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NOTE

Symbols of United Nations documents are composed of capital letter combined with figures. Mention of such a symbol indicates a reference to a United Nations document.

Documents of the Security Council (symbol S/ . . .) are normally published in quarterly *Supplements of the Official Records of the Security Council*. The date of the document indicates the supplement in which it appears or in which information about it is given.

The resolutions of the Security Council, numbered in accordance with a system adopted in 1964, are published in yearly volumes of *Resolutions and Decisions of the Security Council*. The new system, which has been applied retroactively to resolutions adopted before 1 January 1965, became fully operative on that date.

FIFTEEN HUNDRED AND THIRTY-FOURTH MEETING

Held in New York on Tuesday, 17 March 1970, at 3 p. m.

President: Mr. Joaquín VALLEJO ARBELAEZ
(Colombia).

Present: The representatives of the following States: Burundi, China, Colombia, Finland, France, Nepal, Nicaragua, Poland, Sierra Leone, Spain, Syria, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America and Zambia.

Provisional agenda (S/Agenda/1534)

1. Adoption of the agenda.
2. Question concerning the situation in Southern Rhodesia:

Letter dated 3 March 1970 from the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/9675);

Letter dated 6 March 1970 addressed to the President of the Security Council by the representatives of Algeria, Botswana, Burundi, Cameroon, the Central African Republic, Chad, the Congo (Democratic Republic of), Dahomey, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea, the Ivory Coast, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Morocco, the Niger, Nigeria, the People's Republic of the Congo, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, the Sudan, Swaziland, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, the United Arab Republic, the United Republic of Tanzania, the Upper Volta and Zambia (S/9682).

Adoption of the agenda

The agenda was adopted.

Question concerning the situation in Southern Rhodesia:

Letter dated 3 March 1970 from the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/9675);

Letter dated 6 March 1970 addressed to the President of the Security Council by the representatives of Algeria, Botswana, Burundi, Cameroon, the Central African Republic, Chad, the Congo (Democratic Republic of), Dahomey, Equatorial

Guinea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea, the Ivory Coast, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Morocco, the Niger, Nigeria, the People's Republic of the Congo, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, the Sudan, Swaziland, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, United Arab Republic, the United Republic of Tanzania, the Upper Volta and Zambia (S/9682)

1. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Spanish*): In accordance with previous decisions of the Council and with its consent, I intend to invite the representatives of Algeria, Senegal, Pakistan, Yugoslavia and India to participate in the debate without the right to vote. Since there is not sufficient space at the table itself for all, in accordance with the practice followed in the past in similar cases, I would request those representatives to take the places reserved for them at the side of the Council chamber, on the understanding that they will be invited to sit at the table when it is their turn to address the Council.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. N. Harbi (Algeria), Mr. I. Boye (Senegal), Mr. S. A. Karim (Pakistan), Mr. Z. Jazié (Yugoslavia) and Mr. S. Sen (India) took the places reserved for them in the Council chamber.

2. Mr. ORTEGA URBINA (Nicaragua) (*interpretation from Spanish*): Mr. President, allow me first to state that your excellent qualities as a statesman, your wealth of diplomatic experience and your natural propensity to reflection lead us to feel highly honoured to serve under your presidency. I also wish to convey a cordial greeting to the Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of Zambia, who has come here specially to participate in the work of this Council.

3. I have listened carefully to the enlightening statements that have been made on the question of Southern Rhodesia; and many such statements indeed have been made because this is a question of concern to all. It is also a source of particular concern to the United Nations and has been so from the very moment when this Council decided that it was likely to constitute a threat to international peace and security and because it involved not only the fate of the people of Southern Rhodesia, but also cherished principles of justice and equality that should govern relations between men and between nations. We cannot fail to be concerned at the maintenance of a system which denies to a man, because of his race, the right to participate on an equal

footing with his fellow nationals in all aspects of the life of his country.

4. My delegation condemns the illegal régime of Southern Rhodesia and its legal system, which is based on racial discrimination, and extends its sympathy and moral support to the people of Rhodesia. We cherish the hope that in the near future a democratic system may be set up which will allow that people to enjoy in its institutions based on mutual respect and equal rights. My Government does not recognize the unlawful régime of Ian Smith, nor does it maintain consular or trade relations of any kind with that Government, and we are faithfully carrying out the resolutions adopted by this Council.

5. After hearing the representatives who have already participated in this debate, I believe I am not mistaken in thinking that not a single delegation disagrees with the idea that the state of affairs now unfortunately obtaining in Southern Rhodesia should be changed. I have not heard a single voice raised to state the contrary. And this should satisfy the international conscience although not lull it into resignation.

6. We should seek the means which would make it possible to translate into reality this unanimous desire to find a favourable—and, of course, a viable solution—to the problem of Southern Rhodesia. And if our purpose is unanimous, it is only fitting that the methods and means that may be agreed upon should also meet with the unanimous support of this Council.

7. It has been said here—and I must agree with the statement—that a divided opinion would be self-defeating in its effects. Indeed I believe that a split now would serve to blur the clear picture of unanimous repudiation by this Council of the alleged republic recently proclaimed by the racist minority.

8. In the opinion of my delegation, the draft resolution submitted by the Finnish delegation [S/9709] could serve to unify our thinking and lead to the approval of a resolution by unanimous vote. It confirms the decisions taken in previous resolutions of this Council and adds new constructive points, such as that spelt out in paragraph 19 (c), which may well be useful in helping us to find a favourable solution. It also takes up the initiative reflected in the United Kingdom draft resolution [S/9676/Rev.1] and a good portion of the text sponsored by Burundi, Nepal, Sierra Leone, Syria and Zambia [S/9696 and Corr.1 and 2].

9. In concluding this brief statement, I should like to lay emphasis on my desire and my hope that Southern Rhodesia may come to be a democratic, free, sovereign and independent State.

10. Lord CARADON (United Kingdom): I do not wish to go back over the many past debates on Rhodesia in this Council and in the Committees of the Assembly—nor, I believe, would the Council wish me to do so. I am primarily concerned now—as I am sure we all are—with the question of what action, what effective action, can now be taken. What should be

the message to go out from this Council to Africa and to the world? Should it be a clear and strong message of agreement or should it be merely a confused noise of division and desperate dispute?

11. I accept most readily that unanimity and agreement are of value only if we have something positive, something worthwhile to say, but I put it to you, Sir, and to the Council that we have things we can say now—things of great significance and far-reaching consequence. We have a duty to say them. I trust that we can say them now and say them together. Consequently, I very warmly welcome the speech to which we have just listened by the representative of Nicaragua.

12. It is in the hope that we can avoid further recrimination that I shall not go back for long over past arguments. Those who have taken part with me in past debates on Rhodesia will at least admit that I have never failed to state plainly what my country can do now and what it cannot do.

13. My country took a decision of the greatest importance. We proposed and participated in comprehensive mandatory economic sanctions against Rhodesia. It was a decision based on principle and determined policy. By carrying it out we have suffered and still suffer heavy financial loss—heavier indeed than any other country, but we have not wavered in pursuing the policy which we declared. I have at the same time plainly stated that we cannot now do more.

14. The main demand made of us, and repeated in this debate, has been that we should attempt to settle the future of Rhodesia by the use of force, and I shall first deal with that. On the use of force, I ask you to remember what I said in this Council at the 1479th meeting on 19 June 1969:

“On this issue I know that there has been strong feeling, but that strong feeling is, I believe, partly based on a lack of understanding. Comparisons made in our debate have shown the extent of that misunderstanding. The misunderstanding of the military and practical factors in the minds of some speakers is so serious that they even compare the situation in southern Africa with that in Anguilla. This suggests extraordinary misconceptions. Comparisons have been made between Rhodesia and other British colonial Territories where force has been used in the past to deal with disorder or violence, but there has been no recognition of the fact that the situation in Rhodesia has been and is quite different from that in the other Territories which have been named.

“Since Rhodesia was first formed as a self-governing colony in 1923 there has never been a British army there, nor since that time has there been any British official in administrative authority there. In these respects Rhodesia has been self-governing, with its own forces, for nearly half a century. What is the importance of that? It means that it is not a question of merely deciding to adopt a new local policy or of taking local action to maintain order as we did in colonies which Britain

administered. It is a question of an invasion—an invasion in the middle of a continent. It is a question of starting a war. We know that once force is used escalation can easily ensue. We know that the results of violent action are incalculable. We cannot tell where force would lead. We all know that it is much easier to start a war than to end one. At least we are entitled to expect recognition of the fact that those of us who are against starting a conflict are serious and sincere in our reluctance to resort to force.

“It should not be regarded as strange or even unusual in this Council, charged with the responsibility for the maintenance of peace and security and with the peaceful settlement of disputes, when we defend our opposition to starting a war. We have seen so many examples in the world of the results of violence and force that some of us may be forgiven for believing that, rather than use force, every possible alternative should first be explored—explored in peace and explored to the end.

“Since the demand is that my country should undertake the military expedition, since the demand is that a British army should start this war, we have a right to be consulted and we have a right to be heard.”

I make no excuse for having restated our position on the use of force.

15. Now let me turn to the arguments for imposing economic sanctions against the whole of southern Africa. With regard to proposals for extending sanctions against South Africa and Portugal I have repeatedly and carefully explained our position to the Assembly and to this Council. As regards South Africa, this is what I said as long ago as 1965:

“We must accept the fact that in the circumstances of South Africa anything less than a major economic and strategic blockade would fail to achieve the required result. We must accept the fact that, as far as my country is concerned, it is impossible at present to go beyond the arms embargo which we have already imposed. We must accept the fact, moreover, that a full campaign of economic sanctions backed by a blockade would require resources beyond the present capacity of our Organization.”¹

16. For my country, which as much as any country in the world depends on its foreign trade, to cut off trade with all those countries whose policies we dislike or oppose would be economic suicide. I might add that refusal to commit suicide may be unpopular but it is not immoral.

17. Nevertheless, in view of our direct responsibility, we have initiated and implemented comprehensive sanctions against Rhodesia. We are anxious to make them more effective. In spite of what has been said by some members of this Council, I do not believe that anyone here recommends that sanctions should be abandoned.

¹ This statement was made at the 472nd meeting of the Special Political Committee, the record of which is published in summary form.

This is no time to relax, let alone give up. It is a time to press on and press harder.

18. The facts have not changed. They cannot be wished away. But these are not arguments for defeatism, for doing nothing. They are arguments for considering together most carefully exactly what we can do, always insisting that there must be no compromise with racial discrimination and no compromise with racial suppression. These are the issues on which we must never be on the wrong side.

19. It is with the hope that we can now act positively and unanimously that I will forgo replying to some of the speeches to which we have listened in this debate. Some things were said which seemed to me distorted by spite—it would perhaps be more charitable to put them down to ignorance—but there would be no value in pursuing them. In a spirit of brotherly co-operation I shall even forgo the full reply I had intended to make to my friend Ambassador Malik.

20. When he first spoke on Rhodesia I paid him the compliment of saying that there was much in his speech that was new and much that was true though, unfortunately, what was true was not new, and what was new was not true. Now I must sadly admit that in his latest speech [*1532nd meeting*] there was neither. He repeated a number of false accusations. He suggested that my Government had not fully and faithfully respected the comprehensive sanctions which we first proposed and have since rigorously put into effect. Let me tell him that no country has done more than mine. We respect the part that Zambia has played, but no other country has suffered greater loss in giving effect to the comprehensive sanctions than mine. What is more, no country has taken more effective punitive legal action against any of its citizens shown to have engaged in trade with Rhodesia, either directly or through South Africa or Portugal. Furthermore, no country has done more in the Committee of this Council dealing with sanctions against Rhodesia. We have ourselves brought nearly 100 reports of possible breaches of the sanctions to the Sanctions Committee. I assure the Ambassador of the Soviet Union that when we accept an obligation we carry it out.

21. Ambassador Malik went further and even suggested that my country had actually encouraged and supported the illegal régime. He spoke of my country affording that régime open support. That is, as he well knows, the exact opposite of the truth.

22. He goes on to make even wilder statements. He speaks of mortal hatred for the Africans and enslaving the African peoples. These are very offensive remarks to those of us who have had the privilege of working in Africa, and particularly to those of us who have had experience of working with Africans in Africa's advance to self-determination and independence.

23. We may, and often do, have differences and disputes between us here in this Council. It does not help to resolve them when resort is made to the kind of allegation which we heard from the permanent rep-

a representative of a great Power for whom personally we all have such high regard.

24. So let me turn from controversy to the constructive search for agreement. Let me again plead for agreement. To search for it is, we all know, the permanent obligation of this Council. If we abandon the search for agreement we are failing in our primary task in this Council. Always it is our duty to harmonize our actions and to search diligently for common ground. The longer I serve in this Council the more I realize that this is an obligation which transcends all others.

25. When we agree our actions can be effective. When we disagree we encourage the forces of conflict and tyranny. On the question of Rhodesia now before us we have in the past acted unanimously, as the Ambassador of Finland reminded us [1533rd meeting]. If we disagree and divide now we shall bring comfort and rejoicing to the régime which we all heartily condemn.

26. Condemnation is not enough. I certainly agree with those who have so argued here. I did not come here merely asking for a repetition of past condemnations. I have asked for action on recognition and for action on the related issue of representation. No one has suggested that these questions are unimportant. They are vital. I say again that they are issues of first importance to the illegal régime and to the world.

27. Already we have made good progress since I asked the Council to meet, and achieved good results, as the representative of Pakistan told us last week [*ibid.*]. Every speaker in this Council has called for refusal to recognize the illegal régime. The African draft resolution [S19696 and Corr.1 and 2] incorporated the same call. So did the Ambassador of Finland. On this it is already absolutely clear that we are unanimous.

28. Equally important, the call for refusal to recognize has been followed by positive action on representation. Nine countries have now followed up the action which my Government took last June by ending their representation in Salisbury. I pay my tribute to Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, France, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Switzerland and the United States for the action they have taken. This has been a most welcome and spectacular response to the call. Our call to bar the door of recognition now and for the future has been accepted. That was our purpose and it has been achieved.

29. I have never suggested, however, that action to refuse recognition and end representation was enough.

30. I have listened with the greatest respect to the proposals of the Ambassador of Finland, whose resource and initiative are such assets to the Council. We are, I assure him and other members of the Council, very ready, as we have always been ready, to search for action on which we can agree and which is within our capacity. We stand ready to do so now.

31. Let me finally say this. I never myself bring personal considerations into our debates. We speak for our Governments rather than for ourselves, but some personal references have been made in this debate. The Ambassador of Syria has been good enough to quote [1532nd meeting] from a book I wrote some years ago. I am much flattered and I congratulate him on his excellent taste in literature but in reply to what he and others have said to me, let me repeat what I have said in this Council before. I myself served many years ago in North Africa and West Africa and I have been involved in the problems of southern Africa for some time. I do not forget that I once had the honour of being appointed by the Secretary-General to give advice with others on those problems. Before that I had resigned from my position as an ambassador here, as the Minister of State from Zambia has reminded me, because I disagreed with my Government at that time. I disagreed on the issue of the need to consult all the people of Rhodesia on their constitutional future. Would that they had been consulted at that time.

32. Permit me also to confirm that I would not have hesitated to resign again rather than be associated with any dishonourable settlement in Rhodesia which offended against the principles of consultation and consent; but permit me to say too that I myself do not disagree with the two main decisions which I have defended—the decision that the United Kingdom cannot now send an army to start a war in southern Africa and the decision that the United Kingdom cannot now justify an economic war against all southern Africa. As I have said, these are hard facts and hard decisions but they are facts that have to be faced. None of us, least of all I, can run away from them.

33. There is one final word I should like to say. I make no complaint about expressions of furious frustration and even bitter impatience. Indeed I often share them. It is galling, to use the mildest word, that no drastic or dramatic measures can now be advocated to assist the peoples of southern Africa to advance to self-determination and freedom. But, for what it is worth, I put it to those who are furious and bitter—and I do so most earnestly—that we shall not be serving the interests of the peoples of southern Africa if we now divide and disagree here at the United Nations. It is my judgement that we must be content for the moment to hold fast and hold together, and maintain a common front against the evils we oppose.

34. I realize that what I say may be misunderstood or misrepresented. I cannot help that. But I greatly hope that what I say will be heeded, for I assure you that it is honestly intended.

35. I go back to what I said earlier, to the question of what effective action we can take now. I am not so much concerned with procedure or the method of our decision provided it can be agreement in the end. It is the end and not the means that matters. Again and above all I repeat and urge the arguments for acting within our capacity and acting together. That, Mr. President, has been the object of the consultations you

have wisely initiated. I trust that, with the co-operation of us all, that object will be secured.

36. Mr. DE PINIES (Spain) (*interpretation from Spanish*): Hearing you, Mr. President, speaking our language is for me a source of both pride and satisfaction. And this to be sure is not the only tie that binds us together; it is but one among many. To see Colombia so worthily represented by you, Sir, presiding over this eminent organ of the United Nations, is cause for congratulation not only for the members of this Council, but for you personally as well. For although you have held so many public offices in your lifetime, this is, in essence, a further recognition of your great qualities and of the mastery with which you are conducting our debates. In the discharge of your functions, Mr. President, you shall never lack the collaboration of the Spanish delegation.

37. I wish also to offer a special word of appreciation to Ambassador Terence of Burundi for the skill and dexterity with which he guided our debates last January. I should likewise wish to offer at this time a cordial word of congratulation to the representative of China, who, by his quiet efforts relieved us from having Council meetings so that we could prepare for the meeting that is being held now.

38. The Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of Zambia is participating in our deliberations. My delegation offers him a warm word of thanks for the contribution he is making to this important debate.

39. After listening carefully to the speakers who have taken part in our discussion, my delegation has reached the conclusion that there appears to be unanimity concerning the attitude of condemnation adopted by the members of this Council in the face of the deplorable situation that the British settlers have created in Southern Rhodesia. Many previous speakers, and in particular the Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of Zambia, have depicted for us the tragic situation in which the Zimbabwe people finds itself, deprived as it is of its legitimate rights by a people artificially imported and settled in a land which does not belong to them. The international community cannot remain indifferent to these facts. All the formal acts by which the settlers in Rhodesia have sought to legalize their situation in the territory—the political declarations, the constitutions and the referendum—are devoid of meaning. To ask the usurpers themselves for their opinion concerning the colonial situation that they and the administering Power have created is a manoeuvre that can deceive no one.

40. The United Nations has declared that those formal acts to which I have referred are contrary to the provisions of the Charter and the resolutions of the United Nations, and cannot therefore ever be a basis for any legitimate status.

41. Apparently there is also agreement on the necessity of adopting measures to put an end to this intolerable situation. There are, however, certain divergences concerning the scope of such measures, but opinion

is almost unanimously inclined to favour a reinforcement of the sanctions laid down in Council resolution 253 (1968), of 29 May 1968. The Spanish Government has scrupulously applied the provisions of that resolution and remains convinced that that policy must be maintained.

42. There is no full agreement, however, as to the scope of the responsibilities involved. In that regard, my delegation, in its intervention on this item last June [1481st meeting], pointed out that the primary responsibility devolves upon the United Kingdom as the administering Power. The situation created in Rhodesia is the result of Great Britain's colonial policy, built upon laws that remain in force under the secessionist régime. The United Kingdom is responsible for having tolerated the attitude of the British minority that continues to maintain its domination, based on racial discrimination and contempt for the value and worth of the human person, over the Zimbabwe people, which possess inalienable rights over the territory.

43. My delegation has already drawn the Council's attention to the fact that this attitude on the part of Britain ill accords with its previous assertions that the interests of the people are, as stated in the United Nations Charter, "paramount". It conveys the impression that once again the interests that are being safeguarded are those which suit the artificially imported British minorities contrary to the legitimate rights of peoples deprived of their freedom or their territory.

44. Apart from that responsibility, which we might term causal, there are other aspects too. The representative of the United Kingdom has told us that his Government is scrupulously applying the sanctions agreed upon by the Security Council, thereby evading all other responsibility in view of the obvious failure of the policy of sanctions. But in my delegation's opinion, the policy of sanctions should be understood, within the context of the Charter, as a continuing and intensifying process directed toward one goal, that of putting an end to a situation which, under the terms of the Charter, constitutes a threat to international peace and security. The Salisbury régime knows that the sanctions will be limited because the United Kingdom does not seem prepared to use all the resources at its command. With such moral support it is not difficult to withstand an economic blockade.

45. In the course of this debate many delegations have recalled that in similar situations—and I believe that I remember hearing Northern Ireland and the territory of Anguilla mentioned in this connexion—the United Kingdom has had recourse to all sorts of methods to maintain its authority, and there are many well-known cases in which British naval demonstrations have coincided with political decisions that unquestionably have served the purposes of the United Kingdom Government.

46. In view of everything I have just said, my delegation, though appreciating the efforts of the British Government to find a solution to this problem and

understanding the difficulties of a political nature that prevent it from satisfying its desire to go further, considers that the United Kingdom draft resolution, being inadequate, will not help to solve this grave conflict. In our desire to facilitate the task of the British Government itself, we believe that a resolution which focuses on the problem of direct responsibility for Rhodesia, without diminishing it or shunting it off on other countries, since it would thus reflect the clamour of world public opinion, would make it possible for the British Government to undertake all the measures necessary to enable it to settle the dispute.

47. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Spanish*): I am very grateful to Ambassador De Pinies for the generous words he addressed to the President.

48. I should now like to inform the Council that I have just received a communication from the representative of Saudi Arabia [S/9710] to the effect that he would like to be invited to participate in this debate, without the right to vote. If I hear no objection and with the consent of the Council, I propose to invite that representative to take a place at the Council table.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. J. Baroody (Saudi Arabia) took a place at the Security Council table.

49. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Spanish*): I now call on the representative of Saudi Arabia to make his statement.

50. Mr. BAROODY (Saudi Arabia): Mr. President, it is indeed an honour for me to address the Council under your presidency. As we all know, we are on the threshold of spring. The United Nations, including the Security Council, has been proliferating resolutions and all kinds of documents in all seasons, so that one is reminded of the profusion of spring leaves on sappy boughs.

51. Promises have been peddled ever since the inception of the United Nations. What we need is language that can be translated into action so that we may not become the laughing-stock of peoples all over the world. We in the United Nations can hardly afford further abortive efforts, whether in the Council or in the General Assembly. We should learn from the fact that the League of Nations foundered. If we cannot learn anything from the League of Nations, I think that we may have a trauma in the not-too-distant future, because faith in this Organization is being lost.

52. If there were an alternative to this Organization, one would perhaps console oneself and try other methods of solving intricate problems, but each one of us knows that there is no alternative to this Organization. If it falls we fall with it; the whole world will fall with it. That is why I venture to speak to sound a warning that time may be running short and we should take heed so that we do not fall into the abyss because of our rhetoric and self-complacency inside this Council and the Headquarters itself.

53. We are isolating ourselves from the whole world by force of habit. We come to our offices. Some of us receive certain instructions. We are becoming cogs in the machines of politicians all over the world, with hardly any exceptions. One might ask what bearing this has on the item before us. The crux of the matter is whether the United Nations can devise machinery that will work or whether we should continue with oratory and verbiage and then, as I say, lose the confidence of the whole world in us.

54. The question of Southern Rhodesia is a case in point. We cannot afford any more to peddle promises which cannot be fulfilled. I have listened very carefully to and read the deliberations of this Council. I commiserate with my good friend the representative of the United Kingdom. I have mentioned in the Fourth Committee time and again, when this question was discussed at length, that one cannot ask the United Kingdom to do what it perhaps cannot do.

55. Many of us here doubt the intentions of the United Kingdom. Unfortunately, the United Kingdom, like a few other European Powers, at one time had a vast empire and the remnants of that empire, one of which is Southern Rhodesia, make us suspicious. I will hold no brief for the United Kingdom.

56. In my younger days—although I was an insignificant person, I was not like Lord Caradon—I did my little bit to fight colonialism in my area. I would still fight it wherever I find it if I had the physical energy to do so. But the United Kingdom cannot be expected to make itself bankrupt; nor, I believe, is the Government prepared to fall because of the sentiment of the majority of the white people in the United Kingdom—and I visit the United Kingdom every year on fact-finding tours, not to talk with the Government but to talk with many of my friends there, whom I met in the late twenties and the whole decade of the thirties. That majority of white people will bring down any Government that sends troops to fight Southern Rhodesia.

57. Of course, I am saying it bluntly. Lord Caradon will say it in his own politic way, embellishing it with his eloquence and diction, and once in a while cracking a few jokes, which relieves the tragedy. Whether or not the white people of the United Kingdom are right in feeling that way is beside the point. They feel that way—they may be prejudiced—and they are prejudiced. But does the Council think that they are the only people that are prejudiced? No, Sir. Even in our part of the world we have certain prejudices.

58. But speaking on this particular issue, the United Kingdom Government would fall overnight if it were to wage war on Ian Smith and his cohorts. Therefore, my African and Asian brothers—because we are all united in submitting resolutions hoping that something can be done by way of the Council—rule out any intervention by force on the part of the United Kingdom.

59. How happy I was and how lucky the British people were when the British Empire fell—and its fall

was mighty. Mr. Churchill saw the liquidation of that British Empire before he was interred. We were all proud. How lucky the British people are. None should be praised more than that gentleman who sits on the Council, Lord Caradon, who, as he mentioned, and I remember, opposed his Government when he was fighting for the liberation of certain African people.

60. There is an Arab proverb which says: "God does not expect any person to carry more than he can bear". That is why I sometimes feel sorry that some of our African friends and Asian brothers are labouring under the impression that the United Kingdom still has the power of the Empire. That Empire is gone. Do not expect anything from the United Kingdom and, I say, fortunately for the people of the United Kingdom. They are no longer burdened. There is no more rationalizing power as the white man's burden and such balderdash, to use an American expression that I learnt here.

61. Therefore, I sometimes really feel sad when I see the United Kingdom condemned—and I mean that. Perhaps it could do more and perhaps it should do more. But the onus is placed on the United Kingdom—and I think it is wrong. On whom shall we place the onus? We should find a solution, otherwise I will be engaging in rhetoric, in oratory, signifying nothing.

62. I shall deal with this subject, as I submit, in an unorthodox manner. We know that throughout history the mantle of power falls on the shoulders of certain States. It so happens that the mantle of power, after the Second World War, fell on the shoulders of the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics—I should like to say "Russia", it is easier for me. I will disclose to the Council that four or five years ago I was active on this question. I spoke to my American friends and I spoke to my Soviet friends—if I may call them so, a monarchist like me. I have friends amongst them. I found out that both are committed to fight discrimination and colonialism. The persons with whom I talked were honourable men and they were not hiding anything. They were really against colonialism and racialism. It was no surprise, for after all the people who populated the United States fled from Europe at one time because of persecution on racial grounds and because their human rights were trampled underfoot.

63. So it was not unnatural for the United States to be against racial discrimination. Although I must say that, with the years, some of them have assumed certain—what shall I say—self-righteous manners with regard to people that are not lily-white. To speak plainly they—not all of them, because the civil rights movement is to be lauded in this country—are against the blacks. We know that—the 25 million of them. But I think this problem will be solved one day because after all those blacks are as American as Abraham Lincoln and Washington. If they do not say that they are, then the only Americans are the Red Indians who are put in reservations. But I believe that the civil rights movement is making great progress.

64. We come to the Soviet Union. It is a conglomeration of Republics—I believe sixteen of them. There

are the Mongol type, the yellow, the white, the brown—all shades of colour. From my knowledge and from my conversation I do not think there is any discrimination on the grounds of colour in the Soviet Union.

65. Then there are the anti-colonial attitudes of both. We know that the United States was a colony. It was only in 1776 that the United States was freed or liberated. We do not have to go into the history of Russia. But we salute Mr. Khrushchev, who introduces the famous anti-colonial resolution 1514 (XV).² Both countries have power. Both are anti-racial and both are anti-colonial. What are those two super-Powers doing with their power? Let us see. Are they bringing justice to people who are not allowed to exercise the right of self-determination? I submit that some of them try. But maybe they are right. They do not wish to have a confrontation. I go back to the conversations I had four or five years ago—confidential talks. They are no longer confidential now; four or five years pass and the whole thing is like a broken record. The Russian representative—I do not want to name him; it was before our friend Mr. Malik returned to us here, and I had the privilege and pleasure of knowing him for twenty years—communicated with Moscow, and he replied to me: "Our hearts are with the Southern Rhodesians and with the peoples of Africa, but, to put it succinctly, we do not want to have a confrontation because a confrontation might mean war. We are in the United Nations. We cannot afford to have a war with all those atomic bombs flying around—the whole world would come to an end."

66. A very serious-minded American—I do not want to name that American gentleman—told me, in unequivocal words, that this was a question that should be the responsibility of the United Kingdom. "Passing the buck", they call it in America. The United Kingdom at that time—I do not think Lord Caradon was here then—was doing its best to find a solution. It brought pressure; it spoke of sanctions; it spoke of many things, but all those efforts, unfortunately, were abortive.

67. *Quo vadis?* Where now? The two world Powers do not want to have a confrontation; thus the people who do not exercise self-determination are left "in the cold". Is there not a way, on this particular issue—I am not talking of South-East Asia now—for both Powers to agree and, if necessary—and I am far from recommending that they should use force—take drastic measures—what drastic measures? I shall come to that—and stop Ian Smith and the other racists in that part of Africa?

68. Incidentally, I do not want to mention Portugal in this context, because Portugal is not racist; I have relatives in Brazil; and remember that Brazil was a Portuguese colony. You should not lump the Portuguese with Ian Smith: they may be colonial, yes, but they are not racist. They mix, there is inter-marriage and they are not self-righteous. They do not

² *Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifteenth Session, Plenary Meetings, 869th meeting.*

believe, like some people of the North—not all people of the North—that God has made a mould for them, and then He made several other moulds. I do not know, as an Arab, what mould I would be in. That, however, is parenthetical.

69. There are several ways open to both the Soviet Union and the United States if they agree on this question. They should, through the United Nations, agree to train Africans who will form a real *cordon sanitaire* around Rhodesia, to the extent it is humanly possible. There should be United Nations guards in Zambia, for example, and the other contiguous countries, financed and officered or advised by the Soviet Union and the United States.

70. Why do they send advisers to the Far East? I hear about nothing but advisers in South Viet-Nam and North Viet-Nam. Why do they not send advisers to organize and form, through the United Nations, a *cordon sanitaire* against the racists in Africa? Why not? Because the Africans and the Asians happen to be weak; they do not exercise power. All right, we are Members of the United Nations, we have rights, just as they have. Why not exercise those rights here through the United Nations?

71. This is short of using force. I said once that force could be used, provided it did not cost a lot of life and treasure, by training paratroopers so that they could pounce on Government House, round up the racists, put them in strait-jackets and have their minds examined, without treating them badly. They must be living in the Middle Ages to engage in such racism in the second half of the twentieth century. But I am sure they are not going to do that. They use force when they abduct one another; they send troops into Europe when they are fighting one another; they send paratroopers into Europe. Many paratroopers were dropped behind the lines and performed wondrous feats I hear. Even Mussolini was abducted by paratroopers. Why do they not use paratroopers? They will not use them. That is why I spoke of a sort of *cordon sanitaire*—not that I do not agree with all the sanctions and other measures that are embodied in this draft resolution before us.

72. Then the United Nations should take the lead, with all its membership—not depend only on those two States—by educating the whites of Southern Rhodesia to their responsibilities and obligations towards their black brethren—if they want to call them “brethren”, because, after all, they are all *homo sapiens*—and they have been colonialists there; those whites had come from the outside; they were not natives. But the Africans will accept them—I guess they have no choice but to accept them—but will not be discriminated against by them because of their colour.

73. The Office of Public Information of the United Nations could be strengthened; the budget could be replenished with more funds; and let there be a programme for Rhodesia and other places in Africa where racism is practised to enlighten the whites to what is

going on in the world and to indoctrinate them in the principles and lofty ideals of the United Nations, and not to allow Ian Smith and his cohorts to brain-wash them with the idea that whites are supermen.

74. It can be done, but it needs funds. The United Nations budget is suffering. Why should it suffer? Every day we hear of the loss in South-East Asia of planes that cost several million dollars each and are used to kill people in war. Money is spent right and left on war. Why is it not spent for a good cause here? The Office of Public Information of the United Nations must be strengthened; we must have educational programmes for the whites as well as for the blacks in Southern Rhodesia and other parts of Africa. It costs money for announcers, and so on.

75. I am not a technician, but I should think they could “bug” those radio programmes. “Bugging” is something that will alert the people. Why are we not listening? When I was discussing this plan, when I said that some of those planes like the ones that were sent over Russia at one time to spy on it—I do not recall what they were called—should be sent to drop educational leaflets over Southern Rhodesia some said that most of the blacks do not know how to read or write. Then let our Japanese friends donate about 20,000 transistor radios every year to be parachuted over Southern Rhodesia so that the people can hold them and hide them and listen to what is going on.

76. There are many ways. Where there is a will there is a way. There are many ingenious methods in which you can do something, instead of each one coming here and reading prepared notes. The United Nations is not even interesting as a debating society any more. We want something drastic, something done by people who are committed to the United Nations. I am committed to the United Nations and I am not the only one committed to the United Nations. Many of my colleagues are committed to the United Nations, which we consider transcends national interests. Otherwise why should we be here as members?

77. These are stray thoughts. I am not going to elaborate a plan now. I hope I am sowing a few seeds that may germinate into something in the future. I will wager that a year from now somebody will come here to speak on the same subject and with a similar draft resolution and nothing will happen. There are two world Powers. They should ginger themselves up and do something. There is a war in South-east Asia. One of the two mightiest Powers has committed about half a million troops allegedly to fight the spread of an ideology—communism. Yet they sit here with the communists, they wine and dine and drink cocktails. I said “allegedly”, because it is a small Power. They do not let them determine their own future. I am not incriminating anybody, but I have a right to talk. I am an Asian, and in my part of the world an alien people is fighting as the proxy of certain Western Powers. We are the chess-board and the pieces are not wooden pieces but human beings. We are the pawns. Why is it that there are half a million men in South-east Asia, but when it comes to Southern

Rhodesia they say they cannot do it? One thousand and one excuses are found not to touch a hair on the heads of Ian Smith and his colleagues. Whom are we fooling by this talk around this horseshoe table? It is not a good-luck horseshoe any more. Whom are we fooling here? Ourselves? Some here are gullible enough or smug enough in their positions but the peoples of the world are more important. The Charter begins with the words "We the peoples of the United Nations" not "The Member States of the world". Do not think I am angry. This is my style. I am very cool inside. But really one should be angry.

78. Lord Caradon has submitted a draft resolution [S/9676/Rev.1], and, with his permission, I want to draw his attention to certain things in it—if I remember rightly, I did draw his attention to them—just for the sake of clarity, to show how certain interests are served, but I am sure that on the part of Lord Caradon it was not intentional. It is the word "urges" in paragraph 2. It says: "... urges States not Members of the United Nations, having regard to the principles stated in Article 2 of the United Nations Charter, to act accordingly". Since when have we been urging States not Members of the United Nations? I have been crying to the high heavens on human rights that we should call on all States, regardless of whether or not they are Members of the United Nations or of the specialized agencies. Mentioning the specialized agencies came later as an escape clause for some who wanted to include certain countries which my country does not recognize. But that is beside the point. We are the United Nations here. How can we urge? We may request. This is a step forward, in this sense, that in good causes we should call on all peoples of the world, whether or not they are members of the club called the United Nations and whether or not they are members of the specialized agencies. But my point is this. I do not know whether it will be adopted anyway, but I think the word "urges" should be replaced by "requests", "calls upon" or something like that. If I know the English language correctly, "urges" has a slight connotation of prodding. When it suits us we urge them. When it does not suit us we neglect them. That has been the case quite often, especially on questions of human rights. Whenever I had a draft resolution in the Third Committee or elsewhere and addressed a request to the whole world community, somebody used to come and amend my request, saying that it should be addressed only to the Member States—or, if they are not Member States of the United Nations, they should be members of the specialized agencies. I think this is a step forward. We are having this Organization universalized—I hope not only in this instance but in all instances.

79. I am sorry if I have been a little blunt in my frankness, but as I have said time and again, we should, in the United Nations and all its organs, say what we mean and mean what we say. Quite often we resort to the nineteenth-century diplomacy of saying what we do not mean and meaning what we do not say. It is high time the United Nations became the sounding board for all the world and not a place for negotiations in the antechambers. It is high time everything we said here was listened to by all the world. This should not

become a club for concoctions or for consensuses, which have been abused. At one time I thought the veto was nefarious. I thank God sometimes for the veto, because the consensus is subversive sometimes, though not all the time. In the consensus everyone looks after his own little interests. They have a common denominator and a circle over the common denominator—where the rights of other people are concerned they are thrown into the East River.

80. I was really moved by the intervention of our brother, the illustrious Foreign Minister of Zambia [1531st meeting]. He was not speaking from his head alone. He was speaking from his heart. He came here to express the feelings, the inner thoughts, of the African people, and I can feel with him, because I know what it is to live under a foreign yoke. One of our friends said, "He is a very nice man but he is emotional." Emotion is a healthy sign that he is alive. He is expressing the feelings of his own people—not only his own people in Zambia but the people of Africa that are still being suppressed. When one of us from Asia or Africa speaks, they sometimes crack jokes about us as if we were only children. We consider most Europeans children in civilization and culture and here in the United States they are infants. If we do not exercise power, it does not mean that we are not human, that we do not have minds, that we do not have the right to express our ideas humbly—and not superciliously or sanctimoniously as those who exercise power do.

81. I shall reserve the elaboration of my plan and shall consult many of my colleagues between now and the General Assembly, hoping that we can devise a way—if I am still around and the United Nations is still going strong, as I hope it will be—to get out of this impasse of proliferating documents that is becoming the laughing-stock of the world. We should see that our language can be translated into deeds, into action, and not become academic and mere dissertation on what can be done and what cannot be done.

82. Mr. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*translated from Russian*): This is the second time during the relatively short period in which the Security Council has been debating the question of Southern Rhodesia that the representative of the United Kingdom, Lord Caradon, has reacted with extreme nervousness to the statements of the Soviet delegation, which were frank, true and based on incontrovertible facts. This is neither new nor original. We are, of course, flattered that in his remarks he should have devoted the greater part of his attention to our statement, making only passing references to the statements of the representative of Syria and the Zambian Minister of Foreign Affairs. We were given first place, and we are proud of it. We interpret the note of irritation in Lord Caradon's reply as a healthy sign that we made a correct appraisal of the United Kingdom's role in the tragedy which has befallen the Zimbabwe people, who, as a result of the policy pursued by the United Kingdom, are now in the power of present-day white imperialist pirates and racists. That appraisal and the general conclusions we drew are fully in keeping with

what has been said in the same connexion by the representatives of Zambia, Algeria, Burundi, Senegal, Poland, Syria, Nepal and Pakistan. Thus the overwhelming majority of the members of the Security Council and of the representatives who have taken part in the discussion of this question emphatically condemn the United Kingdom's policy on the Rhodesian question. Consequently, the fact that Lord Caradon has chosen our statement as the target of his reply is a matter of great satisfaction and pride to us, for we are among those who are against racism, imperialism and colonialism. We have been in the past, are now, and always will be in the ranks of the anti-imperialists, and no attacks, from whatever quarter, will deter us from that course.

83. Lord Caradon said that he was not giving a full reply, which is regrettable. I should have preferred a full reply from him, but he has disregarded two basic points in our statement. Thus he did not give a full reply but, in summarizing, misrepresented our position. We realize that he does not like our criticism of United Kingdom policy. The truth hurts. At the same time, however, we note that the representatives of the African countries quoted our statements both when the Rhodesian question was last discussed and during the present debate. There are, accordingly, two kinds of truth: imperialist, colonialist, racist truth, and the truth of those who are fighting for freedom and national independence.

84. In the matter of sanctions Lord Caradon has obviously misrepresented our statement. We said that in the Sanctions Committee the most active member is the representative of the United Kingdom: he makes a great to-do, produces documents and cites instances of the violation of sanctions. We must therefore take note also of the positive side of the United Kingdom representative's work in the Sanctions Committee, yet the political appraisal we made is correct: the purpose of all this to-do, this playing to the gallery, so to speak, is to divert attention from the real facts—and the facts are that the United Kingdom still refuses to take effective measures against the illegal rebel régime in Southern Rhodesia. That amounts to supporting the régime.

85. I listened with great attention to the statement of my distinguished friend Mr. Baroody, but I cannot agree with him when he says that the United Kingdom is so weak, so impotent, that it can do nothing about the illegal rebel régime in Southern Rhodesia. That is an incorrect premise and assessment of the situation. I am deeply convinced that if the United Kingdom had the will to do so it could put into effect all those measures which you, Mr. Baroody, suggested in your speech against that régime. But what would that require? It would require, as an essential condition, that the United Kingdom had the will to do so, but there is no such will, no such desire. That is tantamount to supporting the illegal rebel racist régime in Southern Rhodesia. Those are the facts, that is the real situation.

86. The United Kingdom has the capability, it is not all that powerless. The distinguished representative of Burundi put some facts before us here showing how

the United Kingdom can make short work of a régime which it considers to be in a state of rebellion, and if it wanted to it could do so in this case too; but it lacks the will.

87. Lord Caradon did not like our remark that the South African racists and imperialist monopolies have a deadly hatred of Africans. Yet the fact is that those monopolies carry on a brisk trade with the South African racist régime, which is, in the real sense of the term, the African-hater number one. Those who help the African-hating South African racists thereby share in that hatred. Why should it be argued that this is not so? Lord Caradon thinks it is not so, but we are deeply convinced that it is: whoever helps a murderer is an accomplice in murder, and whoever helps a racist is an accomplice in racism. There can be no two opinions about that. But Lord Caradon has his own opinion; let him keep it.

88. Lord Caradon disregarded the reference in our statement to the fact that the United Kingdom has a "Treason Act" applicable to rebels, and if the will were there that Act could be used against the rebels in Southern Rhodesia as well. Lord Caradon also ignored our statement regarding investments in Southern Rhodesia. In our statement we noted the beginning of a wave of consulate closings in Southern Rhodesia. This is certainly a positive factor, but after all, what else could be done? There force of world public opinion, the force of African unity as reflected in the appeal to the Security Council by about forty African states calling for the matter to be examined by the Council, obliged the European states and the United States of America to close their consulates in Southern Rhodesia. This is one positive result of the discussion of the question in the Security Council; but it is not enough.

89. The Soviet delegation declared that this wave of consulate closings should be followed by a wave of withdrawals of investments from the economy of Southern Rhodesia—and those investments are substantial. According to the latest statistics—I read them only today in the United States press—the United States holds about \$55 million worth of investments in Southern Rhodesia. This is a considerable sum. There are official statistics showing that the United Kingdom has investments worth £200 million in Southern Rhodesia. I believe that the withdrawal of such a sum from the economy of Southern Rhodesia would shake the régime there to its foundations. But it is not being done, and that too amounts to supporting the régime, Lord Caradon. Why do you accuse us of misrepresenting the facts? We always base our statements on concrete facts, and the facts are precisely these. If the Western Powers, after closing their consulates, were to go further and withdraw their investments, that would be a real blow to the illegal rebel régime. But it is not being done, and failure to do so is tantamount to supporting the régime. This is what we have been saying and we will continue to say it. None of your wordy rhetoric about the "old" and the "new" will help. The facts cannot be concealed; there is no getting away from them.

90. In the circumstances I feel it is appropriate to ask the United Kingdom representative bluntly: does the United Kingdom intend to withdraw its £200 million from the Southern Rhodesian economy or not? That is the point. Accuse us of misrepresenting the facts, if you like, but the facts are these.

91. Lord Caradon also chose to ignore the question of the part played by South Africa and Portugal. Everyone in the world knows, and all of us here know, that Portugal and South Africa are the closest friends and allies of the racists in Southern Rhodesia. It was not you, Lord Caradon, nor was it I, who invented the term "the Unholy Triple Alliance"—the unholy alliance formed by Portugal, South Africa and Southern Rhodesia. Are Portugal and South Africa helping Southern Rhodesia? Yes. This even you cannot deny. Are they allies of Southern Rhodesia? Yes. This too, you cannot deny. Do they trade with Southern Rhodesia? Yes. No one can deny that, not even you, Lord Caradon. And who is helping South Africa? Who is not only maintaining but expanding its economic links with that country? We have quoted statistics on this. It is the Western countries, the United States and the United Kingdom in particular. Here are some official statistics, compiled by the Unit on *Apartheid* of the United Nations Secretariat in a document entitled *Foreign Investment in the Republic of South Africa*,³ in the section on capital investment by the Western countries in the Republic of South Africa at the end of 1966. The investments amount to an astronomical figure—\$5,313 million. For such a relatively small country as South Africa investments totalling over \$5,000 million represent a colossal sum. Any of the countries whose representatives are here in this room would be happy to have \$5,000 million invested in its economy. That would give its economy a tremendous boost. United Kingdom investments in the Republic of South Africa amount to \$3,313 million, that is, over half of the total investments; the United States accounts for \$697 million. That is obviously assistance to the South African racists—certainly no one will deny it. The South African racists are helping Southern Rhodesia. Certainly no one will deny that, either. Not only will no one deny it; it is recognized in an official United Nations document. I have before me the second report of the Committee established in pursuance of Security Council resolution 253 (1968) of 29 May 1968, referred to for the sake of brevity as the Sanctions Committee. I refer to paragraph 45 of this report, which is dated 12 June 1969 [S/9252]:

"On the basis of all the facts at its disposal, the Committee wishes to state that the Governments of South Africa and Portugal have not taken any measures to implement the provisions of resolution 253 (1968), have continued to maintain close economic, trade and other relations with the illegal régime and to permit the free flow of goods from Southern Rhodesia through the territories of South Africa and the colony of Mozambique and their ports and transport facilities."

92. This is an indictment of those who are giving the Southern Rhodesian racists direct assistance. And

who is helping the South African racists? That too is obvious. It is clear from the first official United Nations document, on United Kingdom and United States investments in the Republic of South Africa.

93. I ask you, Lord Caradon, where is the Soviet delegation misrepresenting the facts? Here are official statistics—documents issued by the United Nations. What right have you to say that the Soviet delegation is misrepresenting the facts? Kindly prove it. I am proving my point with facts, documents, quotations and figures. That is how the matter really stands.

94. In an effort to conceal these facts, to get away from them, Lord Caradon resorts to rhetoric. But that will not take him very far.

95. I am not even talking about the colossal volume of trade between the United Kingdom and South Africa, which has reached the sum of about \$1,000 million and is growing every year. South Africa calmly hands over merchandise from the Western countries to Southern Rhodesia and supports the racists there. There you have an illegal rebel régime, and that is how you fight it!

96. As regards the substance of the present position of the country represented by Lord Caradon, we shall judge it when the vote is taken on the resolutions before the Council.

97. The Afro-Asian delegations, the representatives of the countries of Asia and Africa in the Security Council, have submitted their draft resolution [S/9696 and Corr.1 and 2], to paragraphs 8 and 9 of which I should like to draw attention. Paragraph 8 reads:

"Condemns the assistance given by the Governments of Portugal and South Africa and by other imperialist Powers . . ."—I repeat, imperialist Powers—in this text a spade is called a spade—"to the illegal racist minority régime in defiance of resolutions of the Security Council and demands the immediate withdrawal of the troops of the South African aggressors from the territory of Zimbabwe".

This is based on the report of the Sanctions Committee, to which I have already referred.

98. Paragraph 9 reads:

"Decides that Member States and members of the specialized agencies shall apply against the Republic of South Africa and Portugal the measures set out in resolution 253 (1968) and in the present resolution";

in other words, shall apply sanctions against the Republic of South Africa and Portugal. We shall see how the representative of the United Kingdom votes on these paragraphs and on this resolution. That will be indicative; it will tell us whether the United Kingdom is helping the Southern Rhodesian racists or whether it seriously intends to help Africa and the Zimbabwe people to win freedom from racist tyranny.

³ United Nations publication, Sales No. E.68.II.K.8.

99. There is only one conclusion to be drawn from the discussion of this matter in the Security Council: racism, imperialism and colonialism are in the dock before the United Nations and the whole world. Their days are numbered. To change this inexorable and irreversible march of history is not within the power of anyone, not even a British Lord.

100. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Spanish*): The list of speakers for the present debate has been exhausted. I shall therefore now speak as the representative of COLOMBIA.

101. Before taking up the problem that is before us today, I should like to put before the members of the Council a matter of concern which might be a subject for future consideration.

102. In guiding the debate and in conducting the consultations I have found it somewhat difficult to divide my mind and separate myself from my country's attitude on a matter in order to act with complete impartiality in my capacity as President of the Security Council. That does not mean that I have not succeeded in achieving that impartiality, as I hope members will have recognized. But I should like to put this matter before members for them to think about, without, however, going so far as to suggest solutions now.

103. The fact that, because I am President, I am called upon to speak last, relieves me of the need to go into many of the details that other delegations have expounded in ample terms. But I should like clearly to define Colombia's position.

104. The statements of the members of the Council on the question before us have been characterized by a common element which I cannot fail to emphasize, nor could it go unnoticed. The Security Council has unanimously expressed its emphatic repudiation of the adventure upon which the Salisbury régime has embarked and has condemned a situation which is at odds with justice, which is unacceptable within the system of nobler standards of behaviour, to which the United Nations is primarily directed and, which is of course, incompatible with the principle of the self-determination of peoples.

105. For our own part, for reasons as old as our country, colonialism and any tendency by a racist minority to impose its rule will inevitably meet with our most emphatic repudiation. That has been our position in the past, that is our criterion and our conviction now and it shall continue to be our attitude in the future.

106. While the draft resolutions submitted for consideration in the Council contain certain obvious and necessary features, they do not completely coincide with the attitude of my delegation, which would hope to see a text which was directed towards the same objectives but which at the same time would be likely to command broad support; today, more than ever, that is of great importance in the eyes of the world. Needless to say, the results achieved by even such

a text would depend on the decision of nations aware of their international responsibilities. Without that contribution of goodwill and genuine co-operation, this problem and, generally speaking, all those that affect international peace and security will not find a solution compatible with the interests of justice. Each and every nation of the world bears a share of responsibility, whose degree of weightiness varies, of course, but the roots and theoretical derivation of that responsibility are unquestionably identical.

107. Should neither of the two draft resolutions meet with the approval of the Security Council, I believe that we should continue trying to arrive at some formula which, as far as possible, would command unanimous support.

108. Speaking now as PRESIDENT of the Council, I call on the representative of the United Kingdom, who has asked to speak on a point of order.

109. Lord CARADON (United Kingdom): I was anxious to speak to the Council on a matter of procedure and I deliberately refrained from delaying the Council by an endeavour to answer the Ambassador of the Soviet Union. I shall not do so now, beyond assuring him that from the date of the comprehensive compulsory sanctions imposed, no capital, no goods, no trade have flowed from my country to the illegal régime or to Rhodesia itself. Those are the facts which I would ask him to remember.

110. Turning to the question of procedure, I wish to put a serious consideration before the Council. I go back to the arguments that I have put forward for the maximum endeavour to achieve agreement and co-operation so that we can take the most effective action for the purposes which we share. In order to do so, we should have regard to the principle, well-established in this Council over many years, that before a vote is taken all of us should be in a position to know the full facts and all the factors which must be taken into account before we proceed to the vote. I have some status in this matter because I am the sponsor of one of the draft resolutions, which I put forward to the Council at the beginning of our deliberations [S/9676/Rev.1].

111. We all know that we have worked together in consultations over a period of several days, seeking to find the maximum agreement among us. There are therefore several considerations which we must take into account. We have the United Kingdom draft resolution, never intended to be final or complete but nevertheless intended to carry the maximum support of all members. We have also the draft resolution put forward by Afro-Asian members of this Council [S/9696 and Corr.1 and 2], which has been before us for some little time, of which we have been aware. We also heard a set of proposals put forward to us by the Ambassador of Finland when he spoke to us, and we paid great attention to what he said. We understood that in due course he would present to us a draft resolution that would incorporate those proposals.

112. All of us have given our minds to those three propositions. Two of them are in the form of formal draft resolutions submitted to us. The third is still not before us as a formal presentation, but the proposals which it was to include were very clearly explained to us. All of us have been considering the whole matter against the background of those three initiatives.

113. Speaking, as I say, solely to a question of procedure, it is my strong view that we should not proceed today to the vote on two only of those propositions, but that we should allow some further time so that the third can also be taken into full account. The fact is that, speaking for the administering Power, Great Britain, which all of us agree must have the right to be heard, at least, in this matter, we wish to work with members of the Council to achieve the maximum agreement. We have so undertaken from the beginning of our proceedings. We confirm our view that that should be the course to be followed. I therefore would put it to the Council that it would be right to allow ourselves another twenty-four hours so that we can study these considerations in full before we come to our conclusion. I would put it as high as this: that if we are in favour of fair and full consideration, if we are genuinely in favour of endeavouring to find the fullest measure of agreement, then to refuse an application for a delay of so short a time would be against the traditions of this Council, against the interests of the majority of people in Rhodesia, and certainly against the reputation that this Council has established for itself over the years.

114. I therefore suggest for your consideration that we might agree together—I think we have heard at this point all the speeches that are to be made in the Council—that we should allow ourselves a short period for further reflection and consultation before we attempt to come to any conclusion. Speaking as the sponsor of the draft resolution which has precedence, I would ask that the vote should not be taken until, shall we say, tomorrow afternoon at a meeting, if you will agree, at 3 o'clock. I will, if necessary, put forward a formal proposal to that effect but I should like to consult other members of the Council on what seems to me an unassailable proposition.

115. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Spanish*): The representative of the United States also wishes to speak on a point of order, and I call on him now.

116. Mr. YOST (United States of America): We have just heard an eloquent plea that the vote on the two draft resolutions before us should be postponed until tomorrow. My delegation most earnestly supports that request. I believe all of us around the table entered this chamber today in the expectation that we would be voting on the two draft resolutions before us as they stand. However, from informal discussions which, I believe, have been taking place among some members, it now unexpectedly appears that this may not entirely be the case. There seems to be some expectation that, with the deletion of certain paragraphs, the attitude of some delegations towards the Afro-

Asian text might change. I wish to emphasize that my delegation has not been consulted about a paragraph-by-paragraph vote on the text and has not had an opportunity of considering what its position would be if certain paragraphs were eliminated. All members of the Council will recognize that such a move would create an entirely new situation. Surely the state of affairs in Southern Rhodesia is far too serious for us to act without all the deliberation and reflection the problem deserves. We would not be doing ourselves justice if we should take final decisions today on what would be, in the circumstances I have mentioned, a substantially different draft resolution from the one originally submitted and the one on which we have been reflecting. My own instructions, frankly, do not cover such a contingency.

117. My delegation, therefore, would also wish at least twenty-four hours to consider any substantial modification or any possible modification of the propositions on which we will be asked to vote. I would therefore very strongly and respectfully urge the Council, as a courtesy to those of us who need new instructions to meet this contingency and in accordance with our customary practice in similar circumstances to defer the vote until tomorrow. I would particularly ask the sponsors of the Afro-Asian draft to support this reasonable request for a twenty-four hour delay.

118. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Spanish*): I should like to ask whether the request for postponement is based on the premise that there would be a paragraph-by-paragraph vote on the Afro-Asian draft, or whether it is for postponement in any event.

119. Lord CARADON (United Kingdom): The position is perfectly clear as far as I am concerned. I believe that if we vote today we vote without adequate opportunity to consider all the factors in the matter before us. It would be preferable, I am sure, in the interests of the Council and the subject we discuss that we should give ourselves a little time for further consultation and reflection, and indeed to obtain instructions in different contingencies, before we proceed to a vote on a matter of this consequence.

120. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Spanish*): I call on the representative of Sierra Leone on a point of order.

121. Mr. NICOL (Sierra Leone): Mr. President, we have listened with much interest to the debate this afternoon and the past few days under your Presidency. The decision on the point of order raised is yours to make under rule 30 of the provisional rules of procedure.

122. We have also listened with sympathy to Lord Caradon's proposal. But, on behalf of the Afro-Asian members which have presented the second draft resolution, I would say that we do not feel able to accept the proposal of an adjournment. Our positions have been stated and are quite clear. We do not wish to embarrass the representative of the United Kingdom, I repeat, but we would remind him that we

accepted under pressure that he should speak on Friday, eleven days ago, when that was not convenient for us. Similarly, we must ask him now to accept that we wish this matter to be voted on this afternoon.

123. We have heard the representative of the United States. But the draft resolutions have been in front of us for several days and have been discussed paragraph by paragraph in consultations, and we feel, without any discourtesy—and I speak on behalf of the five members which presented the second draft resolution—that we ought to reach some decision on the matter this afternoon.

124. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Spanish*): I call on the representative of Burundi on a point of order.

125. Mr. TERENCE (Burundi) (*interpretation from French*): In the same spirit as the Ambassador of Sierra Leone I should like to say, on behalf of the Afro-Asian delegations which on 11 March submitted the draft resolution contained in document S/9696 and Corr.1 and 2, that we fully understand the feelings expressed by the representatives of the United Kingdom and the United States. We also know that this question of Rhodesia has been before the Council for almost three weeks. I should like to support the statement of the representative of the United Kingdom, who said that the world must receive a message and that we must act in the interests of the Zimbabwe people. That people is probably impatient and it wants to learn of the results of the debate in the Security Council concerning their fate. Thus we should like to ask that the vote be taken since such a measure would be fully in keeping with the initial course on which the representative of the United Kingdom launched the debate when he stated that his delegation wished to see a solution adopted as quickly as possible. Therefore, we consider that a new postponement would be tantamount to delaying the debate unduly and might give rise to complications which would prevent the President from meeting the ardent wish we expressed to him a few days ago that this series of meetings be concluded.

126. Mr. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*translated from Russian*): The Soviet delegation has listened with great attention to the arguments put forward both by those who do not wish the two draft resolutions before the Council to be voted on today and by those who insist on a vote being taken. We think the arguments put forward by the representatives of the African countries are more convincing.

127. Indeed we all remember how at the very beginning, at the 1530th meeting, Lord Caradon made impassioned appeals for haste; time was pressing, an illegal rebel régime had been set up, and urgent measures had to be taken against it.

128. As we observed in our first statement at that meeting, the African representatives were kind enough to take Lord Caradon's wishes into account and agreed to call a meeting and hear what he had to say. Now he suddenly does an about-face. The United Kingdom

representative insists on postponing the vote. What has happened? Why is he insisting on this?

129. Two draft resolutions are before the Council. He speaks of some third draft resolution, but no third draft has been formally submitted. He is asking for twenty-four hours in which to study the third draft, but no such third draft exists. When it is submitted every one of us will have the right to ask for twenty-four hours in which to study it and to obtain instructions. That argument is therefore without foundation. We do not need any twenty-four hours to vote on the two drafts which we already have. Both of them were submitted some time ago. We have all studied them carefully, every paragraph, every word, every full stop, every comma. I am therefore somewhat surprised by the statement of the United States representative, who apparently—to judge from what he said—has only general instructions and does not know how to vote on individual paragraphs. I do not see how this can actually happen. If you have instructions on how to vote on the whole, you also have instructions on how to vote on separate parts of the text. Therefore that argument is not very convincing either.

130. I do not know what other draft resolutions will be submitted—none of us know. There was some mention of a Finnish draft resolution; but tomorrow there may be a Nicaraguan draft resolution, or perhaps a Polish draft resolution, or perhaps a new draft resolution from Sierra Leone. There may be any number of draft resolutions. Then we will have the right, under the rules of procedure, to ask for twenty-four hours in which to study the texts and obtain instructions. But at the moment, considering that the two draft resolutions before us were submitted some time ago, quite a few days ago, we have had an opportunity of studying them, of informing our Governments about them, and of obtaining instructions. I can therefore see no reason for postponing the vote on these two draft resolutions today.

131. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Spanish*): I call on the representative of the United Kingdom on a point of order.

132. Lord CARADON (United Kingdom): I do not think it would be well to extend this discussion. I would maintain that it is a clear division between those who wish to work for agreement and those who are determined that there shall not be an agreement. I would therefore formally wish to propose under rule 33, paragraph 3, of the provisional rules of procedure that the Council should be adjourned until 3 o'clock tomorrow afternoon.

133. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Spanish*): The Council has heard the proposal that this meeting be adjourned. Under the rules that proposal has precedence over any other motion.

134. I call on the representative of Sierra Leone on a point of order.

135. Mr. NICOL (Sierra Leone): This is just to say, on behalf of my colleagues again, that we should like

to oppose the adjournment. I do not think it is a matter of agreement or disagreement. It is a matter of agreement and more agreement or less agreement, because there are certain proposals in both draft resolutions on which everybody agrees. Some people feel that the agreement should be extended in a certain direction, while others feel it should remain in a limited direction. We fail to see what an addition of twenty-four hours would do to change the position.

136. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Spanish*): I call on the representative of Burundi on a point of order.

137. Mr. TERENCE (Burundi) (*interpretation from French*): I hope you will bear with me. Following upon the statement of the representative of the United Kingdom, I wonder where the majority lies because the point raised by the representative of Sierra Leone is the reflection of the views of five delegations; supported by the representative of the Soviet Union. True, the representative of the United Kingdom has raised a motion that was seconded by a delegation; therefore we would ask the President to rule in the light of the facts that I have just mentioned.

138. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Spanish*): Actually these are no longer points of order but this is a general debate. We shall therefore proceed to a vote on the United Kingdom motion that the meeting be adjourned until tomorrow.

A vote was taken by show of hands.

In favour: China, Finland, France, Nicaragua, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America.

Against: Burundi, Nepal, Poland, Sierra Leone, Syria, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Zambia.

Abstaining: Colombia, Spain.

The result of the vote was 6 in favour, 7 against with 2 abstentions.

The motion was not adopted, having failed to obtain the affirmative vote of nine members.

139. Mr. YOST (United States of America): I should like, in these rather extraordinary circumstances, to make another suggestion. Since I wish to be sure that we have time to consider it seriously with all the seriousness that I think these circumstances warrant, I am going to ask for consecutive interpretation, and I announce that in advance.

140. I very deeply regret the decision of the Council. It is a procedural one, of course, but I must say I find it out of keeping with the normal spirit in which we conduct our operations. I have had a great deal of experience of this Council, and I can remember any number of occasions when members, for reasons that seemed good to them because they were confronting difficult decisions on important matters, have requested postponements.

141. The representative of the Soviet Union, for example, has frequently done so, in my recollection. Those requests have almost invariably been granted, in the spirit of courtesy and mutual accommodation which governs the business of this Council.

142. There are many differences of substance between us and we try to resolve them as best we can, over a period of time; but in order to do so, we try to conduct our business in such a way as to give rise to as little difference and as little dissatisfaction and resentment as possible. Therefore, I must say that I do find legitimate a request designed to give several members of the Council an opportunity to reflect on a new situation. This is not simply a question of the text of the draft resolution, with which, of course, as the representative of Sierra Leone points out, we have been fully familiar for a long time. A new situation was created by private consultations after the meeting had begun—as far as we are aware—in which we were not involved; and that has presented a new set of circumstances of great gravity and moment, on which we certainly would have wished to have further instructions from our Government.

143. Voting on a draft resolution of this magnitude, importance and scope is not a matter to be undertaken lightly. We had previously considered, and I explained in my comments on the draft resolution, some of the difficulties that confronted us; but, as we are all quite aware, the exact composition and balance of the draft resolution make a difference to some delegations: some can vote for one paragraph and not for others, and vice versa. Therefore, a fundamental change may occur in the course of paragraph-by-paragraph voting.

144. Now we entirely agree with the statement that the representative of the United Kingdom made earlier in this meeting, in which he explained that it would be impossible for his Government to undertake applying force in the special circumstances that exist in Southern Rhodesia. We think that his explanation was a convincing one and that it would not be in the interest of the United Nations or the people of Southern Rhodesia—and I speak, of course, of the people as a whole—if any such action were undertaken; none of us can fully foresee the repercussions and consequences of that action.

145. As I mentioned in my remarks the other day [1533rd meeting], the United States also finds it extremely difficult to join in a decision of this Council that would sever postal, telegraphic and wireless communications with Southern Rhodesia. The United States has not taken such extreme measures as rupture of communications even at the worst periods of its relations with a number of countries. In fact, we maintain postal service even with North Korea and North Viet-Nam. It does not seem to us that cutting off channels of communication and information is an appropriate way of dealing with a problem or is likely to assist in its solution.

146. We did, of course, close our consulate-general in Salisbury as a consequence of the recent action of

the illegal régime there, and we did so with the feeling that it was a necessary, appropriate and proper action. Nevertheless, we did so with some hesitation, because there are American citizens in Rhodesia, who need access to consular and related services, who need to be in communication with their relatives in this country or with whom our Government might need to be in communication, and the prospect of cutting them off totally is one we would find very, very difficult, if not impossible, to support.

147. There are all sorts of ramifications to these two paragraphs, as well as, of course, to the paragraphs relating to the application of sanctions against the Republic of South Africa and Portugal, to which Lord Caradon also referred with, it seemed to us, eminent good sense. It is hard to imagine that any such measures could be effective without the comprehensive sort of blockade which we find it difficult, as indeed does he, to imagine the world community is prepared, at this stage of its evolution, to support and carry out effectively.

148. Therefore, as I say, this draft resolution, which we treat with the utmost seriousness, which we do not wish to deal with in any way lightly or precipitately, presents us with the most serious problems and requires the most careful reflection.

149. Finally, since the majority of the Council, to our deep regret, has been unwilling to grant the request for a delay of twenty-four hours, we would appeal once again that, as a matter of courtesy, there should be a suspension of the meeting for half an hour in order at least to give us that much time to reflect on the new situation that has been created.

150. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Spanish*): In accordance with the rules of procedure, the representative of the United States has submitted a proposal for a suspension of the meeting for half an hour. I see that the representative of Sierra Leone wishes to speak and I give him the floor.

151. Mr. NICOL (Sierra Leone): I think I ought to say that the Afro-Asian position is that we have debated this question in one form or another for four years. Last year the Afro-Asian Group accepted defeat graciously on this matter. We sympathize with the position of the United States about communications and its other reservations and we cannot compel the United Kingdom to use force or to commit financial suicide. We have no animosity towards the United Kingdom. But we feel strongly—we, the co-sponsors of the second draft resolution—that we should not be held indefinitely to ransom by a few million Europeans in southern Africa, and on that point I wish to propose that we proceed immediately to a vote on the draft resolutions.

152. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Spanish*): We shall continue discussion of the proposal for a suspension of this meeting as requested by the representative of the United States.

153. Mr. TOMEH (Syria): I wish to emphasize that I waive my right to consecutive interpretation in order not to delay unduly the deliberations of the Security Council. All I want is merely to support the proposal put forward by the representative of Sierra Leone.

154. Lord CARADON (United Kingdom): I did not expect to wish to speak on this question, but having served in this Council for some years I should like to say that I have never before known a rejection of a request for a short adjournment. First of all to reject a request for time for reflection and instructions before an important vote, and then to refuse even a short delay, as proposed by the representative of the United States, is something I have not heard of. I hesitate to use an adjective to describe it, but it seems to me to be an act of discourtesy and irresponsibility.

155. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Spanish*): I call upon the representative of Syria on a point of order.

156. Mr. TOMEH (Syria): Mr. President, a motion to suspend the meeting has been made and a motion not to suspend the meeting has been made. Will the President kindly rule which motion should be put to the vote now?

157. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Spanish*): Let us read the rules. Rule 33 of the rules of procedure states:

“The following motions shall have precedence in the order named over all principal motions and draft resolutions relative to the subject before the meeting:

“1. to suspend the meeting;”

Reading the rules of procedure, I believe that a motion for the suspension of the meeting has precedence over a motion for the continuation of the meeting, even though it was made later. Therefore, since the representative of Syria has consulted me, I would say that a motion for the suspension of the meeting takes precedence. I shall, however, abide by the wishes of the majority of the Council if they wish to hold consultations.

158. Mr. ORTEGA URBINA (Nicaragua) (*interpretation from Spanish*): I wish to state that in my delegation's opinion, in the case of such a short suspension as that requested by the representative of the United States, out of courtesy and because we consider that this will in no way affect, and might on the contrary be beneficial to, the outcome of our deliberations, my delegation is in favour of the suspension of the meeting for the requested half-hour period.

159. Mr. NKAMA (Zambia): To begin with, I should like to say that, to assist the President in expediting his work, my delegation did not want to speak. The representative of the United Kingdom had appealed to the Council to move forward with speed and despatch in disposing of the item now before it. I am sure that I am speaking on behalf of all my colleagues when I say that we listened to that eloquent and, in

our view, sincere appeal of the representative of the United Kingdom.

160. This afternoon, as a number of my colleagues here—namely, the representatives of Sierra Leone, Burundi, the Soviet Union and Syria—have said, the tide has suddenly changed. The speed about which we heard so much at the beginning of the discussions of the Council has ceased to be necessary, has ceased to characterize the interventions, the comments, the remarks of the representative of the United Kingdom.

161. I do not want to be a victim of circumstances or to be a victim of certain things which I shall not name. Earlier the President was kind enough to inform the Council that the debate on the issue now before the Council had terminated. My delegation, and I am sure the majority of the delegations in the Council, welcomed that conclusion, welcomed the decision of the President. Unfortunately, a few moments ago the representative of the United States made a long intervention and, unfortunately, he was not even kind enough to waive his right to consecutive interpretation. I am not going to ask him why he did that; I suppose he is entitled to do so. But I think that the President will be in a position to answer my question. What my delegation cannot understand is this. After the President has ruled that the debate has come to an end, why should a representative be allowed to make a long intervention and, as if to add fuel to the fire, not waive his right to consecutive interpretation? That is a very serious thing. I think it is a breach of the provisional rules of procedure of the Council.

162. As I say, my delegation did not want to speak. It was not because we had nothing to say; we had plenty to say, we had a million and one things to say to the Council; but in order to expedite the work of the Council and to assist the President in his task—because we know that the task of President of the Council is not an easy one—we chose silence. When certain delegations here were accusing us of all sorts of things, of ignorance, of immaturity, because we acted in good faith we ignored those accusations.

163. Now, last but not least, I should like to reject categorically the irresponsible remarks of the representative of the United Kingdom that there are delegations here which are being irresponsible. First, we want Lord Caradon to know that we are not small boys. Secondly, we want him to know that we are not representing the United Kingdom colonies here. Thirdly, we want him to know that we have come a long way in order to represent the respectful and respected independent Asian, African and other countries.

164. I hope that from now on Lord Caradon will stop arrogating to himself the role of patriarch, the role of brother—shall I say, big brother?—of Africa and Asia. We are mature enough to take care of our destinies and of our future. I support what has been said by my colleagues from Sierra Leone, Burundi, Syria, the Soviet Union and tacitly supported, I am sure, by many other delegations.

165. Mr. NICOL (Sierra Leone): So that I shall not forget at the end of my statement to waive consecutive interpretation, I think I had better do so at the beginning.

166. I do not think that we should allow expressions uttered in moments of heat to colour this serious deliberation about a serious matter. It is true that an adjournment of half an hour was requested and that our group felt that it could not consent to it. But I think, after we have discussed these various matters, that we are all mature, we are all courteous and we are all responsible, and I think that we have already given the United States about twenty minutes of its requested half an hour.

167. Therefore, may I repeat that we should like the Council to proceed to a vote now.

168. Mr. YOST (United States of America): I shall not delay the meeting long. I appreciate the wise and friendly remarks of the representative of Sierra Leone. I should like to comment for just a moment on the remarks of the Minister of State of Zambia. We are all in a great hurry to proceed when it happens to suit our convenience. But, on the other hand, we are all ready to delay our proceedings for several days if that suits our convenience. I would just like to remind him that I think the first meeting of the Council in this series on this question was first asked for on 2 or 3 March. It was delayed first until the end of that week in order to meet the convenience of our African members. Then, after a brief meeting on that Friday, it was delayed again until the following Tuesday in the expectation that three African Foreign Ministers would then have time to arrive. We were happy to endeavour to meet their convenience by delaying in that way. We are very happy that the Minister of State of Zambia did indeed come.

169. All during that period of a week or ten days there seemed to be no terrible hurry as far as we could gather, but now suddenly there seems to be such a terrific haste to act that even a request for a further half hour's delay is not granted. I regret this but I am quite prepared to proceed to the vote.

170. Mr. KUŁAGA (Poland): I shall add another half minute to the twenty minutes or more of which the Ambassador of Sierra Leone spoke a few moments ago by saying that I am in favour of proceeding to the vote on the draft resolutions immediately. I do not request—I repeat: I do not request—consecutive interpretation.

171. Mr. TERENCE (Burundi) (*interpretation from French*): I shall not request consecutive interpretation. I wanted to say only two words concerning the last statement of the representative of the United Kingdom. It is true that from time to time it is necessary to change the routine procedure. If the customary situation seemed to him unprecedented, the world has also observed with consternation an unprecedented situation in which so many millions of inhabitants have been sacrificed for 200,000 settlers. Moreover, it is

unprecedented for the United Kingdom Government to make an exception to a rule that it has always followed in the past, namely, to strangle a movement and it has not done so in a case which is an affront not only to the Zimbabwe people, but also to mankind. There is an even more serious matter, namely, the situation created in Southern Rhodesia. I would therefore ask you, Mr. President, to proceed to the vote, as requested by several delegations.

172. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Spanish*): The Council will now vote on the proposal of the representative of the United States for a suspension of the meeting for half an hour.

A vote was taken by show of hands.

In favour: China, Finland, France, Nicaragua, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America.

Against: Burundi, Nepal, Poland, Sierra Leone, Syria, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Zambia.

Abstaining: Colombia, Spain.

The result of the vote was 6 in favour, 7 against with 2 abstentions.

The proposal was not adopted, having failed to obtain the affirmative vote of nine members.

173. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Spanish*): The representative of the United Kingdom and the representative of Spain have asked to speak on points of order. I call first on the representative of the United Kingdom.

174. Lord CARADON (United Kingdom): Mr. President, there may be some misunderstanding. I had some time ago asked to speak briefly before the vote on the second draft resolution. May I understand that I shall be permitted to do so? Shall I do so now or shall I do so at a later time?

175. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Spanish*): I note that you have asked for the floor to explain your vote before the vote on the second draft resolution.

176. I now call on the representative of Spain.

177. Mr. DE PINIES (Spain) (*interpretation from Spanish*): My delegation would also like to make a brief statement before we proceed to vote on the second draft resolution. Accordingly, I reserve my right to intervene at that time.

178. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Spanish*): Under the first paragraph of rule 32 of the provisional rules of procedure of the Security Council, I shall first put to the vote the United Kingdom draft resolution appearing in document S/9676/Rev.1.

179. The representative of China wishes to speak before the voting in explanation of his vote.

180. Mr. LIU (China): I wish to make a brief explanation of vote. It is hardly necessary to explain why we shall vote for the draft resolution in document S/9676/Rev.1. It is the unanimous agreement of all the members of the Council that the illegal Smith régime must be isolated from the community of nations. This may not by itself be sufficient to topple the régime, but, as I said in my statement of 13 March [*1533rd meeting*], my delegation does not underestimate the impact that such a course of action might have in weakening that régime.

181. As for draft resolution S/9696 and Corr.1 and 2, I assume, Mr. President, that you will put some of the paragraphs to a separate vote. My delegation is in general agreement with the purposes behind it although we are not without reservations concerning paragraphs 5, 8 and 9. All members of the Council, including the representative of the United Kingdom, are agreed that Britain, as the administering Power, has a continuing responsibility over Southern Rhodesia. In previous meetings of this Council my delegation had occasion to express its doubts about the wisdom of ruling out the possibility of the use of force in the early stages of the Rhodesian crisis on the part of the British Government. In the last analysis, however, of whether force should or should not be used to quell the rebellion, it devolves upon the Government of the United Kingdom to make the final decision, for, after all, it is the Government of the United Kingdom that must bear the main brunt of any military action.

182. The fact that year after year no real progress towards United Nations goals seems forthcoming cannot but give rise to frustration and impatience. Yet the immediate failure of the United Nations to bring racial justice and self-determination to Southern Rhodesia need not, in the view of my delegation, detract from the long-term value of the measures already put into effect. In fact, the recent decisions of several Powers to close their consulates in Salisbury can only be regarded as steps in the right direction in reflecting the views of this Council by bringing increased pressure on the Smith régime.

183. In the light of these considerations, my delegation will abstain on paragraph 5 if it is put to the vote separately.

184. Paragraphs 8 and 9 concern South Africa and Portugal. My delegation understands very well the reasons for them; but under existing circumstances, we question the practicability of extending to those countries the same sanctions which are directed against the illegal régime in Salisbury. There is always the danger that the United Nations may undertake tasks beyond its present capability. We will therefore also abstain on paragraphs 8 and 9 if they are put to a vote separately.

185. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Spanish*): I now put to the vote draft resolution S/9676/Rev.1.

A vote was taken by a show of hands.

In favour: China, France, Nicaragua, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America.

Against: None.

Abstaining: Burundi,⁴ Colombia, Finland, Nepal, Poland, Sierra Leone, Spain, Syria, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Zambia.

The result of the vote was 5 in favour, none against, with 10 abstentions.

The draft resolution was not adopted, having failed to obtain the affirmative vote of nine members.

186. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Spanish*): I call on the representative of Sierra Leone, who wishes to explain his vote.

187. Mr. NICOL (Sierra Leone): On behalf of the Afro-Asian group sponsoring the second draft resolution [S/9696 and Corr.1 and 2], I wish to begin by saying that we reject utterly and emphatically the declaration of a republic by the rebel leader Ian Smith, and we speak not only for our own delegations but also for our Foreign Ministers who have come from the Organization of African Unity.

188. Our abstention from voting on the United Kingdom draft resolution [S/9676/Rev.1] was due to the fact that we did not feel that it went far enough. Its proposals have in fact been rendered superfluous by the withdrawal of most of the foreign consulates from Salisbury, and I wish again to express our gratitude to those nations which have done that. Yet, though superfluous by itself, the United Kingdom draft resolution may quite definitely have affected the situation, and for that we again wish to express our appreciation.

189. We know that this matter is one which means much to the representative of the United Kingdom, Lord Caradon. He has staked his career on it more than once and we respect him personally for this and will continue to do so. We refuse, however, to believe that the United Kingdom cannot do more. Even a show of force before the April elections of the rebel régime in Southern Rhodesia can still salvage the situation and bring order and justice to millions of Africans and thousands of thoughtful and liberal Europeans in that Territory. My delegation feels, with respect, that a mixture of irresolution, sentimentality and a genuine desire to avoid bloodshed on the part of the United Kingdom Government have left us in an impasse which must now be solved.

190. A handful of ex-officers of the British armed forces have staged a military *putsch* in Southern Rhodesia. Their mutiny and disloyalty should by now have landed them in the Tower of London to await trial or sentence. Instead, we are annually asked to adopt draft resolutions in reply to their arrogant and impertinent statements. If Britain as a great Power

chooses to engage in a dialogue with them—and any such dialogue, in my view, simply encourages and hardens the rebel régime—we, as an international Organization, should not continually be asked to do so.

191. Ian Smith and his colleagues are men who won their spurs in combat and who maintain an inflated standard of living by holding down millions of Africans by force. They are not familiar with textbooks of political science and treatises on international law. Legalistic resolutions mean little or nothing to them except when it hurts them, as sanctions have done.

192. If we believed that sanctions would bring the régime down, we would be more hopeful. The great leakage through South Africa and the Portuguese-held Territories of Mozambique and Angola has rendered it hopeless. After some time, sanctions will be in danger of being simply a source of irritation to trading nations and communities that should by now be purchasing from or supplying the needs of a market of 4.5 million people, both black and white, under a non-racial—and I repeat: non-racial—government of Rhodesia.

193. The draft resolution presented by the United Kingdom is contained in our own draft resolution, where it is linked with more positive and forceful proposals.

194. The co-sponsors of our draft resolution, including my delegation, have had extensive consultations on this draft resolution and have taken advice; we would prefer to put it forward rather than to support the shorter and admittedly incomplete draft resolution of the United Kingdom, which would probably close the door to or defer the taking of more active measures on this matter.

195. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Spanish*): I shall now put to the vote the draft resolution co-sponsored by Burundi, Nepal, Sierra Leone, Syria and Zambia. This draft resolution appears in document S/9696 and Corr.1 and 2. I should like to draw to the attention of members of the Council that the fact that a corrected version of paragraph 3 of the draft resolution appears in document S/9696/Corr.2 and of paragraph 7 in document S/9696/Corr.1. Accordingly, we shall vote on the draft resolution as it stands.

196. I have had requests from the representatives of Spain, the United Kingdom and the United States to speak in explanation of vote before the voting.

197. Mr. DE PINIES (Spain) (*interpretation from Spanish*): More than explaining its vote, my delegation wishes to make a request of the co-sponsors of the draft resolution on which we are about to vote, which appears in document S/9696 and Corr.1 and 2. We request that under rule 32 of the rules of procedure paragraphs 8 and 9 should be put to the vote separately.

198. Lord CARADON (United Kingdom): I merely wish to say that there are a number of provisions in this draft resolution which my Government cannot sup-

port. Therefore, I would say that if there are any proposals—indeed one has already been made—for paragraph-by-paragraph voting, my delegation will abstain on such paragraph-by-paragraph votes since it is not possible for us to support the draft resolution as it stands as a whole.

199. Mr. YOST (United States of America): Only the most serious of considerations would cause us to take the step of casting a negative vote on a draft resolution of such importance. The United States has staunchly supported the economic sanctions which have been imposed on Rhodesia, and we were prepared to look with favour on the suggestions put forward earlier in the debate by the representative of Finland for taking further action in common. We shall still continue, of course, to explore all possibilities in this sense.

200. However, we are not able to support the draft resolution which by implication calls upon the United Kingdom to use force. We have repeatedly stated the view that force is not the answer to this problem, and for that reason we oppose a draft resolution condemning the United Kingdom for failure to use it.

201. We closed our consulate in Southern Rhodesia, thus leaving our citizens in that country with no direct protection. We did so in the belief that it remained possible for our citizens at least to be in contact with their own country and with consulates elsewhere in Africa. We cannot now agree to cut off not only their communications with the rest of the world but even all means by which they might leave Southern Rhodesia. Paragraph 6 would, in our view, amount to barring American citizens in Rhodesia from contact with the outside world, and this we cannot support. Besides the grave effect this action would have on United States citizens, many of whom are there for the sole purpose of alleviating suffering among the black majority of the population, we do not think that such an action is in the interests of the oppressed majority in Rhodesia, nor indeed that it would have any decisive effect on the illegal minority régime.

202. It is with very great reluctance, therefore, that we take this step. We have felt and continue to feel that a little greater effort to find common ground might have obviated this necessity. Let us not now abandon the search for common ground, but resolve to try all the harder to grapple together with the problem of Rhodesia which so deeply concerns us all and which sooner or later must and will be resolved in the interests of the oppressed majority.

203. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Spanish*): I call on the representative of Sierra Leone in explanation of vote.

204. Mr. NICOL (Sierra Leone): On behalf of the co-sponsors I wish to say that we agreed to the separate voting on paragraphs 8 and 9 requested by the representative of Spain. The representative of the United States has spoken on paragraph 5. We feel it to be perfectly logical. We do not condemn the United Kingdom. We note that there are many there who hold views as strong

as ours. We condemn the persistent refusal to use force to bring an end to the rebellion. I have never heard of a peaceful rebellion in my life. Every rebellion has been carried out by force, and it seems to me from my study of physics that force can only be answered by force.

205. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Spanish*): the representative of Spain has called for separate votes on paragraphs 8 and 9 of the draft resolution S/9696 and Corr. 1 and 2. Since I hear no objection, I shall put these paragraphs to the vote separately. We shall first vote on paragraph 8.

A vote was taken by show of hands.

In favour: Burundi, Nepal, Poland, Sierra Leone, Syria, Union of Soviet Republics, Zambia.

Against: None.

Abstaining: China, Colombia, Finland, France, Nicaragua, Spain, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America.

The result of the vote was 7 in favour, none against, with 8 abstentions.

Paragraph 8 was not adopted, having failed to obtain the affirmative vote of nine members.

206. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Spanish*): I shall now put paragraph 9 to the vote.

A vote was taken by show of hands.

In favour: Burundi, Nepal, Poland, Sierra Leone, Syria, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Zambia.

Against: None.

Abstaining: China, Colombia, Finland, France, Nicaragua, Spain, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America.

The result of the vote was 7 in favour, none against, with 8 abstentions.

Paragraph 9 was not adopted, having failed to obtain the affirmative vote of nine members.

207. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Spanish*): Having deleted these two paragraphs which have been rejected, we shall now proceed to vote on the draft resolution as a whole, as it appears in document S/9696 and Corr. 1 and 2.

A vote was taken by show of hands.

In favour: Burundi, China, Nepal, Poland, Sierra Leone, Spain, Syria, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Zambia.

Against: United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America.

Abstaining: Colombia, Finland, France, Nicaragua.

The result of the vote was 9 in favour, 2 against, with 4 abstentions.

The draft resolution was not adopted, one of the negative votes being that of a permanent member.

208. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Spanish*): The representatives of Finland and the United Kingdom have asked to speak in explanation of vote. I call first on the representative of Finland.

209. Mr. JAKOBSON (Finland): Let me say first that my delegation supported the request for postponement of the vote not because my delegation was unprepared to vote now, but because we believe that if the Security Council is to act as a serious negotiating body we should allow every opportunity for further consultations.

210. Now, however, the vote has taken place and, both drafts having failed to be adopted, we find ourselves in a situation which can serve the interests of no one except Mr. Smith in Salisbury. It creates the impression that the Security Council is hopelessly divided on the issue of Southern Rhodesia and that the policy of sanctions against the illegal régime is losing support. Such an impression would in fact be misleading, for there is a basic unity of purpose in the Council on this matter, as has been stated by many members.

211. We would hope, therefore, that the Council would not conclude consideration of this question in this state of indecision but would make an effort to agree on a course of action which would intensify the international pressures on the illegal régime in Southern Rhodesia, while also restoring unity in the Council itself.

212. Last Friday my delegation circulated informally to members of the Council a draft resolution, in the hope that it might provide, at the right time, the basis for such an agreement on a course of action. I should now like to inform the Council that we would wish to submit that draft resolution [S/9709] formally.

213. Since the text of the draft resolution has been in the hands of all delegations on this Council for several days, I do not think I have to describe it in detail, and I shall only draw attention to some of its key positions.

214. Of course, the draft resolution would condemn the illegal proclamation of a republic and decide that Member States should refrain from recognizing the illegal régime or maintaining representation in the Territory.

215. It would call upon Member States to ensure that any acts performed by officials and/or institutions of the illegal régime should not be accorded recognition.

216. It would call upon Member States to take more effective measures to prevent any circumvention of existing sanctions.

217. It would decide to extend the application of Article 41 of the Charter to all diplomatic, consular, trade, military and other relations—this, of course with the humanitarian exceptions provided for in paragraphs 3 (d) and 4 of resolution 253 (1968). It would further decide that Member States should interrupt any existing means of transportation to and from Southern Rhodesia that they may still maintain.

218. It would call for the suspension of any Southern Rhodesian membership or associate membership in the specialized agencies, and for the expulsion of Southern Rhodesia from any international or regional organizations so as to complete the isolation of the illegal régime of Southern Rhodesia from the world community.

219. It would give the Committee established by resolution 253 (1968) a more active and wider role.

220. Finally, it would urge Member States to make a renewed effort to increase their assistance to Zambia, which has the heaviest burden to bear as a result of any further measures the Council might decide to take.

221. As I said before, we now wish to submit our draft resolution formally, and we would hope that the Security Council could agree to vote on it tomorrow.

222. Lord CARADON (United Kingdom): I should like to say very seriously that I greatly regret that the Council should have proceeded to a snap vote this evening; and again I would say that I believe that what was done this evening was contrary to the best traditions of the Council. Indeed, having delayed for a fortnight, it was strange that a refusal should be given to a request for an adjournment of twenty-four hours, or even for half an hour. Having swallowed the camel of two weeks, members strained at the gnat of half an hour. I believe that we have done harm to our traditions today and I am sorry that we were forced into that position.

223. I should like to say, however, with regard to the contribution made by the representative of Sierra Leone speaking on behalf of the African and Asian members of this Council, that I thank him, on behalf of us all, for what he has said today. He never speaks without raising the level of our debate, and I know that he realizes that I would never speak without the greatest respect for him and for those he represents; but I think he would also agree that it is a sign of respect when we speak straight to one another and speak openly and without any false restriction. He would prefer it so, and I would expect him to speak to me in the same way.

224. I would also say that I had greatly hoped that I would never have to cast a veto on behalf of my country on an African issue. I very deeply regret that a deliberate decision was taken to force me into that position. For those who decided to press the vote today knew very well what they were doing. A deal was done; a bargain was made. Why was it made? Was it made in the cause of seeking an agreement and of finding common ground on which we could advance

together? No. Was it done in an effort to find more effective action against the illegal régime? It was not. On the contrary, it was done with the knowledge that what was done today would lead to no result—not to agreement but to deadlock. It was an act not of constructive advance but of obstruction.

225. I might have wished to say more on this occasion had it not been for the fact that we have just listened to an intervention from the representative of Finland. As we all know, the representative of Finland has worked throughout to find a way of proceeding which could carry the maximum support. There is still, therefore, the possibility that we can go forward together to take effective action. That should be our hope, and from the beginning I have said that we stand ready to work with others to find the highest measure of common agreement so that we can act together. Therefore I hope that we can disperse tonight with the determination to seek without delay the maximum agreement and the earliest decision and the most effective action, and I hope that we shall be able to proceed to do so on the basis that the representative of Finland has put to us.

226. Mr. NKAMA (Zambia): I am grateful for this opportunity of making a few closing remarks. I wish to pay a sincere tribute to all those delegations that voted in favour of our draft resolution. I refer to the Afro-Asian draft resolution, which, as has been seen, comprises constructive elements which are not beyond the capacity and the means of the United Kingdom, which is the administering Power in Rhodesia. We praise those delegations that have supported us for the unstinting assistance and advice they so readily placed at our disposal during our very difficult moments and hours. We are aware that they have really given this support not to those of us who are sitting around this table; it is axiomatic to say—and I have no doubt I am expressing the sentiments and views of my colleagues—that they have given this support to humanity in general but especially to the oppressed and long-suffering people of Zimbabwe and of the world.

227. Today, needless to say, we have exposed the cynicism and hypocrisy of the administering Power. Since 1965—or is it since 1923, when the white minority was placed in a commanding position in Rhodesia—the United Kingdom has been masquerading as “the defender of the faith” in Rhodesia. Now for the first time we have unmasked the true intentions and policies of the United Kingdom with regard to the 5 million oppressed black people. This afternoon we have witnessed the sad spectacle of the exercise on the part of the United Kingdom and, I am sorry to say, on the part of the United States of America of their rights of veto. We want the world to know that henceforth the United Kingdom has abdicated from its responsibility for the people of Rhodesia. All we can say is, shame on the United Kingdom, a country whose representative, Lord Caradon, has claimed an association with Africa and its people. Now we know the true colours of the administering Power.

228. Once again, on behalf of my colleagues who sent me here, the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of that

struggling continent, that emergent continent, that determined continent, Africa, I want to thank all those delegations that have supported us in the fight we have waged around this table. There is no doubt that without that support, coming from their heads and from their hearts, we could not have spearheaded our debate and brought our fight to the conclusion of which we are all only too well aware. Those delegations, as we all know, are those of Poland, Nepal, Syria, the Soviet Union and Spain—and need I mention my own brothers from Sierra Leone and Burundi?

229. We all recall that a few moments ago the representative of the United States of America called on the Council to work even harder to find a solution to the crisis in Rhodesia. This is impossible, to say the least, for it would appear that the positions of the United Kingdom and the United States, and no doubt those of their allies, are diametrically opposed to the positions espoused by mankind as a whole—mankind which makes a clarion call to the British to bring the rebellion in Rhodesia to an end.

230. It would appear now that the people of Zimbabwe must clearly distinguish between their friends and those who are not their friends—in short, their enemies. Unless the United Kingdom and the United States are in a position to modify their attitudes, it is clear that unanimity on matters of principle and substance as they pertain to the question of Zimbabwe is not only impossible but out of the question.

231. I should like to end on a familiar note which I brought to the Council the other day when I said, speaking on behalf of my delegation, that for the past five years, since the unilateral declaration of independence, the United Kingdom has been appealing to and calling on us to be patient, to be reasonable, to be calm, and all sorts of things. I ask, as I did the other day, is it not now our turn not only to ask but to appeal to the United Kingdom and to Lord Caradon to understand our position, to appreciate our appeal? Is it not our turn to appeal to the administering Power to be patient, to be calm, to be reasonable? And my I extend this to the United States, which exercised its veto this afternoon, as did the United Kingdom, the administering Power. On that note I end my remarks.

232. Mr. TERENCE (Burundi) (*interpretation from French*): I should like to thank you, Mr. President, for giving me the floor at this juncture. However, my delegation's statement is necessary in order to introduce certain clarifications which, I would say, must be aired in view of the words of the representative of the United Kingdom in his last statement—that is to say, after he cast the veto. He had the audacity to say—and I apologize for quoting in English:

“A deal was done, a bargain was made, in order to find a common ground”.

233. I should like to state before the Council that the patience of the Afro-Asian delegations has been such that yesterday, in the presence of the President

of the Council, those delegations made this appeal to him and, out of courtesy, contrary to what may have been said earlier around this table, and to ensure the maximum degree of understanding, we spoke to him in his own language, although it is not our official language. I shall quote the words which I addressed to him yesterday in the office of the President of the Council. I said then—and again I apologize for using his own language, but I do so in order to avoid any possible false interpretation and to use the same words as I used yesterday:

“All the ideas expressed by the British draft resolution are contained in our own draft resolution, while the British proposed resolution does not move towards our own. Let the United Kingdom join our position in order to find an ideal solution, a common meeting ground.”⁴

After these words I should like someone to tell me where we have not accepted the necessary compromise. I added: “The United Kingdom is entitled to bring improvements”.⁴ I am quoting myself literally. The United Kingdom representative says that we have refused any compromise and declined to negotiate. I felt compelled to introduce this clarification in the Council and I should like to go on now to discuss the vote that has just been taken.

234. It will be recalled that on Friday last, 13 March, I said that the behaviour of the United Kingdom defied all normal logic, but that it was part of the subtlety of the political technique of the United Kingdom to reconcile its behaviour with previous acts. Once again it goes without saying that the United Kingdom's intentions could have been disguised from time to time owing to the subterfuges which are characteristic of the Government and representatives of that country, but after its veto, they are clear. The veto displays with unprecedented clarity the position of the United Kingdom and the nature of its determination to find an adequate solution to the problems arising in Zimbabwe. True the representative of the United Kingdom has stated that they cannot send an army out to Rhodesia, that the United Kingdom has no troops in Rhodesia, that Rhodesia has been autonomous for fifty years. Then we should ask the United Kingdom why it waited fifty years instead of seizing every occasion that arose to grant total independence to Rhodesia?

235. This is tantamount to saying what I said in my statement on Friday [1533rd meeting], that the United Kingdom has favoured a process designed to create or to set up in southern Africa a nursery garden of Hitler's disciples. The United Kingdom's position this evening serves once again to confirm the predictions that several delegations have repeatedly made, both this year and in previous years. We all know how many times the United Kingdom, and in particular Lord Caradon, has appealed to the realism of the African delegations, to their wisdom, to their patience. On 23 June last [1480th meeting], before this very Council, I stated that we were asking the United Kingdom—which has wisdom and political maturity—what

the solution would finally be. I said then that those who were accused of a lack of realism were on the contrary the more realistic, particularly in the present case, and that the rebellion, as it was described by the United Kingdom, was leading us towards a total impasse.

236. We have heard words that apparently cannot be brought into conformity with normal logic, which cannot explain what solution the United Kingdom can propose to us.

237. During these same negotiations, the United Kingdom representative told us that for humanitarian considerations, it was essential to avoid declaring a complete interruption of communications with Rhodesia, that there were missionaries there, and other citizens who were not to blame. We said: All right, we agree that where humanitarian considerations, are involved we cannot demand that human beings should be sacrificed. But when it is a case of choosing between two evils, one always chooses the lesser. That was exactly the reply that was given to Lord Caradon yesterday. Now, the lesser evil in this case is to impose, even on these innocent citizens, whether they be white or black, sacrifices which are essential if we are to be able to find a final solution which, in the last analysis, would be beneficial to all of the people of Rhodesia, black and white communities alike. That is how we reason in logic.

238. Obviously, we were given explanations which exceeded the most elementary common sense. I ask: what is the purpose? are the interests of 5 million inhabitants to be subordinated to the interests of a handful of settlers? I am talking about the protégés of the United Kingdom. That is question that we put to the Security Council and to the common sense judgement of everyone.

239. Before concluding, I should like to state—and we have made this appeal previously—that the United Kingdom position perhaps does not in the short run serve the interest of the settlers but in the long run that position does a disservice to the interests of the settlers. I should like to stress once again that when in future this fatal confrontation occurs—one which we would not wish to see come about but which will of necessity come about, following upon the formal refusal of the United Kingdom to apply adequate remedies to the situation—we will again call upon the United Kingdom to refrain from any form of intervention to protect the Rhodesian settlers, when they will be left on their own, face to face with the Zimbabwe people, armed with all the means available to them, either from within or outside the country. The United Kingdom must today make a statement to us and give us a solemn commitment that it will not intervene if tomorrow, the Zimbabwe people succeeds in reversing the situation. We formally put this question and we would like a reply to be given to it.

240. Mr. NICOL (Sierra Leone): Mr. President, we wish to thank you for the able and just way in which you have conducted our debates this afternoon. On

⁴ Quoted in English by the speaker.

behalf of the delegations from Africa and our friends and co-sponsors Nepal and Syria, we wish to thank all those who have supported us this afternoon: Poland and the Soviet Union, great fighters for freedom; Spain, the first and historic decolonizer; and the Republic of China, the inheritors of the wisdom of Confucius.

241. Although we have suffered a technical defeat, we have gained a victory of conscience. Slowly and certainly the floodgates are being forced open to the torrential waves of freedom and justice for the black man in Africa. We know that the representatives of the United Kingdom and the United States will not wish to deny us that victory.

242. Mr. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*translated from Russian*): I feel that I must make two comments after the voting that has taken place. The first one is a formal comment on procedure. In their various statements and replies, the representatives of the United Kingdom and the United States tried to create the impression that, during the voting on the two draft resolutions before the Security Council, there was some kind of departure from the established traditions. Strong terms were used: obstruction, filibuster, contrary to the best traditions, unprecedented, harm to our traditions. That is absolutely at variance with the truth. It is the right of every member of the Security Council to ask for a postponement of a vote when a proposal is made to vote on a draft resolution submitted at that meeting. In such a case every one of us has the right to request and insist that we should each be given twenty-four hours to study the draft resolution submitted, to bring it to the attention of our Governments, to make appropriate proposals and to ask for instructions as to what our position on the draft resolution should be.

243. But when a draft has been submitted a week earlier and there has been ample time to study it thoroughly, any attempt to insist on a postponement of the vote on the pretext of the need to have twenty-four hours to study it amounts to obstructionism, to sabotaging the vote. That is the only way to describe such a position. Therefore, when the representative of the United States says that there have been precedents, that there have been occasions during the twenty-five-year history of the United Nations when the Soviet delegation requested, demanded and insisted on the postponement of the vote, that is not in accordance with the facts. There has been no case in the history of the United Nations in which we have requested the postponement of a vote on a draft resolution which has been before us for seven days.

244. There have been other precedents, when we insisted on, and demanded, the postponement of a vote on a draft resolution introduced at the time of the discussion. That is our right, it is everyone's right. Therefore, to refer to that kind of precedent and to make it appear that we are today establishing the precedent of not respecting a request for the postponement of a vote is without any foundation whatsoever.

245. In the practice of the Security Council we shall all undoubtedly continue to take into account the fact

that, if a draft resolution is introduced at a given meeting and the sponsors insist on a vote, every member of the Security Council has the right to request, demand and insist on a postponement of the vote. If, on the other hand, the resolution has been before the Council for some time, then there are no grounds for postponing the vote. The majority of the members of the Council acted correctly today in rejecting a motion of that kind. The purpose of that motion was to prevent a vote. Obviously, the Security Council, or at least the majority of its members, could not support that motion.

246. Lord Caradon's comment that he had never been in such a position is symptomatic. True, you were never in that position because throughout the history of the United Nations you have been accustomed to controlling and manipulating the voting machinery. You did not have to use the veto then. Using your automatic majority, you imposed your will on others and forced it down their throats. But times have now changed, and today you are in a position in which you have been obliged, with the support of the United States representative, to use the veto.

247. This I would call a really unprecedented case in the twenty-five-year history of the existence of the United Nations: the use of the veto on a question like this by two representatives who are permanent members of the Security Council; thus a dark and sombre page in the annals of the United Nations has been written. Here we have two permanent members of the Security Council voting, despite the principle of unanimity of the permanent members, against a draft resolution, that is, using the veto in defence of a most unjust cause—to protect two racist régimes in southern Africa and the colonialist régime of Portugal. The whole world has been shown the true position and the real intentions of those who voted against it.

248. I maintain that what has happened today demonstrates that two permanent members of the Security Council voted against a just draft resolution, designed to protect human dignity, human rights and the national freedom of the 5 million Zimbabwe people, which was urged and demanded by the whole of Africa, as is clear from the resolution adopted this month by the Council of Ministers of the Organization of African Unity at Addis Ababa and from the wording, essence, and content of the draft resolution submitted by the African representatives in the Security Council; two permanent members of the Security Council voted against this just draft resolution. What was their motive for taking that stand, what was their purpose? They sought recourse to every possible device: filibustering, obstructionism and the unnecessary and totally uncalled-for consecutive interpretation into all working languages—which, by the common consent of the members of the Security Council, has long since been abandoned; but they were in a difficult position and were forced to stake everything. This is a very sorry page in the history of the United Nations, especially on the eve of its twenty-fifth anniversary.

249. Furthermore, the Commission on Human Rights is now in session. In that Commission, the representa-

live of Israel, representing an aggressor country which is violating the elementary human rights of the Arab population in the occupied territories and disregarding the Security Council's decisions concerning the withdrawal of Israel armed forces from the Arab territories occupied by them, is attempting to slander the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. The United States representative, on the pretext of protecting human rights and dignity, is supporting the Israeli representative; and here in the Security Council the representative of the United States and the representative of the United Kingdom vote against human dignity, human rights and the freedom of the 5 million people of Zimbabwe simply because they are Africans.

250. That is the true position. Therefore we cannot ignore it and close our eyes to it. It can truly be said that never before in the history of the United Nations have two permanent members of the Security Council found themselves in such splendid isolation on such an important and serious matter.

251. I waive consecutive interpretation.

252. Mr. YOST (United States of America): I shall be very brief. That seemed to me to be a most extraordinary statement from the representative of a country which has exercised the veto over 100 times—the last time, if I am not mistaken, to prevent Council action in regard to the invasion of a small country in central Europe.

253. Mr. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*translated from Russian*): I can prove by documentary evidence that the Soviet Union has used the veto only for just purposes. I have frequently stated that without the Soviet veto the imperialist Powers would not have admitted to the United Nations a number of socialist countries: Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania and Mongolia. Had it not been for our veto, those countries would still be in the position of another socialist country which the Western countries have prevented from joining the United Nations—the German Democratic Republic. That country has even been deprived of the right to have an observer at the United Nations because of the actions of the Western Powers. It was only our veto which enabled these States whose names I have mentioned to become Members of the United Nations.

254. Mr. Yost, we have used the veto—I myself have done so by raising this hand—about fifty times in the defence of just causes, of the interests of those whom you oppressed and despised, those against whom you were discriminating, those whom you were refusing to admit to the United Nations. The purpose of the recent veto to which you referred was to prevent the revenge-seekers and imperialists from entering a socialist country friendly to us, and, as I told your predecessor, Mr. Ball, to prevent the imperialist Powers from sticking their noses into our socialist affairs. That

was why we used the veto; it was used for just purposes. A Socialist country was saved from the introduction of revanchism, nazism, militarism and imperialism.

255. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Spanish*): As there are no further speakers, as President I propose to make an announcement.

256. First, the President, foreseeing this conclusion, took the liberty of bringing together yesterday some of the sponsors of the two drafts that were submitted earlier and of the draft which is being circulated today, with a view to seeking some arrangement, some compromise, that would enable us to reach, if not unanimity, at least that near-unanimity which the President considered necessary to give sufficient strength to a Security Council resolution of this type on a problem so difficult and so delicate as to compromise peace.

257. Unfortunately, the meeting that was convened yesterday in the President's office came rather late, for certain positions had already been taken which, in view of the way the forces in the Council would be aligned, it was felt necessary to put before today's meeting. Therefore, I ventured yesterday to ask the sponsors to await the conclusions reached at today's meeting with a sporting attitude of mind. Unfortunately, the outcome of this meeting has been too tragic to be taken in a sporting manner.

258. In any case, as President for the month of March, I beg of the members of the Council, cordially but insistently, that we be allowed to reflect on our responsibility and that we do everything possible to follow the course indicated to us by the representative of Finland when he reminded us that this Council is a forum for negotiation rather than a debating hall which might echo the differences to be found throughout the world.

259. In that spirit of negotiation the Finnish draft has been submitted [*S/9709*], and I respectfully request the members of the Council to examine it with no preconceived notions and with an open mind, in order to decide whether, at the meeting we have planned for tomorrow at 3.30 p.m., we could commence our discussion of that text. We must not forget today's outcome, of course, for, as the representative of Sierra Leone very wisely stated, it reflects a technical and a moral result. We have to balance those two aspects. Therefore, bearing in mind that, technically speaking, we need a majority to be able to impose the opinion of the United Nations on the illegitimate government of Southern Rhodesia, let us make an effort to consider a formula such as that proposed by the representative of Finland.

260. It is for this reason then that, as President, I again request that in a spirit of cordiality we meet again tomorrow at 3.30 p.m.

The meeting rose at 8.05 p.m.

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