUNDRED AND NINETY-SECOND PLENARY MEETING
held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Tuesday, 8 February 1983, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman:

Mr. D. Erdembileg

(Mongolia)

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Algeria:

Mr. B. OULD ROUIS

Mr. A. TAFFAR

Argentina:

Mr. J.C. CARASALES

Mr. R. GARCIA MORITAN

Mr. R. VILLAMBROSA

Australia:

Mr. D. SADLEIR

Mr. R. STEELE

Mr. T. FINDLAY

Mr. P. MCGREGOR

Belgium:

Mr. A. ONKELINX

Mr. J.M. NOIRFALISSE

Brazil:

Mr. C.A. DE SOUZA E SILVA

Mr. S. DE QUEIROZ DUARTE

Bulgaria:

Mr. K. TELLALOV

Mr. D. KOSTOV

Mr. P. POPCHEV

Mr. C. PRAMOV

Burma:

U MAUNG MAUNG GYI

U TIN KYAW HLAING

U THAN TUN

Canada:

Mr. D.S. McPHAIL

Mr. G.R. SKINNER

Mr. P.W. BASHAM

China:

Mr. LI LUYE

Mr. TIAN JIN

Mrs. WANG ZHIYUN

Mr. PAN ZHENQIANG

Mrs. GE YUYUN

Mrs. ZHOU YUNHUA

Cuba: Mr. L. SOLA VILA
Mr. P. NÚÑEZ MOSQUERA

Czechoslovakia: Mr. M. VEJVODA
Mr. A. CIMA

Egypt: Mr. S.A.R. EL REEDY
Mr. I.A. HASSAN
Miss W. BASSIM
Mr. A.M. ABBAS

Ethiopia: Mr. T. TERREFE
Mr. F. YOHANNES

France: Mr. F. DE LE GORCE
Mr. J. DE BEAUSSE
Mr. M. COUTHURES

German Democratic Republic: Mr. G. HERDER
Mr. H. THIELICKE
Mr. F. SAYATZ
Mr. M. NOTZEL
Mr. M. SCHNEIDER

Germany, Federal Republic of: Mr. H. WEGENER
Mr. F. ELBE
Mr. W.E. VON DEM HAGEN
Mr. W. RÖHR

Hungary: Mr. I. KÓMIVES
Mr. F. GAJDA
Mr. T. TÓTH
Mr. E. BISZTRICSÁNY

India: Mr. M. DUBEY
Mr. S. SARAN

Indonesia:

Mr. B. DARMOSUTANTO
Mr. I.H. WIRAA'TMADJA
Mr. F. QASIM

Iran:

Mr. FARHAD SHAHABI

Italy:

Mr. M. ALESSI
Mr. B. CABRAS
Mr. C.M. OLIVA
Mr. E. DI GIOVANNI

Japan:

Mr. R. IMAI
Mr. M. TAKAHASHI
Mr. K. TAKANA
Mr. M. YAMAMOTO
Mr. T. ARAI

Kenya:

Mr. D.D.C. NANJIRA

Mexico:

Mr. A. GARCIA ROBLES
Mrs. Z. GONZALEZ Y REYNERO

Mongolia:

Mr. D. ERDEMBILEG
Mr. L. ERDENCHULUUN
Mr. J. CHOINKHOR
Mr. S.O. BOLD

Morocco:

Mr. A. SKALLI
Mr. M. CHRAIBI

Netherlands:

Mr. R.J. AKKERMAN
Mr. H. WAGENMAKERS

Nigeria:

Mr. G.O. IJEWERE
Mr. A.N.C. NWA'OZOMUDOH
Mr. J.O. OBOH
Mr. L.O. AKINDELE
Mr. A.A. ADEDOJU
Miss I.E.C. UKEJE

Pakistan:

Mr. M. AHMAD

Mr. T. ALTAF

Peru:

Mr. P. CANNOCK

Mr. V. ROJAS

Poland:

Mr. J. ZAWALONKA

Mr. S. KONIK

Mr. J. CIALOWICZ

Mr. T. STROJWAS

Mr. G. CZEMPINSKI

Romania:

Mr. I. DATCU

Mr. T. MELESCANU

Sri Lanka:

Mr. A.T. JAYAKODDY

Mr. H.M.G.S. PALIHAKKARA

Sweden:

Mrs. M.M. THEORIN

Mr. C. LIDGARD

Mr. C.M. HYLTEINIUS

Mr. L. NORBERG

Mr. G. EKHOLM

Mr. S. ASK

Mr. B. JONSSON

Mr. H. BERGLUND

Mr. H. ISRAELSSON

Mr. O. DAHIMAN

Mrs. A. LAU-ERIKSSON

Mr. H. OLSSON

Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics:

Mr. V.L. ISSRAELYAN

Mr. B.P. PROKOFIEV

Mr. R.M. TIMERBAEV

Mr. G.V. BERDENNIKOV

Mr. V.F. PRIAKHIN

Mr. G.N. VASHDZE

United Kingdom:

Mr. R.I.T. CROMARTIE
Mr. L.J. MIDDLETON
Miss J.E.F. WRIGHT

United States of America:

Mr. L.G. FIELDS
Mr. M.D. BUSBY
Mr. H.L. BROWN
Mr. H.L. CALHOUN
Mr. P.S. CORDEN
Ms. K. CRITTENBERGER
Mr. W. HECKROTTE
Mr. J.J. HOGAN
Mr. R.L. HORNE
Mr. J. MARTIN

Venezuela:

Mr. A. LÓPEZ OLIVER
Mr. O. GARCÍA GARCIA

Yugoslavia:

Mr. K. VIDAS
Mr. M. MIHAJLOVIC

Zaire:

Mr. B. ADEITO NZENGEYA
Mrs. ESAKI-EKANGA KABEYA

Under-Secretary-General for
Disarmament Affairs:

Mr. J. MARTENSON

Secretary of the Committee on
Disarmament and Personal
Representative of the
Secretary-General:

Mr. R. JAIPAL

Deputy-Secretary of the
Committee on Disarmament:

Mr. V. BERASATEGUI

The CHAIRMAN: I declare open the 192nd plenary meeting of the Committee on Disarmament.

I have on my list of speakers for today the representatives of Belgium, the United Kingdom, the German Democratic Republic, Australia, China, Cuba and Kenya. Because of the long list of speakers, we may need to continue this plenary in the afternoon.

Before giving the floor to the first speaker on my list I would like to inform the Committee that, if there is no objection, I intend to convene an informal meeting this afternoon, as soon as we have listened to those members making statements today, in order to continue our consideration of the agenda and programme of work, as well as of other organizational matters.

I now give the floor to the representative of Belgium, Ambassador Onkelinx,

Mr. ONKELINX (Belgium) (translated from French): I should like first of all, Mr. Chairman, to express to you the appreciation of the Belgian delegation for the way in which you are conducting our work, and I should like, too, as previous speakers have done, to assure you of our full co-operation during the month of your chairmanship. I should also like to greet and congratulate Ambassador García Robles not only on the way in which he directed our work during the concluding part of our last session but also on the award to him of the Nobel Peace Prize. I have already offered him my congratulations, both in writing and orally but I am very happy to repeat them here in our Committee. I should like, lastly, to welcome the presence among us -- the faithful presence, I might say -- of Mr. Martenson, Under-Secretary-General of the United Nations, whom I should like to congratulate, too, on his recent promotion.

The year 1983 has begun in an atmosphere of increased interest in the subjects of disarmament and international security and many declarations have been made in that connection.

This atmosphere has much to do with the aspirations of the international community as a whole, aspirations freely expressed by a large part of the community, which demands that States, and especially those bearing the greatest responsibilities, should both achieve concrete results in the sphere of disarmament and ensure the requisite conditions for the restoration of international security.

Belgium is wholly in favour of the achievement of speedy progress in these spheres.

In this body which is devoted to disarmament I should like to recall that my country, with its close partners, was responsible for the initiatives which have led to several of the major disarmament negotiations that are in progress. The Geneva negotiations concerned respectively with the elimination of all intermediate-range missiles and the reduction of strategic weapons, the negotiations in Vienna on mutual and balanced force reductions in central Europe and those taking place in Madrid with a view to the adoption of a substantial and balanced document containing, in particular, the mandate of a conference on disarmament in Europe, are thus all of vital importance in our eyes.

(Mr. Onkelinx, Belgium)

It is Belgium's hope that this year will see positive developments in all these negotiations.

A vast public debate has opened on these negotiations and more particularly on certain of them.

I should like here, however, in a very general way to express my fear that these public debates may in the end prevent real progress being made in the negotiations.

In any event, if the public debate continues, and if the work of the negotiators is not hampered, it seems to me necessary, in order to create a real climate of confidence, that such debates should be balanced and free from polemics. Public opinion in all countries concerned should be able to participate in them. These debates should not be designed to influence public opinion over the heads of governments but rather to inform the public as accurately as possible of what is involved.

Given the present international context to which I have referred, some might question the role of the Committee on Disarmament. It was Belgium's wish five years ago to become a member of the Committee on Disarmament because it was convinced of the real and necessary role of this body that is unique in the annals of world affairs. While the multilateral deliberative approach is clearly becoming less and less satisfactory, we believe, on the contrary, that multilateral negotiation in the Committee on Disarmament has very great possibilities.

Belgium, along with its western partners, is more and more convinced of the prospects offered by the Committee on Disarmament, and the participation in the discussions this session of leading western statesmen is additional proof of the role that the Committee on Disarmament can and should play. It is true that its first five years of existence have not so far produced any concrete results, and that its record up to now has been less satisfactory than was that of the bodies which preceded it. I am deeply convinced, however, that the Committee is capable -- if not of controlling all the factors which make success in the disarmament endeavour so difficult -- at least of playing its full part as the single multilateral disarmament negotiating body. To this end we ought to aim at effectiveness. We ought to avoid debates that are a mere statement of position or purely theoretical and pay more attention to practical issues.

We ought to stop making statements on subjects which at this stage hold out no hope for multilateral negotiation. The Committee on Disarmament ought to be not merely a platform but a negotiating forum. We ought to give up trying to deal here with questions which, while dear to one country or another, have no chance at the present time of being the subject of agreement in this body. It is not a matter of asking our States to abandon this or that aspect of their security policy that they consider essential. It is a matter rather of identifying those spheres in which we can really do useful work in the immediate future.

My country is among those which attach particular importance to conventional disarmament, in addition to the questions relating to nuclear disarmament to which I referred earlier. But it is clear that the Committee is not at present in a

(Mr. Onkelinx, Belgium)

position to conduct negotiations on conventional weapons in view of the reservations that exist in that connection. We have made the effort of not insisting on the discussion of this matter here, preferring to leave it to other forums that are at present more appropriate than this one. We hope that our example will be followed with respect to other items on which there are no immediate prospects of negotiations.

Belgium hopes that the Committee will this year give priority in the use of its time to what is actually negotiable. The disappointing results of the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament inevitably led the Committee, during its session of last summer, to pursue this course to some extent. We trust that this trend will be confirmed and developed in 1983.

I wish to refer in particular to the question of the prohibition of chemical weapons. It is in fact these negotiations which offer the most promising prospects since the conditions for fruitful negotiation now actually exist. These negotiations can be brought to a successful conclusion in the fairly near future if all the parties concerned show the necessary flexibility. I should like today to launch an urgent appeal for this chance of success to be seized.

We are particularly encouraged by certain statements and declarations by the two countries which were conducting bilateral negotiations on this question before the Committee on Disarmament took it up. These declarations, as Mr. George Bush, the Vice-President of the United States, has just confirmed to us, indicate a willingness to move forward which can only be welcomed and which the Committee on Disarmament ought to convert into reality. We await with much interest the document promised us by Vice-President Bush and we endorse the objective he set of accelerating the work of the Committee on Disarmament with a view to eliminating the threat of chemical weapons.

We should be making a great mistake if we did not decide to put all the resources necessary at the service of these negotiations. If the Committee succeeds in putting before the General Assembly the text of a treaty prohibiting chemical weapons, we shall have achieved a great step forward in our work. If, on the other hand, we disperse our efforts, the Committee will become more and more an outmoded instrument that will fall into disuse.

Let us, then, in our use of time, give these negotiations all the priority they merit. The Working Group ought to resume its activities as soon as possible. It ought also to be able to set aside time for periods of "concentration" like those we held during the month of January. We must also take care to conduct our work in an orderly manner. The Working Group's report for 1982, usefully supplemented by the three weeks of work at the beginning of this year, provide the necessary basis for the continuation and conclusion of these negotiations.

Important work remains to be done to clarify the structure of the convention. Generally speaking, it is my delegation's belief that we should remain very flexible as regards the use of negotiating techniques. At the same time, we ought clearly to take care to avoid two dangers: the first is that of becoming embroiled in semantics, which would be a waste of time; the second is that of forgetting that there can be no agreement on the whole of the draft treaty without prior agreement on each of its elements.

(Mr. Onkelinx, Belgium)

The Working Group will no doubt be obliged simultaneously to give attention to some more technical issues relating to certain aspects of the convention. I am thinking in particular of certain problems concerned primarily with the procedures for verification of compliance with the convention. Useful work was done during the last technical consultations with the participation of experts, especially in the matter of the determining which precursors of chemical warfare agents will call for specific verification procedures during the chemical production process. The same applies to the definition of requirements as regards verification of the destruction of stockpiles of chemical weapons and the dismantling of facilities. However, it seems to me that it should be clear to everyone that these technical discussions ought to lead to arrangements that can be incorporated in the convention. In other words, we must not lose sight of the ultimate object of such exercises, and see to it that overly technical or academic considerations do not unnecessarily add to the complexity of these talks. It will be necessary, at an appropriate time, to consolidate the elements which have formed the subject of convergencies of views during these consultations into draft annexes to the convention.

While the Working Group continues its efforts -- which we hope will be resumed shortly, for it would be unwise to interrupt the process that is under way -- it would seem to us appropriate to initiate, at the highest level in this Committee, genuine negotiations on the main issues where divergencies of views remain. I think we now know very well what these issues are. I think it would be easier to reconcile the opposing views in small consultation groups. We believe that this is essential to the success of our work.

Another of the subjects I have described as being negotiable at the present time is that of the prohibition of radiological weapons. This question ought not to require such extensive work as that of chemical weapons. In fact the work on it appears to have reached a more advanced stage. What we most need in order to reach positive results during the present session is political decisions.

I shall not repeat here the reasons which, in our view, warrant the speedy conclusion of these negotiations. Belgium is well aware of the complexity of the other problems connected with the prohibition of radiological weapons in the strict sense. We have in the past indicated the way in which we think a reasonable compromise could be reached. We are convinced that possibilities exist for strengthening that compromise in such a way that the question of the prohibition of attacks on nuclear installations, to which we, too, attach importance, can be settled in the near future in the context in which it arose.

Belgium is not one of those countries which originally linked the question of attacks on nuclear facilities with that of radiological weapons. The course of the negotiations on radiological weapons happens to have led to these two questions being linked. What we now suggest is that the nature of this link should be defined -- this approach being a change from our initial position. We look to others to adjust their positions also, both those who consider that the two questions have no connection with each other and those who wish to juxtapose them.

The solution we now envisage would include both a commitment to negotiate the prohibition of attacks on nuclear facilities, which would form an integral part of the convention on radiological weapons, and the working out of precise procedures for the implementation of this commitment. Belgium will put forward a proposal in this connection at a later stage.

(Mr. Onkelinx, Belgium)

In addition to actual negotiations, there are other matters where the Committee on Disarmament ought to play a useful part in preparing the way for negotiations.

It has already done this, although in a very preliminary fashion, in the sphere of the prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests. A Working Group was set up in 1982 -- to the satisfaction of all because our delegations had long been awaiting agreement on this way of proceeding. We believe that this Working Group ought to continue and extend the scope of its efforts. The few hours granted to it last year, too many of which were spent on procedural matters, allowed only a brief preliminary review of the question. We therefore hope that the Working Group will resume its work quickly, where it left it in September 1982.

The Committee could also contemplate a similar role in the matter of the prevention of an arms race in outer space. We hope that it will be possible to reach agreement quickly on a mandate for a working group to deal with this question.

We suggest that for a start this subsidiary body should, after thorough consideration, define the questions to be discussed with a view to the prevention of an arms race in outer space. To begin with, a study could be made of all the international agreements referring to this matter, so as to see where further elaboration might be necessary.

In addition to such activities -- and I have purposely avoided listing them all, because it seems to me that the Committee on Disarmament ought to concentrate its efforts on the practical priorities, which in no way means abandoning the priorities that have been agreed on by all, particularly at the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament -- I should like to draw attention to another sphere in which the Committee could contribute effectively by stimulating other efforts.

I am referring to confidence-building measures in the nuclear sphere. It seems to me that there are here great possibilities which have not up to now been sufficiently explored at the level of the Committee on Disarmament. This is an important matter because it constitutes one element in the whole complex of issues involved in the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament. It is relevant at this moment because both the concrete proposals of the President of the United States of America referring to such measures, and that part of the political declaration of the States parties to the Warsaw Treaty which refers to this subject, indicate a desire to take new steps to prevent war, and more particularly nuclear war.

The contribution which the Committee on Disarmament could make -- according to procedures we have yet to determine but which should not be such as to lead us again into fruitless procedural debates -- would have the merit of enabling

(Mr. Onkelinx, Belgium)

it to emerge from the stage of purely theoretical discussions on the subject of what is nowadays more and more often referred to as "the prevention of nuclear war". But that would not be the only advantage of such action by our Committee -- far from it. Its principal merit would be to encourage a dialogue between the nuclear powers, while fully respecting the policies and security requirements of each.

In this way, too, the views of non-nuclear-weapon States in this connection could be duly noted by those bearing the principal responsibility in this sphere. Belgium intends to make its own contribution to this discussion at the appropriate time.

In concluding this general statement, I should like to express the hope that during the fifth year of its existence the Committee on Disarmament will be wise enough to draw the lessons from its experience which, while recent, is none the less instructive. We ought to try to abandon habits that have proved paralysing, particularly in the general organization of the committee's work. And here I should like to say, in parenthesis, how concerned we are at the slowness of our consultations and decisions in the matter of organization. We have already held a number of meetings and are still far from reaching agreement, even on an agenda, and I am truly very worried to see that discussions on the establishment of working groups, the choice of chairman for them and their organization have not even begun, and I find this particularly regrettable. And I should like to add yet another comment after what happened yesterday in the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts. I find it rather disheartening that when there is -- I think it is not too much to say -- consensus in the Committee on the person to be appointed, who is a person beyond reproach, and everyone in the various groups in the Committee has expressed admiration for this person, it has proved impossible for the Ad Hoc Group of Experts to initiate its work, which is of interest to all of us. We all have a number of experts who have come from our capitals for the purpose, but again there is a delay in that Group on a purely procedural matter and for reasons which, I must admit, I do not fully understand.

We ought also to try to avoid reiterating to each other the positions we know only too well on subjects offering no hope of immediate negotiation. We ought to act as negotiators rather than as orators.

Belgium intends to play its full part as a State member of the Committee on Disarmament and will spare no effort to try to ensure that during this fifth session the Committee finally achieves positive results.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the representative of Belgium for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of the United Kingdom, Ambassador Cromartie.

Mr. CROMARTIE (United Kingdom): I should first like to congratulate you on your assumption of the Chair at this auspicious time at the beginning of the new session of our Committee. Under your chairmanship the 1983 session has got off to a good start with a week in which it has been addressed by three distinguished statesmen holding very high offices in their own countries: the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs of Canada, the Vice-Chancellor and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany, and finally the Vice-President of the United States. The very fact that they all took the trouble to come to speak in our Committee has demonstrated the importance attached to disarmament in Western Europe and North America and to the role that this Committee can play.

I welcome the fact that all three statesmen stressed the importance of the INF and START negotiations. As these are bilateral in character and outside the framework of our Committee, I will not offer detailed comments on them but I should like to stress one point, which is highly relevant to what we do in this Committee and provides the background against which we work. If agreement could be reached on the basis of the proposals outlined by Vice-President Bush, it would result in a substantial measure of nuclear disarmament. This would be the turning-point for which we have all been waiting. It is our fervent hope that these two negotiations will be successful.

In the meantime we have plenty of tasks on our own agenda. World-wide attention is focused on disarmament at present and it is important that this Committee should be able to carry out effectively its task of negotiation. The British delegation has always approached the great problem of disarmament in a pragmatic spirit, seeking areas where worthwhile steps forward seem likely to be possible, and concentrating its efforts on those areas. We believe that this is the most effective way to make progress. In this spirit, we need, in these early days of the 1983 session, to take a realistic view of our priorities, and then to focus our efforts on fields where there is a convergence of views on the main issues involved, and therefore a real prospect of reaching agreement.

My delegation is encouraged by the general agreement that progress can be reached in the field of chemical weapons. We are much encouraged by the remarks on this subject made by Vice-President Bush during his visit to the Committee last week. We support his call for the Committee to begin real negotiations on a chemical weapons convention, and hope that the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons can resume its work without delay. We look forward to examining in detail the proposals put forward by the United States delegation when its paper becomes available and hope that it will provide the necessary impetus for rapid progress.

(Mr. Cromartie, United Kingdom)

My delegation will make a further statement on this subject in due course, but I should like at this stage to comment briefly on the outcome of the recent consultations on technical issues relating to a chemical weapons convention. My delegation thought that these consultations showed that a measure of agreement was emerging on a number of technical points relating to the definition and identification of key precursors of chemical weapons, and to some of the procedures which might be suitable for verifying the destruction of stockpiles of chemical weapons. We were therefore disappointed to find that delegations were not able to reach agreement on a way of recording the discussion which had taken place. An oral report by the Chairman, however careful and balanced, cannot really replace an agreed written report.

It is also, in the view of my delegation, most regrettable that the work of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts has been delayed. We hope the procedural obstacles in the way of the Group's resuming its work will be quickly removed.

My delegation attaches importance also to an early start to the work of the Ad Hoc Working Group on a Nuclear Test Ban, which was set up last year after protracted negotiations over its mandate. At the end of the last session, my predecessor, Mr. Summerhayes, described in some detail the conclusions which we drew from the discussions which followed. We do not, as he then made clear, subscribe to the view that the current mandate has been fulfilled. Indeed, we do not see how it is possible to argue that work on it has been completed, given the conflicting views set out in the report of the Working Group. Much remains to be done to resolve differences over the key question of verification. In the view of my delegation the Working Group should continue its work without delay under the present mandate, in order to try to reach a clearer understanding of what measures of verification are necessary to achieve the successful conclusion of a nuclear test ban. The present mandate specifically provides of course, for the Working Group to take into account all existing proposals and future initiatives. We should be prepared during this session to elaborate further on our own position.

At the last session of the General Assembly my delegation joined in a consensus on resolution 37/99 C, dealing with radiological weapons. This resolution for the first time referred to the prohibition of attacks on nuclear facilities. In the view of my delegation, the fact that such a reference was made does not imply that the proposal to link this issue with that of radiological weapons in the same international instrument is generally accepted. Delegations will recall the view expressed last week by the Foreign Minister of the Federal Republic of Germany that the proposal creates so many technical and legal problems that it is questionable whether the two subjects should be combined. As is well known, this is very much the view that my delegation has always taken. We are, however, again prepared to take part in a discussion of both these topics in the Working Group without commitment either to the form of any instrument which might result or to the forum in which our agreement on a prohibition of attacks on nuclear facilities might be negotiated. We believe that such exploratory discussions can best be conducted in the existing Working Group under the present agenda item.

(Mr. Cromartie, United Kingdom)

Another unfinished task before us is the comprehensive programme of disarmament, which was remitted to us by the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. It is important, in the view of my delegation, that, when we begin work again on this topic, we should not lose sight of the gains which were made during the second special session in respect of some key issues, even if these gains were not fully reflected in the document which emerged from the session. We should not underestimate the difficulties of our task, nor should we delude ourselves that it requires a change of attitude on the part of only one, or a few, States to make a comprehensive programme of disarmament possible. The text as transmitted to us from the second special session contains many brackets, and it will require compromise on the part of all delegations to make agreement possible. But such compromise is only possible within the limits set by each State's security concerns. We stand ready to take part in this Working Group as actively as we have done in the past.

I should now like to consider briefly resolution 37/78 I, in which the General Assembly requested the Committee on Disarmament "to undertake, as a matter of high priority, negotiations with a view to achieving agreement on appropriate and practical measures for the prevention of nuclear war and on which informal consultations are taking place". My delegation did not support this resolution in the General Assembly but abstained, in common with a substantial number of other delegations represented in this Committee. This was certainly not because my delegation is against the prevention of nuclear war, but because we differ with some other delegations on the best way to achieve this desirable end. The British Government's view was communicated to the Secretary-General and is available for all delegations to study in document A/S-12/11/Add.1. My delegation has been surprised to note, however, that, in spite of the high priority which delegations give to this topic, replies were received by the Secretary-General in response to resolution 36/81 B from very few States and from fewer than half of the members of this Committee. My delegation has no objection to the Committee seeking to identify specific measures to prevent war which could command a consensus in the Committee; but it would be premature to consider embarking on negotiations on this topic before any real common ground exists on how the problem should be tackled, let alone solved. I have this morning seen Working Paper CD/341, containing the views of the Group of 21 on this subject, but I have not, of course, had time to study it. I may wish to revert to the subject in due course.

This leads me on to some more general considerations about the conduct of our work. On 17 September the distinguished representative of the Soviet Union suggested that working groups should be formed on all items of our agenda. We have doubts about the practicability of this suggestion, given the crowded nature of our programme and the strains that it already places on many delegations, including my own. We should find it difficult to agree that it is useful to form working groups on all items unless preliminary discussions had clearly identified specific areas where, by general agreement, there was a prospect that successful negotiations could take place. We should judge all proposals against this criterion. In the same intervention the distinguished representative of the Soviet Union also expressed opposition to working groups becoming involved in

(Mr. Cromartie, United Kingdom)

discussion of subsidiary issues before an understanding had been reached and agreement formulated on the main issues. With this sentiment we could certainly agree; but we may not agree always on what are the main issues and what are the subsidiary ones. Matters of key importance to some delegations should not be brushed aside with claims that they are merely subsidiary.

On the same day, 17 September, the distinguished representative of Brazil made a plea that we reconsider the form of our report. His point is well taken: our reports are undoubtedly difficult to follow and hardly make interesting reading. My delegation is grateful to the distinguished representative of Brazil for grasping this nettle, though we cannot entirely go along with him in his objection to qualifying phrases, while there is insistence on including in our reports views which are controversial and which are inevitably challenged. If it is not made clear that these controversial views are held by only some delegations, we run the risk that it will at a later stage be claimed that there had been consensus on them. It seems to us that the way to avoid this would be for the report to express genuine consensus views and to include sparingly, if at all, views on which no such consensus exists. The report would then be much shorter, easier to read and therefore more widely read. The more ambitious reader who wanted to study the divergence of views expressed during the session could do so in the admirable verbatim reports, in which the positions of individual delegations are firmly on the record. The reports of the contact groups on chemical weapons at the last session gave us a valuable pointer to the direction we might take, and we believe that the form of these reports might perhaps be more widely adopted. If, Mr. Chairman, you decide to take up the suggestion of the distinguished representative of Brazil to form a group to work on a revised form of our report, my delegation would be happy to participate.

I should also like to remind the Committee of the suggestion made by my predecessor in his final address to the Committee (CD/PV.186), that representatives of non-member States should not automatically be relegated to the bottom of the speakers list. We need not institute any new rule and we should be content to leave the matter to the Chairman's discretion. But I hope that all delegations would agree that when eminent representatives of non-member States, particularly those who are not resident in Geneva and who hold high office in their own countries, take the trouble to address the Committee, we should respond by enabling them to do so at an appropriate and predictable time.

I should not like to conclude my statement without offering my congratulations to our very distinguished colleague, Ambassador García Robles of Mexico, and to Mrs. Myrdal of Sweden for the award to them of the Nobel Peace Prize. I personally remember the valuable contributions they were already making to disarmament when I was in Geneva from 1967 to 1969 as a member of the United Kingdom delegation to the ENDC and then to the CCD. In fact one of the first statements I heard in this room was when Ambassador García Robles came from Tlatelolco to give us a first-hand account of the conclusion, a few days before, of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, which the United Kingdom warmly welcomed. I remember, too, that we stood in Geneva at that time at the beginning of a period of progress. Let us hope that we do so again.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the representative of the United Kingdom for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of the German Democratic Republic, Ambassador Herder.

Mr. HERDER (German Democratic Republic): Comrade Chairman, it is with great pleasure that I join in the congratulations to you, the representative of socialist Mongolia, on your assumption of the chairmanship of the Committee on Disarmament for the month of February. With your long-standing experience and dedicated work in the field of disarmament, I am confident that you will contribute significantly to a constructive beginning of our work this year.

My delegation also notes with great satisfaction that one of our colleagues, Ambassador García Robles of Mexico, has been awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for 1982. This is certainly a fully deserved recognition of his tireless struggle for the cessation of the nuclear arms race and disarmament, which he has carried on in the service of his country. One can only agree with what Ambassador Robles said at a press conference in Mexico City on 10 November 1982, namely, that "every one of us -- in his field of activities -- has a share of responsibility in helping to avert a nuclear catastrophe", and that "there is no worse struggle than one which is not waged." This speaks of deeply humanistic convictions which, together with his contribution, inter alia, to the Treaty of Tlatelolco and the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, have gained him respect and appreciation in my country also.

May I also request the Swedish delegation to transmit our congratulations to Mrs. Alva Myrdal in connection with the Nobel Peace Prize awarded to her. We certainly remember her engagement and devotion in striving for disarmament.

By the same token, I would like to express my heartfelt words of welcome to all our new colleagues represented here and wish them well for their future work. I would also like to welcome in our midst the head of the Department for Disarmament Affairs, Under-Secretary-General Mr. Jan Martenson.

Comrade Chairman, when the Committee on Disarmament takes up its activities this year, it is facing two alternatives which become ever clearer: either, measures to stop the arms race will make peace more secure or superarmament decisions with serious consequences accompanied by a continuing stagnation in negotiations will push mankind ever closer to the brink of a nuclear holocaust. The year 1983 must not become a "missile year". The consequences would be disastrous for all peoples.

With their recent peace initiatives the States parties to the Warsaw Treaty have shown a way out of the serious situation. The Prague Declaration proves that with all determination they stick to their course of safeguarding peace by arms limitation and disarmament, dialogue and peaceful coexistence. They have submitted a convincing programme for agreements which would definitely make the international situation more healthy.

Reactions by peace-loving forces in the world, ready to achieve an understanding, show that our fundamental objectives are well understood. At the same time, we take note of the expressed intention of Western countries to study seriously the proposals made in Prague. We hope that this examination will lead to an early and constructive response. Nobody should try to close their eyes to the vital interests of people having different political, ideological or religious convictions, passionately advocating the cause of peace and disarmament with their words and deeds.

(Mr. Herder, German Democratic Republic)

The General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany and Chairman of the Council of State of the German Democratic Republic, Erich Honecker, declared in this respect on 10 January 1983: "Mankind has arrived at a crossroads. Superarmament and confrontation threaten to end in nuclear war. Nobody should find it difficult, therefore, to choose and actively pursue reasonable accommodation and peaceful exchanges in international relations."

The Prague proposals take into account that in the nuclear age there can be no security for one side at the expense of the other side. Moreover, the firm conviction was expressed that States and, in particular, the nuclear-weapon States should base their military policy exclusively on defence purposes and that it should take into account the legitimate security interests of all States. It must not hamper the conclusion of agreements in the field of disarmament.

Unfortunately, some States are not following such a course of action, even if one has tried in recent days in this Committee to make us believe the opposite. But how can a policy of superarmament and confrontation be reconciled with the search for peace and disarmament? We heard dramatic words about the danger for civilization stemming -- as we were told -- from the alleged use of chemical weapons, an assertion based only on lies and distortions. Does that mean that we should forget about the sword of Damocles, i.e. the danger of nuclear war, hanging over us? Recent events show that these are real dangers we are facing.

The "Defence Guidelines" of one nuclear-weapon State for 1984 to 1988 have become known. They are said to contain plans for a "protracted nuclear war". They project a nuclear first strike against targets on the territories of the USSR and the other countries of the Warsaw Treaty, including the use of nuclear medium-range systems. The so-called decapitation strike is a main pillar of this strategy. Outer space has been fully integrated in these war plans.

To back up such plans, armament programmes are being implemented which include all categories of weapons: nuclear and chemical as well as conventional weapons. The representative of a Western nuclear-weapon State who some days ago explained to us the so-called arms control policy of his country declared already in 1981 in this regard: "One has to have a weapons potential which inflicts more damage on the other side than they can do to us. That exactly is the way to victory in a nuclear war."

In view of such a statement only one conclusion is possible: to avert the danger of nuclear war is the most important objective. Without delay appropriate measures must be taken and all possible solutions must be explored. We join all those who insist energetically that each and every relevant proposal -- no matter from which side they come -- be examined immediately and thoroughly.

The central task, namely, to explore and to agree on measures to prevent nuclear war, should therefore also be reflected in the agenda of the Committee on Disarmament. General Assembly resolution 37/78 I contains clear stipulations to this effect. Together with other socialist countries, my delegation supports the proposal of the Group of 21 to include an item on the prevention of nuclear war in the agenda of the Committee on Disarmament and to set up a corresponding working group. We have just received the working paper of the Group of 21 with certain precisions on this proposal, and I am happy to declare that my delegation is in principle prepared to go along with the suggestions contained in the document submitted by the Group of 21.

(Mr. Herder, German Democratic Republic)

An effective and important measure for preventing the outbreak of a nuclear war would be an undertaking by all nuclear-weapon States not to be the first to use nuclear weapons. Having this in mind, the German Democratic Republic wholeheartedly welcomed the proclamation of the USSR at the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament that it will not be the first to use nuclear weapons. Furthermore, at the recent session of the United Nations General Assembly, we introduced resolution 37/78 J which states that "the solemn declarations by two nuclear-weapon States made or reiterated at the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, concerning their respective obligations not to be the first to use nuclear weapons offer an important avenue to decrease the danger of nuclear war". It also expresses the hope "that the other nuclear-weapon States will consider making similar declarations with respect to not being the first to use nuclear weapons".

Sometimes the argument is advanced that it is not possible to treat the non-use of nuclear weapons separately, that it should not be separated from the question of the non-use of all weapons. First of all, we strongly believe that nuclear weapons pose the greatest danger to the survival of mankind and that the prevention of nuclear war and nuclear disarmament should, therefore, be treated on a priority basis. This would not exclude the possibility of a comprehensive approach to the non-use of military force.

In this context, we would like to direct the attention of delegations to the recent proposal by the Warsaw Treaty member-States to conclude a treaty on the mutual renunciation of the use of military force and the maintenance of peaceful relations.

The Warsaw Treaty member-States are not seeking military superiority over the NATO States and have no intention of attacking these States or any other country in or outside Europe. The NATO member-States also declare that they have no aggressive intentions. These existing declarations offer a unique chance to reduce considerably the danger of conflict by concluding such a treaty. It would in fact be another important guarantee for the principle of the non-use of force.

Besides, such a treaty could contain elements which so far have not been incorporated in international agreements, such as the renunciation of the first use of nuclear and conventional weapons and measures to prevent surprise attacks, as well as certain confidence-building measures.

In order to prevent a world-wide nuclear war, there must be no further escalation of nuclear confrontation in Europe. On the contrary, it has to be reduced.

There can be no doubt: if a nuclear first-strike potential were to be established in Europe by deploying new American medium-range nuclear systems, that would mean a decisive change of the strategic military situation. It would require adequate measures by the Warsaw Treaty member-States in order to safeguard their own security. Such a development must be avoided. From many sides it is now recognized that the relevant negotiations between the USSR and the United States here in Geneva will only bring forth results when unrealistic demands are given up and a just settlement is aspired to, based on the principle of equality and equal security. The zero-option concept, aimed at unilateral disarmament, has so far prevented results. No one considering the problem seriously can deny that this

(Mr. Herder, German Democratic Republic)

unrealistic concept is only used as a smoke-screen to delay the negotiations and to make possible the deployment of new American missiles at the end of this year. Such a course of action will also seriously affect the security of my country, in the immediate neighbourhood of which a considerable proportion of these weapons — among them the Pershing II missiles — will be stationed, according to NATO plans.

Also we cannot overlook the fact that there are already over 6,000 nuclear warheads deployed to the west of our borders. How can one speak, then, of a monopoly of the other side?

Europe does not need new nuclear weapons. It is necessary to reduce the level of nuclear confrontation. In this regard my country has only recently made a concrete offer. In response to a proposal by the Swedish Government to set up a zone free from tactical nuclear weapons on both sides of the dividing line between the NATO and Warsaw Treaty countries in central Europe, the German Democratic Republic has stated its readiness to make its entire territory available when a nuclear-weapon-free zone is established in central Europe. It stands to reason that the principle of equality and equal security must be duly taken into account.

The realization of this project, supported by the peoples in the area, now depends on a positive reply from the other side.

This year again the Committee on Disarmament faces important tasks. The immediate cessation of all nuclear-weapon tests certainly ranks among the most urgent ones.

In three resolutions the General Assembly, at its thirty-seventh session, called for their comprehensive prohibition. The time is ripe to revise the mandate of the NTB Working Group in order to enable it to proceed to practical negotiations with the aim of elaborating a draft treaty. The basic provisions of a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests, submitted by the Soviet Union at the General Assembly's thirty-seventh session, provide a good basis.

However, in its recent authoritative statement the United States has again made it clear that it wishes us to forget about negotiations on a treaty and go on spending our time on discussions of verification issues in the hope of some day finding a verification system which will suit the interests of the United States.

But it is common knowledge that it is not verification which matters. There is no doubt that, given the necessary political will, the verification problems can be solved quite fast. The real issues are to be found elsewhere.

(Mr. Herder, German Democratic Republic)

It is difficult not to agree with Mr. Ralph Earle, former Director of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, who felt compelled to state in the New York Times of 17 December 1982: "The [United States] Administration has made clear its intention that it wants to continue testing" and "that its real concern appears to be that a CTB would prevent the development and testing of new weapons ...".

In the light of this situation, the Committee on Disarmament should seriously review the implications such a position has for our work.

Nuclear disarmament is the best guarantee against the danger of nuclear war. The Prague Declaration contains a proposal for a programme of step-by-step nuclear disarmament, i.e. an idea which is broadly shared in this Committee. Its realization would require, as reaffirmed by resolution 37/78 C, that all nuclear-weapon States, in particular those which possess the most important nuclear arsenals, live up to their special responsibility for the fulfilment of the task of achieving the goals of nuclear disarmament. Unfortunately, this still meets with considerable resistance. The above-mentioned resolution justly points to certain doctrines and concepts for the use of nuclear weapons as a serious obstacle for reaching agreement on nuclear disarmament. They have to be rejected for what they are — intellectual preparation for nuclear war.

The beginning of a process of nuclear disarmament could be facilitated by a freeze on nuclear arsenals. Two resolutions adopted by the General Assembly at its thirty-seventh session clearly express the view of an overwhelming majority of States that it is urgently necessary to agree immediately on a nuclear arms freeze. The Prague Declaration, meanwhile, not only supports the demand for a freeze on nuclear weapons. It also spells out practical first steps towards its realization by proposing that the strategic weapons of the USSR and the United States be frozen quantitatively and their modernization be limited to the maximum extent possible.

Now, time must not pass without avail. In resolution 37/100 B, 119 States Members of the United Nations expressed their firm conviction that "at present the conditions are most propitious for such a freeze, since the USSR and the United States are now equivalent in nuclear military power and it seems evident that there exists between them an over-all rough parity".

The cessation of the qualitative development of nuclear weapons has become even more urgent in view of the fact that production of nuclear neutron weapons has started in one nuclear-weapon State. As is known, the development and production of this weapon system form part of the aggressive concept of making nuclear war wageable and winnable. It would lower the threshold for the use of nuclear weapons.

Scientists have pointed out that nuclear neutron weapons are to be considered the forerunners of a new, third generation of nuclear weapons. Such weapons, which selectively boost one component of the effects of nuclear weapons, such as heat, radiation or blast effects, would represent an extremely dangerous qualitative development of nuclear weapons arsenals.

(Mr. Herder, German Democratic Republic)

Demands from peace movements all over the world as well as from a growing majority of the States Members of the United Nations reaffirm the request to the Committee to start without delay negotiations within an appropriate organizational framework with a view to concluding a convention prohibiting nuclear neutron weapons. That would be an important contribution to and element of a comprehensive solution to the problem of nuclear disarmament.

The Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons has recently achieved some progress. The shape of a future chemical weapons convention is becoming clearer. Now is the time to tackle the matter with the seriousness it deserves and proceed to actual drafting work. In this process the problems remaining can be overcome. Let us not waste time in discussions which might lead us away from our common aim — a chemical weapons convention, the elaboration of which is first and foremost a political task and not so much a question of technical perfection.

We noted with interest the recent announcement that a new comprehensive proposal will be tabled by the United States delegation. It is our hope that it will further our work in drafting the convention. But how can one reconcile this announcement with news reports coming these days from the capital of the same country that additional funds — the figure of \$150 million is mentioned — will be allotted to the development and production of new chemical weapons? This is certainly a counterproductive measure, and at the same time, it would be counterproductive perpetually to bring up new verification demands. From the history of negotiations on a comprehensive test ban and other disarmament issues we know what this may lead to.

We stand for a realistic verification system, based on a combination of national and international procedures, including certain on-site inspections. This would correspond to the legitimate interests of all sides in enhancing confidence that the convention is being complied with. So, we do not believe that it is necessary to preach to us the virtues of verification.

At the recent session of the General Assembly, special attention was directed towards countering the qualitative development of chemical weapons and their stationing on the territory of other States, for this worsens conditions for the conclusion of a chemical weapons convention. In short, everything should be avoided which stands in the way of the process of elaborating the convention.

That is why the German Democratic Republic reaffirms the proposal submitted in the Prague Declaration for a Europe free from chemical weapons. Moreover, the

(Mr. Herder, German Democratic Republic)

Government of my country has officially declared that it is ready to create together with interested States a chemical-weapon-free zone in central Europe and has proposed to enter into appropriate negotiations.

Some remarks on the prevention of an arms race in outer space. Many of us have been witness to the efforts of a majority of States at the thirty-seventh session for the adoption of a joint resolution. The result was resolution 37/83 which we consider to be a good basis for negotiations in this Committee. It is unfortunate that a single State opposed the consensus.

In the above-mentioned so-called "Defense Guidelines" it is declared that outer space operations "add a new dimension to our military capabilities. We must make sure that treaties and agreements do not block opportunities to develop such capabilities". The question arises whether the international community will again be faced with accomplished facts? Should it not be possible to counter such efforts by elaborating an international treaty prohibiting the stationing of weapons of any kind in outer space? We support the establishment of a working group for this purpose, with a corresponding mandate.

This year, when our multilateral negotiating body enters into the fifth year of its existence in its present composition, it appears appropriate to recall the consensus reached at the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament in 1978 that its task must be to elaborate international treaties with binding obligations for the cessation of the arms race, for arms limitation and disarmament. This objective, which at the same time is a challenge to all of us, has been reaffirmed by resolution 37/78 F on the intensification of disarmament negotiations.

The starting point of all efforts should be awareness of our responsibility for the peace and security of all States and peoples. To break the deadlock in the field of arms limitation and disarmament, the German Democratic Republic and the other Warsaw Treaty member-States in their Prague Declaration, have reaffirmed their determination to take an active and constructive part in this endeavour.

Today, my delegation has focused its attention on some of the problems which it considers to be most important. During the session we will, of course, explain our position on other items of the agenda.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the representative of the German Democratic Republic for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of Australia, Ambassador Sadleir.

Mr. SADLEIR (Australia): Mr. Chairman, on behalf of the Australian delegation I offer you our congratulations on assuming the chairmanship of this Committee for the important opening month of our activity during 1983.

I should also like, through you, to express our congratulations to the distinguished Ambassador of Mexico, His Excellency Mr. Alfonso García Robles, on the award to him of the Nobel Peace Prize, an award that not only honours his long and outstanding work, but enhances his country, the cause of disarmament and this Committee.

Mr. Chairman, I am sufficiently new to this Committee clearly to recall the helpful spirit in which those around this table received me and others among us who were similarly new when first we joined the Committee. In that same spirit I welcome our new colleagues, the Ambassadors of China, India, Japan, Kenya, the United Kingdom and Venezuela.

There is consensus in international opinion that, for disarmament, 1983 will be an unusually important, if not crucial year. Many things contribute to this widely held view but they all have their origin in the state of mutual confidence or, rather, the lack of it. The two overriding world concerns -- the arms race, conventional as well as nuclear, and the political relationship between the major powers -- come together in the issue of confidence. In the time of détente, the military forces which each side deploys seemed somehow less awesome because of the political understandings and trust then in play. It was apparent then that the risks of conflict were relatively low. If there are now widespread fears that the risks are relatively high, it is not so much because of the change in forces. It is because of the change in confidence.

For better or worse, 1983 will be of particular significance to this continent. Europe is far from Australia but, like so many others, we find our fate bound up with that of this small, historically significant and, once again, militarily charged region of the world. The negotiations taking place in this city on intermediate-range nuclear forces have their *raison d'être* in Europe, even though their military scope and ramifications extend well beyond its frontiers; their role in disarmament and arms control negotiations will have a bearing on the whole disarmament agenda (including the strategic arms reduction talks also taking place here) and, politically, they will touch on many issues of world concern. It is not only the people of Europe who harbour hopes and fears for these talks. The talks remain a legitimate cause of international interest on the widest scale, not least for Australians who, as with, I venture to say, most, if not all the peoples represented in this room paid with their lives in many hundreds of thousands in two world wars touched off by the reluctance of the States of Europe to solve their domestic and regional problems without resort to violence.

(Mr. Sadleir, Australia)

Thus, all of us look for success in the negotiations, success of a kind that will generate mutual confidence since it is the element of confidence itself that is crucial. In international relations, confidence is a brittle and fragile matter. It needs careful development by positive as well as by negative measures. States, and disarmament negotiators, should do what is necessary in the way of being patient, practical and constructive. They need to avoid intemperate or pointless actions and words which militate against agreement. This applies around the world; it applies to Europe today and it applies to this negotiating body.

Other speakers have already identified various factors which, in recent years, have set back the cause of disarmament by shaking international confidence. They include actions which have challenged principles of the United Nations Charter, of human rights, of the rule of law and of international treaty commitments. I do not want in my statement today to suggest that these issues should be set aside or relegated to the past -- many of them, regrettably, are still with us -- but I do want to look in this statement (and in this year) to the future, and specifically to the question of how we in this body can contribute simultaneously both to confidence-building and to the cause of disarmament.

My first point is a general one. There is in the Committee, not surprisingly, much frustration at the absence of achievement and the impediments to success that exist. Frequently the frustration expresses itself in rhetorical references to a "lack of political will" or the deployment of "smoke-screens". At times such rhetoric seems to be a substitute for practical alternatives. At worst it is itself a smoke-screen, indicating reluctance to press ahead. I appeal to delegations to adopt different, more imaginative attitudes. There are more ways of tackling brick walls than colliding with them, more ways of breaching them than covering them with slogans. In this crucial year we should look for ways around difficulties, and certainly not create new difficulties or bigger ones than exist. Issues of topics for the agenda, mandates for working groups, chairmanships and rules of procedure can stop us in our tracks -- or they can be circumvented. Delegations can in fact achieve progress on issues of importance to them if they wish to; I quote only the example of chemical weapons, where we have transcended debate on precise terms of reference and on agreed modalities and done very good work on our fourth agenda item.

I do not say that organizational matters are not important. They can be. There is, however, no mutual exclusion between the need to settle such issues and the need to progress on substance. I propose that whenever possible there be parallel meetings to meet the two needs. I suggest, too, that maximum use be made of informal consultations. Unfortunately there is in this body a natural propensity towards formality so that even our "informal meetings" take on a staid and rigid character. I am not certain whether a little formality is always a bad thing. I am certain, however, that too much formality is not the way to make progress, especially in difficult political times.

(Mr. Sadleir, Australia)

My second point concerns verification. We have in the Committee at last begun to face up to the implications of this concept, which is central to disarmament. Verification is no smoke-screen, as some have alleged. On the contrary; it is the clearing and checking process by means of which everyone may see that a treaty commitment is being honoured. It is a sine qua non -- quite simply there can be no more disarmament treaties without it. The days of non-verifiable conventions (the 1925 Geneva Protocol, the Biological Weapons Convention and the Enmod Convention) are over.

I want to say two other things about verification. First, technology has revolutionized verification, making it less intrusive and, thus, more acceptable. This development made possible the bilateral agreements reached on strategic arms limitation. Secondly, technology is becoming more flexible and, equally important, less expensive. As we look at ways to verify a nuclear test ban or a chemical weapons convention, we should explore the possibilities that exist. We do not have to wait forever or to keep up with the state of the art. But we would be irresponsible if we ignored any means to achieve a relatively non-intrusive, politically satisfactory, inexpensive and verifiable agreement.

I turn now to our agenda. In doing so I address only the issues of special importance to my delegation. The first of these is the nuclear test-ban item. That is an item to which, in particular, my earlier remarks apply, because it is verification that is the focus of the Committee's work on a CTB in not one but two of its subsidiary bodies, namely, the NTB Working Group and the Group of Scientific Experts.

The conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty has been a long-standing objective of Australian policy. Over many years the Australian delegation in the First Committee of the General Assembly has taken the lead in preparing the annual CTB resolution -- the only resolution calling for a comprehensive ban on all nuclear test explosions. A CTB agreement which would prohibit all nuclear testing by all States in all environments could, in our view, contribute significantly to impeding both the vertical and the horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons. But we have also always recognized that verification is the crux of the matter. We have therefore taken an active part in the work of the Group of Scientific Experts and in the discussion of issues on verification and compliance in the newly established NTB Working Group.

While we recognize that the establishment of the NTB Working Group under a mandate limited to issues of verification and compliance was not perceived by anyone as more than a beginning, nevertheless the discussions in the Group during the last session revealed how complex that beginning really is. In our judgement, verification and compliance require more attention than the Working Group has so far been able to give them during its short summer session last year. Accordingly, we support a continuation of the current work on verification and compliance and stand ready to contribute.

(Mr. Sadleir, Australia)

As to the other Group dealing with CTB issues, i.e. the Group of Scientific Experts, Australia is impressed at the work done so far and looks forward to its continuation under a new Chairman at this session. May I halt at this point to pay tribute to the late Dr. Ericsson for his dedication, his imagination and his tireless efforts. I and my delegation wish his successor well in the demanding task before him.

As the seismic Group prepares to issue its third progress report, there have been murmurs that, perhaps, the mandate of the Group should be updated or even terminated altogether. We consider such rumination to be premature and would prefer to await the outcome of the session which is to begin this week. We do, however, make the general point that verification is so important to negotiation of a comprehensive test ban that this Committee needs to study every avenue. While the Committee should not pursue the state of the art as an end in itself, neither should it close off important opportunities.

The Australian delegation has been encouraged by the progress that the Group of Scientific Experts has made, but if it is to continue to help our work it needs to be encouraged rather than discouraged. This is particularly the case now that the question of international data centres is coming under study. I recall, in this context, that Australia has offered to give favourable consideration to any proposal to situate one of the international data centres on its territory. Australia and other States that have made offers of this kind will need to have access to continuing work by the Seismic Group, and in the Committee as a whole, if an international seismic monitoring network is ever to be realized.

The conclusion of a chemical weapons convention is, in Australia's view, one of the most important tasks before the Committee on Disarmament. Under successive dynamic chairmen the Ad Hoc Working Group has tackled the task well at the past three sessions. Key issues have been identified; broad agreement has been reached on the main problems; alternative formulations for elements of the future convention have been advanced. Novel approaches have been successfully tried. These approaches have included resort to highly informal sessions and periods of intense concentration with experts strengthening delegations. The Soviet Union last year submitted "basic provisions" for a chemical weapons convention. The United States is shortly to table its own detailed ideas. My delegation greatly welcomes this development. We welcome, too, the steady stream of new ideas and technical papers from many quarters, as well as the active involvement demonstrated by all delegations. In view of the promise generated by the work of the Working Group on Chemical Weapons, I urge that no hiatus and no hesitation be allowed to damage its prospects and that it be permitted without faltering speedily to continue its operations under a new Chairman.

(Mr. Sadleir, Australia)

The key problems before the Working Group relate to scope and to verification. On scope, my delegation believes that the case of including a ban on the use of chemical weapons is stronger than ever. Ambiguities remain as to the existing prohibition; it is also the case that the use of chemical weapons reportedly continues. Moreover, the concept at the heart of the future convention -- that there must be a ban on the use of chemicals as weapons -- is a concept of use; and the so-called "general purpose criterion" which all agree should define this concept is a use criterion. Having said that, my delegation will carefully examine any alternative ways to meet our central concern. It may prove possible, for example, by providing in the convention for strong verification mechanisms, which would be triggered by evidence that these repugnant weapons have been used, decisively to end the prospects of that ever happening.

Verification is the central issue. The international community must have some way of ensuring that treaty commitments are being honoured. National arrangements can certainly simplify the task but they can never be a substitute for verification measures of international scope. The Ad Hoc Working Group has recently gone into greater depth on what chemical stocks States should declare when they become parties to the convention, and on what procedures are necessary to destroy stocks: the conclusion which seems increasingly inescapable is that a strong system of international checking is essential to these and other aspects of the future treaty. Such a system, it is clear, must provide for a measure of on-site inspection under international auspices. How much, how intrusive and how often are questions awaiting answers and elaboration, but the principle is a fundamental one. On-site inspection, strengthened as necessary by remote sensors and other non-intrusive technological means, is the key to achieving a chemical weapons convention. If agreement is reached here, the outstanding issues will almost certainly fall into place.

There are many other important issues before this Committee. My delegation will contribute actively to consideration of the questions before the Ad Hoc Working Groups on Radiological Weapons, on negative security assurances and on a comprehensive programme of disarmament. Progress is possible in all these areas. My delegation shares the concern of others to avoid an expensive arms race in outer space which could impede the peaceful use of outer space and affect the significant role of space-based systems in fostering stability on earth. It is, moreover, important that the new frontier of man should not be abused. These should be questions tackled in an orderly way by the Committee on Disarmament at the earliest moment.

I wish now briefly to return to the issue of nuclear disarmament, the issue of highest priority in this body. It is a complex issue which cannot be addressed in isolation from other types of disarmament activity, notably conventional arms control: this has been shown already in the INF and START arms talks. Also

(Mr. Sadleir, Australia)

organically linked to the question of nuclear disarmament are issues of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, non-proliferation and questions of nuclear safety. Proposals to put at least some of these aspects on our agenda have already been made. My delegation is not at all convinced that the Committee on Disarmament is the appropriate forum, but some aspects of the wider issues do bear directly on our work. I shall briefly mention some of them.

The scaling down of nuclear arsenals is sure to be immensely difficult, but some success at least is in prospect. The holding in check of the spread of nuclear weapons capability is equally difficult, but here success can by no means be guaranteed. The capability of nuclear weapons is a grey area, full of uncertainties. Uncertainties currently exist in nuclear trade, some of which is conducted without full consideration of the implications for nuclear proliferation. Uncertainties also exist in definitions, such as whether a nuclear explosion is a nuclear weapons test: in practice all nuclear explosions without exception have implications for weaponry. There are two sides to the cases I mention. But the issue of confidence remains. Uncertainties and grey areas can easily damage confidence, and they can all too easily expand. In this year, this crucial year in which confidence must increase and the disarmament process must thereby be set at last in train, it is essential that a concerted effort be made to reduce the uncertainties.

Finally, I urge on this body a new spirit of accommodation. Many speakers have urged that we get down to substance, that we spend less time on procedural questions, that we not tolerate political obstacles. But it is time for action, not words. Last week the Committee failed to carry out an important task called for in the report of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons in document CD/334, namely, to produce a report on the latest consultations on technical issues. One delegation blocked consensus, and did not offer an explanation. There is a risk that those areas where this negotiating body not only can do good work, but actually has done good work, may be frustrated by actions such as these. In addition to the technical consultations it could be that the normal work of the Chemical Weapons Working Group runs this risk. The seismic work of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts, the direct relevance of which to the nuclear test-ban item has been repeatedly shown, has also been recently queried in the same way. Informal consultations have not, so far, it seems, produced consensus on chairmanships for our subsidiary bodies, despite the existence of understandings which normally constitute the oil that enables our somewhat cumbersome machinery to function effectively. Mr. Chairman, my delegation insists that we get down to work at the earliest possible moment.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the representative of Australia for his statement and the kind words he addressed to the Chair.

I now give the floor to the representative of China, Ambassador Li.

Mr. LI LUYE (China): Mr. Chairman, first of all, please allow me, in the name of the Chinese delegation, to congratulate you on your assumption of the chairmanship of the Committee on Disarmament for the first month of this year's session. I am confident that under your guidance our meeting will have a good beginning. You may count on the Chinese delegation for full co-operation. As this is the first time I am participating in the work of this Committee, I wish to extend my gratitude to you, Mr. Chairman, and to all the other delegates for the welcome accorded me. At the same time, I wish to take this opportunity to extend my sincere congratulations to Ambassador García Robles of Mexico on receiving the Nobel Peace Prize. I would also like to request the Swedish delegation to convey my congratulations to the other winner of the Nobel Peace Prize, Mrs. Alva Myrdal. Their dedication and unremitting efforts over the past years for the cause of peace and disarmament have won the respect of the peoples of all countries. I would like also to welcome the Under-Secretary-General, Mr. Martenson, who has come to participate in our meeting.

Four years have elapsed since the Committee on Disarmament commenced its work in 1979. This year marks the fifth year of its work. The people of the world have ardently hoped that the work of the Committee would gain achievements so as to promote the cause of disarmament and help maintain world peace and security. But, much to their disappointment, no substantive progress has been made on any of the important disarmament items in the Committee and a genuine reduction of armaments remains a distant objective. This is closely related to the tense and turbulent international situation, as other disarmament conferences and negotiations lacked progress in recent years. The current session of the Committee on Disarmament still faces a difficult and unfavourable international climate. It is our consistent view that the rivalry between the Superpowers constitutes the root cause of the tense and turbulent international situation and the absence of progress in disarmament. Such a fierce rivalry, coupled with the economic recession which is sweeping the developed countries and affects other areas, have resulted in the intensification of all the basic contradictions in the world. The situation has thus become even more uneasy and disturbing. This constitutes the salient feature of the present situation. The grave military confrontation in Europe, the continued armed occupation of Afghanistan and Kampuchea, both non-aligned countries in Asia, the turmoil and conflicts in the Middle East and the stormy situation in Africa are all related, directly or indirectly, to the Superpowers' rivalry for world domination.

Meanwhile, notwithstanding the fact that the Superpowers have come forward with a host of disarmament programmes and proposals, people can see that both sides have been escalating their respective armaments in a contest for military superiority under the pretext of maintaining "balance". One has planned to increase military appropriations by a large margin in order to strengthen its armaments, and the other has declared that it will never allow its rival to gain superiority, claiming that it will deal with its opponent with similar weapons. They are both engaged in the intensified development and production of new types of nuclear weapons. Their contention is by no means confined to the field of strategic weapons, but has extended to theatre and field nuclear weapons, and even into the space. In conventional armaments, their rivalry is also intensifying. With the development of military technology, both sides have added to their respective arsenals conventional weapons with greater precision and lethal capacity. What deserves our attention is that speedy and mobile conventional forces that are to be used for intervening in and controlling certain strategic areas are also being augmented. Their rivalry and military expansions pose a grave threat to world peace and tranquillity, with the numerous third world countries bearing the brunt of it.

(Mr. Li Luye, China)

The ever-escalating arms race between the Superpowers has consumed enormous sums of money and resources, and has become a heavy burden on their own people. It is sincerely hoped that those two countries, which already possess unparalleled arsenals and are now experiencing economic difficulties, will heed the voice of wisdom and retreat from the erroneous path by immediately halting the arms race so that guns are turned into butter. They should respond to the aspirations of the people of all countries by actually shouldering their special responsibilities for disarmament and by taking the lead in substantially reducing their weapons.

Many representatives have made reference to the Soviet-American negotiations on the reduction of strategic nuclear weapons and on the reduction of intermediate-range nuclear forces in Europe currently being held in Geneva, and expressed the hope that these two negotiations will be fruitful. It is also the hope of the Chinese delegation that in conducting their negotiations the Soviet Union and the United States will take a serious and responsible attitude towards world peace and the security of all countries and will not use them as a propaganda ploy to influence world public opinion. We also hope that their agreement, if it is to be achieved, will genuinely contribute to the reduction of the threat of nuclear war and to world peace and security, and will not be another agreement based on mutual escalation. It should also be pointed out that the outcome of the Soviet-American nuclear negotiations should in no way prejudice the interests of third States. If the missiles to be reduced are not destroyed but merely transferred to another area, then not only will the actual number of nuclear weapons remain the same, but they will create a new factor harmful to world peace and security.

I would now like to state the views of my delegation on some of the questions to be discussed by this Committee.

First, I will speak on the question of the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament, which is of universal concern. With the escalation of the nuclear arms race and the growing danger of nuclear war, there is an increasingly stronger international call for carrying out nuclear disarmament, and a development of popular movements opposing the nuclear arms race and demanding the prevention of a nuclear war. We fully understand and sympathize with the legitimate desire of the people of the world to safeguard peace and prevent the outbreak of nuclear war. We are ready to work with other delegations in a common search for effective approaches and measures to put an end to the nuclear arms race and to carry out disarmament.

Everyone knows that the present threat of nuclear war originates from the two Superpowers which have the largest nuclear offensive capabilities and which are stepping up their rivalry for nuclear supremacy. Thus the inevitable conclusion is that the correct approach and primary measure of nuclear disarmament should be a substantial reduction in the two largest nuclear arsenals. As both Superpowers already possess such huge quantities of sophisticated nuclear weapons, a reduction by even one half would in no way affect their security. Even they themselves do not deny this fact. Therefore, whether or not they do reduce their arsenals depends essentially on their sincerity. In addition, in view of the serious situation arising from the new round of the nuclear arms race between the Superpowers, many countries demand an immediate halt to their testing, development and production of nuclear weapons and means of delivery and a stop to the production of fissionable materials for military purposes. All this is entirely justified. Their nuclear weapons have already reached a dangerous level of over-kill and there is therefore

(Mr. Li Luye, China)

no reason whatsoever to continue the testing, development and production of any nuclear weapons. This is quite clear and unequivocal. We hope that they will heed popular wishes and put an end to their arms race.

China, as a nuclear-weapon State, is willing to commit itself to nuclear disarmament. China has been compelled to maintain a small number of nuclear weapons to defend itself against military threat. At the same time, we have consistently advocated the complete prohibition and total destruction of nuclear weapons. Our aim in developing a small number of nuclear weapons is to break the nuclear monopoly and blackmail with the ultimate goal of eliminating nuclear weapons. We have long since unilaterally undertaken not to be the first to use nuclear weapons and not to use them against non-nuclear-weapon States. At the second special session of the United Nations General Assembly on disarmament, held last year, the head of the Chinese delegation solemnly declared that if the two Superpowers took the lead in halting the testing, improvement and production of nuclear weapons and reducing by 50 per cent all types of their nuclear weapons and means of delivery, thereby lessening their nuclear threat to other countries and demonstrating their sincerity in carrying out nuclear disarmament, the Chinese Government would be prepared to assume obligations through negotiations with all other nuclear-weapon States to stop the testing, improvement and production of nuclear weapons and to reduce them according to a rational ratio until their total destruction.

China is a developing socialist country. We are now going all out to develop our economy and accelerate construction and therefore need a lasting peaceful international environment. The people of China fervently aspire to an early realization of the goal of the complete prohibition and total destruction of nuclear weapons. We believe that mankind, endowed with the wisdom to produce nuclear weapons, can surely eliminate them instead of being destroyed by them. We are ready to make joint efforts with all other peace-loving countries and peoples to realize this goal.

We hold that, notwithstanding the on-going bilateral nuclear negotiations between the USSR and the United States, the Committee on Disarmament, as the sole international body charged with multilateral disarmament negotiations, should play its role in dealing with the important and urgent question of promoting nuclear disarmament and preventing a nuclear war. Therefore, we support the establishment of an ad hoc working group on nuclear disarmament under the Committee on Disarmament.

The prohibition of chemical weapons is a question of great concern to all countries. Over the past few years, the Committee on Disarmament has done a lot of work in this regard and has made some progress in the elaboration of the elements of a future convention on the complete prohibition of chemical weapons. At the beginning of this year, delegates and experts of various countries continued their in-depth discussions and consultations on the basis of last year's results and made some progress on certain issues. This is a positive development. However, we have noted wide divergences on such important issues as "verification" and "the scope of the prohibition", where we still have a long way to go before agreement can be reached. In particular, on the questions of international verification and on-site inspection, to which many countries attach importance, a major power that possesses chemical weapons remains at a standstill. This cannot but make people feel concerned.

Like other delegations, we hope that at the current session the Committee will be able to speed up its pace in negotiating and elaborating a convention on the complete prohibition and total destruction of chemical weapons with a view to fulfilling at an early date the task of thoroughly eliminating such savage and detestable weapons from the earth. The Chinese delegation will continue to make active efforts in this regard.

(Mr. Li Luye, China)

The prevention of an arms race in outer space is also an important question. The dynamic development of space science and technology has opened up prospects for man's conquest of the universe. While being inspired by the achievements already made in this respect, people are deeply concerned about the fact that the major Powers with enormous space capabilities are extending their arms race into outer space. For years they have been spending huge sums of money on the development of space weaponry. Anti-satellite weapons have already been manufactured and research on laser weapons and particle-beam weapons has intensified. In recent years, the military activities of these Powers have also been intensified in outer space. Their ever-increasing rivalry has already made "space war" no longer a figment of science fiction, but a growing component part of their respective global strategies. Such a dangerous trend must be stopped promptly.

China consistently maintains that outer space should be used solely for peaceful purposes, and it attaches importance to international co-operation for the peaceful use of outer space. We hold that an international legal instrument on the prohibition of an arms race in outer space should be elaborated through negotiations. To this end, we are in favour of the establishment by the Committee on Disarmament of an appropriate ad hoc working group. It is true that it is a rather complicated problem to prevent the militarization of outer space. Nevertheless we are confident that a solution can always be found to any difficult and complicated problem, provided all States work in co-operation with sincerity.

The question of a comprehensive programme of disarmament is also one to which numerous non-aligned countries attach great importance. In order to advance the cause of disarmament they have made enormous efforts on the elaboration of a CPD. Although the failure of the General Assembly's second special session on disarmament to produce a commonly accepted programme has caused regret and dissatisfaction among many countries, quite a few non-aligned countries express the will to continue their work towards the completion of the programme. The Chinese delegation supports their tireless efforts. From our participation in the whole negotiating process of the programme, both in this Committee and at the second special session, we have seen that the non-aligned countries have made concessions on a number of issues whereas the countries with the largest arsenals have been trying by every possible means to obstruct an agreement.

Since the summer session of this Committee last year, various countries have had a period of time for reflection and might by now come up with new ideas on how to break the deadlock in the work on the programme. We hope that this Committee will acquire a new impetus in the elaboration of the programme, so as to accomplish in time the task of submitting a revised draft of the CPD to the United Nations General Assembly at its thirty-eighth session.

Faced with the tense and turbulent international situation of the 1980s, the task of the Committee on Disarmament is arduous and complex. To live up to the aspirations of the people throughout the world, the Committee should try to overcome various difficulties and obstacles in its advance along the road of genuine disarmament, so as to contribute to the maintenance of world peace.

The CHAIRMAN: We have exhausted the time available to us this morning. I intend to suspend this plenary meeting now and resume it this afternoon at 3.30 p.m., so that the Committee may listen to the remaining members listed to speak today.

The meeting was suspended at 12.55 p.m. and resumed at 3.50 p.m.

The CHAIRMAN: The 192nd plenary meeting of the Committee on Disarmament is resumed.

The Committee will now listen to those speakers who could not make their statements this morning.

I now give the floor to the representative of Cuba, Ambassador Sola Vila.

Mr. SOLA VILA (Cuba) (translated from Spanish): Comrade Chairman, it is a very great pleasure to see you, Ambassador Erdembileg, the representative of a brother country, the Mongolian People's Republic, with which Cuba is united by indestructible ties of fraternal co-operation, presiding over the work of this multilateral disarmament negotiating body during the opening phase of our 1983 session.

Allow me also doubly to congratulate your predecessor in that office, Ambassador García Robles of Mexico, both on the brilliant way in which he directed our work during the closing period of our session last year and on the award to him of the Nobel Peace Prize which he received— and, it must be said merited — for his intense activity on behalf of disarmament. I would ask the Swedish delegation to convey our congratulations, too, to Mrs. Alva Myrdal. I should also like to take this opportunity to welcome to our negotiating body the new colleagues who have joined us, the Ambassadors of India, the People's Republic of China, Japan, Venezuela, the United Kingdom and Kenya with whom we are sure we shall be able to continue the co-operation we enjoyed with their predecessors.

The Committee on Disarmament is meeting once again against the background of a difficult situation in international relations: in addition to the dangerous situation already created in recent times by the escalation of the arms race, the increase in military expenditures, the affirmation of dangerous doctrines based on the use of nuclear weapons and attempts to destroy the existing military balance and secure military superiority, there are the problems of the critical economic situation affecting the developing countries, which are suffering as a result of the deterioration in their terms of trade, the decline in the prices of the raw materials they export, the rise in interest rates and the failure to make any headway in the global negotiations on which they had set their hopes.

It has been said that the year 1983 will be crucial for disarmament negotiations; it will also be crucial for the survival of mankind.

The Committee has begun its work this year in the company of eminent world statesmen. Let us hope that this is a good omen for the future that our negotiations will have during the coming weeks.

The great majority of the members of this Committee and the international community as a whole believe that disarmament is a vital problem for all the peoples of the world and must be seen in its broadest context.

We have heard many arguments declaring the need for the reinforcement of confidence-building measures and we agree with those views; however, these measures must take into account the interests of all and not those of a few only.

The following, for example, might well be regarded as contributing to the building of confidence: declarations by all the nuclear-weapon States that they will not be the first to use nuclear weapons; a decision to freeze at their present levels nuclear weapons and their means of delivery, as well as their deployment; the starting of concrete negotiations within the Committee, in a working group with a mandate which allows it to negotiate, on the prohibition of nuclear weapons tests;

(Mr. Sola Vila, Cuba)

the dismantling of all foreign military bases imposed against the will of peoples and governments; the cessation of threatening and intimidating military manoeuvres like those which have just taken place in Central America and the Korean peninsula; the cessation of all kinds of co-operation with the racist regimes of Israel and South Africa; support for the convening of a conference on the Indian Ocean, which is manifestly in the interests of the countries of the region, or even, as regards the continent of Europe and neighbouring areas, support for the establishment of a nuclear-free zone in northern Europe and in the Balkans, and the creation of a zone of peace in the Mediterranean.

It is not enough to talk about confidence-building measures; it is necessary to show willingness to carry them out in a broad way and in accordance with the fundamental interests of all.

Our presence in the Committee on Disarmament is an opportunity for us to go beyond mere proposals; we can negotiate here on the various priority items that appear on our agenda, but unfortunately there is a small group of countries which is denying us this right, for a glance at our work shows that they do not want to prohibit nuclear-weapon tests, or to put an end to the nuclear arms race, or to prevent the outbreak of a nuclear war or to prevent an arms race in outer space, all of which are items of the utmost priority.

Much has been said, too, in recent days about the negotiations taking place in Geneva outside the framework of this Committee and I should like to make a few brief comments on them myself.

A few days ago this negotiating body heard a statement by the Vice-President of the United States of America who was in Europe, he said, on a peace mission, but his words and actions echoed the warlike policy of the Administration he represents and gave no indication of an improvement in the international situation.

During his tour he did no more than repeat the same position as always and there was no sign of any flexibility as regards ways of reducing the number of nuclear weapons in Europe and achieving a military balance at gradually lower levels, as indeed was recognized by the Western press itself.

The "letter to the Europeans" repeated the so-called "zero option" which, it is not too much to say, is neither an option nor zero — neither the one thing nor the other — and it was unable to sway European public opinion.

As one journalist put it: "as a public relations act it may impress Madison Avenue [the centre of advertising concerns in New York] but as regards public opinion in western Europe, it can have no effect here".

In sum, then, it was a mere publicity gambit. Once again the "zero option" and the determination to secure military superiority at no matter what cost, giving a new boost to the arms race.

Before the former Director of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Mr. Eugene Rostow, resigned from his office — at the request of President Reagan himself — he said: "There must be a way between those who want an agreement with the Soviets at any cost and those who don't want an agreement at any price".

(Mr. Sola Vila, Cuba)

To tell the truth, as some commentators have said, certain persons in the United States are "allergic to arms control", and this has a negative effect both on the bilateral negotiations with the Soviet Union and on the work of this Committee.

I must confess that my delegation hoped for some new proposal, something concrete to help forward the work of this Committee, but we were disappointed. Once more the "zero option" which, I repeat, is neither an option nor zero, and the deployment of the 572 intermediate-range nuclear missiles in Europe, which is a provocation to the Soviet Union and to the socialist community, and if it is carried out will greatly increase the danger of a nuclear war, which is why 1983 will be crucial for the survival of mankind, as President Fidel Castro pointed out when he said: "The United States is trying to persuade its allies to accept this policy, but they are putting up greater and greater resistance, a resistance which is being expressed in particular among the peoples of Europe, where the movement in favour of disarmament and peace is growing, with ever larger and more forceful demonstrations, directed not only against the arms race but also against the proposal to deploy 572 nuclear missiles in Europe, which is truly a very dangerous plan since it is designed purely and simply to destroy the strategic balance".

"We ought not to forget", President Fidel Castro continued, "that the presence in Cuba in 1962 of 42 medium-range nuclear missiles almost provoked a nuclear war.

"While this arms race compels the socialist countries to redouble their efforts in favour of co-existence and peace, it compels them at the same time to invest no one knows how great resources in order to counteract these imperialist attempts to establish military superiority. These are the inevitable consequences of such a policy.

"We must thus be aware that the dangers for the peace of the world and the dangers of war are greatly increasing. Not only the dangers of local Yankee intervention, but also real dangers of a nuclear war. We should bear this fact in mind".

What we are concerned with now is almost 14 times as many missiles as provoked the October crisis, and far more sophisticated ones.

I have dwelt at length on these matters because of their importance, and I should simply like to add, paraphrasing the words of a dear colleague who spoke at the opening meeting, that we too prefer those who show flexibility in order to achieve concrete measures of disarmament, and who make constructive and realistic proposals, rather than those who stick to their original ideas in order to prevent the achievement of any agreement.

As far as the work of this Committee is concerned, my delegation's position is well known. We think that much time is lost over procedural matters at the beginning of the session, in spite of the fact that the inclusion of most of the items on our agenda is recommended to us by the General Assembly.

We believe that once an item is on the agenda, a working group on it should be set up without delay because that is certainly the most effective method available to us for the conduct of our negotiations.

(Mr. Sola Vila, Cuba)

In this connection, my delegation fully supports the inclusion of an item on our agenda concerning — and the setting up of a working group to negotiate — practical measures to prevent the outbreak of a nuclear war. This proposal, as I have already made clear, is today more pertinent than ever.

Similarly, we support the inclusion on our agenda and the setting up of working groups on the proposed items concerning the prohibition of nuclear neutron weapons and the safe development of nuclear energy. The first of these two items already has a lengthy history in the Committee, including documents which could serve as the basis for the negotiations; the second is particularly important for small countries which do not have sufficient natural resources to meet their development needs and require guarantees for that purpose as regards the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

In conclusion, I should like to state that it is my delegation's view that the Working Group on a Nuclear Test Ban which was set up by the Committee has already exhausted the mandate given to it and that it is essential to confer upon it a new mandate which will permit it to negotiate towards the adoption of a treaty on the prohibition of nuclear weapon tests in all environments for all time, to which all nuclear-weapon States should be parties.

I should like, too, to repeat our view that working groups should be set up on the prevention of an arms race in outer space and on the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament. On both these issues there is a sufficient basis for the work of the Committee, since a number of working papers have been submitted.

Those are the comments my delegation felt it necessary to make at this stage of our work. We shall be speaking in greater detail about the various items on our agenda at future plenary meetings.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the representative of Cuba for his statement and the kind words he addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of Kenya, Mr. Don Nanjira.

Mr. DON NANJIRA (Kenya): Mr. Chairman, the grave concern about the prevention of the spread of nuclear weapons and indeed of the possible outbreak of a nuclear war did not spring full-blown from the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, but the historical significance of that session lay in the fact that it produced a Document, which no matter how weak and imperfect it may appear to some, or declaratory in nature to others, was nevertheless based upon the consensus of the international community, and all of us and our nations have an obligation — a moral obligation — to implement that, and whether through citations of the relevant provisions of the Final Document — its paragraphs 18, 47-50 and 56-58, for instance — or in statements of policy delivered herein and elsewhere, the fact has been stressed time and again that a nuclear war, whether unintentional or by design, would neither be limited in scope nor be winnable by any would-be combatant. It has been stressed time and again that the failure of the international community to stop the nuclear arms race and attain nuclear disarmament would lead to one inevitable end-result — the total and complete extinction of the human race and its civilization. It has been stressed time and again, both in this forum and in resolutions of the General Assembly, including its resolutions 36/81 B of 9 December 1981 and 37/78 I of 9 December 1982, that the removal of the threat of a world war, the reduction of the risks and the prevention of a nuclear war, are "the most acute and urgent task of the present day", and they are matters of the highest priority.

(Mr. Don Nanjira, Kenya)

Thus it is surprising and indeed shocking that representatives of some States members of this Committee still regard the crucial issue of the prevention of nuclear war as merely one of those items, you know, on which views can be exchanged, all right, and even lectures given and philosophical and rhetorical questions asked — as if this were a class of secondary school boys and girls — as to whether or not the Committee on Disarmament should even be discussing the highest priority question of the prevention of nuclear war. It is unbelievable that one still hears the task in this Committee on, and witnesses the treatment of, nuclear weapons as if they were toys to be merely debated or even played with only among the nuclear-weapon States, and this in complete disregard and oblivion of the relevant provisions of the Final Document, including its paragraphs 28 and 32! Yes, the human race is indeed confronted with a choice, and what issue can be more important and more fundamental than the one which decides the survival or annihilation of the human race? What multilateral body can be charged with a heavier and higher responsibility than the forum, this one here, which has the duty to tackle the nuclear arms race, prevent nuclear war and achieve nuclear disarmament? And yet this Committee on Disarmament has hitherto been prevented from agreeing on even the procedural matter of creating a mere working group to deal systematically with the item on the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament!

The Group of 21 is gravely concerned by such negative attitudes of a few members of this Committee. We would like to see concrete action taken by all States, and in particular by the nuclear-weapon States which have a special responsibility in this regard, to prevent nuclear war. This is the central message in the working paper of the Group of 21 which has been issued and circulated here as document CD/341, entitled "Working Paper of the Group of 21 on prevention of nuclear war", and which I have the honour and privilege to introduce formally in this Committee on behalf of the Group of 21.

In this position paper the Group of 21, inter alia, rejects the paradoxical and ironical theories of nuclear deterrence because these doctrines are the root cause of the nuclear arms race. The Group of 21 further calls for urgent and practical measures for, and negotiations on, the prevention of nuclear war, and negotiations should also be conducted on agenda item 2 within this single, multilateral negotiating body in the field of disarmament. We are also of the strongest conviction that the best way to treat the question of the prevention of nuclear war is to introduce it as a separate item on the Committee's agenda and consequently establish an ad hoc working group on the item at the beginning of this spring session of the Committee on Disarmament. The Group of 21 is convinced that our practical proposals warrant attention and we therefore hope that they will be accepted with the urgent endorsement of States represented here. We are ready to enter into serious consultations on the creation of such a working group as soon as possible, and I would therefore request you to bear our wish in mind when scheduling informal consultations within this Committee.

We cannot continue to live indefinitely in fear of a nuclear war, because sooner or later some circumstance, someone, somewhere, somehow, sometime and some day will, intentionally or otherwise, press the button, and once that is done, Mr. Chairman, that will be it! It will be too late. It will simply be too late. It will be too late. So, therefore, let us act now, and act quickly!! This is a matter of survival or extinction for all of us.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the representative of Kenya for his statement and the kind words he addressed to the Chair.

That concludes my list of speakers for today. Does any other delegation wish to speak?

As I announced this morning, I intend to convene, immediately after this plenary meeting, an informal meeting of the Committee to consider the agenda and programme of work and other organizational matters. The next plenary meeting of the Committee on Disarmament will be held on Thursday, 10 February, at 10.30 a.m.

The meeting stands adjourned.

The meeting rose at 4.15 p.m.

ERRATUM TO CD/PV.193

Amend the first paragraph on page 43 to read as follows:

"decision to discontinue all nuclear-weapon tests for all times and in all environments. Resolution 37/72 calls upon the three States which are the depositaries of the partial test-ban Treaty and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to halt without delay all nuclear explosions. This resolution also urges States to refrain from testing in the environments covered by the 1963 Treaty. My delegation has supported this resolution and will continue to press for its implementation in the course of our negotiations".

COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.193
10 February 1983
ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE ONE HUNDRED AND NINETY-THIRD PLENARY MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 10 February 1983, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman:

Mr. D. Erdembileg

(Mongolia)

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Algeria: Mr. B. OULD-ROUIS
Mr. A. TAFFAR

Argentina: Mr. J.C. CARSALES
Mr. R. GARCIA MORITAN
Mr. R. VILLAMBROSA

Australia: Mr. D. SADLEIR
Mr. R. STEELE
Mr. T. FINDLAY
Mr. P. MCGREGOR

Belgium: Mr. J.M. NOIRFALISSE
Mr. J.M. VAN GILS

Brazil: Mr. C.A. DE SOUZA E SILVA
Mr. S. DE QUEIROZ DUARTE

Bulgaria: Mr. K. TELLALOV
Mr. D. KOSTOV
Mr. P. POPCHEV
Mr. C. PRAMOV
Mr. L. KHRISTOSKOV

Burma: U MAUNG MAUNG GYI
U TIN KYAW HLAING
U THAN TUN

Canada: Mr. D.S. McPHAIL
Mr. G.R. SKINNER
Mr. P.W. BASHAM

China: Mr. TIAN JIN
Mr. LI CHANGHE
Mr. PAN ZHENQIANG
Mr. YU ZHONG ZHOU

Cuba: Mr. A.V. GONZALEZ PEREZ

Czechoslovakia: Mr. M. VEJVODA
Mr. A. CIMA
Mr. J. JIRUSEK
Mr. J. FRANEK

Egypt: Mr. I.A. HASSAN
Miss W. BASSIM
Mr. A.M. ABBAS

Ethiopia: Mr. T. TERREFE
Miss K. SINEGIORGIS
Mr. F. YOHANNES

France: Mr. F. DE LA GORCE
Mr. J. DE BEAUSSE
Miss L. GHAZERIAN
Mr. M. COUTHURES

German Democratic Republic: Mr. G. HERDER
Mr. H. THIELICKE
Mr. F. SAYATZ
Mr. M. NOTZEL
Mr. M. SCHNEIDER

Germany, Federal Republic of: Mr. H. WEGENER
Mr. F. ELBE
Mr. W.E. VON DEM HAGEN
Mr. W. ROHR
Mr. J. PFIRSCHKE

Hungary: Mr. I. KOMIVES
Mr. F. GAJDA
Mr. T. TOTH
Mr. E. BISZTRICSANY

India:

Mr. M. DUBEY

Mr. S. SARAN

Indonesia:

Mr. N.S. SUTRESNA

Mrs. P. RAMADHAM

Mr. I.H. WIRAATMADJA

Mr. HARYOMATARAM

Mr. F. QASIM

Iran:

Mr. J. ZAHIRNIA

Italy:

Mr. M. ALESSI

Mr. B. CABRAS

Mr. C.M. OLIVA

Mr. E. DI GIOVANNI

Japan:

Mr. R. IMAI

Mr. M. TAKAHASHI

Mr. K. TANAKA

Mr. M. YAMAMOTO

Mr. T. ARAI

Kenya:

Mr. D.D.C. DON NANJIRA

Mexico:

Mr. A. GARCÍA ROBLES

Mrs. Z. GONZALEZ Y REYNERO

Mongolia:

Mr. D. ERDEMBILEG

Mr. L. ERDENCHULUUN

Mr. J. CHOINKHOR

Mr. S.O. BOLD

Morocco:

Mr. A. SKALLI

Mr. M. CHRAIBI

Netherlands:

Dr. F. VAN DONGEN

Mr. R.J. AKKERMAN

Mr. H. WAGENMAKERS

Nigeria:

Mr. G.O. IJEWERE
Mr. A.N.C. NWAUZOMUDOH
Mr. J.O. OBOH
Mr. A.A. ADEDOJU
Miss I.E.C. UKEJE

Pakistan:

Mr. M. AHMAD
Mr. T. ALTAF

Peru:

Mr. P. CANNOCK
Mr. V. ROJAS

Poland:

Mr. J. ZAWALONKA
Mr. S. KONIK
Mr. J. CIALOWICZ
Mr. T. STROJWAS

Romania:

Mr. I. DATCU
Mr. T. MELESCANU
Mr. L. TOADER

Sri Lanka:

Mr. A.T. JAYAKODDY
Mr. H.M.G.S. PALIHAKKARA

Sweden:

Mrs. M.M. THEORIN
Mr. C. LIDGARD
Mr. C.M. HYLTIENIUS
Mr. L. NORBERG
Mr. G. EKHOLM
Mr. H. BERGLUND
Dr. J. LUNDIN
Mr. H. ISRAELSSON
Mr. O. DAHLMAN
Mrs. A. LAU-ERIKSSON
Mr. H. OLSSON

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

Mr. V.L. ISSRAELIAN
Mr. V.M. GANJA
Mr. L.A. NAUMOV
Mr. Y.V. KOSTENKO
Mr. A.P. KOUTEPOV
Mr. V.A. KROKHA
Mr. V.F. PRIAKHIN
Mr. G.N. VASHADZE
Mr. V.A. EVODOKOUSHIN

United Kingdom:

Mr. R.I.T. CROMARTIE
Mr. B.P. NOBLE
Mrs. J.I. LINK

United States of America:

Mr. L.G. FIELDS
Mr. H.L. CALHOUN
Mr. P.S. CORDEN
Ms. K. CRITTENBERGER
Mr. R.L. HORNE
Mr. J. MARTIN

Venezuela:

Mr. A. LÓPEZ OLIVER
Mr. O. GARCÍA GARCIA

Yugoslavia:

Mr. B. BRANKOVIC

Zaire:

Mr. B. ADEITO NZENGEYA
Mrs. ESAKI-EKANGA KABEYA

Under-Secretary-General for
Disarmament Affairs:

Mr. J. MARTENSON

Secretary of the Committee on
Disarmament and Personal
Representative of the
Secretary-General:

Mr. R. JAIPAL

Deputy Secretary of the
Committee on Disarmament:

Mr. V. BERASATEGUI

The CHAIRMAN: I declare open the 193rd plenary meeting of the Committee on Disarmament.

I have on my list of speakers for today the representatives of Italy, Japan, Peru, Argentina, Hungary, Bulgaria, the United States of America, Nigeria, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Ethiopia. Because of the long list of speakers, we may need to continue this plenary in the afternoon.

I now give the floor to the representative of Italy, Ambassador Alessi.

Mr. ALESSI (Italy) (translated from French): Mr. Chairman, it is a particular satisfaction to me to see you presiding over the Committee's work. Your activities here, and your mission in Rome as Ambassador of Mongolia, have enabled us to know and appreciate your experience and personal qualities. At the opening of this session you offered congratulations, on behalf of the entire Committee, to the Nobel Peace Prize winners for 1982, Mrs. Alva Myrdal and Ambassador Alfonso García Robles. I should like warmly to associate the Italian delegation with those congratulations and to pay a tribute to two eminent persons who embody the great humanist and pacifist traditions of their countries. The great distinction bestowed upon them should serve to encourage us all. To Ambassador García Robles, who is among us, I should like to offer particular congratulations and to assure him of my delegation's full co-operation in the task of bringing the negotiations on a comprehensive programme of disarmament to a successful conclusion.

Lastly, I wish to express our appreciation of the presence of Under-Secretary-General Dr. Jan Martenson, and to address a very warm welcome to our new colleagues, the distinguished representatives of Algeria, China, India, Japan, Kenya, Sweden, the United Kingdom and Venezuela.

The problems of disarmament and security are rightly in the forefront of international discussion; in some areas of the world they are the subject of growing attention on the part of broad sections of public opinion. The immense moral authority of the churches is directed at the same problems — problems which have never been purely technical and which are now no longer purely political. Where such deep currents of opinion and feeling cannot be freely expressed, their existence may be assumed.

The 1983 session of our Committee is set in this context, which is in part new. The participation of representatives with high governmental responsibilities in their countries is an encouraging sign.

My delegation considers that progress can and therefore must be made during the present session, in three directions in particular: nuclear questions, and especially the general and complete prohibition of nuclear tests, chemical weapons, and the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

In the short term, the elaboration of a convention prohibiting chemical weapons appears to be a realizable objective. In view of the importance that such a result would have in itself and for the multilateral disarmament negotiations as a whole, no effort should be spared to attain this objective. On 4 February 1983, we heard with satisfaction Mr. Bush, Vice-President of the United States, express the hope that the Committee's work in this field would be accelerated and negotiations undertaken for the conclusion of a treaty. A number of speakers have already stressed the interest with which the comprehensive document announced by Mr. Bush is awaited.

(Mr. Alessi, Italy)

The areas of convergence, as well as the points of divergence, appear to us to be identified sufficiently clearly. The time has come to make a decisive effort to seek the necessary compromises and to overcome the points of divergence. In our view, the Working Group should concentrate its efforts on this task, with a view to moving on as soon as possible to the drafting of the articles of the convention. This delicate phase in the negotiations calls for appropriate methods and rhythms of work; it will be for the new Chairman of the Ad hoc Working Group to find procedures which, through their flexibility and informal nature, will contribute to the success of our efforts.

Two resolutions relating to the prevention of an arms race in outer space were adopted by the General Assembly at its thirty-seventh session, by a very large majority. Their adoption was preceded by intense negotiations among various interested delegations; although it did not prove possible to overcome certain differences of views and present a single resolution, these resolutions form a useful frame of reference for the continuation of our discussions on agenda item 7.

These discussions should take place in the most suitable framework, such as an ad hoc working group with an appropriate mandate.

The very first obstacle which will have to be faced is the absence of consensus as to the precise subject of our negotiations. In order to overcome this obstacle, a collective effort is necessary to facilitate the discussion and definition, after thorough examination, of the various questions to be dealt with in the negotiation of effective and verifiable measures to prevent an arms race in outer space.

Resolution 37/99 D indicates that, among these questions, that of ensuring the immunity of satellites through the negotiation of an effective and verifiable prohibition of anti-satellite systems is the most urgent. It is of course not the only one; there are other questions, too, which we are likewise prepared to examine and discuss. It has been observed that spacecraft, by their nature, lend themselves particularly well to international co-operation. Our experience in this area confirms this observation and, in our view, increases the urgency of strengthening the legal protection afforded to the space objects of all nations: the progress made by the European Space Agency during the past ten years sets an example in this regard; my country shortly intends to launch, from a platform off the coast of Kenya, the fifth of the "SAN MARCO DL" scientific satellites, whose activities in the spheres of teledetection and climatology are of interest to all countries, particularly those in the tropical zone.

Positive achievements towards the prevention of an arms race in outer space will serve as a powerful stimulus for the peaceful use of space and international co-operation for the benefit of all countries.

As a party to the Non-proliferation Treaty since 1969, Italy is in favour of the conclusion of an agreement capable of winning universal adherence that prohibits nuclear-weapon tests in all environments for all time. A fundamental aspect of this agreement would have to be its verifiability. The matter of verification is not confined to the subject of a comprehensive test ban: it is a crucial aspect of any arms control agreement; this was also recognized by the Political Declaration adopted in Prague on 5 January 1983, which made an interesting reference to the measures of international co-operation that would be necessary.

The mandate of the Working Group set up last year reflects this fact. Despite its limited character, this mandate does not prevent the Working Group from taking up any question connected with a CTB. My delegation hopes to see the Ad Hoc Working Group resuming its work without delay on the basis of the existing mandate, with the possibility of reconsidering the question when the present mandate has been exhausted.

(Mr. Alessi, Italy)

We are thinking of the link that exists between the complete prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests and the bilateral negotiations now under way in Geneva on the reduction of intermediate-range and strategic nuclear forces. The former would assume its full importance within the framework of a genuine process of nuclear disarmament and with real prospects of a substantial reduction in nuclear arsenals.

However, its value as a measure serving to prevent the vertical and horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons, and the special political significance it has acquired over the years in the eyes of the international community commend it for immediate action. It continues in our eyes to be a priority objective towards the attainment of which our Committee undoubtedly has an essential contribution to make.

The Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts is doing invaluable work towards this end; we wish to pay a tribute to the late Dr. Ericsson, whose untimely end we sincerely regret, and to thank the Swedish delegation for providing an expert of the competence of Dr. Dahlman to replace him as head of the group. It is essential that the store of expertise and knowledge accumulated by the Group of Scientific Experts over years of activity should be maintained and strengthened. For this reason, we wish to express our concern at the surprising developments in connection with the appointment of the new Chairman of the Group, which are preventing the resumption of the work of the Group itself. The implications for the future that can be seen in these developments make them all the more disturbing.

The question of nuclear disarmament is at present the subject of negotiations to which my Government attaches the greatest importance.

In the area of the world in which Italy is situated, hundreds of years of experience have shown, sometimes tragically, that a balance of forces is the guarantee for the maintenance of peace. For this reason, the preservation or restoration of this balance is a fundamental objective of my country's security policy.

In the nuclear age, States can no longer see security as a competitive objective, an advantage to be acquired over their potential adversaries. Security should be considered as a shared asset. States should show reciprocal moderation in their quest for security, since without it they are in danger of initiating competitive activities which will end in a further rise in the level of forces. These principles are also recognized in the recent Prague Declaration.

However, the Soviet Union would not appear to have based its action on them, particularly when it proceeded to the development and deployment of a new generation of intermediate-range missiles. The deployment of SS-20 missiles poses a dual challenge, at once political and military. In the context of the strategic balance, it raises doubts as to the long-term intentions of the USSR and thus threatens the political stability of the regions at which the missiles are aimed. In the second place, it is a threat to military stability in the sense that the combined characteristics of the SS-20 make it an eminently offensive weapon.

The two-track approach adopted by NATO in December 1979 has already borne fruit: bilateral negotiations have been undertaken, precisely on the basis of the offer made in this approach.

(Mr. Alessi, Italy)

I wish to emphasize here the great importance we attach to the positive, equitable and speedy conclusion of these negotiations. The Italian Government has at present no higher priority in the field of disarmament than this.

We consider that the complete and reciprocal elimination of all intermediate-range land-based nuclear missiles would be by far the most appropriate and desirable solution. The reasons are obvious: this would be a global solution providing for absolute parity, verification of which would consequently be easier. Moreover, it would be the solution most in line with the aspirations of our peoples.

We remain prepared, however, to explore, together with our allies, any serious proposal put forward during the negotiations. The Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Colombo, stated before Parliament on 3 February 1983: "Such exploration could open the way to possible negotiated solutions of an interim character, provided that these represent definite steps towards the final objective of the zero option and are based on the fundamental principles of equality and parity. Our readiness for negotiation and compromise cannot be taken to mean that during the interim stages the Soviet Union can be left with the monopoly of intermediate-range nuclear missiles".

The argument that the countries of western Europe should continue to live defenceless under the burden of a threat which the Soviet Union rightly shows it would fear just as much, should such a threat be directed against itself, is unacceptable. Our determination to restore a balance of forces, by negotiation if possible but by deployment if necessary, can be in no doubt. This position enjoys very wide support among Italian political forces and public opinion.

The quest for greater security through arms control and disarmament should concentrate on the central problem, which remains that of reducing armaments and armed forces to progressively lower levels, in conditions of undiminished security. There exist today real possibilities for proceeding in this direction and for beginning to reverse the arms race: both in Geneva and in Vienna negotiations are taking place with the aim of placing major qualitative and quantitative restrictions on certain categories of weapons and armed forces. I should like to emphasize here the very great importance we attach to the endeavour to bring about substantial reductions in forces rather than their stabilization at high levels.

A substantial and balanced reduction in military arsenals would also be a major contribution to another undertaking of the highest priority: the prevention of war, and in particular of nuclear war. Specific bilateral or multilateral measures might also be envisaged for this purpose. Some of these, dealing with what is known as crisis management, have been successfully negotiated in the past. Others, dealing with the growth of mutual confidence, were recently proposed by President Reagan to the Soviet leaders. The sphere of confidence-building measures appears to us to be of particular importance for the prevention of war. The part which our Committee could play in identifying concrete and effective measures of a multilateral character in this sphere is one of the questions we should consider with the utmost attention.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the representative of Italy for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the Chairman. I now give the floor to the representative of Japan, Ambassador Imai.

Mr. IMAI (Japan): Mr. Chairman, as this is the first occasion for me to speak before this Committee, I would like, on behalf of my delegation, to express our pleasure and satisfaction in seeing you, Sir, in the chair of this Committee during the first month of this year's session.

May I also join in with the others in extending our sincere congratulations to Ambassador García Robles for his leadership as Chairman during the closing month of last year's session, and, of course, for the Nobel Peace Prize, which was not only a personal reward for the great and deserving work of many years, but indeed an encouragement and recognition to those others engaged in the field of disarmament.

I should also like to take this opportunity to thank you, Mr. Chairman, and other delegates for their kind words of welcome expressed in the earlier interventions. It is indeed my personal pleasure and honour to be able to join this very distinguished forum of multilateral disarmament negotiations.

The second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament held last year is a matter still very much vivid in our memory. At this special session and at the thirty-seventh session of the General Assembly which followed, as well as on other bilateral and multilateral occasions, a variety of concepts and proposals on ways of furthering the disarmament cause have been brought to our attention. Many of them reflected very noble ideals, serious proposals and interesting formulations.

I should say, however, that the noblest of ideals and the most appealing formulations do not in themselves constitute effective disarmament. I would even venture to say that they bear no particular relevance to the cause of disarmament unless such ideals or ideas are actually translated into concrete and workable measures through an effective process of negotiations among the parties directly concerned.

There is no need for me to point out to this distinguished and well-experienced body that the peace and security of the world today are, and will continue to be, maintained through the proper balancing of power, including among others, nuclear and conventional forces. It is precisely for this reason that disarmament is a matter of vital importance, and of inescapable relevance to the national security policies of all the countries of the world. Disarmament negotiations, therefore, require constant efforts to lower the level at which such forces achieve their relevant equilibrium. In addition to noble idealism and good ideas, a very careful assessment based on realism will be required in this difficult and often tedious process.

In this regard, I wish to reaffirm that this Committee is the only multilateral organ of global implications which can command a considerable degree of expertise, wisdom and technical capabilities in order to promote substantive negotiations toward concrete and verifiable disarmament measures.

Today, as it has never been in the recent past, the need for disarmament is very acutely recognized and insisted upon. In particular, nuclear disarmament is obviously one of the greatest and the most urgent tasks that the world community is faced with. In this context, it is well known that Japan has a strong interest and concern in the major reduction of these weapons with tremendous power of destruction. I would like to point out the heavy and undoubtedly very serious responsibilities of the nuclear-weapon States. It is from such a point of view that I wish to urge two of the nuclear-weapon States, namely, the United States of America and the

(Mr. Imai, Japan)

USSR, to undertake with all the resources and skill they can command to achieve substantive progress in their strategic arms reduction talks. Such is quite clearly in accordance with the wishes of the entire world community.

Similarly, as regards the intermediate-range nuclear forces negotiations, Japan would like to urge and appeal to the two aforementioned countries to make the maximum possible efforts to make progress and to come to an early agreement commensurate with the wishes of the people not only of the countries of Europe but of the other parts of the world as well. My country has been calling for the complete elimination of all the intermediate-range nuclear missiles, especially mobile and highly accurate ones such as the SS-20s of the Soviet Union. Furthermore, should it so happen that, as a result of the intermediate-range nuclear forces talks now resumed in Geneva, missiles now pointing at European targets were to be transferred to the Far East, in addition to the SS-20s already deployed in the region, I am afraid that this will cause very serious concern by further raising the level of the threat to the peace and security of Asia. It is indeed deplorable that the Soviet leadership has reportedly made a remark recently which indicated that such concern of ours is not totally unfounded.

We strongly urge the United States and the USSR to pursue these negotiations from a global point of view and in a global context so that solutions will be worked out which will not impair the security, not merely of Europe but also of the entire world, including the security of the Far East in which my country, Japan, is located. If sufficient considerations are extended to these aspects, and if substantive progress can be achieved in the bilateral nuclear negotiations, they will in turn stimulate and precipitate the progress of other disarmament deliberations and negotiations. I would like to emphasize that such is indeed the expectation and hope of Japan.

Let me now take up some of the important issues on the current agenda of this Committee and express my country's views regarding these matters.

The tripartite CTB negotiations among the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union have been virtually suspended, and this leaves this Committee on Disarmament as the only meaningful forum where substantive debates can be pursued on a comprehensive ban on nuclear testing, which my country regards as the highest priority item for the achievement of nuclear disarmament. In this respect, we believe that we should make the most effective use of the Working Group which was established last year after overcoming considerable difficulties.

Nevertheless, it is regrettable to recall that last year did not find all the nuclear-weapon States participating in this Working Group. No agreement was reached on the programme of work and thus the Working Group failed to implement its mandate. Few people would disagree in stating that the most difficult point in the comprehensive nuclear test ban is the matter of verification. Unless adequate and sufficient considerations are given to the problems of verification and compliance, as called for in the Working Group's mandate, the road to a truly meaningful and effective draft treaty will indeed be very difficult to find.

My predecessor took various opportunities to emphasize that it was imperative to promote nuclear disarmament, starting with a comprehensive test ban, not only for its own sake but also in order to strengthen the world-wide nuclear non-proliferation regime with the non-proliferation Treaty at its core. As one who has been very much involved in both national and international debates over the non-proliferation Treaty, I would like to take this opportunity to stress that I, too, have the same view about this very point. It is from this stand that I strongly urge, on behalf of my Government, that this Committee makes tireless and energetic strides toward the goal of a comprehensive ban on nuclear testing.

(Mr. Imai, Japan)

In particular, at this session, the Working Group should refrain from further waste of time on procedural matters. It should draw up, as early as possible, an appropriate programme of work and immediately embark upon its deliberations so that the existing mandate can be completely implemented. I would like to take this opportunity to express once again the position of our country that it is against any nuclear test by any State. We have been watching with interest the fact that one of the nuclear-weapon States does not seem to have conducted any nuclear tests for the last two years.

Scientific experts from my country have been actively taking part in the meetings of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts on the detection of seismic events. I hope that the Group will immediately resume its work and submit its third report at the earliest possible date. It seems to me that further refinement of seismic work is an essential factor in the context of any agreement. I should like to take this opportunity to express the special appreciation of my delegation for the contribution of the late Dr. Ericsson who successfully guided the Group until last year. And here I would like to add that I am looking, with a certain sense of dismay, at the possibility that the momentum he helped so much to build up might be disturbed or even delayed at this crucial juncture.

Considerable progress has been observed in the field of a ban on chemical weapons, resulting from the intensive work of last year. It will, we hope, become the basis on which further progress will be achieved this year, and in this context the recent statement by Mr. George Bush, Vice-President of the United States, who used the occasion of his presence in this Committee personally to announce that the United States' views on the content of a treaty banning chemical weapons would be submitted soon, is a welcome indication of the positive attitude which his country is assuming on this subject.

In the Working Group on Chemical Weapons this year, the key elements of a chemical weapons convention, that is, "Definitions", "Declarations", and "Verification", need to be considered in depth and in close connection with each other. With regard to "Verification", we expect that progress will be achieved toward the establishment of effective international verification measures, including on-site inspections, with the co-operation of the Group of Scientific Experts on their technical aspects. I believe that progress in the field of verification will facilitate the early conclusion of a chemical weapons convention.

It is still fresh in everyone's memory that the United Nations General Assembly last year adopted by consensus an important resolution concerning a ban on radiological weapons, thus expressing its renewed expectation for its early realization. This resolution requested the Committee on Disarmament to continue negotiations on this question in order that a draft treaty prohibiting radiological weapons might be submitted to the General Assembly at its thirty-eighth session. It also requested the Committee on Disarmament to continue its search for a solution to the question of the prohibition of attacks on nuclear facilities. We have negotiated on a ban on radiological weapons already for three years. As a result, draft texts of a treaty have been submitted by the Working Group's chairmen, Ambassador Kömives of Hungary and Ambassador Wegener of the Federal Republic of Germany. On the question of the prohibition of attacks on nuclear facilities, we have on the table working papers submitted by the Federal Republic of Germany and Japan. We are given to understand that other initiatives, including one from Sweden, are to be expected.

(Mr. Imai, Japan)

We continue to believe that the conclusion of an agreement prohibiting attacks on nuclear facilities for peaceful purposes, within the framework of a radiological weapons treaty, is of great significance in order to break the seeming deadlock in the elaboration of the radiological weapons treaty itself. In this sense, we strongly expect that the outline of a draft optional protocol, which my delegation proposed last September, will serve as a useful catalyst for making progress on this issue. My delegation, for its part, will spare no efforts towards the achievement of this objective.

My country recognizes that recent remarkable progress in science and technology for the development of outer space, while opening up very promising possibilities for the future of mankind, gives rise, at the same time, to concerns over the possible extension of an arms race into outer space in the near future. Based on such recognition, we have pointed out that the commencement last year in the Committee on Disarmament of consideration of the item, "Prevention of an arms race in outer space", was quite timely and opportune. Although this is a complex issue and can entail many complications, we hope that the Committee on Disarmament will continue to give serious consideration to this matter.

Finally, there is today a growing tide of ardent and serious voices asking for the attainment of real disarmament. These voices have shown a great interest in the development of the negotiations on the reduction of strategic weapons and on intermediate-range nuclear forces now being conducted between the United States and the Soviet Union here in Geneva. At the same time, I certainly believe that these voices are calling upon the activities of this Committee with a great deal of expectations. To meet these expectations is a very serious responsibility for all of us in this Committee.

I would like to conclude my statement by expressing our conviction that, if we are to achieve any progress in the field of disarmament, there will be no other way than to keep in mind the high ideal but at the same time to exert steady efforts toward the realization of concrete disarmament measures one after another in a constructive and steadfast manner. My Government reaffirms its resolve to continue to contribute to the work of this Committee in this direction.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the representative of Japan for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the Chairman. I now give the floor to the representative of Peru, Ambassador Cannock.

Mr. CANNOCK (Peru) (translated from Spanish): Mr. Chairman, I believe that this part of the 1983 session of the Committee on Disarmament is opening in circumstances that are particularly favourable for the development of our work.

We are all aware of — and I am sure that we all correctly appreciate — the growing movement of public opinion which, transcending all ideological barriers and geographical boundaries, is demanding more and more insistently and forcefully that our governments should guarantee to their peoples the elementary right to live in peace and security.

(Mr. Cannock, Peru)

This united demand reminds me of the Latin saying: Vox populi, vox Dei ("the voice of the people is the voice of God"). This voice, sonorous and wise, can be heard in both East and West. It is a voice that cannot be ignored because it is the mandate of reason, and we who are the mere mandataries of this common, collective and universal feeling have no choice but to respect it and to carry out the responsibility laid upon us.

Mr. Chairman, in the few days which have passed since the opening of this part of our session, my delegation has been able to appreciate your exceptional qualities in the conduct of our debates. While expressing to you our greetings and gratitude, we are aware that this responsibility devolved upon you from an illustrious predecessor, from that great Latin American, Ambassador García Robles, the worthy representative of Mexico, whom I do not wish to burden with more compliments out of respect for his modesty.

The Nobel Peace Prize, awarded to Ambassador García Robles and Mrs. Alva Myrdal, is a source of legitimate pride for the peoples of Mexico and Sweden, and Peru wishes to associate itself with the congratulations which have been offered them.

My delegation likewise wishes to offer a warm welcome to the representatives of India, Japan, Kenya, the People's Republic of China, the United Kingdom and Venezuela, who will undoubtedly make a valuable contribution to the progress of our work. It is a pleasure, too, to note the presence in the Committee of Mr. Martenson, an Under-Secretary-General of the United Nations.

After all that has been said by the various delegations represented in the Committee, it is difficult to contribute something new to the debate. The Peruvian delegation will therefore confine itself to making some comments on certain aspects that are of particular concern to us. I should like first of all to say that although disarmament is the common cause of all members of the international community, the discussions in this negotiating body have not yet managed to free themselves from the burdensome atmosphere of mistrust which prevails between the Superpowers and their respective allies. This very negative atmosphere is, I believe, the biggest obstacle that is hindering us from making any advance in this Committee.

Indeed, the situation is reaching truly laughable extremes. We have seen in recent days an unobjectionable proposal put forward by the Group of 21 — that of including in our agenda an item on the prevention of nuclear war — being questioned by the group of Western countries, perhaps solely because the proposal has also been sponsored by the socialist group.

It is likewise a cause for alarm that decisions on procedural matters are being delayed and our work thereby held up. We have already spent many fruitless hours discussing something so elementary as the chairmanship of a subsidiary body — the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events — despite the fact that there is general agreement on the choice of an eminent Swedish scientist.

(Mr. Cannock, Peru)

We are thus faced with the difficult and frustrating task of conducting our work in this atmosphere of mutual suspicion and distrust which characterizes the relations between the Superpowers and is inevitably reflected in this Committee. In these circumstances, the application of the rule of consensus — which in practice means unanimity of views even on subsidiary matters — places an even greater obstacle in our path, and here I feel bound to say that the Group of 21 bears no responsibility for this situation. We have not generated mistrust. Nor did we sponsor the rule of consensus.

At the same time, the failure of the Committee to achieve concrete results in its work should not lead us to draw negative conclusions about its role. We know that its existence is today more important than ever. The failure to produce results is due almost entirely to the negative attitude of certain delegations.

Furthermore, these circumstances unfortunately exist at the very time when all mankind, regardless of country and race, is threatened with the possibility of a nuclear disaster, which could undoubtedly even be brought about by a chance error in an electronic brain.

The argument for the building up of armaments is that it is to protect security, but when we know that the existing stockpiles of nuclear weapons are more than enough to destroy the earth many times over, wiping every trace of life from its surface, we have to ask ourselves: security of whom or for whom? Doctrines have, of course, been invented to justify, explain and direct this insane process, but they will never succeed in convincing world public opinion which, prompted by simple common sense, has begun to deny the content of these doctrines and to clamour massively and vociferously for disarmament. The doctrines of deterrence through a balance of terror and those advocating limited nuclear wars are losing ground to the only valid possibility at this time, which is that of disarmament, and the leaders of the world ought therefore to act in accordance with this universal demand, lest they be condemned by their own peoples — if there is still the possibility for such a thing to happen.

For a developing country like Peru which desires to live in peace, to raise the standard of living of its citizens and to guarantee their survival and that of the coming generations, there is no other possibility but to fight for peace and consequently for a general and complete disarmament that will remove tensions and release resources that should be used to support the development efforts of the vast majority of the peoples of the world, and establish the long-awaited social justice. It is frightening to see how the amounts squandered on arms are increasing year by year: the current figures — \$650 million per annum, 25 million men under arms, 10 million in paramilitary forces, 500,000 scientists in the military sector — are enough to indicate the colossal size of this folly. For all this, and given the lack of positive results in the multilateral and bilateral negotiation processes on disarmament matters, we cannot exonerate either of the two principal nuclear powers, for while the arms race persists the fundamental responsibility will continue to rest with the two main nuclear powers and their position as such so dictates. True, degrees of differentiation could be established, but until agreed levels are reached

(Mr. Cannock, Peru)

these would have only an academic value and could even at times distort the truth or create false expectations. In the eyes of the Peruvian delegation, there is only one alternative: either the major powers reach significant agreements that will guarantee the actual survival of the systems they claim they are defending, or they leave the way open to the imminent possibility of a nuclear holocaust, taking all of mankind with them. Two questions arise in this connection. First, do systems depend on man or does man depend on systems? Secondly, would not coexistence be preferable to mutual destruction? The answer is obvious.

We have important matters before us. It would be of immense value if we could, this year, overcome the difficulties that prevented the adoption of a comprehensive programme of disarmament at the last session of the General Assembly.

With regard to item 4 of our agenda, chemical weapons, I should like to express our gratitude to the Ad Hoc Working Group on this subject for the work it did under the able guidance of Ambassador Sujka, which made significant progress possible in this sphere. This goes to prove that when the political will exists to act, or at least not to obstruct the efforts of the Committee, it is perfectly possible to make headway. Naturally, this recognition is without prejudice to the order of priorities established by the General Assembly at its first special session devoted to disarmament, which was recently confirmed.

We would not wish to let this opportunity pass without making a very brief reference to the process of the bilateral negotiations that are being conducted by the two main nuclear powers. We appreciate the concrete proposals that have been made and we hope that the two powers will abandon their positions of intransigence and move on to an authentic process of negotiation which will free the world from the present threat of nuclear confrontation. From this forum, we appeal to them to relinquish propaganda ploys and devote themselves to the fulfilment of the moral imperative to achieve peace.

The armaments race has serious implications. In the first place it is an obstacle to the efforts being made by the majority of the peoples of the world to escape from the situation of underdevelopment that bedevils them and which has now become more obdurate owing to the present world economic crisis. In this sense, our right to development is being flagrantly denied. In the second place, it is a factor creating insecurity that is multiplied by the present politico-economic circumstances affecting the international community. It is enough to note the social costs of the maintenance of the rate of increase in arms expenditures by the developed countries to understand the dimensions of the problems these create in our countries, which find themselves forced to turn their attention away from many truly urgent problems as they become involved in the international distrust and subject to the psychological pressure imposed by the merchants of death.

Lastly, my delegation believes that whatever effort we may make in favour of disarmament, however small it may be, will never be in vain, because doing nothing will multiply the effects in the opposite direction. I should like to end by saying that there cannot be peace without security, or security without development.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the representative of Peru for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the Chairman. I now give the floor to the representative of Argentina, Ambassador Carasales.

Mr. CARSALES (Argentina) (translated from Spanish): Mr. Chairman, allow me first to extend to you the warmest congratulations of the Argentine delegation on your assumption of the chairmanship of this Committee. I am sure that, in your activities as leader of this important body, you will show the same qualities of prudence and deliberation that you have always displayed in representing the People's Republic of Mongolia. You may be assured that, in the performance of your duties, you will receive the most wholehearted co-operation of the Argentine delegation.

With regard to your distinguished predecessor, the representative of Mexico, Ambassador García Robles, what can I say that has not already been said many times? His long and vigorous campaign for the cause of disarmament received its just recognition with the award of the Nobel Peace Prize to Ambassador García Robles, jointly with Mrs. Alva Myrdal, to whom I extend sincere congratulations. This esteemed award not only enhances Ambassador García Robles's personal prestige and that of his country, Mexico, but is also reflected in two spheres to which he has made such a great contribution -- Latin America and this Committee on Disarmament. I consider it a privilege to have the opportunity to work with such an illustrious colleague and friend.

Some members of this Committee have left to take up other positions, and new representatives are now sitting in this room. To all of them I bid the most cordial welcome and I am sure that the relations between our respective delegations, and at the personal level, will be just as warm as with their predecessors.

Lastly, I should like to acknowledge the presence among us of the Under-Secretary-General of the new Department for Disarmament Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat. Mr. Jan Martenson is an old acquaintance of ours and we are always pleased to see him again, but on this occasion his visit in his present capacity demonstrates the increasing importance attached within the structure of the United Nations Secretariat to disarmament matters, in accordance with the wishes of the General Assembly.

The Committee on Disarmament is beginning its session this year at a very special time. Although these words may have been repeated on many occasions, I believe that it is clear to us that international attention is today focused on the matters that concern us with particular intensity and interest. I believe it is no accident that the Nobel Peace Prize should have been awarded recently to two champions of the cause of disarmament.

1982 saw the blossoming of a popular movement of unheard-of proportions. Hundreds of thousands of persons all over the world took to the streets to demonstrate their concern over the nuclear arms race, the possibility of a nuclear war and their own survival.

The failure of the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament caused no decline in this general interest. On the contrary, it is continuing and growing as time passes and no concrete measures of disarmament are adopted. A glance at the daily newspapers reveals that their headlines are dominated by the actions or inactions in this sphere of the various governments, whose spokesmen are for ever explaining and publicizing their positions on this question.

(Mr. Carasales, Argentina)

It is no mere rhetoric to say that the eyes of the world are turned towards Geneva, this city with its long tradition of peace which has at the same time been, as it still is, the scene of the most positive international efforts in the sphere of disarmament.

Both bilateral and multilateral negotiations are now taking place in Geneva. The former involve the two major nuclear powers, while the setting for the latter is this Committee on Disarmament. Although they are independent and completely separate, they are undoubtedly connected with each other. Both provide an appropriate forum to demonstrate the sincerity and political will which constitute the essential basis for any success in this area.

One positive fact is that the countries with the most powerful nuclear arsenals are sitting at a negotiating table. Dialogue is in itself a good thing. Unfortunately, little progress seems to have been made. Each party publicly proclaims its own proposals and rejects those of the other. Announcements made recently, including some made in this forum, appear to indicate a greater flexibility, which is certainly welcome. The freezing of positions leads to nothing but deadlock and paralysis. And in matters of disarmament it is well known that failure to make progress in fact means retrogression, for the qualitative and quantitative developments in arsenals make the possibility of agreement increasingly remote, while at the same time augmenting the risk of a catastrophic conflict.

The least that those not participating in these bilateral negotiations can do is to express their profound concern and the firm hope that they will lead to concrete results in the not-too-distant future. Even the partial success of those negotiations is bound to have favourable repercussions on the progress of the work of this Committee. It must, however, be recognized that the bilateral negotiations, because of the limited nature of their agenda and, basically, because of the small number of parties involved, may supplement but can never replace or nullify the genuinely multilateral search for concrete disarmament measures. After all, such measures directly affect all members of the international community, who can never agree to their security and their future being decided in forums from which they are completely excluded.

In any event, as was stated repeatedly at the recent session of the General Assembly and as is requested in resolution 37/78, it is advisable for the States involved in these bilateral negotiations to provide, jointly or separately, reliable periodic reports, to the extent possible, on what is happening in the negotiations, so that the competent international forums -- in this case the Committee on Disarmament -- may be kept informed of them in an appropriate manner and not through press statements and declarations, which are conceived with other purposes in mind.

Despite the interest now being aroused by the bilateral negotiations, we cannot and must not overlook the fact that the work of the Committee on Disarmament retains the importance and urgency assigned to it in the Final Document. It may even be said that these have increased. The topics included in the Committee's agenda are among the most important that there are. Even if the Geneva bilateral negotiations were to be completely successful -- and let us hope that they will be -- the dangers of nuclear war will persist. There will be a limitation or reduction in the number of missiles, and it may even be possible to eliminate some types completely in a given region of the world, but that will represent only a partial and limited step towards the solution of the problem of nuclear disarmament, which will continue to loom as large as ever.

(Mr. Carasales, Argentina)

It would be repetitive to state that the task confronting the Committee on Disarmament is vast and many-faceted. Regrettably, however ambitious its agenda may be, the number of its concrete achievements thus far is nil and the prospect that things will change in the near future is slight.

No progress has been made on what is perhaps the most important item, "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament". What appeared to be -- and indeed is -- a priority item, "Nuclear test ban", has not yet led to the opening of negotiations on this subject, and the efforts of a Working Group with a mandate so limited that there is room for doubt as to its actual usefulness, are no substitute for such negotiations.

The comprehensive programme of disarmament, the object of the concern of the Nobel Peace Prize winner and of the efforts of this Committee for a number of years, could not be presented to the second special session of the General Assembly in final form, and it was referred back to us so that the Committee might renew its efforts to arrive at a document with real significance. I can see no substantial change in the positions and attitudes which led to the failure of earlier efforts, and in fact it is difficult to be optimistic at present. Nothing would please me more, however, than for events to prove me wrong.

The Working Group on Radiological Weapons has seen something which in the past seemed very close, namely, the conclusion of an agreement on this question, elude its grasp. It is to be hoped that this year this possibility, a modest but real one, will finally take shape.

Work on the question of so-called negative security assurances has come to a veritable standstill. There can be no way out of the present situation, at least in my delegation's view, without substantial changes in the positions of certain nuclear powers. Moreover, the undenied use of nuclear weapons in the South Atlantic conflict necessitates serious and profound reflection on this question and on the real validity and significance of nuclear-weapon-free zones.

Two other fundamental items await due consideration by the Committee on Disarmament. I refer to the cessation of the arms race in outer space and the prevention of nuclear war. It would be difficult to find two questions on which there exists wider agreement as to their overriding importance and the need to make the maximum possible efforts to avoid such eventualities.

Outer space should be used solely for peaceful activities, but in fact it is already being used for military purposes, and the plans and projects under way augur a growing and expanded militarization.

It would be superfluous to dwell on anything so obvious as the need for the prevention of nuclear war. However, I should like to say that we cannot accept the idea that this question should be dealt with in the broader context of the prevention of war in general. While it is self-evident that any war should be prevented and avoided, it is also true that war has been with man since his earliest days and that all efforts to eliminate it from the conduct of nations have proved fruitless. Such efforts should constantly continue, but the beginning of the atomic age in 1945 brought with it the possibility of a conflict in which nuclear weapons might be used with such horrifying properties as to endanger the very survival of the human race. This fully justifies the initiation in appropriate forums -- and the Committee on Disarmament is one -- of a search for practical measures to reduce and if possible eliminate the risks of the outbreak of a nuclear war.

(Mr. Carasales, Argentina)

However, it would appear that in these two areas, too -- outer space and the prevention of nuclear war -- the Committee will be unable to play the full role that it has been assigned and which is expected of it, despite the appeals made in this respect by the United Nations General Assembly. Once again, the Committee will at best be limited to an exchange of views, either formal or informal. The Committee is not a deliberative body, and the international community will not be satisfied with words and more words, which often leave no trace.

It is only in the area of chemical weapons that the Committee is acting with the appropriate vigour and determination. Important problems remain to be solved, but at least there seems to be a genuine will to negotiate, which should always be present in the proceedings of the Committee, but which unfortunately seldom seems to exist. This is not the approach which the great majority of the members of the Committee adopt to their participation in its work, but there are many examples of cases in which the perspective is totally different.

At its first special session devoted to disarmament the General Assembly adopted by consensus a Final Document which, precisely because it had been approved by all parties, was received with great hopes. The propositions set forth in this valuable instrument would, it was thought be translated into concrete results through the Geneva Committee on Disarmament, which had become the multilateral negotiating body par excellence, with members and procedures which enabled it to carry out that role with complete efficacy.

As we all know, the reality could not be more different. In addition to legitimate differences of opinion and of perceptions of what is of international importance, it seems clear that the Committee is not regarded by all as the right body to deal with a broad range of questions, including the most important ones. This leads us to wonder whether at any time, even in 1978, upon the adoption of the Final Document, there has been unanimity with regard to the purpose of the Committee or its real significance within the structure of disarmament machinery.

In any event, it seems clear that there is a consistent policy to remove more and more issues from the jurisdiction of the Committee. The reasons given are many and, in some cases, may be valid or worthy of consideration. However, the result, given the fact that the decisions of the Committee are subject to consensus, is ultimately the same, namely, that the Committee is unable to consider certain subjects or, if it does consider them, it does so informally and only in order to exchange ideas. Moreover, if, in exceptional cases, it is authorized to conduct negotiations -- which should be its principal function -- such negotiations generally become deadlocked.

It certainly cannot be claimed that any negotiations are easy or that no problems will be encountered or that any such problems will not be difficult or even impossible to solve at a given moment. But at least negotiations would be taking place. What causes pessimism and doubts is the fact that the number of spheres in which negotiations are being conducted is actually very small.

At a time when, as I noted at the beginning of this statement, international attention is focused on disarmament, when problems are multiplying, when the danger of a nuclear catastrophe is becoming an increasingly clear possibility, it is frustrating to see that the Committee on Disarmament can do very little in this regard, thus becoming the object, justifiably or not, of very negative judgements as to its effectiveness and its actual *raison d'être*. Public opinion does not differentiate between who is or is not responsible for this inactivity or rather, this ineffectiveness, since delegations cannot be accused of lack of interest or sustained effort.

(Mr. Carasales, Argentina)

This picture which I have drawn and which, in my view, is an accurate reflection of reality, could change completely if there were a slight shift of position in certain capitals. The Committee cannot remain indifferent indefinitely to the growing outcry in all sectors of the international community.

I believe that all delegations participating in this Committee are always prepared to work hard and with dedication on each and every one of the items on its agenda. What is needed are positive instructions from Governments and not negative attitudes or delaying tactics which lead to inactivity or failure, two words which, in the matter of disarmament, are synonymous.

As it has been in the past, the Argentine Republic is still ready to co-operate to the fullest in the ceaseless search for solutions to the problems which confront us. My country considers that the responsibility of this Committee is great and it wishes to contribute to the common effort in the best possible conditions. It is with this intention that my Government has decided to place its delegation to the Committee on Disarmament on a more stable basis, converting it into a permanent delegation based in the city of Geneva. There could be no clearer indication of the importance which my country attaches to the work of this Committee.

We shall continue to work with the same steadfastness and determination as in the past, convinced that, despite the frustrations and failures which it often encounters, there is much that the Committee on Disarmament can and must do in the vast area of disarmament problems which are its concern. The challenge is still before us. It is up to us to decide whether or not we are going to meet it successfully.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the representative of Argentina for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the Chairman.

I now give the floor to the representative of Hungary, Ambassador Kőmives.

Mr. KOMIVES (Hungary): Comrade Chairman, may I first of all congratulate you, the representative of the Mongolian People's Republic, on your succession to the chairmanship of the Committee on Disarmament. Your personal capabilities and long experience in disarmament negotiations can make it possible for this Committee to restart its work in a constructive atmosphere. May I wish you full success in your very responsible task, and I promise you the full co-operation of the Hungarian delegation.

My delegation expresses its appreciation to Ambassador García Robles for the efficient and skilful way in which he guided us in the closing month of the previous session.

It is an awkward situation indeed that the disarmament community should pay its tribute to such an outstanding diplomat at a time when mutual understanding and co-operation have reached unprecedentedly low levels. But it is not at all the fault of Ambassador García Robles. The human qualities of our eminent colleague, his professional competence and unceasing commitment to the promotion of a peaceful world have been known for long and always appreciated. The awarding of the 1982 Nobel Peace Prize is, therefore, a well-deserved recognition of his great contribution to the universal struggle for the prevention of nuclear war, for the cessation of the arms race, for disarmament. When I extend to him the warm congratulations of the Hungarian delegation, I wish also to express the hope that Ambassador García Robles will continue his selfless service in the cause of peace and disarmament for a long time in strength and good health.

(Mr. Kömives, Hungary)

My delegation also wishes to congratulate the co-recipient of the Nobel Peace Prize, Mrs. Alva Myrdal, who is similarly well-known for her devotion to peace and progress in the world. May I request the representative of Sweden to convey our high esteem to her predecessor.

I wish to extend my sincere welcome to our new colleagues, and to assure them that the Hungarian delegation stands ready to maintain and further develop the good relations it had with their predecessors.

Finally, let me simply say how reassuring it is to know that we can continue to rely on the great experience of Ambassador Riki Jaipal, as well as the selfless assistance of the talented staff under his direction.

A year ago, when the representatives of States members of this Committee presented their Governments' assessment and evaluation of the international situation, the general picture was already dark; the statements were heavily loaded with profound disappointment and deep worry for the prospects. It is really sad and rather discouraging that the alarming trend which had been characteristic of the last year is still prevalent also today. The 1983 session of our Committee starts in a situation full of tension and fraught with grave dangers. Subversive activities threatening world peace and international security have continued all through last year, pushing mankind ever closer to a global disaster.

In my statement just a year ago, I gave a detailed analysis of the basic causes of the degradation of the international situation, and since the trend or the factors contributing to it have not changed in the meantime, I do not feel any need to repeat it. The main reason for the continuous deterioration of the situation has remained the same: the aggressive policies of extremist imperialist circles and their never-ending attempts to upset the balance of power, to attain military superiority. In the course of the last year we have witnessed their systematic actions aimed at undermining and destroying the results which had been achieved previously, including some of the international arms limitation and disarmament agreements. They have increased the pressure on the countries and movements which resist the imposition of their will on other States, and have intensified their campaigns of slander and propaganda against the socialist countries and other progressive forces.

The highest-level representatives of the States parties to the Warsaw Treaty, in the Political Declaration issued after their recent meeting in Prague, summarized this trend when they stated that "the situation as a whole is thus becoming ever more complicated; international tension is mounting and the threat of war -- especially nuclear war -- is increasing".

The document, however, also contains an enumeration of the factors and forces that are capable of countering that dangerous trend. Proceeding from the whole of the evaluation, the Warsaw Treaty member States have offered a realistic alternative. As the Declaration has been circulated as an official

(Mr. Kömives, Hungary)

document of the Committee (CD/338), it would be superfluous for me to go into any detailed explanation of its salient points. I am convinced that the document has been the subject of serious studies here, just as in every responsible political milieu.

Nevertheless, I wish to permit myself to quote a sentence from the Political Declaration, which I believe is the key not only to a better understanding of the basic aspirations of the peoples and Governments of the Socialist countries, but also to the task facing every delegation around this negotiating table:

"Central to the struggle for the prevention of war is the task of curbing the arms race and moving toward disarmament, and in particular nuclear disarmament."

As has been repeatedly stated, 1983 will be a crucial year for the fate of mankind in general, and also for disarmament negotiations. What is needed, therefore, is a persistent will to revive the momentum of serious negotiations aimed at halting the arms race and achieving substantial progress in disarmament. What is needed here is real and sincere commitment to the pursuit of serious negotiations on the most burning and acute questions.

In order to start such negotiations, it is imperative that certain Governments give up the utterly unrealistic position wherein the other side is repeatedly presented with a clearly unacceptable proposal, a "take it or leave it" offer, known from the very moment of its inception to be aimed at gaining the upper hand and undermining the security of the other party. It is high time to realize that attempts to make gains at the expense of other States' security can only meet with categorical refusal. It is high time to realize that even casual references to a kind of "moral position" cannot hide the outrageous motives behind such an option.

Our peoples are not to be treated as naive children, nor are their Governments to be so treated. What they expect are sincere efforts and honest proposals aimed at arriving at effective solutions based on the fundamental principle of equality and equal security. What they expect are serious and constructive proposals, like those contained in the Political Declaration of the States parties to the Warsaw Treaty, which are welcomed by responsible statesmen as convincing proof of goodwill and by the broad public everywhere, which demand reciprocal steps from the other side.

Peoples must be treated as grown-ups with rapidly increasing political consciousness. They are fully aware of the gravity of the danger of nuclear war, and are resolved to prevent it. It would be a serious mistake if certain Governments disregarded the evident signs of a growing sense of urgency on the part of the peoples of the countries most directly involved and affected by the sinister plans, which are scheduled to be put into action in less than a year's time.

(Mr. Kömives, Hungary)

For a delegate from Hungary, it is not a simple exercise of moral philosophy or rhetoric to express views on such questions. Like many of my colleagues here, I belong to a generation that has experienced all the horrors of a world war. Relying strongly on the support of the more fortunate younger ones, that generation is doing everything possible to prevent any such repetition, to avert the danger of nuclear war.

It must be absolutely clear to any sober-minded person that a major conflict in this continent would immediately and unavoidably lead to an all-out conflagration, to a global nuclear war. Therefore, my country, the Hungarian People's Republic, is doing everything possible to avoid such a development of events. The Hungarian delegation is consequently ready to promote by every possible means any measures capable of contributing to the prevention of a nuclear war.

It must be absolutely clear to everyone that propaganda ploys and publicity stunts are not substitutes for serious proposals and sincere negotiations. At this juncture, the first sign of seriousness and sincerity would be for certain delegations to stop obstructing the adoption of a suitable agenda that includes the relevant items to that end.

The constructive proposals of the socialist countries concerning all the items on the draft agenda are on the table, awaiting serious negotiations and implementation. All those proposals and a large number of draft agreements accompanying some of them have been endorsed and commended by the General Assembly of the United Nations, many of them for years in succession, and most recently by several resolutions adopted at the thirty-seventh session.

In their Political Declaration, the Warsaw Treaty member States devoted great attention to all those items as well as many other questions, and in a very concise but unequivocal manner reconfirmed their positions and continued readiness to work out and conclude agreements on all questions of arms limitation or reduction and disarmament. Here and now, I only wish again to draw the attention of other delegations to that document, the great importance and timeliness of which have been amply underlined everywhere, and -- using the words of the Declaration -- call upon them "to give a new impetus to the negotiations".

Today I do not intend to deal with individual agenda items. My delegation will set out its views and suggestions, as well as concrete proposals whenever appropriate, soon after the agenda and the programme of work are adopted. For the time being, however, I wish to emphasize that in 1983, the agenda of the Committee on Disarmament, "the single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum", cannot be considered complete and realistic unless the question of the prevention of nuclear war is included. Therefore the Hungarian delegation, like all the other delegations of the socialist countries, welcomed and unconditionally supported the initiative of the group of non-aligned States. We are in full agreement with the idea of conducting, as a matter of the highest priority, multilateral negotiations on this subject in the Committee "with a view to achieving agreement on

(Mr. Kőmives, Hungary)

appropriate and practical measures for the prevention of nuclear war". We urge, furthermore, the establishment of an ad hoc working group on this item without any delay. Finally, we accept the draft proposed by the group last August as a basis for consultations on the mandate as contained in document CD/309.

Last week we heard an eloquent statement which contained numerous references to the dire need for reducing distrust and creating confidence. We believe it would be a good step in that direction if certain delegations could match their pious statements with concrete actions, and instead of twisting their hands, could give their agreement to the proposal contained in document CD/341. Confidence-building is an important task; that is exactly why the socialist countries are calling for the convening of a conference designed to deal with confidence-building measures, as well as security and disarmament in Europe. Confidence-building, however, should start with small steps, like the one I have just mentioned.

At our last meeting, the representative of Cuba enumerated a great number of urgent measures, which would all have great impact on confidence-building on a global scale. The first and perhaps the most urgent one of such measures would be a joint commitment on the part of all the nuclear-weapon States not to be the first to use nuclear weapons under any circumstances. Of course, it would be an even more far-reaching step if a treaty could be concluded on the mutual non-use of military force in general, as suggested by the Warsaw Treaty member States. Similarly, the confidence-building effect of a general freeze on nuclear weapons and their delivery systems cannot be over-emphasized.

As a final example of concrete measures of great confidence-building value, I wish to mention the recent proposal of the Swedish Government concerning the creation of a zone in central Europe which would be freed in a first phase of tactical or battlefield nuclear weapons. The proposal has already received favourable response from several countries, among them my own. The Hungarian Government -- at a meeting on 3 February -- stated its agreement with the proposal, which it found timely and capable of building confidence among States in Europe and improving the international atmosphere. Adding the view that the width of the zone ought to be twice as much as originally suggested, the Hungarian Government expressed its readiness to take part in talks concerning various details connected with the zone, and to promote the success of such talks.

In conclusion, allow me to refer to the statement made by the head of the Swedish delegation a week ago. While admitting that "a favourable international climate is important for progress in disarmament efforts" and that negotiations are naturally influenced by international events, Mrs. Theorin emphasized that "linkages between arms negotiations and political events should be avoided". My delegation is fully in agreement with both parts of her statement. As a matter of fact, in my contribution to the general debate in the First Committee on 20 October 1982, I made a similar point, as follows: "Nobody could contest that ~~the~~ international situation in general and relations between the Soviet Union and the United States in particular, were not ideal during the Viet Nam war. Despite that fact, some disarmament agreements had been worked out and adopted by the predecessors of the Committee on Disarmament" (A/C.1/37/PV.6, p. 37). The key to progress in disarmament negotiations, therefore, is the political will to negotiate in good faith with a sincere desire to reach agreement.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the representative of Hungary for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the Chairman. I now give the floor to the representative of Bulgaria, Ambassador Tellalov.

Mr. TELLALOV (Bulgaria): Comrade Chairman, I would like to express the Bulgarian delegation's satisfaction that the Committee's session for 1983 has opened under the chairmanship of my able friend, Ambassador Erdembileg, the representative of fraternal socialist Mongolia. I congratulate you, Comrade Erdembileg, on the assumption of this responsible post and wish you successful and fruitful work.

I have also the pleasure of extending my congratulations to the representative of Mexico to the Committee on Disarmament, our esteemed colleague, Ambassador García Robles, on the occasion of the award to him of the 1982 Nobel Peace Prize. I take the opportunity to pay tribute to Ambassador Robles, and to join in all that has been said about his great efforts to prevent a nuclear war, halt the arms race and reach disarmament, and for his services especially in this Committee on Disarmament. All this is well known to the Bulgarian public.

Permit me, Comrade Chairman, to ask, through you, the distinguished representative of Sweden to convey the same warm congratulations to Mrs. Myrdal, the other laureate of the 1982 Nobel Peace Prize.

On behalf of the Bulgarian delegation I would also like to congratulate Mr. Martenson, Under-Secretary-General of the United Nations.

I avail myself of the opportunity to extend my best wishes to the heads of delegations who join the work of the Committee for the first time.

A number of the preceding speakers have underlined that the year 1983 is particularly important, even "crucial" from the point of view of taking urgent, long-overdue decisions on the issues of disarmament. We share the anxiety over the present situation in which the arms race is advancing into a qualitatively new and much more dangerous stage, involving all kinds of weapons, both nuclear and conventional, and all types of military activity, and affecting all regions of the world. The continuing deterioration in international relations, which is also manifested in many other spheres, comes, as we have stated on other occasions, as a result of further activity on the part of the imperialist circles.

Hence, it is interesting to note what ideas and practical measures are being proposed by the different governments and groups of States, as well as by public circles in order to relieve the world of the present military danger. May I offer briefly the comments of my delegation on this basic question.

On the one hand, the socialist countries, members of the Warsaw Treaty Organization, started the year 1983 by advancing new, far-reaching peace initiatives. To refer to the language of the Political Declaration of the Warsaw Treaty member States, adopted on 5 January, "the socialist countries ... are laying on the scale of peace all their international authority as well as their political and economic potential".

An expression of the will to improve the international situation and to consolidate peace is, for one thing, the proposal to conclude a treaty on the mutual renunciation of the use of military force and the maintenance of peaceful relations between the Warsaw Treaty member States and the Member States of NATO. The proposal of the socialist countries is notable for its explicit and profound logic: it opens the way for considerable and lasting changes in the political atmosphere and strengthening the legal foundations of the relations between the two alliances.

(Mr. Tellalov, Bulgaria)

It should also be stated that along with the Member States of the two alliances, other interested European States would have the right to participate in the drafting and signing of such a treaty. From the very beginning, this treaty would also be open to other States wishing to accede to it, and these States would have equal rights as parties to the treaty. In view of the complexity of the present situation, the conclusion of the treaty would have a particularly favourable influence on further international developments.

The proposal of the Warsaw Treaty member States is aptly linked with the well known and extensive proposals concerning the problems of the limitation and reduction of nuclear weapons advanced by the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Y.A. Andropov.

Without going into the depths of the matters concerning the Soviet-American bilateral negotiations on limiting nuclear weapons in Europe and on limiting and reducing strategic arms, I would like to stress a point which was eloquently made by Ambassador V.L. Issraelyan in his statement of 1 February: the only sound basis for progress is that of the principle of equality and equal security. The same applies to the relations in general between the Warsaw Treaty countries and NATO.

In the opinion of my Government, one of the important avenues for strengthening European security is the creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones on the continent. In this connection I would like to say that the idea of creating a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Balkans is becoming ever more popular amongst the people and the leaders of the Balkan States. A remarkable contribution to this development has been the proposal made by the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party and President of the State Council of the People's Republic of Bulgaria, Todor Zhivkov, for the convening in Sofia of a meeting of the leaders of Balkan States in order to discuss the idea of turning the Balkans into a nuclear-weapon-free zone.

A proposal has recently been made by the Government of Sweden to create in Europe a zone free of battlefield nuclear weapons. The People's Republic of Bulgaria supports the initiative of Sweden -- in expression of our consistent policy in favour of disarmament, in favour of any peace initiative of a constructive nature, regardless of where it is coming from. In the official reply of the Bulgarian Government it is stated that our preferences go to a solution of this problem on a more radical and complex basis. Specifically, we are for enlarging the proposed zone so that it could comprise all components of the battlefield nuclear weapons.

The process of strengthening European security will also be enhanced by headway at the Vienna negotiations for the reduction of armed forces and armaments in central Europe. The socialist countries have tabled a constructive proposal at these negotiations and are of the opinion that all the prerequisites exist for an agreement to be worked out within the shortest possible time.

There are other spheres where the problems of European security could and should be solved through negotiations, for example, to convert the Mediterranean Sea area into a zone of peace and co-operation, and to free Europe of chemical and other weapons. We hope that the Madrid meeting which is in session again will finally take a decision on the convening of a conference on confidence-building measures and on security and disarmament in Europe.

(Mr. Tellalov, Bulgaria)

In contrast to these positive ideas, the military programme of the United States and some of its allies designed to achieve military superiority have a particularly negative effect on international security. More specifically, programmes are being implemented for the development and production of nuclear weapons, and for the development of weapons based on the latest scientific achievements and discoveries. Strategic concepts and doctrines are being introduced based on the assumption that it is possible to win a victory in a nuclear war by being the first to use nuclear weapons. All this leads to an aggravation of international relations and the disruption of international stability.

Not only the process of political contacts but also the normal development of economic, scientific and technical, and cultural ties between States are being hindered. Economic "sanctions" and embargoes are again being imposed as an instrument of policy. Propaganda campaigns of a particularly vicious nature are being waged against the social order and the people of the socialist countries.

We share the opinion that the intention of NATO to carry out its decision concerning the deployment of new American medium-range missiles on the territory of a number of west European countries represents a very serious danger for the peoples of Europe. The implementation of this decision would inevitably lead to a new aggravation of the situation and a severe worsening of European security.

Under the circumstances, the initiatives and actions of all countries in the sphere of disarmament acquire a particular importance for strengthening world peace and security. And here I want to stress that we firmly believe in the important role of the non-aligned countries in efforts to avert the danger of nuclear war, to halt the arms race and to achieve disarmament.

With your permission, Comrade Chairman, I should like to note the way in which the current session has opened. The participation in the work of the Committee of high-ranking statesmen is undoubtedly desirable. It contributes to boosting the authority of the Committee and above all it attracts the attention of the mass media, which have otherwise forgotten us. I would not, however, hide my disappointment and, I am sure, the disappointment of many colleagues that their speeches offered no new ideas and proposals. On the contrary, well known negative positions of the West were reconfirmed, and harsh and unfounded attacks against the Soviet Union and the socialist countries were repeated here again.

It would be the least to say that we can only be sorry for these developments. It is quite obvious that large portions of those speeches were not addressed to the Committee but rather to public opinion in certain countries. I am beginning to wonder: is the Committee on Disarmament being included in some large-scale propaganda campaign? We read that one great country has created two top-level special committees and has provided generous sums in order to influence public opinion and make it favourable to the Western concepts on disarmament issues. In another great country, a project has been proposed for hiring an advertising agency to convince the citizens of that country of the necessity of installing new foreign missiles on their territory.

I should not predict what the reaction of public opinion in these countries will be as a result of the "publicity" campaigns. The distinguished head of the

(Mr. Tellalov, Bulgaria)

Swedish delegation stated that public opinion is in harmony with common sense, basic values and sound politics. And may I add that the people of the twentieth century are well informed and can easily detect what is the truth and what is a lie, what is moral and what is demagogic, and above all they know what is best for them. Without doubt, it is peace, a world without arms and without wars.

Now I would like to give in brief the view of my delegation on the Committee's agenda and the order of priorities.

The Committee on Disarmament would not live up to expectations if it did not pursue vigorously the solution of the key questions of today -- the prevention of nuclear war and the achievement of progress in the elaboration of a stage-by-stage programme of nuclear disarmament.

The delegation of the People's Republic of Bulgaria introduced a document on this question at the second special session on disarmament, on behalf of the socialist countries. Therefore, we strongly support the position of the non-aligned countries for the inclusion in the agenda of the issue on working out, on a multilateral basis, measures to prevent a nuclear war. All over the world, millions of people are joining the movement for peace and disarmament. Their persistent demand is that specific measures be taken to avert the nuclear threat. In this respect a crucial necessity is the renunciation of strategic concepts and doctrines creating a psychological climate of "acceptability" of the use of nuclear weapons. It is in this context that my delegation would like to stress once again the importance of the historic step undertaken by the Soviet Union to declare a unilateral pledge not to be the first to use nuclear weapons. This example should be followed by other nuclear-weapon States which have not yet done so. This is a stand which is not taken by the socialist countries only. The idea of responding identically to the Soviet initiatives is shared by authoritative circles in the West, too. Last week, according to a dispatch by the Associated Press, a group of former military leaders in the United States, the United Kingdom and the Federal Republic of Germany has called for a declaration by the West that it would not be the first to use nuclear weapons. Both ordinary citizens and military experts are becoming increasingly aware of the danger posed by the current thinking on nuclear matters in Washington. Regrettably, what we heard in this Committee on behalf of the United States shows no shift in the American position on the first-use doctrines or its endeavours to reach military superiority.

Next, we are, as is well known, for working out as soon as possible a treaty on a complete and universal nuclear-weapon test ban.

At the present session the situation regarding this pressing issue is notable for certain new aspects. Above all there is a clear tendency in favour of widening the mandate of the relevant Ad Hoc Working Group, with a view to creating the necessary conditions for negotiating the draft of a treaty. This is the position of the socialist countries and of a number of other countries members of the committee also.

The proposal of the Soviet Union, made at the thirty-seventh session of the United Nations General Assembly, on the basic provisions of a treaty on the complete

(Mr. Tellalov, Bulgaria)

and universal prohibition of nuclear weapon tests, is of particular practical importance. So far as the Ad Hoc Working Group of the Committee on a comprehensive test ban is concerned, it is necessary that the Group should be joined by those nuclear-weapon States which have not so far participated in its activities.

The resumption of the tripartite negotiations between the USSR, the United States and the United Kingdom would undoubtedly give a considerable impetus to the efforts of the Committee on Disarmament to reach a complete and universal ban on nuclear-weapon tests.

We share the view that one of the Committee's main tasks is accelerating the elaboration of an international convention on the prohibition and elimination of chemical weapons. The socialist countries, including the People's Republic of Bulgaria, are actively pursuing this course. The basic provisions for a chemical weapons convention introduced by the USSR, the other relevant documents of the socialist countries, as well as their participation in this Committee's Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons are significant examples of their constructive activity. For co-ordinating mutually acceptable texts, however, it is necessary for certain States to give up their attempts to enforce the inclusion of unrealistic or biased elements in the future convention. We are awaiting with interest the proposal of the United States on this matter.

Regrettably, the leading Western power continues to disrupt the normal atmosphere in the Committee and its Working Group, and by directing unfounded allegations against another member State is trying to influence the negotiations on a chemical weapons convention. As in the past, my delegation is of the opinion that the resumption of the Soviet-American negotiations on banning chemical weapons will considerably improve the chances for the early elaboration of a convention.

The elaboration of a convention on the prohibition of neutron weapons is another item to which my country attaches great importance. As is well known, a draft of such a convention was introduced by the socialist countries in 1978. The urgency of this problem is far from declining, particularly when it is viewed in the context of the growing need to avert nuclear war and halt the nuclear arms race.

In the view of the delegation of the People's Republic of Bulgaria the Committee ought, at its present session, to decide on the opening, without delay, of negotiations on the prohibition of the stationing of weapons of any kind in outer space. Judging from the results of the thirty-seventh session of the United Nations General Assembly on this issue, the conclusion may be drawn that there is now a wider basis for working out a generally acceptable mandate for a working group. We are resolutely for the creation of an ad hoc working group on this subject, and are ready for consultations and co-operation with all interested delegations. At the same time we vigorously oppose any suggestions to simply "exchange views", or "address the matter in a more systematic way", as a substitute for genuine negotiations.

My delegation is among those which are in favour of reaching speedy agreement concerning an international convention on the prohibition of radiological weapons.

(Mr. Tellalov, Bulgaria)

In regard to this issue we would like to draw the attention of Committee members to the need for certain States to indicate their readiness to revise their maximalist formulations, which have failed, in the course of time, to win general approval. We are convinced that a demonstration of goodwill on the part of those delegations will allow a process of bridging the differences on problems like the scope of a future convention, and the way to the final solution of the problem of the prohibition of radiological weapons will be cleared.

A topical problem which should find its place in the agenda is the working out of measures to ensure the safe development of nuclear energy. The People's Republic of Bulgaria has a special interest in this problem since a considerable part of the power output in the country comes from nuclear thermal sources.

As to speeding up the solution of the problem of strengthening the security guarantees of non-nuclear-weapon States, the position of my delegation on the issue is well known. Our position was reaffirmed at the thirty-seventh session of the General Assembly of the United Nations and was embodied in resolution 37/80.

Needless to say, in the course of the spring session the Bulgarian delegation will address in greater depth all of the above issues as well as other questions which will be included in the agenda.

In conclusion, I would like to state that the delegation of the People's Republic of Bulgaria is ready to participate most actively in the negotiations and the proceedings in the Committee. In the spirit of the Prague Declaration, we are ready for consistent efforts aimed at reaching agreements which would provide for a reduction and liquidation of weapons and in particular nuclear weapons. As is stated in the Declaration, "today there is no task more important for the peoples of the world than the preservation of peace and the halting of the arms race. It is the duty of all governments and all those who are responsible for determining the policies of their countries to accomplish this task". In my opinion, the Committee on Disarmament should do everything in its power to prove worthy of this noble task.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the representative of Bulgaria for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the Chairman.

We have exhausted the time available to us this morning. I intend to suspend this plenary meeting now and to resume it this afternoon at 3.30 p.m., so that the Committee may listen to the remaining members listed to speak today.

The meeting was suspended at 1 p.m. and resumed at 3.30 p.m.

The CHAIRMAN: The 193rd plenary meeting of the Committee on Disarmament is resumed.

The Committee will now listen to those speakers who could not make their statements this morning.

I now give the floor to the representative of the United States of America, Ambassador Fields.

Mr. FIELDS (United States of America): Mr. Chairman, may I associate myself and my delegation with the remarks directed to the Chair by Vice-President Bush last week, and with his high tribute to our distinguished and honoured colleague, Ambassador García Robles of Mexico, in his deserved recognition as a Nobel peace laureate. I wish also to greet and welcome the many new colleagues in our Committee and pledge to them the friendship and co-operation of the United States delegation. We take special pleasure in congratulating our friend, Jan Martenson, on his promotion to Under-Secretary-General and wish him well as he undertakes the important leadership of the new Department for Disarmament Affairs in the United Nations Secretariat.

My delegation wishes also to note with deep sorrow the passing of Dr. Ulf Ericsson who led with distinction the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts for many years. His able leadership and expertise in this vital activity will be sorely missed.

Mr. Chairman, the complete and effective prohibition of chemical weapons is perhaps the most important task currently before this Committee. This is an area which is ripe for serious negotiations. Much preliminary work has already been done and the principal issues have been well-defined. It is now time for the Committee to intensify its efforts to resolve these critical differences so that the spectre of chemical warfare may never again threaten mankind.

In his statement to the Committee on 4 February, Vice-President Bush reiterated the commitment of the United States to the objective of the complete and verifiable elimination of chemical weapons and stressed the urgency of its accomplishment. My task in taking the floor today is to present in detail the views of my Government as to how this long-sought objective can finally be reached. I will offer to the Committee a comprehensive document on the content of an effective convention and outline our suggestions on how the Committee can most rapidly move ahead.

If progress is to be made, it is essential that the views of all delegations be clearly stated -- and in detail. To this end my delegation outlined, on 12 August last, the points which we believe could serve as the basis for a chemical weapons convention. We further developed these ideas in the contact groups and consultations on technical issues.

Today, the United States is tabling our detailed views on the content of a complete and verifiable chemical weapons convention, which we hope will serve as a framework for discussion. It will be the basis for United States participation in negotiations to resolve key issues which are indispensable to the realization of our common objective.

(Mr. Fields, United States)

Our document is an elaboration of the general points which we presented last summer. I would stress, however, that the substance of the document results from a very careful review by our experts of the ideas presented in the Committee by many delegations over a period of years. The results achieved in the contact groups established last summer received particular attention. As you study our document, it will become apparent that suggestions and ideas from many different sources have been adopted. There are also many new ideas.

As delegations will have an opportunity to study the document in some detail, let me just sketch out briefly our approach to the key issues, especially those relating to verification and compliance.

The United States supports a comprehensive ban on chemical weapons. Any activity to create or maintain a chemical weapons capability would be forbidden. On the other hand, chemical activities with a legitimate purpose would continue unhampered. The convention should also contain several specific provisions relating to the use of chemical weapons to help ensure that our common objective -- to remove the menace of the possible use of such weapons -- is met. In particular, use in circumstances not covered by the Geneva Protocol should be prohibited; the provisions for dealing with compliance issues should be applicable to all allegations of chemical weapons use.

Existing chemical weapons stocks and production and filling facilities would be promptly declared, and destroyed over a 10-year period. In order to take into account concerns expressed in contact group discussions, we have incorporated specific ideas for dealing with the possible discovery of chemical munitions, for example, on World War I battlefields, after the initial declaration of stocks.

As Vice-President Bush emphasized, the key to an effective convention is the firm assurance of compliance through effective verification. We have learned the hard way -- through the bitter experience of recent events in Sverdlovsk, south-east Asia and Afghanistan -- that effective verification is an absolute necessity for any future agreement.

Many different approaches to the verification of a chemical weapons ban have been discussed in this Committee. We share the view of the majority of delegations, which have emphasized the importance of systematic international on-site inspection. Only an independent, impartial system responsible to all the parties can provide the necessary confidence that the provisions of the convention are being faithfully observed. National technical means alone are not sufficient, as they are available only to a few and are of extremely limited utility for the verification of a chemical weapons ban. Nor can so-called systems of "national verification", which would be tantamount to self-inspection by parties, be taken seriously when one considers the vital import of such a convention.

(Mr. Fields, United States)

In our view, the following should be subject to appropriate forms of systematic international on-site inspection on an agreed basis:

Declared chemical weapon stockpiles and the process of their elimination;

Declared chemical weapons production and filling facilities and the process of their elimination;

Declared facilities for permitted production of chemicals which pose a particular risk.

To avoid misunderstanding, I want to emphasize that we do not believe it necessary to subject the entire chemical industry of States to inspection, nor do we seek to have inspectors roam throughout the territory of a party. Systematic international on-site inspection is necessary only at a limited and carefully-defined group of facilities, which must be declared.

An effective mechanism for dealing with compliance issues is essential. This is one of the key lessons to be drawn from the compliance problems encountered in recent years with respect to the Geneva Protocol and the biological and toxin weapons Convention. My delegation believes that the mechanism must promote prompt resolution of issues at the lowest possible political level. At the same time it must be flexible, and allow issues to be taken to higher levels, including the Security Council, whenever that may be necessary. We believe that States must undertake a strong commitment to co-operate in resolving compliance issues. This should include a stringent obligation to permit inspections on a challenge basis.

The United States delegation is putting forward this document to help advance the work of the Committee. We believe that the verification approach it described is tough but fair and practical. I want to emphasize that we are not seeking absolute verification. We recognize that some risks will have to be accepted. However, we do insist that these risks be minimized in order to safeguard our security and that of all other countries. We must have a level of verification which meets that objective.

I want also to emphasize that we are continuing to explore possibilities for new and more effective means of verification, for example, possible use of on-site sensors. We have invited others to join us in a co-operative evaluation of such sensors. I wish to reaffirm that invitation. Furthermore, we are prepared to explore seriously any suggestions by others for achieving an effective level of verification. Our views are subject to modification and further refinement. In fact, we encourage constructive comments and contributions

(Mr. Fields, United States)

from other delegations, particularly with respect to any additional verification arrangements which would reduce the problems of possible undeclared stockpiles and facilities.

We recognize, too, that on reading this lengthy document questions may arise. We welcome your questions and will do our best to respond promptly. We are anxious to explain our approach. In fact, our delegation is tentatively planning to hold, in the near future, an informal session open to all delegations for the express purpose of receiving and responding to your questions and comments.

Vice-President Bush pointed out that a chemical weapons ban is long overdue and urged that efforts toward this long-sought goal be intensified. The United States delegation is ready to engage in intensive negotiations on a chemical weapons ban. We have once again augmented our delegation with our best experts. Our interest is in solving problems so that a convention can be achieved as soon as possible, and we sense that most delegations here share that ardent desire.

But, speaking frankly, the first three weeks of work on a chemical weapons ban this year have been discouraging. It has been quite clear that a small group, led by the Soviet delegation, has thwarted any achievement of concrete results. We call upon the Soviet Union to join with us and other members of the Committee at our 1983 session to find ways to overcome the difficult issues which have prevented progress -- especially those pertaining to verification and compliance. As we have repeatedly made clear, we are prepared to consider any and all channels, including bilateral negotiations, that promise to be productive. We must have reason, however, to expect that bilateral negotiations would be productive rather than simply a device to draw a cloak of secrecy around these vital negotiations. Thus far, we have had no reason to be optimistic on this point.

We have repeatedly stated that for such negotiations to be fruitful, the Soviet Union needs to demonstrate, rather than simply profess, that it is genuinely ready to work out and accept effective provisions to verify compliance with a chemical weapons prohibition. And the Soviet Union must also show the United States and the rest of the world that it will abide by existing agreements in this area if meaningful progress is to be made.

It is sobering to realize that the chemical weapons Working Group is entering the fourth year of its existence. Considerable useful work has been accomplished, but the pace is much too slow. The work can and must be accelerated. I would like to outline some suggestions as to how this could be accomplished.

(Mr. Fields, United States)

First, let us not waste time and energy on procedural struggles. The chemical weapons Working Group should be re-established and resume its negotiations immediately. It is the responsibility of the western delegations to nominate this year's Chairman. As you know, Ambassador McPhail has agreed to assume the Chair under the rotation system. Consultations on other procedural issues could be conducted simultaneously. Let us not hold up this vital work while we attempt to sort out other problems.

Secondly, let us focus on the tough issues, which are the key to real progress towards a convention. Some may argue that progress could be made by dealing with the "easier" issues, or by drafting treaty texts on matters already agreed on in principle. But this would be a fruitless exercise if the key verification issues cannot be resolved. We will not support a diversion of effort away from the real obstacles to a convention. Before the drafting of actual treaty text can be productive, an acceptable verification and compliance framework must first be negotiated.

Thirdly, the chemical weapons Working Group should be allowed to proceed at its own pace. It should determine its own schedule and not be dependent on the schedules of other groups. It is to be expected in any serious negotiation that during some periods frequent meetings will be needed, while in other periods very informal consultations and work within delegations will be most productive. The Working Group should have the flexibility to adopt whatever schedule will best facilitate its work.

Fourthly, the very useful innovation of contact groups should be retained and refined to permit related issues to be dealt with together. For example, a method needs to be found to deal simultaneously with all questions related to stockpiles -- declarations, destruction and verification. These issues are so closely linked that they cannot be resolved in isolation.

Fifthly, more effective ways must be found to make use of technical expertise. Experience has shown that close interaction between technical experts and diplomats is essential. While there will continue to be a need for discussions which are primarily technical, the highest priority should be given to integrating political and technical considerations, perhaps within the framework of the contact groups. As part of the work of these groups, specific periods should be planned, well in advance, for combined political-technical discussion of issues on which technical advice is particularly important.

In closing, I want to stress again what Vice-President Bush said a few days ago in this room. The goal of my Government is to eliminate the threat of chemical warfare by achieving a complete and verifiable ban on chemical weapons as soon as possible. We urge every member of this Committee to join the United States in intensive negotiations to ensure that the possibility of chemical warfare is eliminated for ever.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the representative of the United States of America for his statement. I now give the floor to the representative of Nigeria, Ambassador Ijewere.

Mr. IJEWERE (Nigeria): Mr. Chairman, my delegation is very pleased to see you presiding over the affairs of our Committee for the month of February and at the beginning of the 1983 session of our work. Your wealth of experience in the field of diplomacy as well as your personal qualities are guarantees that you will pilot us successfully through this crucial month. On behalf of my delegation I want to assure you of our full co-operation. You have taken over the chairmanship of the Committee from an equally worthy predecessor, Ambassador Alfonso García Robles of Mexico. May I also welcome the leaders of the delegations of India, Venezuela, the United Kingdom, China and Japan who have just joined us.

Once again, I wish to place on record the joy with which we received the news of the honour conferred on two illustrious citizens of this Committee by the award to them of the Nobel Peace Prize for 1982. Ambassador García Robles and Mrs. Alva Myrdal have distinguished themselves in their service to mankind. Ambassador Robles is a man of many qualities but the two qualities I admire most in him are his tenacity of purpose and the saintly courage with which he expresses his conviction.

After the United Nations General Assembly's second special session on disarmament followed by its thirty-seventh regular session, our Committee has resumed its work as the only multilateral negotiating body on disarmament matters. Since the end of the thirty-seventh session of the General Assembly, nothing has happened to improve the world political and economic climate. But there is some comfort in the fact that world public opinion has shifted dramatically in favour of disarmament and that the subject itself is no longer of marginal political interest. This is borne out by the fact that within one week of the beginning of this session, no less than three world figures have honoured the Committee by coming here in person to address us. It is also important to note that at no time in the history of the United Nations has our Committee been armed with as many resolutions as the ones handed over at the end of the last General Assembly session -- a fact which reflects the increasing concern being shown by the international community about the arms race. Indeed, it is a reminder that the world is in crisis -- both political and economic crises -- with the one reinforcing the other. The political crisis is reflected in the arms race which in turn exacerbates the economic crisis. It is a vicious circle.

Men all over the world are becoming increasingly conscious about the uncertainty of the future and the desire to rid the world of the menace of the arms race in general and in particular of the nuclear arms race. It is, therefore, in the view of my delegation, an important aspect of our responsibility not only to continue to examine seriously the various items on our agenda within the framework of the mandates received from the United Nations General Assembly, but above all to continue to underline the major obstacles to progress in disarmament negotiations. It is only in this way that we can sustain the interest of the general public which, in the final analysis, must decide when and how the arms race is to be brought to an end. After all, it is the general public whose scarce resources are being used to produce these weapons, of which they are also the primary targets. In this regard, we believe it is desirable that we strengthen our co-operation with the

(Mr. Ijewere, Nigeria)

non-governmental organizations and the peace movements -- two types of organizations that have acted in many areas as the vehicles through which our ideas are transmitted to the world at large.

It has been shown throughout history that, after all is said and done, power belongs to the people and that politicians, however powerful they may be, must bow to the wishes of the people. We are not surprised that for some time some people have adopted negative attitudes towards peace movements; but with time, thanks to their persistence and seriousness of purpose, it has been shown that these organizations are motivated by the highest ideals of peace and justice for all mankind, and in a world where everyone seems to be losing his head, they are gaining in stature and respectability. It is worth while to recall here that on the occasion of the presentation of the 1983 Nobel Peace Prize, a part of the citation was that the recipients were two people who have helped "to open the eyes of the world to the threat mankind faces in continued nuclear armament".

For too long we have heard it said here that the main obstacle to progress in disarmament negotiations is lack of political will and one of us rightly pointed out some time last year that political will cannot be manufactured here in Geneva. This is true because it means that on every vital issue we need to seek directives from home. If this is not true of everybody, it is certainly true of most of us. Assuming, therefore, that one needs directives from home which of course means from political bosses, one way of influencing such decisions is through the democratic process of helping to focus public awareness on disarmament issues.

Speaking as a citizen of the third world, I cannot but underline the evils of the arms race as it affects social and economic lives in the poor countries of the world. The problems that make people and governments insecure are economic as well as military in nature. Today, these problems are likely to become worse, not better, as a result of military spending. Military expenditure is a form of consumption which absorbs the resources that could otherwise have been used in civilian society. In the words of Adam Smith, "Great fleets and armies are the models of unproductive labour". Jean Baptist Say improved upon this by saying, "Smith calls the soldier an unproductive worker: would to God this were true! For he is much more a destructive worker; not only does he fail to enrich society with any product and consume those needed for his upkeep, but only too often he is called upon to destroy, uselessly for himself, the arduous product of others' work". Third world countries therefore see the arms race as the greatest evil that man has had to contend with in this century, especially at a time of prolonged and severe world recession.

With the exception of the racist regime in South Africa, African countries have never been in the vanguard of the arms race; rather they have been the victims. A number of peace-loving African States in southern Africa like Zambia, Mozambique, Angola, Zimbabwe and Lesotho have been victims of unprovoked and humiliating aggression by the racist regime in South Africa. The people of Namibia have been slaughtered in large numbers by the racists of South Africa and on many occasions attempts have been made to destabilize the Governments of African countries by the

(Mr. Ijewere, Nigeria)

use of a band of social outcasts, otherwise known as mercenaries, organized and financed by certain elements inside and outside the continent. As long as these humiliating experiences persist, African countries may be forced to acquire arms to defend their sovereignty, territorial integrity and self-respect.

Although one must grant to every nation the right to establish its own priorities regarding its security needs, a narrow interpretation of a nation's security requirements may mean less security for others. This is more so in a world that is becoming increasingly interdependent. Some have argued that armaments are the result of insecurity much more than insecurity is the result of armaments. This is not quite the case because it is also true that whether one feels safe or insecure depends to a very large extent on who is acquiring the arms. When your potential enemy acquires arms, he creates a feeling of insecurity in you. When your friend acquires arms, you do not feel insecure. So it depends upon your relationship with the one acquiring arms. In today's world what we are seeing is an unprecedented arms race by two opposing camps. This means that the acquisition of arms by one camp invariably leads to a feeling of insecurity in the other which then seeks to redress the situation by acquiring more arms. It has been shown that this endless acquisition of arms does not really buy more security. At the very best it postpones the evil day.

While it is true that we have many urgent problems to deal with, it is the view of my delegation that there is an ascending order of urgency. For psychological reasons it might be necessary to concentrate on those areas where success is more likely and in this regard the negotiations to ban chemical weapons come readily to mind. It is, therefore, the view of my delegation that we should not lose the momentum already acquired in the process of negotiating a chemical weapons ban. While we believe in the psychological advantage of trying to achieve success where it is more likely, we are convinced, like the rest of mankind, that the most urgent task before us is nuclear disarmament. Because of their devastating and indiscriminate effect, nuclear weapons can hardly be regarded primarily as weapons of war. They are essentially weapons of genocide and mass killing. The intended targets of nuclear weapons are not the combatants in the field but the civilian population. This was demonstrated in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. It is, therefore, our hope that the Ad Hoc Working Group on a Nuclear Test Ban will start its work as soon as possible, with a wider mandate covering not only verification but also the scope of an agreement.

In recent months there has been a series of proposals by the Superpowers on certain vital aspects of disarmament. We hope that these proposals will be taken up seriously by those to whom they are addressed. We have heard about the zero option proposed by one Superpower. We hope it will not be rejected out of hand, especially now that it has been made known that it is not a take-it-or-leave-it proposal. In other words, it can be modified by negotiations.

In this Committee we have also received document CD/338, introduced by the distinguished Ambassador of Czechoslovakia. The document contains a proposal by the Warsaw Pact countries for the conclusion of a treaty on the "mutual renunciation of the use of military force and the maintenance of peaceful relations" between them

(Mr. Ijewere, Nigeria)

and the NATO countries. It is explained in the document that the core of the treaty could be "the mutual commitment of the States members of the two alliances not to be the first to use nuclear or conventional arms against one another, and thus not to be the first to use against one another military force in general". Moreover the treaty would contain a commitment by the signatories "not to use force against third countries".

It is the view of my delegation that this proposal deserves serious consideration. We are not naive enough to believe that negotiating such an agreement will be an easy task. Nothing of value is easy to acquire and one should not abandon a worthwhile cause simply because it is difficult to realize. We are pleased to note that so far there has not been any outright rejection of the Prague proposals. Indeed, the only major reaction known to my delegation is that by the Vice-Chancellor and Foreign Minister of the Federal Republic of Germany, Mr. Hans-Dietrich Genscher when he addressed us on 3 February this year. On that occasion he said, "The North Atlantic defence alliance is ready to examine whether the Warsaw Pact declaration opens possibilities for applying the principle of the ban on force embodied in the United Nations Charter even more consistently in relations among States". In our opinion this is an encouraging development provided that serious steps are taken to examine the proposals leading to actual negotiations in good faith.

Before closing I should like to speak briefly on two major items of special concern to my delegation. The first is the problem of an arms race in outer space. It is our view, which we have held consistently, that outer space must be a zone of peace to be used for the benefit of all mankind. Serious efforts should be made by this Committee to implement General Assembly resolution 37/83 calling upon it to establish an ad hoc working group on the subject at the beginning of the 1983 session, with a view to undertaking negotiations for the conclusion of an agreement or agreements, as appropriate, to prevent an arms race in all its aspects in outer space.

The second is the need to prevent the outbreak of nuclear war. At no time in recent years is the prospect of an outbreak of nuclear war more imminent than today, thanks to the complete lack of meaningful dialogue between the East and West and the fast development of military technology, which is now a major factor in the conduct of international relations. This foreboding scenario, in our humble opinion, requires this Committee to do its utmost to respond to the call made by the world community at the thirty-seventh session of the United Nations General Assembly to undertake, as a matter of urgency, negotiations with a view to achieving agreement on appropriate and practical measures for the prevention of nuclear war.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the representative of Nigeria for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the Chairman.

I now give the floor to the representative of Ethiopia, Ambassador Terrefe.

Mr. TERREFE (Ethiopia): Comrade Chairman, it gives me great pleasure to see you presiding at the opening of the 1983 session of the Committee on Disarmament and to wish you well as you strive to conduct the beginning of our work in the direction of the progress we all seek to achieve.

My delegation is gratified that your predecessor in the chair, the distinguished Ambassador García Robles of Mexico, who is acclaimed by all as a staunch advocate of peace and genuine disarmament has earned the Nobel Peace Prize for 1982. We would like, through you, Sir, to extend our warmest congratulations to him. The many qualities which Ambassador García Robles has displayed are so well known that we are proud to have someone like him in our midst, one who has devoted the better part of his active life to the struggle for peace and disarmament. We also join those delegations which have paid tribute to Mrs. Myrdal as co-winner of the Nobel Peace Prize and request the delegation of Sweden, through you, Comrade Chairman, kindly to convey our congratulations to her.

I should like to welcome our new colleagues in the Committee, the distinguished representatives of Algeria, China, India, Japan, Sweden, the United Kingdom and Venezuela. My delegation would also like to extend its congratulations to Mr. Jan Martenson on his appointment as Under-Secretary-General of the Department for Disarmament Affairs in New York.

No one can fail to note with deep concern the serious anxiety of the peoples of the world as regards the current international situation. It is undeniable that the world is in a period of economic and political tension, the effects of which permeate the entire fabric of all international relations. Aggressive postures characterize most ongoing negotiations. Ethiopia and other developing countries believe in the principles of peaceful coexistence and are struggling to create the conditions for economic and social development. For this reason they should not be prime targets for international imperialism, or co-ordinated military, political and economic aggression.

In the Committee on Disarmament, the main issue now is the prevention of nuclear war. The Group of 21 and the socialist group have justifiably called for this question to be inscribed as a separate item on the Committee's agenda and a corresponding ad hoc working group to be established. Ethiopia fully supports this proposal which should merit the highest priority attention. As stated by my delegation in the past, Ethiopia cannot accept the notion of equating or linking the prevention of nuclear war with other political issues. We reject such an argument, which only serves as a pretext for preventing negotiations for practical measures on this urgent question.

On the question of a nuclear test ban, Ethiopia has consistently called for the conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty and would favour the ad hoc working group resuming and continuing its work with a broader mandate so as to negotiate on all aspects of the issue. My delegation also favours the establishment of a working group on item 2, i.e., the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament. The recent session of the General Assembly has drawn attention to the need for the setting up of a working group on this question in resolution 37/78 G, which urges this Committee to establish an ad hoc working group "as a matter of urgency". A mandate for such a working group has been proposed by the delegation of India (CD/309) as well as by the German Democratic Republic (CD/193), both of which we feel deserve support. The complete cessation of nuclear weapon tests has been a basic objective of the United Nations for the past two decades. The technical and scientific aspects of the problem have been adequately examined. What remains to be achieved is the political

(Mr. Terrefe, Ethiopia)

decision to discontinue all nuclear-weapon tests for all times and in all environments. Resolution 37/72 calls upon the three States which are the depositaries of the partial test-ban Treaty and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to halt without delay all nuclear explosions. This resolution also urges States to refrain from testing in the environments covered by the 1983 Treaty. My delegation has supported this resolution and will continue to press for its implementation in the course of our negotiations.

My delegation once again reiterates the urgency of keeping Africa free from nuclear weapons, in view of the growing international concern that South Africa's nuclear weapon capability is posing grave danger, not only to the security of African States whose territorial integrity the racist regime has been continuously violating, but also to international peace and security in general. The continued collaboration of certain Western countries with the racist regime in Pretoria constitutes an affront to the international community. My delegation continues to condemn such acts.

My delegation strongly supports the principle of declaring regions as nuclear-weapon-free zones. There is no reason why the successful experience of the Latin American region in this respect could not be repeated in Europe and elsewhere. A number of speakers have also emphasized the principle of equality and equal security in disarmament negotiations. It is difficult for many of us to comprehend the reason why on the part of certain countries there is such lack of enthusiasm to negotiate in good faith.

In its resolution 37/77 A the General Assembly requested the Committee on Disarmament to prepare a draft comprehensive agreement on the prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons. Part B of the same resolution recognizes the need to refrain from taking measures to increase the quantity or improve the quality of weapons of mass destruction. On the other hand the resolution calls upon all States to undertake efforts to ensure that scientific and technological achievements may be used only for peaceful purposes. This has always been the wish of all developing countries. Judging from the massive peace campaigns and the unfolding economic crisis being observed in industrialized countries it seems to be the only sound course of action.

As regards the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons, useful work has already been done. The Ethiopian delegation would like to emphasize the necessity for the earliest possible conclusion of a convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and their destruction. While some outstanding issues pertaining to the scope of the future convention and its verification require intensified negotiations and greater flexibility by all, it would be highly essential and imperative not to further complicate the present negotiations by pursuing the development and production of new types of chemical weapons. In this respect, resolution 37/98 A adopted by the United Nations General Assembly deserves attention. In its operative paragraph 5, the resolution "reaffirms its call to all States to refrain from any action that could impede negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons and specifically to refrain from the production and deployment of binary and other new types of chemical weapons, as well as from stationing chemical weapons on the territory of other States". Assent to this resolution by the United States which, regrettably, was the only State to have voted against, as well as the resumption of the bilateral negotiations between the USSR and the United States as called for in the resolution could, we believe, facilitate chemical weapons negotiations in the Ad Hoc Working Group.

(Mr. Terrefe, Ethiopia)

In accordance with the Concluding Document of the second special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament, the Committee is requested to submit a revised draft comprehensive programme of disarmament. While grateful for the effective leadership provided by the Chairman of the CPD Ad Hoc Working Group, we consider that the task of elaborating a CPD requires active participation and a constructive spirit of accommodation from all.

On the prevention of an arms race in outer space, my delegation reiterates its position in support of the undertaking of concrete measures that would prohibit any military or hostile use of outer space. The best way to tackle this would be the establishment of an ad hoc working group on the subject, as was recommended by the General Assembly in its resolution 37/83. Last year my delegation expressed the hope for a common approach on this subject. It is our hope again that the draft mandate proposed by the Group of 21 in document CD/329 will be accepted as a basis for the establishment of an ad hoc working group on the subject.

There are three new items proposed for inclusion on the agenda for this session of the Committee. As to the item relating to the prevention of nuclear war, I have already expressed the full support of my delegation. With respect to the item on the prohibition of the nuclear neutron weapon, we consider it appropriate and relevant for the Committee to have the item included on our agenda. The nuclear neutron weapon represents a further step in the qualitative arms race in the field of nuclear weapons and therefore constitutes a grave threat, as stated in resolution 37/78 E, "particularly to the unprotected civilian population".

On the question of item 10 of the draft agenda, i.e., "Ensuring the safe development of nuclear energy", my delegation would have no objection to its being inscribed on the agenda as the intention is to seek a solution to overcome the difficulties encountered in the ad hoc working group on radiological weapons. In the past few days, we have listened to words uttered by important personalities which we cannot treat lightly in our search for a common basis of negotiation. But words are not sufficient in themselves to lessen the danger of nuclear catastrophe. As you pointed out in your opening statement, Mr. Chairman, the peoples of the world attach great hopes to the successful conclusion of the Soviet-United States talks on the limitation and reduction of nuclear and strategic weapons, without which a new spiral of the arms race would be inevitable. On the other hand the Committee on Disarmament and the bilateral negotiations would contribute immensely to the halting of the arms race if confidence-building measures were taken to lessen the present military confrontation, the threat of the use of force, and aggression and the destabilization of peace in various regions of the world.

No responsible community can accept passively the alarming news about the quantitative increase and qualitative improvement in nuclear weapons. We hear news that the United States is determined to deploy, by the end of 1983, some 572 cruise and Pershing II missiles some of them capable of reaching targets deep in the Soviet Union in a matter of minutes. It is also stated that the number of nuclear explosions by the nuclear-weapon States increased to 55 in 1982 as compared with 49 in 1981, rendering arms reduction and the limitation of the arms race an elusive goal. The USSR has demonstrated the necessary political will for mutual reduction of these nuclear warheads. From the other side, however, simply to reject such an offer is unreasonable, and to expect the impossible by way of concessions is also callous.

(Mr. Terrefe, Ethiopia)

The United Nations resolved last December by a vote of 111 to 1 with 35 abstentions that all nuclear tests should be outlawed. The opposing vote was that of the United States. In the limited test-ban treaty of 1963, both the United States and the USSR pledged themselves "to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time". The non-proliferation Treaty also included a similar pledge.

It is with these in view that my delegation recalls the unparalleled mass support for a nuclear freeze and the peace campaign which is currently under way in many countries. My country attaches great importance to the initiative of such peace-loving forces and fully supports the campaign. For us peace and security are inseparable and we believe that "the increase in weapons, especially nuclear weapons, far from helping to strengthen international security, on the contrary weakens it" and that "nuclear weapons today constitute much more a threat than a protection for the future of mankind".

It is terrifying for us to contemplate the fact that hundreds of millions of people would be killed in a full-scale nuclear war through thermal and nuclear radiation, through the blast wave generated by nuclear explosions and through the lethal effects of radioactive fallout. We know that there would be no safe location in the world during or after a nuclear war and that the chances that society as a whole would survive are negligible.

This is why we believe that we should seek security in disarmament and why we oppose all theories of "limited", "winnable" or "protracted" nuclear war, for they are all illusory and dangerous. This fact has been clearly stated in working paper CD/341 presented by the Group of 21. The immediate goal of all States, as was expressly declared in the Final Document of the special session of the General Assembly of 1978, is "the elimination of the danger of a nuclear war". "Mobilizing world public opinion on behalf of disarmament" is therefore a universal task.

It is to be hoped that the momentum for disarmament efforts will accelerate, in response to the yearning of nations for a world free from the fear of nuclear catastrophe.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the representative of Ethiopia for his statement, and for the kind words addressed to the Chairman.

I now give the floor to the representative of the German Democratic Republic, Ambassador Herder.

Mr. HERDER (German Democratic Republic): In paragraph 50 of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, all States Members of the United Nations emphasized that the achievement of nuclear disarmament would require the urgent negotiation of agreements, inter alia on the cessation of the qualitative improvement and development of nuclear-weapon systems.

One of the first steps in this regard could be negotiations with a view to concluding a convention on the prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling, deployment and use of nuclear neutron weapons. That would be an important contribution to and element of a comprehensive solution to the problem of nuclear disarmament.

(Mr. Herder, German Democratic Republic)

Such a step, supported by a growing majority of United Nations Member States, would also correspond to the demands of a broad mass movement which, especially in many European countries, has called for urgent action to prohibit the nuclear neutron weapon, ever since plans for its production were announced.

The socialist group, therefore proposes that the Committee on Disarmament include the item "Prohibition of the nuclear neutron weapon" in its agenda and establish the necessary organizational conditions for such negotiations. The best framework for the elaboration of the above-mentioned convention would be an ad hoc working group.

Since many representatives have asked for a more detailed explanation of the reasons behind proposals for items to be included in the agenda of the Committee on Disarmament, my delegation would like to ask you, Comrade Chairman, to circulate as a working paper the position of the group of socialist countries on the nuclear neutron weapon.

This document which I transmitted to you for circulation reflects the views of the socialist group on this question and should facilitate an understanding on the inclusion of this question in the agenda as a separate item.

It refers to the fact that the nuclear neutron weapon and its introduction into military arsenals will lead to an escalation of the nuclear arms race. In the statement I made on 8 February 1983 I referred to the published views of scientists, considering this weapon as the first type of a new, third generation of nuclear weapons.

It has also been stated by many countries, for instance at the thirty-seventh session of the General Assembly, that nuclear neutron weapons will lower the nuclear threshold, thus making a nuclear war not only thinkable but also wageable. Moreover, they are a weapon par excellence for a potential aggressor, since their use would enable him to annihilate human beings and to take over intact material facilities such as towns, factories and the like after a relatively short time. These weapons are part of the concept of waging a "limited nuclear war" far from the territory of the user.

We hope that this document will be studied with the attention it deserves, so that a decision on the inclusion of a corresponding item in the agenda of the Committee on Disarmament can be taken soon.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the representative of the German Democratic Republic, Ambassador Herder, for his statement and for his introduction of a working paper. This document will be circulated as an official document of the Committee.

That concludes my list of speakers for today. Does any other delegation wish to speak?

Members will recall that, at our informal meeting yesterday, I announced that I would seek the Committee's approval for the State Secretary of Norway to address the Committee at its plenary meeting on Tuesday, 15 February. If there is no objection, I shall inform the Norwegian Mission accordingly. The question of Norway's request for participation in informal meetings and working groups will be taken up later, together with other such requests from non-members.

It was so decided.

The CHAIRMAN: As agreed yesterday, and in view of the need to continue our consideration of the draft provisional agenda and programme of work and other organizational matters, I shall convene an informal meeting immediately after **this** plenary meeting. In addition, I suggest that the Committee hold tomorrow, Friday, 11 February, an informal meeting at 3.30 p.m.

It was so decided.

The CHAIRMAN: The next plenary meeting of the Committee on Disarmament will be held on Tuesday, 15 February, at 10.30 a.m.

The meeting stands adjourned.

The meeting rose at 4.50 p.m.

FINAL RECORD OF THE ONE HUNDRED AND NINETY FOURTH PLENARY MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva
on Tuesday, 15 February 1983 at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman:

Mr. D. Erdembileg

(Mongolian)

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Algeria: Mr. B. OUL-ROUIS
Mr. A. TAFFAR
Mr. M. HADEF

Argentina: Mr. J.C. CARASALES
Mr. R. GARCIA MORITAN
Mr. R. VILLAMBROSA

Australia: Mr. D. SADLEIR
Mr. R. STEELE
Mr. T. FINDLAY

Belgium: Mr. A. ONKELINX
Mr. J.M. NOIRFALISSE
Mr. J.M. VAN GILS

Brazil: Mr. C.A. DE SOUZA E SILVA
Mr. S. DE QUEIROZ DUARTE

Bulgaria: Mr. K. TELLALOV
Mr. P. POPCHEV

Burma: U MAUNG MAUNG GYI
U TIN KYAW HLAING
U THAN TUN

Canada: Mr. D.S. McPHAIL
Mr. P.W. BASHAM

China: Mr. LI LUYE
Mr. TIAN JIN
Mrs. WANG ZHIYUN
Mr. LI CHANGHE
Mr. PAN ZHENQLANG
Mrs. GE YUYUN

Cuba: Mr. P. NUNEZ MOSQUERA

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. M. VEJVODA
Mr. A. CIMA
Mr. J. JIRUSEK
Mr. L. WANIEK

Egypt:

Mr. EL. S.A.R. EL REEDY
Mr. I.A. HASSAN
Miss W. BASSIM
Mr. A.M. ABBAS

Ethiopia:

Mr. T. TERREFE
Mr. F. YOHANNES

France:

Mr. F. DE LA GORCE
Mr. J. DE BEAUSSE
Mr. M. COUTHURES

German Democratic Republic:

Mr. G. HERDER
Mr. H. THIELICKE
Mr. F. SAYATZ
Mr. M. NOTZEL
Mr. M. SCHNEIDER
Mr. K.H. LOHS

Germany, Federal Republic of:

Mr. H. WEGENER
Mr. F. ELBE
Mr. W.E. VON DEM HAGEN
Mr. W. ROHR
Mr. J. PFIRSCHKE

Hungary:

Mr. I. KOMIVES
Mr. F. GADJA
Mr. T. TOTH

India:

Mr. M. DUBEY
Mr. S. SARAN

Indonesia:

Mr. N.S. SUTRESNA
Mrs. P. RAMADHAM
Mr. B. DARMOSUTANTO
Mr. I.H. WIRAATMADJA
Mr. HARYOMATARAM
Mr. F. QASIM

Iran:

Mr. F. SHAHABI

Italy:

Mr. M. ALESSI
Mr. B. CABRAS
Mr. C.M. OLIVA
Mr. E. DI GIOVANNI

Japan:

Mr. R. IMAI
Mr. M. TAKAHASHI
Mr. K. TANAKA
Mr. M. YAMAMOTO
Mr. T. ARAI

Kenya:

Mr. D.D.C. DON NANJIRA

Mexico:

Mr. A. GARCIA ROBLES
Mr. Z. GONZALEZ Y REYNERO

Mongolia:

Mr. D. ERDEMBILEG
Mr. L. ERDIENCHULUUN
Mr. J. CHOINKHOR
Mr. S.O. BOLD

Morocco:

Mr. A. SKALLI
Mr. M. CHERAIBI

Netherlands:

Mr. F. VAN DONGEN
Mr. R.J. AKKERMAN
Mr. H. WAGENMAKERS

Nigeria:

Mr. A.N.C. NWAZOMEDOH
Mr. J.O. OBOH
Mr. L.O. AKINDELE
Mr. A.A. ADEDOJU
Miss I.E.C. UKEJE

Pakistan:

Mr. M. AHMAD
Mr. T. ALTAF

Peru:

Mr. P. CANNOCK
Mr. V. ROJAS

Poland:

Mr. J. ZAWALONKA
Mr. S. KONIK
Mr. J. CIALOWICZ
Mr. T. STROJWAS
Mr. G. CZEMPINSKI

Romania:

Mr. I. DATCU
Mr. T. MELESCANU

Sri Lanka:

Mr. A.T. JAYAKODDY
Mr. H.M.G.S. PALIHAKKARA

Sweden:

Mr. C. LIDGARD
Mr. G. EKHOLM
Mr. H. BERGLUND
Mr. J. LUNDIN
Mr. H. ISRAELSSON
Mr. O. DAHLMAN
Mrs. A. LAU-ERIKSSON
Mr. H. OLSSON

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

Mr. V.L. ISSRAELIAN
Mr. B.P. PROKOFIEV
Mr. R.M. TIMERBAEV
Mr. V.M. GANJA
Mr. L.A. NAUMOV
Mr. G.V. BERDENNIKOV
Mr. A.P. FILATKIN
Mr. Y.V. KOSTENKO
Mr. A.P. KOUTEPOV
Mr. V.A. KROKHA
Mr. V.F. PRIAKHIN
Mr. G.N. VASHADZE
Mr. V.A. EVODOKOUSHIN

United Kingdom:

Mr. L.J. MIDDLETON
Mrs. J.I. LINK
Miss J.E.F. WRIGHT

United States of America:

Mr. L.G. FIELDS
Mr. M.D. BUSBY
Mr. H.L. CALHOUN
Mr. P.S. CORDEN
Ms. K. CRITTENBERGER
Mr. W. HECKROTTE
Mr. J.J. HOGAN
Mr. R.L. HORNE
Mr. J. MARTIN
Mr. R. MIKULAK

Venezuela:

Mr. A. LÓPEZ OLIVER
Mr. O. GARCÍA GARCIA

Yugoslavia:

Mr. K. VIDAS
Mr. M. MIHAILOVIC

Zaire:

Mr. B. ADEITO NZENGEYA
Mrs. ESAKI-EKANGA KABEYA

Secretary-General of the
United Nations:

Mr. J. PEREZ DE CUELLAR

Under-Secretary-General for
Disarmament Affairs:

Mr. J. MARTENSON

Director General of the United Nations
Office at Geneva:

Mr. E. SUY

Secretary of the Committee on
Disarmament and Personal
Representative of the
Secretary-General:

Mr. R. JAIPAL

Deputy Secretary of the
Committee on Disarmament:

Mr. V. BERASATEGUI

Non-Member States

Norway:

Mr. E. BERG

The CHAIRMAN: I declare open the 194th plenary meeting of the Committee on Disarmament.

At the outset I wish to extend, on behalf of all members of the Committee, a warm welcome to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Mr. Javier Pérez de Cuéllar, who has been taking a deep and active interest in the promotion of negotiations on measures of disarmament. His presence among us at this juncture reflects his concern that these negotiations should be pursued with intensified efforts and greater faith. I am sure we shall derive encouragement from his views and advice.

I would also like to welcome the State Secretary of Norway, Mr. Eivinn Berg, who will speak today. The State Secretary of Norway is well known to the Committee, which he has addressed before. I am sure that all members will follow his statement with interest.

I have also on my list of speakers for today the representatives of Pakistan, Czechoslovakia, Sri Lanka, France, Hungary and Algeria.

I now give the floor to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Mr. Javier Pérez de Cuéllar.

Mr. PÉREZ DE CUÉLLAR (Secretary-General of the United Nations) (translated from French): Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the Committee on Disarmament, allow me first of all to thank you, Sir, and all representatives in this Committee for your very kind welcome. It is a pleasure for me to speak before the Committee during my brief stay in Geneva. Some members of the Committee are old friends and former colleagues in the United Nations and I am very happy to see them again here.

I have sought this occasion to meet you today for two reasons that are paramount in my mind: firstly because I wish to underline the great responsibilities conferred on this Committee, the world's sole multilateral body for negotiating measures of disarmament, and secondly, because I am acutely conscious of the crucial stage we have reached in the history of mankind's efforts at disarmament, an endeavour of supreme importance to the preservation of human life and values.

At this time, we have arrived at a unique conjuncture. Both major nuclear-weapon Powers have declared their solemn intention of reaching agreement on curbing the nuclear arms race. During a visit I paid to Washington recently, President Reagan impressed upon me his sincere determination to negotiate. I am looking forward to meeting General Secretary Andropov in Moscow next month; he has also reiterated his strong commitment to progress in the negotiations. Here in Europe, governments are giving high priority to exploring means of arms limitation, a priority which is indeed shared by all countries of East and West, North and South alike. Concurrently, I know that the non-aligned movement, which since its inception has been making sustained efforts to achieve disarmament, will continue to focus attention on this vital question at its forthcoming meeting in New Delhi. This growing momentum cannot be lost.

Parallel to such developments is the mounting concern among peoples all over the world at the threat of nuclear war. Here in Europe, and indeed in every corner of the globe, we see the ferment of public debate on an issue which is engaging people in all sectors of life as rarely before.

(Mr. Pérez de Cuéllar, Secretary-General)

The nuclear-weapon Powers bear a special and heavy responsibility to all mankind. For it is humanity as a whole that now lives in the shadow of a threat unique in its history, the threat of extinction. Moreover, the danger of nuclear war breaking out has not lessened over the years, but instead the possibility seems to have increased with the advent of new weapons and the greater accuracy of their delivery. For the peoples of the world, the fragile state of their existence has at times been considered too horrible to contemplate, and at times resisted with all the conviction of the instinct for survival. At the heart of the public movement that is now gathering strength lies a deepening understanding by many people of the true nature of nuclear war, a conflict in which there will be no winners and where all that will be left is what has been described as a republic of insects and grass. The realization is dawning that the choice is between new generations of weapons and future human generations.

As greater public involvement is brought about by deep concern over an ever escalating arms race, the importance of a well-informed international opinion becomes essential. We at the United Nations are doing what we can to foster constructive public debate with the World Disarmament Campaign, launched by the General Assembly, which is aimed at further informing, educating and generating public opinion in favour of disarmament, in an objective manner and in all countries.

The United Nations Charter, as you know, contains two very specific mandates to further the cause of disarmament. Article 11 of the Charter assigns to the General Assembly the function of considering and making recommendations with regard to "the principles governing disarmament and the regulation of armaments". In fact, the General Assembly has gone far beyond the enunciation of principles and has recommended priorities, objectives, measures, a programme of action and a negotiating forum. Article 26 provides for the Security Council to submit to the Members of the Organization "plans for the establishment of a system for the regulation of armaments ...". No such plans have been submitted by the Security Council.

A further dimension of our efforts to promote disarmament is given by the vexed and complex relationship between disarmament and international security. There can be no doubt that the arms race in itself threatens international security. At the same time, as I stressed in my annual report to the General Assembly, in the absence of an effective system of international security, governments feel it necessary to arm themselves beyond their means. The problem is to find ways of enhancing the collective security machinery afforded by the United Nations Charter and by the Security Council in particular.

The crisis facing the multilateral approach and the instruments created to pursue it, which unfortunately we can see in many areas of United Nations endeavour, is also evident in the field of disarmament. I am indeed conscious of the fact that multilateral negotiations have been going on continuously in Geneva since 1962 and that they have so far yielded only a number of useful, but nevertheless partial, measures of disarmament. Obviously, none of them has put a stop to the arms race.

At its first special session devoted to disarmament, in 1978, the United Nations General Assembly recognized that "the removal of the threat of a world war -- a nuclear war -- is the most acute and urgent task of the present day". Little, if any, progress has been achieved on this score, although the prevention of nuclear war

(Mr. Pérez de Cuéllar, Secretary-General)

covers a wide range of political and technical measures which require careful consideration by nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States alike. Since it poses a threat to the survival of the human species, nuclear war is a matter of concern to all. I see no other body at present where a balanced and representative membership may engage in a thorough discussion of that most important question.

The past four-and-a-half years have also seen frequent outbreaks of conventional war, with untold loss of life, destruction and human suffering as a result. Disarmament can of course not be restricted to nuclear arms, and effective measures to promote conventional disarmament are essential both to increase security and to help prevent the violence and bloodshed that we see today in various parts of the world. Precisely the opposite effect is achieved by the continued conventional arms race. It is up to governments and the international community as a whole to restrain this deplorable trend and to use, instead, available alternatives to assure security.

A further imperative for disarmament is the need to use our scarce resources wisely for the promotion of social and economic progress. I would recall the same Article 26 of the Charter, which urges disarmament in order to promote the establishment and maintenance of international peace and security with the least diversion for armaments of the world's human and economic resources. As a national of a developing country, I am especially concerned at the grievous and senseless waste of resources on armaments which could instead be used to meet fundamental requirements in those countries. The fact that armaments and development are in a competitive relationship for global resources has been made clear by a recent United Nations study. Additionally, the latest United Nations experts' reports on the economic and social consequences of the arms race and of military expenditures stresses the threat to the security of nations posed by underdevelopment. Both expert reports indicate that development is a near universal requirement in that it includes the need for an accelerated economic performance by the developing countries and a sustained rate of economic growth by the developed countries. The conclusion is obvious: the world cannot sustain the present levels of military consumption of its finite resources without making development a casualty of armaments.

I stressed in my first message to your Committee last year that we cannot afford to wait for the dawn of ideal conditions before undertaking measures of disarmament. Differences in political and social systems are an inevitable aspect of our modern world and need not be obstacles to the stabilization of peace, provided the necessity for mutual tolerance and restraint is acknowledged and practised. The peaceful resolution of international disputes, the reconciliation of differences and conflicts of interest, the removal of misperceptions and misunderstandings, and the promotion of all forms of co-operation — these are the vital complements to the process of disarmament negotiations. In a word, the observance by Member States of their obligations under the United Nations Charter.

(Mr. Pérez de Cuéllar, Secretary-General)

World attention, there is no doubt, is concentrated on the bilateral talks between the Soviet Union and the United States on nuclear weapons. I attach the greatest importance to these negotiations. Nevertheless, I am equally convinced that progress in the work of the Committee on Disarmament should not be made hostage to their results. The tasks facing this body are indeed formidable and urgent by themselves. Your Committee has a comprehensive agenda and your annual programmes of work are clear evidence of sustained efforts to discover areas of convergence of views, to identify the issues that divide and to establish an agreed basis for negotiation. These efforts have not been easy, because there is unfortunately a relationship between the climate for negotiations and their results. At the same time, you will agree, effective disarmament measures can themselves promote a better climate and re-establish the momentum for progress that was so fleetingly achieved in 1978. It is therefore of vital importance that you should persevere in your labours with even greater vigour and determination.

Of especially high priority are the two nuclear questions on the Committee's agenda since 1979: a nuclear test ban and nuclear disarmament. No issue in the history of nuclear arms limitation has been given more prominence and attention than that of the comprehensive test ban. However, in spite of tremendous intellectual and technical efforts, including those by this Committee, it remains unresolved. My predecessors were unanimous in their strong support for a solution of this problem, which is long overdue. I share their concerns and would urge the Committee to make every effort to reach agreement on this key question. Let me recall here the general agreement reached at the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament that the cessation of nuclear-weapon testing would, inter alia, help to end the qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons and the development of new types of such weapons. This is an important objective in the context of the stern declaration of the first special session that "mankind must halt the arms race and proceed to disarmament or face annihilation".

As far as the question of nuclear disarmament is concerned, I feel sure that the Committee will look closely at the various concrete proposals that have been made so far and devise appropriate procedures for a sustained consideration of that question. The other issues on your agenda deserve equally pragmatic handling, notably the negotiations on chemical weapons. The Committee has been conducting an in-depth review of technical issues relating to a chemical weapons ban. The time now seems ripe for political action leading to agreement on this question.

As you know, there is a great deal of public interest in your endeavours to fashion a comprehensive programme of disarmament. You have already fully explored every dimension of this ambitious project. It is natural that there should be differences of opinion, perception and approach to any such long-term programme. I trust, however, that you will be able to reconcile these differences and effectively discharge your important mandate. In urging progress on this complex question, I bear in mind that your efforts are guided by an outstanding diplomat, whose well-known achievements need not be recalled. The Nobel Peace Prize awarded to my distinguished friend, Ambassador García Robles, is a timely recognition of his vision and devotion to the cause of disarmament.

(Mr. Pérez de Cuéllar, Secretary-General)

Let me also touch on one of the fundamental dilemmas that you often face. In dealing with the specific disarmament issues before you, the technical problems can usually be overcome, but problems that have a bearing on confidence between nations are more difficult to surmount. Differences of opinion over the adequacy of measures for verifying compliance with disarmament agreements are really reflections of deep-seated suspicions. Verification is certainly essential to disarmament arrangements, but in the absence of mutual trust, it can assume an importance beyond its original purpose.

Mr. Chairman, members of the Committee,

In the quest for disarmament, painstaking and unremitting efforts are vital for success. This Committee has exceptional possibilities before it. No other multilateral organ has accumulated such tremendous experience and expertise in an area that is considered one of the most complex, intractable and challenging in our time. You are uniquely qualified to forge a consensus on several key disarmament issues. This will require political courage and vision. Moreover, progress in your negotiations can have a significance that will go beyond the confines of your own agenda and encourage governments to tackle other aspects of disarmament with greater confidence and determination.

1983 will be a critical, indeed a crucial year for disarmament and therefore for the future of all of us. Governments must arrive at a more complete understanding of what true security entails. They must realize that there is no such thing as a national security in isolation, one that does not take into account the security of others. Above all, they must heed the call of people throughout the world that they seize the present occasion. It must not be said that, in disarmament, the governments of the world are failing the peoples of the world. For let us not forget that it is the peoples of the world who have resolved in the Charter of the United Nations that their governments shall combine their efforts to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war.

I wish you every success in your endeavours.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the Secretary-General for his important statement and for the kind words that he has addressed to me.

I understand that the Secretary-General of the United Nations has some other important and urgent engagements. May I suggest that we now have a short recess for him to leave. We will resume the plenary meeting in five minutes' time.

The plenary meeting is suspended.

The meeting was suspended for five minutes.

The CHAIRMAN: The 194th plenary meeting of the Committee on Disarmament is resumed. I now give the floor to the State Secretary of Norway, Mr. Eivinn Berg.

Mr. BERG (Norway): Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the Committee, ladies and gentlemen, may I first of all, Mr. Chairman, thank you for your very warm words of welcome. I am indeed extremely happy to take the floor today under your able leadership at a time when disarmament matters are the subject of increasing attention around the world. This, I think, represents an additional challenge, a challenge also for the important work of this Committee.

I am also greatly honoured to be present this morning and to take the floor following the important statement just made by the Secretary-General of the United Nations, His Excellency Mr. Pérez de Cuéllar. His personal appearance here today gives added weight and urgency to the process of multilateral disarmament negotiations. His enlightening and thought-provoking address today will no doubt be very carefully registered and examined by all who consider disarmament to be of vital concern to the future of mankind.

Permit me also, Mr. Chairman, in the context of this Committee, to extend my heartfelt congratulations to Ambassador García Robles. It was indeed an honour to have him visit Norway last December to receive the Nobel Peace Prize, awarded by the Norwegian Nobel Committee to him and another distinguished person, Mrs. Alva Myrdal, who also made substantial contributions to the work of this Committee over the years.

There is today a new sense of urgency in the field of disarmament, not only on this continent but in the world at large.

The current Soviet-American negotiations in Geneva on limitations on intermediate-range nuclear forces are of particular importance to the security of Europe.

Norway, as you know, is fully in support of the dual-track decision of the Western alliance and remains convinced that the zero option, that is, the elimination of this category of weapons altogether, would represent an ideal outcome of these talks. This, however, does not mean that the zero option is the only acceptable solution. As has been stated repeatedly, we are prepared to study constructively any serious proposal that would re-establish balance and lead to real reductions in this field.

Neither governments individually nor negotiating bodies such as this Committee can dismiss the increasing public interest in disarmament. In my view, this public interest represents a valuable source of support in our efforts to find constructive solutions to urgent disarmament issues.

As a representative of a small nation, I should like to stress the significance of disarmament talks along a variety of parallel and mutually supportive paths. Negotiating efforts in multilateral bodies such as this Committee would stand to gain from increasing bilateral and other forms of contact among its major members with a view to facilitating progress. Similarly, the search for arms control and disarmament must continue in its own right, although this is not to say that disarmament talks are taking place in a political vacuum.

(Mr. Berg, Norway)

As part of its security policy the Norwegian Government has drawn up its own very comprehensive disarmament programme. On the basis of two recent white papers submitted to Parliament and which we hope will be the subject of debate this spring, the outline of this comprehensive programme can be summarized briefly as follows:

Firstly, an adequate and credible national defence, combined with participation in an alliance, together with active support for arms control and disarmament, constitute integral parts of our security policy.

Secondly, active involvement in arms control and disarmament must aim at supporting efforts to create a militarily stable situation and seek undiminished security at the lowest possible level of armaments between east and west and in the world as a whole.

Thirdly, as a member of a defence alliance, Norway attaches great importance to the commitment of this alliance to concrete results in the talks on nuclear arms limitation and reduction here in Geneva and those on conventional force reductions in Vienna, and to a substantial and balanced outcome of the Madrid meeting, including a clear and precise mandate for a disarmament conference in Europe.

Fourthly, the United Nations and its major bodies should play a central role in the field of disarmament deliberations. As regards multilateral disarmament talks, Norway attaches particular importance to this very Committee on Disarmament as the single multilateral negotiating forum and would like to see this body strengthened.

Fifthly, broad popular and, I may add, as indeed did the Secretary-General a few minutes ago, informed involvement in disarmament matters is of great significance and should be encouraged. Similarly, openness about security policy matters both nationally and in a global context is highly desirable.

Finally, active involvement in disarmament matters make appropriate institutional arrangements necessary both at home and abroad.

Taking this programme of the Norwegian Government as a point of departure, I should like now, with your permission, to comment in somewhat more detail on a few selected subject matters before this Committee.

A comprehensive test ban is of singular importance in multilateral disarmament negotiations. A comprehensive test ban would have two significant consequences, as we see it. In the first place, it would be essential in order to stop the further vertical and horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons. Secondly, a comprehensive test ban would improve the prospects for multilateral disarmament negotiations in general.

Norway hopes that the establishment in 1982 of a Working Group on a Nuclear Test Ban can pave the way for further progress in this field. The present mandate of the Working Group is far from exhausted. In particular, more work should be done with regard to the establishment of a global seismic network which can verify compliance with a nuclear test ban. My Government believes that a proposed global seismic network will play a central role in verifying a comprehensive test ban. The establishment of such a network should take full advantage of recent technological advances in this field. As a result, we should be much better equipped than before to deal conclusively with the substantive issues involved.

(Mr. Berg, Norway)

In this connection I would like to recall to the Committee that representatives of the Norwegian Seismic Array (NORSAR) last year demonstrated for members of this Committee a prototype system for international seismic data exchange, using regular telecommunications and a low-cost microprocessor-based system. At present, NORSAR is planning an international experimental exchange of level II data. An invitation has in fact been extended by NORSAR to all experts represented in the seismic expert Group of the Committee. A working paper will be presented later to the Committee on the basis of the results of this experiment.

The prevention of an arms race in outer space is becoming an increasingly important task. Recent technological developments demonstrate that further international instruments beyond the outer space treaty of 1967 are essential. In particular, and as a first step, attention should be focused on the development of anti-satellite weapons and their destabilizing effects on international security. To this end, Norway co-sponsored last year a General Assembly resolution on the prevention of an arms race in outer space and the prohibition of anti-satellite systems. This resolution calls for further measures and appropriate international negotiations in accordance with the 1967 Treaty, such as the establishment of a working group on outer space in the Committee on Disarmament.

My Government believes that an intensification of the Committee's activity in this field is desirable and that the deliberations will benefit from adequate assistance from experts. We would hope that the major space Powers would offer such assistance in order to expedite the Committee's work. Other countries ought to draw on available expertise as well. For our part we should like to follow closely the work of the Committee also in this area, while drawing on our own experts. Many of the issues involved may seem complex and maybe even remote today. We are convinced, however, that these are issues with a major bearing on future strategic stability and therefore on the security of all of us.

Norway recognizes the importance of the progress which was made during the 1982 session of the Committee on Disarmament in the negotiations concerning a multilateral convention on chemical weapons. We are indeed encouraged by recent developments and would like to welcome the new United States initiative announced in this Committee by Vice-President Bush on 4 February. In a statement on the same day, the Norwegian Foreign Minister expressed the hope that this move would provide a new impetus in these negotiations. The document which Ambassador Fields presented on 10 February certainly provides the Committee with a fresh opportunity to intensify the negotiations on such a convention. Given this document, together with the basic provisions which Foreign Minister Gromyko of the USSR introduced during the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, it seems that a sound basis has now been established for real negotiations with a view to concluding a convention containing adequate provisions for on-site inspection. Energetic efforts should now be made to prepare a draft convention at the earliest date, while solving all outstanding issues.

(Mr. Berg, Norway)

In our view this is more than ever a priority task in multilateral disarmament. The importance which my Government attaches to this question is demonstrated by the fact that a research project has been undertaken in Norway dealing with verification of a chemical weapons convention. Last year, as the Committee will recall, we presented a working paper on the results of the first phase of this research project. The second stage of the project is now under way. The results of this will be presented in a follow-up document during the second part of this year's session.

Before commenting on certain institutional matters, I would like to stress that Norway will take part in the working groups on other questions also. In particular, we consider it important that the Committee on Disarmament should agree this year on a comprehensive programme of disarmament. We intend to continue to contribute to this work.

During the thirty-seventh session of the General Assembly, Norway took an active part in efforts aimed at streamlining institutional arrangements in the field of multilateral disarmament. We had the honour to introduce the draft omnibus resolution in this field. It was adopted without a vote. This resolution has five operative parts, two of which, we feel, are of particular relevance to this Committee. Before commenting on this I should like to welcome the establishment of a Department for Disarmament Affairs in the United Nations Secretariat in New York and the fact that Mr. Jan Mårtenson, whom we know well as a very able diplomat and administrator, has been appointed Under-Secretary-General. I am very happy to see his presence here today.

We are also pleased that the General Assembly accepted our proposal to establish the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) as an autonomous institute while reviving the Secretary-General's Advisory Board, and making it serve as the Board of Trustees of UNIDIR. The Norwegian Government, I am proud to say, has recently decided to contribute \$25,000 to UNIDIR in order to assist it in carrying out independent research on disarmament and related security issues.

The omnibus resolution on institutional arrangements recommended that this Committee should consider designating itself as a conference. This recommendation, as you know, Mr. Chairman, has our full support. We understand that consultations are still going on concerning this question and we hope that the outcome will mean a strengthening of this body as the single multilateral negotiating forum.

In this connection permit me also to draw the attention of the Committee to another part of the omnibus resolution, dealing with the review of membership. At the second special session suggestions for an expansion of the membership of the Committee in a limited and balanced way received wide support.

The Norwegian Government hopes that the members of the Committee on Disarmament can complete the membership review this year. It is the hope of my Government that this review will result in an agreement on a limited expansion of the Committee's membership. We note, therefore, with appreciation that several delegations at the 1982 session and indeed at this session have spoken in favour of such a limited expansion and that there does not seem to be any objection in principle to such a solution.

Mr. Berg, Norway)

Although it may not be needed, I should nevertheless like to reiterate the strong desire of my Government that Norway should become a full member of this Committee. In this event, we are quite prepared to establish a separate disarmament delegation in Geneva and to strengthen further our apparatus at home and abroad in order to be able to participate actively and constructively in the Committee's activities. In particular, we would be interested in developing further our co-operation with Norwegian research institutes, drawing even more extensively than we do today on their expertise in disarmament affairs.

Finally, I should like to sum up very briefly how I see Norway's involvement in the activities of this Committee during the current session:

Pending a solution to the membership question, we should like to take full advantage of our observer status and continue our full and active participation in all of the Committee's working groups.

Norwegian scientists will continue to participate in the Group of seismic experts and in expert consultations on chemical weapons. In addition, we would like to see Norwegian experts follow the work of the Committee with regard to outer space.

We intend to continue allocating resources to research projects relevant to disarmament matters on the agenda of this Committee.

Working papers will be prepared on the verification of a chemical weapons convention and on the results of an international experimental exchange of seismic data (so-called level II data).

In sum, I think I can say that Norway has in fact never devoted so much attention, personnel and material resources to the cause of disarmament as we do today. And finally, may I make one brief observation and that is that we are witnessing today, all over the world, a strong development in public opinion, demanding an end to the arms race and in particular to what seems like an endless accumulation of nuclear weapons. With due regard, of course, to the security of our nations, we should, I think, redouble our efforts to achieve arms control agreements which are balanced, equitable and viable. The attention of the peoples of Europe is now focused on the work of this Committee. Concrete results are being called for. We trust that the Committee will be able to respond to the aspirations and expectations of all of us. I should like to conclude my statement by following up the wishes expressed by the Secretary-General and wishing you, Mr. Chairman, and your colleagues, the best of luck in your extremely important negotiations for the cause of peace.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the State Secretary of Norway for his statement, which I am sure has been followed with interest by the Committee, and for the kind words addressed to the Chairman. I now give the floor to the representative of Pakistan, Ambassador Ahmad.

Mr. AFMAD (Pakistan): Mr. Chairman, allow me to extend to you sincere felicitations on behalf of the Pakistan delegation on your assumption of the chairmanship for the first month of this session of the Committee on Disarmament. May I pledge to you the full co-operation of my delegation in the discharge of your duties.

I have great pleasure in welcoming our new colleagues, the Ambassadors of Algeria, China, India, Japan, the United Kingdom, Venezuela and Yugoslavia. The Committee, I have no doubt, will benefit greatly from the very rich diplomatic experience that each brings with him.

It is also my very pleasant duty to express our thanks to your predecessor as Chairman, Ambassador García Robles and to offer the congratulations of my delegation on the award of the Nobel Peace Prize for 1982 to him and to Mrs. Alva Myrdal of Sweden. The award is a fitting tribute to the untiring efforts of the co-recipients in the cause of peace through disarmament. Both have richly deserved it.

The award of the Nobel Peace Prize to these two outstanding personalities, who have crusaded for disarmament over decades, testifies to a new, acute awareness all over the world that peace is inextricably linked to disarmament. To us, associates of the distinguished Nobel laureate Ambassador García Robles, it must serve as a constant reminder of the crucial need for the Committee on Disarmament to accelerate the pace of multilateral negotiations on disarmament. The presence of the Secretary-General of the United Nations in our midst earlier this morning underlines both the importance of the multilateral process and the importance of this Committee, which is the sole multilateral negotiating body for disarmament.

The Secretary-General honoured the Committee with his participation in this plenary meeting. Given the interdependent world in which we live, he has, as head of the United Nations Organization, justly emphasized common security as the only means available to mankind to ensure its survival. His address strengthens our faith in the imperatives of international co-operation and understanding.

In a world dominated by the Superpowers and military alliances, the smaller, non-aligned nations find themselves relying increasingly on the moral authority of the United Nations and on the principles enshrined in the United Nations Charter, particularly those requiring countries to refrain from the threat or the use of force and from interference in the internal affairs of other nations while conducting inter-State relations. We in Pakistan attach the utmost importance to the upholding of these principles and to a policy of seeking friendship and peace in our region. I wish to take this opportunity to express our sincere appreciation for the very constructive efforts made by the Secretary-General to promote a just political settlement of the Afghanistan problem.

1983 is a year of exceptional importance for disarmament. New, more lethal, more accurate weapons systems have been deployed or are planned to be deployed in a part of the world already saturated with armaments if a mutually acceptable solution is not found soon at the INF talks between the two Superpowers. Should such an agreement not be forthcoming, another and more intense round in the arms race will inevitably follow. This is a frightening prospect even for a world already living under the spectre of a nuclear holocaust. A lower nuclear threshold means a dangerous shrinkage in the margin of time available for reflection and cool decision-making. Serious efforts, therefore, will need to be exerted to reach a satisfactory and equitable solution. Remaining locked on preferred options may not be the best way to make progress. There were signs of flexibility in some of the major statements made before the Committee on Disarmament in the first week of this session. We hope it will lead to concrete results at the negotiating table.

(Mr. Ahmad, Pakistan)

A tactical nuclear force cannot be separated from a strategic arsenal. The INF and START talks are, therefore, integrally linked to each other and in our view must be pursued in parallel.

The two Superpowers and their allies view these negotiations from a perspective of the need for balance and for equal security. As seen by the world at large, that is a narrow concept. The agreements sought to be reached in these negotiations will still leave a substantial number of powerful weapons in their silos, on submarines or on aircraft. Even if one does not give credence to the suggestion that each side's proposals are in fact a ploy to secure nuclear superiority for itself, we are still left on the wrong side of the threshold of mutually assured destruction. The non-aligned countries cannot close their eyes to the obvious threat that this poses to their security and survival. The negotiating process under way in Geneva therefore also raises our concern for enquiry into the larger issue of global security, and underlines our faith in multilateral negotiations on fundamental questions such as a nuclear test ban, the cessation of the nuclear arms race, nuclear disarmament and the prevention of a nuclear war. No one underestimates the importance and value of the negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union, but equally no one must regard these as dispensing with the role of the Committee on Disarmament.

Unfortunately the hopes invested in the Committee as a consequence of the commitments contained in the Final Document remain unfulfilled. There is precious little to show to the world as the Committee's contribution to disarmament. The causes for the Committee's failure are, firstly, the absence of political will and secondly, deeply held mutual suspicions which have come to be manifested in vociferous demands for verification on the one hand and an equally determined opposition to transparency on the other.

The absence of negotiations on a comprehensive test-ban treaty is due entirely to the lack of political will. The technical problems of verification and compliance with a nuclear test ban have been resolved. Only last week the Swedish representative gave us a detailed count of the underground test explosions carried out by each of the nuclear-weapon States in the past two years. The purpose of the restricted mandate which the Working Group on a Nuclear Test Ban was given late last year was to investigate a comprehensive verification regime. But the verification provisions of any disarmament instrument have to be related to the purpose and scope of that instrument. The Group was, therefore, destined to make little progress from the very start. We would strongly urge that this deficiency in the Group's mandate be removed to allow the commencement of negotiations on a test ban treaty itself. The mandate suggested by the Group of 21 in document CD/181 in our view provides the most suitable guideline in this respect.

An agreement on a nuclear test ban is absolutely the first step towards any progress on the entire range of nuclear disarmament issues. It will be self-deluding to believe that such a ban as a long-term goal will not have negative effects both on nuclear disarmament and on vertical as well as horizontal non-proliferation.

Failure to agree on a nuclear test ban was the principal obstacle to the adoption of a comprehensive programme of disarmament at the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. It is a matter of deep concern to us that prospects for progress in this regard have not improved in view of the assertion in this Committee once again that a ban on nuclear tests remains a long-term policy goal of one of the Superpowers. A comprehensive programme of disarmament in a nuclear age would be hollow, if not meaningless, if it did not include a nuclear test ban as a primary goal to be achieved in its first phase. We are afraid that continued disagreement in this respect will only jeopardize the substantial work done

(Mr. Ahmad, Pakistan)

in previous years on the comprehensive programme of disarmament and the schedule of work ahead of us in this session for the submission of the draft programme to the United Nations General Assembly at its thirty-eighth session. If we all stand firm by our commitments in the Final Document, then a measure of flexibility must become evident which will enable us to draw up a workable and generally acceptable programme to be implemented within a reasonable period of time. On the other hand failure to do so will entail, apart from the increasing threat to international security as a direct result of the accumulation of weaponry, an economic burden of serious proportions even for the most powerful and rich States. The alternative to the comprehensive programme of disarmament is a costly arms race which even the richest nations may not be able to afford. A quest for superiority is, by definition, unending. Given the conditions in which a large majority of the people of the world live, such a waste of resources is immoral.

As the major nuclear-weapon States continue to multiply their nuclear arsenals, the security of the non-nuclear weapon States comes to be increasingly threatened, even when the latter have taken no part in the arms race. It is logical, therefore, that they should demand credible and legally binding assurances about the non-use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against them. We have no doubt in our minds that the offer of effective negative security assurances can only reinforce the resolve of the non-nuclear-weapon States to maintain their non-nuclear status. We have had occasion in the past to point out that the existing unilateral declarations, with the exception of one, are inadequate, conditional and thus ineffective. These do not take into account the security concerns of the non-nuclear-weapon States but are based exclusively on the strategic perceptions of the nuclear-weapon Powers themselves. This ironic twist in the negotiations in the Ad Hoc Working Group on Security Assurances has, not surprisingly, brought about a deadlock, the responsibility for which rests entirely on some of the nuclear-weapon States.

But this impasse must not be interpreted as a signal to give up. As long as nuclear weapons exist, the security of the non-nuclear-weapon States will have to be a matter of urgent concern and serious negotiations. Our delegation, therefore, remains receptive to any indication of a desire on the part of the nuclear-weapon States concerned to resume negotiations in a constructive and fruitful manner. We believe that the extension of meaningful security assurances will not detract from the nuclear-weapon States' security needs. On the other hand, it will allay the legitimate fears of non-nuclear-weapon States and contribute to the relaxation of tensions in many regions of the world.

The proposal to include prevention of nuclear war as a new item on the agenda of the Committee deserves serious consideration. My delegation fully supports this proposal. That is not to say that we are unmindful of the different views and perceptions in this respect. On the contrary, we believe that the scope of the item admits their full consideration. An out of hand rejection of this important proposal will justifiably draw charges of a myopic outlook and parochial attitude. An open discussion of security compulsions and strategic planning will afford members of this Committee an opportunity to focus on the root causes of a possible nuclear war.

We are satisfied that 1982 was a productive year at least for the elaboration of a convention on chemical weapons. The contact groups have painstakingly worked out substantive details of the draft elements of a convention. Various views and perhaps all possible alternative approaches, ideas and proposals have been taken into account. The work, however, has now reached a plateau, and unless the major Powers display a degree of foresight and political will at this point, we may run the risk of sliding back to irreconcilable positions. On the question of verification, there was evidence late last year of a growing realization that a measure of least intrusive yet on site inspection is inescapable for ensuring mutual compliance with a future

(Mr. Ahmad, Pakistan)

convention. National verification measures alone are an insufficient and unacceptable guarantee. We need to build upon this in the Working Group this year.

A similar display of foresight at the decision-making level can forestall mass destruction which will certainly follow in the aftermath of an attack on nuclear facilities. Scientific enquiry has proved that this is the only possible means of radiological warfare available at present. Without the provision of a prohibition of attacks on nuclear facilities, the proposed radiological weapons treaty will be no more than a dead letter.

A view has been expressed that the prohibition of attacks on nuclear facilities should not be discussed by the Committee on Disarmament as it falls within the area of the rules of war. On the other hand, the prevention of nuclear war is justifiably considered a legitimate subject for this Committee's full and immediate attention. Radiological warfare and nuclear warfare are essentially the same in character and identical in their inhuman consequences. The mass-destruction criterion is equally applicable in both cases. To take a diametrically different view of radiological warfare from nuclear warfare is manifestly self-contradictory. This duality of approach is hard to comprehend.

We are encouraged that in another context many States have recently affirmed their agreement to deal with the protection of nuclear facilities within the radiological weapons treaty. Our delegation will continue to participate positively in negotiations aimed at preventing attacks on nuclear facilities, however modest, involved in all stages of the nuclear fuel cycle, in the interest of the speedy conclusion of a radiological weapons treaty.

Our delegation also hopes that a working group on the prevention of an arms race in outer space will be established to commence work at this session of the Committee. In view of the breathtaking developments in the area of warfare in outer space, it is imperative that serious negotiations begin immediately to prevent the emergence of new frontiers of the arms race. There is no longer any doubt as to the imminence of the development of the so-called futuristic weapons for use in space. An American writer, Ralph K. Bennet, in an article entitled "Struggle for Supremacy in Space", has the following to say in this regard: "A secret race is taking place in private and government laboratories around the United States, and in huge military-scientific complexes inside the Soviet Union, to see who will perfect a new generation of weapons of blinding speed and destructiveness. Such weapons could destroy all the satellites in the sky in a few minutes, and also any ICBM warheads in the upper atmosphere before they start on their ballistic paths back to targets on earth". These are portents of a critical time ahead of us.

At the beginning of my statement this morning, I spoke of the shift in contemporary perceptions, namely, that peace is linked not to the accumulation of weaponry but to disarmament. Its manifestation through rallies, peace marches, sit-ins, ecumenical congregations and scholastic seminars transcending national and political boundaries places a responsibility on our Committee which it cannot conscientiously ignore or even underestimate. It is the fervent hope of my delegation that the Committee will interpret this message correctly and that its response will be commensurate with the historical proportions of this challenge.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the representative of Pakistan for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the Chairman. I now give the floor to the representative of Czechoslovakia, Ambassador Vejvoda.

Mr. VEJVODA (Czechoslovakia): Comrade Chairman, in my statement today I intend to deal with the questions of the prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests, chemical weapons, and a comprehensive programme of disarmament, as well as with some other problems of international negotiations on disarmament.

But before I do so, let me express the deep satisfaction of my delegation at the fact that the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Mr. Pérez de Cuéllar, addressed our body this morning. His devotion to the cause of peace, international security and disarmament is well known in Czechoslovakia. We therefore listened with great interest to what he had to say to us. Now I wish to stress that we fully share his preoccupations and agree with his assessment of United Nations activity in the field of disarmament.

The thirty-seventh session of the United Nations General Assembly will be remembered as the one which vehemently drew the attention of the international community to the most urgent and vital problems of our times. More resolutions than ever before dealt not with specific problems or various procedural aspects, but directly addressed questions which have a bearing on the vital interests of all nations, on the safeguarding of peace and the solving of the most urgent disarmament problems.

The significance of resolutions concerning the prevention of nuclear war, the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament, the cessation and prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests and other important resolutions need not be commented on in detail in this body. I shall therefore limit myself to expressing the hope that the spirit of these resolutions will find its reflection in our negotiations this year. Let us hope that the Committee on Disarmament will not shy away from these priority questions while busying itself with other problems, sometimes rather marginal and technical, if not simply procedural. Last week when we discussed our agenda and programme of work, arguments were raised that we should not lose time on procedural matters. While we agree that subsidiary organs, when established, should use their time to the full, we categorically reject the assumption that efforts to include in the Committee's agenda top-priority items of the thirty-seventh session of the United Nations General Assembly are of a procedural nature.

All the world, the peoples of all the countries of the West and the East, the North and the South, are urging the adoption of measures aimed at the prevention of nuclear war. Nobody can diminish the importance of this highest priority question of our times. By no means, therefore, can we agree that the Committee on Disarmament should ignore this matter, not including it in its agenda. We insist that the item on the prevention of nuclear war be given its due place as a separate agenda item. Let me recall that this question was discussed in detail in one of the subsidiary bodies of the General Assembly at its second special session devoted to disarmament. As is well known, quite a number of concrete proposals were advanced during the deliberations of this body by the socialist and non-aligned countries and also by some western countries. In view of this we cannot even think of an agenda of the Committee on Disarmament without a separate item entitled "Prevention of nuclear war".

(Mr. Vejvoda, Czechoslovakia)

Almost a year has passed since we first created a working group on a nuclear test ban. Although the Committee has not had much opportunity to sit and negotiate during this time, the summer session of last year rather convincingly demonstrated that the present mandate does not give us much room for the actual preparation of the relevant treaty. My delegation, as well as many others, had serious reservations as to the limited nature of the Group's mandate. However, willing to give impetus to discussions on this question, we displayed the necessary flexibility. We hope now that those delegations which imposed upon us this limited mandate will duly take into consideration the justified demands of the majority of the members of the Committee on Disarmament and allow this body to proceed to the negotiations on an NTB treaty.

In expressing this hope, we regret that one nuclear-weapon State considers today as a long-term objective of its foreign policy what not long ago seemed to be taken as a priority matter. We still have fresh in our memory the words which the former United States representative to the Committee on Disarmament, Ambassador Flowerree, pronounced two and a half years ago in this room.

On 5 August 1980, Mr. Flowerree stated: "The desire of the vast majority of nations to see a CTBT come into effect at the earliest possible time is clear. It has been recorded in statements in this Committee and in the United Nations General Assembly. My country not only shares this sentiment but has demonstrated in a concrete way its willingness to work toward this goal by putting its best efforts into what have already proved to be long and difficult negotiations. It is not the goal on which we have disagreed but the most expeditious means of achieving it".

At the next meeting of the CD, on 7 August 1980, Mr. Flowerree, while referring to the report on the trilateral CTB negotiations, said:

"In the report, the three negotiating parties rededicate themselves to the early and successful completion of their work. As for the United States, we are determined to do our best to promote that vital effort, bearing in mind constantly the great responsibility placed on us by members of this Committee as well as by the world community at large."

Comparing these statements of the United States representative in the Committee on Disarmament of not so long ago with the statement of a very high-level government representative of the same country a few days ago, we can only wonder why such a change in the policy of this country has occurred. We would still like to believe that the recent statement was not the last word in this regard and that notwithstanding the changes in short- or long-term objectives of the United States Government, the United States delegation will display enough flexibility not to stand in the way of improving the mandate of the relevant Working Group, which is quite clearly not satisfying the needs of our work and the requirements of the world community.

(Mr. Vejvoda, Czechoslovakia)

In the opinion of my delegation, we have one more reason to start serious negotiations on the NTB treaty. At the thirty-seventh session of the General Assembly, the Soviet Union submitted a document entitled "Basic provisions of a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests". It is our considered view that this document could serve as a very good and realistic basis for concrete negotiations on the relevant treaty.

The next issue I wish to address now is the prohibition of chemical weapons. My delegation highly appreciates the efforts made by Ambassador Sujka of Poland, assisted by Colonel Cialowicz, as the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons during the last period of our work. He undoubtedly succeeded in bringing new initiatives and reaching progress in the negotiations. In document CD/333 he also summarized the most important opinions which had emerged up to then from the deliberations in the Group, indicating that there does exist a significant convergence of views, and that drafting the treaty is a realistic task which could be started sooner than some delegations are ready to admit.

It is the view of my delegation that the Committee and the Working Group should concentrate maximally on efficient work on the treaty, and that we should not allow ourselves to be distracted from such work by discussing questions having nothing to do with the negotiation of a convention. This is exactly what happened at the end of the last technical consultations, thus preventing the Group from reaching consensus on the report summing up the results of the consultations.

We are ready to consider seriously any new proposal aimed at the solution of difficult issues involved in the treaty. We are upset, however, at the repeated tendencies to present in the Committee unsubstantiated allegations clearly distorting the historical effects regarding the use of chemical weapons in a contemporary conflict.

I would also like to express bewilderment over the way the United States delegation presented its draft concerning chemical weapons. This body, whether as the ENDC, the CCD or the CD, has always worked in a matter-of-fact, lucid atmosphere, in which one delegation never tried to offend another. And this atmosphere had been maintained even during difficult situations in the international field. But what are we witnessing now? How can one believe in the sincerity of its intention if one delegation accompanies its proposals with words full of poison and distortions, concerning not only general issues but also the relations in this Committee?

The slanders against the delegations of the socialist countries which allegedly created obstacles to the deliberations of the chemical weapons Working Group during the month of January, convened for this period, by the way, upon the initiative of the socialist countries, do not testify to the intention of the authors of the draft to undertake business-like negotiations. Moreover, certain preconditions for further negotiations on a chemical weapons convention were raised. All this increases the doubts of the Czechoslovak delegation as to the sincerity of the United States delegation's intentions.

(Mr. Vejvoda, Czechoslovakia)

There is no doubt that the verification issue remains one of the most important unresolved problems. It would seem unwise, however, to press for the inclusion in the treaty of political views bearing so much the mark of the present political atmosphere of mistrust and suspicion and of such evident efforts to gain a unilateral military advantage.

This is why my delegation supported, and is going to support, the concept of international verification underlying the basic provisions for a chemical weapons convention submitted last year by the USSR. May I recall that, according to this concept, different phases with different amounts of information and of verification measures have been foreseen for the substantial period of time needed for the complete destruction of chemical weapons stocks and facilities. This period has been understood as a sui generis process of international co-operation, in the course of which the States parties will be given an increasing opportunity to prove mutually their serious commitment to a strict compliance with all the provisions of the convention.

This concept has fully taken into account the existing international situation and provides for a dynamic process of permanently increasing confidence as well as an increasing mutual exchange of information, satisfying all legitimate demands of States for the necessary security guarantees. At the same time we are of the opinion that the concept of a systematic international verification on the basis of agreed quotas could be further elaborated in a more detailed form.

I would like to assure you that my delegation is ready to co-operate in the negotiation of these important questions in a most effective and constructive manner.

The elaboration of the comprehensive programme of disarmament is the question the Committee on Disarmament has again turned its attention to. The negotiations of the relevant Working Group consumed a lot of efforts and energy, especially last year before the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. Many of our colleagues around this table could also bear witness to the fact that no effort was spared at the special session itself. We join those delegations which have expressed their regret at the special session's failure to finalize and adopt the CPD. We also share the opinion, expressed by many delegations, and most eloquently by Ambassador García Robles of Mexico, as to the cause of this negative outcome.

It is our view that the experience gained so far should not be forgotten in our present approach to further work on a draft comprehensive programme of disarmament. It seems to us that efforts should be concentrated now on finding meaningful and mutually acceptable formulations on such problems as the prevention of nuclear war, a nuclear test ban, the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament, etc.

In dealing with these priority problems my delegation will proceed from the provisions contained in the Prague Declaration of the Political Consultative

(Mr. Vejvoda, Czechoslovakia)

Committee of the Warsaw Treaty Organization. As far as nuclear disarmament is concerned, we shall pursue the adoption and implementation of an appropriate stage-by-stage programme, as proposed in the Prague Declaration.

I should also like to assure the Chairman of the CPD Working Group, Ambassador García Robles, of my delegation's deep satisfaction and happiness that he was willing to continue to act as Chairman of this difficult working group.

Before concluding, allow me a few remarks of a general nature, which we nevertheless consider important, especially in the light of what we have heard here from some outstanding politicians of the western countries, who participated in our debate.

There is no doubt that disarmament negotiations should be vigorously pursued and backed with a positive approach, not with automatic cynicism and suspicion towards other parties. Mutual trust is one of the necessary requirements for the success of disarmament negotiations; it is one of their inevitable prerequisites. Another equally important necessity is that their fundamental objective must be the attainment of increased mutual security rather than unilateral advantage. I have taken the latter sentence from the statement of the Deputy Prime Minister of Canada and Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. Allan J. Maceachen. But did the statements and arguments used in this forum recently correspond with this more or less general truth?

My delegation would like to say a few words with respect to the Soviet-American negotiations on strategic nuclear weapons and their negotiations on nuclear weapons in Europe, since we do not want the Committee to be one-sidedly informed. I do not want to repeat what is contained in document CD/340 containing the replies of Y.V. Andropov, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union to questions from a Pravda correspondent. But let me draw your attention to the views from the "other side" and quote something from an article in the American magazine Time of 6 December 1982 entitled, "Disturbing the Strategic Balance". The article rightly states that the American administration has consistently underplayed two important considerations in arguing that the USSR has advantage in missiles.

Let me quote: "First, there are the so-called asymmetries between the two sides in the composition and capabilities of their forces. Some of those asymmetries favor the USSR, but others favor the US. The Soviets have, for a combination of historical, geographical and technological reasons, concentrated their fire-power on gargantuan land-based missiles with large numbers of multiple warheads. The US has diversified its deterrent among the three legs of the strategic triad -- on land (ICBMs), in the air (bomb and cruise missiles aboard aircraft) and at sea (submarine-launched ballistic missiles). That means that the theoretical vulnerability of land-based forces is by definition more of a problem for the USSR than for the US". So much for the magazine Time.

(Mr. Vejvoda, Czechoslovakia)

Regarding the problem of nuclear weapons in Europe and the so-called zero-option of President Reagan, let me quote another American paper, namely the New York Times, which on 2 February of this year wrote the following: "Mr. Reagan's aim was rearmament first, in quest of an elusive nuclear superiority, and only then negotiations, in which the Russians would beg for relief from a costly race. The President did finally propose deep reductions in both intercontinental and European nuclear arms. But the proposals are seeking much more for public relations than negotiations".

In other words, by talking about land-based missiles the United States are covering the advantages they have in other weapons, not to mention the missiles deployed by their west European allies. Such an approach -- as the New York Times rightly stated, seeking more publicity than negotiations -- should be abandoned from all disarmament negotiations including those in the Committee on Disarmament. Such an approach could hardly lead to a successful outcome of our negotiations, which the United States Vice-President here claimed to be on the mind of all the Western countries including the American administration.

For some countries the problem of nuclear weapons in Europe may be merely a question of numbers or options. But not so for Czechoslovakia. The substantial bulk of the new American missiles is to be deployed in extreme proximity to our borders. These missiles could reach our territory in tens of seconds. My country, situated in the heart of Europe and directly threatened by the NATO 1979 decision, fails to understand the real reason for the eagerness to have these missiles installed in Europe.

It is obvious that the new American missiles, if deployed on the territory of some west European countries would in fact become strategic weapons. Hence we firmly believe that the NATO 1979 decision has offensive purposes. The alleged necessity to defend western Europe is nothing but a pretext.

We support all initiatives and proposals aimed at freeing Europe from nuclear weapons. For this reason we assess positively the initiative of Sweden to create a zone free from battlefield nuclear weapons in central Europe. Like other delegations before us, we also maintain that the creation of a strip free of such weapons between the NATO and WIG countries somewhat wider than that originally proposed could be considered.

Before concluding my statement I should like to stress that our major task is to do the utmost in halting the arms race, that means to stop the smokescreening and start serious negotiations -- covering all aspects of problems -- to bring about the so much needed disarmament agreements. As far as my delegation is concerned, we want to stress once more our readiness to do the utmost in helping to succeed in real negotiations leading to the fulfilment of our goals. In the spirit of the Prague Declaration, which I introduced here as a working paper of our Committee on 1 February, the delegation of Czechoslovakia will try to be most helpful in bringing the Committee on Disarmament back where it belongs -- on the path of business-like negotiations, as called for by the United Nations General Assembly and by the expectations of the world community.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the representative of Czechoslovakia for his statement. I now give the floor to the representative of Sri Lanka, Ambassador Jayakoddy.

Mr. JAYAKODDY (Sri Lanka): Mr. Chairman, it is a great pleasure for me, in the name of the delegation of Sri Lanka, to offer you our congratulations and good wishes on your becoming Chairman of this Committee for the month of February. You have, during the past two weeks, steered this Committee's work with mature skill, invaluable experience, unlimited patience and great courtesy, and we have no doubt that during the rest of this month you will guide the Committee to constructive endeavour through your untiring efforts. My delegation readily pledges its fullest support and co-operation to you in your onerous duties.

My delegation would like to express its warm thanks to the distinguished Secretary-General of the United Nations for his presence in this Committee today and for his thought-provoking statement. I have no doubt that his emphasis on the opportunities that this Committee has to act constructively on disarmament negotiations, and the stress he placed on the indivisibility of security will influence this Committee's work. We wish the distinguished Secretary-General success in his untiring efforts to make this world a safer place for all of us.

The Sri Lanka delegation has the honour to offer its salutation to His Excellency Alfonso García Robles, the distinguished Ambassador of Mexico and co-winner of the Nobel Peace Prize for 1982. My delegation associates itself with all the sentiments that have been addressed to the distinguished Ambassador. But we would like to mention specifically that the lifetime of work of the distinguished Ambassador for peace through disarmament has a special meaning for us in Sri Lanka. This work forms part of the great Buddhist tradition of Ahimsa — non-violence — which pervades the lives of the people of Sri Lanka. We therefore rejoice at the honour bestowed on the distinguished Ambassador and wish him many more years of spirited, active work for disarmament.

At the same time may I request, through you, Mr. Chairman, that the delegation of Sweden convey to Mrs. Alva Myrdal, the other co-winner of the Nobel Peace Prize for 1982, our congratulations and good wishes. Mrs. Myrdal is no stranger to Sri Lanka. She is well known in the island and her dedicated work for peace and economic and social development has won her many Sri Lanka admirers. We wish her good health and many more years of constructive work.

My delegation welcomes the distinguished Ambassadors of Algeria, China, India, Japan, Peru, the United Kingdom and Venezuela who have joined the Committee this month. We wish them all a pleasant stay in Geneva and look forward to their valuable contributions in this Committee. Let me also extend a welcome to Mr. Jan Mårtenson, Under-Secretary-General of the United Nations, who guides the United Nations Department for Disarmament Affairs. He has our good wishes in his new duties.

The critical importance of 1983 for international peace and security, for disarmament and for this Committee has been repeatedly stressed in the past two weeks. My delegation is part of that consensus that attaches such importance to 1983 and hopes that our sessions will be pervaded by this common feeling. My delegation, as always, is ready to persevere with other delegations in the best execution of our obligations as a member of the Committee.

We were honoured by the visits of several distinguished statesmen who spoke to us of their countries' commitments to peace, disarmament or arms control and emphasized their countries' readiness to contribute towards working for international

(Mr. Jayakoddy, Sri Lanka)

peace and security. My delegation would like to express its appreciation to all the distinguished statesmen who came to the Committee and would like to thank them for their contributions which we hope will have a positive effect on the Committee's work.

Each opening session of the Committee on Disarmament offers us an opportunity and a temptation. We have the opportunity to look back on our work of the previous years, take stock of what was achieved or not achieved, and to organize ourselves to execute the solemn obligations that we voluntarily assumed by becoming members of this Committee. The temptation that comes our way is to gloss over our failures, to disguise the extent of our under-achievement and to minimize the degree of responsibility that is attached to each of us for not making this Committee do what it should be doing, viz. disarmament negotiation.

We are embarked on our fifth year, and I shall seize this opportunity to express my delegation's evaluation of the Committee's work and our attitude towards what has taken place here. If we look at the balance-sheet of this Committee's work, we find it to be heavily lopsided. Till last week we had held, since the Committee started work in 1979, 193 plenary sessions, innumerable informal meetings, hundreds of consultations, scores of working group meetings and we have produced a mountain of documents that will no doubt be an adornment to any library on disarmament. But let us go beyond these accomplishments. What has all this time, labour, dedication and attendance at meetings produced to demonstrate that the Committee is fulfilling the mandate it was given? We succeeded up to last year in adopting agendas and programmes of work although, after two weeks of meetings this year, consensus on the agenda and programme of work for 1983 has still not been forged. Let me turn to the substance of our work during the past four years.

The one area in which the Committee has made some evident progress which can give rise to a faint degree of hope and optimism is its work on a chemical weapons ban. Successive working groups supplemented by contact groups on this item have helped to bring closer the day when we can with caution expect that drafting of a treaty could begin this year. It is evident that all representatives in this Committee continue to demonstrate willingness to move the work further forward. The Committee, therefore, can justifiably claim a small degree of achievement on this issue.

But let us look at other items. The work on a comprehensive programme of disarmament that went to the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament was incomplete. The outcome at the second special session on the comprehensive programme of disarmament was a failure, and it is back on our desks for further negotiation. The impasse on security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States continues and there is no reason for hope that 1983 will be a better year for the item. A similar impasse confronts the issue of a ban on radiological weapons.

Let us turn to the issues of a nuclear test ban and the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament. These items for my delegation are the chief priority items not just of this Committee but of the world. They constitute the starting points for the process of disarmament in our times. At no time in human history has there been greater concern, stronger insistence and deeper commitment amongst the people of the world to eradicate a source of threat to the very existence of mankind. The ending of all nuclear-weapon tests and the cessation of the nuclear

(Mr. Jayakoddy, Sri Lanka)

arms race, the prevention of nuclear war, and nuclear disarmament, are the solemn obligation of all of us who gave our assent, freely and willingly, to the Final Document of 1978 and then reaffirmed it in 1982. But what have we done here in this Committee? We have spoken of the Final Document, we have stressed and reiterated our continuing commitment to it and our intention to work for its implementation. But the work of the Committee as a whole falls far short of any measurable implementation of our mandate on nuclear weapons issues.

After nearly three and a half years of persistent debate that exhausted every political and technical argument for having a working group on a nuclear test ban, the Committee last year did set up such a working group. The fears and disappointment expressed over its thin mandate were realized even before the year ran out. Verification and compliance without scope have proved to be unworkable. Scope and implementation without verification and compliance will be equally unworkable. The Committee is now faced with the task of addressing itself to a widening of the mandate to ensure that the Working Group can proceed to a meaningful exploration of the possibilities for the drafting of a nuclear test ban treaty.

It is when one looks at the issue of the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament that our disappointment reaches its peak. The Committee has discussed this item with great forensic skill and though the dust has been disturbed a little it has returned to settle over the issue as before. We are told repeatedly that the issue is not ripe for negotiation; that only when the issue has matured can we think of a working group to negotiate. I am not convinced by these arguments because, to my mind, the issue became mature and then quite ripe in 1945. When on 6 August and 9 August 1945, the first atomic bombs fell on Hiroshima and Nagasaki and the world saw for the first, and hopefully last time, what monstrous horrors it had created for itself, the issue of eradicating atomic weapons, of all other future weapons which are a qualitative and quantitative improvement of those 1945 weapons, became mature and ripe for negotiation. For negotiations that would eliminate them swiftly from the arsenals of the world. This was realized as far back as January 1946, when the United Nations General Assembly's first resolution establishing the Atomic Energy Commission called upon that Commission to report to the Security Council and to make specific proposals, amongst other things, "for the elimination from national armaments of atomic weapons and all other major weapons adaptable to mass destruction". This call went unheeded, and since then there have been no real multilateral negotiations to end the nuclear arms race and promote nuclear disarmament. In the view of my delegation, by limiting its work on this issue to mere discussion, debate and exchanges of view the Committee is avoiding its responsibility and is side-tracking the most urgent and high-priority item of its work.

Nuclear disarmament and the prevention of nuclear war are not the sole responsibility of nuclear-weapon States. Neither are these States the eternal trustees of world peace and security merely because they possess nuclear weapons. We who have no nuclear weapons are indeed held hostage by the nuclear-weapon States, but this very condition of ours impels us to speak out loud and clear in insisting on nuclear disarmament and urgent action to prevent nuclear war. As much as the nuclear-weapon States draw comfort and security from the weapons that they have, these very weapons have created discomfort and insecurity for countries such as mine.

(Mr. Jayakoddy, Sri Lanka)

Let me for a few brief moments refer to a security concern of my country. Until about 1970 we continued to live in our small island paradise in the Indian Ocean threatening no one and threatened by none. But since 1970 we are floating on a nuclear pond. Day and night all kinds of naval vessels of the great armadas of today criss-cross the Indian Ocean, their deadly missiles equipped with mega-death-carrying nuclear warheads. These vessels are not on pleasure cruises carrying affluent tourists to distant exotic destinations, nor are they carrying merchandise which is the produce of hard, laborious work. They are on other business, a deadly business. They constitute an integral part of the strategic forces deployed around the globe to go into action at the flick of a switch. And what is the net result? The Indian Ocean, which to us is a zone of peace, has been transformed into a haven for nuclear weapons which if ever used will draw retaliation on and the destruction of the whole region. We speak so much about the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, vertical and horizontal. But we ignore the spatial dimension of proliferation. It is not the non-nuclear-weapon States that have proliferated nuclear weapons in our region. The finger must surely point elsewhere. This state of affairs is not confined to South Asia alone. It has been replicated elsewhere and we are, therefore, not surprised at the growing insistence from countries such as mine that this forum act urgently to negotiate measures to prevent nuclear war.

My delegation welcomed last year the commencement of negotiations between the United States and the USSR on intermediate-range nuclear forces and strategic arms reductions. We did so because we consider such bilateral negotiations as a contribution towards lessening tension between the two biggest nuclear-weapon Powers. We have been informed in a variety of ways about what has taken place in the negotiations. The only comment we would wish to make is that no negotiation can succeed if it is based on one-sided proposals that prove to be unacceptable to the other side. The principle of equality and equal security cannot be avoided if a lasting and equitable agreement is to be obtained. Seeking to acquire or retain superiority for oneself whilst imposing inequality on the other side is not the basis of relations or agreements between sovereign States. All such attempts are doomed to failure. We therefore once again exhort the two States involved to act realistically and responsibly so as to bring the two sets of negotiations to a successful conclusion.

For us in the non-aligned movement the goal is not a series of arms control agreements between the nuclear-weapon States or groups of States. Arms control measures have not halted the arms race or reversed trends in the accumulation of nuclear weapons. Despite the arms control measures agreed upon up to now, both nuclear and conventional weapons have been revolutionized by new technology and they have acquired unprecedented levels of sophistication and destruction. The situation in armaments has not improved but seriously deteriorated.

We recognize the limited role and usefulness of arms control agreements but we must refrain from confusing them with disarmament or using them to postpone or avoid genuine disarmament negotiations in this Committee. Such agreements, limited in their scope, their adherents and their duration, cannot become a substitute for general and complete disarmament.

Let me leave aside this planet for a while and turn to outer space. 1982 was a significant year where outer space was concerned. We witnessed some spectacular feats by the United States and the USSR in which man demonstrated his genius, talent, skill and courage. These feats reminded us of what great benefits we could draw if

(Mr. Jayakoddy, Sri Lanka)

we so willed it and at the same time alerted us to dangers that lurk not so far away. The "UNISPACE 1982" conference came out with a blueprint for genuine international co-operation in the exploration and peaceful use of outer space, but it did not fail to remind us of the dangerous trends now under way to make that environment a new arena of the arms race. We in this Committee have had a few opportunities to examine the question of the prevention of an arms race in outer space. My delegation was happy to bring to the Committee someone who speaks knowledgeably about the question. We failed to set up a working group here last year but we kept the issue alive at the thirty-seventh session of the General Assembly.

We take a very positive view of the wide sponsorship of General Assembly resolution 37/83 and the support that was extended to it. Regrettably, the best efforts of many in New York were insufficient to ensure that there was only one resolution. Although disappointed, we are not disheartened. We feel that there is universal endorsement of the proposal that urgent action must commence on negotiating an agreement or agreements which will prevent outer space from being used for the arms race. Several distinguished representatives who preceded me have spoken on the subject in constructive terms. Interesting suggestions and practical ideas have been put forward as to how this Committee could proceed on this question. My delegation wishes that the Committee should set up at this session a working group that can start work at an early date. The drafting of a mandate, we feel, should not become a further source of discord in the Committee. The question is of concern to all States, although only a very few share outer space activity amongst themselves. My delegation earnestly hopes that the Committee will be able to arrive at an unanimous and early decision on how further work on the issue could be pursued to the satisfaction of all.

In conclusion, as we slide into our work this year, let us pause for a while to reflect on each of our commitments to the Final Document of 1978. Leaving aside the question of its legal validity, let us reflect on whether there is any higher moral, ethical obligation for us today than working, through negotiations, for eliminating the nuclear threat that faces the world. Let us then with deeper resolve and firmer insistence transform this Committee into a forum of urgent action.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the representative of Sri Lanka for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the Chairman. We have exhausted the time available to us this morning. Before suspending this plenary meeting I would like to announce that the Ad Hoc Working Group on a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament will meet on Wednesday, 16 February, at 3.30 p.m. I now intend to suspend this plenary meeting and resume it this afternoon at 3.30 p.m. so that the Committee may listen to the remaining members listed to speak today.

The meeting was suspended at 12.50 p.m. and resumed at 3.50 p.m.

The CHAIRMAN: The 194th plenary meeting of the Committee on Disarmament is resumed.

The Committee will now listen to those speakers who could not make their statements in the morning.

I now give the floor to the representative of France, Ambassador de la Gorce.

Mr. DE-LA GORCE (France) (translated from French): Mr. Chairman, since I am taking the floor at a plenary meeting for the first time since the opening of the session, I should like to offer you the very warm congratulations of the French delegation on your assumption of the chairmanship of the Committee on Disarmament. This office is particularly important during the period when we are organizing our annual session. You have our sincerest good wishes for the successful accomplishment of your task.

I should also like to express to Ambassador García Robles, your predecessor in the Chair, our very warm gratitude for the valuable assistance he gave us in bringing to its conclusion the work of our fourth session with the skill and competence with which we are all familiar.

Since then, the Nobel Peace Prize has been awarded to our distinguished colleague from Mexico in recognition of his exceptionally meritorious efforts on behalf of disarmament. For this we offer him again our heartiest congratulations.

The Committee on Disarmament has today for the first time been addressed by the Secretary-General of the United Nations. The French delegation would like to say how much it appreciated Mr. Pérez de Cuéllar's presence among us. It has many times stressed, both here and in New York, the great importance of the participation of the United Nations, of the entire international community, in the disarmament endeavour.

The Secretary-General's visit and the statement he made clearly demonstrate the close association between the United Nations and the multilateral disarmament negotiating body. This should be a cause for great satisfaction to all of us.

I should also like to say how much we appreciate the visit of Mr. Eivinn Berg, State Secretary of the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, who has also addressed us. Norway is not a member of the Committee but it takes a particularly active interest in disarmament questions, which it expresses in particular through its permanent association with our work. The French delegation has many times urged the opening up of our Committee to countries which have shown a desire to make a substantial contribution to the Committee's tasks in the sphere of disarmament. Norway is one of the most worthy countries in that respect.

I should also like to offer a welcome to our new colleagues, the Ambassadors representing Algeria, China, India, Japan, Peru, the United Kingdom and Venezuela.

I should like, lastly, to offer Mr. Hårtenson, the new Under-Secretary-General in charge of the Department for Disarmament Affairs, our very warm and friendly congratulations and our best wishes for his success in that very important office.

Our fifth annual session has opened in circumstances which give us grounds both for anxiety and for hope.

The international situation is still disturbing. The use of force, in violation of the Charter, is continuing in Afghanistan -- which is still occupied by Soviet forces battling against national resistance, in the Middle East, where Lebanon has been and still is the victim of violence, in south-east Asia and in southern Africa; as we all know, pressures persist in Poland. The Helsinki agreements are being clearly violated in the humanitarian and human rights spheres. East-West relations are too often marked by polemics and suspicion, with a resulting marked decline in confidence and the sense of security.

(Mr. de la Gorce, France)

On the other hand, the opening in Geneva between the two principal military Powers of two sets of negotiations on nuclear weapons, the one on strategic weapons and the other on intermediate-range weapons, is a positive development of very great importance.

The second of these two sets of negotiations, those on intermediate-range weapons, is giving rise in Europe and elsewhere to a major political debate which has had repercussions in this forum. It is not the intention of the French delegation to express its views on this subject today, but it will revert to it shortly. France's position is in any case well known. It was presented on 20 January last by Mr. François Mitterand, the President of the French Republic, when he spoke before the parliament of the Federal Republic of Germany; the statement he made then will shortly be circulated as an official document of this Committee.

The negotiations under way in Geneva will undoubtedly be long and difficult, but great hopes are placed in them, and the very fact that they are taking place constitutes a substantial confidence-building factor which should be of benefit to our work as a whole.

The same applies to the negotiations taking place in Madrid within the framework of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe. We very much hope that it will prove possible to reach agreement at those negotiations on a mandate for a conference on the reduction of conventional weapons in Europe — a conference which, in its initial phase, would deal with the question of confidence-building measures.

This Committee is thus not working in a vacuum. Several members of the Committee have already drawn attention to the extensive debate on disarmament going on in political circles and among the general population in a number of countries. This debate is in itself something positive: it expresses the legitimate and fundamental interest which the peoples of our countries attach to peace and security, and the major role that disarmament can and should play in the service of both. Public opinion can exercise a very useful influence in this connection, if the public is provided with free and complete information. During the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, there was considerable discussion precisely of the conditions necessary for the world disarmament campaign to be really effective. The guidelines adopted stipulate that this campaign "should be carried out in all regions of the world in a balanced, factual and objective manner", on the basis of free access to information. These rules of conduct should be applied to any debate on disarmament; they should preclude references to "world public opinion", which no one has the authority to express, and to public opinion in certain countries, wrongly interpreted as being hostile to the security policies of those countries' governments. It would seem to us at the very least rash to set governments against peoples in the case of countries where freedom of opinion exists and where governments are freely chosen by those governed.

The action of political forces and of organs of opinion can only effectively support the efforts of governments if they are based on a clear perception of the conditions essential to any progress in the sphere of disarmament. There is, first, a political condition: respect for the most important provision of the Charter, that contained in its article 2, paragraph 4, namely, the obligation not to resort to the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of

(Mr. de la Gorce, France)

any State. Then there are the security conditions, as set forth in the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament: the maintenance of the balances that are necessary to security and the verification measures that are essential to create confidence and to ensure compliance with disarmament agreements -- measures which can only be credible if they are international in character.

The peoples of our countries, if they are well informed, will understand -- they understand already to a very large extent -- that acceptance of these conditions -- balance, the very basis of security, and international verification -- constitutes the real test of the political will of governments in the matter of disarmament. These fundamental principles are at the very heart of our debates and our negotiations.

The first is inseparably linked with that of the prevention of war, and thus the prevention of nuclear war, which we have been discussing in connection with the new item proposed for our agenda. The President of the French Republic, in the statement to which I referred a moment ago, described this link in the following terms: "One simple idea governs the thinking of France: war must remain impossible, and those who might think of unleashing it must be deterred therefrom. It is France's conclusion and conviction that nuclear weapons, the instruments of this deterrence, are still whether one likes it or not, the guarantee of peace, provided there is a balance of forces. Only such a balance, furthermore, can lead to good relations with the countries of the East, our neighbours and historic partners. It was the sound basis on which what is called détente was founded ... It made the Helsinki agreements possible."

As regards international verification, the United Nations General Assembly, at its last session, confirmed the principle thereof in three resolutions. We regret that these resolutions encountered a certain amount of opposition, for we do not think that a principle which is as basic as it is indisputable, and the concrete applications which it necessarily implies with respect to any measure concerning the reduction or use of weapons, should give rise to polemics, suspicion or exploitation. We find it difficult to understand how States which intend to respect a treaty can have any substantial reasons for objecting to compliance with the clauses of that treaty being ensured principally by international measures of verification. We therefore hope that where this question arises in our negotiations, it will finally be possible to formulate and adopt satisfactory solutions.

The organization of our work for this session is still under discussion. We, for our part, regret that an excessive amount of time is being devoted to it. We regret that decisions cannot be taken on matters where all are agreed, on measures that are not in dispute, because these decisions depend on others, relating to new proposals, or on the settlement of questions relating to working groups already set up. We respect the right of each delegation to defend its positions, but it would seem to us preferable, and moreover in conformity with our previous practice, to take our decisions independently of one another and thus to resume without delay the work of substance we have already begun on various subjects.

My delegation would like to offer some preliminary comments concerning that work.

Among the tasks confronting the Committee, that of negotiating a convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons is of primary importance and could offer prospects of real progress in the very near future. We note certain positive elements in this connection.

(Mr. de la Gorce, France)

During our 1982 session, with two additional weeks of intensive work in January 1983, the Working Group on Chemical Weapons achieved significant results. The "contact groups" method introduced by Mr. Sujka -- and I should like to take this opportunity to offer him the thanks of my delegation for the work he has done as Chairman of the Working Group on Chemical Weapons -- gave rise to an intense exchange of ideas resulting in a clearer definition of the problems and of possible solutions. The reports of the co-ordinators of those contact groups, which are annexed to the report of the Working Group on its 1982 session, will constitute one of the bases of negotiations during the present year. It would seem to us useful if this method could be used again, with the necessary adjustments.

The Working Group will also have the benefit of the technical contribution made each year through the meetings of experts. At the meetings which have just taken place, the discussions were more substantial than they have been heretofore. It was thus possible, under the able guidance of the Egyptian expert, Dr. Ezz, who was asked to undertake this task by the Chairman, to draw up a list of precursors with the active participation of all the experts. The content of this list was not contested. My delegation considers it all the more regrettable, therefore, that the opposition of certain delegations prevented the submission of a report on the results achieved. We hope that the Chairman's practice of holding consultations with experts will be continued and that they will provide the technical data necessary for the current negotiations.

The submission by the United States delegation of a very full document on the content of a future convention, which it is prepared to negotiate, as announced by the Vice-President of the United States, also constitutes a very positive element.

The Soviet delegation circulated to the Committee last year, on 21 July, a document containing proposals for the basic provisions of a convention on chemical weapons.

Documents of such importance have prompted and will undoubtedly continue to prompt comments and requests for clarification from other delegations. The United States delegation has said that it is ready to answer questions put to it at a meeting arranged for that purpose. We are glad to hear this, and are sure that the Soviet Union delegation will do likewise.

The French delegation hopes that the Working Group on Chemical Weapons will be re-established without further delay. In addition to those I have just mentioned, it has at its disposal many important contributions and there will no doubt be others.

On the basis of the discussions that have taken place and the documents that have been submitted, the Committee is now in a position to perceive clearly those points on which there are divergencies of substance, and it is on these that the negotiations should be concentrated from now on.

(Mr. de la Gorce, France)

With regard to radiological weapons, the French delegation earnestly hopes that the Working Group will be able finally to conclude its negotiations on a draft convention. The question of the protection of nuclear facilities, which a number of delegations wish to include within the same framework, appears to us to be a separate issue, relating rather to the laws of war than to disarmament. Those delegations should ask themselves whether or not they wish to make headway towards a solution.

It seems to us that the question of negative security assurances merits further examination this year. At the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, the French Government redefined its position in this connection. As Mr. Claude Cheysson, France's Minister for Foreign Affairs, stated at the time: "In drawing closer to the guarantee already offered by others, France intends to facilitate the drafting of a Security Council resolution".

The French delegation believes that this new element justifies the resumption of discussions in this connection. It believes that a Security Council resolution giving the backing of the Council to the existing declarations would greatly strengthen their political and legal value, and that these things together would constitute a system of guarantees of undeniable significance.

We have just decided that the Working Group on a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament is to start work again without delay under the chairmanship of Ambassador García Robles. The French delegation can only express its pleasure; it intends to continue, as before, making an active contribution to this difficult task, which the Committee has been asked to complete before the next session of the General Assembly.

As for the Working Group set up last year to consider the problems relating to verification that would arise in connection with a treaty prohibiting nuclear-weapon tests, the French delegation did not participate in its work; it will not do so this year either, for the reasons it gave on 5 August last. I would repeat that this does not mean that it underestimates the importance of establishing an effective and non-discriminatory international verification system.

Among the other items on our agenda — those not being dealt with in a working group — the item concerning nuclear disarmament is clearly of exceptional importance. The French delegation considers that it should form the subject of a discussion of substance; private meetings of the Committee would seem to offer the appropriate framework, since that corresponds to the highest level of our discussion as well as to the breadth and nature of the issues. The French delegation is determined to make a very active contribution to their consideration. It will refer again to this very important subject at a plenary meeting in the near future.

With regard to the prevention of an arms race in outer space, the subject of item 7 of our agenda, the French delegation took an active part in the consideration of this question last year and expressed its views in detail. In view of the very great complexity of the subject we believe that it should this year be given very thorough study. This study should concentrate, as a matter of priority, on a consideration of the problems relating to the prevention of the deployment in outer space of those weapons that are potentially the most destabilizing, such as anti-satellite weapons.

(Mr. de la Gorce, France)

The French delegation is ready to join in a consensus on the setting up of a working group, provided its mandate is satisfactory.

Lastly, we have this year, as at every session, to take up certain matters of an institutional character as well as questions concerning the organization of the Committee and its methods.

At its last session the General Assembly adopted resolution 37/99 K, which deals precisely with institutional arrangements relating to the sphere of disarmament. This resolution contains in particular the decisions relating to the transformation of the Centre for Disarmament into a Department of the United Nations Secretariat and relating to the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research which was made fully autonomous. We are pleased at these two measures. Two other provisions of the same resolution are addressed specifically to the Committee. One concerns a review of its membership; the other commends that it should consider the proposal that the Committee should designate itself as a Conference.

You, Mr. Chairman, have put before us a draft decision covering both these points and we agree with you that they should be treated on an equal footing. The Committee has already begun but has not been able to conclude a consideration of the recommendation concerning a change in its name. We hope that it will soon embark on a consideration of the recommendation concerning its membership, for the French delegation attaches great importance to this question. It would like to see a moderate enlargement of the Committee which would not affect its character as a negotiating body. It seems to us that it would be to the advantage of this Committee to show a certain openness; the admission of certain countries which have taken an active interest in the disarmament effort would only be fair and would be beneficial to our work. Certainly in any such enlargement considerations of political and geographical balance must be borne in mind, but we do not believe that it is necessary to be extremely strict in this respect for the rule of consensus makes this unnecessary.

The French delegation therefore hopes that a positive decision will be taken shortly. It notes that we stated in our last report that there was no objection in principle to such a decision.

With regard to questions of organization and methods, we are of course ready to discuss these again but we believe our rules of procedure permit all necessary adjustments and our practices have improved every year. The best example is the fact that our working groups now meet outside formal sessions of the Committee. If the results of our work are inadequate that is not the fault of the institution and its methods.

In this connection I should like to recall by way of conclusion what the French delegation declared at the end of our last session, namely that progress clearly depends on other conditions: the will and capacity of governments to negotiate and reach agreement, which themselves depend on the state of international relations, the requirements of security and the maintenance of confidence.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the representative of France for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the Chairman. I now give the floor to the representative of Hungary, Ambassador Komives.

Mr. KOMIVES (Hungary): Before turning to the subject of my statement, I wish to say how much we feel honoured by the visit of the United Nations Secretary-General, Mr. Pérez de Cuéllar, because his devotion to the cause of disarmament and his sincere interest in seeing progress achieved in this Committee fill us with encouragement. My delegation is in full agreement with the preoccupations and expectations contained in his statement.

Comrade Chairman, the group of delegations representing the socialist countries members of the Committee on Disarmament have requested the inclusion of a new item in the agenda of the Committee. The item now figures on the draft provisional agenda as item 10, entitled, "Ensuring the safe development of nuclear energy".

In view of the numerous requests for a detailed explanation of the motives behind our proposal, my delegation handed in to the secretariat a working paper, explaining our position on draft item 10. On behalf of the group of socialist countries I request you, Comrade Chairman, to have that working paper circulated as an official document of the Committee on Disarmament. By way of preliminary presentation, may I be allowed to make a few remarks.

When proposing the inclusion of the said item in the agenda, and the establishment of an Ad Hoc Working Group as the most suitable organizational framework to deal with the subject, the delegations of the socialist countries took into account the relevant resolutions adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations at its thirty-seventh session. In one of those resolutions the General Assembly requested the Committee "to continue its search for a solution to the question of prohibition of military attacks on nuclear facilities, including the scope of such prohibition, taking into account all proposals submitted to it to this end". We are convinced that the elaboration of political and legal norms, aimed at promoting the strengthening of international security in one of its most important aspects, is a task which brooks no delay.

The question of ensuring the safe development of nuclear energy has certain specific features, which the Committee has not as yet come across. Let me call attention to a few of them:

First, the question contained in our proposal is by its nature of a universal character, and should, therefore, be treated and solved in the most suitable multilateral framework, which -- we are convinced -- is the Committee on Disarmament.

Secondly, the countries of the world without a single exception are deeply interested in the solution of that question, since an attack on a facility producing nuclear energy, wherever it may be located, would pose a grave threat to the vital interest of all States, whether in the neighbourhood or far away, and whether themselves possessing any nuclear facilities or not.

Thirdly, the consideration of the question of ensuring the safe development of nuclear energy, as a separate item on the Committee's agenda, would no doubt stimulate the early solution in a favourable manner of the question of prohibiting radiological weapons through the elaboration and conclusion of a convention to that end.

Finally, the initiative of the socialist countries is, and the implementation of their proposal would be, a significant contribution to the solution of the most urgent and acute problem facing the world community today -- the prevention of nuclear war.

(Mr. Komives, Hungary)

Such are some of the considerations behind the proposal of the group of delegations of the socialist countries, on whose behalf I have the honour to request a quick and constructive decision by the Committee on that proposal.

While I have the floor, I would like to touch upon the question of the organization of the Committee's work. The group of socialist countries, as in previous years, is fully in favour of having that question solved as early as possible, allowing the Committee to proceed to negotiations of priority questions without any delay, without wasting its precious time. While favouring the earliest possible solution of organizational questions, the socialist countries insist that those questions should be solved on a fair and equitable basis, without any efforts by certain delegations aimed at imposing unacceptable, unjust decisions.

Unfortunately, there have been attempts recently clearly aimed at putting the socialist countries in a disadvantageous position. Certain delegations tried to tell us which working group our representative is supposed to chair. The intention of our delegations, the candidature of representatives from the socialist delegations, were not even considered by them. In a very strange and unusual manner, on one occasion, dealing with such questions, the representative of a Western delegation took the liberty of stating flatly which delegation should chair the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons. He did so in spite of the fact that no previous agreement had been reached in that respect. He then went on to state that in the case of a number of other working groups the chairmanship should be kept unchanged.

We simply cannot accept a selective approach whereby in one case the Committee should adhere to the established principle of rotation, but in other cases it should adopt the method of continuation. Such an approach can only be considered as an attempt against the interest of the socialist countries.

In view of such developments, the group of socialist countries states that the principle of rotation should be applied to all the working groups dealing with priority questions, or the method of continuation is to be followed with respect to all the working groups. We do not allow the legitimate rights and interest of our countries to be infringed upon. We wish to state that in the most categorical manner.

Having stated that, the group of delegations representing the socialist countries members of the Committee on Disarmament is putting forward the candidacy of the representative of the German Democratic Republic for the chairmanship of one of the ad hoc working groups dealing with priority questions. Ambassador Herder is well known as one of the most experienced diplomats in the field of disarmament negotiations. Having taken part in the work of this body for the last decade, and having presided over the Committee in March 1981, Ambassador Herder enjoys wide recognition in the Committee as well as the full support of the socialist countries for his candidacy.

Finally, on behalf of the socialist group, I wish to call attention to the statement made by the representative of the United States on 10 February, which contained a totally unfounded and insulting evaluation of the activities of the socialist countries in the Committee on Disarmament. Such actions can in no way

(Mr. Komives, Hungary)

promote business-like negotiations in this forum, nor can they help build confidence among its members. They are in sharp contradiction with calls stressing the urgent need for constructive dialogue, calls which have been voiced in the statements of numerous delegations, including those of some of the Western countries.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the representative of Hungary for his statement. I now give the floor to the representative of Algeria, Ambassador Oul-Rouis. You have the floor, Sir.

Mr. OUL-ROUIS (Algeria) (translated from French): Mr. Chairman, as this is the first time that I have the honour to address the Committee on Disarmament at a formal meeting, allow me to perform the agreeable task of congratulating you on your accession to the chairmanship of the Committee on Disarmament for the month of February, and to tell you how pleased we are to see you guiding our work.

We should also like to congratulate your predecessor, Ambassador García Robles, who has always carried out the tasks entrusted to him with the competence, experience and devotion with which we are all familiar.

It is fitting to say here with what satisfaction we heard the news of the award of the Nobel Peace Prize to Ambassador García Robles and Mrs. Alva Myrdal. This great distinction honours the tireless efforts of these two ardent fighters for the cause of disarmament. It is also an honour to our Committee and should stimulate it in its efforts.

I should also like to take this opportunity to express my gratitude to you, Mr. Chairman, and to my other colleagues for the words of welcome you so kindly extended to me.

For my part, I can assure the members of the Committee of my full co-operation in our common task.

Allow me, lastly, to associate myself with the words of welcome addressed to the Secretary-General, whose presence this morning was a great honour for us. I should like to say that we fully share his concern at the present state of the multilateral negotiations, as we share also his hope that it will prove possible for this Committee to initiate a genuine process of disarmament.

We should also like to welcome the Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs, Mr. Martenson, who has been among us since the start of this session.

It has become almost a habit to say at the beginning of each session of the Committee on Disarmament that the international situation is constantly deteriorating, that the arms race is accelerating and that the gap between North and South is widening still further, making the conditions of life of two-thirds of humanity even more precarious.

Unfortunately, these are not mere rhetorical statements but three truths which we must recognize.

They are in fact the three principal characteristics of the world today. Closely connected one with another, they constitute the three dimensions of the structural crisis confronting the international community. They are caused and perpetuated by a system of international relations based on the values of domination and exploitation, in which security problems are seen only in terms of relations of force and the balance of power.

(Mr. Oul-Rouis, Algeria)

Because it was tacitly confined to a particular geographical area, the "process of détente" has constantly revealed its limitations as the sole alternative to confrontation. The policy of détente, in the form in which it was conceived, has shown itself incapable of substituting a climate of confidence and harmony for the attitude which approaches all problems in terms of conflict.

More unjust has been the perverse effect of détente which has meant the transfer of the East-West tension to the third world, which is now caught up in an intolerable military partitioning of the world as the result of a very pliable sense of their vital interests on the part of certain Powers.

In our region, the Mediterranean has become a theatre for demonstrations of strength by foreign Powers, contrary to the aspirations of the majority of the States of the region which have clearly expressed their desire to make it a zone of peace and co-operation. The Indian Ocean is the scene of an unprecedented military concentration.

How can we talk about détente and international security when resort to force is still being used as a means of settling disputes? We only have to look at what has been going on in the Middle East and in southern Africa where, in defiance of the orders of the international community, the Tel Aviv and Pretoria regimes are continuing with impunity their policies of aggression against the peoples of these regions.

Détente can and should be a positive factor in the development of international relations. For this purpose it must necessarily be universal and cover all aspects of international life.

The present system of security brings with it all possible risks of conflagration because it is based on the illusion of the maintenance of peace through nuclear deterrence and a "balance of terror". The possible disruption of this precarious balance has become the daily nightmare of all humanity. The vast movement of protest against the nuclear threat, which knows no political, geographical or ideological boundaries, well illustrates this obsessive concern.

This system, which makes international peace and security dependent solely on agreement between the two blocs, is in itself the root cause of the deadlock in multilateral negotiations that we are confronted with today. A climate of uncertainty and mistrust gradually developed, to the detriment of harmony and dialogue.

The global negotiations that we have been calling for for a number of years, in order to halt the continual deterioration in the international economic environment and to reverse the trend, have still not been started. Focal points of tension continue to threaten international peace and security. The disarmament process advocated in the Final Document of 1978 is still far from having begun, while the frantic arms race is accelerating.

This situation of deadlock is the result of the absence of a political readiness on the part of the major Powers to embark on a search for a global solution to the vital problems of our time by dealing directly with their causes.

Allow me now to refer to certain matters directly concerned with the work of the Committee.

(Mr. Oul-Rouis, Algeria)

My delegation notes with regret that the Committee on Disarmament is still not in a position to undertake negotiations on questions relating to nuclear disarmament -- a paradoxical situation when everyone recognizes the existence of a risk of nuclear war and the paramount need to take steps to avert it.

Unfortunately, nuclear war cannot be prevented either by expressions of good intentions or by magic spells, and even less by the hurling of abuse at one another. The deliberative approach, which is becoming more and more common in the Committee on Disarmament, should be replaced by the negotiation of concrete measures of disarmament, so restoring to this body its original function, that of negotiating international instruments.

It is not just giving in to the fashion for making categorical statements to say that the prevention of nuclear war is the most urgent task that there is.

The growing accumulation of nuclear weapons, the qualitative improvement in arsenals and the emergence of doctrines based on the illusion of a nuclear war reduced to the level of the "acceptable" are all elements contributing to a narrowing of the gap between the possibility of the outbreak of a nuclear war and its probability.

It was on the basis of these facts and on the basis also of the provisions of the Final Document of 1978 and of the relevant recommendations of the General Assembly that the Group of 21 took the initiative of proposing the inclusion in the Committee's agenda of an item on the prevention of nuclear war. The Group of 21 has also proposed the setting up of an ad hoc working group to deal with this matter.

We believe that this question, the urgency and importance of which need no demonstration, should be dealt with as a matter of priority.

Furthermore, the deadlock that is preventing the Committee on Disarmament from implementing paragraph 50 of the Final Document under item 2 of our agenda ought to be broken. As everyone knows, this is a matter of the highest priority. We hope that it will be possible this year for the Committee to undertake the identification of the questions of substance to be dealt with in the multilateral negotiations on nuclear disarmament, within the framework of a working group.

Negotiations relating to certain types of nuclear weapons are at present taking place in Geneva between the two Superpowers. That is an encouraging sign, as many speakers in the Committee have pointed out. Nevertheless, however important they may be, these negotiations should not be used as a pretext for preventing the Committee on Disarmament from embarking on negotiations on nuclear disarmament on the grounds that this could hamper the bilateral negotiations. To confine negotiations on nuclear weapons within the narrow framework of bilateral relations is to reduce the other States to the level of passive observers of a contest in which the stake is their own security. The bilateral negotiations under way in Geneva should be complementary to those that ought to take place in the Committee on Disarmament. The former cannot be a substitute for the latter nor should they be used as an excuse for postponing them precisely because they are based on a limited, sectoral and regional approach. Certainly, the two Superpowers have a special responsibility in the process of nuclear disarmament. But this responsibility cannot be exclusive.

If there is a responsibility which the nuclear-weapon Powers cannot evade, it is certainly that of providing real guarantees of security to the non-nuclear-weapon States, until such time as nuclear disarmament is achieved.

(Mr. Oul-Rouis, Algeria)

It must, however, be admitted that the major gaps in resolution 255 (1968) of the Security Council have still not been filled, and certain nuclear-weapon Powers are persisting in their refusal to take account of the legitimate concerns of the non-nuclear-weapon States. The negotiations on what are called negative security assurances are at a standstill, and there is nothing to inspire hope that these negotiations will be resumed.

A solemn declaration by the nuclear-weapon States that they will not be the first to use nuclear weapons would constitute an important step towards the conclusion of an international instrument guaranteeing the non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

My country, like many others, has as a matter of principle stood aside from the systems of military alliance, and it attaches very great importance to this matter. Furthermore, we consider that negative security assurances should be provided without any conditions or restrictions.

We therefore urge that all efforts should be made to implement paragraph 59 of the Final Document of 1978, it being understood that in order to be valid and effective the security assurances should be accompanied by concrete measures of nuclear disarmament.

One measure which could help begin the process of nuclear disarmament would be the conclusion of a treaty prohibiting all nuclear-weapon tests. It is clear to all that apart from its "non-proliferation" function, the conclusion of such a treaty would have a symbolic value and would restore credibility to the Committee on Disarmament as the sole multilateral disarmament negotiating body.

At the Committee's last session my delegation was among those which agreed to the setting up of an ad hoc working group on nuclear-weapon tests with a limited mandate, on the understanding that that represented a stage towards the negotiation of a treaty prohibiting nuclear-weapon tests. We consider that this mandate has now been exhausted and that the time has come to give the Working Group a broader mandate so that the Committee can implement paragraph 51 of the Final Document of 1978.

We believe that the broadening of this mandate would not be detrimental to the interests of those delegations which consider questions of verification to be of primordial importance. While not wishing to minimize the importance of these questions, we are convinced that they should not be considered in isolation from the other aspects of the future treaty.

The lack of willingness to negotiate a treaty prohibiting nuclear-weapon tests as a matter of the highest priority is also one of the main reasons why the Committee on Disarmament has been unable to reach agreement on a comprehensive programme of disarmament.

My delegation welcomes the re-establishment of the Ad Hoc Working Group on a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament under the wise guidance of Ambassador García Robles, and hopes that those who are the cause of the deadlock will show flexibility so as to enable the Committee to submit to the General Assembly at its next session a revised draft programme that is acceptable to all parties. The time available is short and the task is hard. The Ad Hoc Working Group ought therefore to resume its efforts as soon as possible.

(Mr. Oul-Rouis, Algeria)

The growing militarization of space -- another subject of concern to the international community -- is likely to lead to the conversion of outer space into a theatre of confrontation between the major Powers.

Outer space is the heritage of humanity and should be reserved exclusively for peaceful uses for the benefit of all. This is our deep-seated conviction and we feel obliged, therefore, to stress the imperative need to prevent an arms race in outer space.

The participants in the "UNISPACE '82" conference held in Vienna last August invited States possessing major space capabilities to contribute actively to negotiations aimed at preventing an arms race in outer space while refraining from any action running counter to that objective.

At its last session the General Assembly adopted a resolution on similar lines in which it requested the Committee on Disarmament to establish an ad hoc working group with a view to undertaking negotiations for the conclusion of an agreement or agreements to prevent an arms race in all its aspects in outer space.

At the present stage in the work of the Committee on Disarmament, the negotiations on chemical weapons are indisputably the only sphere in which agreement is possible.

While it is true that the negotiations are proceeding with difficulty because of the divergencies of views that persist, nevertheless they offer promising prospects. The establishment of contact groups each responsible for looking into a given aspect of the future convention has had the merit of bringing out clearly the areas of agreement and the points where there is disagreement. The time has come for the major Powers to show the political will necessary to permit the solution of the problems that are preventing the Committee from passing on to the phase of drafting the articles of the future convention. The proposals made by the Soviet delegation at the last session and those put forward at the beginning of this session by the United States delegation should serve as the basis for finding solutions acceptable to all parties, so that the present difficulties can be overcome.

As regards the negotiations on radiological weapons, the Ad Hoc Working Group ought to direct its efforts more towards finding a solution to the problem of the prohibition of attacks on nuclear facilities.

As a developing country, Algeria will continue to stress the need for a comprehensive approach to the problems of security, development and disarmament, for it is undeniable that these three elements are indissolubly linked.

It is perhaps unnecessary to repeat that the arms race which is poisoning the relations between East and West and the ever-widening development gap between North and South are without doubt the two main factors of tension at the present time.

This fact reinforces our conviction that lasting international peace and security cannot be ensured without a fundamental recasting of the present system of security and the requisite structural changes in international economic relations.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the representative of Algeria for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the Chairman. That concludes my list of speakers for today. Does any other member wish to take the floor? The United States: Mr. Busby, you have the floor.

Mr. BUSBY (United States of America): Mr. Chairman, I will be brief. I merely wanted to recall to the Committee the statement made during Ambassador Field's presentation to the plenary last week that the United States delegation would, if there were sufficient interest, be willing to meet with other delegations to receive questions and explain the provisions of the paper which we tabled, entitled "Detailed views on the contents of a chemical weapons ban". We have, through the good offices of the secretariat, reserved a room, and I believe this information has been circulated here, setting forth the times for two meetings at which we would be willing to do that. I merely wanted to call that to the attention of the Committee, through you, Sir.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the representative of the United States for his statement. Is there any other member who wishes to take the floor? I see none.

Before adjourning this meeting I should like to state that the Chair has taken note of a request made by the representative of Hungary, Ambassador Komivés, that the working paper of a group of socialist countries that he has introduced will be circulated as an official document of the Committee on Disarmament. The next plenary meeting of the Committee on Disarmament will be held on Thursday, 17 February, at 10.30 a.m. The meeting stands adjourned.

The meeting rose at 4.50 p.m.

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