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Items 31, 72 and 138 of

the preliminary list*

THE SITUATION IN KAMPUCHEA

REVIEW OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE

DECLARATION ON THE STRENGTHENING

OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES

BETWEEN STATES

SECURITY COUNCIL
Forty-fourth year

Letter dated 21 February 1989 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of
the Permanent Mission of Democratic Kampuchea to the United Nations
addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit herewith, for your information, a press statement by the three components of the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea (see annex), approved on 20 February 1989 by His Royal Highness Samdech Norodom Sihanouk, President of Democratic Kampuchea, National Leader of Cambodia and Head of the Cambodian National Resistance.

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex distributed as an official document of the General Assembly, under items 31, 72 and 138 of the preliminary list, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) SISOWATH Sirirath
Chargé d'affaires, a.i.

* A/44/50.

ANNEX

*It is perfect. I entirely approve this document and I wholeheartedly support the very just position of the Delegation of our Cambodian National Resistance (CGDK) at JIM II.
Very profound affection.*

(Signed):

NORODOM SIHANOUK
*President of Democratic Kampuchea,
National Leader of Cambodia, and Head of
the Cambodian National Resistance.*

Beijing, 20 February 1989

**PRESS STATEMENT OF THE THREE COMPONENTS
OF THE CGDK**

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I. In the spirit of contributing to the search for an overall political solution to the problem of Kampuchea in order to put an end to the undescribable sufferings of the Cambodian people and thereby ensuring peace, security and stability in South-East Asia, We attend JIM II in goodwill and open-mind, and have made utmost effort to bring JIM to a success.

II. To contribute to achieving that goal, the Cambodian National Resistance -the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK) has shown flexibilities and made since JIM I, concessions:

- the phased reduction of military aids to the four Cambodian parties together with the Vietnamese troop withdrawal within an overall political settlement of the problem of Kampuchea.

- the acceptance of including a foreign-installed regime as part of a provisional quadripartite coalition government under the leadership of H.R.H. Samdech NORODOM SIHANOUK for the sake of a genuine national reconciliation.

- the disarming of the armed forces, within an overall political settlement of the problem, of the three Cambodian parties of the CGDK (in particular of the Khmer Rouge army), who exceed the 10,000 men.

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- we accept the Vietnamese representatives to work with the International Control Mechanism of the United Nations (ICM-UN).

- the dispatch to Cambodia of an International Peace Keeping Force of the UN (IPKF):

- . to prevent the Democratic Kampuchea party (Khmer Rouge) from monopolizing the power, thus meeting the concern and fear of all,
- . to prevent chaos and civil war in Cambodia.

III. HOW DOES VIETNAM REACT TO OUR GOODWILL?

Failing to impose a fait accompli in Cambodia by military means, Vietnam resorts to diplomatic manoeuvres:

1. By presenting the Kampuchean problem as having "two separate aspects: internal and external", so as to present itself as an "outsider" of the problem and make it look as a "civil war."
2. More than a hundred thousands of Vietnamese occupying armed forces are in Cambodia. Vietnam cannot pretend to belong only to "the external aspect" of the problem. It holds responsibility in both "internal and external."
3. By claiming to seek for a political solution of the problem, Vietnam has tried to induce the world community into accepting the regime installed by it in Phnom Penh, which amounts in fact to impose a military solution, because that illegal regime has been set up, backed, nurtured and maintained by more than a hundred thousands of Vietnamese forces.
4. Vietnam avoids an effective and adequate International Control Mechanism to supervise its troop withdrawal within an overall political solution of the problem. The "Vietnamese ICM" is unacceptable, because it is not effective.

While the world community strive for making impossible for the Democratic Kampuchea party (Khmer Rouge) to monopolize the power in Cambodia, it should, legitimately, also strive for making impossible the violation of any agreement on an overall political solution of the Kampuchean problem which would be signed by Vietnam. "Before the ink was dry on the (1973) Paris Agreement the North Vietnamese began to dishonour their solemn obligations... The North Vietnamese systematically blocked the operation of the International Commission of Control and Supervision (ICCS), which was supposed to monitor the cease-

fire and any violation of the Agreement, ... since two of its communist members refused to confirm the Vietnamese Communist violation, ... thereby cancelling out the observation" of the ICCS, wrote Dr. Kissinger.

For the sake of the survival of the Cambodian nation and peace and stability in the region, a sort of such "gross violation" should not be permitted to happen.

5. Vietnam comes to attend JIM II with nothing new. It makes instead the problem confuse.

6. If the Vietnamese-installed regime in Phnom Penh is "really popular" and "solid", there would be no need to keep the Vietnamese troops in Cambodia until 31 December 1990 as confirmed by Nguyen Co Thach.

20 February 1989

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**PRESS COMMUNIQUE BY THE THREE COMPONENTS
OF THE CGDK**

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1. JIM has been organized with the objective of finding a fair and comprehensive political settlement of the Kampuchean problem, which is a problem between Kampuchea and Vietnam, through frank exchange of views among the conflicting parties and the concerned countries. However every time JIM is held, Vietnam tries to force the meeting to reach an agreement by fooling the world community about its so-called troop withdrawal. On 26 May 1988, barely a month before JIM I, Vietnam announced that 50.000 Vietnamese troops would be withdrawn by the end of December 1988. The reality is now well known to all. According to reliable and independent sources "there are at least about 100,000 Vietnamese soldiers still in Kampuchea." Furthermore, more and more Vietnamese fresh troops have been sent into Kampuchea. More and more Vietnamese soldiers have been posed as soldiers of the Phnom Penh regime.

Again this time, the very day JIM II's Working Group was opened Vietnamese Foreign Minister Nguyen Co Thach declared: "No agreement at JIM I, no troop withdrawal by September." Is it not a condition imposed upon JIM?

2. Vietnam has declared that all its troops would be withdrawn if a political settlement could be reached. What does Vietnam mean by "IF"? In fact, Vietnam has so far linked its troop withdrawal to the following conditions:

- There must be an agreement among the 4 Cambodian factions;
- There must be a settlement of the "Kampuchean refugee problem";
- There must be an agreement at JIM II.

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Therefore, the Vietnamese troop withdrawal from Kampuchea, as has been pointed out by H.R.H. Samdech NORODOM SIHANOUK, President of Democratic Kampuchea and Leader of the Cambodian National Resistance, is "neither real nor unconditional." While announcing the "unilateral withdrawal in September", Vietnam puts forward sine qua non conditions, which if they are not fulfilled before September 1989, "would prevent" it from withdrawing its troops from Cambodia!

Vietnam knows full well that such sine qua non conditions will never be fulfilled because it will manipulate at will its people installed in Phnom Penh for that purpose. Thus, that sine qua non conditions can hardly hide Vietnam's real intention: to perpetuate its occupation of Cambodia.

3. The Vietnamese troop withdrawal can only be credible if it can be supervised and controlled by an effective International Control Mechanism (ICM). This ICM should have the task of verifying:

- The withdrawal of the Vietnamese forces;
- The cease-fire among the parties to the conflict;
- The disarming of 4 Cambodian parties' forces which exceed the 10,000 men limit for each party within the framework of a provisional quadripartite army;
- The phased reduction of military aids to the 4 Cambodian parties in parallel with the timetable of the withdrawal of the Vietnamese forces;
- The free elections, and
- The non-reintroduction of foreign armed forces and armaments and war material into Cambodia after the withdrawal of the Vietnamese forces.

The Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK) proposes an ICM of the United Nations.

4. Vietnam claims that the 4 Kampuchean factions should meet among themselves to discuss the "internal aspect" of the problem. According to Vietnam, to do so is to let "the people of Kampuchea to exercise their right to self-determination" and "avoid any outside interference in the internal affairs of Kampuchea." Needless to say that the sole gross violation of the right to self-determination of the Kampuchean people and the gross interference in the internal affairs of Kampuchea

is the continued occupation of Kampuchea by hundreds of thousands of Vietnamese forces.

The three components of the CGDK are prepared to meet in good faith with the other Khmer faction whenever and wherever it is ready to do so, under the leadership of H.R.H. Samdech NORODOM SIHANOUK, Leader of the Cambodian Nation, in order to contribute to the search for a comprehensive political solution to the 10-year old Kampuchean problem.

5. Inspired by our sincere desire to arrive at a political solution as soon as possible and bring JIM to a success, the 3 components of the CGDK have put forward the 5-point peace plan of H.R.H. Samdech NORODOM SIHANOUK and the Modalities for its implementation, which we sincerely hope could lead to a verifiable Vietnamese troop withdrawal and prevent any possibility of monopolizing the power by the Khmer Rouge and prevent a civil war in Kampuchea and any possibility of Vietnam invading Kampuchea once again, thereby establishing a truly independent, neutral, non-aligned and peaceful Cambodia and securing peace and stability in the region.

17 February 1989
