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NOTE

Symbols of United Nations documents are composed of capital letters combined with figures. Mention of such a symbol indicates a reference to a United Nations document.

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FIFTEEN HUNDRED AND FORTY-SEVENTH MEETING

Held in New York on Tuesday, 21 July 1970, at 3 p.m.

President: Mr. Guillermo SEVILLA SACASA (Nicaragua).

Present: The representatives of the following States: Burundi, China, Colombia, Finland, France, Nepal, Nicaragua, Poland, Sierra Leone, Spain, Syria, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of América and Zambia.

Provisional agenda (S/Agenda/1547)

- 1. Adoption of the agenda.
- 2. The question of race conflict in South Africa resulting from the policies of *apartheid* of the Government of the Republic of South Africa:

Letter dated 15 July 1970 addressed to the President of the Security Council by the representatives of Algeria, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo (Democratic Republic of), Dahomey, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea, India, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, People's Republic of the Congo, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, United Arab Republic, United Republic of Tanzania, Upper Volta, Yugoslavia and Zambia (S/9867).

Adoption of the agenda

The agenda was adopted.

- The question of race conflict in South Africa resulting from the policies of *apartheid* of the Government of the Republic of South Africa:
 - Letter dated 15 July 1970 addressed to the President of the Security Council by the representatives of Algeria, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo (Democratic Republic of), Dahomey, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea, India, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, People's Republic of the Congo, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Togo, Tunisia,

Uganda, United Arab Republic, United Republic of Tanzania, Upper Volta, Yugoslavia and Zambia (S/9867)

1. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Spanish*): In accordance with the decisions previously taken by the Council, and with the consent of the Council, I intend to invite the representatives of Mauritius, Somalia, India, Ghana and Pakistan to participate in the debate without the right to vote.

2. As the number of scats available at the Council table is limited, and in accordance with the practice followed in the past in similar cases, I invite the representatives I have mentioned to take the seats reserved for them at the side of the Council chamber, with the understanding that they will be invited to sit at the table when the time comes for them to address the Council.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. R. K. Ramphul (Mauritius), Mr. A. A. Farah (Somalia), and Mr. S. Sen (India) took the places reserved for them.

3. Mr. ZAKHAROV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): Mr. President, before I express my views on the item on our agenda, allow me to join in the congratulations extended to you on the occasion of your assuming the Presidency of the Security Council. Knowing of your great diplomatic experience, we are confident that you will be successful in guiding the work of the Council in July. The delegation of the USSR is also pleased to join in expressing gratitude to Ambassador Khatri, the representative of Nepal, under whose Presidency and wise leadership the Council did useful work last month.

4. The delegation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics fully shares the well-founded concern of many States Members of the United Nations over the situation which has arisen in southern Africa as a result of non-compliance with United Nations resolutions on the policy of *apartheid*, particularly the failure of the Western Powers to observe the embargo on the delivery of arms to South Africa. The Security Council's attention is rightly drawn to the danger of the present course of events in that area in the letter from forty States dated 15 July [S/9867], as also in the letter from the Chairman of the Special Committee on the Policies of *Apartheid* of the Government of the Republic of South Africa of 2 July 1970 [S/9858]. 5. There is no question that the raising of the policy of *apartheid* in the Republic of South Africa to the level of a State policy and its implementation in practice, the spread of *apartheid* to other parts of Africa and the building up of a powerful military arsenal for the propagation of this policy by force all constitute a serious threat to peace.

6. At a time when the voices of anger and indignation are being raised ever louder in protest against the criminal policy of *apartheid*, the Western States—including members of this august organ of the United Nations, the Security Council—are, despite the resolutions of the General Assembly and the decisions of the Security Council itself, maintaining close economic and military ties with the Republic of South Africa and giving its Government political support.

7. Therefore, when condemning the monstrous crimes committed by the racist and Fascist régime of Pretoria against the African population, the Security Council should draw attention to the fact that the Western Powers have extensive economic and military ties with the Republic of South Africa which are contributing to the "survival" of the régime, encouraging its obstinacy in carrying out its policy, and enabling it to propagate racism by force and to intensify terrorism against the national liberation movements.

8. The Western Powers, about whose actions the representatives of Mauritius, Somalia, India, Syria, Zambia, Ghana, Sierra Leone, Nepal and Pakistan spoke so convincingly at our last two meetings, are broadening their co-operation with South Africa and are not implementing the resolutions of the Security Council and the General Assembly. It is this, in the Soviet delegation's view, which provides the basis for the defiant stand taken by the rulers of the Republic of South Africa. Relying on precisely this political support given them by the imperialist Powers, which in the war against the national liberation movement are obstinately defending the vestiges of colonialism, the racists of Pretoria are rejecting with unprecedented cynicism the decisions of the United Nations.

9. The African and Asian representatives cited a large number of specific facts bearing witness to the development of economic and military co-operation between the Western countries and the Republic of South Africa. The fact is that from year to year the trade relations of those countries with the Republic of South Africa are increasing. According to information from the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, exports of Western countries to the Republic of South Africa in 1969 increased by 10 to 20 per cent as compared with 1968, and in some cases by as much as 30 per cent.

10. A document of the Special Committee on *Apartheid* of 18 June 1970¹ has listed the main trading partners of the Republic of South Africa. What were the countries named in that document? I shall name them in the order in which they appear on page 23

of the document in question: they are the United States of America, the United Kingdom, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, France, the Netherlands, Japan, Sweden, Canada and Australia.

11. It is known that there is a huge flow of investments from the Western countries into the economy of the Republic of South Africa and southern Africa as a whole. The same report by the Special Committee on Apartheid on page 24 lists the main countries which invest capital in the Republic of South Africa. These are the countries, in the order in which they are given in the document: the United Kingdom, the United States of America, France, Switzerland, the Federal Republic of Germany, Belgium and Luxembourg. The interests of the imperialist monopolies in southern Africa are closely interwoven with the interests of the racists of the Republic of South Africa: they are jointly exploiting the African population. That is the economic basis of the criminal policy of *apartheid*. Monopoly capital places profit and gain above any principles of humanity and morality.

12. It is true that the representatives of the Western Powers do not mind occasionally condemning *apartheid* in words, but when it comes to putting into effect the resolutions of the Security Council and breaking off economic and military ties with the racists, then hatred of the national liberation movements gains the upper hand, money and profit outweigh other considerations, and the principles of morality and humanity are forgotten. The hypocrisy of the protectors of the colonialist and racist régimes of southern Africa has frequently been exposed in this forum.

13. In the "Note on military forces and equipment of the Republic of South Africa" prepared by the Special Committee on *apartheid* of 25 June 1970,² it is shown that between 1960 and the beginning of 1969, the Republic of South Africa obtained from the Western countries weapons to a value of \$US 924 million. From the names given in that note of the tanks, aircraft, cannon, submarines, rifles and weapons of other kinds obtained by the Republic of South Africa it is clear that these weapons were provided to the racists by States members of the aggressive NATO military bloc.

14. With the assistance of these countries the rulers of South Africa are greatly increasing their economic and military potential and expanding their armed forces, turning the Republic of South Africa into a military arsenal for all the colonialist and racist régimes in southern Africa, for all the members of the "unholy alliance" which has been established in that area. While for the financial year 1960-1961 the military expenditure of the Republic of South Africa amounted to R44 million, in the financial year 1969-1970 it totalled R272 million. This means that military expenditure has risen more than six times in the last ten years.

15. With the active assistance of the Western countries and under the licences obtained rom them, the Republic of South Africa has organized the produc-

¹ Document A/AC.115/L.276,

² Document A/AC.115/L.279 and Corr.1.

tion of military equipment of various kinds: armoured transport vehicles, military lorries, automatic rifles, tear-gas, missiles, mines and napalm bombs.

16. It has been firmly established that the Republic of South Africa is building up its military power with the support of its Western protectors in order not only to implement its racist policy within its own borders but also to combat the national liberation movements in Namibia and Southern Rhodesia, and to provide assistance to the Portuguese colonialists in their struggle against the patriotic forces of Guinea (Bissau), Mozambique and Angola, and to endanger the sovereignty of the young independent African States. It is understandable that the African peoples and their representatives in the United Nations should be particularly alarmed over this situation.

17. As may be seen from the data put forward here in the Council, the embargo on the delivery of arms to the Republic of South Africa has never been fully complied with by the Western Powers.

18. However, the statement made yesterday by the United Kingdom Government concerning its manifest intention openly to resume the sale of arms to the Republic of South Africa, although it concerns for the moment only naval weapons, is a step towards providing military assistance of all kinds to the South African racists on a broad scale; it is a clear challenge by British imperialism to world public opinion as a whole, a challenge to the principles of the United Nations Charter, and it is in complete disregard of the resolutions of the Security Council. Such actions would unquestionably lead to an exceedingly dangerous aggravation of the situation in southern Africa, which is complicated enough as it is. These intentions on the part of the United Kingdom Government therefore deserve to be roundly condemned. The Security Council should take effective measures to ensure a complete embargo on the delivery of arms to the Republic of South Africa.

19. The United Kingdom Government is, of course, seeking a plausible justification for its open military support of the racists of the Republic of South Africa. It speaks of the "defensive" character of the arms in question. It is putting forward the feeble argument that it is necessary "to protect the sea routes around the southern part of Africa" and to counteract so-called "Soviet penetration". They had to think up something in order to mislead public opinion. But we are not living in the times when the peoples could be expected to believe in that kind of colonialist fairy tale. The statements of a number of representatives in the Council yesterday unmasked the fabrications of the British.

20. The real purposes of the United Kingdom and the other Western countries in South Africa are quite different. By providing assistance to the Republic of South Africa, they are trying to maintain the colonialistracist order in southern Africa and to establish a beachhead there for the struggle against the national liberation movements in Africa. With the help of the colonialist-racist régimes in southern Africa, the imperialist monopolies are reaping fabulous profits. Imperialism needs these régimes. 21. The deterioration of the situation of the African population in the Republic of South Africa as a result of the hardening of the policy of *apartheid* requires the United Nations to take vigorous measures to curb the racists. It is essential to ensure the implementation by all States of the resolutions adopted by the Security Council and the General Assembly on the subject of *apartheid*. The countries which are today the main partners of the Republic of South Africa must be required unconditionally to put an end to the assistance and support which they have been giving it.

22. The Soviet delegation supports the proposal by forty African and Asian States concerning the necessity, as an urgent measure, of strengthening the embargo on the delivery of arms and ensuring its full implementation.

23. The Soviet Union's refusal to tolerate the policy of the racists in the Republic of South Africa or any other manifestations or forms of colonialism or instances of the oppression of man by man, is known to all. It is dictated by the very nature of our social structure, of our communist ideology and morality.

24. The Soviet people, imbued with the loftyhumanitarian ideas of Lenin concerning the freedom and equality of all peoples, large and small, irrespective of their race, reject with anger and indignation the inhuman policy of *apartheid* and condemn it in all its manifestations.

25. The Soviet Union is strictly implementing the resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Council on *apartheid*. It has never maintained and does not maintain any political, economic or other relations with the racist régime of the Republic of South Africa.

26. There are many States, which, like the Soviet Union, do not maintain any relations with the Republic of South Africa. It is essential to ensure that all countries without exception should follow this example, above all those permanent members of the Security Council mentioned here who are flouting its decisions concerning an embargo on the delivery of arms to the Republic of South Africa.

27. A further confirmation of the consistently anticolonial policy of the USSR appears in the communiqué issued on 17 July concerning the negotiations between the leaders of the Soviet Union and the United Arab Republic. That communiqué states, *inter alia*:

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"The leaders of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United Arab Republic have had a comprehensive discussion of the question of the national liberation movement and have reaffirmed their determination to strive for the complete, final and unconditional elimination of colonialism and neo-colonialism and for the implementation of the United Nations Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. They have expressed their grave concern over the subversive activities of the imperialist Powers directed against the African countries and peoples now struggling to achieve genuine independence. They have vigorously condemned the policy of *apartheid* pursued by the racists of the Republic of South Africa and Rhodesia, and appeal to all Members of the United Nations to take measures for the practical implementation of the decisions of the United Nations aimed at securing the independence of Namibia and the liberation of the peoples of Angola, Mozambique and Guinea (Bissau)."

28. In the view of the delegation of the USSR, the Security Council, in formulating its decisions, should strive for the adoption of measures which would lead to the genuine international political isolation of the South African racists, those slave owners of the twentieth century. That is the kind of action which would be effective in helping the peoples of southern Africa who are suffering under the colonialist and racist yoke.

29. Mr. VALLEJO ARBELAEZ (Colombia) (*inter-pretation from Spanish*): The speakers who have preceded me have been at one in expressing their concern over the announcement of a possible lifting of the arms embargo and over established violations of the Security Council's resolutions of 1963 and 1964.

30. The documentation referred to is impressive indeed; it leaves one with the impression that we are wasting our time here when, after long debate, we adopt a resolution which is not respected.

31. In these circumstances, may I be allowed to set forth very briefly the position of my delegation on the question.

32. First, the question of *apartheid*. Since resolution 181 (1963) and 182 (1963), and 191 (1964), were the immediate result of the *apartheid* policy, my delegation would begin by stating that we have always condemned that policy as being in violation of the principles of the Charter and of human rights. We fail to comprehend how, in this day and age, that kind of racial discrimination can continue, and we are confident that the firm stand of the United Nations and the spirit of rebellion among the subjugated peoples will put an end to all such segregation. The arms embargo is merely one way that has been chosen towards that end.

33. Second, Namibia. From the very outset, Colombia agreed to act as a member of the Council established for the purpose of laying the groundwork for what is to be an independent country when the Government of South Africa changes its attitude with regard to United Nations decisions, as indeed it must if this Organization tenaciously persists in tightening the measures that have been advocated for the purpose of enforcing the resolutions of the Security Council and the General Assembly.

34. During these very weeks a commission, presided over by the representative of Colombia in the Council on Namibia, has been travelling through Africa in an effort to reach agreement with African Governments on certain procedures for legalizing the independence and self-rule of the people involved. 35. One further justification for the arms embargo then is that it will facilitate the emanicipation of Namibia.

36. Third, the question of Rhodesia. In the debates in March it was made clear that there are very close ties between the Governments of Rhodesia and of South Africa for the purpose of putting down liberation movements among the subjugated minorities. Here again the embargo is justified.

37. Fourth, the matter of respect for Security Council resolutions. Having stated the clear-cut position of my delegation on the problems which led to the imposition of the arms embargo on South Africa, may I now be permitted to stress one matter of concern which my Government has on various occasions brought to the attention of the United Nations, namely, the question of why this Organization does not command sufficient strength to enforce compliance with its decisions; whether it is a question merely of a lack of will on the part of the Member States, or whether there are structural defects in the system that justify the adoption of new statutory rules. Of course, the adoption of such fundamental changes would also require the concurrence of its Members. But we now see very close at hand a new cataclysm that is approaching the world, so that, rather than allow ourselves to be enguifed in it, we should be well advised to modify the structure of this Organization and confer greater authority upon it.

38. Fifth, the question of the arms race. At past meetings of this Security Council my delegation has indicated how pessimistic we are with regard to the chances of establishing a permanent peace by laying down ground-rules for warfare, as if we were dealing with something like those discredited duels of honour in which gentlemen used to engage.

39. This artificial balance of power can be upset at any moment, plunging us into war. Permanent peace will not be achieved without a forthright policy of complete disarmament, and this will be impossible so long as no structural changes are made for guaranteeing that the aggressor will be punished. But although the possibility of bringing about disarmament of the super-Powers seems remote indeed-we must not say it is impossible-we should at least be concerned to prevent the arms race from taking place among other nations, particularly among the developing countries, which need all they can spare for the strategy of the Second United Nations Development Decade. It is criminal to assert that the arms industry would be ruined if sales were suspended, and, although we may deny it or try to conceal it, the fact is that the same old tricks of the merchants of death are being repeated as countries are brought into confrontation and forced to arm themselves at the sacrifice of the resources they vitally need for development.

40. In summary, my delegation shares the views of the signers of the letter appearing in document S/9867, because we believe that the Security Council should thoroughly examine this situation.

41. Mr. CHAYET (France) (*interpretation from French*): First of all, Mr. President, I should like to congratulate you on your assumption of the office of President of the Security Council. You have earned the confidence of the French delegation because of your great experience and because you have demonstrated in the United Nations the complete impartiality that has always been characteristic of Latin American representatives. We also greatly appreciated the con-

gratulations you extended to our delegation on the occasion of our national holiday. Finally, I should like to thank Ambassador Khatri, the Permanent Representative of Nepal, President of the Security Council for the month of June, for the manner in which he performed his tasks. He most certainly justified the high esteem in which he is held by all of us.

42. I should now like to turn to the item on the agenda of the Security Council: the question of race conflict in South Africa resulting from the policies of *apartheid* of the Government of the Republic of South Africa.

43. The French delegation would like first of all to reaffirm very clearly its categorical opposition to the doctrine of *apartheid*. The prejudices on which it is based and which have prompted the Government of South Africa to put into effect discriminatory and repressive practices, which one cannot fail to condemn, are in flagrant violation of the principles on which France has built its philosophy for many centuries. We are opposed to racial discrimination in all its forms and my country has long since proclaimed that it felt that all men were equal. It has endeavoured to spread throughout the world these concepts for which it has so frequently fought and these views are in fraternal harmony with the legitimate endeavor of Africans who are sighting for their dignity and economic development.

44. That is why my delegation fully understands the feelings of African States which, once again, have felt that it was necessary to draw the attention of the Security Council to the deplorable situation of their brothers in South Africa. We believe that it is important and useful that expression be given in our Organization to the disapproval of the international community of a policy which is so contrary to the duty to ensure universal "respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion", a duty which is imposed on Member States by the Charter.

45. These considerations, as the Council will recall, prompted my delegation to vote in favour of General Assembly resolution 1663 (XVI), which states "that the racial policies being pursued by the Government of South Africa are a flagrant violation of the Charter" and appeals to that Government finally to abide by the obligations flowing from the Charter. More recently, these considerations, for humanitarian reasons, prompted us to vote in favour of General Assembly resolution 2054 B (XX) creating the United Nations Trust Fund for South Africa. We contributed to that Fund and we supported resolution 2506 A (XXIV) whereby last year the General Assembly condemned: "... the Government of South Africa for its repressive acts against the political movement of the oppressed people of South Africa, and in particular for its enactment of the Terrorism Act, 1967".

46. I am aware that some have questioned the practical effect of those texts and have stated that only the effective application of international sanctions would induce the white minority of South Africa to take a more proper view of human relations.

47. However, can we not already detect among the white minority the signs of a long-awaited thaw? Three months ago the elections in South Africa were marked by the defeat of the more extreme supporters of the policy of apartheid. Two months ago, students demonstrated in favour of the release of twenty-two Africans detained under the Terrorism Act. Even in business circles, a certain amount of scepticism has emerged regarding the compatibility of *apartheid* with the requirements of economic development. There can be no doubt that the considerable moral pressure exerted on Pretoria, *inter alia* through the intervention of the United Nations, has made a definite contribution to this awakening. However, if the Organization were to try in addition to adopt enforcement measures and interfere directly in the internal affairs of a Member State, would it not be exceeding its authority as recognized by the Charter? The position of my delegation on this point is well known. It was set forth before the Council in 1963 when we considered the question which is once again on today's agenda. Developments since that time have not changed our position. No matter how regrettable the situation may be, it cannot be considered a threat to the peace within the meaning of Chapter VII. The question legitimately arises whether the application of these provisions, in addition to the very serious reservations to which, in the present situation, they give rise from the legal standpoint, would make it possible without serious drawbacks for the world economy to achieve the objectives which are so ardently desired by those who advocate them.

48. Our Council has so far, and not without reason, avoided any recourse to Chapter VII. Member States have all replied to the appeal sent to them calling for an end to the sale of military equipment to South Africa. In so doing, a good many, including States which are in a position to supply Pretoria with arms, have tied reservations to their commitments. Many have felt, doubtless, that a Member State cannot be denied the right to self-defence against armed aggression recognized by Article 51 of the Charter, and they have drawn a distinction between arms designed to serve the needs of external defence and arms likely to be used in the implementation of the policy of *apartheid*.

49. Here I should like to recall that such a distinction was introduced in resolution 181 (1963) adopted in August 1963 by the Security Council since the fifth paragraph of the preamble of that resolution states:

"Noting with concern the recent arms build-up by the Government of South Africa, some of which arms are being used in furtherance of that Government's racial policies".

I would add that this seems to have been accepted by the Council since, in its resolution 182 (1963) of 4 December 1963, it noted "with appreciation the replies to the Secretary-General's communication to the Member States on the action taken and proposed to be taken by their Governments in the context of paragraph 3 of that resolution . . .".

50. Among the replies sent in was, of course, the reply of the French Government dated 31 October 1963. Using the very words of the statement made by the representative of France in the Council on 6 August 1963, my Government stated that "the French authorities will take all steps that they consider necessary to prevent the sale to the South African Government of arms which might be used for purposes of repression" [1054th meeting, para. 105]. This undertaking was supplemented later on and expanded to apply also "to equipment and material for the manufacture and maintenance of such weapons", as affirmed in a statement to that effect made in the Council on 3 December 1963 by the representative of France [1078th meeting, para. 31]. My Government has abided by that commitment. I cannot then accept the assertions, wrongly made here, to the effect that steps taken by my Government have violated resolutions of the Security Council concerning the arms trade with South Africa. Giving full consideration to the legitimate concern of African States, we have stated that we intend to pursue a policy the limits of which have been brought to the attention of the Council. No one can in good faith challenge the fact that we have abided by our commitments.

51. My delegation has not failed to make known to our Government the views expressed in the Council and in particular those put forward by African States with whom we have friendly relations. I am authorized to state here today that the French Government, anxious to avoid anything that would place in jeopardy the security of these countries, and in particular Zambia, has been considering whether it is appropriate to take additional steps along these lines.

52. The constant concern of my Government has indeed been to help restore in South Africa a situation which is more in line with the legitimate aspirations of the oppressed peoples there. But there can be no doubt that the triumph of justice, which we all so ardently desire, does not depend only on an arms embargo, whether it be partial or, as some would like, total.

53. It is in the minds and hearts of the whites of South Africa that there must be a peaceful and enlightened revolution. My delegation hopes that the present debate will hasten that day.

54. Mr. KULAGA (Poland) (*interpretation from French*): Mr. President, 1 take pleasure in expressing to you the congratulations of my delegation on your assumption of the post of President of the Security

Council for July. We listened with great attention to your opening address, which gave us all the more reason to feel that under your guidance the Council will carry out with honour the very important tasks with which it is charged. You may be sure, Mr. President, that my delegation will give you its full cooperation in the implementation of these tasks.

55. Mr. President, I cannot overlook the congratulations that you were kind enough to address to my delegation concerning the Polish national holiday on 22 July. I thank you most cordially for that.

56. It is also customary to congratulate the outgoing President, and I do so with all the more pleasure since Ambassador Khatri is a person for whom we have the greatest respect, and his term of office was marked by the adoption of two unanimous resolutions on two important problems.

57. The debate on the item that was submitted to the Council by forty delegations and presented very brilliantly at our meeting of 17 July by the Ambassadors of Mauritius and Somalia [1545th meeting], and which has been discussed at such length since then, includes, in the view of my delegation, a number of aspects the importance of which can not be overestimated. They are important primarily for the people of South Africa, who will recall from this debate not the juridical argumentation nor the distinctions, as artificial as they are arbitrary, drawn between arms for external defence and arms for internal use, nor the exercises in intellectual acrobatics on the very hackneyed theme of global strategy, but rather the core of our debate, namely, whether the embargo on the supply of arms, of military equipment and all other means of buttressing and strengthening apartheid, will or will not be maintained, reinforced and made effective.

58. This debate also has great importance with respect to the situation in southern Africa. Each of us will agree that all matters of decolonization concerning Africa bring us back to what our own Foreign Minister, at the twenty-fourth session of the General Assembly, referred to as a pillar of colonialism and racism in Africa.³ All this brings us back to the South African Republic.

59. All my colleagues have already mentioned the role of the South African Republic in Namibia, Angola, Mozambique and Southern Rhodesia, and they have mentioned the aggressive expansion of *apartheid*, and the consequent threat to peace and security. I myself mentioned this at previous Council debates. Therefore, I hardly need to stress this point.

60. The present debate is equally important for the role and the authority of the United Nations as an Organization dedicated to the cause of equality amongst peoples, decolonization and, above all, to maintaining peace and international security. This holds particularly true for the Security Council. It

^a See Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-fourth Session, Plenary Meetings, 1767th meeting.

would be most regrettable if at the very time that we have just adopted a unanimous resolution aimed at strengthening the role and effectiveness of the Council, and when we are preparing documents designed to strengthen the United Nations after twenty-five years of existence, and when we are preparing future tasks for the United Nations—it would be most regrettable, I say, if the minimum objectives laid down in the Council's resolutions 181 (1963), 182 (1963), and 191 (1964) were not reaffirmed, strengthened and expanded.

61. The present debate enables us to compare professions of faith, and moral condemnations on the one hand with objective acts on the other hand.

62. It would be easy-all too easy, I would add-to accumulate facts pointing to the continual deterioration of the situation in the South African Republic and in southern Africa. The well-known attitude of Poland on this subject, as well as the statements we have heard, obviate the need for me to repeat these points. What is important in this debate, in my view, is to avoid. all evasive explanations, to avoid any interpretation which, as recent years have shown, attenuate and erode the resolutions already adopted. In the opinion of my delegation, we must therefore concentrate on the main element: namely, the role that the United Nations and all States can play, and which they do play, and their influence on the fundamental political equation in South Africa: the balance of power between the national liberation movements on the one hand and the racist Government of Pretoria on the other. For it is in this fashion that the national liberation movements assess the situation.

63. In the report of 13 July 1970 of the Special Committee of Twenty-Four,⁴ which quite recently dispatched an *ad hoc* group to Africa to make contact with the representatives of the national liberation movements of that continent, we read *inter alia* that the representatives of these movements have requested the United Nations:

"to bring pressure on the countries concerned to implement the relevant United Nations resolutions concerning the supply of arms to South Africa and Portugal".⁵

Further on the report adds, and again I quote:

"NATO was bitterly criticized by most of the representatives, who felt that the relations of NATO with Portugal, and of individual nations comprising NATO with Portugal and South Africa, constituted one of the most serious impediments in the way of decolonization in Guinea (Bissau), Mozambique, Angola, Namibia and Southern Rhodesia."⁶

64. It is in this same manner that the Pretoria Government assesses the situation. More than twenty years

of appeals, almost eighty resolutions containing moral condemnations, have not produced any change in the policy of *apartheid*, if not to strengthen it and to expand it. The South African Government remains oblivious to moral condemnations. On the other hand, the South African Government could not remain oblivious to practical measures which would buttress the moral condemnations and the result of which would be to reduce considerably the superiority enjoyed by South Africa at the present time with respect to the anit-apartheid forces, the anti-colonial forces and the national liberation movements. In order to maintain this superiority, the South African Government uses every pretext: rabid anti-communism (quite natural, I would say, for the apostles of *apartheid*), the appeal to class, racial and ideological solidarity and also the appeal to the profit instinct.

65. It is unnecessary for me to recall once again that politically and legally the United Nations has taken a clear position on this matter by recognizing, on the one hand, the legitimacy of the struggle carried on by the national liberation movements and by asking us to provide political and material assistance to these movements, and, on the other hand, by condemning the policy of *apartheid* of the South African Government.

66. It is curious to observe that the very same countries which, year after year, recommend to the liberation movements and to the African countries a peaceful solution of the conflict and which oppose the granting of political and material assistance to national liberation movements—these very countries have no scruples about financing and arming a Government which has been condemned by the overwhelming majority of the United Nations, supplying it with material means for applying a policy based on oppression and aggression, which itself is the negation of a peaceful solution.

67. For, if we examine today the question of *apartheid* in one of its military aspects, we cannot at any moment disregard the economic co-operation and financial assistance of such countries as the United States, the United Kingdom and the Federal Republic of Germany, and the list is much longer, which constitute the economic basis for the dangerous process of militarization of the Republic of South Africa.

68. The situation we have to face is set forth briefly but convincingly in document A/AC.115/L.279 and Corr.1. Since 1960-1961, almost a thousand million dollars has been allocated by the South African Government for the purchase of military equipment including Mirages and Mystères, French submarines, missiles and helicopters, Buccaneers, British tanks and spare parts, American military equipment and spare parts, as well as Italian training aircraft and still other items; all of which, as shown in the document I have just mentioned, is interwoven in the complex pattern of co-operation within the competition typical of international arms monopolies.

⁴ Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples.

⁵ Document A/AC.109/L.641, para. 39.

⁶ Ibid., para. 15.

69. And now we are faced with the declaration of intent submitted yesterday by the British Government to resume arms deliveries to the Republic of South Africa.

70. In this regard we must note that the United Kingdom still remains the main trading partner and the most important source of investments for South Africa, and we must note that the equipment of the South African Army, as may be seen from document A/AC.115/L.279 and Corr.1, consists mainly of British armaments and that British know-how is still the basis for the technological development of the South African armed forces.

71. We must observe that this declaration, if implemented, will have the most serious consequences for the effectiveness of the measures provided for in resolutions 181 (1963), 182 (1963) and 191 (1964), which, despite their limitations, remain the only resolutions which contain practical measures adopted by the Security Council against the South African Government.

72. Such a decision would have a political and practical influence, since not only would it strengthen the potential of South Africa for oppression and aggression and be regarded by the Republic of South Africa as a new defection from the policy of limited sanctions directed against South Africa, but at the same time it would constitute a kind of certificate of respectability, so necessary to the Pretoria Government under the present circumstances.

73. Only a few weeks ago Her Majesty's Government, in its reply to the Secretary-General concerning the consideration of measures for the strengthening of international security,⁷ stated:

"The standing of the United Nations must depend on the respect given to its authority and its decisions."

Further on it stated:

"Furthermore, decisions of the Security Council regarding international peace and security are to be fully accepted and implemented by all the Members."

74. Must we now conclude that that declaration also has been disregarded and that the first important political measure to be taken by the new British Government with respect to the United Nations will be to undermine one of the resolutions of the Security Council concerning peace and security?

75. We have, of course, noted the statement made by Mr. Warner, according to which the British decision was not a definite one.

76. Even at this stage of the debate, one thing seems clear. This debate, expressing as it does world opinion through the intermediary of the principal organ of the

United Nations responsible for the maintenance of international peace and security, indicates to the British Government not only the Council's opposition to any relaxation of the arms embargo but also its determination to strengthen that embargo. It indicates that the Security Council accepts neither the distinction between arms for exernal use and those for internal use nor the validity of so-called "strategic" arguments.

77. In all that I have just stated, you will find all the elements of the consistent attitude maintained by Poland on the problem of *apartheid* and colonialism in southern Africa. In all United Nations bodies we have always fully supported the objective of putting an end to the system of *apartheid*, with all the elements it involves: unacceptable racial discrimination covering the subjugation of the people of South Africa, the territorial aggression and the ideological extension of this system, as well as the threat to peace and security that it represents.

78. In particular, we consider an essential element of these objectives to be the unconditional implementation of an embargo on the supply of arms, military equipment, military technology and expertise, experts and everything which strengthens the South African Government's potential for repression and aggression. Consequently we shall vote in favour of any resolution that will promote these objectives.

79. Mr. TERENCE (Burundi) (*interpretation from French*): Mr. President, it is a great pleasure for my delegation to express to you our sincere congratulations and to wish you every success in discharging the tasks entrusted to you by the Security Council. You may be assured of the co-operation of my delegation.

80. Furthermore, the kind words which you expressed with respect to my country when you mentioned our national holiday, which falls on 1 July, elicit from me the same good wishes with respect to the Republic of Nicaragua.

81. Speaking on my own behalf, I have known you for a number of years, Sir, and I have witnessed your political mastery and your diplomatic experience. Therefore, I can say that this Council is in reliable hands.

82. With respect to the representative of Nepal, who guided the Council so ably during the past month, I should like to express to him the warm feelings of my Government and its people, and I should like to tell him how pleased we were and are for the assistance that he has always given to the Afro-Asian group in general and to the African group in particular.

83. I shall now deal with the basic problem before us—namely, the embargo which has been broken by the British Government. Indeed, the feverish haste shown by the Conservative Government in breaking the embargo indicates that it is stubbornly attached to an alliance considered as its political pivot.

⁷ See document A/7922 of 15 May 1970.

84. Recent developments in London illustrate the degree to which the Conservative Government values the oppressive régime of Pretoria. Indeed the marathon race in which the new British Government is now engaged in order to throw itself into the arms of the apologists of racial inequality poses a challenge to logic.

85. The authors of the confidential document CCOC 274, dated last February, which represents the foreign policy programme of the Conservative Party, are undoubtedly proud of their strategic genius. According to this obscurantist plan, the Conservative Government advocates the right of the United Kingdom to strew the two oceans encircling Africa—the Indian Ocean as well as the Atlantic Ocean—with naval and air bases. The leaders of the Tory Party have thus assumed as their main task the girdling of the African continent with military bases intended to ensure the defence of the outmoded régimes of Pretoria, Lisbon and Salisbury—and I gather this from the aforementioned document.

86. This programme affects Angola and Mozambique, which it considers as "military buffers" for South Africa, as well as Guinea (Bissau) and the Cape Verde Islands, which it considers as "a position of vital strategic importance".

87. The platform which the Conservatives intend to follow in their African policy reveals three main patterns as follows.

88. First, military collusion between the governments of outmoded régimes which have been universally stigmatized. This alliance will serve as a shield to the doctrine applied by the white South Africans and will strengthen a system which disseminates terror, provokes bloodshed and unleashes the hatred of the whites against their fellow men. By supplying weapons to South Africa the Conservatives are guilty not only of the genocide planned by the disciples of *apartheid*, but they are institutionalizing their approval of a theory which is as base as it is degrading.

89. Secondly, the military assistance which the Tories plan to lavish upon the Portuguese Government aims at buttressing the position of Portugal, encouraging it to occupy in perpetuity the colonies under its domination.

90. Thirdly, there will inevitably be a confrontation, between races on the one hand and amongst non-African Powers on the other hand.

91. At the very outset, may I be allowed to refute the allegations of the United Kingdom, according to which the political programme contained in the document I have just referred to was prepared by a private group.

92. How can we attribute to private individuals a programme which is already literally being applied, as is shown by the resumption of the sale of arms to Pretoria? Aside from the fact that the Government is actually applying this programme, those who are

presently in power are the very same people who were that the head of that committee which drafted, submitted and championed the various arguments contained in this document. Therefore, it seems strange that these very people who, the day before, were advocates of these ideas should abandon them on the morrow since they constitute the very cornerstone of their political platform. Is this about-face the result of the discovery that the international community is denouncing the malicious schemes of those who champion a discredited policy?

93. The zeal displayed by the Conservative Government in coming to the assistance of the champions of racism contrasts curiously with its alarming apathy with respect to problems which are truly matters of priority and which require urgent solutions, such as Rhodesia, Namibia and even the internal situation in Britain, which, because of its urgency, is grave from more than one standpoint. The haste shown by the new masters in London to assist the practitioners of *apartheid* brings into relief the enthusiasm with which they support and back up a régime that has been universally anathematized.

94. Since such problems as galloping inflation, savage strikes which have all but paralysed the country, have been relegated to the background by the new Government, the Security Council can only conclude that London is intent on identifying its own interests with those of the South African separatists.

95. A thesis according to which heavy armaments cannot contribute to the application of *apartheid* is pure fantasy. If we are to believe such specious reasoning, the Security Council might well be deceived by the duplicity of Governments which violate with impunity the arms embargo directed against Pretoria. According to them, only light weapons can serve to strengthen racism, whereas heavy arms, which are incapable of achieving this objective, are intended only to defend sea lanes or to put down external aggression against the chosen few of this planet, who advocate white supremacy.

96. Although it is true that all the members of the Council are doubtlessly not military geniuses or experienced strategists, they cannot be deceived to such an extent that they support such grotesque farces as those aimed at classifying the weapons supplied in two different categories only one of which could harm the African populations.

97. The allegations of the advocates of racial separation gloss over the fact that the arms exported to South Africa are double-edged swords. Military equipment may be aimed at a double objective, but the main target is none other than the Africans—these sub-humans who are subjected to eternal misery simply to ensure the pleasure of white supermen.

98. Have the Conservative Government and its partners proof to challenge the fact that the bombers and helicopters that have been sold to Pretoria can be, utilized to rain hails of bombs on African populations and to raze entire towns and villages? Is it not by means of these same helicopters and aircraft that thousands of Africans have been asphyxiated? Is it not by these very same aircraft and helicopters, always ready to unleash death and destruction, that the Namibian people and the black South African people are continually subjected to indescribable suffering?

99. The *Washington Post* of 10 July 1970, in an article entitled "White South Africa's Security Network Terrorizes Foes" on page A-14, states as follows:

"But even if the Tories rescind the 1964 ban, it will not greatly change the current situation. The French, and other suppliers, have eagerly sold their latest jets, helicopters and other epuipment to the South Africans, who are rapidly developing their own armament industries.

"Some informed observers say South Africa has the potential to develop nuclear weapons, perhaps within a decade or two.

"Presently, its 14,000-man armed forces possess more than 100 heavy tanks, another 100 medium tanks, two destroyers, 124 jet bombers and perhaps 100 jet fighters.

··. . .

"Soweto, the sprawling housing compound fifteen miles outside Johannesburg, is home for 600,000 Africans. It is located on an open plain.

"On one side sits a South African air force base. Two other military installations are within minutes of Soweto."⁸

Even heavy weapons can easily be used to destroy African populations and African villages.

100. Let us leave this subject and deal with submarines which allegedly are not included among the categories of arms intended to strengthen internal repression. The conventional armament of a submarine includes machine-guns, cannons and torpedoes, while the atomic armament of a submarine consists of missiles. Are the Governments which supply South Africa with such armaments ready to deny that these weapons could be used in the interior of South African territories and the territory of Namibia against the indigenous population? Do not missiles have an explosive power sufficient to destroy instantaneously the objectives against which they are launched by military aircraft sold to Pretoria by its usual suppliers? That being so, how can they have the temerity to ignore that the arms intended for South Africa are harmful to Africans?

101. Similarly, the clever distinction which has been invented between arms for external use and those for internal oppression—is not this distinction simply sheer subterfuge? Even if such a differentiation were hypothetically possible, how could the proponents of that argument dissociate military equipment, war material, from the over-all South African arsenal which they supply?

102. Doubtless it is due to the resources of their inventive minds that these open or clandestine suppliers of *apartheid* are able to distinguish between the military supplies described above for the military establishment and those for the police network that is set up throughout the entire territory of Namibia and South Africa. How far will such hair-splitting go?

103. The "fundamental disagreement" with the racial policy of South Africa expressed by the British Foreign Secretary is conveyed in mere words, whereas the action undertaken by his Government is the very antithesis of his verbal declarations. Furthermore, the Conservative Government has always limited itself to displaying disagreement, which it has never followed with action. This is not a doctrine of which the Conservatives disapprove; on the contrary, they support it very concretely. Indeed when they dare to state that the arms they plan to deliver to Pretoria are not intended to serve the purposes of *apartheid*, they compel the world to concede that they are, indeed, endowed inventive imagination. with their proverbially However, even this has its limits. It must be moderated for excessive cleverness degenerates into naïveté if not into self-degradation.

104. The pretext used to violate the arms embargo is that of British interests. We recognize that the economy of the United Kingdom has been forced to seek commercial assistance from Africa. But, however vital its interests may be, the Conservative Government, rather than safeguarding them, is using such reprehensible means as violence and thus might well jeopardize these interests irremediably.

105. If the commercial needs of the United Kingdom require passage and use of the Cape of Good Hope route, it is legitimate that we are entitled to ask what motives lead Mr. Heath's party to resort to prohibited measures. The second version advocated by the Tories considers that the Cape of Good Hope route has vital strategic importance.

106. In both cases it is rather abnormal that the propnents of such theses should disregard all the coastal African States along the Indian and Atlantic oceans. Although from an economic and military point of view their resources are still limited, the countries located on the perimeter of the African continent are in a position to combine their strength with London in order to ward off the aggression directed against the interests of another member of the Commonwealth, that is, the British Isles.

107. On the contrary, however, the leader of this Commonwealth prefers to link its destiny to that of South Africa, a country which has betrayed the Commonwealth's cause and whose régime is severely criticized all over the world.

⁸ Quoted in English by the speaker.

108. In the last analysis, we are bound to observe that the eagerness and the solicitude shown by the Conservatives in dealing with a rebel deserter are in direct proportion to their casual attitude towards the African members. It is well known that the Conservatives pay little or no attention to the opinions formulated by eminent African leaders with respect to the European-South African military alliances.

109. This very week several leaders of the Commonwealth—including the Presidents of Zambia, Tanzania and Uganda—have issued warnings to the Government in London, but these leaders of African States were not heeded.

110. Moreover, the economic and military interests which London is bent on defending at any price take precedence over the rights to citizenship and to life which the non-whites are constantly denied by the domination imposed upon them by the *apartheid* militants.

111. The Conservatives, in an about-face, are endeavouring to justify their military collusion with South Africa by invoking "phantom" aggressors and communist threats. Viewed from this angle, we can only ask where the greatest guilt lies—with the alleged warmongers or rather with those who provoke war and foment international conflicts, such as the Tory Government which is promoting racial wars in southern Africa.

112. The suppliers of arms to the champions of *apartheid* are dangerously gambling with the future of the human race. In this connexion I should like to quote from the speech of the Secretary-General, U Thant, delivered to the National Assembly of Algeria on 4 February 1964, the text of which was published on page 2 of the magazine *Objective: Justice*, vol. I, No. 1.⁹

"The proponents of racial discrimination have historically been the most emotionally backward and most spiritually bankrupt members of the human race. Their sickness really arises from a sense of fear and insecurity rather than from a superior pride . . . There is the clear prospect that racial conflict, if we cannot curb, and finally eliminate it, will grow into a destructive monster compared to which the religious or ideological conflicts of the past and present will seem like small family quarrels. Such a conflict will eat away the possibilities for good of all that mankind has hitherto achieved and reduce man to the lowest and most bestial level of intolerance and hatred. This, for the sake of all our children, whatever their race or colour, must not be permitted to happen."¹⁰

113. At a time when the nuclear age contains all the elements required to promote interracial solidarity, it is strange that the Powers which have in the past been victims of murderous wars are now rebelling against the peaceful mission of the United Nations. At a time

when scientific and technological progress impels all members of the human race to follow the same road towards the same ideal—that is, peace which transcends frontiers—it is sad to observe that the very States which are supposed to be models of conformity to the principles of the Charter complacently defy the decisions of our Organization.

114. By arming the fanatics of racial "divisionism", the Conservatives and their allies are contenting themselves with rushing to the protection of their immediate interests without worrying about the fate of their descendants. But is it right to satisfy selfish needs at the price of shedding the blood of millions of human beings? In addition to this shameful bargain which consists of arming the African usurpers by sacrificing the most inalienable rights, the Governments parties to this deal are contributing to the creation of an eternal gap between future generations.

115. Indeed, one of the inherent attributes of selfishness is disregard for future generations. This characteristic apparently seems to clearly identify the exporters of arms to South Africa. Although such a backward policy jeopardizes future harmony between the races, the opportunists of the moment are preparing their plans in accordance with a most unsavoury principle: "After me, the deluge". This deviation from the norms of human conduct will progressively lead to a very fatal result.

116. We must ask Pretoria's military partners whether they are mindful of the fate of their own posterity. Are they aware that the treatment inflicted on non-white races is such as to generate violent reprisals which will be directed against the white race? Any lucid assessment of the situation must lead to the realization that the crusaders of *apartheid* are deliberately exposing their descendants to formidable dangers.

117. The supplying of arms to the cruel régime of South Africa is, in reality, equivalent to an open conspiracy against all of Africa.

118. In the light of the foregoing it is necessary to put the problem in its proper context. The breach of the arms embargo—which in any case was never fully applied by the United Kingdom—has a fourfold significance.

119. First, the undeniable determination of the British Government to strengthen and cement blood ties with the South African whites even at the price of strangling the African peoples.

120. Secondly, the necessity to counter the zone of influence which France is gradually carving for itself in South Africa through its continual supplying of arms to Pretoria.

121. Thirdly, a reversion to imperialist dreams that have been frustrated by the reconquest of national sovereignty by practically all the former British colonies.

⁹ Publication of the Office of Public Information, OPI/371.

¹⁰ Quoted in English by the speaker.

122. Fourthly, a final attempt to perpetuate the domination of African countries by means of new procedures, with the assistance of Pretoria and Lisbon.

123. There is much evidence supporting this deduction and I shall quote *Le Monde Diplomatique* of November 1968 as follows:

"If the Rhodesian rebellion can be firmly established and if sanctions were to be revoked, it is said that the same policy of participation which allows the whites to have control over all cities and over the industrial power could be extended to the north of the Limpopo in Rhodesia, and perhaps even to Angola and Mozambique.

"Moreover, although it is rarely admitted publicly, mention is made of encircling Zambia, outflanking the United Republic of Tanzania and reducing these two countries to docile satellites and thereafter extending this policy as far as Katanga."

124. I shall now quote from the document which I mentioned at the very outset—this concerns assistance which the United Kingdom intends to give to Portugal:

"Despite the cost in financial terms rather than human, for military losses are small, there are no signs that Portugal cannot hold Angola and Mozambique indefinitely, should she so choose. In view in particular of the importance of the Cape Verde Islands to the Cape route, it would seem fully appropriate to reverse the present unfriendly policy and come to some arrangement with our Portuguese ally for naval support more especially in the region of San Vincente."¹¹

125. The reabsorption of the African sub-continent, which is presently being planned by the apostles of the white race, was foreseen by *Le Monde Diplomatique* and I shall quote it further on.

126. Such a strategy, aimed at dominating all of southern Africa, is clearly based on artificial norms, namely, on the so-called law of blood kinship or consanguinity.

127. Everything points to the accuracy of the predictions that war will be unleashed by separatist fanaticism, and although the explosion may not be imminent it is merely a matter of timing.

128. Other aims can be summarized under three points: (a) expansion and defence of the white fortress; (b) the acquisition and exploitation of a more extensive and more diversified market; (c) to continue the annihilation of the non-whites who today have been reduced to the status of sub-humans and who are at the mercy of the white superman who has been raised to the rank of a god.

129. Le Monde Diplomatique further added as follows: "There is an informal alliance, but a very effective one, between South Africa, Portugal and the rebel Rhodesian régime which has the support of powerful trends of opinion in the United States and Western Europe . . . it is essentially South Africa . . . governed by men who consider the facts of the situation with a very clear-thinking, calculating mind.

"... First of all, there was a growing conviction that the economic power of South Africa could be better exploited if it would cover a broader general market, including its sources of raw materials such as petroleum from Angola, within the framework of a common market dominated by Pretoria and Johannesburg....

"Finally the rebellion of the settlers in Rhodesia did actually occur, hence the need for South Africa, if the rebellion was to survive, to extend its influence northwards and to take this same Rhodesia under its wing by making it a political and military satellite. . . .

"Since 1962 the new offensive policy acquired two basic forms. Firstly, that of regular military collaboration with Portugal and Rhodesia even prior to the settlers' coup d'etat in 1965."

130. Le Monde of last February quotes the following statement by General R. C. Hiemstra, the Commanderin-Chief of the South African forces:

"South Africa has become a vital link in the struggle carried on by the West against the Soviet Union, all of which requires a new political and military structure in the Atlantic and Indian Oceans. Now that the Soviet Union is present in the seas surrounding Africa, it is urgent to revise Atlantic strategy and to realize that South Africa holds a key position in case of a Soviet threat coming from Western Africa or from the Middle East."

131. The revelations contained in the aforementioned quotations are the greatest evidence of the vast and permanent conspiracy being hatched on the African continent by the arms dealers in South Africa acting in complicity with the Pretoria-Salisbury-Lisbon axis.

132. In conclusion, it seems to my delegation that the best road to follow both for Africa and for the former European metropolitan countries would be to observe the following four golden rules: (a) to renounce the selfish and short-sighted policy which persists in sacrificing the fundamental rights of the Africans and their most vital interests; (b) to refrain from supporting those régimes which have been rejected by the universal community, namely the Governments of Salisbury, Pretoria and Lisbon; (c) to extirpate all the causes of provocations and wars which are being implanted and entrenched by the arms trade in South Africa; (d) to acquire and foster diplomatic farsightedness and political wisdom which are so essential in order to realize that Africa is on the eve of vast co-operation with all countries, thanks to its fabulous resources and its inexhaustible potential.

¹¹ Quoted in English by the speaker.

133. The enemies who would stop at nothing to despoil our young continent would have much to gain by joining with Africa instead of plundering it, for despite the Machiavellian plans being prepared against Africa, the peoples of this turbulently youthful continent have many surprises in reserve and are perhaps capable of unsuspected economic miracles. They themselves will ensure their own development. The Africans, marked by their recent evolution and by revolution on all fronts, are now in a position to achieve their full aspirations against all odds and their destiny will surely be on a par with the dimensions of their gigantic continent.

134. If the former metropolitan countries are incapable of observing these four golden rules which represent not only Africa's salvation but also their own, their prospects for the future will be most pitiful indeed. For then the hour of political and diplomatic degeneration will have struck.

135. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from* Spanish): There are no more speakers on my list, and as no other representative wishes to speak I propose to adjourn the meeting.

136. As the result of appropriate consultations, I wish to inform the Council that members agree that the next meeting should take place tomorrow, Wednesday, 22 July, at 10.30 a.m.

The meeting rose at 5.25 p.m.

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