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FOURTEEN HUNDRED AND TENTH MEETING

Held in New York on Monday, 1 April 1968, at 3 p.m.

President: Mr. Y. A. MALIK
(Union of Soviet Socialist Republics).

Adoption of the agenda

The agenda was adopted.

Present: The representatives of the following States: Algeria, Brazil, Canada, China, Denmark, Ethiopia, France, Hungary, India, Pakistan, Paraguay, Senegal, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and United States of America.

Provisional agenda (S/Agenda/1410)

1. Adoption of the agenda.
2. The situation in the Middle East:
 - (a) Letter dated 29 March 1968 from the Permanent Representative of Jordan addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/8516);
 - (b) Letter dated 29 March 1968 from the Permanent Representative of Israel addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/8517).

Expression of thanks to the retiring President

1. The PRESIDENT (*translated from Russian*): I declare the 1410th meeting of the Security Council open.
2. Before the Council proceeds to its consideration of the questions on the agenda of today's meeting, I should like, on my own behalf and, I hope, on behalf of all the members of the Security Council, to express my most cordial gratitude to our friend and colleague, the representative of Senegal, Ambassador Diop, for the skill, tact and patience he displayed during his Presidency of the Security Council in March. It was a great pleasure for us to work with him and we extend to him our best wishes.
3. Mr. CISS (Senegal) (*translated from French*): I should like, Mr. President, to express my delegation's gratitude for the generous remarks you made about Ambassador Ousmane Socé Diop, who was President of the Security Council for the month of March. I shall not fail to convey your kind words to the Ambassador.
4. In thanking all members of the Council for the sincere co-operation they have given the President during the past month, I should also like to assure you, Mr. President, of my delegation's full co-operation, now that you are taking over the guidance of our work. I am already convinced that, with your long experience of international affairs and your great qualities as a statesman and diplomat, you will discharge your new responsibilities in the most appropriate manner.

The situation in the Middle East:

- (a) Letter dated 29 March 1968 from the Permanent Representative of Jordan addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/8516);
- (b) Letter dated 29 March 1968 from the Permanent Representative of Israel addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/8517)

5. The PRESIDENT (*translated from Russian*): In accordance with the Council's earlier decision, I invite the representatives of Jordan and Israel to take seats at the Council table and to participate in the present debate without the right to vote.

6. I call on the representative of Algeria.

7. Mr. BOUATTOURA (Algeria) (*translated from French*): In accordance with the established procedure it is not customary to take the floor while delegations are being invited to participate in the work of the Council. However, my delegation was disappointed to note that some of those delegations, in the course of such participation, made a practice of slanderous and insulting attacks on countries which are members of the Security Council. Consequently, I feel it my duty to ask you, Mr. President—with the consent of the Council, needless to say—to request the parties which are allowed to participate in the Council's work, according to the usual practice, to respect both the written and unwritten rules of conduct, and at least the rules of courtesy and respect due to Council members. This obligation arises from the very fact that membership in the Security Council, conferred upon all of us by decision of the General Assembly, makes it essential for us to exercise a certain degree of self-restraint, since, as members of the Council, we bear certain generally recognized responsibilities.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. M. H. El-Farra (Jordan) and Mr. Y. Tekoah (Israel) took places at the Council table.

8. The PRESIDENT (*translated from Russian*): This morning I received a letter from the representative of Syria [S/8522] containing a request that the Syrian delegation be invited to participate, without the right to vote, in the discussions in the Security Council. Unless I hear any objections, I shall invite the representative of Syria to take a place at the Security Council table.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. G. J. Tomeh (Syria) took a place at the Council table.

9. The PRESIDENT (*translated from Russian*): The Security Council will now proceed to its consideration of the item on the agenda. The first speaker on my list is the representative of Israel, on whom I now call.

10. Mr. TEKOA (Israel): Mr. President, this being the first meeting of the Security Council under your Presidency, I should like to express my profound respect to you. I should also like to express my delegation's appreciation to the outgoing President, the representative of Senegal.

11. Mr. President, I regret to inform you that acts of aggression against Israel are continuing. Today, 1 April, at 08:00 hours local time, Jordanian military positions opened artillery and mortar fire on Israeli forces on the west bank of the Jordan six kilometres south of Abu Tzutz, in the central sector of the Jordan Valley. Israeli forces abstained from returning fire. A short while later, fire was opened again from the Jordanian positions in the same area. This time the Israeli forces returned fire. Also today, at approximately 10:00 hours, an Israeli patrol discovered, in the same area, two anti-vehicle mines, one of them of Chinese manufacture. The mines were deactivated.

12. Yesterday, 31 March, at 20:00 hours local time, an Israeli patrol encountered a band of marauders south of Kuneitra. During the clash that ensued, an Israeli soldier was killed and two were wounded. One of the marauders was killed. A Klatchnikoff rifle and two Russian grenades were found near his body.

13. On 29 March, I requested an urgent meeting of the Security Council to deal with renewed Jordanian acts of aggression and violations of the cease-fire. At the last meeting of the Security Council, on 30 March, the representative of Jordan announced once again that the Arab war of aggression against Israel, started in 1948, was continuing. The war is not over, he confirmed. The cease-fire is a cease-fire and nothing more.

14. The people of Israel have been subjected to this war for twenty years. Our children do not know what a state of peace is. Our young men and women have known for twenty years that when they are called up for military service, it is to face an enemy at war with us that they must go. Thus the entire people, under constant threat for two decades, remains beleaguered, besieged and embattled.

15. This is a war unprecedented in its length. This is a war unparalleled in the passions it has generated; a conflict that has created for Israel a danger never faced by any other State in the world.

16. Which of the States represented on the Security Council, or, for that matter, which of the States Members of the United Nations, has faced a twenty-year long war? Which of the States has neighbours who teach in school that it is a virtue for them to kill that State's people? Which has enemies who strive not merely to defeat them, but to wipe them off the map to annihilate their population?

17. Who is it, then, that feels competent to give advice to Israel on how to cope with the war imposed on us? Who is

it that feels experienced enough to instruct us on how to defend ourselves under the circumstances we confront? Who considers it appropriate to suggest to Israel, fighting for its life for twenty years, that it be less determined, that it be more forthcoming, more magnanimous and compromising? Can one be more forthcoming towards those who desire one's destruction and actively strive for it? Can there be compromise between war and peace, between murder and the defence against it?

18. How senseless it is to expect that the Arab States, while not only persisting in warfare against Israel, should also set the rules for Israel's reaction to this warfare.

19. By decision of the Arab Governments the war is not terminated. By action of the Arab Governments the war continues. It continues by the method of raid, terror and sabotage. Following the defeat of Arab frontal aggression last June this is the method most readily available to the Arab States. This is the method on which the Arab Governments rely to prepare the ground for the resumption of full-scale military activities.

20. On 26 February 1968 Radio Baghdad announced: "The activities of the *Fedayeen* paved the road for an Arab regular military operation that will come shortly." On the following day the official Cairo daily *Al-Ahram* said: "The sabotage activities which are increasing from day to day are the first step towards victory."

21. As early as 7 December 1967, Radio Cairo broadcast that a military conference had been held at which a single military strategy was worked out for *Fedayeen* activities against Israel. The broadcast added that military communiqués will be issued. Then on 20 January it was announced in Cairo that a joint command was formed for all terrorist organizations. Since then, warfare by terror and sabotage has been expanding continuously while the Arab Governments have made no secret of the fact that they are behind it. Only two days ago, on 30 March, President Nasser promised publicly to continue to assist the terror organizations.

22. Prime Minister Telhouni of Jordan stated on the same day, according to *Agence France Presse*: "Jordan will continue to aid the saboteur organizations with all its power."

23. Raah Tawil, the Commander of the People's Army of Syria, as the para-military forces are known there, said according to Radio Damascus on 13 March: "The People's Army is an integral part of the regular army and the *Fedayeen* activities constitute the implementation of the slogans of the popular war."

24. At the last meeting of the Security Council I emphasized the official military character of the terrorist war machine and its activities. Today I should like to bring to the Council's attention the following facts which have become known to the Israel authorities.

25. One: in Amman, a recruiting office for El-Fatah has been opened. There is nothing clandestine about that office. It is quite open and clearly marked for the public. It is carrying out mass recruiting for the terrorist organizations.

26. Two: members of the El-Fatah are exempt from service in the Jordanian Army on production of a certificate attesting to membership in El-Fatah.

27. Three: the members of El-Fatah and the other similar terrorist organizations are free to come and go openly in Amman in uniform and carrying arms.

28. Four: the Jordanian Government has facilitated the establishment of terrorist bases along the frontier. The administration and policing in those bases is in the hands of the Jordanian authorities. The Arab Legion encourages the terrorists to open fire from the proximity of army positions on the east bank and even from inside these Jordanian army positions. Recently, El-Fatah received 120-mm mortars of Russian make from Iraq. A number of them were captured by our forces on 21 March at Karameh.

29. Five: the Jordanian Army is helping the terrorists with information on movements of the Israel defence forces, with co-ordinating time and place of infiltrations and with covering fire, including artillery fire for forward movement and for retreat.

30. Six: the field command of the terrorist organizations has been transferred from Syria to Jordan. However, the training bases of terrorist organizations continue to operate in El-Hamune near Damascus, while the El-Fatah central headquarters remain in Damascus.

31. Seven: at the present moment, hundreds of officers and men from regular army units are being transferred from Syria to Jordan and are joining the terrorist organizations. A Syrian lieutenant in command of the terrorist group was killed on 10 March near Gesher.

32. Eight: Iraq is giving assistance by supplying arms and by training through its expeditionary force in Jordan. Terrorists are being trained, in particular, in the Iraqi Army Camps in Mafrak. Iraqi Commando Battalion 421 is very active in this. Its officers and men actually take part in the terrorist actions and many of them were killed on 21 March at Karameh. I should like to submit to the Security Council a number of certificates taken from terrorists in Karameh and indicating their membership in the Iraqi Commando Battalion.

33. Nine: in Egypt, *Fedayeen* Battalion 141 of the regular Egyptian Army was chosen for sabotage operations and went through sabotage training in army camps near Cairo. The regiment has been transferred to Jordan and its activities are directed by the Egyptian Embassy in Amman. Its activities are conducted in the name of different organizations. For example, the explosions carried out by it at Eilat on 13 January 1968 were attributed to El-Fatah. Major Sami Dahahne, second in command of the regiment, is in Jordan and is responsible for the liaison between the Egyptian Embassy and El-Fatah and the Jordanian authorities.

34. Ten: sixty officers and men from the regular Palestinian battalions of the Egyptian Army have been transferred from Egypt to Jordan during recent months. They act as a command cadre for the terrorist organizations in Jordan. Some of them have been captured by the Israel forces.

35. Eleven: in January 1968 the Egyptian Government decided to intensify its links with the terrorist organizations and agreed that terrorists would be trained by Egyptian officers at army camps. More than 100 have been trained under this agreement and many of these are now in Jordan. A number of El-Fatah units were moved in Egyptian military planes from Syria to Cairo and underwent military training in army camps near the capital. The officer in charge of their training was Captain Saber. These units were returned to Syria in Egyptian military planes and from there transferred to Jordan. They were placed under the command of Major Dahahne of the Egyptian Army. Together with the units, Egyptian Army equipment, explosives, mines and weapons were sent to Jordan.

36. Twelve: the operations of the terrorist organizations are co-ordinated between the Governments of the United Arab Republic, Syria, Jordan and Iraq.

37. The Security Council is fully aware of the fact that this is not the first time that the Arab Governments have resorted to this method of warfare. It was applied by the Government of Egypt in the fifties and led to the Sinai campaign in 1956. It was then adopted by the Government of Syria, pursued with great vehemence and discussed time and again before the Security Council. It contributed in no small measure to the outbreak of hostilities last June.

38. As the Secretary-General pointed out in his introduction to the last annual report on the work of the Organization:

“Another serious problem for which no solution had been found at the time of the outbreak of hostilities in June was that of the El-Fatah-type of sabotage and terrorist activities. . . .”¹

39. The organized military character of the terrorist war machine found incisive confirmation in a dispatch from Amman published yesterday in *The New York Times*. The dispatch said:

“Newsmen who have visited Karameh in recent days have found the camp deserted by Palestinian refugees and inhabited by about 300 *fedayeen* armed with Soviet sub-machine guns and pistols, and grenades from Eastern Europe. The *fedayeen* wore spotted camouflage trousers and shirts, military forage caps, and various other military and civilian garments.

“The *fedayeen* arms presumably come from Syria, because Jordan has no supplies of communist weapons.”

40. By now the world is too well acquainted with the warfare tactic of terrorism applied by the Arab States to be impressed by attempts to confuse the true nature of this tactic—attempts made only here, not in the area itself, and for purely debating purposes.

41. There is too much United Nations jurisprudence throughout the years censuring this method of warfare for the Arab representatives to be able to suggest to the

¹ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-second Session, Supplement No. 1A, para. 47.*

Security Council now that it should not concern itself with Arab terrorism and sabotage against Israel.

42. The Arab Governments using this method in preference to others cannot shed responsibility for the attacks by terrorists and saboteurs any more than they can shirk responsibility for the acts of their soldiers. Nor can they escape the grave consequences of such activities.

43. However, in one aspect the terrorists do differ from soldiers.

44. Soldiering is not the pleasantest of occupations. But it is a profession of honour and valour, quality and respect. As Napoleon said: "I love a brave soldier who has undergone the baptism of fire, whatever nation he may belong to."

45. One cannot say the same of the terrorist raiders that the Arab Governments have been sending against Israel. Look at them and their activities. To steal across the border in the security of the night; to plant a mine on a truck near a children's camp used by children only, so as to blow up a children's bus; to throw a grenade into a house where a family is asleep; to fire a mortar blindly into a village and to run away into the darkness; to murder a lonely Druze watchman guarding tractors in a forlorn field; to shoot a policeman in the back in a crowded market place: there is no bravery, no valour, no honour in these acts. Those who perpetrate them are cowardly, miserable creatures who deserve no respect from anyone. If the Arab Governments wish to stoop to glorifying these marauders, the world can have nothing but disdain for such Governments.

46. I have with me a sample of the dastardly arsenal of these terrorists. It is a mine of Chinese manufacture, the size of a button, shaped like a button. When placed on a highway, in a park, in a playground or on a street it is sufficient to pick it up to have it blow up in your face. A trained soldier will not pick it up. It will be picked up by the unsuspecting civilian, by the innocent child.

47. The documents found in the terrorist base in Karameh and the testimony of the terrorists in our hands confirm that the operations in the immediate future were to be directed against hospitals, public transport and similar objectives. All these operations were to be carried out by raiders, members of the military and para-military forces of the Arab States coming from the terrorist bases established in Jordanian-controlled territory with the consent of the Jordanian Government and the assistance of the Jordanian Army.

48. I repeat what I said at the previous meeting:

"Attempts have been made here to describe the raiders as enjoying the support of the Arab population in areas under Israeli control. This is contrary to the facts. Local Arab inhabitants do not support these aggressive activities. The Arab population, like its Jewish neighbours, is weary of the twenty-year war. . . .

"The raiders, whether they be called marauders, terrorists, saboteurs, are simply messengers of hate and death who come from the outside and whose aim is to

undermine the possibilities of understanding and agreement between the two peoples." [1409th meeting, paras. 60 and 61.]

49. If proof of this were required it should be sufficient to point out that 90 per cent of the acts of terror and murder carried out in recent months occurred along the cease-fire line.

50. The basic tenet of the United Nations is the maintenance of international peace and security.

51. When the Arab States went to war against Israel in 1948, the Security Council called on the parties in a number of successive resolutions to make peace. Today, twenty years later, there is still no peace between Israel and the Arab States. There is no peace because the Arab States refuse to make it. There is no peace because the Arab States choose to pursue war.

52. Though this is the fundamental cause of the present situation in the Middle East, the Security Council cannot disregard its own influence on the developments of the last two decades. Equivocation about responsibility for belligerency and warfare, consideration of symptoms without sufficient attention to the causes of the present conflict, censure of Israeli defence measures and application of the veto or vague generalities about Arab acts of aggression—all these have undoubtedly had a most unfortunate impact on the area. Double standards have proved failures in the internal life of States. Surely they cannot but be disastrous in international life.

53. We again appeal to the Security Council to see the situation as it is, in all its gravity, and take a clear stand on the dangers of continued Jordanian warfare by raid, terror and murder. We appeal to the Security Council to assist in putting an end to this warfare and advancing Israel and the Arab States towards peace.

54. The PRESIDENT (*translated from Russian*): I call on the representative of Jordan.

55. Mr. EL-FARRA (Jordan): I shall not answer the many distortions that we have heard this afternoon. I shall have more time to do so at a later stage. I should simply like to say that the heroes of the Irgun and the Haganah, those who committed the massacres at Deir Yassin and others, are not competent to preach to us about virtue.

56. The Council is now considering the Jordan complaint, which is of a very serious nature. It calls for an urgent remedy. Any delay in taking adequate action will be harmful both to the area and to the prestige of the Security Council.

57. It cannot be argued that because there were no observers at the time of the Israeli attack the Security Council is not in a position to make any findings or any determination. That, I submit, is nothing but a pretext intended to serve other designs. There is ample evidence to convict Israel. The evidence is there, clear and sufficient.

58. Indeed, what does the Council need other than the open admission, or rather the complete confession, made

by no less a person than the Israeli Defence Minister, Moshe Dayan, who said over the Israeli radio that the attacks on Jordan were part of the campaign that will continue until Israel comes to a decision with the Arabs? What more does the Council want than the clear statement made by Mr. Moshe Kol, the Minister of Development and Tourism in Israel, who did not hide the fact that the Israelis had deliberately launched the attack against Jordan and stated that it was limited in scope but would be bigger and wider in the future?

59. It will be unfair to Jordan if an attempt is made to exploit our complaint for a different purpose. To make out of the Israeli crime a call for observers is not helpful, because it amounts to diversion. What is before the Council is not an item on observers. I know of no member round this table who has suggested such an item. I believe that the Council should confine its deliberations to the item under discussion and should not go into a question that is irrelevant to the complaint. But if the Council deems it fit to deal with that question at a later stage, after having given Jordan's complaint an adequate and effective remedy by invoking Chapter VII of the Charter, then I submit that it is the duty of the Council to take action that is not in conflict with existing arrangements concerning peace-keeping in the area. Thus it is the duty of the Security Council to request the parties to employ the armistice machinery as a means of reducing friction. We are for that. But if Israel finds that this conflicts with its aggressive designs, neither the Security Council nor any of the organs of the United Nations would wish to accommodate those aggressive designs, because such a course would be harmful to the Council and not helpful to the executive organ of the United Nations.

60. The purpose of having the Mixed Armistice Commissions in the area was to ensure an impartial investigation and adjudication through fact-finding machinery, namely, those Mixed Armistice Commissions. The purpose was to ensure fact-finding on the spot. If the Security Council does not encourage and strengthen the functioning of the armistice machinery in the area, what will the result be? The answer is simple: since no adequate machinery would be functioning in the area under the Armistice Agreements, the Security Council would be resorted to with regard to each and every issue and violation. It would then assume the task and function of the Mixed Armistice Commissions. I appeal to all members of the Council to ponder this; would that reduce or magnify the tension? Also, would it enhance or reduce the prestige of the Security Council? Would it promote or undermine the application of the rule of law?

61. The past practice of the Security Council shows that the Council was lucky to have local machinery handling such disputes and violations in the first instance. That being the case, the Council should encourage the functioning of that machinery and reactivate it. To do otherwise—and I should like to emphasize this—would be to weaken the Council's own resolution 242 (1967) of 22 November 1967, which by calling for "withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict" recognized the machinery existing before 5 June and the demarcation line of the Armistice Agreement.

62. Moreover, it has been the desire, and indeed the practice, of the Security Council to support its machinery

and to urge the parties to use that machinery before coming to the Council. On 17 November 1950—over seventeen years ago—the Security Council adopted a draft resolution that had been co-sponsored by the United States of America. In that resolution the Council called upon "the parties to the . . . complaints to consent to the handling of complaints according to the procedures established in the Armistice Agreements for the handling of complaints and the settlement of points at issue" [*resolution 89 (1950)*].

63. The Council's position was explained by the United States. Here is what the Permanent Representative of the United States said on the question:

"We do not believe that the remedies available to the parties have been exhausted. We think that the parties should make every reasonable and required effort to exhaust these remedies before they confront the Council with their complaints." [*522nd meeting, p. 14.*]

64. The United States representative felt that that was in the "interests of ensuring the continued effective operation of the Mixed Armistice Commissions" [*ibid.*]. He reiterated on this question that: "the Council should certainly concern itself with the continued effective operation of the Mixed Armistice Commissions . . . and with the general effective execution of the armistice agreements" [*ibid.*, p. 15].

65. That was the position of the United States. I have cited the position of the Security Council, which is embodied in a Security Council resolution adopted as long ago as 1950.

66. Those were the positions of the Security Council and the United States for seventeen years. Would not the Council by ignoring its original stand risk something of its prestige, especially after the Israeli aggression and occupation of 5 June? Even if we assume that the United States is now on its way to changing positions and stands to accommodate a given situation or certain circumstances, can the United Nations Security Council afford to do the same? No, that amounts to accommodating the aggression, and we know that by an illegal act no legal result can be produced, no right acquired, no fruits can be gained through aggression. I find no better answer to show what that would lead to than the position of the United States in 1957, when its representative said:

"... it is incompatible with the principles of the Charter and with the obligations of membership in the United Nations for any Member to seek political gains through the use of force or to use as a bargaining point a gain achieved by means of force".²

67. Therefore, I hope that those who are really interested in effective steps to ensure against repetition of Israeli acts of aggression will support the armistice régime. They cannot rightly argue that there are conflicting claims made by the parties and that therefore United Nations observers should be stationed in the Israel-Jordan cease-fire sector, for in the present case the facts are not in conflict,

² *Official Records of the General Assembly, Eleventh Session, Plenary Meetings, 666th meeting, para. 25.*

especially when this body has the admission—the arrogant admission—of the Israeli authorities.

68. Furthermore, what we have now is a cease-fire. I said that before, and Mr. Tekoah quoted me earlier. I maintained, and continue to maintain, that we have a cease-fire. It continues to be a cease-fire and should be treated as such. No action should be taken by the Council which might explicitly or implicitly create a new situation which would affect the character of the cease-fire. The cease-fire is conceived of as a temporary stage in order to enable the Security Council to take steps to bring about the complete liquidation of the acts of aggression, so that no fruits can be gained through aggression.

69. Certainly the cease-fire was never intended to be a kind of permanent arrangement, nor was it intended to give it a semi-permanent character. That being the case, let me make it emphatically clear, without any reservations and with no room for misunderstanding, that we see and reject the attempts aimed at creating a new machinery and establishing a new so-called line and cease-fire agreement as being illegal, in contradiction of the jurisprudence of the Security Council, in violation of its resolutions and in defiance of the present machinery created for peace-keeping in the area. We are confident that friendly States and peace and security loving members of the Security Council will not be parties to these manoeuvres and tactics which reflect not only on the policies of Governments but on the great prestige which this Council should retain, indeed, on the authority which makes the Council the hope of mankind, the primary organ responsible for peace and security.

70. I submit that, had all the efforts to convince Jordan to accept observers been used to bring about the end of aggression and the termination of the Israeli acts of oppression against Jordanian citizens, to bring about a halt to the continued defiance of this Council's resolutions and to end Israel's continued utter contempt of public opinion and complete disregard of the United Nations values, which the peoples of the United Nations are determined to make the basis for saving succeeding generations from the scourge of war, the Council would not have been sitting here to consider a Jordanian complaint about a renewal of Israeli aggression. Had all these efforts to convince Jordan to accept observers been used to liquidate the aggression, there would have been a better atmosphere in the area and one conducive to peace. Too much effort is being used on the question of observers, and little or no effort is being employed to help in putting an end to aggression, bringing about withdrawal and discouraging the aggressor from committing further acts of aggression.

71. The Council in its resolution last week condemned Israel and warned "that the Security Council would have to consider further and more effective steps as envisaged in the Charter to ensure against repetition of such acts" [*resolution 248 (1968)*]. A few days later we were attacked again. We came to this Council for remedy. To avoid embarrassment, attempts are being made to undermine the complaint and divert attention to some other issues which are indeed irrelevant. Thus some members are referring to different reports presented to the Council immediately after it was convened. Although we are grateful to the Secretariat for

its contribution, we will oppose any attempt by any member to exploit the reports for other purposes.

72. The United States representative asked the Council to heed the Secretary-General's advice. The United States representative asked for the stationing of United Nations observers in the Israel-Jordan cease-fire sector.

73. Nowhere in his report did the Secretary-General refer to stationing observers in a specific cease-fire sector and nowhere in his report did the Secretary-General revoke his position about the Armistice machinery, embodied in the introduction to his report of last year, 1967, where he said:

"... there has been no indication either in the General Assembly or in the Security Council that the validity and applicability of the Armistice Agreements have been changed as a result of the recent hostilities"—of 5 June—"or of the war of 1956; each agreement, in fact, contains a provision that it will remain in force 'until a peaceful settlement between the parties is achieved'."³

He continued as follows:

"Nor has the Security Council or the General Assembly taken any steps to change the pertinent resolutions of either organ relating to the Armistice Agreements or to the earlier cease-fire demands. The Agreements provide that by mutual consent the signatories can revise or suspend them. There is no provision in them for unilateral termination of their application. This has been the United Nations position all along and will continue to be the position until a competent organ decides otherwise."⁴

74. Are we meeting to decide otherwise on the complaint of Jordan? This is and continues to be the jurisprudence of the United Nations. The Armistice Agreements are there and they are valid. Israel does not have a veto power to revoke any of them. The Council should not take a position which it is not authorized to take.

75. It does not help peace or stability in the area to have a complaint about renewal of Israeli aggression become the instrument opening the door for new attempts serving different purposes. We come to the Council for action. We warned the Council earlier of the Israeli aggression. We warned the Council of the previous 21 March Israeli aggression. In both cases the Council did not take action to check the aggression before it happened. Some responsible members of the Council either did not take the question seriously or were indifferent to it, and therefore we faced the wide-scale, unprovoked Israeli military attack.

76. The Israelis not only shelled and used artillery on different Jordanian positions and villages, but went to the extent of using a huge number of jets to bombard the food-producing area in the northern part of the east bank of the Jordan, as well as in the populated areas, including the villages of Al Baqurah, Al 'Adasiyah, Shuna Shamaliyah, Tall al Arba'in, Umm Qays, Al Mashari, Kuraymah, Deir Abu Said, At Tayyibah and the Karameh refugee camp.

³ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-second Session, Supplement No. 1A*, para. 43.

⁴ *Ibid.*

77. Now we come before the Council and not firmness, but expediency playing its part; not a concentration on the need for withdrawal, which is the basic step for securing peace and tranquillity; not a concentration on invoking Chapter VII of the Charter, as the Council's resolution of last week had warned, but, in some of the statements made here, a lack of desire to help the area.

78. This, we submit, will have far-reaching implications. If the Council wants, through its inaction, to make indiscriminate bombing of populated areas, villages, food-producing fields and irrigation projects the rule of law, and thus give Israel a green light to continue its practices, then I submit that the Council is inviting disaster. In doing so, it is not stopping the resistance of those who are offering their lives to promote justice and peace and to safeguard human rights. On the contrary, the Council is telling them that they should not rely on the Council, that this organ is not the hope of mankind and that they should rely on themselves and their struggle and their sacrifices.

79. No one wants war. But does the bombing of the food-producing area of Jordan and the populated villages in the northern part of the east bank bring peace? Does the failure of the Security Council to take immediate action to check aggression bring peace? Does the attempt to inject a foreign substance into our complaint bring peace? Does the continued occupation of our territories bring peace? Mr. Tekoah just spoke about some individuals resisting the Israelis' occupation. But the question arises: Why are the Israelis there? What are they doing in the west bank of the Jordan? Why are they present in Sinai? How come they are still in Gaza, committing all kinds of acts of oppression and intimidation? Why are they still in Golan? If they want peace, it is not enough to sing the song of peace. Peace requires acts and deeds. They cannot occupy all these Arab territories and then expect peace. To seek peace, they must practice peace. And you do not practice peace by occupying territories through force. That is conquest, and conquest dictates, imposes a duty on every individual to struggle—to struggle for liberty. It is not something invented by an Arab. This has been the history of your great country, Mr. President, the Soviet Union, and of the countries of many members around this table. They were subjected to occupation and they had to struggle. I can count six, seven or eight countries here in the Council who had to struggle against occupation.

80. Occupation imposes a duty. Struggling against it is the only legitimate thing unless the Council, faithful to its obligations, will take action and firmly uphold the values enshrined in our Charter. But to come and speak to us about peace—of course we want peace. Yet what are they doing in the west bank?

81. In conclusion, I appeal to all the members around this table to look at this serious complaint, not from the point of view of political expediency or the size of a Member State of the United Nations, but from the point of view of the grave responsibility this Council has undertaken vis-à-vis humanity at large and the right of man to be free from crimes committed because of the arrogance of power, crimes committed because some members give the rule of law lip-service. The Council's decision on this complaint will answer a serious question in the mind of every Arab:

should we expect a solution from the United Nations, or is the United Nations paralysed and therefore able to offer no solution?

82. Mr. IGNATIEFF (Canada): Mr. President, first of all I should like to associate myself with the tribute which you have paid to our former President, Ambassador Diop of Senegal, who conducted with such consummate skill, calm and patience the busy affairs of the Council last month

83. I should also like to take the opportunity, since this is the first occasion on which we sit under your Presidency, to extend to you our very best wishes and to assure you of the desire of the Canadian delegation to co-operate with you and to take advantage of the long experience and ability which you bring to this serious responsibility.

84. I find it difficult, in view of the statements we have heard and the submissions of both parties, to find words to express the deep concern and dismay of my delegation over the latest violent incidents and the exchange of fire, as well as the serious charges and counter-charges to which we have listened today.

85. Confrontation in the area once again threatens peace and risks disrupting the efforts of the United Nations to find a way out of the vicious circle of violence which once again threatens to escalate, instead of leading to a political solution.

86. The complaints of Israel and Jordan before us in documents dated 29 March 1968 and the accounts of the parties are clear enough, as always, but the evidence that they have submitted is, in my judgement, conflicting in some respects. The information available to the Council from objective sources is scant indeed. Our Secretary-General, in the report which he submitted last Saturday, 30 March 1968 [S/7930/Add.66] on the latest breaches of the cease-fire and the events which we are now discussing, has stated in unequivocal terms his inability to provide verified information from objective sources in the present situation, and has pointed to the benefits of the maintenance of peace which could be derived from the presence of United Nations observers in the area. This seems to be the point which—at least in my view and that of the delegation of Canada—it is important to take into consideration.

87. General Odd Bull, the representative of the Secretary-General in the area, advises the Secretary-General that "it is practically impossible for me to report on the developments in the Israel-Jordan cease-fire sector"—he does not speak of lines, but of the whole area—"due to the fact that no United Nations observers are operating in the area".

88. General Odd Bull took the occasion to point out that the presence of United Nations observers in an area can be helpful in preserving a cease-fire in ways other than reporting. This is the point that he makes; it is not just a question of reporting. The mere fact of their watchful presence, he says, can be something of a deterrent to military activity. They can be in a position to report on indications of the build-ups which often precede military action, and when fighting does break out they can quickly intervene on the spot with the opposing local commanders

to arrange an immediate cease-fire. The Secretary-General points out also that it may be noted that, largely because of the presence of United Nations observers, the Security Council cease-fire resolutions are better served and maintained in the Suez Canal and Israel-Syria sector than in the Israel-Jordan sector which we are now discussing.

89. The Canadian delegation, for its part feels strongly that it is not enough simply to call for respect of the cease-fire, although such a call is certainly in order. Surely we must ask the parties—this is a matter of co-operation and voluntary arrangement—to allow observers to function in a mobile fashion. No one has spoken of a new line or of some permanent arrangements which are to the disadvantage of one side or another. It would be a voluntary arrangement, but one which would help in the maintenance of the cease-fire and secure conditions of calm in the area.

90. For my part, at least, I am not in a position to attempt to pass judgement on the conflicting claims and charges that are put forward in this Council by both parties without independent information coming to us from the Secretary-General. When we met only last week the Canadian delegation expressed the hope that something could be done to facilitate the assignment by the Secretary-General of United Nations observers to the area, and we suggested then that by helping to establish conditions of calm such an arrangement would assist the efforts of Ambassador Jarring to achieve agreement on the application of Council resolution 242 (1967), which is our fundamental jurisdiction, on the basis of which all our discussions are proceeding at the present time. The need for such action is even more urgent and evident today, given the state of open confrontation of hostile forces in the area which, according to the statements which we have listened to this afternoon, is becoming even more dangerous.

91. I earnestly hope that this Council will continue to urge the parties to accept observers and to co-operate with them in restoring a measure of quiet in the area. But surely the supreme aim at this time must be for us all in this Council and the parties concerned to give all the support we possibly can to Ambassador Jarring in his mission of peace which is being conducted on behalf of all members of the Security Council in the name of the Secretary-General. The latest report on Ambassador Jarring's efforts is contained in document S/8309/Add.2, of 29 March 1968, which the Secretary-General has been good enough to put before us. I should like to take this opportunity, therefore, once again to urge all the parties concerned to extend full co-operation to Ambassador Jarring on the basis of the acceptance of the Council's resolution of 22 November 1967 [resolution 242 (1967)] as a whole.

92. Mr. BERARD (France) (*translated from French*): First of all, Mr. President, my delegation knowing as it does your great authority and experience, would like to express its great pleasure at seeing you in the high office you have assumed today. It should also like to acknowledge the competence and efficiency with which your predecessor, Ambassador Socé Diop, conducted our work.

93. On 24 March 1968, by its resolution 248 (1968), the Council unanimously condemned the military action launched by Israel in flagrant violation of the United

Nations Charter and the cease-fire resolutions. It deplored all violent incidents in violation of the cease-fire and declared that such actions of military reprisal and other grave violations of the cease-fire could not be tolerated and that the Council would have to consider further and more effective steps as envisaged in the Charter to ensure against repetition of such acts.

94. Yet, less than five days after the adoption of that resolution, new and serious incidents have occurred which have once more bathed the area in blood and have made it necessary for the Council to meet again. Fresh fighting has broken out along the 120 kilometres of the Jordan valley; a particularly violent and destructive artillery duel was carried on for six hours; the Israel Air Force intervened and numerous localities were subjected to bombardment from land and air.

95. The Security Council knows my Government's position on this matter. The unanimously adopted resolution of 22 November, which laid down the basis for a settlement in keeping with the views of the French Government, remains, as our Minister for Foreign Affairs recently recalled, the foundation of French policy. It is along the lines laid down in this resolution and not in the opposite way—by military action—that we must resolutely proceed until a final solution is reached.

96. My Government is deeply concerned over the loss of human life, the additional suffering and the damage to property caused by the renewed military activities of 29 March. But what concerns us even more is that the repetition of such serious incidents can only widen the gap of mistrust between the adversaries and postpone still further the peaceful settlement we all desire.

97. We cannot allow such clashes to continue. Their frequency has mounted dangerously during the last few weeks and they threaten not only to become more numerous, but also more widespread. There is a danger that a real war, in all its forms, may break out once more in that region, and if that were to happen no one could foresee where it would stop.

98. The Council cannot allow its authority to be flouted or its decisions ignored. It must demand that its decisions be respected, especially those embodied in resolutions 242 (1967) and 248 (1968) of 22 November 1967 and 24 March 1968. To adopt resolutions is not enough; the Council must ensure that they are carried out. It must seek solutions and put them into effect.

99. In order to achieve that end, the Council must be in a position to determine the most effective courses of action. It needs to be fully and accurately informed. Its resolutions are more valuable when they are based on unassailable facts. In the supplemental information he has submitted to this Council on 30 March [S/7930/Add.66], the Secretary-General pointed out that the presence of United Nations observers in an area can be helpful in preserving a cease-fire in ways other than reporting. The mere fact of their watchful presence, he added, can be something of a deterrent to military activity. They can be in a position to report on indications of the build-ups which often precede military action and, when fighting does break out, they can

quickly intervene on the spot with the opposing local commanders to arrange immediate cease-fires.

100. This is fair enough, but let it be understood that there can be no question of taking action which might in any way appear to condone conquest or military occupation, which is something we do not recognize, or to accept the positions occupied by the opposing sides at the time of the cease-fire. That must be very clearly understood. But if a mobile unit could be set up under the command of the Chief of Staff of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization; a unit which would bear these considerations in mind and which would be capable of intervening anywhere it was needed in the Israel-Jordan sector in order to expose and prevent military concentrations such as those we witnessed on the eve of the 29 March fighting, or in order to halt military activities as soon as they occur, we would certainly have taken a step towards a settlement.

101. At the same time, we must demand scrupulous respect for resolution 248 (1968) of 24 March 1968, without, however, losing sight of the fact that it is only through the full application of resolution 242 (1967) of 22 November 1967 that we can hope to find a lasting solution to the Middle East problem.

102. Mr. SHAHI (Pakistan): Mr. President, my delegation extends to you our warm congratulations on your accession to the Presidency of the Security Council. Your qualities of high statesmanship for which you are well known, and the fact that you represent a world Power which is dedicated to the establishment of a just peace and the elimination of colonialism in all its manifestations, makes it doubly appropriate that you should preside over our deliberations on these very issues this month.

103. I also take this opportunity to pay a sincere tribute to Ambassador Diop of Senegal for the patience, judgement and skill of which he gave so much proof while presiding over the many meetings of the Security Council last month when questions of great moment—the enlargement of freedom and the maintenance of peace in the world—occupied our attention.

104. The Security Council on 24 March 1968 adopted resolution 248 (1968), condemning the military action launched by Israel in flagrant violation of the United Nations Charter and the cease-fire resolutions. Yet, five days later we were faced again with another large-scale military action by Israel. This was a heavy and concentrated bombardment of the east bank of the Jordan by land and air; it caused further loss of life and laid waste fertile lands which formed the source of livelihood of the Arab refugees who, for the third time in twenty years, have been uprooted by violence from their homes.

105. In 1968 and 1969, nearly one million Arab inhabitants had to flee their homes in Palestine. In 1967, another 400,000 on the west bank of the Jordan and elsewhere again became homeless, many of them for a second time. And this year, since 15 February, some 77,000 according to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East have been compelled to flee from the east bank towards Amman in consequence of Israeli military operations across the river Jordan.

106. The magnitude and depth of this human tragedy and the cruelty and suffering it has inflicted is beyond description. The Security Council has repeatedly declared that acts of military reprisal cannot be tolerated; far less can they be tolerated against a practically defenceless State such as Jordan, which has been subjected to massive violence and destruction in reprisal against the acts of the Palestinian resistance.

107. How can we believe that the resistance emanates solely from Jordanian territory and that nothing but peace and tranquillity prevail in the occupied areas? Even if the Israeli charges were true, here a clear distinction must be drawn, as has been pointed out by one of our colleagues, between military operations waged deliberately by Governments after thorough preparation and acts of individuals or groups inspired by natural feelings. We cannot forget that they have been the victims of ruthlessness and violence for twenty years, condemned to a rootless and hopeless existence for the rest of their lives; and it has been even more tragic for their children.

108. Confronted with this situation the Security Council, in the view of my delegation, cannot but bear in mind the whole background of the problem. My delegation was deeply impressed by what the representative of the United Kingdom, Lord Caradon, said at the 1407th meeting of the Security Council: "To attempt to deal with last week's events in isolation . . . would be to fail to recognize the realities of the situation as a whole" [1407th meeting, para. 38].

109. We cannot fail to recognize the realities. We must acknowledge that the immediate cause of the problem before the Council is the continued occupation of Arab territories by Israel. Nothing but the departure of the occupying forces will prevent a further deterioration of the situation and serve to bring tranquillity to the area.

110. In this context, we greatly deplore the thinly veiled designs of Israel to annex the Jordanian territory occupied since June last. These designs inevitably provoke acts of resistance from the uprooted, despoiled and dispossessed people of Palestine. Unless we in the Council resign ourselves to a pattern of repeated violations of the cease-fire, unless we lapse into indifference with regard to the endless sufferings of the refugees, unless we are oblivious of the imperative not to countenance any acquisition of territory by military conquest, we must call upon Israel to accept and implement, without any further delay, Security Council resolution 242 (1967) of 22 November 1967 and to fully co-operate with the Special Representative of the Secretary-General by withdrawing its forces from all the territories occupied since 5 June of last year.

111. My delegation has taken careful note of the supplementary information submitted by the Secretary-General in document S/7930/Add.66, of 30 March 1968. While we appreciate the Secretary-General's argument for establishing the watchful presence of United Nations observers in the Israel-Jordan sector, we consider that the apprehensions expressed by the representative of Jordan are only natural and justified in the circumstances, given the record of Israel and its expansionist designs. The machinery of the United

Nations should not be so exploited as to lead to an insidious transformation of an occupation into a *de facto* annexation of territory acquired by military conquest.

112. With those inescapable considerations in mind, my delegation would like to stress that there is no warrant for considering Security Council resolution 73 (1949), which provided for a machinery to supervise the armistice between Jordan and Israel, as obsolete.

113. In considering the Secretary-General's recommendation contained in his supplemental information note, my delegation is of the view that the Security Council might well examine how that machinery should be put together again and deployed to meet the needs of the present situation.

114. Mr. SETTE CAMARA (Brazil): Mr. President, allow me to convey to you the congratulations of my delegation on your assumption of the high duties of President of the Security Council.

115. Allow me also to express to Ambassador Diop of Senegal our gratitude and admiration for the way in which he presided over the deliberations of this Council during the past month of March.

116. I came from my country only last week, but I know that all of you around this table had a very busy month and also, may I say, a successful one. I am also aware of the fact that no small part of that success was due to the dedication and intelligence which Ambassador Diop brought to the difficult job that is now yours, Mr. President.

117. Only some days ago the Security Council adopted by unanimity resolution 248 (1968), in view of the large-scale military action taken by Israel on the territory of Jordan, and also in view of the armed attacks launched from Jordanian territory through and beyond the cease-fire line. The Security Council, in that resolution, condemned "the military action launched by Israel" and deplored "all violent incidents in violation of the cease-fire". Those are the very words of resolution 248 (1968).

118. Today this Council is examining the occurrence of new incidents on the Jordanian-Israeli sector of the cease-fire line where, on 29 March, "heavy and prolonged firing including artillery exchanges and aerial activity" took place, according to "Accounts presented by both parties" [S/7930/Add.66, para. 1]. This is in the Secretary-General's supplemental information of 30 March 1968.

119. Resolution 248 (1968) of this Council also made it clear that "actions of military reprisal and other grave violations of the cease-fire cannot be tolerated", and that "the Security Council would have to consider further and more effective steps as envisaged in the Charter to ensure against repetition of such acts".

120. On past occasions my delegation has firmly stated that this Council cannot condone the use of force under any form whatsoever, and that the cease-fire, on which all hopes for the Middle East depend, cannot go on being the object of systematic violations. The authority and the prestige of the Security Council are at stake today in the

Jordan valley. And when a decision of this organ is at stake somewhere, peace is at stake everywhere. When a cease-fire ordered by the Security Council is so lightly respected, it is not only the well-being and safety of the inhabitants of the Jordan valley that suffer; all other eventual cease-fires that this Council may one day order in other parts of the world also will suffer, and with this the very foundations of the world that the United Nations has been trying to build since 1945. Therefore, I can never overstress the vital importance that my Government attributes to the necessity for the most scrupulous respect of the cease-fire.

121. Equally grave is the fact that the Security Council, faced with such deplorable violations, is not even in a position to know objectively all the elements of the situation in the Jordanian-Israeli sector of the cease-fire line and has to rely on the accounts given by the parties concerned. In consequence, the first step for us to take here must be to enable the Security Council to follow developments in that area. My delegation welcomes the suggestion made by the Secretary-General in his last report [ibid.] on the need for United Nations observers in the Jordanian-Israeli sector of the cease-fire line. The reasons invoked by the Secretary-General for such a proposal should be seriously considered and acted upon if and when there is a political consensus on the part of this Council. It is indeed very difficult for the Security Council to take action on the basis of conflicting official reports coming from the parties involved or from mere hearsay. In this context, I would also like to point out that, given the present situation in the Middle East, any curtailment of United Nations activities in the area must be regretted, be it the end of the presence of the Organization in Jerusalem or the withdrawal of the United Nations Emergency Force just before the war broke out.

122. On the other hand, I wish to express the concern of my Government as to the possible effects of the most recent events on the future and the prospects of the Jarring mission. In his latest report of 29 March 1968 on the mission [S/8309/Add.2], the Secretary-General points out that the mediation efforts of Ambassador Jarring "have been interrupted by recent events". It is the hope of my delegation that the parties will continue to co-operate with Ambassador Jarring and will enable him to renew, as soon as possible, the contacts that he has been maintaining since last December.

123. Let me conclude my remarks by appealing again to the parties to exercise their utmost restraint in the future. The bitter experience of twenty years of hostility should have made clear to all by now that nothing is to be gained by war. The records of history deride those who thought they were accomplishing something by the use of force and violence. History may indeed one day ask sceptically what was the meaning of all the sound and the fury of the present situation in the Middle East. But this generation of Arabs and Israelis will only live up to their responsibility before history if they decide, as I am sure they will, to bequeath to their sons not a legacy of hatred and destruction but a heritage of coexistence and prosperity.

124. Mr. BORCH (Denmark): Mr. President, at the outset I should like to associate myself with the well-merited praise you paid to the representative of Senegal, our

esteemed President during the difficult month of March. In welcoming you, Mr. President, to your high office I wish to assure you most sincerely of the fullest co-operation of the Danish delegation.

125. It was with great regret and concern that my delegation learned about the violent outbreaks of fighting between Israel and Jordan only five days after the unanimous adoption by this Council of resolution 248 (1968). I wish to take this opportunity to re-emphasize that it is of the utmost importance that the cease-fire be scrupulously adhered to by all concerned. For quite apart from the human sufferings and material losses which are inflicted by any violation of the cease-fire, such violations tend to impede progress towards the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the area in accordance with Security Council resolution 242 (1967). If new catastrophes are to be averted it is indeed essential that all parties extend their full co-operation to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and desist from any step whatsoever which might further complicate his endeavours.

126. In my statement in this Council on 21 March 1968 [1403rd meeting] I spoke in favour of a strengthening of the United Nations' supervisory functions. The supplementary information presented to us by the Secretary-General in document S/7930/Add.66 confirms the need in this respect. Fortified by the observations in this document, already repeatedly quoted in this meeting, my delegation would like to put on record that it is prepared to give positive consideration to any practical steps such as deployment of the observers of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization in an appropriate area that may strengthen the Secretary-General in the discharge of his reporting responsibilities under the resolutions of this Council and that may help in deterring further violations of the cease-fire.

127. Although we do not underrate the difficulties, it is the hope of my delegation that it will prove possible for the Security Council, in co-operation with the parties concerned, to find the formula that will allow for the presence of United Nations observers in accordance with the observations of the Secretary-General.

128. The PRESIDENT (*translated from Russian*): I call on the representative of Israel in exercise of his right of reply.

129. Mr. TEKOA (Israel): The representative of Jordan referred to the Armistice Agreements—destroyed by the Arab States. What is behind that reference? At the Security Council meeting on 31 May 1967, the representative of Jordan said:

“There is an Armistice Agreement. The Agreement did not fix boundaries;... The Agreement did not pass judgement on rights—political, military or otherwise. Thus I know of no territory; I know of no boundary” [1345th meeting, para. 84].

130. As the Security Council is aware, the United Nations through its representative, Ambassador Jarring, is now engaged in an effort to vindicate the political and military rights of the States in the area, such as the right to live in peace, the right to live free from threats of force, the right

to freedom of navigation. The United Nations is now actively engaged in an effort to establish boundaries and to define territory. Indeed, the United Nations for the first time in many years is working towards a just and lasting peace that would establish precisely those elements that, in the words of the Jordanian representative, did not exist under the Armistice Agreement.

131. The Jordanian representative would nevertheless like the Security Council to take the road backward, to cancel all prospects of peace, to thwart all chances of understanding between the parties. To Jordan and to the other Arab States we say: the world expects us to move forward to peace and stability, not backward to renewed chaos and continued warfare. Let us take this road together. That is what our peoples desire. That is what our peoples pray for.

132. The PRESIDENT (*translated from Russian*): I call on the representative of Jordan in exercise of his right of reply.

133. Mr. EL-FARRA (Jordan): Last year I said, and I continue to maintain, that the Armistice Agreement did not fix boundaries. Certainly, the Armistice Agreement did not fix a boundary for Israel. The boundaries are fixed by the United Nations. There is a resolution referring to boundaries, but the Armistice Agreement never fixed boundaries. What Israel occupied by force, in violation of the United Nations resolutions, is certainly not a boundary; otherwise, the United Nations would be condoning aggression. It was taken by force in the same way that Israel took by force the territory it has been occupying since 5 June. There is nothing wrong in the statement that the Armistice Agreement did not fix boundaries. It is not Jordan saying this. It has been affirmed by the United Nations, by the Security Council and by the General Assembly.

134. Mr. Tekoah tells us: “Let us move forward to peace.” They are moving forward—to expansion. They moved forward when they occupied the west bank. They also moved forward in Sinai, forward in Gaza and forward in Syria. Mr. Tekoah speaks about moving forward to peace. But they should go backward first to what was given them by the United Nations. They should implement the demands of the United Nations. They should go back to the Lausanne Protocol signed by them on 12 May 1949.⁵ That would be a reflection of peaceful motives. But to keep speaking about peace when they are practising aggression certainly does not fool anybody—not even the Israelis.

135. The PRESIDENT (*translated from Russian*): The list of speakers is exhausted. There are no other representatives who wish to speak at today's meeting.

136. After informal consultations with the members of the Council it has been established that a majority of the members is in favour of holding the next meeting of the Council for the consideration of this item of its agenda at 3 p.m. on 2 April. Since I hear no objection, it is so decided.

137. Before closing the meeting, I should like to express my gratitude to those members of the Security Council

⁵ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Fourth Session, Ad Hoc Political Committee, Annex, Vol. II, document A/927, annex B.*

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