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TWENTY-THIRD YEAR

1457th MEETING: 4 NOVEMBER 1968

NEW YORK

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FOURTEEN HUNDRED AND FIFTY-SEVENTH MEETING

Held in New York on Monday, 4 November 1968, at 3 p.m.

President: Mr. Otto R. BORCH (Denmark).

Present: The representatives of the following States: Algeria, Brazil, Canada, China, Denmark, Ethiopia, France, Hungary, India, Pakistan, Paraguay, Senegal, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and United States of America.

Provisional agenda (S/Agenda/1457)

1. Adoption of the agenda.
2. The situation in the Middle East:
 - (a) Letter dated 1 November 1968 from the Permanent Representative of the United Arab Republic to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/8878);
 - (b) Letter dated 1 November 1968 from the Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/8879).

Adoption of the agenda

The agenda was adopted.

The situation in the Middle East:

- (a) Letter dated 1 November 1968 from the Permanent Representative of the United Arab Republic to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/8878);
- (b) Letter dated 1 November 1968 from the Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/8879)

1. The PRESIDENT: In accordance with the decision taken by the Council at its 1456th meeting, I propose, with the consent of the Council, to invite the representatives of the United Arab Republic and Israel to take places at the Council table in order to participate without vote in the discussion.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. M. A. El Kony (United Arab Republic) and Mr. Y. Tekoah (Israel) took places at the Council table.

2. The PRESIDENT: The Security Council will now continue its consideration of the question before it.

3. Mr. BERARD (France) (*translated from French*): I should like, first of all, to offer the President my sincere congratulations on his assumption of the presidency of the

Council. We have long been familiar with his qualities of intelligence; rectitude and impartiality. We are glad that we shall be able to benefit from them in a very special way during the present month.

4. I should also like to welcome Mr. Wiggins, the new representative of the United States. I do so the more cordially since his predecessor's sudden departure prevented him from taking leave of us, and us of him, as we should all sincerely have desired to do.

5. We are gathered here once more as a result of incidents which have again disturbed the Near East. How many meetings the Council has held during the past year and more to deal with similar situations! And how many other incidents have occurred, in addition to those which we have examined round this table! The length of that list might give grounds for discouragement and lead some to conclude that it is impossible for the Security Council to take effective steps to remedy events which we deplore and forestall dangers which we apprehend.

6. That difficulties exist we realize only too well. But that they are impossible of solution we refuse to accept. The Security Council has a duty to face the responsibilities laid upon it by the Charter. It has a duty not to disappoint the expectations of the peoples or the hopes which, despite everything, are still placed in it. The concern which we feel, the difficulty of our task, should, on the contrary, strengthen our determination to find a solution to these problems.

7. Such a determination appears to us all the more necessary as the incidents consistently increase in number and in gravity. A day no longer passes without some incident occurring somewhere in the occupied territories. As they multiply, one cannot escape the feeling that the fire threatens to be rekindled along the entire length of the front.

8. Increasingly large-scale operations are launched. The Israeli attack of 31 October, following the actions of 26, 28 and 30 October, shows that operations now extend to areas far distant from the cease-fire line and penetrate deeply into enemy territory. There is no hesitation about aiming these operations at civilian installations.

9. Two doctrines are now proclaimed: that of preventive defence and that of a policy of warnings. What we have here, in theory as well as in practice, is a particularly disturbing escalation, and we cannot overemphasize how dangerous the consequences may be.

10. My delegation has carefully studied all the information we have received, all the documents and all the papers which have been circulated to us on the incidents which have taken place for over a year and particularly on those of the past few weeks. It has done so with a view to determining the causes of these incidents and finding means of preventing their recurrence. Hence it has paid particular attention to General Bull's report to the Council of 28 October [S/7930/Add.96] and to the conclusions which he draws from his observations.

11. It is, of course, useful for the Council to endeavour in each case to establish the immediate responsibilities of each party in these incidents. However, we are bound to admit that these responsibilities are sometimes shared or successive, and that they vary from one incident to another. This endeavour cannot, therefore, be sufficient.

12. Some previous speakers have expressed the wish that strict observance of the cease-fire should be imposed by every means available to us, and they have suggested a reinforcement of the UNTSO personnel. My delegation sincerely supports this suggestion. It believes that the Security Council should protest vigorously against violations of the cease-fire. It will willingly associate itself with any decisions to that effect; its only fear is that the measures open to us will not be sufficiently effective and will prove inadequate to restore calm and open the way to the return to peace.

13. For many months now my delegation has feared and deplored the developments which we witness today; for many months it has expressed its concern that incidents might increase in number and in gravity if no attempt was made to correct the situation from which they spring. I feel compelled to repeat: what needs to be done is to strike at the root of the evil.

14. For the past year we have been emphasizing, repeatedly and consistently, that such incidents are the more or less inevitable result of the absence of a basic settlement. If we want to be realistic and effective, then what we have to do, essentially, is to see to it that this situation, and the occupation, are brought to an end. The means was indicated long ago by the Council: it is the implementation of resolution 242 (1967) of 22 November 1967. That resolution was adopted unanimously. It is a document whose provisions were studied carefully and in which equitable concessions and equitable compensation were requested and granted to both sides. That resolution must be carried out without further delay if we are to prevent developments fraught with the most serious dangers.

15. My delegation deeply regrets that both sides have not been equally willing to agree to the implementation of this resolution. According to the great majority of observers, the United Arab Republic has recently made an effort to facilitate the execution of Mr. Jarring's mission. We hope that a comparable effort will be made by the other side. We understand very well, of course, the hesitations which may arise in connexion with such an effort, but we are convinced that that effort is essential and that, if it is not made, the possibility of a settlement may elude us and, possibly, never recur.

16. Two considerations suggest prompt action along these lines. We were glad that Mr. Jarring was willing to extend his mission for another month, and we thank him for this. The parties concerned must be aware of their grave responsibilities in failing to adopt the positions requested of them, as well as in provoking, or countenancing incidents which further jeopardize any chances of progress—progress which must, it appears, be made before the end of the present month.

17. At the same time, the scale of the incidents of 28 and 31 October was sufficiently alarming to compel us to measure the gravity of the situation and of its potential consequences.

18. My delegation greatly welcomed the most praiseworthy step which has just been taken to settle the conflict in the Far East. We hope that an equally courageous effort will be made on the eastern banks of the Mediterranean by those whose responsibility it is to make it. A gleam of hope has arisen on the shores of the Pacific; we hope that it will spread in the course of the coming weeks. In the Near East, too, the dawn, as the Scriptures say, must be forced to come. That dawn must be that of peace.

19. The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of France for the over-generous comments which he was good enough to make about me.

20. The next speaker is the representative of the United Arab Republic, on whom I now call.

21. Mr. EL KONY (United Arab Republic): Mr. President, I should like, with your permission, to reply to a number of points raised by Mr. Tekoah in his statement before the Council on 1 November 1968 [1456th meeting]. Before doing so, however, I should like to address myself to a question of a general but disturbing character. A statement of unprecedented arrogance and unbound defiance was made before this august body. In his futile attempt to justify the criminal armed attack by Israeli aircraft against civilian targets in the United Arab Republic, the representative of Israel declared that Israel had struck in an effort to bring home the necessity of the maintenance of the cease-fire. He further affirmed that Israel will continue to strike until the Arab States bow to the terms dictated by Israel.

22. The Council and the world at large must have been gravely disturbed by such an escalation of defiance of the authority of the Security Council. Israel is conveying an ultimatum to the whole world, in which it declares its own doctrine of disregarding the norms of the Charter and taking the law into its own hands.

23. According to this doctrine Israel is giving itself the self-proclaimed right to attack in order to expand and to strike thereafter, and to restrike in order to persuade the victim of its aggression to acquiesce in and bow to its dictates.

24. In his letter to the President of the Security Council [S/8879] the representative of Israel requested an urgent meeting of the Council. In view of the doctrine enunciated

in his last statement, one might question either the urgency or the importance attached by the Israeli authorities to such a meeting. Should we assume that the motives behind such a request were to elaborate before the Council the newest manifestation of this long-established Israeli policy?

25. Some of the statements which were made during the last meeting of the Council seemed to imply that this air attack could be viewed as a simple incident within the framework of cease-fire violations. Such a view overlooks the serious and real character of the new phase which Israeli aggression is assuming through the premeditated and wanton attacks on civilian targets far removed, by hundreds of miles, from the cease-fire lines and from any military positions and concentration of troops. Israel is trying to destroy the vital economic structure of the United Arab Republic by attacking the main irrigation utilities of the country.

26. This is a new phase in the execution of Israeli plans for continued aggression. My Government feels duty bound to bring to the urgent and solemn attention of the Council the serious character of this new phase and its grave implications.

27. The representative of Israel has alleged that the report of General Odd Bull leaves no doubt as to the responsibility for the exchange of fire on 26 October 1968. His conclusions, as usual, have been drawn through distorting some parts and ignoring other relevant parts of the report. He has therefore deliberately omitted to refer to the additional information which has been made available to the members of the Council in document S/7930/Add.99. This information indicates that the military observers were shown an Israeli missile which had not exploded.

28. As stated in my letter to the President of the Security Council dated 27 October 1968 [S/8870], the Israelis have set up missile sites facing the Suez Canal cities with the intention of shelling the populated centres in the Canal area. As the Council may recall, this is not the first time that Israel has resorted to the use of missiles. What makes it most dangerous is the increase of missile sites and the escalation of their use. My Government did not fail to inform General Bull of the fact in time, on 24 October 1968. It requested him to undertake the necessary steps to avert the consequences of the existence of missile sites opposite the Canal cities and warned that the movement of missiles to the east bank was a prelude to new aggression by the Israeli armed forces. Unfortunately, our fears materialized when the Israeli forces used missiles again, on 26 October, on the city of Port Tawfiq.

29. The Israeli occupation on the east side of the Suez Canal has been systematically used by their armed forces to inflict death, havoc and destruction on the innocent civilians of the Canal area. In order to maintain their illegal, aggressive occupation and thus continue their criminal actions, the Israelis have clearly manifested their insistence on undermining and disregarding the obligations incumbent upon them by resolution 242 (1967) of 22 November 1967. All that Israel is doing now contradicts the fundamental elements on which that resolution was based.

30. They claim that they are observing the Council's cease-fire resolution; yet their aggressive shelling of the civilian centres in the Canal—not to speak of their latest blatant attack in upper Egypt—reveals beyond any doubt that their lip service to the cease-fire resolution is but a subterfuge to obstruct and procrastinate about the Security Council resolution of 22 November 1967.

31. It should be borne in mind that the cease-fire injunctions were only a first, though essential, step to put an end to the Israeli-initiated armed aggression against the Arab States. It was never envisaged as anything more. When resolution 233 (1967) was adopted on 6 June 1967, all the members of the Council emphasized its preliminary and provisional character.

32. I should like to quote a few excerpts from the verbatim record of the 1348th meeting of the Council. The United States representative described the cease-fire as a "first step" [1348th meeting, para. 12]; the United Kingdom representative described the cease-fire as a "first essential step" [ibid., para. 39]; the representative of Argentina described the cease-fire as "a provisional measure" [ibid., para. 54]; and the representative of Brazil described it as "a first step" [ibid., para. 65].

33. It is therefore clear from the language of the cease-fire resolution and the statements made in the Council when the resolution was adopted that it was a preliminary and provisional step, to be followed by the withdrawal of Israeli forces and the establishment of a just and peaceful settlement.

34. Provisions to that effect were embodied in Security Council resolution 242 (1967). Those provisions emphasized the basic principles of the Charter and international law—namely, the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war—and affirmed that the fulfilment of Charter principles requires withdrawal of the Israeli forces. The cease-fire resolution cannot, therefore, be interpreted in a vacuum. It must be viewed in the light of its provisional character and construed in conjunction with the substantive resolution of the Security Council, namely, resolution 242 (1967).

35. On such a basis the United Arab Republic has accepted, adhered and continued to adhere to the cease-fire resolutions and to Security Council resolution 242 (1967). Israel, however, opposes this position of the Council and views the cease-fire as a means of freezing the situation resulting from its aggression.

36. I regret that the representative of Israel saw fit to repeat his distortions about the protective defence measure taken by the United Arab Republic authorities. We have stated and shall not tire of repeating that these are measures adopted out of consideration for human lives, those of the citizens in the Suez Canal cities, and aimed at their protection. No amount of invective on the part of Mr. Tekoah can change their human character.

37. Mr. Tekoah pretends in his statement that Israel is defending itself against the Arabs. In this connexion he says that Israel has had to defend itself first from behind truce

lines, then from behind armistice lines, and now from behind cease-fire lines. I wonder what kind of defence this is which always leads forward. Is it really defence or is it expansion? One has only to look at the maps since 1947.

38. We have repeatedly stated that the continued occupation by the Israeli forces of the Arab territories constitutes a situation fraught with the gravest dangers for peace and security in the Middle East. The normalization of this grave situation can be effected only through the insistence of the Council that its resolution 242 (1967) should be strictly and speedily implemented. I need hardly reiterate our position, which has been clear from the start and was recently reaffirmed by the United Arab Republic Minister for Foreign Affairs in his memorandum to Ambassador Jarring to which I referred in my last intervention.

39. In conclusion, it is my duty to stress to the Council once again the serious nature of this new phase of Israeli policy and the grave implications it entails. Israel should realize that the course of action it has embarked on is fraught with danger. The Council should bring this fact home to the Israeli authorities by taking prompt action in discharging its responsibilities for the maintenance of international peace and security.

40. Mr. DE ARAUJO CASTRO (Brazil): Mr. President, allow me first of all to express my satisfaction at seeing you preside over our proceedings during the current month, November. We count on your leadership and proven ability to guide us in the crucial debates ahead of us. Too many problems remain unsettled and some new ones are cropping up. We feel bound likewise to render our tribute to your distinguished predecessor.

41. It is with pleasure and gratification that we extend our warm welcome to Ambassador Wiggins, the new representative of the United States of America. His wisdom, tactfulness and high qualifications constitute a sure pledge of the valuable contribution he will make to the proceedings of the Security Council.

42. We are engaged in a debate which is neither new nor unprecedented. On the contrary, it strikes us as a re-enactment of previous meetings and of previous discussions. Again we are confronted with the same old concern and with the all too familiar frustrations. In other words, we are confronted with renewed acts of violence, artillery barrages and retaliation. What, may I ask, is the course open to the Security Council at this stage? To try to ascertain all the facts, to trace all the violence, assign responsibility, identify aggressors and victims, to allot blame and to pass judgement? Are we to meet again, in informal consultations, and to embark again on a draft resolution based on the same ingredients of the past, "the Security Council, deeply concerned", "deploring", "recalling" and "reminding", "urging" and "calling upon", "emphasizing" and "warning"? As we have pointed out on previous occasions, we are running short of possible measures and even running short of vocabulary, since all terms and words have by now become polemical and controversial. Anything, even semantics, is likely to become controversial in the Middle East.

43. The authority and the prestige of the Security Council have been challenged time and again by the parties in the

dispute, who, to a pessimistic observer, would appear to shun both war and peace and to insist on a stalemate pregnant with acrimony and occasional outbursts of violence. World public opinion is thus shaken in its faith in the United Nations and in the organ which bears the primary responsibility for world peace and security. The crisis in the Middle East, serious and ominous in itself, is now being compounded by a serious crisis in the Security Council. We should try to settle both, if we are intent on preserving both peace and the machinery for peace. The problem is no longer purely political. Several circumstances of various types have likewise made it institutional. We have been unanimous and yet unanimity has not kept us from collective failure. In the particular case of the Middle East the Council is neither blocked nor paralysed: it is inoperative.

44. The permanent members, which are so prone to disagree on world issues, have, notwithstanding, agreed on the terms of resolution 242 (1967), but this has not been enough to secure the implementation—and here we wish again to circumvent the over-all problems of semantics—of the self-same resolution. It appears that power, even permanent power, never exists without certain sobering limitations. And it is obvious by now that the unanimity achieved on the text of resolution 242 (1967) does not extend to the exact interpretation to be given to all paragraphs thereof. Whether it embodies a solution or just a safe and sound basis for agreement, this resolution 242 (1967) is definitely the text on which we have to base our earnest endeavours towards peace. The problem of interpretation is therefore largely academic. What really counts is the will and the determination to proceed.

45. Our concern is enhanced by our apprehension that the unanimity achieved on 22 November 1967 may not endure for ever. It is an indisputable fact that relations among the major Powers have deteriorated considerably since August last. We shall not be more specific lest our remarks should give rise to some points of order. It is quite plausible that this unfortunate deterioration is already being reflected in the pattern of the Middle East crisis, through the operation of a system of alliances or allegiances. Difficult to settle on its own terms and on its own merits, the dispute in the Middle East may become downright insoluble if it is converted into another chapter of the long instalment story of the cold war. That is a clear possibility which we should ponder and consider.

46. Furthermore, the unanimity reached on 22 November 1967 may prove to be the maximum area of agreement among the major Powers on the question of the Middle East. It is highly arguable and uncertain that the same unanimity of views should be possible on any course of action other than the one contemplated in resolution 242 (1967), which constitutes a bold step out of the cold war and our of war itself.

47. For it should be stressed that if the Council has failed so far in its executive functions, if it has perhaps over-indulged in judicial and fact-finding activities, it has none the less responded with high statesmanship and constructiveness in the normative field. Indeed, seldom has the Security Council responded to a given situation with the

dexterity and imagination it showed when it adopted resolution 242 (1967), which still strikes us as the safest and most equitable approach to the whole problem.

48. As was pointed out last Friday by Lord Caradon [1456th meeting], we have already a pre-established goal and a pre-established solution, although we are not sure of the road towards that ultimate goal. We have set up the machinery and even today Ambassador Jarring is at the disposal of both parties for the pursuit of peace, through a mutual adjustment of views and positions. A complete and undisturbed cease-fire is both unlikely and inadequate as a permanent solution. Only a political settlement will bring peace back to the Middle East and it is incumbent upon the Security Council, as a diplomatic body, to strive towards such a settlement. Otherwise, the Security Council will be convened time and again to deal with specific acts of violence, artillery barrages and retaliation.

49. We are determined to insist upon a point that we have raised on four different occasions in this very Chamber. So far, we have been unable to secure any response to, or even any comment on our suggestion. Perhaps we have not made ourselves quite clear. While we pile up words, apprehensions and recommendations in this room, the parties are piling up weapons and ammunition in their respective territories. Each of the parties to the dispute has made references to purchases and preparations undertaken by the other side, but it is our contention that the solution to the problem may lie in a mutual basic understanding among the major Powers with a view to restricting, regulating or balancing the supply of arms and implements of war. While the arms race remains unchecked, the dangers of a new conflagration are thereby increased day by day and may soon compel us to forsake all hope of a peaceful solution. Weapons are the ingredients of war and they may be utilized in a new round of fighting. Weapons are not the components of a fair and permanent settlement.

50. We raise this point once again because we earnestly believe that, some day, somehow, the Council will have to face squarely this issue of the arms race, which cannot be ignored any longer, lest we be confronted with irreversible, gloomy events in this critical area. We are disappointed to see that no serious efforts are being made towards a basic understanding on this problem. This has been a recurrent theme of all the statements of the Brazilian delegation on the question of the Middle East and the point was recently emphasized in our Foreign Minister's statement in the general debate of the twenty-third session of the General Assembly.¹

51. We must be realistic enough to admit that, without the full diplomatic co-operation of the major Powers on this particular question of the arms race and on other aspects of the question of the Middle East, no significant progress can be achieved. Although the primary responsibility for that settlement ought to fall on the parties to the dispute, as sovereign nations, it is inescapable that only restraint, statesmanship and constructive efforts on the part of the major Powers will pave the way to peace in the area.

52. The Charter confers special powers and responsibilities upon the permanent members of the Security Council. We are therefore entitled to expect adequate diplomatic assistance and adequate restraint and caution from those major Powers. We should strive to remove not only the seeds, but also the implements and instruments of war. We cannot think of a better field of action for the major Powers in which to exercise their influence and to offer tangible evidence of their determination to secure a real *détente* in world affairs.

53. On the other hand, it is obvious that the parties concerned, before agreeing to a permanent settlement, will request, and demand, some assurances as to the permanence and stability of the terms of the settlement; and, in the world of today, only the major Powers are in a position to offer such assurances and guarantees. This is not wishful thinking; this is sheer realism. May I recall, on this particular aspect of the problem, that resolution 258 (1968) clearly states the conviction of the Security Council to the effect that "all Members of the United Nations should co-operate towards a peaceful settlement in the Middle East".

54. On the specific points before the Council, it is clear that we deplore and condemn both the aggressive acts undertaken by one side and the retaliation to which they have given rise. The Brazilian delegation will do its utmost to contribute to the strengthening of the cease-fire, although we believe that a cease-fire is not enough and is not a goal in itself. It is clear, at any rate, that such attacks and counter-attacks are serious, not only for what they signify in and of themselves, but as an indication, I am sorry to say, of the lack of will to compose differences and to forgo violence. Each such attack and counter-attack represents an additional difficulty along the road to a permanent solution. Cease-fire is not a permanent goal, but it is definitely the prerequisite for peace. As has been said, no war is ever inevitable: it is always the product or the consequence of some failure in human wisdom.

55. The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Brazil for his kind remarks addressed to me.

56. Mr. CSATORDAY (Hungary): I wish to join the speakers who preceded me in congratulating you, Sir, as President of the Council and to wish you success in the discharge of the duties of this high function in accordance with the Charter.

57. The Hungarian delegation also joins you, Mr. President, and other representatives in expressing our congratulations to your predecessor, Ambassador Ignatieff, who showed indisputable competence during his term of office.

58. May I also be permitted, on behalf of my delegation, to welcome our new colleague in the Council, Ambassador Wiggins of the United States.

59. The Security Council is again convened to deal with the Middle East situation. Again it was the United Arab Republic which was obliged to turn to the Council following the aggression committed against it by Israel on 31 October. This is not the first time that Israel has

¹ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-third Session, Plenary Meetings*, 1677th meeting.

hastened to ask for a meeting of the Council after an Arab country, victim of its admitted aggression, has done so. It is not out of place, perhaps, to remind members of this fact after hearing the accusations put forward by Israel against the United Arab Republic during the 1456th meeting on 1 November.

60. Israel, having repeatedly resorted to open aggression against the United Arab Republic, continues to violate the Charter provisions forbidding the use of force in international disputes. The mere fact that Israel, true to its traditional policy practised during the two decades of its existence, feels free to come to this Council to enunciate the "doctrine of free aggression"—what it calls "reprisals"—only shows Israel's approach to international relations.

61. Allow me now, to make a few observations on the issue before us. First, as I have already said, Israel wishes this Council to accept its contention that whenever Israel feels or says that it has been wronged, it has the right to practise a policy of unilateral military actions. Israel does not seek that the Council should establish the facts and provide a remedy for the situation. It acts in a manner which is clearly outside the scope of the Charter and then comes here to accuse the victim of its aggression. It acts as a one-State Security Council, establishes the facts at its will, and then proceeds to take enforcement actions.

62. Even if, ignoring the existing realities, we were to assume that the allegations presented to this Council by Israel could not be contested—which is not the case—Israel would have no right to attack any of its neighbours at will.

63. We have often underlined the fact that the idea of military reprisals is clearly rejected by the Charter and more specifically by resolutions of this Council. In resolution 248 (1968), adopted on 24 March 1968, it is stated in paragraph 3 that the Council "declares that such actions of military reprisal and other grave violations of the cease-fire cannot be tolerated and that the Security Council would have to consider further and more effective steps as envisaged in the Charter to ensure against repetition of such acts."

64. It is common knowledge that the Council has had to condemn Israel repeatedly in the course of the past year for resorting to offensive military actions and other grave violations of the cease-fire. Unfortunately the Council has so far been unable to take the kind of action envisaged in the above-quoted resolution. The responsibility for that state of affairs rests on those members which have consistently protected Israel from the application of measures listed in Chapter VII of the Charter. The consequences of our failure are there for everyone to see.

65. Secondly, attempts are made here by Israel and its protectors to place Israel and the Arab victims of its repeated aggressions on an equal footing. It is being said that all parties must respect the cease-fire and we are advised to adopt resolutions whose provisions have one objective and one objective only, namely, to enable Israel to maintain its occupation over the Arab territories conquered during last year's aggression against the United Arab Republic, Syria and Jordan.

66. In that connexion I feel obliged to say that the cease-fire cannot in our view serve as a cover for continued Israeli occupation. It cannot be utilized to let Israel consolidate its hold over these territories, to annex them, to settle them with its citizens, to utilize their natural resources, to obstruct navigation on international waterways, and so on. All those actions run counter to Charter principles and to General Assembly and Security Council resolutions.

67. Thirdly, the attempts of Israel and of its friends—attempts which I have just described—are designed to conceal the fact that whatever military actions have taken place in the Middle East since June 1967 have taken place on the territories of the Arab countries. When Israel tells us that it is defending itself, it is actually setting fire to the refineries of Suez, shelling Ismailia, damaging the bridges on the Nile or transformer stations in the United Arab Republic.

68. The other day we heard the representative of Israel describe the aggression that Israel's armed forces committed against the United Arab Republic on 31 October as a matter of self-defence. He stated that Israel acted to protect its security. One is constrained to ask: What about the security of its Arab neighbours? Are we really concerned with the security of Israel when it is the cities, the industries, the bridges, the canals of the United Arab Republic, the villages and territories of Jordan, Syria and Lebanon which are systematically and wantonly attacked and destroyed? There has not been a single case where the representative of Israel in this hall could accuse Israel's neighbours of bombarding its cities, deporting its citizens, declaring curfews in its towns, and so on. It is necessary to recall these matters to put the situation into proper perspective.

69. Consequently, no appeals to mutual restraint can change the fact that what we are dealing with here is not a dispute between several Member States but the flagrant aggression of one State against others. And let me stress this: as long as there is occupation of Arab territories conquered by the use of arms, the Israeli aggression continues. Almost a year ago the Council adopted resolution 242 (1967), which sought to put an end to the continuing aggression on the part of Israel against the Arab States. We know that the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Ambassador Jarring, is now engaged in serious talks with a view to finding a settlement on the basis of the provisions of resolution 242 (1967). The primary provision of that resolution is the withdrawal of the Israeli forces from occupied Arab territories. Everyone in this hall knows perfectly well who accepts resolution 242 (1967), thus facilitating the task of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, and who puts obstacles in his way.

70. The fact that Israel felt it advisable to extend its aggression to objectives deep in the territory of the United Arab Republic prompts us to ask: Is a deliberate extension of the area of savage military attacks contributing to the efforts to improve the prospects for peace in the Middle East? Were the bridges on the Nile the intended objectives of Israel's latest aggression or was it simply the peace mission of Ambassador Jarring that was the target? If Israel

feels that the road to a political settlement in the Middle East leads through the illegal and discredited policy of military actions called "reprisals", then Israel is badly mistaken. The Council should reject this notion which is favoured so much by Israel. To do this, it should resolutely condemn the latest wanton aggression by Israel. By doing so the Council will help Ambassador Jarring's mission because it will clearly say that the solution to the problems created by Israel's aggression against its neighbours should be expected not through the policy of terror, but rather through peaceful and political means.

71. The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Hungary for his good wishes.

72. Mr. IGNATIEFF (Canada): I have already extended the best wishes of the Canadian delegation to you at our previous meeting. They are very sincere and I only wish to repeat them.

73. Before entering into the substance of the item before us it gives me great pleasure to join other members of the Council in extending a warm welcome to Ambassador Wiggins of the United States. I should also like to thank those who have addressed undeserved cordial remarks in my direction with regard to the term of hard labour which the President served in September.

74. The latest serious incidents in the Suez Canal sector and inside the United Arab Republic focus attention once more, particularly in this Council, on the precarious nature of the cease-fire in the Middle East. Despite all too frequently repeated calls of the Council for scrupulous observance of the cease-fire, most recently in September when I was President, the Council is once again meeting to consider serious breaches of the cease-fire, admitted on the one hand by one of the parties and reported on the other hand by the United Nations observers on the spot. We have been reminded that cease-fire arrangements are of value only if scrupulously observed and rigorously respected by all concerned on both sides. Neither party is entitled to interpret the cease-fire arrangements to its own advantage.

75. The significance of the cease-fire should be clear enough by now. It is not of course meant to be a permanent solution. On the contrary, the Council intended that it should be followed by a peaceful settlement of the issues in dispute. The cease-fire is important because it provides for a halt to death, injury and destruction, enabling an atmosphere to develop in which serious steps towards a peaceful settlement can be taken.

76. This is my delegation's understanding of what a cease-fire means: the abandonment of violence for the pursuit of peace. Consequently, we can only deplore the latest developments and deeply regret the loss of life and damage to property. Both the United Arab Republic and Israel have in fact committed violations, and their actions are obviously interrelated. Reports submitted by General Bull indicate that the United Arab Republic was the first to initiate fire in the incident of 26 October. This action must be deplored. I must point out however that this does not mean that Israel's retaliatory raid can in any way be condoned or that it does not deserve equal censure.

77. Whatever the links between the acts of violence on both sides between the dates of 26 October and yesterday, 3 November, when we received a further report from General Bull, it must be clear that retaliation begets further retaliation and that in this cycle there can be no winners. Such a process can lead only to an escalation of violence in which the cause of peace is the loser.

78. It may be said that repeated acts of violence spring from the absence of a settlement some seventeen months after the cease-fire was established to end hostilities. But if the frustrations caused by this situation find expression in continued acts of hostility, whether surreptitious or overt, the achievement of a peaceful and accepted settlement will not be hastened but obstructed and further delayed. In speaking of violence and its causes and the recurrent hostilities and the escalation I should like to acknowledge the timely warning issued more than once in this Council by my neighbour, the representative of Brazil, regarding the dangers of an unlimited escalating arms race in the Middle East. We should heed his words and consider what needs to be done with this very urgent and difficult problem.

79. It seems clear to my delegation that any and all violations of the cease-fire must be condemned and that each party bears its full responsibility for the maintenance of the cease-fire. More important still, it must be recognized that the parties themselves carry the main responsibility in the search for a peaceful settlement. The Secretary-General's Special Representative, Ambassador Jarring, can of course assist the parties, but he needs their full co-operation in order to do so, for the responsibility of the parties themselves is paramount. Each must show deeper understanding of the deep-rooted fears and suspicions of the others and of their common desire to live in dignity and security.

80. In the whole course of the efforts made since the June war in 1967 to reach a solution there has not been a more fateful moment than the present one. I think we all realize that. I do not think it is an exaggeration to say that the days which lie ahead may well show whether the current efforts for peace have a chance of success or not. It is to those efforts and only to those efforts that the parties concerned should now lend their fullest support and devote all their energies.

81. As the representative of France reminded us only a few minutes ago, the Special Representative has consented to extend his mission until the end of this month, and that time should be given up fully to the continuing and sustained quest for peace by the parties.

82. Lij Endalkachew MAKONNEN (Ethiopia): I wish first of all to present to you, Sir, the congratulations and best wishes of the Ethiopian delegation upon the occasion of your assumption of the high office of President of the Security Council for the present month. By your dedication to duty and your active participation in all efforts aimed at consultation and conciliation you have already made a mark on the Council's proceedings during your few months of association with us and we, your colleagues, can say with satisfaction and pride that you have proved worthy of your country and of the high standards set by your predecessors

in the office of the Danish representative to the United Nations. Please accept the renewed assurance of my felicitations and best wishes. I should also like to include the two colleagues who preceded you in the Chair in the friendly sentiments I have expressed in your regard. Allow me also to join with my other colleagues around the table in extending a warm and friendly welcome to our new colleague, the distinguished representative of the United States.

83. When the twenty-third session of the General Assembly convened some five weeks ago the world community focused its attention on New York, hopefully expecting that the unique opportunity of this year's session would help speed up the peace-making effort that the Secretary-General's Special Representative has undertaken on our behalf. The Security Council had itself helped to encourage those high hopes on the part of the international community by, so to speak, preparing the ground for the contacts and consultations that everybody expected. In its resolution 258 (1968) of 18 September 1968 the Council, after expressing great concern with the deteriorating situation in the Middle East declared in clear and strong terms in its two operative paragraphs that the Security Council:

"1. *Insists* that the cease-fire ordered by the Security Council in its resolutions must be rigorously respected;

"2. *Reaffirms* its resolution 242 (1967) of 22 November 1967, and urges all the parties to extend their fullest co-operation to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General in the speedy fulfilment of the mandate entrusted to him under that resolution."

84. This time the call for the fullest co-operation of the parties with the Special Representative of the Secretary-General was given even greater significance by the meaningful presence here in New York both of the Foreign Ministers of the countries directly concerned and of Ambassador Jarring, who came here to United Nations Headquarters for consultations with the Secretary-General. These events and happenings could not but create a genuine and understandable feeling that now at last something could be in the air which might help move the Middle East peace effort from its present state of dangerous stalemate to that of a start in the direction of progress towards the final goal of a just and lasting settlement. But, alas, the events of the last few weeks have dampened the hopes of the international community just as much as they have hurt the prospect of peace-building in that troubled region. Moreover, recent statements and attitudes reported on both sides have underscored the gravity and the urgency of the situation we are facing.

85. It must be obvious to everyone that the cause of peace in the Middle East can in no way be served by military actions and counter-actions which can only intensify and perpetuate the military confrontation and conflict. The cease-fire is a necessary, albeit temporary, arrangement the maintenance of which is an essential condition for the peace effort that has been initiated by the United Nations. There must therefore be the utmost restraint on the part of all concerned to respect and maintain the cease-fire. Moreover, any incident or incidents in connexion with the

cease-fire should be brought to the attention of the Council for its appropriate judgement and action and must never be made the justification or excuse for one side or the other to take the law into its own hands. If a cycle of violence and counter-violence is allowed to continue, the chain of events will lead inevitably to the gradual escalation of the conflict, to such an extent that we shall have total war before we are aware of it.

86. So the Council must insist that no violation of the cease-fire and no military action based on the premise of retaliation or reprisal can be allowed and that all incidents and disputes must be referred to the United Nations representatives in the area for settlement through the machinery that the United Nations has established for that very purpose.

87. While that should be the general line of action that we should follow with regard to the complaints contained in our present agenda, we must always look beyond current incidents and concentrate our efforts on healing the deep wound in the Middle East body politic of which the current incidents are only the painful symptoms. It is in an endeavour to obtain a just and speedy settlement that we should concentrate all the force of our attention and our effort.

88. I was most impressed in this respect by the advice given us by our distinguished and learned colleague, Ambassador Baroody of Saudi Arabia, during his statement before the Council last Friday evening [*1456th meeting*]. He emphasized the need for a new and positive approach that deals with the roots of the problem and does not rely solely on temporary and inadequate palliatives. I believe that by its unanimous resolution 242 (1967) of 22 November 1967 the Security Council has indeed initiated such a positive approach that goes to the roots of the problem in the Middle East. The mandate defined in resolution 242 (1967) provides the only hopeful way by which we can bring just and lasting peace to that area and it is to the speedy fulfilment of the objectives of the mandate entrusted to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General that we and the parties should turn our concerted attention so that the gathering storm of impending conflict overhanging the skies of this meeting-ground of continents can be forestalled and removed before it is too late.

89. I shall limit myself to that short statement at this stage and shall, with your permission, Mr. President, intervene later on if necessary in the light of the future deliberations in the Council.

90. The PRESIDENT: May I thank the representative of Ethiopia for his good wishes and for his kind words not only with regard to my distinguished predecessor but also with regard to myself. Fortunately in less than a month I shall be given an opportunity to reciprocate properly.

91. I now call on the representative of Israel.

92. Mr. TEKOAH (Israel): I regret to inform the Security Council of another Egyptian act of aggression. Yesterday, United Arab Republic Mig-21 aeroplanes violated the cease-fire line in the Suez Canal area. They were challenged

by Israeli fighter aircraft and driven back. In the ensuing interception one Egyptian plane was hit and trailing smoke behind it. No Israeli aircraft was lost.

93. On 26 October 1968 in a wanton and sudden aggression the Egyptian army mounted a treacherous attack along the entire cease-fire line. Fifteen Israeli soldiers were killed and thirty-four wounded. This was, proportionately, as if an enemy attack had killed in a single day 1,500 American or Soviet soldiers and wounded more than 3,000.

94. The Israelis killed and maimed were young men who were on the cease-fire line at the Suez Canal for one reason only, because Egypt and other Arab States have not allowed Israel to live in peace on other demarcation lines. They were confronting Arab aggression as their fathers and elder brothers had done ever since the Arab States launched war against Israel in 1948 and even before. They fell like many before them, simply because Egypt continues to deny their people the right to life, to peace, to security. They were buried, and every home in Israel mourns them. In them we see ourselves and our children, embattled, menaced and bleeding, defending our independence, securing our future.

95. This is the tragedy of the Middle East. It has continued for twenty years. It has been a nightmare of daily bloodshed and murder. It has made each one of us live in the shadow of death. It must end. We shall not allow it to continue.

96. Whatever the distress of others, our pain is not born of living, whether in the cold of a winter wind, or in a refugee tent instead of a house. Our anguish comes from the attempt to deny us the right to live; our grief comes from having to fight desperately for our very survival; our sorrow, from the endless sacrifice of young lives to the Moloch of hate and aggression.

97. This is the tragedy that hovers over the Middle East and all others pale before it. We regret suffering and the loss of life on either side. However, to remove the threat to the life of a whole people is surely of the highest political and humanitarian priority.

98. How grave and urgent this is, how real the threat of which I am speaking, was illustrated at our previous meeting when the Security Council's Arab member spoke openly and unabashedly of the destruction of Israel as the only solution of the Middle East crisis. This spectacle of Algeria, a member State of the Council, defying international law, the United Nations Charter and United Nations resolutions is an affront to the Security Council. It highlights the problems and dangers which menace Israel.

99. I may remind the Council that Algeria has not yet accepted the cease-fire of June last year. This is documented by the Secretary-General in his note of 30 November 1967 [S/8279]. Algerian public information media have boasted about their participation in the 26 October aggression. I have reported this to the Council.

100. The attempt made today by the representative of the United Arab Republic to distort General Bull's reports on

Egypt's aggression of 26 October is a rather lame attempt to deny what is by now general knowledge and to suggest that the Security Council should accept the very opposite of what is being told by the Egyptian Government itself to its own people. In Cairo there is no hesitation in taking the credit for launching the attack along the Suez Canal. The responsibility for the attack is also recorded clearly by General Bull, who states in his report: "At 1445 GMT OP Lima observed mortar and heavy artillery fire initiated by United Arab Republic forces . . ." [S/7930/Add.95, para. 2.]

101. General Bull goes on to describe how the Egyptian forces initiated fire at other points along the cease-fire line and used rockets. Indeed, it is clear from his report that the United Arab Republic was the first to attack; it is clear that it was the last to cease-fire and that it had escalated the dimensions of the confrontation by using rockets.

102. To this unequivocal attribution of responsibility to Egypt, the only answer which the representative of the United Arab Republic is able to produce is that on the following afternoon the United Arab Republic authorities, according to General Bull's additional report of 1 November, showed to the United Nations military observers "a weapon in Port Tawfiq which the UAR authorities alleged was one of the missiles fired by the Israeli forces on Port Tawfiq on 26 October" [S/7930/Add.99]. The United Nations military observers themselves had not seen or heard such missiles being fired. The United Nations military observers did not report that such missiles had been used.

103. This is not the first time that the United Arab Republic authorities have resorted to such fabrications. The degree of veracity in the story about missiles that we heard today from the representative of the United Arab Republic is the same as that in the Egyptian version of how the Israeli measure of 31 October was carried out—a version scoffed at and denied in the meantime by Egyptian eye-witnesses.

104. The sudden and unjustified recrudescence of Egyptian acts of aggression has evoked widespread concern.

105. *The Times* of London of 31 October interpreted the United Arab Republic aggression as follows:

"Egypt appears to have adopted a new strategy in relation to its cease-fire line with Israel along the Suez Canal, whereby it will not consider pre-emptive artillery strikes against Israel positions on the occupied east bank a breach of the cease-fire agreement.

"The new Egyptian move, which was explained by Mr. Salah Gohar, Under-Secretary at the Foreign Ministry, to Lieutenant-General Odd Bull, the Chief United Nations Observer in the Middle East, marks a dangerous turn in the Arab-Israel situation. It means that short of launching an offensive across the Canal, the Egyptians have declared that they will no longer respect the cease-fire line between the two armies."

106. The distinguished political commentator Drew Middleton wrote in yesterday's *New York Times*:

"Egyptian comments on the Arab raid of October 26, echoing the boasts of Egyptian leaders before the war of

June 1967, indicate a renewal of political aggressiveness in Cairo.”

107. On 1 November, for instance, radio Cairo, in a statement notable as much for its candid acceptance of initial responsibility as for its bombast, declared: “Israel’s act is a cheap retort to Egypt’s glorious action.” This broadcast was simply echoing a campaign in the Egyptian press, radio and television extolling the new policy of intensified aggression and calling for the use of force against Israel.

108. The Swiss daily *La Suisse* wrote on 29 October 1968:

“Cairo’s policy tends to sabotage everything by creating incidents aimed at spreading conviction that we are on the verge of war rather than two paces away from peace.”

This does seem to be a possible motivation for the United Arab Republic’s new policy of “preventive” military operations: to sabotage the peace-making efforts. There appears to be no other logical reason for such unprovoked aggression.

109. The Paris newspaper *Le Monde* of 28 October accuses Egypt of renewed aggression and attributes it to Cairo’s desire to demonstrate its strength, raise the morale of its army and emphasize its opposition to negotiations. Recently, President Nasser openly announced that the stage of resistance is over and that the United Arab Republic has now entered upon a new stage of deterrent, preventive actions against Israel. The next stage, according to President Nasser, will be the “stage of liberation”.

110. This is an ominous statement of Egyptian policy and intentions. Is it of peace that Egypt is thinking, or of war? Is it the sword that it will persist in wielding?

111. The United Arab Republic’s intransigent posture is reflected in its attitude towards the peace-making efforts that are being pursued by Ambassador Jarring. The United Arab Republic refused to enter into direct peace negotiations with Israel. Then it rejected the proposal for joint meetings under Ambassador Jarring’s auspices. Today, it has not yet shown any readiness to join us in a meaningful preliminary exchange of views through Ambassador Jarring. Instead, it indulges in frivolous misrepresentations of Security Council resolution 242 (1967) of 22 November 1967, which it then hastens to cover up by claims that it accepts the resolution. This is simply not good enough. The Egyptian Government has never had any difficulty in making professions of faithfulness to international obligations; only to ignore them completely in practice. For twenty years it has waged overt war against Israel while claiming allegiance to the Charter. It has always been ready to announce its loyalty to some United Nations resolutions while defying others that called on it to make peace with Israel and refrain from active belligerency against Israel.

112. Now Egypt again waves pious declarations in the Security Council’s face while its political intransigence and military aggressiveness belie its own words. As an old Arab proverb states, it is “a mouth that prays, a hand that kills”.

113. The November 1967 resolution calls for the establishment of a just and lasting peace with Israel. The United Arab Republic Government has carefully avoided any specific mention of this central provision and has not yet undertaken to reach a just and lasting peace with Israel. The November resolution calls for agreement between the parties. The United Arab Republic Government has not given any indication of its willingness to conclude agreement with Israel.

114. Instead, the United Arab Republic seems to suggest that a political solution should be imposed on the parties from the outside by means of the so-called time-table. This is a distortion of the November resolution. The resolution does not speak of a time-table for matters which have not been agreed. It speaks of agreement. It does not call for a mere “political solution”. It calls for something more far-reaching: a just and lasting peace.

115. With Israelis falling under Egyptian bullets and shells, with the United Arab Republic Government publicly announcing the adoption of the policy of aggressive military operations against Israel, with the United Arab Republic refusing to enter into meaningful clarifications of views through Ambassador Jarring, it might have been natural to conclude that the pursuance of peace-making efforts with Cairo would at this stage be fruitless.

116. Yet, the Government of Israel has decided to persist in its search for agreement, Mr. Abba Eban, Israel’s Minister for Foreign Affairs, has returned to New York with further proposals and additional clarifications. This morning he has resumed his contacts in a constructive spirit with Ambassador Jarring. He is prepared to maintain these contacts: for without the utmost perseverance complex international problems cannot be resolved. It will now be up to the United Arab Republic to determine whether those contacts will, as we hope, develop into a serious exchange of views leading to understanding and permanent peace.

117. Mr. BOUATTOURA (Algeria) (*translated from French*): If this statement had been made by someone other than the spokesman for the Zionist authorities which are occupying Palestine, my delegation could have exercised its right of reply. A number of gratuitous and provocative statements have just been made, and my delegation wishes to clarify a number of points.

118. I shall not dwell on the contribution which the Algerian delegation can or cannot make to the work of the Security Council. Others are in a better position to judge of the quality of the contribution which we can make to the Council’s labours. Indeed, Algeria was elected by an overwhelming majority to the seat which it now occupies in the Security Council. As far as we are concerned, that is the best proof of confidence that can be given to a country.

119. Algeria, of course, has not contributed, as have the Zionist authorities, to the deterioration of the international atmosphere. We have not, for over twenty years, violated that fundamental principle: the right to self-determination. Algeria has not occupied territories other than Algerian territories. From that point of view, it has clearly not made a major contribution to international relations.

120. In order the better to dissimulate the motives and intentions of their policies, the Zionist spokesmen frequently bring up the well-known problem of the existence of Israel. On this subject, I should like to repeat what my delegation has had occasion to say several times before: the basic problem is that of the existence of the Palestinian people; that is the people to which all national existence is denied. The basic problem is that of recognizing the Palestinian people's right to self-determination, of recognizing its national rights. The basic problem is not and cannot be the recognition of a *fait accompli*, whatever it may be.

121. We have said, we repeat now and, if necessary, we shall repeat it again: we cannot recognize colonial régimes which have been imposed by force and which suddenly set themselves up as States, whether in Palestine, or, in a few weeks' time, in Rhodesia or, as happened many years ago, in South Africa. We cannot have one position about Palestine and another about Rhodesia or South Africa, or vice versa.

122. With regard to the cease-fire, my Government and my delegation have on several occasions made our position clear. As was shown by events in Algeria itself, and as has been shown in the last few days by events in Viet-Nam, a cease-fire must be conditional on a political settlement. When the right of self-determination is at issue a political settlement can never be conditional on a cease-fire, whatever its nature.

123. The fact that Algerians had the honour of fighting at the side of their brothers of the United Arab Republic was primarily due to the natural solidarity which unites them with all who fight for their national liberation, all who fight for the recovery of their national territories. That is true in the Arab context. It is equally true, as everyone knows, in the African context.

124. The PRESIDENT: I recognize the representative of Israel in exercise of the right of reply.

125. Mr. TEKOAH (Israel): As has already become clear there is really no need for me to reply to statements by the representative of Algeria. It is quite sufficient to leave it to his superiors to do that. On 25 October 1967 President Boumédiène of Algeria stated: "Nasser's main error was his acceptance of the cease-fire agreement". On 25 October 1968 the Foreign Minister of Algeria said the following before the General Assembly of the United Nations: "The fundamental problem, however, lies in the creation of Israel".²

126. That attitude makes it clear that Algeria has placed itself outside the family of nations and that Algeria's participation in the United Nations organ entrusted with peace and international security is an affront to members of this Council and of the United Nations as a whole. The representative of Algeria masquerades here as a defender of all peoples' rights, while denying such rights to the people of Israel. It is time that he and his Government recognized

that law and justice cannot be based on discrimination and that the people of Israel also have a right to self-determination, to independence, to peace and to security.

127. Mr. BOUATTOURA (Algeria) (*translated from French*): Perhaps because I was using a language which is not familiar to the spokesman of the Zionist authorities established in Palestine, he was unable to grasp even the meaning—not to speak of the whole significance—of the statement I made a few minutes ago.

128. I shall simply say that, for Algeria, when the right to self-determination is at issue, when the effective recognition of that right is at issue, a cease-fire must be conditional on a political settlement; a political settlement cannot be conditional on a cease-fire. The events in Algeria proved it; the events in Viet-Nam are proving it.

129. I have to say, and to repeat, what my President has said, to repeat what my Minister has said, for in so doing, we remain true to ourselves, true to our past, true to our contribution to international relations. The problem is indeed that of the creation of Israel, the problem is indeed that of the right to self-determination of the Palestinian people—the only authentic people of Palestine. The problem is identical—I have said it and I repeat it—with the Rhodesian problem, with the South African problem. Those are the three cases: the problem of the creation of Israel, of Ian Smith's Rhodesia, of South Africa with its *apartheid*.

130. I do not know who have placed themselves outside the international community: those who, like Algeria, see their action encouraged by their Arab brothers, see their action encouraged by all the African peoples, which only recently deemed it appropriate to pay a tribute to my country by holding their meetings in Algiers, or those who for the past twenty years have trampled that principle of self-determination underfoot, those who for the past twenty years have been engaged in territorial expansion, those who for the past twenty years have refused to submit to international law.

131. As for discrimination, Zionism, like *apartheid*, has become its symbol.

132. The PRESIDENT: The representative of Saudi Arabia has just informed me that he would like to address the Council again this afternoon. If I hear no objection, I shall invite him to take a place at the Council table and address the Council.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. J. M. Baroody (Saudi Arabia) took a place at the Council table.

133. The PRESIDENT: I now call on the representative of Saudi Arabia.

134. Mr. BAROODY (Saudi Arabia): Mr. President, I must thank you and the other members of the Council for granting me permission to speak again. Every time the representative of Israel calls the Arabs aggressors, I feel duty bound to rebut his allegations and to show who the real aggressor was in Palestine.

² See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-third Session, Plenary Meetings*, 1707th meeting, para. 90.

135. I am duty bound to offer a few clarifications to the Council. This question started in 1920. I do not know where Mr. Tekoah was in 1920. Mr. Tekoah tells us that the Romans chased the Zionists. If we examine history books, we find that there were no Zionists in the times of the Romans. There were Jews; there were Jews of the area and they were real Semites. Mr. Tekoah is a Jew by religion but he looks to me, as do many of those who usurped the Holy Land, like a European.

136. Their religion is Judaism. We always profess that this religion is one of the three noble monotheistic religions. Ethnologically, he and those who came from Eastern Europe do not belong to the area. The mere fact that they are Jews does not give them any more right than Christian Europeans to embark on another invasion of Western Asia. Mr. Tekoah had some curious figures and he drew certain parallels. He mentioned that fifteen were killed some days ago—fifteen Israelis—and thirty or so wounded, and he said it as if 1,500 Americans were killed and 3,000 wounded. I am sure he was talking to the Jews of New York, but he forgot that there is another side of the coin. At least one million or so Palestinians have so far lost their homelands on account of Zionist incursions into our midst. People would laugh if I said it was as if 100 million Americans were chased out of the United States of America. But, since we are drawing up comparisons, it is as if 100 million Americans had been chased out of their country. Such parallels are misleading. They dramatize the issue. No doubt Mr. Tekoah is eloquent, and his diction is quite good for a Semite from Eastern Europe, but he cannot dramatize tragedy, the tragedy which—as my colleague from Algeria mentioned—has befallen the Palestinian people, the whole people of Palestine but for 6 per cent who were Jews in 1919 at the time the United Kingdom was granted the Mandate over Palestine.

137. As I said during previous interventions, the majority of those 6 per cent were Arab Jews. I call them Arab Jews whether he likes it or not. They spoke Arabic. They had an Arab background and culture. Their religion was only Judaism inasmuch as the religion of some Jews was Christianity, but they were Arabs. The religion of some people in the area was Judaism, but they spoke Arabic, they thought in Arabic. Let them consult the words of history when the Arab Jews thrived and were respected by the Arabs when they were at the zenith of their glory. I say “glory” judiciously—not an empty glory; I am talking of the Arabs of the Middle Ages when darkness had spread its wing over Europe and when Plato and Aristotle and others were made familiar to Europe through the Arabs. I do not have to recall how they flocked from Oxford—which was no more perhaps than a high school of today—they flocked to Spain to learn Arab philosophy, and ancient Greek philosophy and culture. And many of those Arabs that were in Spain were Jews, but they did not come from Eastern Europe. There was no Herzl then who, frustrated as he must have been because of the persecution of Jews in Europe, thought he could perhaps think of creating an enclave for the Jews where they could live at peace. But the Arabs never persecuted the Jews. They were never aggressors against the Jews. And here comes a Jew from Eastern Europe, a Zionist who has repeatedly called us aggressors. He talks of Egyptians—who were Hamites at the time of

Christ and before Christ, but now are Arabs, because as I said, there is a resiliency in Arabism.

138. Then he speaks about the Algerians; I do not know who inhabited Algeria, but they were Arabites and they are perhaps better Arabs than many people of Arab origin. We do not discriminate.

139. When he talks about Arab aggression and throws aspersions at the Arabs he is also speaking against the Sudanese, who were Arabites—as I said in my last intervention—not by coercion or compulsion but by example.

140. I think Mr. Tekoah should be careful to go back to history, to the genesis of this movement, before he throws journalistic terms around here. There is nothing wrong with journalism, it is very instructive, but let me say that he cited various newspapers today. Of course, he mentioned Drew Middleton of *The New York Times*. What is *The New York Times* but a Zionist newspaper? There are no more newspapers except big Zionist newspapers here in New York City. When I first came to America, to New York City, there was *The Sun* and *The World Telegram* and *The Herald Tribune*. They played politics with the Zionists in those days to get the advertisements from the department stores and the Zionist concerns. They folded up, and now there are two newspapers.

141. No matter how they pretend they are fair in treating news, when it comes to Israel I think their minds have become befogged. That is quite natural. They have been brainwashed by the Zionists. The Jews have been brainwashed by the Zionists here, but thank God for those who still opt for Americanism—Jews who are loyal American citizens and who have their loyalty to the United States, not this split loyalty, one to Israel and one to the United States.

142. I do not know who bought *The Times* of London. It has changed hands since I was in London in 1929. *The Times* of London has to survive; it is not *The Times* it used to be when I was in London in 1929. Maybe it needs a little more advertising. I am talking frankly: it has to cater to the Zionists and slant its news in favour of these advertisers. I know who controls the exports and the distribution of goods in Great Britain, the department stores. I lived there; I know. I lived for a decade in London.

143. Mr. Tekoah mentioned *La Suisse*; he mentioned *Le Monde* of Paris. I do not know who owns those papers; I know that here in this country the Zionists have seen to it that they control many newspapers—the mass media of information. And we call what they write great journalism reflecting the freedom of the press. How can there be freedom of the press when there are advertisers and when you have to court them? And we know who those advertisers are.

144. How can there be freedom of the press when a certain family which owns a newspaper tries to indoctrinate its readers with one candidate or the other in an election, wielding influence out of proportion to its numbers, using methods that affect the subliminal mind of man through repetition?

145. Advertising is an art; it has even invaded the minds of men to such a degree that sometimes I wonder to what extent they have been conditioned by news that is subtly repeated and presented in such a manner as to make the readers believe what those newspapers want them to believe.

146. But has it occurred to Mr. Tekoah that he sadly neglected mentioning any other newspapers—for example from Moscow? Why did he not quote Moscow, for that matter? Why did he not quote certain Hungarian newspapers or African newspapers, or Asian newspapers, for that matter? Why? Because he chooses what suits him to build up a case—a case which is built on sand and which will totter, as history will show.

147. He said that all the Arabs are ganging up on Israel and that Israel has the right to live. It fell to me years ago to draw the attention of the General Assembly and that of the Security Council to the fact that Palestine did not belong to Egypt, or to Jordan, or to Lebanon, or to Syria, but to a people in whom sovereignty resided: none other than the Palestinian people, regardless of whether they were Arabs, regardless of whether they were Christians, Moslems, or adherents of any other religion. They had a personality, and lived for centuries on the land. Conquerors had come and conquerors had gone; but they stuck to the land. Their ancestors are buried in the soil of Palestine. You cannot do away with the Palestinian people.

148. Mr. Eban spoke of a five-year plan—I listened to him—thinking that the refugees could be scattered around: perhaps some of them might come to the United States, even. The United States, with the pressure that the Zionists can exert on this country, could, in his estimation, probably absorb some of those refugees. And others could go to Australia: the Western countries are sympathetic. He did not mention it: I do not know whether he wanted to send some of them to Russia. The Zionists are always asking that the gates of the Soviet Union should be opened so that good Jewish Soviets may flock into Palestine.

149. Sometimes one thinks that if even the Soviet Union—one of the super-Powers of today—is maligned because of alleged anti-Semitism, what can we Arabs do when we have no mass media of information to rebut the false allegations made time and again by the Zionists.

150. Is it any wonder that I ask to intervene here? This is the only place where we can make our voice heard, even though the newspapers say, “Ah Baroody is a negligible quantity, and Arabia is engulfed in the sands of the Peninsula”. But Baroody and every Saudi is an Arab; and every Arab is a Palestinian.

151. As I said on Friday, we may bicker and quarrel, but when it comes to Palestine, every Arab, whether he is a Moroccan, a Tunisian, an Algerian, a Sudanese, a Lebanese, a Syrian, a Jordanian, an Egyptian, a Saudi Arab, or someone belonging to the principalities and sheikhdoms which are federating now in the Gulf, every one of us is an Arab, and every Arab is a Palestinian when it comes to Palestine.

152. I think my colleague from Brazil did not recite a homily this afternoon, as we sometimes hear in the United Nations. He was frank and outspoken, and gave us some food for thought. So did our colleague from Ethiopia when he referred to what I had said: that we should go to the root of the matter, and not satisfy ourselves with palliatives.

153. To most of you here Palestine is more or less academic. And who briefs you? Experts, many of them—not all—oriented experts, oriented by the policies that serve national interests. But when the experts are honest they are not listened to—like Sir Ronald Storrs at one time, when he spoke to Mr. Balfour. He was not heeded by Mr. Balfour; or Mr. Henderson, for that matter, or Paul Allen—may God rest his soul in peace—who spoke to me in 1948; he was a member of the State Department and he spoke to Mr. Truman. Mr. Truman, in his memoirs, said: “Who are these striped-pants boys?” The experts are called “striped-pants boys”. Luckily for us diplomats nowadays, we do not wear striped pants any more.

154. Mr. Tekoah said that the Israelis have the right to live. Nobody is denying them the right to live as Jews, as people who would have liked to live in Palestine. During the Ottoman Empire, in the best tradition of Islam, the Jews not only were not discriminated against, but were a privileged people in Istanbul. Many of them were advisers to the Ministers at the Porte. We in Western Asia did not discriminate against the Jews. It was in Europe that discrimination started. Again I must say that, as if from a guilty conscience, some Europeans wanted to seek redress for the Jews, and thought that they could entertain the whims of a dream—the dream of Herzl—for which there was no longer a *raison d'être*. For, as I mentioned—and I mention again—after the Dreyfus affair, legislation was initiated all over Europe to see that the Jew would not be looked down upon.

155. The Jews have privileges now—not equal rights, but privileges. Well, it is human for any person—not only the Jew or the Zionist—to get privileges. As I have said in a Committee of the General Assembly time and again, most people nowadays fight not for equality but for privileges and human rights: wealth, power and glory. Some people want more wealth than they can use; others more power than is good for them or the community or the nation or the world in which they live; and others want glory—vain glory. All these are in the nature of seeking privileges. Why should not the Jew seek privileges? But when it is at the expense of a whole people—the Palestinian people—then we must heed the fact that if we do not stop Israel there will be a world conflagration, because the United States will not leave us alone and the Soviet Union is not going to leave some of the Arabs alone—the balance of power, mentioned time and again.

156. We have not changed since the days of the League of Nations. I observed the League of Nations: the balance of power. But at whose expense in the long run? At the expense of the Palestinian people. Well, the Palestinian people have been roused and I think it is high time that they fended for themselves, whether the Arabs can or cannot help them effectively.

157. What shall we do? Dump two million Palestinians into the Mediterranean, or disperse them? Suppose they do not want to be dispersed, they do not want to emigrate. At one time the Zionists thought, "Well, in twenty years those Arab refugees who left their country will have died." But who are the Palestinian freedom fighters now? Are they the old folks? No, the freedom fighters range between the ages of seventeen and twenty-five. Many of them were born in the camps. What shall the Arabs do—Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, Syria?

158. Syria exercises a great deal of wisdom. It is not talking about peace because it knows that there can be no peace. I do not say that it is wrong for the Egyptians or for the Jordanians, for that matter, to seek an honourable solution. But I was involved in the Syrian national uprisings in 1925—and when it comes to national acumen, you cannot change a Syrian. He will die fighting. They know it is futile to talk when, if they do give in, the Palestinian people in Syria and all over the Arab world will see to it that they are liquidated. It takes only a bullet to kill a person.

159. Out of thirteen leaders who were shot, when it was rumoured that they were going to find a solution with the Zionists before the partition of Palestine, I knew nine. I assure the Council that they were all innocent. But there are activists in the Arab world as there are in every other country, including the United States, no doubt Russia, the Balkan countries and elsewhere in Europe. There was a rumour that they were going to find an accommodation with the Zionists and they were shot like birds. One of them, a king, was shot in the mosque—none other than the grandfather of His Majesty King Hussein, whom I knew personally. I used to meet him in London when he came there in the 1930s in order to deal with this question with the Mandatory Power. The Palestinians or those of the same persuasion shot them. Here again I refer to the wise words of my colleague from Brazil, who said something about an exercise in semantics when resolution 242 (1967) of 22 November 1967 was referred to. Although I must not judge Mr. Goldberg by rumours, I heard that he had a good hand in drawing up that resolution.

160. But the Zionists who helped in writing that resolution somewhere in one of the capitals succeeded in putting the knot of the wood in the saw of the carpenter. The Zionists will withdraw if you live with them, if you make peace with them. I think Mr. Eban finally realizes that no Arab Government can talk about treaties with Israel, and this is why they are talking of parallelism. Poor Mr. Jarring—one day the Arabs talk to him and another day the Zionists, and he tries to synthesize something out of nothing. I commiserate with him because he is a gentleman, a man with a great conscience. No wonder he wanted to leave. The Israelis do not want peace. They could have peace if, instead of hoisting the banner of Israel they brought it down and became components of a Middle East community, living in peace either by way of cantonization or some other political device, like the Swiss for example, and forget about the in-gathering of the Jews from all over the world. The majority of the Jews do not want to go to Israel; they are happy where they are. They are building skyscrapers in Manhattan, they control lots of business in Western Europe; of course they could not do that in the

Soviet Union because there the State controls industry, but if they could perhaps the skyscrapers in the Soviet Union, because it is a bigger country, would be higher than the Empire State Building.

161. I was a little amused when Mr. Tekoah mentioned, or rather adduced, for one of his arguments an Arab proverb. Our repertory of Arab proverbs is quite large and I single out one proverb which the Arabs here will understand: in English the meaning is "He hit me and he cried and wept, and you are the first one to complain". These people came in 1919, they flocked into Palestine; they even hanged the British Tommies—Lord Caradon will tell you—calling them enemies. Finally, the British gave up and dumped the Mandate in the lap of the United Nations. They even went to the partner of Mr. Truman, Jacobson I believe or some name like that, when he was in the haberdashery business in Missouri. There is nothing wrong with rising from a haberdasher to become the President of the United States of America; this is to the honour of this country. But they went to Mr. Jacobson until, according to the memoirs of Mr. Truman, he found no more rest. Read those memoirs tonight, Mr. Wiggins, if you can because we are going, as someone has said, to have many sessions here. Because it is not Egypt, or Syria, or Jordan that is going to find the solution with Mr. Jarring, or after Mr. Jarring leaves. It is the Palestinian peoples who refuse—people who have their sovereignty, who have their identity; they are called Palestinians like the Lebanese, the Syrians, the Iraqis, the Sudanese, the Egyptians, or for that matter like any people whether they be from Western Asia, from the heart of Asia or from any continent. Read Mr. Truman's memoirs, Ambassador Wiggins, and you will find that you repeated the error of the United Kingdom in abetting, or rather in wielding your influence for the creation of Israel in a place which is now tantamount, figuratively speaking, to a hornet's nest.

162. Mr. Tekoah says, "We have the right to survival". I answer him: "What about the Palestinian people? Have they the right to survival?" Should we always look at our own interests? What did Moses say? "Love thy neighbour." I wish I had brought the Bible with me because it is full of gems on which Israel is trampling in a secular manner. I am not talking of the orthodox Jews; they are devout and pious like people of other religious denominations. I am talking about the secular leaders, or the leaders who profess a certain religion, and I must say in fairness to the Jews that religion has been used sometimes to motivate a political movement. The Israelis are no exception. Mr. Tekoah cites the Charter of the United Nations. The Charter was brought out in 1945. What about the right of self-determination enshrined in the Charter? Did the United Nations in 1947 consider that the Palestinian people had the right to self-determination? No. They did not consider that because there were political arrangements and modalities. As I said, our friends from the United Kingdom committed a great error at the time of empire, and then it was repeated by our friends of the United States of America. I am not saying "friends" derisively; they are our friends. Sometimes your friends hurt you more than your enemies. They have hurt us tremendously.

163. The Palestinian people cannot be denied the right to regain their homeland, not necessarily by war or bloodshed.

If those who created Israel would prevail upon it to see wisdom and not go back to those days of its creation by pressure, there would be peace. There will be peace if it is based on justice, and justice means the non-denial to the Palestinian people of their homeland. Again I must say that this need not necessarily involve bloodshed.

164. In twenty years the world has changed tremendously, in the twenty years since the creation of Israel. Jews then lived peacefully there without the flag of Israel, without the exclusivity of Zionists in a land which they claim as their own. Nowadays the courts in Israel are having a hard time determining who is a Jew. Incidentally, I read this in *The New York Times*. I need not go into the details, but if the mother is Jewish then the child is a Jew; the father does not count, it seems. Those are fundamentalistic ideas. We have some fundamentalism in our part of the world. But the world has changed tremendously. If the Jews want to live in Palestine as Jews and not as political Zionists, a solution will readily be found, but not under the banner of Israel. I am not talking about the destruction of Israel; Israel is a symbol and there are some symbols that are wrong from the beginning. I am dealing with human beings. Far be it from me to suggest that there should be a day of reckoning, but I am afraid it may come one of these days.

165. Again, somebody here mentioned, and rightly, that Palestine is becoming the arena of power politics for the two super-Powers. But even if the super Powers were to reach an understanding and to see to it that arms were withheld from both sides, what about the future? For the time being that might be a solution, but who could guarantee that there would not be an irruption in the not too distant future? Again we should be treating this question in a way which would be like, as we say in Arabic, treating a fever with poultices of watermelon rind. If you put the rind of watermelon on the skin of a feverish man, he may think he is relieved but the fever will come back with a vengeance.

166. This question should be treated radically and, from my humble experience after having lived for forty-three years with this question, may I suggest that those who created Israel, in particular, re-examine the whole question. States, like individuals, make mistakes. They cannot just patch up such a mistake because, to quote the Biblical proverb, it has become a tattered piece of cloth and you cannot patch a tattered piece of cloth.

167. To those who are wary because the Soviet Union has come into the area—it is mentioned every day in the newspapers here—I would say that by your actions you invited the Soviet Union to come to the area. Since the days of the Czars Russia had been unable to go through the Bosphorus. What if they come? They are an industrial Power and one day they will probably start trading. They are already trading with you and with Egypt, Syria, Iraq. There is nothing wrong with that. The Western Powers have far more economic interests in the area, but it shows the visible and invisible Powers the Zionists wield that these interests are being cast by the wayside.

168. What have we done to certain Western Powers? We sell them oil at a fraction per barrel of what it costs them to

produce it in their own countries. With Arab hospitality we open our arms wide to them. We have never hurt the Western Powers, but the whole of Asia and the continent of Africa have been hurt persistently by the Western Powers. Not all the Western Powers: I must pay tribute to France. France has recognized the errors of the nineteenth century and, because that great statesman, General de Gaulle, is perspicacious in handling international affairs, he is decried as a nationalist by none other than those who wooed France in the past. It shows that the Western peoples are capable of producing men of wisdom and sanity, but if they want to continue to be indoctrinated by the Zionists they are, I submit, misguided, because they do not know their own interest. It may be in their short-term interest, but they cannot stay in the Middle East: if we examine the situation objectively, it is clear that they cannot stay for long. Perhaps in a decade or two, perhaps tomorrow, they will disappear. If the world goes up in flames, as it may very well do, because of the arsenals that are filled with lethal modern weapons, it will not matter then who remains there; it will become a question of squabbles.

169. This is my message to the Council in response to the aspersions which are repeatedly cast by Mr. Tekoah and his ilk at the Arab people. We have our dignity. We respect the dignity of all other human beings. But do not be mistaken; nobody can solve this question except the Western Powers. And do not blame the Soviet Union and its friends if they want to come to the rescue of certain States. What would have happened if there had been no Soviet Union? God help us, what would have happened? You and the Zionists would have had a holiday there, subjugating us as you subjugated Africa and Asia in the nineteenth century. God is great, and invisible. I am not talking of the traditional God, the designer of the universe. The moral forces of the universe, the law of retribution, the law of compensation—all have their play. One does not have to believe in a certain religion to discern that nothing which has been done and which has injured a people can last for long.

170. There is the law of retribution; and I am one who would not like to see retribution, because this is not the spirit that will bring about brotherhood amongst human beings, amongst the human family. But this is how it goes.

171. There can be no pursuit of peace, I repeat, in the Middle East, whether through this Organization or by any other avenues, unless the West realizes once and for all that the exercise of tremendous power does not intimidate a people. In Damascus in 1925, when I was a young man and when the Mandatory Power was being fought, I remember how a hundred men would draw lots in order to take a battery; they had nothing but small arms. Then the hundred would draw lots to see who would be in the centre of those who were trying to capture that battery. The battery was surrounded by a nest of machine guns; there were two wings. That was before the *Blitzkrieg* of Hitler; nobody then had heard of the house painter in Austria. And then, valiantly, with heads high, knowing that they were going to pay with their lives, they assaulted; those in the middle were decimated but from the flanks a few were saved and they took the battery from behind. Who was fighting against those nationalists, who were called terrorists? Who, but our brothers from Senegal, soldiers from

Senegal. That was in the colonial days when revolvers were brandished and whips lashed them if they refused to shoot.

172. The spirit of the nationalists cannot be broken. Do not for a moment entertain the thought that you can break the spirit of the Palestinian people; they have awakened. I was afraid about two or three years ago that it was a lost cause. Algeria taught the whole world a great lesson. Incidentally, it fell to me to write the complaint about Algeria. One of their nationalists came to this city—none other than Mr. M'hammed Yazid, who later became Minister of Information—and I asked him how many troops the Algerian fighters had at their disposal. He mentioned the number of about 15,000 to 18,000. I said: "Then you are losing; you are fighting a lost battle." He said: "We hit and run; we strike when we want. A million Algerians have been wounded." Four hundred and fifty thousand trained troops, valiant troops, were being fought by 15,000 Algerians, until that wise man came, General de Gaulle, and placed his life in jeopardy—because in every country there are people who do not want to relinquish what they have—and finally assisted in the liberation of that country which Mr. Tekoah tries to malign today. Thank God he has no power; otherwise he would expel us all; anyone who did not heed the Zionists would be expelled from the Organization. This gentleman, U Thant, our beloved Secretary-General—his tongue is tied. He was the gentleman who headed the committee for the liberation of Algeria in the Afro-Asian group. He remembers that, when I was chairman of the group, I would ask him and he would kindly come with me to see the late Mr. Hammarskjöld.

173. Where is the colonial Power now? And do you consider Israel anything but a colonial movement, to exploit not only the Arab countries, but the whole Middle East? We say in Arabic: "The error of the clever is compounded a thousandfold". If the Jews had come freely to Palestine because of religious sentiments, nobody would have molested them. They would have lived there, traded, brought their technology. And by Jove, by this time, they would probably be dominating the Middle East. But they wanted the banner of Israel to rally all the Jews in the world. And the Jews in the world are happy where they are

174. The PRESIDENT: Mr. Ambassador, I apologize with great respect for interrupting you. In view of the lateness of the hour, however, and in order to enable me to carry on the business of the presidency in the best possible manner, to plan for the work of the Council, I should appreciate it very much if you, Mr. Ambassador, would find it possible to indicate to me, just in a general way, the approximate length of the remainder of your statement.

175. Mr. BAROODY (Saudi Arabia): I apologize if I have perhaps taken more time than I should have. In fact, I was on the point of winding up my statement. The clock seems to be staring at me and I noted that it was getting late. However, I must mention to you, Sir, that Saudi Arabia has never, during the twenty-three years of its membership, sought a seat on the Council. We have kept aloof from participating in the deliberations of this Council concerning problems on which we have not arrogated to ourselves a special knowledge. So if I have spoken today or on other

days at perhaps greater length than others unfamiliar with the problem may have done, it is because I believe it my duty to enlighten the members of the Council, many of whom could be my sons for that matter or my brothers who come from a different area.

176. But there will be other times when I shall continue this debate. I realize that you have to have consultations now. With your permission I shall resume my intervention at some future date if I feel it necessary. Having said this, I should say that I was winding up what I wanted to say. I am sure you will grant me a minute or two and then you can pursue your consultations, which I hope will be fruitful. I was in fact winding up my statement. My train of thought has been broken—not intentionally of course. I must gather my thoughts and say that there shall be no peace in the Middle East as long as the Palestinian people are ignored; and, conversely, there shall be peace in the Middle East if, as I mentioned during our last meeting, a new approach is resorted to on the lines I suggested then and which I shall elaborate during our next meeting, I hope, with God's will.

177. Allow me to thank you, Sir, and the members of the Council for the generosity you have manifested towards the representative of a small State who has tried to be objective in this matter as much as it was humanly possible.

178. The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Saudi Arabia very much for the accommodating attitude he took to my question which was—I wish to stress—only a question.

179. Lord CARADON (United Kingdom): I had two purposes in asking to be heard. One was to speak very shortly on a theme which has been already dealt with in a series of remarkable speeches this evening. I have in mind particularly the outstanding speeches of the Ambassadors of France, Ethiopia, Canada and Brazil. That theme is the theme that in our effort to advance to a settlement we have now reached—I think we all recognize this—a crisis of the utmost consequence and urgency, and in the light of that theme I wish to speak very shortly but presently to make a suggestion as to our work.

180. I have a feeling—and I think that it is shared by many members of the Council—an uneasy feeling that as far as the advance to a peaceful settlement is concerned, it may well be November or never. November last year was the month of our unanimous agreement. We might look back on this November as the month when the opportunity for a peaceful settlement slipped beyond our reach. And at this critical stage the most dangerous attitude of all, I would respectfully suggest, is the attitude of mutual recrimination, of accusation and counter-accusation, of an increase of ill-feeling. I think it is necessary at this critical time that we should all ask ourselves what we are here for. We are here not merely to state opposing positions; we are here, we trust, to make some contribution to a peaceful settlement; we are here to try again to find agreement among ourselves. Certainly it is true, as the Ambassador of Canada told us, that it is the parties who carry the chief responsibility. But all of us I believe would wish to make if we could some contribution to restoring the peace and to making it

permanent. If the opportunities of this month escape us, we shall look back at 1967 as the year when we agreed on an honourable settlement and on 1968, as the year of failure, as the year when we failed or were prevented from giving effect to our own decisions. If we fail in 1968, then surely 1969 will be the year of retribution, the year when hate, fear and hopelessness take full command, and when the horror of another war becomes a terrible certainty.

181. We know that there are discussions now proceeding, which we trust will urgently continue, which may be decisive; they are of overriding importance and we trust that the Foreign Ministers who are engaged in those discussions will give us in this Council the assistance that we need to escape from the deadlock in which we find ourselves. Surely, we should do nothing to impede or interrupt those vital discussions. I therefore suggest to the Council that we should today adjourn and meet again whenever, after consultations under your direction, we decide that the best time has come. I am not sure that it would be well to attempt to continue immediately the debate on which we are engaged; I believe that time might well be provided for the discussions which we know are proceeding at this time. It is surely the future that matters. My suggestion, therefore, Sir, is that we should have the opportunity of consulting amongst ourselves under your leadership before we decide to continue the present debate.

182. That is the suggestion which I put forward as being perhaps best suited to the needs of the present critical situation.

183. The PRESIDENT: Members will have heard the point of view just expressed by the representative of the United Kingdom as to the timing of our next meeting on the question on our agenda today. I have in my capacity as President, as you will all know, consulted members on how to pursue our consultations. I am somewhat in doubt whether I should go straight ahead in telling about those consultations I have carried on, or whether, in the light of the points of view expressed by the representative of the United Kingdom, there might be members of the Council who might want to intervene at this stage.

184. Mr. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*translated from Russian*): The proposal by the United Kingdom representative is somewhat unexpected, since I had gathered that, following the President's consultations, the majority of members were inclined—or so I was informed—to fix the next meeting for Thursday or Friday. That is quite a long delay, today being only Monday. If consultations are possible on the substance of the question, then the President would have an opportunity for holding them, and the members of the Security Council would

co-operate with him in the matter. That being the case, therefore, the proposal was rather surprising.

185. I am inclined to think that it would be preferable to agree on a date which, according to my information, is acceptable to the majority, that is, to hold the next meeting on Thursday or Friday.

186. Lord CARADON (United Kingdom): I did not wish to put forward a formal proposal under the rules and naturally would conform with the wishes of the Council as a whole. If it could be understood—as I think is the suggestion now made to us by the Ambassador of the Soviet Union—that a date should be fixed but that we would be free, of course in consultation with you, Sir, to vary that date, then I should be perfectly content.

187. The PRESIDENT: I may perhaps now inform the Council *in toto* about my understanding of the consultations that we have carried on. I must admit that the picture of those consultations was not exceedingly clear but it did appear that there was a preference among members—and I should say a strong preference—for the fixing of a definite date for the next meeting.

188. However, when it came to the problem of fixing that date I found it somewhat difficult to ascertain a common denominator. Some wanted Thursday, some Friday, some in the morning, some in the afternoon. I wonder if, in those circumstances, I might suggest that we fix our next meeting for Thursday at 11 a.m., on the understanding that the President will keep in touch with members with a view to the eventual reconsideration, with the consent of the members, of the time fixed for the next meeting should circumstances in the meantime so warrant.

189. Since I hear no objection, I shall take it that members agree with that proposal.

190. Before adjourning, I should like to draw the attention of the members to a letter addressed to the Secretary-General by the President of the Republic of Equatorial Guinea and circulated as document S/8883, submitting an application for admission to membership in the United Nations. I have contacted members of the Security Council informally in that connexion and, as a result of those consultations, I would suggest that a meeting be scheduled for 11 a.m. on Wednesday, 6 November, in order to consider the application.

191. As I hear no objection I shall take it that members agree with that proposal also.

The meeting rose at 6.35 p.m.

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