



General Assembly

Distr.: General
2 October 2006

Original: English

Sixty-first session

First Committee

Agenda item 90

General and complete disarmament

Letter dated 2 October 2006 from the Permanent Representative of Indonesia to the United Nations addressed to the Chairperson of the First Committee

I have the honour, on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement, to transmit herewith the document entitled “Working paper presented by the Non-Aligned Movement”, which contains the long-standing principled positions of the Movement on disarmament and international security, as adopted by the Summit Conference of Heads of State and Government of the Non-Aligned Movement, held in Havana from 11 to 16 September 2006 (see annex).

I would be grateful if the present letter and its annex could be circulated as a document of the First Committee of the General Assembly, under agenda item 90.

(Signed) Rezlan Ishar **Jenie**



Annex to the letter dated 2 October 2006 from the Permanent Representative of Indonesia to the United Nations addressed to the Chairperson of the First Committee

Working paper presented by Indonesia on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement

The Non-Aligned Movement presents its long-standing principled positions on Disarmament and International Security as adopted by the Summit Conference of the Heads of State or Government of the Non-Aligned Movement held in Havana, Cuba, on 11-16 September 2006, as follows:

1. The Heads of State or Government reaffirmed and reiterated the long-standing principled positions of the Movement on disarmament and international security, including the decisions taken at the XII Summit in Durban in 1998, the XIII Summit in Kuala Lumpur in 2003, the XIII Ministerial Conference in Cartagena in 2000, the XIV Ministerial Conference in Durban in 2004 and the Ministerial Meeting held in Putrajaya, Malaysia, in May 2006.
2. The Heads of State or Government *expressed* deep concern over the current difficult and complex situation in the field of disarmament and international security. In this regard, they *called for* renewed efforts to resolve the current impasse in achieving nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation in all its aspects.
3. While *reaffirming* the absolute validity of multilateral diplomacy in the field of disarmament and non-proliferation, the Heads of State or Government *expressed* their determination to promote multilateralism as the core principle of negotiations in the area of disarmament and non-proliferation, and in this regard, they *welcomed* the adoption of General Assembly Resolution 60/59 on Promotion on multilateralism in the area of disarmament and non-proliferation.
4. The Heads of State or Government *expressed* their strong concern at the growing resort to unilateralism and in this context, *underlined* that multilateralism and multilaterally agreed solutions, in accordance with the UN Charter, provide the only sustainable method of addressing disarmament and international security issues.
5. The Heads of State or Government *reaffirmed* the Movement's principled positions on nuclear disarmament, which remains its highest priority, and on the related issue of nuclear non-proliferation in all its aspects and stressed the importance that efforts aiming at non-proliferation should be parallel to simultaneous efforts aiming at nuclear disarmament. They *stressed* their concern at the threat to humanity posed by the continued existence of nuclear weapons and of their possible use or threat of use. They *reiterated* deep concern over the slow pace of progress towards nuclear disarmament and the lack of progress by the nuclear weapons-States (NWS) to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals. They *underscored* the need for the NWS to implement the unequivocal undertaking that they provided in 2000 so as to accomplish the total elimination of nuclear weapons and *emphasised*, in this regard, the urgent need to commence negotiations without delay.

6. The Heads of State or Government *remained* deeply concerned at strategic defence doctrines of NWS, including the “NATO Alliance Strategic Concept”, which not only set out rationales for the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, but also maintain unjustifiable concepts on international security based on promoting and developing military alliances and nuclear deterrence policies.
7. The Heads of State or Government *reiterated* that the improvement in the existing nuclear weapons and the development of new types of nuclear weapons as envisaged in the United States Nuclear Posture Review contravene the security assurances provided by the NWS. They *further reaffirmed* that these improvements as well as the development of new types of such weapons violate the commitments undertaken by the NWS at the time of the conclusion of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT).
8. The Heads of State or Government *emphasised* that progress in nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation in all its aspects is essential to strengthening international peace and security. They *reaffirmed* that efforts toward nuclear disarmament, global and regional approaches and confidence building measures complement each other and should, wherever possible, be pursued simultaneously to promote regional and international peace and security.
9. The Heads of State or Government *reaffirmed* the importance and the relevance of the UN Disarmament Commission (UNDC) as the sole specialised, deliberative body within the UN multilateral disarmament machinery. They *continued* to fully support the work of the UNDC and *called upon* UN Member States to display the necessary political will and flexibility in order to achieve agreement on recommendations based on its two agenda items during the current cycle.
10. The Heads of State or Government *reaffirmed* the importance of the Conference on Disarmament (CD) as the sole multilateral negotiating body on disarmament, and *reiterated* their call on the CD to agree on a balanced and comprehensive program of work by establishing, inter alia, an ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament as soon as possible and as the highest priority. They *emphasised* the necessity to start negotiations on a phased programme for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons with a specified framework of time, including a Nuclear Weapons Convention. They *reaffirmed* the importance of the unanimous conclusion of the ICJ that there exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and to bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control.
11. The Heads of State or Government *reiterated* their support for the convening of the Fourth Special Session of the UN General Assembly devoted to Disarmament (SSOD-IV) and *further reiterated* their deep concern over the lack of consensus on the deliberations to consider the objectives and agenda of SSOD-IV. They *emphasised* the need to reconvene the open-ended working group on SSOD-IV, at an early date, preferably in 2007, as mandated by the General Assembly with a view to reaching agreement on the objectives and agenda of SSOD-IV, including the possibility of establishing its preparatory committee.

12. The Heads of State or Government again *called for* an international conference to identify ways and means of eliminating nuclear dangers, at the earliest possible date, with the objective of arriving at an agreement on a phased programme for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons with a specified framework of time to eliminate all nuclear weapons, to prohibit their development, production, acquisition, testing, stockpiling, transfer, use or threat of use, and to provide for their destruction.
13. The Heads of State or Government *reaffirmed* that the total elimination of nuclear weapons is the only absolute guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons and *reaffirmed further* that non-NWS should be effectively assured by NWS against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. Pending the total elimination of nuclear weapons, they *called for* the conclusion of a universal, unconditional and legally binding instrument on security assurances to non-NWS as a matter of priority. They noted the establishment in 1998 of an Ad Hoc Committee on effective international arrangements to assure Non-nuclear-weapons States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons in the Conference on Disarmament to negotiate universal, unconditional and legally binding security assurances to all non-NWS.
14. The Heads of State or Government *stressed* the significance of achieving universal adherence to the CTBT, including by all NWS, which, *inter alia*, should contribute to the process of nuclear disarmament. They *reiterated* that if the objectives of the Treaty were to be fully realised, the continued commitment of all States signatories, especially the NWS, to nuclear disarmament would be essential.
15. The Heads of State or Government, while *noting* the entry into force of the 2002 Moscow Treaty between the Russian Federation and the United States, *stressed* that reductions in deployments and in operational status cannot substitute for irreversible cuts in, and the total elimination of, nuclear weapons, and *called on* the United States and the Russian Federation to apply the principles of transparency, irreversibility and verifiability to further reduce their nuclear arsenals, both warheads and delivery systems, under the Treaty.
16. The Heads of State or Government *continued to be concerned* over the negative implications of the development and deployment of anti-ballistic missile (ABM) defence systems and the pursuit of advanced military technologies capable of being deployed in outer space which have, *inter alia*, contributed to the further erosion of an international climate conducive to the promotion of disarmament and the strengthening of international security. The abrogation of the ABM Treaty brings new challenges to strategic stability and the prevention of the arms race in outer space. They *remained concerned* that the implementation of a national missile defence system could trigger an arms race(s) and the further development of advanced missile systems and an increase in the number of nuclear weapons.
17. The Heads of State or Government *recognised* the common interest of all mankind in the exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes, and *emphasised* that prevention of an arms race in outer space would avert a grave danger for international peace and security. They *further emphasised* the paramount importance of strict compliance with existing arms limitation and disarmament agreements relevant to outer space, including bilateral agreements, and with the existing legal regime concerning the use of outer space. They *also*

emphasised the urgent need for the commencement of substantive work in the CD on the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

18. The Heads of State or Government *remained convinced* of the need for a multilaterally negotiated, universal, comprehensive, transparent, and non-discriminatory approach toward missiles in all its aspects as a contribution to international peace and security. They *expressed* their support for efforts to be continued within the UN to explore further the issue of missiles in all its aspects. In this regard, they *emphasised* the need to keep the issue under the agenda of the UN General Assembly and that in accordance with its Resolution 59/67 a Panel of Governmental Experts on the issue of missiles in all its aspects would be established in 2007. Pending the achievement of such a universal mechanism related to delivery systems for weapons of mass destruction, any initiative to address these concerns effectively and in a sustainable and comprehensive manner should be through an inclusive process of negotiations in a forum where all States could participate as equals. They *stressed* the importance of the security concerns of all States at regional and global levels in any approach to the issue of missiles in all its aspects.
19. The Heads of State or Government *believed* that the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones (NWFZs) created by the treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Bangkok, Pelindaba and Mongolia's nuclear-weapon-free-status are positive steps and important measures towards strengthening global nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. They *welcomed* the signing of the Treaty on a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia in Semipalatinsk on 8 September 2006 by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, and considered the establishment of that zone as an effective contribution to strengthening regional and global peace and security. They *reiterated* that in the context of nuclear-weapon-free zones (NWFZs), it is essential that NWS should provide unconditional assurances against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons to all States of the zone. They urged States to conclude agreements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned with a view to establishing new NWFZs in regions where they do not exist, in accordance with the provisions of the Final Document of the First Special Session of the General Assembly devoted to Disarmament (SSOD-I) and the principles adopted by the 1999 UN Disarmament Commission. They *noted* with satisfaction the convening of the First Conference of the States Parties and Signatories to Treaties that Establish Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones, held in Tlatelolco, Mexico, from 26 to 28 April 2005, and in this context, *called on* the States parties and signatories to the Treaties of NWFZs to implement further ways and means of co-operation among themselves, their treaty agencies and other interested States.
20. The Heads of State or Government *reiterated* their support for the establishment in the Middle East of a zone free of all weapons of mass destruction. To this end, they *reaffirmed* the need for the speedy establishment of a NWFZ in the Middle East in accordance with the Security Council Resolution 487 (1981) and paragraph 14 of the Security Council Resolution 687 (1991) and the relevant General Assembly resolutions adopted by consensus. They *called upon* all parties concerned to take urgent and practical steps towards the fulfilment of the proposal initiated by Iran in 1974 for the establishment of such a zone and, pending its establishment, they *demand* on Israel, the only country in the region that has not joined the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) nor declared its intention to do so, to renounce possession of nuclear weapons, to accede to the NPT without delay, to place promptly all its nuclear facilities under IAEA full-scope safeguards according to Security

Council Resolution 487 (1981), and to conduct its nuclear related activities in conformity with the non-proliferation regime. They *expressed* great concern over the acquisition of nuclear capability by Israel, which poses a serious and continuing threat to the security of neighbouring and other States, and *condemned* Israel for continuing to develop and stockpile nuclear arsenals. They *were of the view* that stability cannot be achieved in a region where massive imbalances in military capabilities are maintained particularly through the possession of nuclear weapons, which allow one party to threaten its neighbours, and the region. They *further welcomed* the initiative by H.E. Mr. Mohammed Hosni Mubarak, President of the Arab Republic of Egypt, on the establishment of a zone free from weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East, and in this context, they *took into consideration* the draft resolution tabled by the Syrian Arab Republic, on behalf of the Arab Group, before the Security Council on 29 December 2003 on the establishment of a zone free of all weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East. They *stressed* that necessary steps should be taken in different international fora for the establishment of this zone. They *also called for* the total and complete prohibition of the transfer of all nuclear-related equipment, information, material and facilities, resources or devices and the extension of assistance in the nuclear related scientific or technological fields to Israel. In this regard, they *expressed* their serious concern over the continuing development whereby Israeli scientists are provided access to the nuclear facilities of one NWS. This development will have potentially serious negative implications on security in the region as well as the reliability of the global non-proliferation regime.

21. The Heads of State or Government *emphasised* the importance of the observance of environmental norms in the preparation and implementation of disarmament and arms limitation agreements. They *reaffirmed* that international disarmament forums should take fully into account the relevant environmental norms in negotiating treaties and agreements on disarmament and arms limitation and that all States, through their actions, should contribute fully to ensuring compliance with the aforementioned norms in the implementation of treaties and conventions to which they are parties.
22. The Heads of State or Government *emphasised* the importance of the UN activities at the regional level to increase the stability and security of its Member States, which could be promoted in a substantive manner by the maintenance and revitalization of the three regional centres for peace and disarmament.
23. The Heads of State or Government of the States Parties to the NPT, while *reaffirming* the package of agreements of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the NPT and the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference of the NPT, *expressed* their disappointment at the inability of the 2005 Review Conference of the NPT to agree on substantive recommendations. They *reiterated* their call for the firm commitment by all States parties to the Treaty to the implementation of all the provisions of the Treaty and called for the full implementation of the 13 practical steps for systematic and progressive efforts to implement Article VI of the Treaty, particularly an unequivocal undertaking by the NWS to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament. Pending the total elimination of nuclear weapons, they *also recalled* that the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference of the NPT reiterated that legally binding security assurances by the five NWS to the non-NWS parties to the Treaty strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime. They *underlined* the importance to establish subsidiary bodies to the relevant Main

Committees of the 2010 Review Conference of the NPT to deliberate on practical steps for systematic and progressive efforts to eliminate nuclear weapons; to consider and recommend proposals on the implementation of the resolution on the Middle East adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the NPT; and to consider security assurances. In this regard, they *emphasised* the need for the Preparatory Committee meetings to continue to allocate specific time for deliberations on nuclear disarmament, implementation of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East and security assurances. They *recalled* the agreement that the Review Conference will be chaired by a representative from the Movement.

24. The Heads of State or Government of the States Parties to the NPT *called upon* the NWS to implement their commitments not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-NWS parties to the Treaty or NWFZs at any time or under any circumstances, pending the conclusion of a legally binding instrument on security assurances.
25. The Heads of State or Government *reaffirmed* the inalienable right of developing countries to engage in research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination. They *continued to note* with concern that undue restrictions on exports to developing countries of material, equipment and technology, for peaceful purposes persist. They *again emphasised* that proliferation concerns are best addressed through multilaterally negotiated, universal, comprehensive and non-discriminatory agreements. Non-proliferation control arrangements should be transparent and open to participation by all States, and should ensure that they do not impose restrictions on access to material, equipment and technology for peaceful purposes required by developing countries for their continued development. In this regard, they *also expressed* their strong rejection of attempts by any Member State to use the IAEA technical co-operation programme as a tool for political purposes in violation of the IAEA Statute.
26. The Heads of State or Government of the States Parties to the NPT *emphasised once more* that nothing in the Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all the parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with Articles I, II, and III of the Treaty. They *stressed* that this right constitutes one of the fundamental objectives of the Treaty. In this connection, they *confirmed* that each country's choices and decision in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy should be respected without jeopardizing its policies or international co-operation agreements and arrangements for peaceful uses of nuclear energy and its fuel-cycle policies.
27. The Heads of State or Government *stressed* particularly the responsibility of developed countries to promote the legitimate need of nuclear energy of the developing countries, by allowing them to participate to the fullest possible to transfer of nuclear equipment, materials, scientific and technological information for peaceful purposes with a view to achieving the largest benefits and applying pertinent elements of sustainable development in their activities.
28. The Heads of State or Government, while *emphasising* the importance of the positive role played by the Non-Aligned Members in the IAEA, *stressed* the necessity that all members of the IAEA strictly observe its Statute. They *stressed* that any undue pressure or interference in the Agency's activities, especially its verification process, which could jeopardize the efficiency

and credibility of the Agency, should be avoided. They *recognised* that the IAEA is the sole competent authority for verification of compliance with the obligations under the respective safeguard agreements of the Member States. They *also reaffirmed* that a clear distinction has to be made between the legal obligations of Member States under their respective safeguards agreements and their voluntary undertakings, in order to ensure that such voluntary undertakings are not turned into legal safeguards obligations.

29. The Heads of State or Government *congratulated* the IAEA and its Director General, Dr. Mohamed El Baradei, for being awarded the 2005 Nobel Peace Prize. They *expressed* full confidence in the impartiality and professionalism of the Agency. They also congratulated the Agency on its Fiftieth Anniversary in 2007.
30. The Heads of State or Government *reaffirmed* the inviolability of peaceful nuclear activities and that any attack or threat of attack against peaceful nuclear facilities –operational or under construction- poses a great danger to human beings and the environment, and constitutes a grave violation of international law, principles and purposes of the UN Charter and regulations of the IAEA. They *recognised* the need for a comprehensive multilaterally negotiated instrument prohibiting attacks or threat of attacks on nuclear facilities devoted to peaceful uses of nuclear energy.
31. The Heads of State or Government *affirmed* the need to strengthen the Radiological Safety and Protection Systems at facilities utilising radioactive materials as well as at radioactive waste management facilities, including the safe transportation of these materials. They *reaffirmed* the need to strengthen existing international regulations relating to safety and security of transportation of such materials. While reiterating the need to take appropriate measures to prevent any dumping of nuclear or radioactive wastes, they *called* for effective implementation of the Code of Practice on the International Transboundary Movement of Radioactive Waste of the IAEA as a means of enhancing the protection of all States from the dumping of radioactive wastes on their territories.
32. The Heads of State or Government *stressed* that the issue of proliferation should be resolved through political and diplomatic means, and that measures and initiatives taken in this regard should be within the framework of international law; relevant conventions; the UN Charter, and should contribute to the promotion of international peace, security and stability.
33. The Heads of State or Government of the States Parties to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) *reaffirmed* that the possibility of any use of bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins as weapons should be completely excluded, and the conviction that such use would be repugnant to the conscience of humankind. They *recognised* the particular importance of strengthening the Convention through multilateral negotiations for a legally binding Protocol and universal adherence to the Convention. They *reiterated* their call to promote international cooperation for peaceful purposes, including scientific-technical exchange. They *underlined* the need to coordinate among the NAM States Parties to the Convention and expressed their commitment to work towards a successful outcome of the forthcoming Sixth Review Conference, to be held in Geneva, from 20 November to 8 December 2006.

34. The Heads of State or Government of the States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) *invited* all States that have not yet signed or ratified the Convention to do so as soon as possible with a view to its universality. They *reiterated* their call on the developed countries to promote international cooperation through the transfer of technology, material and equipment for peaceful purposes in the chemical field and the removal of all and any discriminatory restrictions that are contrary to the letter and spirit of the Convention. They *recalled* that the full, effective and non-discriminatory implementation of the provisions of international cooperation contribute to the universality of the Convention. They *also called upon* States having declared possession of chemical weapons to bring about the destruction of their chemical weapons at the earliest possible date. While *recognizing* the financial and technical challenges for some possessors, they *called upon* those States Parties in a position to do so, and where requested, to assist such possessor States in the achievement of the total elimination of chemical weapons.
35. The Heads of State or Government *regretted* unsubstantiated allegations of non-compliance with relevant instruments on weapons of mass destruction and *called on* States Parties to such instruments that make such allegations to follow procedures set out in those instruments and to provide necessary substantiation for their allegations. They *called upon* all States parties to the respective international instruments to implement fully and in a transparent manner all their obligations under these instruments.
36. The Heads of State or Government *expressed* their satisfaction with the consensus among States on measures to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction. They *welcomed* the adoption by consensus of the General Assembly Resolution 60/78 entitled “Measures to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction” and *underlined* the need for this threat to humanity to be addressed within the UN framework and through international co-operation. While *stressing* that the most effective way of preventing terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction is through the total elimination of such weapons, they *emphasized* that progress was urgently needed in the area of disarmament and non-proliferation in order to help maintain international peace and security and to contribute to global efforts against terrorism. They *called upon* all Member States to support international efforts to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery. They *also urged* all Member States to take and strengthen national measures, as appropriate, to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction, their means of delivery and materials and technologies related to their manufacture.
37. While *noting* the adoption of resolution 1540 (2004) and resolution 1673 (2006) by the Security Council, the Heads of State or Government *underlined* the need to ensure that any action by the Security Council does not undermine the UN Charter and existing multilateral treaties on weapons of mass destruction and of international Organisations established in this regard, as well as the role of the General Assembly. They further *cautioned* against the continuing practice of the Security Council to utilize its authority to define the legislative requirements for Member States in implementing Security Council decisions. In this regard, the Heads of State or Government *stressed* the importance of the issue of non-state actors acquiring weapons of mass destruction to be addressed in an inclusive manner by the General Assembly, *taking into account* the views of all Member States.

38. The Heads of State or Government *reaffirmed* the sovereign right of States to acquire, manufacture, export, import and retain conventional arms for their self-defence and security needs. They *expressed* their concern about unilateral coercive measures and emphasised that no undue restriction should be placed on the transfer of such arms.
39. The Heads of State or Government *recognised* the significant imbalance in the production, possession and trade in conventional weapons between the industrialized and the Non-Aligned Countries, and *called for* a significant reduction in the production, possession and trade of conventional weapons by the industrialized states with a view to enhancing international and regional peace and security.
40. The Heads of State or Government *remained deeply concerned* over the illicit transfer, manufacture and circulation of small arms and light weapons (SALW) and their excessive accumulation and uncontrolled spread in many regions of the world. They *recognised* the need to establish and maintain controls over private ownership of small arms. They *called on* all States, in particular major producing States, to ensure that the supply of small arms and light weapons is limited only to Governments or to entities duly authorised by Governments and to implement legal restrictions preventing the illicit trade of small arms and light weapons. They *encouraged* all initiatives by States to mobilise resources and expertise as well as to provide assistance to strengthen the full implementation of the UN Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in SALW in All Its Aspects.
41. The Heads of State or Government *emphasized* the importance of early and full implementation of the Programme of Action, and in this regard, *stressed* that international assistance and cooperation is an essential aspect in the full implementation of the Programme of Action. They *expressed* disappointment at the inability of the UN Conference to Review the Progress made in the Implementation of the Program of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in SALW in All Its Aspects, held in New York, from 26 June to 7 July 2006, to agree on a final document. They *reaffirmed* the total validity of the Programme of Action and encouraged the NAM delegations to coordinate efforts in the UN with a view to reaching agreement on a follow-up to the Programme of Action in order to ensure its full implementation. They called for the full implementation of the international instrument to enable States to identify and trace in a timely and reliable manner the illicit small arms and light weapons, which was adopted by the General Assembly.
42. The Heads of State or Government *continued* to deplore the use, in contravention of international humanitarian law of anti-personnel mines in conflict situations aimed at maiming, killing and terrorising innocent civilians, denying them access to farmland, causing famine and forcing them to flee their homes eventually leading to de-population and preventing the return of civilians to their place of original residence. They *called upon* all States in the position to do so, to provide the necessary financial, technical and humanitarian assistance to landmine clearance operations, the social and economic rehabilitation of victims as well as to ensure full access of affected countries to material equipment, technology and financial resources for mine clearance.
43. The Heads of State or Government of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their

Destruction *invited* those States that have not yet done so to consider becoming parties to the Convention.

44. The Heads of State or Government *expressed* concern about the explosive remnants of the Second World War, particularly in the form of landmines which continue to cause human and material damage and obstruct development plans in some Non-Aligned Countries. They *called on* the States primarily responsible for laying these mines and living explosives outside their territories during Second World War to cooperate with the affected countries and provide mine action support to affected countries, including information exchange, maps indicating the locations of mines and explosives, technical assistance for mine clearance, defrayal of the costs of clearance and compensation for any losses caused by mines-laid.
45. The Heads of State or Government of States Parties to the Convention on Prohibition or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May be deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects (CCW) and its Protocols *encouraged* States to become parties to the Convention and its additional Protocol on Explosive Remnants of War.
46. The Heads of State or Government *stressed* the importance of the symbiotic relationship between disarmament and development and the important role of security in this connection, and expressed concern at the increasing global military expenditure, which could otherwise be spent on development needs. They *further stressed* the importance of the reduction of military expenditures, in accordance with the principle of undiminished security at the lowest level of armaments, and urged all States to devote resources made available from there to economic and social development, in particular in the fight against poverty. They *expressed* firm support for unilateral, bilateral, regional and multilateral measures adopted by some governments aimed at reducing military expenditures, thereby contributing to strengthening regional and international peace and security and recognised that confidence building measures assisted in this regard.
47. The Heads of State or Government *commended* the continued work of the NAM Working Group on Disarmament, under the chairmanship of Indonesia, in coordinating issues of common concern to the Movement in the field of disarmament and non-proliferation. They *encouraged* all NAM delegations to actively participate at the international disarmament meetings with a view to promote and achieve the objectives of the Movement.
48. Consistent with and guided by the aforementioned principled positions and affirming the need to promote, defend and preserve these positions, the Heads of State or Government *agreed to*:
 - 48.1. Continue to pursue the positions and priorities of the Movement, as appropriate, in the relevant international fora;
 - 48.2. Task the NAM Coordinating Bureau to undertake efforts, as appropriate, with a view to achieving the objectives of the Movement at disarmament and international security meetings.