



SECURITY COUNCIL OFFICIAL RECORDS

TWENTY-FIFTH YEAR

1531st MEETING: 11 MARCH 1970

NEW YORK

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NOTE

Symbols of United Nations documents are composed of capital letters combined with figures. Mention of such a symbol indicates a reference to a United Nations document.

Documents of the Security Council (symbol S/ . . .) are normally published in quarterly *Supplements* of the *Official Records of the Security Council*. The date of the document indicates the supplement in which it appears or in which information about it is given.

The resolutions of the Security Council, numbered in accordance with a system adopted in 1964, are published in yearly volumes of *Resolutions and Decisions of the Security Council*. The new system, which has been applied retroactively to resolutions adopted before 1 January 1965, became fully operative on that date.

FIFTEEN HUNDRED AND THIRTY-FIRST MEETING

Held in New York on Wednesday, 11 March 1970, at 3 p.m.

President: Mr. Joaquín VALLEJO ARBELAEZ
(Colombia).

Present: The representatives of the following States: Burundi, China, Colombia, Finland, France, Nepal, Nicaragua, Poland, Sierra Leone, Spain, Syria, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America and Zambia.

Provisional agenda (S/Agenda/1531/Rev.1)

1. Adoption of the agenda.
2. Question concerning the situation in Southern Rhodesia:

Letter dated 3 March 1970 from the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/9675);

Letter dated 6 March 1970 addressed to the President of the Security Council by the representatives of Algeria, Botswana, Burundi, Cameroon, the Central African Republic, Chad, the Congo (Democratic Republic of), Dahomey, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea, the Ivory Coast, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Morocco, the Niger, Nigeria, the People's Republic of the Congo, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, the Sudan, Swaziland, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, the United Arab Republic, the United Republic of Tanzania, the Upper Volta and Zambia (S/9682).

Adoption of the agenda

The agenda was adopted.

Question concerning the situation in Southern Rhodesia

Letter dated 3 March 1970 from the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/9675);

Letter dated 6 March 1970 addressed to the President of the Security Council by the representatives of Algeria, Botswana, Burundi, Cameroon, the Central African Republic, Chad, the Congo

(Democratic Republic of), Dahomey, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea, the Ivory Coast, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Morocco, the Niger, Nigeria, the People's Republic of the Congo, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, the Sudan, Swaziland, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, the United Arab Republic, the United Republic of Tanzania, the Upper Volta and Zambia (S/9682).

1. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Spanish*): The representative of Gabon, in a communication dated 10 March 1970, has asked that the name of his country should be added to the list of thirty-eight countries that have signed the letter to the President of the Security Council which is contained in document S/9682.

2. I wish to inform the Council that the representatives of Algeria, Senegal and Pakistan have asked to be allowed to participate in this debate, without the right to vote. These requests appear in documents S/9685, S/9689 and S/9690, respectively. If I hear no objection, I shall invite these representatives to take seats at the Council table.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. N. Harbi (Algeria), Mr. I. Boye (Senegal) and Mr. S. A. Karim (Pakistan) took places at the Security Council table.

3. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Spanish*): The Council will now continue its consideration of the item on the agenda. Before calling on the first speaker on my list, I should like to draw the attention of members to document S/9686, which contains the text of a letter sent to the President of the Security Council by the Chairman of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples.

4. I call now on the first speaker on my list, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Zambia, Mr. Moto Nkama, and I extend to him a very cordial welcome on behalf of the Security Council.

5. Mr. NKAMA (Zambia): Allow me first of all, Mr. President, to thank you for the very warm welcome you have extended to me this afternoon. May I now ask your indulgence and that of your distinguished colleagues so that I may be allowed to thank the Council

for permitting me to participate in this debate? As members are aware, I have come here following a decision of the Council of Ministers of the Organization of African Unity (OAU). Thus, although I am very well aware of the wisdom and skill of my permanent representative, Ambassador Mwaanga, and know how highly he is regarded by you, it has become necessary for me to be here to represent in this debate not only my Government but also, together with my colleagues from Algeria and Senegal, the member States of the OAU.

6. This very decision on the part of the OAU is in itself a measure of the seriousness with which the member Governments of that organization view the deteriorating Rhodesian situation, and, indeed, an indication of their determination to do everything possible to enable the people of Zimbabwe to rid themselves of the oppressive and unconstitutional régime and to attain independence.

7. Allow me also to express my regret at not having been able to be present in this Council when the debate started last Friday, because I should have liked to listen to the characteristically eloquent arguments advanced by the representative of the United Kingdom, Lord Caradon, my previous personal contacts with whom still continue to give me very pleasant memories. Be that as it may, I have, within the last twenty-four hours since I arrived, familiarized myself with the weight of his arguments as contained in the verbatim record of the Council's 1530th meeting. I have also had an opportunity of studying the British draft resolution as amended at the Council's last meeting. As I am aware that all the members, unlike myself, have had the opportunity of listening to his lordship, I do not intend to saddle this Council with a repetition of those arguments. In any case, I think I am right in stating that the theme of them all is what is contained in draft resolution S/9676/Rev. 1. That draft calls for the condemnation of the illegal acts of the racist minority régime in Southern Rhodesia, including the purported assumption of a republican status; and the British representative would wish the Council, in accordance with Article 41 of the Charter, to decide that all Member States of the United Nations should refrain from recognizing the illegal régime or rendering any assistance to it, such action to be taken under Article 2 of the Charter. While I am thrilled at the characteristic eloquence of its arguments, and while I appreciate the desire of the British delegation to propose a draft resolution which is precise, and which urges swift action, I cannot but express, at the same time, my very great disappointment at the extremely limited nature of the kind of action requested of this Council. It is especially disturbing, if I may be permitted to say so, when such extremely inadequate action is requested by none other than the administering Power.

8. The Council will remember the intervention made last Friday [1530th meeting] by Zambia's deputy permanent representative to the United Nations in his capacity as chargé d'affaires *ad interim*. At this stage I shall only endorse his disappointment at the limited goals sought in the British draft. I notice that Lord

Caradon, exercising his right of reply, said that there was much that the Zambian representative had said with which he could readily agree, "particularly with regard to the starting-point of our purposes: to see an end to the illegal régime and to see that the interests of all the people of Rhodesia are given full weight" [ibid., para. 62]. The purpose of my coming here is to find out whether this Council, given that readiness on the part of the British delegation, can now embark on a course of immediate action the purpose of which "is to see an end to the illegal régime and to see that the interests of all the people of Rhodesia are given full weight".

9. At this stage it may be useful here to go back to 11 November 1965 and see how we have tried to grapple with this problem. A day after the unilateral declaration of the so-called independence of Rhodesia, the Security Council was convened at the request of, among others, the permanent representative of the United Kingdom. Among the many important points made by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of the United Kingdom, Mr. Stewart, were the following:

"A group of persons who were until recently the Government of Southern Rhodesia have purported to make a declaration that Southern Rhodesia is independent of Britain. The British Government regards this as illegal and invalid since only the British Parliament has the right and authority to accord independence to Southern Rhodesia. This illegal act has been performed in the hope and with the intention of establishing a form of government which would ensure that the power to control the future of Southern Rhodesia remains in the hands of a white minority comprising only one-twentieth of the population." [1257th meeting, para. 13.]

The Secretary of State later on in his speech stated:

"Now that this illegal declaration has been made, the only lawful Government of Southern Rhodesia is the Government of the United Kingdom. That Government, however, has no physical presence in Southern Rhodesia and in Southern Rhodesia there is therefore now no rule of law. It is, clearly and unmistakably, a British responsibility to re-establish the rule of law in Southern Rhodesia so that in due time that country may enjoy not the mere name of independence but the full substance of freedom for all its peoples." [Ibid., para. 19.]

10. Representatives are fully acquainted with the rest of that momentous speech. In terms of approach, the Council adopted on 12 November 1965 resolution 216 (1965), the substance of which is more or less the same as that which the United Kingdom is asking for now after four years of continuous jungle law in Rhodesia. Of course, further action was taken on 20 November of the same year, when the Council adopted resolution 217 (1965). It should be remembered that in paragraph 4 of this resolution, the Security Council:

"Calls upon the Government of the United Kingdom to quell this rebellion of the racist minority;" and in paragraphs 7, 8 and 9, it:

"7. *Calls upon* the Government of the United Kingdom, as the working of the Constitution of 1961 has broken down, to take immediate measures in order to allow the people of Southern Rhodesia to determine their own future consistent with the objectives of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV);

"8. *Calls upon* all States to refrain from any action which would assist and encourage the illegal régime and, in particular, to desist from providing it with arms, equipment and military material, and to do their utmost in order to break all economic relations with Southern Rhodesia, including an embargo on oil and petroleum products;

"9. *Calls upon* the Government of the United Kingdom to enforce urgently and with vigour all the measures it has announced, as well as those mentioned in paragraph 8 above."

11. As members of the Council are aware, the Government of the United Kingdom, while accepting its responsibility under the Charter as well as its special responsibility over Rhodesia, did very little, if anything at all, to implement the paragraph 4 which I have quoted. With regard to paragraph 7, the British Government entered into a series of fruitless negotiations, not with the representatives of the people of Zimbabwe—whom up to this moment they still do not recognize—but rather with the very same rebels whom they had condemned before this Council. It may be argued, on the basis of NIBMAR—that is, no independence before majority rule—that the British Government's negotiations with the rebels were not outside the scope of the principles embodied in paragraph 7. Yet it is an open secret that as one set of negotiations after another broke down, the talk in London circles was no longer NIBMAR but rather a "return to legality". It in fact became quite clear that if Ian Smith and his fellow rebels had not been so arrogant and power-hungry, they could quite easily have achieved the objectives they had intended to achieve, merely by accepting the British proposals, dissolving their illegal parliament and returning to the same parliament after an election in which the indigenous African population would have been barred from participating. The 1961 Constitution itself was capable of achieving the same results. For is it conceivable that the United Kingdom Government, which has continued to deal with the rebellion in a very gingerly manner, would have done anything for the oppressed masses if Ian Smith and his clique had agreed to "return to legality"? Nor did the United Kingdom Government pursue with vigour, as it was called upon to do in paragraph 9, all those measures it had announced as well as those mentioned in paragraph 8.

12. Our experience in the last four years has shown that the greatest obstacle to the efforts of the Security Council, and the United Nations as a whole, has come mainly from Portugal and South Africa, countries with which the United Kingdom has very close ties. Portugal is a member of NATO; South Africa has very valuable trade and other relations with the United Kingdom. To our knowledge, those relations have not been in any way affected by the open support those two

countries have offered to the rebels in Rhodesia. Time and again the British delegation, in ruling out the use of force or in opposing sanctions against South Africa and the Portuguese colony of Mozambique, has argued as if the relations they have with Portugal and South Africa are only beneficial to the United Kingdom. We refuse to accept those arguments.

13. Frustrated by that attitude of the United Kingdom and concerned about the co-operation which the rebels were receiving from the Portuguese and the South Africans, the Security Council met again, and on 9 April 1966 adopted resolution 221 (1966). An appeal was made to the Portuguese Government to co-operate with the Security Council, all States were requested to divert any of the vessels believed to be carrying oil destined for Southern Rhodesia through Beira, and in paragraph 5 Britain was called upon "to prevent, by the use of force if necessary, the arrival at Beira of vessels reasonably believed to be carrying oil destined for Southern Rhodesia . . .". The story of the *Joanna V* comes to mind. After that the dust seems to have settled; nor was that surprising, because everybody knew, including the British Government, that Rhodesia would get all its oil requirements through South Africa.

14. After a whole year of side-stepping, the Council made a determined effort in December 1966 to take more drastic steps in accordance with Articles 39 and 41 of the United Nations Charter. Resolution 232 (1966) was therefore adopted on 16 December 1966 within that context. States Members of the United Nations were required to cease forthwith the import of several major products of Rhodesia, and not to permit the promotion of any activities which might lead to the export by Rhodesia of those commodities. This was extended to the shipment or air transportation of Rhodesian products. The sale or shipment of arms, military aircraft, military vehicles, and so forth to Rhodesia was also covered. The aircraft and motor industry was to be hit in the same way.

15. Equally important was the reminder in paragraph 3 that failure or refusal by any Member State to comply with that resolution would constitute a violation of Article 25 of the United Nations Charter. All States were called upon not to render financial or any economic aid to the illegal racist minority régime.

16. It should be remembered that those new efforts were especially spurred on by the subsequent refusal by the rebels to accept the terms negotiated between the British Prime Minister and the rebel leader on *HMS Tiger*. Thus it was that the Hon. George Brown, putting the case for his Government before the Security Council, stated:

"The [*Tiger*] document formed a comprehensive solution, and had it been accepted by Mr. Smith and his colleagues, I would have been reporting a settlement here today which I could have commended to the conscience of the world. Alas, On Monday, 5 December, it was rejected by the Smith régime.

“ . . . The Rhodesian Front régime have shown conclusively that they intend to persist not only in their rebellion but in their defiance of civilized opinion everywhere. In the opinion of my Government, the continuation of the rebellion presents an ever greater challenge to the international community. In these circumstances, there is an urgent need for us to strengthen and fortify our actions internationally to overcome this challenge by the best and most effective means open to us.

“The action of the Rhodesian Front in making the illegal declaration backed by the repressive use of force, followed now by their rejection of this fair and reasonable settlement, has brought in its train the most far-reaching consequences. The dangers to peace and stability in the whole region of central and southern Africa are acute. Even outside Africa stresses are being created between nations by this issue.

“Here we have a small set of reckless men whose actions have provoked and are now serving to prolong a most critical situation, a situation fraught with great and growing danger of interracial strife and bloodshed throughout southern Africa—a danger which it is the duty of every one of us to do his utmost to avert. My Government accordingly believes that this Council cannot permit the situation to deteriorate further. It considers that the combination of circumstances flowing from the initial actions of the Smith régime . . . affects not only the stability and progress of Rhodesia’s immediate neighbours, but also the maintenance of international peace and security. . . .” [1331st meeting, paras. 20-24.]

17. Given that kind of situation the Security Council proceeded to take certain measures under Articles 39 and 41 of the Charter, as I stated earlier; but, unfortunately, as if by deliberate design, the Council was not permitted to take all those measures which were at its disposal under Chapter VII and which were acceptable in a situation the gravity of which was so ably described before the Council by the representative of the administering Power. The programme of so-called selective mandatory sanctions, embarked upon too late in the day and frustrated as it was bound to be by some of Britain’s closest allies, was bound to fail.

18. It was not surprising, therefore, that the Security Council had to return to the same problem in May 1968; and it adopted on 29 May 1968 resolution 253 (1968), the purpose of which was, *inter alia*, to place Rhodesian commodities in the cold storage of Chapter VII of the Charter. The same resolution applied to the question of investment in Rhodesia and the restriction of movement of Rhodesians outside the colony; and a committee of the Security Council, generally known as the Sanctions Committee, was established to assist in the implementation of that resolution.

19. As was the case with previous resolutions, resolution 253 (1968) was again limited in its scope, and it is disappointing to note again that among those who

were against taking drastic measures to bring down the illegal régime was the representative of the administering Power. From the very strong statement of the British representative in 1966 we are made to descend to the apologia of Lord Caradon of 29 May 1968 [1428th meeting], which I quote:

“No one has been expected or asked to abandon well-known national positions. Each one of us no doubt has reservations on some of the provisions included in the resolution. But what we have sought to do and what we have succeeded in doing is to find common ground. And that is our achievement.

“We on our side have from the beginning clearly restated the basic position of the United Kingdom on the use of force and our aim to secure a just settlement by peaceful means. We have moreover restated the reasons why we cannot contemplate an economic confrontation with South Africa.

“ . . . As I have often said, this is a job not for the cavalry but for the sappers. We can hope for no speedy and spectacular victories.”

20. I do not intend to give the impression that this debate should be seen as a conflict of approach or of positions between the Government of the United Kingdom and my Government or the Governments of member States of the Organization of African Unity. On the other hand, I have had no choice but to relate my case in the light of the position of the administering Power. It is because Britain holds the ultimate responsibility over Rhodesia that I have taken the liberty of quoting extensively from British representatives. Members of the Council will agree with me that whenever this Council is asked to take firm measures against the rebel colony of Southern Rhodesia the British delegation has worked tirelessly to frustrate the adoption of those measures, as was the case on 24 June 1969 when a draft resolution presented by Algeria, Nepal, Pakistan, Senegal and Zambia [S/9270/Rev.1] failed to command the support of a majority of the members of the Security Council. On that occasion the British representative urged the Council to limit its consideration of the problem to mere declarations—in other words, merely to condemn the illegal régime, which we all know had been done many times before; merely to deplore the limitation of a referendum to a minority, as if that would change the situation; and, finally, merely to condemn the proposals for a new constitution. Apparently, to the British Government, the continued existence of the illegal régime was of secondary importance; but, of course, when the British representative continually advises the Council that “our progress must be slow”, it is not strange that when he comes with proposals, like the ones now before us on which he asks for swift action, they are of a palliative nature.

21. It was necessary for me to give all these details before I submit the hopes and feelings of the member States of the Organization of African Unity in connexion with my mission. I say “necessary” because we have in the past been accused of being men who believe that solutions will be found by violent speeches or wild gestures. Yet for all the restraint and all the hypoc-

rise of the past—or is it because of it?—we are now faced with a situation more involved and more dangerous, and a régime more arrogantly aggressive and oppressive than was the case in 1965. We have agreed to be persuaded, if not to believe, at least to accept the much advertised efficacy of the sanctions policy. The result has been the strengthening of the rebels' hands. The failure of that policy has been exposed by many qualified observers of the Rhodesian situation. Anyone who has read the trade statistics in Security Council document S/9252/Add.1 of 13 June 1969, for example, will no doubt wonder, if he is a believer in the character of the United Nations, why no action has so far been taken against the "sanctions busters".

22. In his so-called New Year message Ian Smith gave conclusive evidence that the tempo of economic development was increasing—and I quote from *Rhodesian Commentary* of January 1970, a publication which regrettably still finds circulation in the United States: "Our problem will be to control and maintain the balance in the surge of expansion which we anticipate". He boasted of a visible trade balance. While Rhodesia had suffered a deficit in 1968, the current account of its balance of payments in 1969 was in surplus. The 1969 gross domestic product showed a growth of at least 13 per cent to over £440 million. The output in the manufacturing sector had made a significant increase during 1969, while mineral production had achieved "an even more remarkable result"—as Smith claimed. In case there are some who may have thought this was merely a political or propaganda speech on the part of the rebel leader, a recent statement by Mr. Owens, President of the Association of Rhodesia Industries, should dispel such misconceptions. He estimated that industrial production would rise in 1970 by between 11 per cent and 15 per cent, "basing this figure on the number of new industrial projects coming on stream, on the level of capital investment, on the value of plans passed for industrial buildings and on the level of retail sales. . . the value of retail sales rose by 13 per cent in the first nine months of last year compared with the same period of 1968". Mr. Owens sees it as follows: "Over-all I believe that the leading indicators for all sectors of the economy show that we in industry are justified in taking optimistic views of the prospects in 1970, and, of course, a confident view of the particular prospects for industry".

23. All my colleagues who sent me to participate in this debate are justified in concluding that the so-called sanctions policy that this Council has pursued for the past four years has only been a decoy. Is it not time this Council re-examined its so-called biting measures against Rhodesia with a view to taking measures that are likely to bring about the desired result in that country? The representatives of member States of the Organization of African Unity who directed that I, together with my colleagues from Algeria and Senegal, should, with the co-operation of the African Group at the United Nations, raise this matter have a few specific requests to make to this Council. Before I enumerate these requests, I should like to emphasize that they have done so in the hope and belief of seeing

in Rhodesia exactly what has been professed publicly by all members of the Security Council, namely, the removal of the illegal régime, the restoration of law and order and the granting of independence to the Territory on the basis of universal adult suffrage and with a democratic constitution that guarantees freedom to all, irrespective of colour, race or creed.

24. Now, what are the requests that the Organization of African Unity is making to this Council? Simply they are as follows: that the existence of an illegal régime in Rhodesia, under whatever banner, be condemned and no recognition be given to that régime, as it is illegal and undemocratic. In pursuance of that measure, all States should undertake all appropriate measures to ensure that no act will be performed by anybody or any institution whatsoever on behalf of the illegal minority régime in their territories. The Council should decide that all States will, in accordance with Chapter VII, sever immediately all consular, economic, military or any other relations with the illegal racist minority régime. This should include rail, maritime and air transport and postal, telegraphic, radio and any other means of communications. These measures should also be applied by the specialized agencies and United Nations organizations.

25. We feel that the Security Council should reiterate its decision to render moral and material assistance to the national liberation movements of Zimbabwe in order to enable them to attain their freedom and independence.

26. It is our firm conviction that the permanent members of the Security Council have a special obligation to see to it that an end is put to the threat of international peace and security caused by the existence of that illegal régime in Zimbabwe. This does not in any way prejudice our firm conviction that the Government of the United Kingdom has primary responsibility over the Territory of Southern Rhodesia and to that extent that Government should apply all means at its disposal, including the use of force, to put an end to the rebellion and thereafter to embark on a deliberately speedy programme of granting independence to the people of Zimbabwe.

27. We ourselves are satisfied that, whatever this Council may try to do, success can be achieved only if the Governments of Pretoria and Lisbon are made to comply with the decisions of this Council. Indeed, it is our considered opinion that those Governments have held in contempt even those half measures the Security Council has been adopting with a view to resolving the Southern Rhodesian crisis. Therefore we appeal to the Security Council to take appropriate measures within the context of Chapter VII of the Charter to bring those two Members of this Organization into line.

28. I am aware that the Council, in its wisdom, will no doubt wish to take further measures, if it is to escape the condemnation of all mankind, to see to it that all its decisions not only are respected but also achieve the results that should follow from those decisions.

In this particular case we are dealing with a régime that has been condemned from its inception, a régime that has survived on the strength of the bayonet. It has imprisoned, detained and restricted hundreds of thousands of inhabitants whose only fault, if fault it is, has been their desire to be free and to participate actively in the affairs of their country; nor has it shown its ruthlessness only to the indigenous inhabitants of Zimbabwe; it has, like every despotic régime, treated liberal-minded white journalists with the same ruthlessness. It has kicked out no fewer than fifty journalists in its attempt to suppress the freedom of the press. It has refused entry into Rhodesia to no fewer than 400 applicants every year. Religious missionaries have been no exception in this smear campaign. In short, it is a régime that has shown every intolerance to all those opposed to it.

29. Is it surprising that, as we are considering the situation in Zimbabwe, there are valid reports of an uprising dating back to January? I say "to January" only, because while there has always been violent opposition to the rebel régime since 1965, the present one is more militant and on a national scale. The people of that country have now taken up arms against the rebels.

30. At this stage, however, I should not fail to express appreciation of the actions of those Governments that have already begun to implement some of the proposals I made in the course of my speech. We are especially delighted by the fact that a number of countries which continue to have diplomatic or consular relations with Rhodesia have, at long last, decided to close their missions in Salisbury. All we can hope is that the few that still have missions in that country will in the very immediate future close them as well.

31. Members of the Security Council will have heard Smith's warning of punitive and pre-emptive action against Zambia as a result of Zambia's continued support of the decisions of the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity. We take a very serious view of that threat. I must state in no uncertain terms that my Government will hold the Government of the United Kingdom fully responsible for any military attacks on Zambia by the Rhodesian rebel minority régime, acting either alone or in collusion with the South African forces currently based in Rhodesia. Britain still maintains that Rhodesia is a British colony and it must therefore be held fully responsible for the lawlessness of the rebels beyond the borders of their territory.

32. It will be recalled that the merchants of bloodshed and hate in southern Africa have already conducted barbaric military raids against the sister republics of Tanzania, Guinea, Senegal and the Congo (Kinshasa), and indeed my own country. This Council has already vigorously condemned those acts of aggression.

33. For the representatives around this table it might be appropriate for me to conclude my present intervention by quoting the Anglican Bishop of Matabeleland, Rhodesia, the Right Reverend Kenneth Skelton, who

said on 4 March 1970 to the Rhodesian Council of Churches:

"I believe the Church and State in Rhodesia are fundamentally in total disagreement in principle and practice. The two sides have reached a point of no return. The actual clash may be temporarily buffered by concessiveness on the part of the Church and permissiveness on the part of the Government. It is the clear duty of any Council of Christian Churches to consult together about how the Church should face such a situation and how it should react to it. If our nation's rulers pursue a policy which is at variance with our belief in God we have no choice but to resist. It is just not good enough to wring our hands and say we must accept it and try to live with it. Justice is more important than law and order"—I repeat: justice is more important than law and order—"and can sometimes be incompatible with it. Are you going tamely, passively, to accept a Constitution based on fear and a Land Act based on racial segregation, and therefore deny Christ? Are you going to accept this deliberate attempt to silence Christian truth which therefore denies Christ?"

34. My question to the Security Council is a simple one in relation to the rebel régime. To use the words of Bishop Skelton: Is it good enough just to wring your hands and say you must accept it and try to live with it?

35. I thank you very much, Mr. President, for giving me the opportunity of speaking. May I reserve my right to intervene again whenever appropriate?

36. Mr. NICOL (Sierra Leone): Mr. President, my delegation wishes to congratulate you on your assumption of the Presidency of the Security Council this month. You have already shown proof of your excellence as President by the tactful and successful way you carried out the negotiations which have resulted in this meeting and the one held last week. We wish you well during your period of office in what promises to be a busy month. We pledge our co-operation to you in your difficult task. We congratulate Ambassador Terence of Burundi and Ambassador Liu of China for their successful tenures as President in January and February respectively.

37. The representative of Zambia, in asking for an adjournment last Friday [*1530th meeting*] on our behalf, indicated that the present draft resolution of the United Kingdom did not sufficiently cover the feelings of ourselves and our African colleagues on this matter. I should perhaps at the outset say that we have no differences with the British draft resolution as put before this Council [*S/9676/Rev.1*]. We feel, however, that if we accept it as such we shall not be working in the spirit of previous resolutions debated in this Council.

38. The declaration of a republic by the rebel leader, Ian Smith, offers a temptation to certain interests in Britain and to waverers in the international community to put forward feelers towards recognizing the illegal régime. The present British draft resolution may halt

this but does not improve the situation which we feel has deteriorated to a point from which anything, short of forceful action, would appear to be condonation.

39. The question of non-recognition of the Republic is one which must be dealt with firmly and with expedition. The Security Council, in its resolution 217 (1965) of 20 November 1965, called upon all States not to recognize Rhodesia nor to entertain any diplomatic relations with it. We note with pleasure that the United States, Italy, Norway, France and, according to news reports this morning, the Netherlands have all withdrawn their consulates from Southern Rhodesia and therefore still recognize it as a British possession. President Nixon a few weeks ago stated that there was no question of the United States condoning or acquiescing in the racial policies of white-ruled régimes. He has fulfilled his pledge in this instance, and we hope that this has initiated a new era of positive action and firm opposition by the United States towards racial despotism in Africa.

40. My delegation recognizes that although the sanctions called for by Security Council resolution 253 (1968) have had a limited effect, they have still failed to bring down the Salisbury régime. We recognize the sacrifices of many countries like Zambia, Botswana and Britain in this particular aspect of the matter. Yet the connivance of South Africa and Portugal has undermined the effectiveness of sanctions. The Security Council Sanctions Committee, which has still to meet this year, had this to say in its second report of 12 June 1969 about their behaviour:

“On the basis of all the facts at its disposal . . . South Africa and Portugal . . . have continued to maintain close economic, trade and other relations with the illegal régime and to permit the free flow of goods from Southern Rhodesia through the territories of South Africa and the colony of Mozambique and their ports and transport facilities.”
[S/19252, para. 45.]

41. If these two countries have openly and blatantly refused to obey the wishes of this Council, there seems to be no alternative but to impose sanctions on them too, if need be by force, to bring to an end their open defiance of the decision of the Council. This we would strongly urge under Articles 41 and 42 of Chapter VII of the Charter since on a number of occasions—in its resolutions 217 (1965) of 20 November 1965, 232 (1966) of 16 December 1966 and 253 (1968) of 29 May 1968—this Council has recognized that the situation in Southern Rhodesia constitutes a threat to international peace and security.

42. Feelings of hesitancy in using force to bring about changes in southern Africa are understandable. The requests by many countries that this should be done by the United Kingdom to end the rebellion in Rhodesia are made not because of any bloodthirsty feelings on our part, but simply because we feel that a more realistic and objective appraisal of the situation leaves no other alternative. Even the intention to take forceful action or preparation towards it would speedily lead to more complacency from the rebels.

43. That African nations do not use double standards in this matter is shown by the fact that, whatever their individual feelings may have been, they tacitly agreed to the military end of a secession in Nigeria, and Britain assisted legally in this by the supply of arms. The United Kingdom in acting promptly would be using judicial force to halt and correct a situation in which force has already been used by the other side, murderous executions carried out in March 1968 by them and treason committed also by Ian Smith and his colleagues in 1965. No British judge to our knowledge has hesitated to convict and sentence a guilty prisoner who happens to be British on the grounds that they both belong to the same race and nation. Thus we fail to see how the question of kith and kin can halt a judicial process, or diminish an evident responsibility. A handful of British citizens in Southern Rhodesia, comprising one half of one per cent of the total population of Great Britain, have held their nation to moral ransom in the world and have subjected it to a decade of confusion and lamentable compromise. The economic benefits to Britain from Rhodesia are less than that accruing from black African nations which, without any claim to blood relationship, have voluntarily remained within the orbit of the sterling area and the Commonwealth.

44. We would strongly urge Britain to reconsider its position in this matter, particularly as it is quite evident that it is so much out of step with many other nations.

45. Military considerations cannot hold back a nation which has remained unconquered for over a century from disciplining a small minority, amounting to less than a London suburb in size, which has refused to obey the laws of common decency and international democratic behaviour.

46. The United States has shown repeatedly in the past decade that white men with strong feelings from its southern areas, at the command of their Government, can use force to control other white men and women from preventing black people from enjoying their rights. The British armed forces do not lack equal discipline and have a longer tradition in this matter because of their longer history in protecting oppressed groups. It is better for a controlled force to handle an explosive situation than to leave it to uprisings and guerrilla warfare, which would in the end cause far more bloodshed and disruption. Lord Alport, a British politician of strong conservative views who has been connected with Rhodesian affairs for almost twenty years and who was High Commissioner to the ill-fated Federation there for a few years, is reported to have predicted that Africans may be able to achieve their legitimate expectations there only as a result of a resort to force. If this is done its abrasive after-effects between the races will be long-lasting and unhappy. This can still be avoided if both Britain and the United Nations act forcefully and promptly.

47. It has been reported that Ian Smith, head of the illegal régime, has scornfully referred to Africans as “savages walking around in skins sixty years ago” and has said that at present they still have a long way to go. He has not denied or withdrawn that remark. It is unfortunate that he should bring up the question

of antecedents in this way, since it is more civilized to praise men for their rapid advance than to stress the lowliness of their origins. My delegation wishes to make two points on this matter since world opinion may begin to believe that the white Southern Rhodesian is the only group fit to govern in that country.

48. Less than a century ago the ancestors of many present-day white Rhodesians were semi-literate agricultural peasants in Europe and elsewhere, semi-naked coal miners and semi-civilized products of the Industrial Revolution. We congratulate their descendants, without any sarcasm, for the affluent position in which they now find themselves on the generous surface of the African continent. Some of them worked hard towards it. Let it be noted, however, that they are not generally recognized as being the defenders of civilization that they imagine and describe themselves to be. We pay a tribute to those of the white population in that country who have shown an outstandingly liberal and cultured outlook. We must note, however, that a distinguished contemporary white British observer who has lived in Southern Rhodesia has described the majority of the white population there as being enslaved by its history, bound by traditional attitudes, and blinded by one of the most powerful of all human lights: the gleam of a large, steady income. Professor Thomas Creighton further described Southern Rhodesia as having been insulated from the political and ethical results of two world wars, though they have served to stimulate the Rhodesian economy. Rhodesia has managed to avoid contact with the liberal and progressive thought of European countries for half a century. He continues:

"A façade composed of all the material appurtenances of the twentieth century conceals antediluvian attitudes and beliefs which appear fragrantly picturesque or pathetically parochial and complacent, according to your viewpoint. It helps to explain how illiberality and emotional thick-headedness have become hallowed national attitudes in Southern Rhodesia."

He continues:

"We have swum, in Rhodesia, into a backwater of the mainstream of social evolution, where a small shoal of fish has been growing in isolation."¹

49. The second point I should like to make concerns Africans in Southern Rhodesia. From my own personal knowledge of that country, I have seen that it is perfectly possible for black and white to live together in harmony and equality and to work towards noble ideals and worth-while goals in the atmosphere of the university and some of the churches. I have also observed, amongst black citizens of Zimbabwe, men and women, many individuals who in other countries to the north, with larger populations and greater wealth than Rhodesia, could quite easily and adequately function as distinguished cabinet ministers, ambassadors and leaders.

¹ T. R. M. Creighton, *The Anatomy of Partnership* (London, Faber and Faber, 1960), p. 31.

50. The views of my delegation are well expressed in the consensus adopted by the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples which, at its 726th meeting on 9 March 1970, stated:

"1. The Special Committee strongly condemns the purported assumption of republican status and other illegal acts by the racist minority régime in Southern Rhodesia. While the Special Committee has no doubt whatsoever about the illegality of these acts, it is gravely concerned at the extraordinarily far-reaching and arbitrary powers which the régime has now arrogated to itself to intensify the oppression of the African majority by the racist minority.

"2. Noting that the recent developments have led to a further worsening of the situation in southern Africa, constituting a dangerous threat to international peace and security, the Special Committee calls upon the Government of the United Kingdom, the administering Power, to take all necessary measures to put an end to that régime and to restore to the people of Zimbabwe their right to self-determination and independence. The Special Committee also calls on all States to co-operate in bringing the rebellion in Southern Rhodesia to an end by complying fully with the relevant resolutions of the Security Council and the General Assembly. Furthermore, having regard to the latest developments, the Special Committee requests all States not to extend recognition to or to entertain diplomatic or other relations with the illegal régime and to refrain from any action which would assist or encourage that régime.

"3. In view of the further aggravation of the situation which has previously been determined by the Security Council to be a threat to international peace and security, it is the feeling of the Special Committee that the Security Council should urgently consider taking further appropriate measures under the Charter to bring the rebellion to an end and to ensure the full implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples." [See S/9686.]

51. My delegation, in conclusion, believes that only firm, swift and forceful action by all concerned can bring about conditions in southern Africa where peace, democracy and stability can be built on lasting foundations.

52. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Spanish*): Speaking on my own behalf, I wish to thank the representative of Sierra Leone for his words of welcome and the congratulations that he extended to me for having co-ordinated these two meetings. I also thank him for his offer of co-operation during the rest of the month of March. May I say to him that any success I may have had is due to the co-operation of all the members of the Security Council?

53. The next speaker on my list is the representative of Algeria on whom I now call.

54. Mr. HARBI (Algeria) (*interpretation from French*): Mr. President, first of all on behalf of my delegation I should like to convey to you my warm congratulations on your acceding to the important functions of President of the Security Council for the month of March and to thank you and all the members of the Council for having been good enough to allow us to participate in your deliberations on the important question of Southern Rhodesia.

55. My delegation is particularly grateful to you because, like the other African delegations that have participated in this debate, we consider it necessary to examine the question of Rhodesia in detail.

56. In addition, before expressing my delegation's preliminary views, I should also like to congratulate your predecessor in the post of President, Ambassador Terence of Burundi, for his enlightened and wise action.

57. The proclamation of an alleged republic by the Rhodesian racists is not of importance in itself. It is the outcome of the logical evolution of Mr. Smith's policies, a supplementary stage towards the consolidation of *apartheid*.

58. The news of that proclamation, therefore, could not come as a surprise which would justify the calculated haste of the administering Power not to act effectively, but simply to add one more condemnation which, when all is said and done, is both illusory and ineffective, to the already lengthy list of condemnations adopted in the past by the Security Council and by various other organs of the United Nations as well. To tell the list of these condemnations like the beads of a rosary may prove a source of moral satisfaction both for the administering Power and for the United Nations, but it serves only to delay the true solution of the problem.

59. Obviously such an attitude will change nothing with respect to the fate of the Zimbabwe people, and it is ill advised on the part of the administering Power to link the urgency of convening the Security Council into session solely to the issue of the unilateral proclamation of an alleged republic. In this case what is urgent is the application of methods likely to put an end to the extension and consolidation of *apartheid*, to the domination of the majority by the minority, in a country which because of its peculiar distinguishing characteristics and its civilization has never ceased to be an African country.

60. It is this sense of urgency which is reflected in document S/9682, in which the African countries call upon the Security Council in the light of its responsibilities to take all necessary steps to safeguard the inalienable rights of the people of Zimbabwe to independence and self-determination.

61. If it is useless now to ask ourselves what is the meaning of the British initiative, on the other hand we cannot fail to express our concern about the way attempts have been made to isolate the problem from

its true context and to deal only with its marginal aspects. To attempt in this way to emphasize the details to the detriment of the over-all picture is in truth tantamount to evading responsibility; this is really the crux of the issue.

62. At the risk of repeating ourselves we should like to reaffirm that the United Kingdom bears the primary responsibility for the fate and future of 4 million Africans and that its passive attitude has made possible the introduction of *apartheid*. Great Britain's refusal to assume its responsibilities—that is to say, to accept the logical and inevitable advancement of the Zimbabwe people—has already led to an explosion which will gradually engulf all of southern Africa.

63. Today we can hardly expect the United Kingdom to use the only means likely to create democratic conditions for the exercise of the right of self-determination by the people of Zimbabwe—and I refer to the use of force.

64. In a statement published recently in Algiers, the representatives of the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) stated:

"ZAPU has never expected or hoped that Great Britain would have recourse to force to overthrow the Smith régime following upon the unilateral declaration of independence in 1965 by the white minority. Our people and our party have understood that the instigator of these reactionary political positions was none other than the British ruling circle, the economic interests of which can be preserved only by the imposition of a fascist-colonial régime in Rhodesia."

65. That statement shows clearly that according to imperialist strategy Rhodesia is to play the role of a protective bulwark for non-African interests, not only in Rhodesia but, above all, in South Africa, and that that self-same device is designed, *inter alia*, to hold back the tide of Africa's legitimate aspirations.

66. It is high time, for that matter, that Africa should question itself seriously about the behaviour of certain countries which offer Africa lavish messages of brotherhood and friendship and, at the same time, continue to arm and fortify Africa's adversary.

67. The situation in Rhodesia has reached the point of no return and from this point onward any solution which rules out recourse to force no longer seems viable. The Security Council, in recognizing that the situation in Southern Rhodesia constitutes a serious threat to international peace and security, has proclaimed certain measures designed to overthrow the Smith régime. However, experience has shown that these measures are as futile as they are ridiculous, and the results expected quickly vanished as soon as they came into contact with reality. Mr. Smith's régime is not only holding its head up, but it is increasing in arrogance. The racist press does not conceal its satisfaction at the failure of the sanctions. That is why a fresh review of the Rhodesian problem as a whole

seems indispensable, on the one hand to determine the reasons for the failure of the policy of sanctions and, in addition, to adopt the new measures required in view of the dangerous evolution of the situation in Rhodesia.

68. If the policy of sanctions has produced results that have been highly disappointing and even contrary to those that were sought, it is because Southern Rhodesia has benefited in large measure from sources of supply and marketing outlets offered by its allies, South Africa and Portugal, through Mozambique. Unless sanctions are extended to the allies of Rhodesia, and unless we bar all the doors to Rhodesia, as well as South Africa and Portugal, there is no likelihood of seeing that racist régime toppled in the near future.

69. Such a likelihood was already envisaged by the Security Council, but it was opposed by States which have a considerable volume of economic ties with South Africa and Portugal. This evaluation of the situation should, in our opinion, lead the Security Council to put the problem in clearer terms.

70. In taking up the Rhodesian question the Security Council has recognized that it constitutes a threat to international peace and security. It is in that spirit that it has enacted a whole series of measures designed to bring down the Smith régime—measures which, however, in the light of experience, have produced insignificant results.

71. Today, the African countries have come to this distinguished Council to ask it to undertake action likely to guarantee the security and stability of their continent.

72. The temporary success of aggression in certain parts of the world, and the lack of any international sanctions, may well encourage imperialism and reactionary racism to act in various ways against African countries, and primarily against the neighbours of occupied Rhodesia. That is possible, it is also feasible. The techniques of provocation have already been perfected. It cannot be ruled out that the South African and Rhodesian racists may charge that a frontier incident has been committed which would result in a lightning invasion of a country like Zambia by their armed bands—which they would then accuse of having allowed liberation forces to be stationed in its territory. This state of affairs makes it urgent for the Security Council to take all necessary measures that are called for to forestall that imminent danger.

73. Having regard to the passive attitude of the administering Power, which still bears primary responsibility for the situation in Rhodesia, the Council is duty bound, as we see it, to take broader and more energetic measures in accordance with the Charter and with the resolutions of the General Assembly. It is up to the Security Council to put them into effect without weakness, without hesitation, and by bringing to bear the full weight of its authority. The administering Power, for its part, is duty bound to measure the extent of the damage it is causing to 4 million Africans and

to take an energetic stand free from any element of wait-and-see.

74. Pending an action that has been too long in coming on the part of the Security Council because of the systematic hostility of certain Powers to the cause of the freedom of peoples, the only forces that are acting to make the principles of the Charter an international reality are the peoples themselves, and the people of Zimbabwe have already thrown themselves into that inspiring undertaking.

75. The hard lesson taught us by colonialism is that peoples which do not fight with weapons in their hands are entitled only to humiliation and contempt. The people of Zimbabwe, like other peoples, will know how to fight the violence that oppresses them with the violence that will free them. They have already experienced house searches, concentration camps and the so-called crimes of attempted escape, but they will succeed in finding inexhaustible resources in the will of the people, so rich in possibilities for the defence of a just cause. Their resistance will gain strength and grow on the battlefields where liberty and dignity are won and will enable them to achieve a genuine national life.

76. On our part, we are convinced that the majority of States Members of the United Nations, by recognizing the legitimacy of the struggle of the Zimbabwe people and by committing themselves to render all necessary assistance in that struggle, is acting in accordance with the spirit of the Charter of our Organization.

77. Today it is for the United Nations and, in particular, for the Security Council to overcome the difficulties it has encountered hitherto in shouldering its responsibilities. It will thus be restoring the meaning of the Charter which was conceived at the outset as an instrument for peace among nations. The time for disquisitions is past. The time for action has come, and we invite the Council to act now.

78. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Spanish*): I wish personally to thank the representative of Algeria for his words of congratulation.

79. Mr. BERARD (France) (*interpretation from French*): Mr. President, I should like to add my congratulations to those already extended to you by my colleagues, who have said how glad we are to see you occupying the Presidency of this Council for the month of March. My colleagues and I are all greatly flattered that a former Director of Public Education, a former Minister of Finance, a former Minister of Development has been appointed by his country to represent it here in the Security Council. We have no doubt that you will prove equal to the responsibilities entrusted to you and we are indeed happy to work under your guidance.

80. With regard to the agenda item before us, I shall as usual be brief. I merely wish to say in a few words what the position of my Government is.

81. The decision which prompted the meeting of the Security Council constitutes the last phase of a process that has been going on for many years now, perhaps ever since the election of 1962 and, in any event, since the unilateral declaration of 11 November 1965. Foreshadowed by a referendum the evils of which were denounced in this very chamber less than eight months ago, that decision consolidates the settler revolt against the authority of the United Kingdom, the administering Power. Furthermore, the constitution which it purports to put into effect institutes a régime of racial discrimination which, by their own admission, it is the intention of its architects to place on a permanent footing in Rhodesia.

82. As if to leave no doubt as to the philosophy that inspires them, the rebel leaders have, furthermore, not hesitated to accompany their proclamation by public statements shocking and unacceptable to the majority of the Rhodesian population.

83. A few months earlier, in similarly inadmissible circumstances, they divided the arable lands of the country into two allegedly equal parts, the first reserved for a few tens of thousands of settlers, the second assigned to over four million indigenous inhabitants.

84. By notifying the Security Council on the day following the proclamation of the so-called republic, and by immediately submitting a draft resolution, the United Kingdom indicated its determination to carry out its responsibilities and to secure international support with regard to a situation whose consequences we may all ponder. That draft is acceptable to us.

85. In likewise requesting a meeting of the Council, thirty-eight African countries, for their part, indicated that while the proclamation of 2 March was assuredly a challenge to the authority of the Organization as a whole, the Africans regarded the acts committed over the past four years in Salisbury as a direct affront to their dignity.

86. Although France doubts that sanctions can remedy the situation, it is sincerely applying the measures decided upon by the Council and, until its recent suspension, participated actively in the work of the Sanctions Committee. This very day I have been authorized by my Government—and I welcome that authorization—to inform the Security Council of its decision to close the consulate general of France in Salisbury. As a matter of fact, there has been no consul general there for several years now.

87. My delegation, furthermore, will associate itself with all efforts made here to condemn the proclamation of a so-called republic in Rhodesia, to prevent any recognition of it, and to contribute to the restoration of legal authority in the rebel colony, in view of the unanimous indignation aroused by the conduct of the Salisbury leaders.

88. It is however obvious that my delegation would be unable to give its support to a text that failed in

this objective or that might compromise the usefulness of our discussions. It is in that spirit that my delegation will vote on the draft resolutions to be submitted to us.

89. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Spanish*): I wish to thank the representative of France for his very kind words.

90. Lord CARADON (United Kingdom): I do not wish unduly to delay the Council, but I would wish to say a few words at this stage before we adjourn our meeting today.

91. I should like to recall that when I spoke on this subject last, I finished by saying that I was confident "that there is no member of this Council that does not agree that it is right that a call should go to the whole world that the illegal régime and the illegal Republic should be recognized by no one" [1530th meeting, para. 65].

92. In the recollection of having said that at our last meeting, I should like, if I may, very respectfully to thank the Ambassador of France for the speech which he has made to us this afternoon. As usual, he sets an example to us not only in eloquence but also in clarity and persuasiveness. I thank him for the manner of his speech and also for the substance which he has communicated to us today.

93. Events that have taken place since we last met have justified the judgement which I made at our last meeting, and my discussions with members of this Council have shown that I was right in stating our unanimity in that conviction. It has been confirmed by every speaker here today that recognition should be refused to the illegal régime. I wish to express the gratitude of my Government to those Governments which have now taken positive and final action in giving effect to the conviction which I am sure we all fully share. Their action at this time has been of the utmost value and far-reaching significance. This is the practical action on recognition and representation which we now welcome and which we believe, as I argued last week, is essential at this time.

94. I have never said that the matter before us is solely a question of recognition. That has not been the case I have made. In particular we do not retract from any of the decisions which we have previously taken together in this Council. They should be fully and energetically carried out. I would also say that my mind goes back to the work we did together, particularly in May 1968, when, over many weeks, we examined every possible step, every possible measure which could be undertaken, working together as we should in full consultation, frankness and understanding. We examined every possible step, every possible measure and we incorporated in a comprehensive resolution [253 (1968)] the results of our deliberations. I do not say that all of us were in full agreement, but it was one of the most constructive efforts in joint action in this Council that I can recall.

95. We then endeavoured to include in that resolution of May 1968 every possible step which we could justify on the test of effectiveness. That was the test that we applied at that time; but what I maintained in our meeting last week, and I repeat now, is that the illegal régime badly wants recognition and that our duty is to refuse it. Whatever else we do or say, our obligation in this limited but vital respect is clear. It is not in dispute between us. In this issue we are united and the contention I have made is that it is well that we should always seek to advance step by step on common ground of agreement.

96. I shall be ready, of course, to examine, as we did in previous years, every aspect of this matter in consultation with other members of this Council—as I should always be under an obligation to do. I have certainly not argued that the step I advocated was the only or the last step. What I maintained and what I still maintain is that it is an urgent step, a sound step, an agreed step and an essential step. I am sure that we should not hesitate to take it.

97. Mr. NKAMA (Zambia): I think that before I exercise the right of reply of my delegation I should apologize for asking for this opportunity to reply to some of the comments which Lord Caradon has just made. I knew that when, moments ago, I called on Her Majesty's Government to take more vigorous action in order to overthrow the Smith régime in Rhodesia, I would be entertained with the usual declarations of Her Majesty's representative here.

98. At least one thing is certain, and that is that both we Africans and the administering Power, the United Kingdom, accept without exception that the Smith régime is illegal and that it is an imposition on the people of Zimbabwe that cannot be tolerated by the international community. Time and again when we come here and make our suggestions and proposals on how we think the rebels ought to be dealt with so as to end the unpalatable situation in that Territory, we are told here in the Security Council: "Oh, yes, we understand the sentiments of the African people, but we should not take hasty action whose consequences we cannot foresee or control later"; or: "Her Majesty's Government is equally determined to crush the rebellion" by the use of what Her Majesty's representative refers to as "gradual and peaceful methods".

99. If my memory serves me right—and I am sure it does—Her Majesty's permanent representative was unequivocal in his attempts some time back to convince Africa that it was necessary for the Security Council to try to implement economic sanctions, as proposed by Her Majesty's Government, and avoid a precipitate course of action because that would discredit the United Nations and, indeed, the international community.

100. Those are the phrases that emanated from none other than the permanent representative of the United Kingdom, who at one time, I am sure all of us will recall, resigned his post in protest against his Govern-

ment's policy over the same Territory that is being discussed this afternoon by this august body. Lord Caradon is the man who appealed to us Africans to be calm, to be patient—not to rush into precipitate action, but to trust Her Majesty's Government and to wait and see. We were even told on one occasion that the sanctions were biting and that the Smith régime in Southern Rhodesia was going to fall in a matter of weeks rather than months.

101. I have no doubt that the Afro-Asian Prime Ministers and Presidents and, I am sure, many world leaders believed every word Prime Minister Wilson uttered. I can also claim here and now that almost all Council members believed that Lord Caradon, in pleading for patience, for understanding and for calm in this Council, meant every word he said.

102. We heard those appeals in 1965, at the time of the unilateral declaration of independence. The same platitudes and appeals were repeated in 1966; they were repeated in 1967; they were repeated in 1968 and in 1969. Now, regrettably, we have entered the 1970s and, despite the United Kingdom claim that its sanctions would work if given time, not only is the rebellion in Southern Rhodesia home and dry, but Smith's economy is booming and last year enjoyed an unusual prosperity, culminating, as I stated earlier in my speech, in a favourable balance of trade. Smith's régime is now much more entrenched than it was in 1965. This means that the United Kingdom position has been disproved and that the fears of the African people have been proved right, beyond any shadow of doubt.

103. Perhaps 1970 is not a year for mud-slinging and recrimination; I think this was noticeable in the speech I just made a few minutes ago. Nineteen seventy must not be a year of politics; it must not be a year of mud-slinging or recrimination.

104. The point is this. Since the United Kingdom and the Africans claim to be pursuing the same objectives and the same principles in Rhodesia, is it not time to get down to business seriously? If the United Kingdom and the African people in independent Africa—and, indeed, in Zimbabwe itself—are pursuing similar principles, similar purposes, similar objectives, I ask: "Is it not time for the British and the Africans to sit down and discuss seriously the future of Zimbabwe?" In my opinion, such an approach is in the interest of both the United Kingdom and the Africans.

105. Is it true that both the United Kingdom and the Africans want the rebellion in Rhodesia removed? Is it true that both the United Kingdom and the Africans want the rebellion in Zimbabwe to go? If the answer is yes—and we hope, even at this late hour, that the answer is yes—why do we not try a more efficacious method of dealing with Smith's high treason? Why can we not adopt more effective measures to ensure that Smith's rebellion is terminated, here and now?

106. We have tried economic sanctions, and no one can deny that they have failed, and failed dismally.

I do not think that the Council would require a better demonstration of Smith's growing confidence and intransigence than the flagrant declaration of a bogus republic, let alone Smith's frequent outbursts saying that a black régime in Southern Rhodesia was inconceivable in his lifetime.

107. The sixties saw the United Kingdom appealing for reason and understanding amongst the Africans. We the Africans ask: Is it not time, in the 1970s, for us Africans—has our turn not come—to appeal to the British Government for an honest reappraisal of its policy towards Smith and his henchmen? What language must we speak? How many conferences must we hold before we can impress upon the British Government the intolerable sufferings and hardships the indigenous population in Zimbabwe has been and is still enduring? How many times?

108. We ask: where is the conscience of the United Kingdom? Where is the conscience of mankind? I think we have the right. Have not the innocent and peace-loving people of Zimbabwe shed enough blood to warrant their obtaining their independence and freedom? Or is Her Majesty's Government waiting for the creation of another Mau Mau? Is it waiting for the creation of another National Liberation Front? Is it waiting for the creation of another National Organization of Cypriot Fighters? Is it waiting for such organizations to emerge in Southern Rhodesia?

109. We do not know; we want to be told. Unless the British value only their financial interests and their kith and kin, who number 200,000, we the African people cannot understand Britain's policy of duplicity and prevarication in Rhodesia; we cannot understand it. We find it extremely difficult to understand this policy. If the United Kingdom and the independent African countries are pursuing the same objectives, the same goals, why is it that the United Kingdom seems to be pursuing policies which are diametrically opposed to what the international community is demanding and what we, the independent African States, are demanding? I think we understand the situation in Southern Rhodesia much better. Our brothers in Rhodesia today are going through exactly what we, the independent African States represented at this table, have endured in the past. So we can speak with authority.

110. There is also a tendency in British Government circles to think that the patience of the African people in Rhodesia is limitless and that Smith's army is so powerful that the Africans will never awaken to defend their country and regain their rights. Obviously that is a dangerous theory because it has been disproved over the centuries and it is being proved wrong today all over the world. Looking around the world, we can see that no amount of fire power—I repeat, no amount of fire power—can stop people from fighting and making sacrifices for that which is rightly theirs. We know that the time will come, if it has not already come, when non-violent leadership, not only in Southern Rhodesia but in other Territories still under colonial domination in southern Africa, will be replaced. It will be replaced because the people in those oppressed

areas realize that the British are not impressed by the language of reason. They are not impressed by eloquent arguments. It is only the language of violence that they will understand and appreciate. The Organization of African Unity shudders to imagine what will happen when that time comes. All this will take place because consecutive British Governments have abdicated their responsibilities in that strife-torn region.

111. At this stage a major question arises. If Britain is refusing to honour its life-long obligations towards the 5 million African people of Zimbabwe, not to speak of millions upon millions in South Africa, Angola, Mozambique and Namibia, do independent African States have cause to take seriously Britain's professed friendship for them? Can we seriously believe it when Britain says it is friendly towards us independent African States? There is an appropriate and wise saying in one of mankind's oldest and richest languages. It is in Arabic and it is as follows: "If the enemy takes your brother to lunch, he will surely take you to dinner." If the British Government persistently and deliberately refuses to resort to the only alternative open to it, that is, the use of force, after we have tried the alternatives open to us initially, which were negotiation and sanctions, what conclusion must we independent African States draw? What must those who support and understand our cause say? Must we continue to rely on the sincerity and honesty of British policy in southern Africa in spite of Britain's vacillating and double-dealing there? What has suddenly happened to the teeth of the British lion? The lion devoured those who dared to acclaim principles of equality, brotherhood, justice and democracy in India, in Cyprus, in Kenya, in the Sudan, in Ghana, in Zambia and in many other areas all over the world. The British lion devoured you if you proclaimed the principles of equality, of justice, of brotherhood, of democracy. Most recently, a glaring example was Anguilla. Those people—6,000 black people—tried to express their wishes, and what happened? The British lion was there and put them down.

112. Let me put this question differently. Supposing the black leaders of Zimbabwe, Joshua Nkomo and Ndabaningi Sithole had seized power from Her Majesty's Government and arbitrarily disowned the Crown, would Prime Minister Harold Wilson have still applied the same arguments which have inhibited him and his Labour Party from using force against the rebels in Southern Rhodesia? That is the question, and it is a pertinent one. Would Prime Minister Wilson have used the same arguments which prevent him now from applying force against the rebels in Rhodesia, if Ndabaningi Sithole or Joshua Nkomo had done exactly what Smith and his henchmen are doing? I think we have a right to know. I come from Zambia, which borders on Rhodesia. So I am in a position not only to understand but to appreciate this question much more. I am sure that a specific question of this nature requires a very simple and straightforward answer from Lord Caradon. For our part we can only say that the performance of the Labour Party since it took office in 1964 is, to say the very least, a cause for disappointment and deep regret. I shall not be letting the cat

out of the bag if I say that many African students who studied in England held the Labour Party, with its purportedly forward-looking socialist principles, in high esteem and even joined in the belief that if and when it took over 10 Downing Street it would pursue policies commensurate with its publicly declared programme of emancipating the oppressed and underprivileged of the world. In fact when my colleague here Ambassador Mwaanga and myself were students in England we used to work for the Labour Party, because we sincerely believed in its socialist principles. I am sorry to say we used to work for that party. It would appear today that those who did not work for the party are enjoying the fruits of our labours. We were grossly mistaken in our beliefs. Comparing the Labour Party with the Tories, one cannot but conclude that the Conservative Party was more forthcoming and more realistic. That in part explains why more Asian and African colonies achieved independence under majority rule during the Tory administration. The clock was set back as soon as the Labour Party ascended to power. I want to be properly understood. I am not saying that the Conservative Party was not anti-colonialist or that it never butchered innocent men, women and children in the colonies. On the contrary, it committed many crimes against Asia and Africa, but at least eventually it admitted its inability to stem or control the winds of change. It admitted its inability to control the winds of change which were streaking across the continent of Africa. Prime Minister Harold Macmillan was able to admit that publicly.

113. In addition, the Conservatives were men enough to recognize their errors and endeavour to do better. That is why, when Sir Roy Welensky, the former Prime Minister of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, dared to turn this Confederation into a dominion, Harold Macmillan, who was the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom at that time, decided without any equivocation whatsoever to station just a couple of jet fighters in Kenya. That did it: just a couple of jet fighters—not a hundred, not a million, just a couple. That saved the situation. Roy Welensky relented. He knew that if he went ahead he was going to face a lot of trouble.

114. Now we ask: why cannot Mr. Wilson do the same in the case of Southern Rhodesia? Why can he not? Have the British people changed? Have the old ones gone and new ones come in? Have they? We want to be told if this is the case. I am sure that the same British people who understood Macmillan and such distinguished anti-colonialists as Iain Macleod would appreciate his actions and policies against rebels.

115. What is interesting is that Mr. Wilson did not at least threaten action if Smith seized power. Or are we asking too much when we say that Mr. Wilson ought to have just threatened—not used—force; just threatened? If that is too much, we would say that at least Mr. Wilson ought to have kept quiet about the impending rebellion before 11 November 1965. He ought to have kept quiet at best—that is, at best or at worst, I do not know which. But he ought to have

kept quiet. But what did he do? He gave the green light to the rebels to proclaim their rebellion, by stating openly that he would not use force even if Ian Smith and his henchmen proclaimed UDI in Rhodesia. He said it. Even before the unilateral declaration of independence was proclaimed, Mr. Wilson said that if this was done he was not going to use force. A lot of Africans have not been able to recover from this. A lot of Africans—independent Africans—have not recovered from this.

116. Now why did Mr. Wilson do this? Why? We cannot accept that it was an inadvertent error; we cannot accept that. We cannot accept that it was an inadvertent political error on Mr. Wilson's part. We find it impossible to accept that, for two reasons. First, we know that Mr. Wilson is such a brilliant man. We know, the world knows, that he is very, very clever. He could not have made this mistake inadvertently. That would be absolutely impossible; it is ruled out.

117. There is another reason why we Africans do not believe that this was an inadvertent error. I want someone to tell me whether, since that statement was made, Mr. Wilson has either regretted it or retracted it. Has he? We have been following different papers in different languages and we have not come across this at all. If it was a mistake, has Mr. Wilson retracted his statement? Again, if that is asking too much, has he regretted the statement? To the best of our knowledge, no such thing has taken place, which leads to the conclusion that Mr. Wilson knew what he was saying, that he knew what he was doing. He wanted to give the green light to the white rebels in Southern Rhodesia.

118. I repeat my question: what would Mr. Wilson have done if the rebellion had been perpetrated by Ndabaningi Sithole or Joshua Nkomo? My argument still stands; I think it is a very logical one. I am not praising myself, but I think that, logically, it is plain.

119. It would appear that the people of Zimbabwe now have no choice whatsoever but to fight for their freedom and independence. This is the conclusion that we Africans can reach because the United Kingdom is not prepared to face up to its responsibilities. Is it really necessary that innocent men, women and children should die at the hands of a bunch of reckless buffoons when the British Government has the capacity and the power to crush the rebellion in Rhodesia? Is it necessary? Why cannot Britain learn from its rich past experience that no amount of higher power, no amount of force, can forever keep down the people's quest for freedom and independence? Why can it not learn from that rich experience? It has had plenty of it. Why can it not learn from that? We do not think this is too much to ask. We want to know.

120. We would ask Lord Caradon to place himself in our shoes. If he were black, as I am, what would he have done about the rebellion in Rhodesia? Would he have said, "This thing has happened", folded his arms and just forgotten about it. "Let it be; it has taken place; justice does not matter; equality does not

matter; human rights, democracy, no; equality, nothing''? We doubt it.

121. It is interesting that, in spite of all the crimes which consecutive British Governments have perpetrated against the black people and the Asian people, independent Asia and independent Africa hold no grudge at all against the British people as such. We hold no grudge at all. I am privileged to state here and now categorically that we enjoy the best of relations with the British Government and the British people in spite of all they have done. Is that not enough to show that the black people in Rhodesia are not demanding that the white man should be driven into the sea? They do not even want Smith to be hanged. They are asking for their rights—equality, freedom, democracy. That is all they are asking for. Is that too much? Is it really?

122. Smith is now busy perpetrating heinous crimes against the indigenous population in Zimbabwe and those who sincerely believe in racial equality, justice and freedom.

123. Where is the conscience of the United Kingdom? Where is it? Is it not time that Britain should confess publicly the truth? The truth of the matter is that Britain's interests are better served in those Territories that have attained independence. Britain knows this. The same principle applies in Rhodesia and the rest of southern Africa. Let Britain grant independence to Rhodesia. Let Britain assist the Zimbabwe people to attain independence.

124. We have no doubt that its national interests will be better served. They are better served now in Tanzania, in Uganda, in Kenya, in Ghana, in Sierra Leone, in Gambia, in Swaziland, in Botswana, in Zambia and in countless other countries.

125. What have we done to the British nationals who reside in our countries? Nothing, except to extend the hand of friendship to them. We welcome them as our brothers. We in independent Africa and independent Asia do not believe that man is judged on the basis of his skin, on the basis of his pigmentation, on the basis of his creed, nor on the basis of his race or place of origin. To us that does not count. That is why the Asians and the Africans are always smiling, laughing

and singing and our enemies think that we are idiots and fools. We are not, because we know what we are doing.

126. I have already said that before independent Africans and independent Asians obtained their freedom, the colonial Power, the United Kingdom, called them all sorts of names. They were called communists, they were called savages, they were called murderers, uncivilized, uncouth and all sorts of things. Patiently the African people tried to explain that they were none of those things, that they were nationalists, that they were patriots, that they were men and women of dignity who did not ask for British blood, that all they wanted was their human rights.

127. Today, the same British Government realizes that it made a mistake in thinking in that way. Why cannot it extend that realization to Rhodesia? Why? We ask Lord Caradon to be fair to us Africans. We are not asking the United Kingdom to give us a piece of England. All we want the United Kingdom to do is to assist the oppressed black population of Rhodesia to regain its independence and its freedom. I think that the time has come for us to say honestly that sweet words, sweet platitudes and sweet declarations are inadequate. We value independence and democracy just as any other nation or race value them. So what we are asking of the United Kingdom is really not beyond its capacity and not beyond its means.

128. I thought that since I had been sent here by the Organization of African Unity all the way from Africa I should make Africa's position clear beyond a reasonable doubt, so that when I leave I shall be able to report that I have fulfilled my mission. I want to stress that the African people do not simply want to condemn the declaration of a republic status in Rhodesia. That is not the crux of the matter. The crux of the matter is the rebellion. I think that the administering Power is trying to cover up, and that it is the duty of the Council not to allow the United Kingdom to do so.

129. With those words, Mr. President, I wish to thank you for allowing me to air the views of tormented and suffering Africa.

The meeting rose at 6.5 p.m.

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