



SECURITY COUNCIL OFFICIAL RECORDS

TWENTY-THIRD YEAR

1451st MEETING: 11 SEPTEMBER 1968

NEW YORK

CONTENTS

	<i>Page</i>
Provisional agenda (S/Agenda/1451)	1
Adoption of the agenda	1
The situation in the Middle East:	
Letter dated 2 September 1968 from the Acting Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/8794);	
Letter dated 8 September 1968 from the Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/8805);	
Letter dated 8 September 1968 from the Permanent Representative of the United Arab Republic to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/8806)	1

NOTE

Symbols of United Nations documents are composed of capital letters combined with figures. Mention of such a symbol indicates a reference to a United Nations document.

Documents of the Security Council (symbol S/. . .) are normally published in quarterly *Supplements of the Official Records of the Security Council*. The date of the document indicates the supplement in which it appears or in which information about it is given.

The resolutions of the Security Council, numbered in accordance with a system adopted in 1964, are published in yearly volumes of *Resolutions and Decisions of the Security Council*. The new system, which has been applied retroactively to resolutions adopted before 1 January 1965, became fully operative on that date.

FOURTEEN HUNDRED AND FIFTY-FIRST MEETING

Held in New York on Wednesday, 11 September 1968, at 11.50 a.m.

President: Mr. G. IGNATIEFF (Canada).

Present: The representatives of the following States: Algeria, Brazil, Canada, China, Denmark, Ethiopia, France, Hungary, India, Pakistan, Paraguay, Senegal, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and United States of America.

Provisional agenda (S/Agenda/1451)

1. Adoption of the agenda.

2. The situation in the Middle East:

Letter dated 2 September 1968 from the Acting Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/8794);

Letter dated 8 September 1968 from the Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/8805);

Letter dated 8 September 1968 from the Permanent Representative of the United Arab Republic to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/8806);

Adoption of the agenda

The agenda was adopted.

The situation in the Middle East

Letter dated 2 September 1968 from the Acting Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/8794);

Letter dated 8 September 1968 from the Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/8805);

Letter dated 8 September 1968 from the Permanent Representative of the United Arab Republic to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/8806)

1. The PRESIDENT: In accordance with the decision previously taken by the Council, I propose now, with the consent of the Council, to invite the representatives of Israel and the United Arab Republic to participate in the discussion without the right to vote.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Y. Tekoah (Israel) and Mr. M. A. El Kony (United Arab Republic) took places at the Security Council table.

2. The PRESIDENT: The Security Council will now continue its examination of the question before it.

3. Before calling on the first speaker on my list I should like to invite the attention of the Council to a report regarding the latest incidents in the Suez Canal sector received from General Odd Bull [S/7930/Add.80].

4. Mr. YUNUS (Pakistan): There are two elements in the situation which is now under the Council's consideration: first, an incident on 26 August on the eastern bank of the Suez Canal; second, the exchange of fire across the Suez Canal on 8 September. As regards the first, the Council heard the statement of the representative of Israel [1446th meeting], alleging that the United Arab Republic was responsible for it. The Council then heard the statement of the representative of the United Arab Republic [ibid.], who categorically denied this allegation. Besides these two statements, the Council had before it the report of the Chief of Staff of UNTSO [S/7930/Add.74] which quoted the statements of the two sides as far as the substantive part of the evidence was concerned. The Chief of Staff later submitted another report [S/7930/Add.76] which corroborated that no conclusive evidence was available on the incident. The statements made thereafter and the informal exchange of views amongst members of the Council suggested only one conclusion, namely, that the Council did not have an agreed version even of the basic facts of the incident of 26 August 1968.

5. As regards the exchange of fire across the Suez Canal on 8 September the evidence is comparatively fuller and clearer. According to General Odd Bull's report, the fire was initiated by Israeli forces at 1325 hours GMT after certain explosions had been observed on both sides of the Canal. This seems to have led to sustained firing from both sides until a cease-fire was arranged. The Council promptly authorized its President to issue an appeal for the observance of the cease-fire [1448th meeting, para. 73], and we hope that that appeal will be fully respected.

6. It is not the first time that the Security Council has considered an explosive turn of the situation in the Middle East. The central fact of this situation is that certain Arab territories are at present under Israeli military occupation. We all know that foreign occupation gives rise to resistance. Episodes illustrating this historic fact are not lacking in the life of any nation. Arab resistance to Israeli occupation is therefore neither a peculiar nor an incomprehensible phenomenon.

7. The issues involved in this situation should be clearly identified. On the one hand, there are incidents which can

properly be called cease-fire violations. On the other hand, there are incidents which are the natural consequences of foreign occupation.

8. As regards the former, the rights and obligations of the parties concerned are clear. None of them has ever claimed exception to the cease-fire. Indeed, in paragraph 7 of document S/7930/Add.74, Lt. General Odd Bull reported that he was assured on 28 August: "of the continued and unqualified adherence of the United Arab Republic to the cease-fire in the area, as required by the Security Council and accepted by the parties, and also to the practical arrangements of 27 July 1967, renewed on 27 August 1967, concerning the prohibition of movements of boats and military activities in the Suez Canal."

9. We wish that Israel had also given a similar unqualified assurance at that time. Instead, on 4 September we heard in this Council a question: "Is Egypt ready to take all the necessary measures to prevent, in the future, attacks of this nature [1446th meeting, para. 50]?" Having put that question, the representative of Israel said that the answer to it was vital for the future maintenance of the cease-fire in the area. Then on 8 September the cease-fire broke down.

10. The grievous loss of life and damage to property to which the people inhabiting the west bank of the Suez Canal were subjected are a cause of deep sorrow for my delegation.

11. As regards incidents of lesser magnitude arising from Arab resistance we believe that in those incidents considerations of a different nature are involved. Legally as well as morally those incidents are in a class by themselves and can hardly be put on a par with cease-fire violations as such. The inhabitants of occupied territories, oppressed by the injustice of foreign occupation, are left with no alternative but to struggle against it. Yet in respect of those incidents a tragic confusion of issues takes place. An argument is advanced that it is the failure of Arab Governments to ensure suppression of Arab resistance to Israeli occupation that invites well-prepared and calculated attacks. In our view that argument invokes the outlawed system of military reprisal and is therefore not acceptable.

12. The Council can no more find fault with the agony of the people of an occupied territory that it can allow the cause of that agony to continue. No one can find gratification in violence and death; but justice, in this Council as well as outside, must take into account the causal sequence which has led to those dreadful results.

13. Tension has once again caught the Middle East in its grip. The question is: what should the Security Council do to bring about a fair and a just and an honourable solution? To this question the Council provided the full and complete answer, not when it arranged the cease-fire in June 1967, which was a first step towards settlement, but later on when it unanimously adopted resolution 242 (1967) of 22 November 1967, which provides for the withdrawal of Israeli armed forces together with other principles of settlement. Indeed, several members of the Council have already referred to the crucial importance of the implementation of that resolution and of the success of

the mission of Ambassador Gunnar Jarring. We believe that in his success lies the best hope of restoring conditions of peace and stability in the area.

14. Mr. BOYE (Senegal) (*translated from French*): I shall make a very brief statement in the debate in which we have been engaged for several days and which, I recall, has already been the subject of a solemn declaration by the President of the Council [1448th meeting, para. 73].

15. I have read and reread very carefully the information which has been communicated to us by General Odd Bull, through the Secretary-General, U Thant, to whom a special tribute should be paid for his efforts to bring about an honourable settlement of the present situation in the Middle East.

16. The dossier we are now studying is, I regret to say, lamentably devoid of evidence whereby the degree of responsibility of either side can be determined. This lack of evidence is not the result of any inertia or inaction on the part of the United Nations observers. The observers, as soon as they were informed, did what they could, whatever it was materially possible for them to do; but they did not have at their disposal any concrete element on the basis of which to establish irrefutably certain alleged facts. They did not even have enough time to go to the places in question or to check the existence of certain elements which were apparently reported in one sector.

17. In these circumstances, the United Arab Republic cannot by any means be held responsible for incidents which occurred in sectors it no longer controls because they have been illegally occupied as a result of large-scale military operations.

18. My Government believes that genuine co-operation with Ambassador Jarring, on the basis of the strict implementation of all the provisions of resolution 242 (1967) of 22 November 1967, is the only way that can lead to the establishment of a just and lasting peace. My Government notes with satisfaction that the United Arab Republic is quite prepared to implement that resolution. We welcome this spirit of co-operation and sympathize with the people and Government of Egypt.

19. We repeat that the only solution to this problem for the time being is implementation of the resolution of 22 November 1967. Neither air-raids nor the firing of guns, rockets or cannon will settle this problem, nor will so-called consensuses, which are in fact only ways of evading the solution of the problem.

20. The fundamental problem is, first of all, the evacuation of the territories occupied by force and the cessation of the shelling of towns. Then the Palestinian people must be allowed to enjoy their natural rights and to live in peace in the land of their ancestors.

21. Mr. BALL (United States of America): This Council, which for many years has been seeking a way towards enduring peace in the Middle East, finds itself once again distracted from that search by incidents which threaten to reignite the flames of war. Much as we deplore this

distraction, we must deal energetically with the larger danger, or the long-range goals of peace will be more remote than ever.

22. The cease-fire in the Suez sector, maintained in reasonable quiet for nearly a year, has now been broken twice within the space of a fortnight. In both cases there was lamentable loss of life. In the second instance, on 8 September, the firing, with the resulting damage and many casualties, took place along a wide front and on an ominously large scale. What do these unhappy incidents portend? The pattern of the future, it seems to me, can only be dimly perceived. The most we can hope for is that these incidents will prove only isolated violations, without sequel. But that is being very sanguine indeed, for quite possibly they may foreshadow a new and still more dangerous situation, a situation in which the parties to the cease-fire in the Suez sector will no longer show even that measure of restraint and forbearance with respect to the actions of their armed forces and other elements of their populations than they have shown in recent months. We dare not ignore that more sombre possibility. Indeed, we must do all we can to avert it, because if such a situation should come about it could gravely jeopardize not only the cease-fire but the all too precarious pursuit of peace.

23. In this situation it is my understanding that both the Government of Israel and the Government of the United Arab Republic intend to adhere scrupulously to the cease-fire. That, however, requires not only a verbalized intention. It requires not only a determination not to fire first but also the avoiding of provocation, the avoiding of actions that could lead to misunderstanding. The maintenance of a cease-fire requires, in other words, caution, care and constant vigilance, and that has not been sufficiently taken into account in recent weeks and months.

24. Incidents such as those we are now confronting would, of course, be deplorable at any time, but in the febrile climate of the Middle East they offer the threat of greater peril, for the obvious danger is that other and still more destructive incidents will follow in a frightening escalation.

25. On 8 September that is precisely what happened. The intensive and widespread exchanges of fire on that day took a heavy toll of lives and property on both sides, and, whatever differences of view members of this Council may have concerning the origin of this second clash, there can be no difference concerning its potential significance—and even the representative of the Soviet Union, I am glad to note, has admitted that it actually occurred, which for him is a considerable concession.

26. It is only too apparent that the restraint to which both sides are pledged under the cease-fire was shown in this case by neither, and it is equally apparent that this outbreak has heightened the danger of a greater conflagration. That is the immediate danger to which this Council must now forthrightly address itself. That is the most urgent matter now before the Council. We must make it emphatically clear that the incidents of the past two weeks will remain isolated exceptions to the cease-fire and not be repeated or become part of a new spiral of increasing violence, further endangering the devoted efforts of the United Nations

representative, Mr. Jarring, to whom the whole world looks anxiously for a peaceful solution.

27. As I noted earlier, since these two incidents both Governments concerned have indicated their continuing intention to adhere scrupulously to the cease-fire. That is their clear responsibility: to carry out these statements of intention fully and without qualification or reservation. On our side—on the side of the Council—it is our duty to insist not only that both sides should adhere to the cease-fire but, to that end, that they should issue strict orders to their local commanders against violations or unilateral actions that may endanger the cease-fire and, finally, that the nations concerned should urgently perfect their co-operation at all levels with UNTSO. Even that, however, does not mark the totality of the Council's duty. In the present conditions of the Middle East, a cease-fire is not peace, and it would be a foolish deception to confuse it with peace. It is merely a necessary condition to the shaping and building of peace, and, until a just peace has been shaped and has been accepted by the parties, it remains a condition inherently unstable, a condition fragile and implicitly explosive.

28. For all too long the parties have delayed in getting on with the hard, dry, wearisome task of finding a just and lasting reconciliation of their competing interests. They have let far too much valuable time be lost in their obsession with procedures and semantics and diversionary efforts to gain temporary and quite meaningless tactical advantages.

29. On 22 November last this Council, in its resolution 242 (1967), provided a skeleton of principles on which a just peace could be erected. Yet Ambassador Jarring, armed as he is with the unanimous mandate of the Security Council, has, for all his skilful and tireless efforts, not yet been able to translate these principles into perceptible progress towards peace. Under these circumstances, the members of the Council, should, I think, examine their own hearts and their own consciences, to see what it is that we can most usefully do.

30. In his able speech yesterday [1449th meeting] our colleague from Ethiopia, Ambassador Makonnen, brought home to us, it seems to me, our sure responsibilities and in doing so wisely put the present incidents in proper perspective. I can think of no better statement of the obligations of the Council than those which Ambassador Makonnen has provided us with.

31. The world today has more than enough instability, more than enough violence, more than enough fanaticism. Let the Security Council, in its most vexing problem at this critical and dangerous moment, exert its timely influence for a decisive turn away from war and towards an early, just and honourable peace.

32. The PRESIDENT: I now call on the representative of Algeria in right of reply.

33. Mr. AZZOUT (Algeria) (*translated from French*): I shall be all the more brief because the Algerian delegation has already had on several occasions, through its Permanent

Representative, the opportunity to rebut categorically the baseless allegations of Mr. Tekoah. Mr. Tekoah's flow of words is proverbial and I do not intend to vie with him in verbosity. The Algerian delegation still wonders whether Mr. Tekoah really hopes to convince anyone in the Council, including his own friends, and, personally, I doubt that he will even succeed in convincing himself.

34. Whether he wishes or not, the problem before the Council is not that of Algeria, a country which has not usurped any territory and is not responsible for the fact that today thousands of refugees are still struggling wretchedly along the roads of Palestine in the cold and mud. Perhaps you, Mr. President, could ask Mr. Tekoah what reasons the Arab people could have to rejoice at the presence of Israeli legions who have come from Europe and elsewhere, or to be ruled with a rod of iron by some *gauleiter* friend of his in the occupied territories.

35. For twenty years, for the Arab peoples—and particularly for the Palestinian people—the word “Israel” has been synonymous with bereavement, ruin, desolation and usurpation of their homeland. I would add that the altogether unbelievable number of insults which Mr. Tekoah heaps upon the Arabs in addressing the Council is such that it deprives his statements of any credibility.

36. In conclusion, I would add that, in the present situation, when Mr. Tekoah speaks repeatedly of peace, his words inspire such confidence that the Arab States call upon the inhabitants of their large towns to take cover. The facts speak for themselves and I will say no more.

37. Mr. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*translated from Russian*): The events of 8 September in the cease-fire zone between the United Arab Republic and Israel, in the Suez Canal sector, cannot fail to attract the most serious attention of the Security Council. This new provocation by the Israeli armed forces, the details of which have been set forth so thoroughly and pertinently both in the statement of the representative of the United Arab Republic, Ambassador El Kony, and in the reports of the Secretary-General of the United Nations based on information received from United Nations observers, represents a new threat to peace in the Near East, a gross violation of the decisions of the Security Council for a cease-fire and the cessation of hostilities in that area.

38. At the 1448th meeting of the Council on 8 September the Soviet delegation already drew the attention of the members of the Council to the fact that the activities to which Israel is resorting and which have provoked a new and dangerous military incident in the cease-fire zone between Israel and the United Arab Republic, in no way tally with the declarations of Israeli leaders that Israel intends to observe the cease-fire decisions and is striving for the maintenance of peace in the Near East.

39. The significance of what happened in the Suez Canal area on 8 September goes far beyond a mere violation of the cease-fire. This is not just a chance military incident. The sequence of events, both military and political, shows that in the past week the Security Council has had to do with a deliberate policy of worsening the situation in the

Near East through acts of provocation by Israel against the United Arab Republic. The scale of these acts and the ensuing military operations organized by the aggressor are increasing in a menacing way and are accompanied with attempts by the Tel Aviv diplomats to conceal and camouflage these acts of aggression by making obviously propagandistic appeals to the Security Council and lodging so-called complaints against the United Arab Republic.

40. The representative of Israel obviously distorts the facts, trying to make out that somebody objects to Israel appealing to the Council.

41. That is not at all the case. In this connexion it must be stressed with the utmost firmness that nobody objects to Israel coming to the Security Council and seeking here, and not through military aggression, a settlement of Near East problems. What we stand for—and we have repeatedly stated this—is that Israel should come to the Security Council and state clearly how and when exactly it intends to implement resolution 242 (1967) of 22 November 1967.

42. But Israel has done neither the one thing nor the other. On the contrary, by appealing to the Security Council it has used a tactic which has the same objective as before, namely, to conceal the continuation of its policy of aggression and the preparation of further acts of aggression.

43. It is for this reason that the Israeli representative has to resort here to all sorts of legends and tales in order to justify further acts of aggression which cannot be accounted for or justified by documents or factual evidence, and still less by reference to the testimony of some deserter and traitor.

44. On 4 September the Council was obliged to meet to consider the first trumped-up complaint which Israel, the aggressor State, addressed to the Security Council, accusing the United Arab Republic, the victim of its aggression, against which Israel had carried out an armed attack and deprived it of part of its territory.

45. The members of the Security Council will recall very well that Israel did not even bother to support its accusations against the United Arab Republic with the evidence of the United Nations observers. Israel is taking advantage of its appeal to the Council solely for the purpose of engaging in unrestrained anti-Arab slander and propaganda and making new threats against the Arab States, particularly against the United Arab Republic.

46. What is more, the Israeli representative even tried to present the Security Council with something like an ultimatum, actually threatening that Israel would resort to further actions if its demands were not met by the Security Council.

47. The Soviet delegation, in its statements at meetings of the Council, exposed the real meaning of Israel's appeal to the Council and the threats of the Israeli representative and warned the Council that all this was a tactical manoeuvre aimed at deluding world public opinion, at diverting attention from Israel's military preparations against the Arab States and at fabricating a pretext for further acts of aggression against those countries.

48. The events of the subsequent days fully confirmed this assessment. Two days ago the Council again witnessed how Israel passed from verbal threats against the Arab States to deeds and on 8 September launched an armed attack on the United Arab Republic, in the Suez Canal area, in violation of the Security Council decision for a cease-fire and the cessation of hostilities.

49. The Israeli representative is continuing his tactics in the Security Council. He resorts to verbal acrobatics and tries to distort the facts and to delude both the Security Council and world public opinion. He strives with all his might to shift the responsibility on to the victim of aggression, the United Arab Republic. But facts are obstinate things. Time after time they expose ever more clearly the aggressor, his designs and aims.

50. Indeed, twice during the past week Israel has addressed to the Security Council its so-called complaints and obviously trumped-up accusations against the United Arab Republic, and both times those accusations have not been supported by facts and the information supplied by the United Nations observers in the Suez Canal area. On the contrary, in both cases the facts and the evidence supplied by the United Nations observers exposed Israel's false versions and its acts of aggression against the United Arab Republic.

51. In the first case the version alleged that two Israeli soldiers had been killed and a third kidnapped. In support of this version the Israeli Military Command was unable to supply the United Nations observers with any evidence except three helmets damaged when and by whom nobody knows, and some footprints in the sand left when and by whom nobody knows, or deliberately planted there. But many peoples have a proverb which says: "Do not build your house on sand". By way of paraphrase one can say: "Do not build your case on sand".

52. Israel puts forward all its so-called accusations against the United Arab Republic solely on the basis of its own assertions unverified and unconfirmed by anyone else. The attempts by the observers to verify the first Israeli soldiers had been killed were unsuccessful. The Israeli Command refused, under an obviously artificial pretext, to give the United Nations observers an opportunity to inspect the bodies of the soldiers alleged to have been killed.

53. In such abnormal circumstances, created by the aggressor himself, the only ones who can believe his version are those who are compelled by imperialistic and internal political considerations and reasons to support everything that is done and everything that is said by the Israeli side—that is said by Israel, which has been condemned many times by the Security Council as the aggressor State. That is how matters stand in regard to the first complaint.

54. In the second case, a new version was invented according to which a mine was discovered and detonated. But this version likewise has not been confirmed in the reports of General Odd Bull, the Chief of Staff of the United Nations observers.

55. From his reports it is clear—and this is easily confirmed by carefully perusing these two documents [S/

7930/Add.78 and 79]—that the first explosion, precisely the first explosion, took place on the east side of the Suez Canal occupied by Israel, at 1306 hours. The Israeli representative also states that at this same time—according to his version at 1300 hours—Israeli field engineers did in fact detonate a mine. Consequently, this first explosion, noted by the United Nations observers at 1306 hours on the east side of the Canal, was not the result of shelling from the United Arab Republic side. It was the explosion of a mine carried out by the Israeli troops themselves.

56. How did the events develop afterwards?

57. From the information communicated by the United Nations observers and submitted to the Council in the report of the Secretary-General of the United Nations it is quite clear that two minutes later, namely at 1308 hours, explosions started on both sides of the Canal, that is, also on the west bank controlled by the United Arab Republic.

58. What were these explosions on the Arab side? Could it be that, in response to the demolition by Israeli field engineers of a mine alleged to have been found on a track on the east bank of the Canal, the Arab side also started, by way of a "policy of mutual example", to explode its own mines on its own territory? No, these explosions were the result of the shelling of Arab territory from the Israeli side. There remains, therefore, only one right conclusion, namely, that the explosions on the west side of the Suez Canal under United Arab Republic control, which started two minutes after Israeli field engineers had detonated a mine on the east bank, were in fact nothing else but the result of the shelling of Arab positions and centres of population in the United Arab Republic, which was promptly started by the Israeli troops two minutes after the provocative explosion and in violation of the cease-fire decision of the Security Council.

59. Furthermore, it is clear from the report of the Chief of Staff of the United Nations observers that after several explosions, noted by the United Nations observers on both sides of the Canal, a lull set in. But who broke this lull, this cessation of explosions? In the report contained in document S/7390/Add.78 it is frankly stated that Israel resumed firing. After the lull, which continued for a few minutes, the Israeli armed forces were the first to reopen fire (at 1325 hours). This is stated in the official report of General Odd Bull. But Israel's guilt does not begin with paragraph 5 of the report as the Israeli representative insinuated in trying with simulated naivety to talk his way out of it. The responsibility for beginning this new act of aggression lies entirely on Israel. This responsibility is quite clearly confirmed by the very first paragraphs of the report and by the Israeli representative himself in his letter addressed to the President of the Security Council [S/8805]. From both these documents it is quite evident that the Israeli side, when exploding a mine on the front line in the cease-fire area, where both sides face each other with their armed forces, did not bother to inform the United Nations observers of the impending mine explosion.

60. All those who take a serious and responsible attitude towards the strict implementation of the Security Council's cease-fire decision could not fail to have doubts

immediately, at the very first meeting of the Security Council when this question was being discussed. Why did Israel fail to notify the United Nations observers of the impending mine explosion? Why did it not warn the other side—the United Arab Republic—through the United Nations observers, that it intended to explode a mine? The Security Council now has official confirmation that no such notification or warning was given by the Israeli side. This fact is fully confirmed in General Odd Bull's second report of 8 September [S/7930/Add.79], which states that the United Nations observers were not informed that the Israeli armed forces intended to explode a mine. Hence the official report of the Chief of Staff of the United Nations observers does not confirm Israel's accusation against the United Arab Republic that the Arab side had started the incident. On the contrary, it is clear from General Odd Bull's official report that immediately after the first explosion which, according to the Israeli version was the explosion of a mine, the Israeli side opened fire on the west bank of the Canal, that is to say, on the United Arab Republic positions. All this confirms documentarily, officially and accurately down to the minute the incontestable fact that the initiator and provoker of this incident was the Israeli side—the Israeli armed forces and the Israeli Command. This fact had to be partly admitted even by *The New York Times* to which the Israeli representative refers so often and with so much enthusiasm in his statements. To him that newspaper is a very authoritative source of information. In today's issue of that newspaper it is stated in the first column on page 7 that it was a mine explosion that gave rise to a four-hour exchange of barrages along the length of the Suez Canal. So that the Israeli representative understands this quotation, I shall read it in English: "a mine demolition Sunday that triggered a four-hour exchange of barrages along the length of the canal".

61. Thus, on the basis of information received from the United Nations observers—for the nth time—it is officially confirmed that the initiator and, therefore, the instigator of acts of aggression in the Near East was Israel this time again. This time again, the whole of this second venture of Israel in lodging a complaint against the United Arab Republic is just as hypocritical and easily seen through as the first one concerning the so-called incident of 26 August. Hence this second appeal by Israel to the Security Council is likewise nothing but a new spurious manoeuvre, an attempt by Israel hurriedly to concoct a cover and a justification for its new bloody crimes and to shift the responsibility for the violation by Israel of the cease-fire decision on to the United Arab Republic.

62. Israel's second complaint against the United Arab Republic is just as unwarranted and devoid of any foundation as the first. The responsibility for the new acts of aggression and the violation of the Security Council's cease-fire decision lies entirely on Israel. It also bears the responsibility for the numerous losses of human life, material damage and destruction which have been caused to the United Arab Republic by this new act of aggression—the deliberately planned and carried-out shelling of Arab territory.

63. In this connexion it must be noted particularly that none of the official documents submitted to the Council,

containing information from the United Nations observers in the Suez Canal area, mentions any facts or data that provide grounds for accusing the United Arab Republic of being responsible for the incidents and violations of the cease-fire.

64. The Security Council has heard repeated statements by the official representative of the United Arab Republic to the effect that the United Arab Republic is strictly complying with the Security Council's cease-fire decision.

65. The incidents involving the use of weapons, deliberately provoked by Israel, along the Suez Canal lead to increased tension in the Near East. They complicate the situation still further. They prevent the restoration of peace and a political settlement in that region.

66. The Security Council cannot fail to take notice of the fact that the aggressor, having invaded the territory of the United Arab Republic, blocked the Suez Canal and disrupted international navigation along this most important waterway of world significance, is purposely and deliberately engaged in bringing about a further worsening of the situation in that region. In these circumstances the United Arab Republic, whose vitally important centres and densely populated areas were in direct danger, being within the range of artillery fire and other means of attack by the aggressor, could not help but take legitimate defence measures to ward off any possible further acts of provocation on the part of the Israeli armed forces.

67. Israel's acts of aggression against the United Arab Republic are creating an increasingly tense situation in the Near East, already fraught with the danger of military explosions as a result of the fact that the consequences of Israeli aggression against the Arab countries have not yet been eliminated.

68. The Security Council cannot brook any further delay in a political settlement in the Near East and the implementation of Council resolution 242 (1967) of 22 November 1967. It is essential to put an end to Israel's seizure of Arab lands and to demand the immediate withdrawal of the aggressor's troops from those lands.

69. As long as the aggressor holds on to the foreign lands which it has taken from the Arab peoples and continues defiantly to flout and sabotage the decisions of the United Nations, tension will be maintained in the Near East and it will be impossible to establish peace in that region.

70. It is the duty of the Security Council in this dangerous situation to pronounce an emphatic condemnation of Israel's aggressive policy, to demand that it should cease immediately its provocative acts of aggression against the Arab countries and that it should carry out forthwith a political settlement in the Near East in conformity with the Security Council's resolution of 22 November 1967 which, as is well known, stipulates as a first principle of the settlement the withdrawal of Israel's armed forces from all the territories seized by it as a result of its aggression in the summer of 1967, and the return of those territories to their lawful owners.

71. The PRESIDENT: I call on the representative of Israel.

72. Mr. TEKOA (Israel): I assure you, Sir, that I would enjoy our daily constitutional verbal ping-pong games with the Soviet representative were it not for the fact that his statements, instead of contributing to the maintenance of the cease-fire, try invariably to confuse, distort and complicate the situation and the efforts to achieve a just and lasting peace.

73. The statement we have heard from him this morning does not really require any comment; it is what one would normally call, in the language of the distinguished representative himself, just another *Pravda* editorial. I think it should be treated accordingly.

74. I should like to say only one thing: the Soviet support for Egyptian aggression is not surprising. On the world scene Moscow and Cairo stand for the same policies, the same violations of international law and international conduct. It is strange that the representative of the USSR, who has a weakness for Arab sources of information, has this time avoided completely any reference to such sources. Had he followed what the Egyptian Governor of Suez had to say following the attack of 8 September and what Egyptian official communiqués stated on it, he would know that Cairo has openly indicated that we face a new policy of preventive military operations. What is extremely grave is that the Soviet Union has in fact expressed today support for this dangerous policy.

75. I should like to make one brief observation on a statement we heard this morning from the representative of Algeria. I may not have convinced him concerning Algeria's policy of war, aggression and defiance of the United Nations—a policy which is an insult to other members of the Security Council in whose midst Algeria sits. However, it seems that I have succeeded in persuading the President of Algeria about the correctness of my statements. I should like to quote two remarks made by President Boumédiène: "Nasser's main error was his acceptance of the cease-fire agreement. We reject the cease-fire, since its meaning is a recognition of the defeat"; and, "The liquidation of Israel is the only solution. Algeria will never accept a solution that guarantees Israel's existence."

76. I should also like to point out that the representative of Algeria has failed to say anything on his Government's continued refusal to accept the cease-fire established by the Security Council.

77. I should like to bring to the Security Council's attention the fact that Egyptian acts of aggression are continuing. Yesterday morning a new Egyptian minelaying incursion resulted in the wounding of one Israeli soldier, whose half-track was blown up by a mine at a point approximately ten kilometres north of Port Tawfiq. The site of that attack is only a few hundred metres from the Egyptian military positions on the west bank of the Canal. In the afternoon four new mines of the standard used in the Egyptian Army were discovered near the site of the mining of the half-track. Footprints of the raiders who had laid those mines led westward to the Canal, which is 170 metres wide at that point. It appears that the mines had been laid during the preceding night, 9/10 September.

78. Also yesterday, an Israeli soldier was wounded in Kantara by Egyptian fire from the west bank. This morning, 11 September, the United Arab Republic forces in the Port Tawfiq area attacked Israeli positions at 0840, 0850 and 0915 hours, local time.

79. In spite of these provocations, the Israeli forces under attack refrained in each case from returning fire, as they did yesterday.

80. These attacks are accompanied by official Egyptian pronouncements and Egyptian press commentaries that the United Arab Republic has launched a policy of preventive military operations.

81. We reiterate our appeal to the Security Council to take effective, equitable action to condemn the Egyptian attacks, to call on Egypt to prevent their recurrence and to return the Israeli soldier captured in the attack of 26 August.

82. The PRESIDENT: I call on the representative of the United Arab Republic.

83. Mr. EL KONY (United Arab Republic): My delegation usually avoids being dragged into the polemics of Mr. Tekoah. We therefore do not consider it fitting to comment on every Israeli distortion. Although the Israelis are masters in this field, I am sure that the members of the Council are by now fully immune to these Israeli tactics which discredit their authors and waste the time of the Council—but without, I hope, ever misleading it.

84. However, I must clarify a point which was raised yesterday by the Israeli representative. He said that the United Arab Republic had violated two cease-fires whereas Israel had abided by them. The report of General Odd Bull clearly contradicts this Israeli allegation. Paragraphs 10 and 15 of the report contained in document S/7930/Add.78 confirm that the two cease-fires proposed by the United Nations observers were accepted by the United Arab Republic.

85. Yesterday [1449th meeting] I relied on paragraph 5 of that report to prove that it was Israel which clearly initiated fire on 8 September. I should like to add that the other parts of General Bull's report to which I did not refer do not deal with the initiation of fire. They are limited to the reporting of explosions on the east side of the Canal, but the relevant paragraph which definitely implicates Israel is paragraph 5 which I mentioned in my intervention yesterday.

86. Mr. Tekoah also said that a further admission of my Government's responsibility was that the Governor of Suez had half an hour's notice about the impending attack. The fact is that the Governor has learned from bitter experience that whenever there are unusual Israeli concentrations and movements on the east side, as occurred on 8 September, it is only a prelude to an imminent attack. I am sure that the Security Council is glad to know that the Governor of Suez had the opportunity of alerting the civilian population of Suez and enabling them to escape the havoc and destruction of the Israeli attack.

87. As to the preventive measures to which Mr. Tekoah referred again today, I should like to state that the repeated attacks of aggression have forced my Government to declare that it will take all protective defensive measures against the Israeli aggressors which direct their fire at Egyptian populated civilian towns.

88. Our attention was drawn to the supplemental information contained in document S/7930/Add.80 regarding "one single rifle shot". I wish to inform the Council that I have not yet received any information from my Government concerning this matter. However, according to the report of General Odd Bull there was "one single . . . shot fired". But there is nothing in the report to substantiate the Israeli allegation that a soldier was wounded.

89. The PRESIDENT: I call on the representative of Israel in exercise of his right of reply.

90. Mr. TEKOA (Israel): I have just one observation. Unfortunately the weakness of the entire Egyptian policy has been that it is at all times ready to accept, to agree, to concede and to consent but never to honour the agreement or the acceptance. The Egyptian Government has repeatedly claimed that it accepts Security Council resolution 242 (1967) of 22 November, and yet it continues to refuse to abandon the Khartoum decision¹ which says "No peace, no negotiations, no recognition of Israel".

91. That Security Council resolution calls specifically for agreement between Egypt and Israel, for a just and lasting peace between Egypt and Israel—and so it is with the cease-fire. I have no doubt at all that the representatives of the Egyptian authorities have agreed to, accepted, consented to and conceded every proposal put forward to them by the United Nations military observers. However, if the representative of the United Arab Republic had continued reading to us from General Bull's report from the same paragraph which he cited, he would have told us that this agreement was never kept and that the United Arab

Republic Forces continued to fire, continued to attack for another half an hour. He would have told us that the official communiqués which have been published in the last few days in the Egyptian press and broadcast over the Egyptian governmental radio made it no secret at all that Egypt refused the cease-fire proposals.

92. The representative of the United Arab Republic has made some comments about the terminology used concerning the new policy evolved by Cairo. It is strange that Cairo, the Cairo newspapers, the Cairo radio, the press all over the world should have the exact formulation and exact translation of the newly proclaimed policy and that everywhere, whether in the newspapers here or in the Middle East, we find a clear reference to a new policy of preventive military operations. With all the experience we have had in the past of denials that come from the representative of the United Arab Republic, I believe that we should rest our case at that.

93. The PRESIDENT: There are no other speakers on my list. I would draw the attention of the members of the Council to the fact that, in addition to the report from General Odd Bull contained in document S/7930/Add.80, to which I have already made reference, supplemental information has been received in accordance with General Odd Bull's indication that he would be sending such information. It has been circulated since we began our meeting in document S/7930/Add.81, dated 11 September 1968.

94. If no other representative wishes to take the floor at this stage I should like to suggest that, taking into account the reports received today from General Bull indicating continuing incidents in the Suez Canal zone, the meeting of the Council should be adjourned now on the understanding that the members of the Council will hold themselves available for consultation and for further consideration of this item in the light of those consultations, at a time to be agreed. If I hear no objection I shall take it that it is so decided.

It was so decided.

The meeting rose at 1.20 p.m.

¹ Resolution of the Arab Summit Conference held at Khartoum from 29 August to 1 September 1967.

HOW TO OBTAIN UNITED NATIONS PUBLICATIONS

United Nations publications may be obtained from bookstores and distributors throughout the world. Consult your bookstore or write to: United Nations, Sales Section, New York or Geneva.

COMMENT SE PROCURER LES PUBLICATIONS DES NATIONS UNIES

Les publications des Nations Unies sont en vente dans les librairies et les agences dépositaires du monde entier. Informez-vous auprès de votre librairie ou adressez-vous à: Nations Unies, Section des ventes, New York ou Genève.

КАК ПОЛУЧИТЬ ИЗДАНИЯ ОРГАНИЗАЦИИ ОБЪЕДИНЕННЫХ НАЦИЙ

Издания Организации Объединенных Наций можно купить в книжных магазинах и агентствах во всех районах мира. Наводите справки об изданиях в вашем книжном магазине или пишите по адресу: Организация Объединенных Наций, Секция по продаже изданий, Нью-Йорк или Женева.

COMO CONSEGUIR PUBLICACIONES DE LAS NACIONES UNIDAS

Las publicaciones de las Naciones Unidas están en venta en librerías y casas distribuidoras en todas partes del mundo. Consulte a su librero o diríjase a: Naciones Unidas, Sección de Ventas, Nueva York o Ginebra.
