



SECURITY COUNCIL OFFICIAL RECORDS

TWENTY-FIFTH YEAR

1533rd MEETING: 13 MARCH 1970

NEW YORK

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NOTE

Symbols of United Nations documents are composed of capital letters combined with figures. Mention of such a symbol indicates a reference to a United Nations document.

Documents of the Security Council (symbol S/ . . .) are normally published in quarterly *Supplements* of the *Official Records of the Security Council*. The date of the document indicates the supplement in which it appears or in which information about it is given.

The resolutions of the Security Council, numbered in accordance with a system adopted in 1964, are published in yearly volumes of *Resolutions and Decisions of the Security Council*. The new system, which has been applied retroactively to resolutions adopted before 1 January 1965, became fully operative on that date.

FIFTEEN HUNDRED AND THIRTY-THIRD MEETING

Held in New York on Friday, 13 March 1970, at 3 p.m.

President: Mr. Joaquín VALLEJO ARBELAEZ
(Colombia).

Present: The representatives of the following States: Burundi, China, Colombia, Finland, France, Nepal, Nicaragua, Poland, Sierra Leone, Spain, Syria, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America and Zambia.

Provisional agenda (S/Agenda/1533)

1. Adoption of the agenda.
2. Question concerning the situation in Southern Rhodesia:

Letter dated 3 March 1970 from the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/9675);

Letter dated 6 March 1970 addressed to the President of the Security Council by the representatives of Algeria, Botswana, Burundi, Cameroon, the Central African Republic, Chad, the Congo (Democratic Republic of), Dahomey, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea, the Ivory Coast, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Morocco, the Niger, Nigeria, the People's Republic of the Congo, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, the Sudan, Swaziland, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, the United Arab Republic, the United Republic of Tanzania, the Upper Volta and Zambia (S/9682).

Adoption of the agenda

The agenda was adopted.

Question concerning the situation in Southern Rhodesia

Letter dated 3 March 1970 from the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/9675);

Letter dated 6 March 1970 addressed to the President of the Security Council by the representatives of Algeria, Botswana, Burundi, Cameroon, the Central African Republic, Chad, the Congo (Democratic Republic of), Dahomey, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea, the

Ivory Coast, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Morocco, the Niger, Nigeria, the People's Republic of the Congo, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, the Sudan, Swaziland, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, the United Arab Republic, the United Republic of Tanzania, the Upper Volta and Zambia (S/9682)

1. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Spanish*): In accordance with the decisions previously taken by the Council, and with the Council's consent, I propose now to invite the representatives of Algeria, Senegal, Pakistan, Yugoslavia and India to participate in the Council's discussions without the right to vote. Since there is insufficient room at the table to seat all representatives participating in the debate, I shall, in accordance with past practice of the Council in similar cases, request them to take the places reserved for them at the side of the Council chamber, on the understanding that they will be invited to take a place at the Council table when it is their turn to speak.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. N. Harbi (Algeria), Mr. I. Boye (Senegal), Mr. S. A. Karim (Pakistan), Mr. L. Mojsov (Yugoslavia) and Mr. S. Sen (India) took the places reserved for them in the Council chamber.

2. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Spanish*): Before calling on the first speaker on my list, I should like to point out that documents S/9696/Corr.1 and Corr.2 have been distributed.

3. The first name on my list is that of the representative of Pakistan, whom I invite to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

4. Mr. KARIM (Pakistan): Mr. President, the Pakistan delegation is grateful to you and the other members of the Security Council for kindly permitting us to participate, without vote, in this debate. While conveying to you and your colleagues the profound esteem of my delegation, I should also like to pay a tribute to your wisdom and high-mindedness which guarantee the success of your Presidency.

5. I hope it is not necessary for me to restate the reasons which prompted my delegation to ask to participate in this discussion; they are evident from the Council's records on the question of Southern Rhodesia, starting from November 1965. The most recent statement of my Government, which has been

circulated in document S/9677, is but one expression of the sense of outrage prevailing in Pakistan at the continuance of the odious Smith régime in Zimbabwe. We fully share the widespread indignation evoked by the persistence of the men in Salisbury in resorting to increasingly brazen acts of defying all standards of legality and every decision of the Security Council.

6. While addressing oneself to this question in this forum one is fortunately free of the burden of having to stress any proposition of a legal or ethical nature. As the permanent representative of Pakistan, Ambassador Shahi, said at the 1475th meeting of the Security Council on 13 June 1969:

"The question before the Security Council is whether or not the sanctions imposed under resolution 253 (1968) of 29 May 1968 have been effective and, if not, how they can be reinforced by other possible measures under Chapter VII. This is a question altogether different from an adjudication of rights and wrongs, a balancing of claims and counter-claims. There is no controversy here on questions of law or morality. The issue before us is predominantly of an executive nature; it has to be faced with candour. If acrimony is undesirable, equivocation is also out of place."

7. The fact that the problem of Rhodesia has been the subject of action under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations is a logical consequence of certain determinations made by the Security Council. Because they constitute determinations, the propositions implicit in them are incontestable. They are: first, that the racist minority régime in Southern Rhodesia is wholly illegal, and no recognition should be accorded to it by any State; secondly, that the continuance of that régime constitutes a threat to international peace and security; thirdly, that the people of Southern Rhodesia are entitled to full self-determination and independence and that all States Members of the United Nations should render them moral and material assistance in their struggle to secure the enjoyment of their rights; fourthly, that the responsibility of dealing with the situation caused by the acts of the Salisbury régime continues to rest primarily with the United Kingdom as the legal administering Power pending the accession to independence of the people of Southern Rhodesia; fifthly, that, since all attempts at a peaceful settlement of this situation made by the United Kingdom have repeatedly failed, the situation calls for coercive measures which the United Nations Charter empowers the Security Council to take; sixthly, that States which afford assistance or encouragement to the illegal régime and persist in trading with it are violating their obligations under Article 25 of the Charter.

8. I need hardly add that all these propositions are more or less explicitly stated in previous resolutions of the Security Council on the subject. The principle of action that the situation in Southern Rhodesia calls for punitive measures means that any contemplated decision of the Security Council must be judged solely by the criterion of the effectiveness of the measures envisaged by it, rather than by any other consideration.

A measure is effective to the degree it forces or helps to force a reversal of the course adopted by the Salisbury régime. It is ineffective if it fails to do so, however well intentioned it might be.

9. Looking at the problem in that perspective, my delegation cannot persuade itself to believe that any reaffirmation of a decision already made by the Security Council would be adequate to the present situation. On the contrary, we are apprehensive that such a reiteration, unless accompanied by other decisions, will be construed by the Smith régime as a confession of the Security Council's impotence. The Council has had ample experience of the mentality of the men in Salisbury. It can well judge the impact of its pronouncements and decisions on them. There cannot be any manner of doubt regarding their cynicism, their stubbornness and their complete disregard of the elementary decencies of international life. Can it, therefore, possibly be assumed that another pronouncement on the basic illegality of this régime, another declaration that it is disqualified for international recognition, will sway the minds of these men and deflect them from their defiant course? To ask that question is not to deny the pertinence of the emphasis that the United Kingdom places on the issue at recognition. On the contrary, it is only fair to acknowledge that the request by the United Kingdom for an urgent meeting of the Security Council and its sponsoring of a draft resolution have already led to some good results. I refer here to the severance of consular relations with Southern Rhodesia by a number of Governments, including those of two permanent members of the Security Council. Nevertheless, it is the sincere and firm conviction of the Pakistan delegation that the assumption by the Salisbury régime of a so-called republican status calls for a more meaningful response from the Security Council than any the Council has made so far. In this context, we consider it appropriate to recall the proposals which were embodied in a draft resolution sponsored by Algeria, Nepal, Senegal, Zambia and Pakistan in the Security Council on 19 June 1969, contained in document S/9270/Rev.1. Unfortunately, that draft resolution failed to obtain the required majority in the Security Council. We would appeal to those members of the Security Council that did not support it at that time to reconsider their position now. We, who were among the co-sponsors of that draft resolution, are happy to see that its main elements are contained in the one embodied in document S/9696 and Corr.1 and 2, which was ably introduced by Mr. Tomeh of Syria on behalf of the Asian-African members of the Council.

10. Is it not a fact that developments since last June have reinforced the already powerful arguments for the adoption of those proposals? Can it be denied that the measures taken so far have failed to resolve the situation in Southern Rhodesia? Is it not, therefore, necessary that the United Kingdom, as the administering Power, should no longer abjure the use of force to enable the people of Zimbabwe to accede to their rightful independence? Is it not also imperative now that all States should sever consular, economic and other relations with the minority régime, including

railway, maritime and air transport and postal, telephone and wireless communications? Is there any doubt that the measures taken so far have not been fully complied with by all States and that in particular the Governments of South Africa and Portugal have been openly and actively aiding the Salisbury régime? Have they not thus made it possible for it to counter the effects of economic sanctions? Is it not, therefore, an essential requirement for the success of economic sanctions that all loop-holes in them should be effectively plugged? Last, but not least, are not the permanent members of the Security Council, who bear the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, expected to help in devising and implementing measures sufficiently effective to bring about the termination of the racist minority rebellion in Southern Rhodesia?

11. I would apologize for raising this series of questions if we did not feel that it is only by squarely facing them that the Security Council can fulfil its commitments in the present situation. Since the fact has been demonstrated that the rebellion in Southern Rhodesia will not be suppressed without the use of force, it seems to us that the time has come, over and above the adoption of any resolution by the Council, for the representatives of the permanent members and the Foreign Ministers of the African States who are duly accredited by the Organization of African Unity to initiate consultations about the possibilities of that course of action. Such consultations will be fruitful if they are not hampered by too many preconceptions, if they are held in an open-minded spirit, if they recognize that the use of force can take diverse forms and if they bear in mind all the resources commanded by the permanent members of the Security Council. In suggesting such consultations, my delegation is regretfully conscious of the fact that too often in the history of this question the assessments made by the African States have been ignored and their warnings have gone unheeded. The situation in Southern Rhodesia will not improve unless the Council discards that kind of approach.

12. The Pakistan delegation, not being a member of the Council, does not have the right to vote, and we do not presume that our suggestions will affect the outcome of any proposal now before the Council. However, we feel obliged to submit that the present deliberations of the Security Council will represent a setback if they do not in some way serve to make the Council's action against the Salisbury régime more forceful. Needless to say, we shall be dismayed by such a failure. Apart from our distress at the human situation in Southern Rhodesia, apart from our anxiety about the dangers to peace and the possibility of a racial war in the southern half of Africa, apart from our sentiments of solidarity with the whole Asian-African community, Pakistan feels a close concern with this question because it engages the honour and prestige of the Security Council to an unparalleled degree. Therefore we trust that the Security Council will remain mindful that a defeat of the many hopes which were aroused by its well-considered decision to act under Chapter VII of the Charter will be a grave reverse to the development of healthier international relations.

13. Mr. YOST (United States of America): Mr. President, may I first join my colleagues in expressing to you our congratulations and pleasure on your assumption of the Presidency of this Council? We are keenly aware of your long experience, your distinguished career and your high qualifications. My delegation and I are particularly happy to welcome to the Presidency a representative of the sister Republic of Colombia with which we enjoy such intimate and cordial relations. We are sure that the month of your Presidency will be graced by distinction.

14. I have listened with great care and interest to the statements made before this Council, particularly the statement made by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Zambia. I also listened with great interest to the interventions of Lord Caradon, representative of the United Kingdom, who stressed the importance of and the need for urgency in acting in unison in not recognizing the so-called republic of Rhodesia.

15. To say that we are meeting at a sad or shocking or deplorable time in the history of the Rhodesian question is but to state a truism. These adjectives apply indeed to the entire period since the unilateral declaration of independence in November 1965. Yet the situation with which we are now confronted does have a special significance, for we are told that a constitution which was approved by 1 per cent of the Rhodesian population is now in effect and that a "republic" which was approved by a similarly small percentage of the electorate has been established. I commented in some detail at our meeting last June on the specifics of that constitution, on the provisions which assure that political power will for ever remain in white hands, and on the ironically entitled declaration of rights. I should like only to remind members of the Council of one of my remarks which I made at the 1475th meeting on 13 June 1969:

"Since these proposals—despite all the trappings of law in which they are dressed—are intrinsically unjust, and since they emanate from an unlawful régime, they will be without legal effect, regardless of the results of the voting of 20 June."

16. My Government's view has not changed since that time. Illegal acts perpetrated by an illegal régime can in no way be considered to lend any air of legitimacy to that régime. Attaching the word "republic" to the illegal minority régime in Salisbury will deceive no one. My Government has assured the United Kingdom that we continue to regard it as the legal sovereign in Rhodesia.

17. Consistent with that position, and following the Smith régime's severance of the last formal ties with the United Kingdom, the United States Secretary of State on 9 March announced that the United States Consulate General in Salisbury would be closed as of 17 March and that the staff would depart. We believe that this was an important step at a crucial time, a step which again made clear the posture of the United States towards the Smith régime's pretensions towards legitimacy. This step may, we hope, help to discourage

any prospect that the newly instituted "republic" might begin to gain acceptance by the nations of the world. We have not recognized, and we have no intention of recognizing, the illegal régime in Salisbury. I repeat this assurance to the members of this Council.

18. The United States has supported every resolution adopted by the Security Council concerning Rhodesia since the unilateral declaration of independence by the Smith régime in 1965. We have implemented strictly the mandatory economic sanctions imposed by resolution 232 (1966) and resolution 253 (1968). We believe that our implementation of the sanctions has been second to none. We and six other members of the Council regretfully found ourselves unable to support the draft resolution placed before the Council concerning Rhodesia last June. I pointed out at that time that the Council had exerted an effective influence on the Rhodesian situation only when it worked on the basis of unanimity, and that the only ones who would find any solace in the division within the Council would be Mr. Smith and his friends. I hope and trust that this will not be the situation that we face during this series of meetings of the Council.

19. The United States supports the view expressed by the delegation of the United Kingdom that we should urgently act in not recognizing the "republic" of Rhodesia, and we support the draft resolution which was introduced by the United Kingdom [S/9676/Rev.1]. I hope that all other members of this Council will do so as well and that we shall not become bogged down in attempts to call for measures which will divide the Council and will not assist the people of Rhodesia. Let us rather adopt this draft resolution speedily and unanimously so that Mr. Smith and his followers will be fully aware that the mind of the international community has not been changed by the purported assumption of a republic status, that we still refuse to recognize his régime and that we remain firm in our belief that majority rule will eventually come to Southern Rhodesia.

20. My Government shares the desire felt around this table that an equitable solution to the situation must be achieved. This is indeed a most difficult and complex problem. We are convinced that all of us here in this Council must meet our responsibilities concerning Rhodesia with perseverance, but also with prudence. The Security Council has steadfastly condemned the actions of the present Salisbury régime and has taken the unprecedented step of imposing mandatory economic sanctions. These sanctions must be firmly maintained and strictly enforced. We must persevere in our opposition to racism and repression.

21. In charting our course for the future, however, we shall want to take particular care that we continue to act with unanimity. My delegation is aware that the failure of South Africa and Portugal to adhere to the sanctions programme provided for in resolution 253 (1968) is a major source of concern. It is regrettable that these two countries continue to flout the sanctions. Minister Nkama, when speaking the other day, made a direct reference to this unfortunate situation, and

I note that this particular question is included in the draft resolution submitted by the Afro-Asian members of this Council.

22. My delegation has had the occasion to state that the application of sanctions to countries neighbouring Southern Rhodesia would be following a dubious course which would introduce new and grave complications in an already complicated situation. There is no doubt that, in view of the continued refusal of the Smith régime to heed the calls of the international community to alter its course, we would all prefer to take more effective and decisive measures. The question, however, arises whether these more extreme measures which have been suggested would be sufficiently supported by the international community, especially those most directly concerned, to make them in fact effective, or whether, in seeking such action against economically powerful States under existing circumstances, they would merely demonstrate the limitations of the United Nations and further entrench the Smith régime and its supporters in southern Africa.

23. We must, therefore, in our view, seek to avoid embarking on unrealistic courses of action which, because they would over-extend the capacity of the United Nations for effective action, would reflect adversely on this body and give aid and comfort to Ian Smith and his collaborators.

24. My delegation also doubts the wisdom and effectiveness of imposing a communication ban as envisaged in the draft resolution. We in the United States have consistently attached the greatest importance to the maintenance of communications with other States, even those with which our relations were greatly strained, and in some cases even when hostilities were in progress between us. The United States has a long history and tradition of freedom of movement and speech, and would view most seriously the prospect of leaving United States citizens anywhere in the world without the means to travel or communicate. Furthermore, we do not believe that cutting off communication and stemming a free flow of information would contribute to a solution of the difficulties with which we are faced. Rather, it might tend to harden further the attitude of the white minority. In our view, such measures tear at the very fabric of international relations and would tend to foreclose the free exchange of information and ideas upon which progress in this unfortunate situation in part depends.

25. I should like to close my remarks by quoting from President Nixon's recent report to the Congress on United States foreign policy for the 1970s. The President said:

"Clearly there is no question of the United States condoning, or acquiescing in, the racial policies of the white-ruled régimes. For moral as well as historical reasons, the United States stands firmly for the principles of racial equality and self-determination."

26. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Spanish*): I invite the representative of Yugoslavia to take a seat at the Council table to make his statement.

27. Mr. MOJSOV (Yugoslavia): Mr. President, I am obliged to follow the established rule for representatives of countries which are not members of the Security Council of refraining from expressing praise and gratification to you on your accession to the important functions of President of the Security Council for this month. We hope that in the month of March the Council will make further progress in strengthening peace and in exerting additional efforts in the search for solutions to problems burdening international relations. However, I cannot but extend my gratitude and also express my deepest appreciation to you, Mr. President, and through you to the members of the Security Council, for permitting me to participate in the debate, without the right to vote, and to submit our views on the important issue which is on the agenda of the Security Council. As has been clearly evident from the discussions so far in the Security Council, the problem is of primary importance not only for the neighbouring countries of Southern Rhodesia but also for all countries of Africa—members of the Organization of African Unity—and equally for the international community as a whole. This problem also constitutes a test of the consciousness and the effective performance of our Organization, which is faced with the precedent of the violation of the most fundamental norms of international relations and disrespect of the decisions of the United Nations—a situation with far-reaching consequences, unless an end is put to it.

28. Regarding developments in Southern Rhodesia and in the southern part of Africa, Yugoslavia fully shares the concern of all the members of the Organization of African Unity, with which my country maintains very friendly relations and co-operates in the field of both bilateral and international relations. The Yugoslav Government has on numerous occasions, both in the United Nations and at many bilateral and international meetings, as well as during the recent visit and talks of the President of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Josip Broz Tito, with the leaders of East African and North African countries, very clearly and resolutely made its position known on the question of Southern Rhodesia. For all these reasons my Government is submitting its views to the Security Council concerning the new situation in Southern Rhodesia.

29. The most recent decision of the illegal régime of Ian Smith, which has proclaimed an alleged republic and attempted by the same act to destroy the last bridge of any form of relations with the United Kingdom as the administering Power, constitutes a serious turning point, one that will regrettably have grave consequences not only for Africa but also for international relations as a whole.

30. Although this decision represents an illegal act of an illegal régime, we must not overlook the fact that it needed only five years after usurping power—because of an attitude of appeasement towards these rebels—to make Rhodesia a racist State in which a minority, numbering less than a quarter of a million white settlers, rules over a deprived black African population of more than 4 million in the most brutal manner.

31. If we were to attempt to analyse the causes leading to such a situation, then we should, above all, note that the adopted sanctions formulated in resolution 253 (1968) of the Security Council proved to be insufficient and, furthermore, inadequately applied and exercised, as has been so eloquently pointed out by many preceding speakers in this debate. Not only did the Republic of South Africa and Portugal challenge and openly refuse to adhere to that resolution, but a number of other countries with substantial economic interests and commitments in Southern Rhodesia and with a rather evident influence in international relations, also failed to exercise appropriate measures with a view to preventing their citizens from engaging in trade and other operations in Southern Rhodesia. A report by the Secretary-General concerning the situation in Southern Rhodesia states that only ninety-nine countries and five specialized agencies have submitted reports on the implementation of the Security Council resolution, while thirty-one countries, among which twenty-seven are Members of the United Nations, did not send in reports. Why have those countries failed to submit such a report? I believe that this is indicative of the fact that the illegal régime of Ian Smith—thanks to the extensive and whole-hearted support of its allies—has succeeded not only in remaining in power but also in consolidating itself further.

32. The unsuccessful attempts to eliminate the illegal régime in Southern Rhodesia and the prevention of the exercising by the people of Zimbabwe of its inalienable right to freedom and independence have strengthened the alliance among the staunch apologists of racism and colonialism in the southern part of Africa, that is, the alliance of the Republic of South Africa, Portugal and the illegal régime in Southern Rhodesia. That alliance not only constitutes an instrument of suppression of the struggle for freedom, independence and fundamental human rights which continues to be waged in the southern part of Africa against colonialists and racists, but also represents a direct threat to the independence and freedom of the neighbouring countries.

33. For these reasons the Yugoslav delegation wishes once again to draw the Council's attention to the necessity of undertaking urgent and effective measures for the elimination of the illegal racist régime in Southern Rhodesia.

34. There is a broad consensus on this question in the Security Council regarding the necessity of enabling the people of Zimbabwe to attain freedom and independence. More serious differences, it seems, are appearing with respect to the means and methods of achieving those objectives. There is no doubt that negotiations and efforts for a peaceful solution remain the most desired approach for the settlement of any conflicting issues and other outstanding international problems. The Yugoslav delegation naturally would support such a course of action provided that specific conditions existed for it and that it would enable a just and appropriate solution to be reached. The case of Southern Rhodesia, unfortunately, is not one in which there

could be a solution through such a desired course. The illegal régime of Ian Smith has in innumerable instances demonstrated that it rejects every solution which does not favour the perpetuation of the domination of the white racist minority over the large majority of the people of Zimbabwe.

35. Having in mind what I have just said, the Yugoslav delegation considers that in the prevailing circumstances the most effective course of action for overcoming the present difficult situation in Rhodesia has been clearly stipulated in General Assembly resolution 2508 (XXIV) adopted on 21 November 1969.

36. Past experience with regard to the application of selective sanctions gives rise to justified doubts about the possibility of achieving the objectives that have been set, as well as about the readiness of individual Member States to abide strictly by the resolutions of the United Nations. The effectiveness of previously adopted sanctions depends primarily upon the goodwill of the Governments of Member States in applying them consistently—goodwill which, unfortunately, has not been shown up till now. In view of the fact that South Africa and Portugal have clearly demonstrated that they do not wish to abide by the decisions on sanctions, the Yugoslav delegation is of the opinion that those two Governments should bear the consequences, as Members of the United Nations which have refused to adhere to frequently reiterated resolutions of the United Nations.

37. Every delay in the implementation of the above-mentioned and other pertinent measures can only lead to further consolidation of a new bastion of racism and colonialism in the southern part of Africa. Should the United Nations reconcile itself to this, we shall be faced in the near future with more serious conflicts not only endangering peace in Africa, but also adversely affecting international relations and the United Nations.

38. We have always maintained the view that the United Kingdom, as the administering Power, should undertake, within its competence, appropriate and effective measures for the liquidation of the abnormal situation in Southern Rhodesia. In doing this, it would meet with the understanding and support of the overwhelming majority of our Organization.

39. My delegation naturally welcomes the recent decision of some countries to close their consulates in Salisbury. However, this measure should constitute only the first, not the last, step in a series of other specific measures which should be taken by all countries. Otherwise, if these first measures remain the only ones, this can create an illusion, which cannot satisfy international public opinion.

40. We are all aware of the fact that the people of Zimbabwe have been the victims of the policy of *apartheid* and of other harsh reprisals taken against them by the white racists and that they are being deprived of their elementary human rights. Those facts

cannot be denied; in fact they have been explicitly stated in the course of the debate in the Security Council.

41. Furthermore, the people of Zimbabwe and its liberation movement are being brutally assaulted not only by the armed forces of Ian Smith, but also by those of South Africa. Does not this brutal intervention of South Africa constitute another flagrant violation of the United Nations Charter on the part of a country that is still a Member of the United Nations? The rapid elimination of the illegal régime would shorten the sufferings and sacrifices of the people of Zimbabwe, but it would also prevent—and this is not insignificant—the inevitable spreading of the racial conflict in that part of Africa, a conflict that would not spare the white settlers either. For all those reasons an urgent solution to this problem would make a significant contribution to the consolidation of world peace and security.

42. In conclusion, may I be permitted to say that the Yugoslav Government has in the past extended full support to all the efforts of the United Nations in the search for a suitable and just solution to the problem of Southern Rhodesia? The Yugoslav Government, in its note dated 2 September 1968¹ informed the Secretary-General of the United Nations that it does not recognize the illegal régime and that it maintains no diplomatic, consular, trade or any other relations with Southern Rhodesia. Furthermore, the Yugoslav Government reaffirmed its full support for the justified struggle of the people of Zimbabwe for freedom and national independence, pointing out that it would, in co-operation with other African States and Members of the United Nations, continue to contribute to further effective measures aimed at enabling the people of Zimbabwe to attain their freedom and independence.

43. In that connexion, on 11 February 1969 the Federal Assembly of Yugoslavia enacted a special federal law prohibiting the establishment of trade or economic relations with the illegal minority régime in Southern Rhodesia. Article 1 of that law states:

“Domestic legal and physical persons are prohibited from trading in any goods and from performing services and from maintaining and establishing other economic relations with legal and physical persons of Southern Rhodesia.

“Also, domestic legal and physical persons are prohibited from acting as representatives, or in any other way mediating or soliciting goods originating in Southern Rhodesia, and engaging in like operations with legal and physical persons of any other country.”

Article 2 further

“prohibits Southern Rhodesian transport from using Yugoslav ports, airports and road facilities, and prohibits Yugoslav transport from using ports, docks, airports and road facilities in Southern Rhodesia.

¹ See *Official Records of the Security Council, Twenty-third Year, Supplement for July, August and September 1968*, document S/8786/Add.1, annex.

Physical persons, although possessing valid passports, may not enter Yugoslavia nor transit through the country, except if such a visit is purely for humanitarian reasons."

In the last articles, the law provides for sanctions and penalties for Yugoslav citizens and enterprises that violate those provisions.

44. In adopting this Federal Law the Yugoslav Parliament reiterated its conviction that in order to solve specific international problems it is essential to undertake, in addition to proclaiming aims and setting goals, the immediate implementation of those objectives through concrete and effective measures.

45. Kindly allow me, Mr. President, to conclude my statement by quoting an excerpt from the joint communiqué of the Yugoslav-Zambian talks held between the President of the Republic of Zambia, Mr. Kenneth Kaunda, and the President of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Mr. Josip Broz Tito, in Lusaka, which was released on 8 February 1970:

"The two Presidents condemned the colonialist and racist policy pursued by Portugal, South Africa and the illegal régime of Ian Smith in Southern Rhodesia. They stressed, in particular, that such a situation and constant threats and provocations made by those régimes against Zambia and other independent countries of Africa constitute a permanent threat to peace and security in that part of the world. Expressing their great dissatisfaction and concern over the stagnation which has occurred in the process of decolonization and emphasizing the grave consequences that could result from this, the two Presidents energetically demanded to have the United Nations and the international community take concrete and urgent measures which would lead, as soon as possible, to the liberation of the people of Angola, Mozambique, Rhodesia, Namibia, South Africa and Guinea (Bissau)."

46. Mr. JAKOBSON (Finland): Mr. President, I am pleased to have this opportunity of extending the best wishes of my delegation to you as President of the Security Council and as representative of a country with which Finland, in spite of physical distance, maintains very lively trade and other relations. We know of your very distinguished public career and have already experienced your leadership in the Council, which has been both firm and tactful.

47. This meeting of the Security Council was convened by the United Kingdom for the purpose of condemning the latest illegal act of the racist minority régime in Southern Rhodesia, the purported assumption of a republican status, and of calling upon Member States to refrain from recognizing that illegal régime. Of course every member of the Security Council agrees that this must be done. My delegation does not agree, however, that it is enough. The representatives of the African States who have come to New York to attend this meeting have conveyed to us in vivid terms the growing concern of the African peoples over the con-

tinued suppression of the fundamental rights and freedoms of the majority of the people in Southern Rhodesia. We believe that the Security Council should respond to their appeal by taking further measures to increase international pressure on the illegal régime in Southern Rhodesia.

48. To make that pressure effective it is essential, in our view, to restore the unity of the Security Council in dealing with the question of Southern Rhodesia. We must not allow a repetition of what happened in June last year when the Council failed to reach any decision at all on the question of Southern Rhodesia, thus creating the impression that the policy of sanctions had become bankrupt. A new division in the Council would only further dismay and confuse all those who have faithfully carried out the decisions we have taken so far. It would encourage Mr. Smith and his supporters, wherever they are, to believe that the Security Council is weakening in its resolve and that soon the sanctions will simply fade away.

49. In actual fact the Security Council is not basically divided on this issue. On the contrary, it has shown greater unity in dealing with it than on most other questions relating to the maintenance of international peace and security. Until last June every resolution concerning Southern Rhodesia had been adopted unanimously, which is a remarkable expression of international solidarity and determination to put an end to this aggression—and aggression of one race against another. I am convinced that this time too we should and can act unanimously, which in the case of an issue affecting international peace and security is the only way we can act at all.

50. It is against this background that, in the view of my delegation, the Security Council should now consider what practical decisions it might take. Neither of the two draft resolutions before the Council would seem to us to provide a basis for unanimous action. The draft resolution of the United Kingdom [S/9676/Rev.1] does not go far enough, as I already stated at the beginning of this statement. The draft resolution submitted by the African and Asian members of the Council [S/9696 and Corr.1 and 2], on the other hand, is likely to recreate the unfortunate situation in which we found ourselves in June last year.

51. My delegation believes, therefore, that efforts should be made to agree on a course of action which, while acceptable to all the members of the Council, would serve the purpose I mentioned at the outset, namely, the purpose of increasing international pressure against the illegal régime in Southern Rhodesia.

52. The Security Council could decide, in accordance with Article 41 of the Charter, that all Member States should immediately cut off all diplomatic, consular, trade, military and other relations that they may have with the illegal régime in Southern Rhodesia and terminate any representation that they maintain in the Territory. Most States have already done so; nevertheless, it would be important to make this a mandatory decision of the Security Council.

53. The Council could also decide, in accordance with the same Article of the Charter, that all States should interrupt any existing means of transportation to and from Southern Rhodesia. This would be a measure that would further increase the isolation of the illegal régime from the international community.

54. It would seem logical that since bilateral relations with the régime in Southern Rhodesia have been declared illegal, that régime should also be excluded from participation in multilateral relations between States. Southern Rhodesia continues to be a member or associate member of a number of specialized agencies of the United Nations. The Security Council should now request Member States to take appropriate action to suspend such membership or associate membership. The Council could further urge Member States of any international or regional organizations to suspend the membership of the illegal régime of Southern Rhodesia from their respective organizations.

55. In addition to such new measures, the Council could call upon Member States to make a greater effort to carry out the economic sanctions more effectively. We all know that much more can still be done by States complying with resolution 253 (1968) to stop leakages in the system of sanctions. Governments could adopt more stringent measures to prevent their nationals or companies from carrying on an illicit trade with Southern Rhodesia.

56. In this connexion, my delegation believes that the Committee established by resolution 253 (1968) could be given a more active and a wider role. It could be requested to make specific recommendations to the Security Council on ways and means by which States could increase the effectiveness of the sanctions.

57. As we are about to sharpen the policy of sanctions against Southern Rhodesia, we should not overlook the consequences of our actions for Zambia, a country which, as we heard from its Foreign Minister [*1531st meeting*], stands in the forefront of the international campaign against the Smith régime. Resolution 253 (1968) has already drawn attention to the special economic problems that Zambia may be confronted with as a result of the decisions of the Security Council, but it would seem to us that more could be done to extend assistance to Zambia by Member States and specialized agencies and other international organizations.

58. These are some of the elements which, in the view of my delegation, could be included in a resolution of the Security Council, and we would be prepared to put forward specific proposals along these lines for the consideration of members, in the hope that on that basis a unanimous decision could be reached.

59. Mr. LIU (China): With the proclamation of a so-called republic, the Smith régime in Southern Rhodesia has broken its final link with the British Crown. This, of course, is not an unexpected development; it is the inevitable outcome of a series of events growing out

of the illegal unilateral declaration of independence in November 1965. From that day to this, both the United Kingdom and the world community have agreed that the Smith régime must be overthrown and the people of Zimbabwe given the opportunity of choosing their own path into the future. This is in accord with the basic principles of the Charter. Indeed, the obligation to promote the advancement of colonial peoples towards self-government and independence has been one of the major commitments of the United Nations.

60. It is one thing, however, to talk about objectives and quite another to agree on the means by which the objectives can be achieved. From the start of the Rhodesian crisis there has been a divergence of views in regard to the steps the United Nations may take to put an end to the illegal régime. The gap between what has been demanded of the Security Council and what the Security Council has actually been able to do seems almost unbridgeable. This was made abundantly clear in the Council's debate of June 1969, when Salisbury sought to perpetuate its policy of white supremacy through an illegal referendum. On that occasion the debate was bitter and acrimonious, resulting in the failure to adopt any resolution at all. This could not have failed to expose the basic weakness of the United Nations to the world at large and to Salisbury in particular. The polarization of attitudes within the Security Council only adds to the generally bleak atmosphere surrounding the efforts to resolve the Rhodesian crisis. None of the measures so far adopted by the Council, including the imposition of comprehensive mandatory economic sanctions in May 1968, have had much impact on the elimination of the racist régime in Southern Rhodesia. The purported assumption of republican status on 2 March 1970 is but the latest proof of Salisbury's intransigence and defiance.

61. In the face of such a situation, the Security Council must, as its first order of business, condemn in unequivocal terms this latest act of illegality and denounce any form of government which is not based on the principle of majority rule, and must call upon all Member States to refrain from recognizing this illegal régime. I agree with the view that, on this issue of non-recognition, the Council must speak with one voice and one mind. Indeed, the representative of the United Kingdom has been the first to impress on the Council the urgency of such action by the Council. Of course, the mere act of condemning what has already taken place will not be of immediate help to the people of Zimbabwe, nor is the strategy of non-recognition likely to bring down the Smith régime in short order. Yet, while fully aware of its limitations, my delegation does not minimize the impact such a course of action might have in weakening the illegal set-up in Salisbury. It must none the less be admitted that in the absence of any determined and more energetic action, any break-through in the Rhodesian situation is not in sight.

62. As the administering Power, the United Kingdom has a continuing responsibility that cannot be abandoned. The dilemma which it now faces is an agonizing

one. Some further action in the near future seems necessary, and it is a decision that the Government of the United Kingdom may eventually have to make, however painful and unpalatable that may be. In the meantime, the increased pressure suggested by the representative of Finland seems to be practical and can be put into effect without delay.

63. Mr. TERENCE (Burundi) (*interpretation from French*): Mr. President, may I first of all express to you my thanks for the kind words you spoke with regard to my Presidency during the month of January. I assure you that what little I was modestly able to accomplish was thanks to the powerful assistance that you and our other colleagues so loyally and freely gave me. In turn, Sir, as I promised last Friday, I likewise wish to offer you my congratulations on the high post that you have been called upon to occupy during the month of March. You will recall, Mr. President, that Colombia has always been termed "the daughter of Simón Bolívar", the valiant liberator of Latin America. Furthermore, there are in fact striking similarities between Burundi and Colombia. Both countries are the best producers of coffee in the world, not only in quantity but also in quality. But, to be less down-to-earth, I would point out that there are other reasons for which we are gratified at seeing you in the Presidential seat. One of them is that both our peoples attribute very great importance to the humane ideals of liberty, sovereignty, and complementary and peaceful co-existence in the midst of diversity and differences of race. We are confident that the immense experience you have gathered in your political and diplomatic career will inspire you and will give you the necessary strength to lead these meetings devoted to the liberation of the Zimbabwe people to a safe haven.

64. From Charybdis to Scylla, that is the fate of the Zimbabwe people. On 11 November 1965 Ian Smith proclaimed independence. Last week the same Ian Smith culminated his impertinence when he turned the British colony into a republic.

65. On behalf of my Government and my delegation I should first like to express our feelings of appreciation to the Governments that have just closed their consulates in Salisbury. I am extremely happy to be able to place on that list such a country as Belgium, which, I have been informed in the course of this meeting, has followed the example of France, the United States, the Federal Republic of Germany and other countries. We are gratified for the simple reason that we enjoy the best of relations with those countries, and particularly with Belgium, the former administering Power of my own country, Burundi. Belgium, unlike the United Kingdom, harkened to the voice of reason and allowed Burundi to become independent whilst it was still a country under the trusteeship of the United Nations; that type of action was even more difficult for Belgium than it would be for the United Kingdom, which is dealing with a colony in every sense of the word.

66. The Government of Burundi and Africa as a whole wish to express their hope that all those Governments

that have broken away from the irrational and illegal vocation adopted by Ian Smith will now join the youthful continent and go beyond the gesture which they have just made. France, in particular, because of its many friends in Africa, because of its experience when confronted by rebellious generals, whom General de Gaulle courageously swept away, can play a determining and important role in assisting London to bear in mind the French victory over the rebels. The United States, which has friendly relations with the Government of Burundi, also has ties of deep friendship with the United Kingdom and is therefore called upon to play a decisive part: to influence the attitude of the United Kingdom Government, and thus to remedy the state of affairs in Salisbury.

67. Even at a time when the apathy of the British Government towards the Zimbabwe people and its paternal solicitude towards the usurping settlers have culminated, it is nevertheless appropriate for me to voice the feelings of my delegation. My delegation's duty is to interpret truly the non-partisan policy of the Government of Burundi. I therefore deem it my duty to devote some moments to the reaffirmation of my country's faith in international co-operation.

68. Drawing inspiration from this basic doctrine, we are convinced that co-operation between a totally freed Africa and the one-time European mother countries falls naturally within the context of both logic and history. It is therefore out of its concern to safeguard and strengthen the ties between Africa and Europe that my Government has never ceased to advocate a speedy end to the colonial burden in the interest not only of the two partner continents but of the entire human family. Alas, there are still colonial Powers that set up insurmountable barriers to the final reconciliation between the African peoples and the nations of Europe.

69. By its refusal to release its last colonial bastion in Africa, the United Kingdom places itself among the Governments that are obstructing a true friendship between Europe and Africa based upon close and mutually beneficial co-operation. It is obvious that a responsible government—apart from not condemning the Zimbabwe people to tyranny and desolation, thus further obstructing the noble cause of friendly co-operation between African States and those of Europe—cannot, if it does so, claim the sympathy and the affection of the African people.

70. So that the Government of London and its representatives should stop complaining about the outspoken indignation that its defeatist attitude and complicity with the Smith régime have provoked all over Africa and the world. It is not an implacable hatred against the British people themselves sworn by the Africans in the Security Council or in Africa itself, but rather the censure and condemnation which the British Government has drawn on itself by its connivance with the monopolizers of power in Rhodesia.

71. Speaking of co-operation, we should mention the Common Market, to which Britain has submitted its

candidacy. Within that context the Community of Six has without doubt far greater need of Africa than of the British Isles. The African States still have reasons to confront and challenge the United Kingdom in that European economic group. When the British Government gives up its ostrich-like policy and decides to transfer to the Zimbabwe people the latter's inalienable rights and powers—those of independence and sovereignty over the direction of their own children—our countries will not delay in working for fruitful co-operation between Zimbabwe and the United Kingdom. This is said to prove that neither my delegation nor any other African delegation has resentments against the United Kingdom.

72. But as long as the latter is on the side of the settlers that have grabbed power on the sole pretext of their racial supremacy, it would be naïve to contend that Africa should be indulgent towards Great Britain. Therefore, the leaders in Great Britain must choose in their own interest either to join Africa or to shatter forever all the ties with her.

73. The flagrant guilt lies with the Labour Government, whilst the peddlers of *apartheid* in Rhodesia merely play the role of docile acolytes. A series of events and facts attest openly to the fact not only that the present fate of the Africans in Rhodesia today was forged in patent collusion between London and Salisbury but also that Ian Smith took the part of the executor of a Machiavellian plan hatched in the British capital.

74. First, Garfield Todd, one-time Prime Minister of Southern Rhodesia (from 1953 to 1957), stigmatized the 1961 Constitution, and accused the United Kingdom before the Special Committee of the United Nations,² stating:

“The United Kingdom was a party to imposing the Constitution on an angry and unhappy majority. Withdrawal of British influence ‘would be a tragic happening, for it will leave us to our own travail, to bloodshed, and to the eventual rout of the white people.

“ ‘If the United Kingdom does not act today—and I plead with it to act . . . then the United Nations will have to act tomorrow.’ ”³

75. Secondly, Prime Minister Sir Edgar Whitehead also proposed a plan to the United Kingdom which was intended, first of all, to do away with the entire racial system and procedures in Rhodesia—that plan was rejected, and we know its fate.

76. Thirdly, from 4 to 11 October 1965 Smith was in London to talk to the British Government.

² Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples.

³ Quoted in English by the speaker; extract from *A Principle in Torment: I. The United Nations and Southern Rhodesia* (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.69.I.26), p. 20.

77. Fourthly, the ultimatum of Smith to Prime Minister Wilson, which has been labelled by some writers as “the eleventh hour”.

78. Fifthly, the visit of Mr. Wilson to Salisbury from 25 to 30 October 1965. After that meeting between the British Prime Minister and the rebellious so-called leader in Salisbury, the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom offered a surprise present to the African leaders for the Zimbabwe people; in other words, he gave Ian Smith full assurances that military force would not be used to overthrow his régime.

79. Sixthly, the meetings between Prime Minister Wilson and Ian Smith: twice in Gibraltar—one on board the *Fearless*, the other on board the *Tiger*.

80. Seventhly, the private meetings between the British Prime Minister and Ian Smith have always been surrounded by mystery, and the parties most directly concerned—namely, the Africans—were barred.

81. Eighthly, the British Government showed no concern for the African prisoners during the course of the entire drama.

82. Ninthly, the Government of the United Kingdom, at every step taken by the settler clique, rushed to the General Assembly or to the Security Council—but on condition that those bodies adopt measures according to the taste and style dictated by London: namely, that neither dare adopt measures not to the liking and in the interests of the United Kingdom. One wondered why the Security Council was being called upon to meet by the United Kingdom—I do not refer to today's meeting but to earlier ones. We also wondered about the motivation of the United Kingdom in hastening to the Security Council and to the General Assembly, since when those organs proposed appropriate measures these were promptly rejected because they did not, of course, fit in with the desires or with the line of least resistance—namely, the ostrich-like tactics—of the United Kingdom.

83. Tenthly, a number of Africans were sentenced to death; yet the United Kingdom took no steps to save them, nor to punish the murderers.

84. Eleventhly—and here I shall have to dwell at some length on this question to allow this Council to glance at the previous aspects of British colonization and the acts which that Government adopted in similar, even benign, cases—the organization of the Mau Mau was repressed with merciless brutality, whereas the usurping settlers in Rhodesia are treated with an almost maternal indulgence. A comparison between the Mau Mau of Kenya and the insurgent settlers in Rhodesia will make it obvious to this Council that there is a tenderness enjoyed by the latter. Immediately after the birth of the Mau Mau movement, exceptional acts of repression were adopted. For acting weakly, Governor Mitchell was removed from office. His successor, Evelyn Baring, was dispatched to Nairobi the next day: a month later he signed the proclamation of the

state of emergency. Even before the state of emergency had been officially decreed, Jomo Kenyatta and eighty-two other suspects were abruptly awakened before dawn and led to prison.

85. Citing from a book called *Africa Addio* will show more accurately the military measures adopted by the United Kingdom to strangle the Mau Mau organization. I quote a passage from that book:

"Since the declaration of emergency the Government had been operating with six battalions of King's African Rifles and one battalion of Lancashire Fusiliers. . . . It called the 39th and 49th brigades, the Kenya Regiment, two other East African units, an armoured car squadron, two flights of RAF Harvards in which each plane was capable of carrying eight bombs and a machine-gun, and a squadron of Lincoln heavy bombers."⁴

86. To confront the situation, the United Kingdom mobilized an army amounting to 70,000 persons, equipped with the most modern heavy weapons, and on 24 April 1954 22,000 soldiers besieged Nairobi to carry out the operation which was known as "Operation Anvil".

87. In less than forty-eight hours 11,600 Africans were interrogated; two weeks later, 16,538 prisoners lay in cells in penitentiaries; an area fifty miles in length by eight feet in width and ten feet in depth, covered with barbed wire and patrolled day and night by the military forces, had been dug around a reservation in which the adherents of the Mau Mau movement had been enclosed. More than 10,000 Mau Mau were killed. At the culminating moment of the uprising the number of prisoners rose to 77,000 persons. At the birth of the organization the colonial Government possessed a surplus of a few million dollars; to meet the needs created by the measures for putting down the Mau Mau, \$200 million were found necessary for military operation alone.

88. From the picture I have drawn and the comparison between Kenya and Rhodesia, it becomes obvious that the same administering Power which yesterday shattered the legitimate and democratic Mau Mau organization, and which has acted likewise in Guyana, Jamaica, Aden and other countries, is today, with maternal indulgence, coddling the usurping settlers.

89. This Council easily notes how quickly the metropolitan Power decided to stifle the Mau Mau movement and the constant marking-time of the United Kingdom in shattering the insurrection—as well as the savage and draconian measures taken against an organization that was created to lead the country to legitimate independence, and the care lavished upon a group of usurpers.

90. It is true that only the United Kingdom, which constantly calls for a moratorium on a rebellion that

she loves as a child, will have to explain this strange contrast.

91. After a careful and thorough examination of the complexity and nature of the Rhodesian problem, my delegation considers that the breaking of the present stalemate lies in the resort to force and the application of economic sanctions extended to all fields. Any other measures will be an obvious failure. Otherwise the total blame will, as heretofore, lie with the Government of the administering Power.

92. From the colonial war in 1776 in America to the most recent events in Anguilla in 1969, the United Kingdom has always resorted to military force to stifle from the outset the nationalist movements that might have harmed its interests but in the case of Rhodesia the British Government has servilely bowed to the teachings of an adventurer whose mission was to go backwards, to wander around and to exploit the diamond mines—Cecil Rhodes, whose style and credulity are fitting only for a professional miner. I quote him: "I have decided that there must be a legislation of classes. . . . We must be their master. . . . The native must be treated like a child. . . . That is my policy, and that will be the policy of South Africa." That statement was made in 1887 by Cecil Rhodes speaking in the Parliament at Cape Town.

93. Very often the best is the enemy of the good. When the Wilson Government pretended to try to force Ian Smith to restore power to the rightful owners, the Africans, it came up against the resistance of certain British circles. Among them were those circles that are directly or indirectly connected with the idolaters of *apartheid* in Rhodesia: the business circles and particularly the great British magnates that possess colossal investments in Rhodesia, and also a few isolated groups of officers in the Army.

94. A short-sighted policy is satisfied with make-shift measures. It would not be surprising if by acceding to the urgings of those circles, the Labour Government was not boasting of having hit on a master-stroke. But such a political sleight-of-hand worked in Great Britain, since it silenced those who advocated the monstrous cause of Ian Smith. In acting thus, the Labour Party clung to power thanks to the credulity of some and the complacency of others. How could this Party overcome all the attacks levelled against it by British partisans of coercive measures in order to lead the Rhodesian colony back to the metropolitan flag first so that it might be led to independence later? What mysterious and magic power do the present leaders of Great Britain use to disarm the justified condemnation and defy the repeated appeals of a certain liberal press which in that country has constantly anathematized the cowardly capitulation of the Government in power to a handful of settlers allowing them to do what they want with impunity in spite of the authority of the administering Power?

95. It is obvious that the British Prime Minister has chosen the road of political opportunism rather than that of the most elementary justice. Since the ma-

⁴ Quoted in English by the speaker; extract from the book by John Cohen. *Africa Addio* (New York, Ballantine Books, 1966), p. 209.

oeuvre assures the Labour Party its political longevity, its leaders will exploit it to the full, even if, when all is said and done, it has to act as though unaware that the flood that will follow will sweep away its Rhodesian pupils.

96. The duplicity which served the British Government as a weapon will be unmasked by the bewitched citizens of Great Britain, when the Zimbabwe people, that have been so provoked and reduced to the condition of animals, rise as one man against tyranny. That event will undoubtedly force certain British circles that now conspire against the Africans in Zimbabwe to turn about completely and hold their Government responsible for the losses in human lives on the part of the settlers, their present protégés, and the material losses for which the same mentors of Ian Smith are willing to sacrifice human freedom and human aspirations of the most fundamental nature among the Africans.

97. African magnanimity will guarantee the fate of the handful of whites in Rhodesia. The consciences of the settlers, overburdened by the horrors they have perpetrated, make them fear reprisals from the African population they have exploited and terrorized, and fills them quite justifiably with fear at the thought of the blacks coming to power. It is true that the criminal acts they have committed have earned tyrants the noose, but the sublimity of the African civilization and culture is above the practice of "an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth". This fact has been illustrated by many examples. I shall merely refer to the cases of the British landowners of the Highlands of Kenya and of the planters in Tanzania and Uganda. If the persons and the property of the foreign settlers were safeguarded and respected elsewhere, there is no reason why they should be treated differently in Rhodesia.

98. This absence of vindictiveness on the part of the African peoples, far from being a weakness, is an obvious proof of moral force and attests to their human nobility. The desire to ensure perfect harmony in multi-racial societies explains this atmosphere of fraternity which Africa has committed itself to create for the Europeans.

99. Mr. Michel Micombero's message to Africa and the world on the eve of the year 1970 proves with what care His Excellency asserts himself as a champion of the safeguarding of harmonious coexistence among multiracial communities. The Head of State of Burundi stated at that time:

"It is the racist and inhuman régime of *apartheid* that is the shame of our continent and of the civilized world. Let the populations of that part of Africa know that our hopes for success accompany them in their struggle for the total liberation of their territory, and let the disquiet of the whites who wish to live in a multi-racial and fraternal society in an independent southern Africa be set at rest, for we reject and condemn reverse racism."

100. In the end, racism is only a degradation of the person who practises it. It would therefore be incon-

ceivable for the Africans to lower themselves to practise an evil they have stigmatized.

101. Once this double premise has been established, the doctrine of co-operation between the one-time metropolitan country and Africa, on the one hand, and the repudiation by the African peoples of racism against the grain on the other, there can be no doubt whatsoever regarding the future of the white settlers in the case of a majority government's being established in Zimbabwe.

102. Doubtless, the pioneers of racism in that country that attach all power to the pigmentation of the skin can ill conceive of the aims of the liberation movements, but all misunderstanding must be eliminated.

103. The Security Council and the world, in the light of the facts I have mentioned, are well able to deal with the question which the delegation of Burundi must obviously ask: is it not a fact that the animal instinct forces the animal to escape from human beings and to devour the latter when they come close to that savage beast? The misanthropy of the Rhodesian settlers is in no way different from animal behaviour since they themselves have banished themselves from human society. If one of their peers approaches them, his audacity will earn him tyrannical treatment or even a lynching—without any further trial. Therefore, we are led to ask whether the Africans who do not feel xenophobia can pretend to be less civil than the Rhodesian settlers, whose proven barbarism and cruelty go beyond those of savage animals.

104. Is it not time for the Rhodesian settlers to give up their crassly naïve belief that the oppressed people ardently desire to adopt a white identity and to assume a white personality as their sole aim?

105. The black African from one end of the continent to the other is fully aware of his own complete identity and personality, and is in no way second to his peer, the white. Therefore, it would be most naïve and gullible to believe that the fighters for freedom are undertaking a frantic quest to gain the skin of the white, when the true end of the struggle can only be to reconquer their right to life, to independence, and to property.

106. The subterfuges of the British Government have reached such a point that the Security Council, without undermining its own authority, can no longer allow London eternally to shirk its responsibilities as administering Power and to resign itself to the greed of the settlers, drunk with their impunity.

107. The Council, whose patience has reached an end, must ask London Cicero's question to Catilina: "*Quousque tandem, Catilina, abutere patientia nostra?*"—"How long will you abuse our patience, Catiline?"

108. The latest event in Salisbury, then, is the last phase of a lengthy process and a long-range conspiracy intended to create in southern Africa a seed-bed of

Hitlerian disciples. The contradiction is made obvious by what I have said. Only the genius of the Labour Government can conciliate its official excuses and the facts I have set before you. And yet, the unchallengeable accuracy of what I have said proves that London has instigated the entire and gradual usurpation by the white settlers at the expense of the black Africans.

109. Since the present behaviour of the United Kingdom regarding Rhodesia is in revolting contradiction with the acts it performed in similar circumstances, or even in perfectly harmless circumstances in the past, and defies traditional logic, the Security Council therefore must itself turn to the subtlety of the political technique of the Labour Party and Labour Government.

110. After the interminable delays that Great Britain has been able to obtain, the time has now come for it to cross the Rubicon, to face its obligations and do honour to the power it holds. In fact, at present the metropolitan area enjoys the favour of the world community, which has done all in its power to assist the United Kingdom to take courage and redress the inhuman fate being suffered by 5 million Africans of Zimbabwe. However, if the metropolitan Power finally refuses to perform its duty, Africa will invite it to assume the formal and solemn engagement and commitment: first, to abstain from intervening in any way on the side of the white settlers when the inevitable confrontation between them and the Zimbabwe people takes place in the latter's endeavour to achieve final liberation. That fatal encounter will enable us to gauge the unbeatable strength of the usurping settlers when left to themselves—without British assistance. That bloody encounter fits in to the prophecy of Lord Alport, one-time representative of the United Kingdom in Salisbury, who, according to *The New York Times* of 8 March, said: "They will only be able to achieve their legitimate expectations as a result of a resort to force."⁵ Secondly, to supply the Africans with all military means, including anything that may be necessary to overcome the pretended inability of the United Kingdom to overthrow the colonial oligarchy and thus prove that the rebellion would have collapsed without resistance had Britain been determined to put an end to it.

111. Now I must very briefly quote Mr. Alexander Gabriel, the representative of Trans-Radio News Agency, who said:

"If the British Government had been in as big a hurry to act against the rebel régime in Rhodesia as it was to call a premature meeting of the Security Council, this seven-year-old problem would disappear in seven hours, or the time it would take for a paratroop landing to oust the Smith usurpers from their lair in Government House in Salisbury."⁵

112. Arguments were advanced that the strength of the rebels and their power were such that the United Kingdom's own forces were unable to confront them

and put down the rebellion so that this twofold commitment will show up the true resolution of the Labour Government, to fulfil the obligations inherent in its position as the administering Power.

113. I must end by recalling to the United Kingdom that to govern means to foresee. In other words, to govern, one must foresee and foresee accurately.

114. I apologize for the length of my statement, which I felt necessary because of the gravity of the matter we are discussing.

115. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Spanish*): I invite the representative of India to take a seat at the Council table and to make his statement.

116. Mr. SEN (India): Mr. President, I must thank you and the representatives on the Council for permitting me to take part in this important debate under rule 37 of the provisional rules of procedure of the Council. In associating myself with all the compliments which have been paid to your country and to you personally as President of the Council this month, I cannot but recall a previous occasion—on 24 June 1969—when another distinguished son of your continent, Ambassador Solano Lopez of Paraguay, presided over the Council. On that occasion Rhodesia was also being discussed and once again a forward-looking draft resolution, submitted by the delegations of Algeria, Nepal, Pakistan, Senegal and Zambia,⁶ was defeated by the abstention of seven members. We would hope that on the present occasion and under your Presidency the Council will take substantial action on a problem which has brought so much misery to many of our fellow human beings and which has quite rightly brought forth the frustrated anguish of the whole continent of Africa.

117. It is a measure of that concern and of the fear of worse things to come—unless of course the international community takes united and timely action—that has made the Organization of African Unity act in concert and give us its views of what should be done. The Council of Ministers of the Organization of African Unity met at Algiers from 4 to 12 December 1968 and adopted a resolution on the question of Southern Rhodesia. Earlier, in 1966, this Council itself had determined that the situation in Southern Rhodesia constituted a threat to international peace, and at the beginning of this month the OAU again adopted a resolution outlining a course of action to be pursued.

118. The pattern that emerges from the debate on this subject both here and elsewhere is that there has been no lack of warning, no short-sightedness of the shape of things to come and certainly no wishful thinking that by shutting our eyes to the looming threat we will avoid it. What has been lacking is the will to act by those who can, or at least claim that they can, act. What is lacking is the determination to strike at evil and the perpetrators of evil in time. There is

⁵ Quoted in English by the speaker.

⁶ *Official Records of the Security Council, Twenty-fourth Year, Supplement for April, May and June 1969, document S/9270/Rev.1.*

a degree of insensitivity, bordering on callousness, of the wrongs the Africans, the Asians and the other coloured peoples have suffered in the past, of what their feelings are at present, and of the fact that if we continue in this downward course, we shall be laying the foundations of race conflict and of wars. I presume that it is in our interest to avoid these.

119. It is in that context that my delegation would like to pay a special tribute to the Foreign Minister of Zambia for the moving impression he created of the thoughts and feelings of Africa and for the clear statement of his mission as the emissary of the Organization of African Unity [1531st meeting]. We salute him for this and express our gratitude to him and to the OAU for leaving us in no doubt of the explosive nature of this problem. He had the courage to ask what the reaction in different quarters would be if the role of the blacks and the whites in Africa were reversed. I do not know if he will get an answer, but I should like to think that when the problems of peace and security are at the same time shot through with racial problems, the Olympians direct their thunder in a very strange but not unpredictable way.

120. One of the dissatisfactions which a delegation like mine experiences in debates of this nature is that while we are always ready to express our deep concern, we are at the same time aware that a considerable amount of energy is being spent in talking. We should be acting instead.

121. The measure of our concern has been repeatedly indicated in this Council, but I hope I will be forgiven if I quote the statement made by my Prime Minister on 4 March of this year—that is, soon after we heard about the latest but not unexpected feat of Mr. Ian Smith. Mrs. Gandhi said:

“The Government of India considers the decision of the breakaway régime to declare itself a republic totally illegal. The Government will continue to support the measures taken by the world community and by the African States against the racist régime. We maintain our firm belief that any constitution for this colonial territory must ensure the principle of ‘one man one vote’ in a multiracial society. We also hold the view that world action should be concerted with a view to taking effective steps leading Rhodesia towards independence, based on the principle of no independence before majority African rule.”

122. The Indian Deputy Minister for External Affairs expressed the hope that the so-called republic would not be recognized by any civilized nation in the world and that all States which continue to maintain diplomatic, consular, economic and military connexions with Rhodesia would immediately sever such connexions. He added:

“In line with our policy on this subject, we shall continue to support any proposals that may be put forth in the United Nations and outside for establishing majority rule in Zimbabwe on the basis of ‘one man one vote’. I am sure the House will join me

in conveying our tribute, sympathy and support to the patriots of Zimbabwe in their just struggle against the illegal racist régime of Salisbury for their inalienable right to freedom.”

123. Time and again over the last few years the Government of India has expressed concern at the highest level over developments in Rhodesia. India severed trade and other relations with the illegal régime in Salisbury six months before the unilateral declaration of independence and has ever since continued to exercise its unequivocal support for the initiatives of the African countries to bring freedom and justice to the people of Rhodesia. Similarly, we have cut off all connexions with South Africa and Portugal. I dare say that this might have meant a little loss of money and perhaps a little loss of power to influence friends, but I am sure that no Indian would regret those losses.

124. The problem of Rhodesia has many aspects, and I should like to refer to some of them. As a colonial Territory, Rhodesia is entitled to independence. The Charter provides for it and the numerous resolutions of the United Nations call for it. Hence, as far as the United Nations is concerned, we should in normal circumstances welcome the independence of any colonial Territory. If such independence cannot be arranged in a peaceful manner, we would even welcome rebellion to achieve it. It is thus not the mere act of rebellion for seeking independence that should cause us any concern. What does, however, make the acts of Mr. Ian Smith reprehensible and susceptible of international action is that he is not supporting the independence of the people of Rhodesia. He is simply establishing a racist, Fascist, colonialist régime in the heart of Africa and at the cost of the people of Rhodesia. He treats them hardly better than savages and exploits them shamefully and shamelessly for the benefit of his white cronies.

125. He violates the Charter again and again and throws to the wind all that we have said in General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) on granting independence to colonial countries and peoples. In the process he threatens international peace, violates the honour and dignity of the African, oppresses men, women and children simply because they happen to be black and finally steals their land, deprives them of their resources and condemns them to perpetual slavery, degradation and endless and intolerable humiliations. In this design he is actively assisted and encouraged by South Africa and Portugal and draws solace and sustenance from other quarters which, let us say in all charity, are unsuspecting and unconscious.

126. If Ian Smith is a rebel to the British Crown, it is indeed for the British Government to decide how it should deal with him. It is not my contention that the Indian delegation is entitled to talk about how the British Government should treat its rebels, or what kind of government Britain should have. If the British wish to decide to negotiate with him, wine and dine with him, that is their affair. If they wish to punish him—and some startling evidence of how the British

have sometimes treated their rebels and traitors can be made readily available—that again is their business. What, however, the international community can expect and demand from the British Government is that it fulfil its obligations to the Charter in ensuring that Southern Rhodesia becomes independent “in accordance with their freely expressed will and desire, without any distinction as to race, creed or colour, in order to enable them to enjoy complete independence and freedom.” These words are contained in General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV).

127. Now, we are told that force cannot be used against one’s kith and kin. I am not British; I am only an Indian. But if I were, I doubt if I would be proud of such kith and kin. It might be noble, of course, not to look down on your depraved relatives, but should this nobility be carried to the point of tolerating criminals or worse?

128. Apart from this, force has been freely used against kith and kin. It was used in a massive form in the last quarter of the eighteenth century; it was used in Ireland, and, if we go further back in history, in numerous other instances. Need I refer to what happened during the Second World War when various nations found themselves divided? Need I mention the different types of force used against settlers and the like? However, Britain is a sovereign country, a permanent member of the Security Council, with special responsibility under the Charter, and if it does not wish to use force no one can compel it to do so. But whether it wishes to use force or not, force is being used in Rhodesia against the Africans. If there is no solution, the conflagration will spread. That is a sad thought.

129. Britain also claims to be responsible for the Territory, but disclaims all responsibilities. No British administrator has been in the Territory for scores of years. No British soldiers or policemen have been sent to Rhodesia within living memory. The British writ does not run in that Territory; and after many years of refusal to supply information under Article 73 *e* of the Charter, Britain only recently indicated that it could not oblige as it had no facilities.

130. One wonders why Britain claims to be responsible for Southern Rhodesia without any responsibilities. Is it because the Security Council can then take no action without British concurrence? Such a theory would have something to do with the use of the veto in certain situations.

131. However many curious things happen none the less. This morning Reuters reported that the Queen Mother has ceased to be a patron of the University College at Salisbury. Why did we have to wait all this time? The British delegation has been pressing for non-recognition of the Salisbury régime for the last few days. Yet the total boycott of consular, diplomatic and other relations with Southern Rhodesia was decided upon by the Council many years ago. Why were the exequaturs of the consuls and so on in Rhodesia, a British Territory, not cancelled or withdrawn by the British Government?

132. In this connexion I should like to express our appreciation to the United States, France and many other countries which have recently withdrawn their consuls or have decided to do so. It is a very small step, but in this situation every little thing helps, and we do express publicly our appreciation of the steps taken.

133. Is it now the fear that, with the declaration of the Republic, if friends like South Africa and Portugal establish diplomatic relations with Southern Rhodesia, the theory that it is a British Territory will suffer a setback? Or perhaps it is the hope that with the type of resolution the United Kingdom would wish the Council to adopt, South Africa, Portugal and maybe a few others of the same ilk would be dissuaded from establishing relations with Rhodesia.

134. I cannot imagine that, except for those countries, any other State would be interested in recognizing Southern Rhodesia. We are told that recognition is what Rhodesia wants most. It seems to us that Rhodesia is doing very well as it is and perhaps recognition is what the United Kingdom wishes to avoid most. For that indeed would subvert all ideas of the United Kingdom being responsible for that area.

135. There are many legal implications of this theory of the United Kingdom being the administering Power, although it administers nothing. I would touch upon only one or two. Presumably over the years the United Kingdom has extended several international conventions, instruments, and so on, to Rhodesia. What happens to those instruments and the United Kingdom’s responsibilities towards them? Were the frequencies of the International Telecommunication Union, for instance, allotted to Britain inclusive or exclusive of Rhodesia? What would happen if one of the neighbouring States of Southern Rhodesia were involved in armed conflict with Southern Rhodesia? Would the British Crown automatically be involved in a war with these African countries because one of the British colonies had been attacked, or in the reverse, that that colony had attacked one of the African countries? Many other questions of that type come to mind and at one stage or other it may be necessary to study and analyse them.

136. Previous speakers have already referred to the failure of sanctions, to the international financial backing which the Rhodesians receive from many sources, and to the way in which the connivance and collusion among Rhodesia, South Africa and Portugal have reduced all action by the United Nations almost to a farce. I shall not therefore deal with them. It may, however, be pertinent to find out how much South African gold has recently entered the international money markets, including such purchase of that gold by the International Monetary Fund.

137. I thought that I should make some of those points—but not in the hope of action by the United Kingdom and much less by South Africa and Portugal. My only intention is to make it as clear as I can that

no progress towards the solution of this problem has been made and to indicate that if the Council cannot take timely and suitable action we in India would perfectly understand and appreciate such action as the African countries may themselves take. Our sympathies will always be with the freedom-fighters of Zimbabwe and we wish them all success; but it is perhaps not too late yet. The draft resolution submitted by the African and Asian members of the Council may still provide a way out. Will the Council approve it? Let us see. If, however, the useful suggestions made by the Ambassador of Finland can produce unanimous and positive results, my delegation will support all such efforts.

138. Mr. NKAMA (Zambia): Mr. President, thank you for calling on me for the third time now. After listening to the remarks which have been made by our friend and colleague, Ambassador Charles Yost of the United States of America, whom I am sure we all hold in very high esteem, I am compelled to make a few observations.

139. First of all, I want very sincerely to thank Ambassador Yost for the remarks to which I have just referred. We listened to those remarks very carefully and attentively. At this stage I think I must breathe a sigh of relief at the assurance of Ambassador Yost that his Government does not intend to recognize the illegal minority racist régime of Salisbury.

140. Be that as it may, I must express dismay and amazement at the rigid and indifferent attitude of the United States to the explosive situation now obtaining in Rhodesia in particular, and in southern Africa generally. We do not agree that if the Council adopted the measures contained in the draft resolution sponsored by the Afro-Asian members of the Security Council [S/9696 and Corr.1 and 2], the capacity of the United Nations would be, as Ambassador Yost put it, over-extended. In our opinion, what would over-extend the United Nations and, in particular, this organ of the United Nations would be inaction and naivety on the part of this Organization, and not the suggestions contained in the Afro-Asian draft resolution.

141. Ambassador Yost went on to argue that the measures proposed in the Afro-Asian draft resolution would further aggravate the already complicated situation in southern Africa. That is not accurate. What is now aggravating the situation in Southern Rhodesia is the connivance of this Organization and, in particular, of some Member States of the Organization in the grave situation in that region. It is this covert and, in certain cases, overt support which Smith enjoys that has enabled him to commit heinous crimes against the indigenous black population of Zimbabwe. It is the West and especially those in the West that have special responsibilities in the maintenance of international peace and security which, to say the least, have enabled Smith and his collaborators to proclaim a bogus republic in Rhodesia.

142. Ambassador Yost even went on to state that an extension of sanctions against Smith, which would

include communications, would only serve to harden the attitudes of the whites in Rhodesia. We do not share that view at all. The sanctions that we proposed in our draft resolution are really aimed at averting a bloody holocaust in Rhodesia and, indeed, in the whole of southern Africa. We cannot expect the people of Zimbabwe to sit idly by while Smith and his fellow rebels commit grave crimes against them. The truth in Rhodesia is that whether or not the people of Zimbabwe resist Smith's aggression and repression, Smith's gangster army is always there to intimidate and even maltreat and kill them. What choice is there for the oppressed people of Zimbabwe? What choice do they have? They have no honourable choice but to resist and to struggle for their rights.

143. The other day I borrowed from the rich Arabic language, and I think today it is fitting that I should borrow from yet another rich language, Russian, which says: "You drink, you die; you do not drink, you die; so better drink." That could be applied to the people of Zimbabwe. They are essentially people of peace, but Smith has imposed violence on them and they are now preparing themselves for a protracted struggle or conflict.

144. We have no doubt in our mind that if the United States of America and Britain and their allies had been realistic and had initiated firm and honest action against the rebels in Rhodesia, we could have achieved spectacular results by now. But up to now the United States has been treading in Britain's footsteps and echoing almost everything London has been saying. At least we can understand Britain's attitude towards the crisis in Rhodesia, but we cannot really understand the behaviour of the United States in colonial matters and matters that pertain to justice and democracy, because the United States itself had to struggle for its own independence and freedom. We say to the United States: the people of Zimbabwe are imbued with the same values and principles as those which prompted the brave Americans to fight for their rights, a fight which culminated in their victory in 1776.

145. As I said the other day, the people of Zimbabwe are not asking for something which does not belong to them as a right. No. Far from it. The people of Africa expect the United States of America to be more realistic and to urge the United Kingdom to be honest so that it can shoulder its responsibilities in Rhodesia.

146. I cannot understand the logic or the reasoning of some delegations here. They tell us that wider sanctions might aggravate the situation in Rhodesia; and yet they are the same people, the same countries, that have taught others how to use arms and how to resort to violence—the very same. The fact is that we are not even asking the United Kingdom to use violence, but simply to take police action to remove the illegal Smith régime, as Southern Rhodesia is, legally speaking, an integral part of the United Kingdom. It is as if there was a revolt in any other part of the United Kingdom. In such a case I do not think that the United Kingdom would wait for a Security Council

resolution. The London Government would act in defence of its territorial integrity. That is all we are asking the British Government to do in the case of Rhodesia, just that and no more.

147. Now let me come back to the United States position. Let me, of course, say quite frankly that we welcome the decision by a number of countries, including the United States of America, to withdraw their consulates from Salisbury. But we hope that, as Ambassador Malik of the Soviet Union said yesterday [1532nd meeting], the withdrawal of consulates from Salisbury will not be regarded as an end in itself, but rather as a means that will enable those countries, and indeed all of us, to take wider measures to ensure the total success of our policies in Zimbabwe. To that effect we would like to appeal to the United States to tighten its sinews and to stop the continued purchase of Rhodesian chrome. That is our first request. We appeal to the United States Government to take steps to stop the purchase of chrome from Rhodesia. The second request is equally mild. Now that the United States has closed its consulate in Salisbury, it should consider the closure of Smith's tourist office in this country. It is indeed amazing, to say the very least, that the rebels of Rhodesia should maintain and operate a tourist office in the United States of America. We appeal to the United States to reconsider its position in this matter.

148. Another of our requests is this. We call on the United States to prevent the production and dissemination of propaganda pamphlets by Smith's agents in this country. This is a tremendous stigma on the character of the United States. We appeal to that Government to stop the production of these pamphlets.

149. We appeal to the United States of America to stop playing the role of a follower of the United Kingdom and to assume a positive posture that will enable the international community to take such steps as will topple the Smith régime in Salisbury. I want to tell Ambassador Yost in all sincerity and honesty—and I believe I told Lord Caradon this just the other day—that we should all realize that United States national interests will be better served under a popular government in Salisbury than under an unpopular régime whose lifespan leaves a lot to be desired and whose stability is non-existent. I do not have to say that the existence of Smith depends on bayonets.

150. We have been told that the use of force in Rhodesia is out. The United Kingdom, which is the administering Power, has said this very often, using a number of alibis or excuses such as difficulties in logistics and the long distances involved—the distance, that is, from London to Rhodesia. Of course, last year I said in Lusaka that, although I had perhaps forgotten a bit of geography, the distance from London to Anguilla seemed to me to be longer than the distance from London to Rhodesia. At one time they were even alluding to their economic problems. These days, however, they do not allude to those problems because, as we all know, the Treasury in London released figures

just the other day—only four or five days ago, I think—saying that Britain's trade surplus stands at £300 million and will very soon stand at £450 million

151. Now then, looking at the Afro-Asian draft resolution, we see that it is a compromise draft, because we do not even call in it for the use of force. We know that the measures we propose in our draft resolution cannot and will not topple the Smith régime, but we believe that they will go a long way towards tightening our present sanction system.

152. I thought I should make those remarks. I hope that Ambassador Yost and his delegation will take into consideration the comments I have just made seriously and in all sincerity.

153. Mr. BUFFUM (United States of America): I shall be very brief indeed. Naturally, we shall wish to give very careful consideration to the remarks we have just heard from the distinguished Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of Zambia. I should like to say, however, by way of introducing this very brief comment that the one thing that pleased me most about his intervention was that all of his remarks reflect—and indeed it is an accurate reflection—the point that we do share, both of us, a very common objective in dealing with the problem of Southern Rhodesia. If I may say so, it emerges equally clearly that where we differ is with regard to the means of achieving that objective; and I think it is very frequently on such differences of tactics and methods that friends can honestly disagree. I do appreciate the spirit in which he made his remarks, and we shall study them in exactly the same spirit.

154. There is only one specific matter on which I should like to comment at this point, and I should like to reserve our right, if I may, to intervene at a later stage with regard to the other questions that he has raised, some of which we shall need to study. He did, in his comments with regard to the purchase of the chrome, imply that the United States is in fact still purchasing chrome in Southern Rhodesia. I can assure him and the members of the Council categorically that that is not the case. In fact, just the contrary is true. As a result of our prohibition on the importation of chrome from Southern Rhodesia it has been necessary for us to secure alternative sources in other countries, often at considerable extra expense and difficulty and in many instances in a less satisfactory manner and with a loss of quality. Nevertheless, we do abide scrupulously by the sanctions imposed by this Council. We do so willingly and whole-heartedly.

155. Just to make quite sure that that point is fully understood in all of its ramifications, I should like to add that chrome arriving in the United States from any source in southern Africa is carefully tested. We have through a consistent and stringent checking system of this kind determined that there has been no disguised Rhodesian chrome entering this country. I should like to submit that information as a partial reply to the remarks of the Minister this afternoon.

156. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Spanish*): Consultations have taken place regarding the possible date of our next meeting. There is some feeling that an understanding is approaching between the opposing sides in the search for a consensus. It appears preferable to schedule the next meeting for Tuesday at 3 p.m. to allow for consultations between Governments and, particularly, for the possibility of an understanding such as that suggested by the representative of Finland. Therefore, since there are no objections,

the next meeting of the Council will be held on Tuesday afternoon at 3 o'clock sharp.

157. Before we adjourn, I wish to thank the representatives of the United States, Yugoslavia, Finland, Burundi and India for the very kind references that they have made both to my country and to me in respect of our assumption of the Presidency of the Security Council for the month of March.

The meeting rose at 6.05 p.m.