



SECURITY COUNCIL OFFICIAL RECORDS

TWENTY-FOURTH YEAR

1480th MEETING: 23 JUNE 1969

NEW YORK

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NOTE

Symbols of United Nations documents are composed of capital letters combined with figures. Mention of such a symbol indicates a reference to a United Nations document.

Documents of the Security Council (symbol S/. . .) are normally published in quarterly *Supplements of the Official Records of the Security Council*. The date of the document indicates the supplement in which it appears or in which information about it is given.

The resolutions of the Security Council, numbered in accordance with a system adopted in 1964, are published in yearly volumes of *Resolutions and Decisions of the Security Council*. The new system, which has been applied retroactively to resolutions adopted before 1 January 1965, became fully operative on that date.

FOURTEEN HUNDRED AND EIGHTIETH MEETING

Held in New York on Monday, 23 June 1969, at 3.30 p.m.

President: Mr. M. SOLANO LOPEZ (Paraguay).

Present: The representatives of the following States: Algeria, China, Colombia, Finland, France, Hungary, Nepal, Pakistan, Paraguay, Senegal, Spain, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America and Zambia.

Provisional agenda (S/Agenda/1480)

1. Adoption of the agenda.
2. Question concerning the situation in Southern Rhodesia:

Letter dated 6 June 1969 addressed to the President of the Security Council by the representatives of Afghanistan, Algeria, Botswana, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Ceylon, Chad, Congo (Brazzaville), Congo (Democratic Republic of), Cyprus, Dahomey, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ivory Coast, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Laos, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mongolia, Morocco, Nepal, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Philippines, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Somalia, Southern Yemen, Sudan, Swaziland, Syria, Thailand, Togo, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, United Arab Republic, United Republic of Tanzania, Upper Volta, Yemen, Yugoslavia and Zambia (S/9237 and Add.1-2)

Reports of the Committee established in pursuance of Security Council resolution 253 (1968) (S/8954 and S/9252).

Adoption of the agenda

The agenda was adopted.

Question concerning the situation in Southern Rhodesia

Letter dated 6 June 1969 addressed to the President of the Security Council by the representatives of Afghanistan, Algeria, Botswana, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Ceylon, Chad, Congo (Brazzaville), Congo (Democratic Republic of), Cyprus, Dahomey, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ivory Coast, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Laos, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mongolia, Morocco, Nepal, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Philippines, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Somalia, Southern Yemen, Sudan, Swaziland, Syria, Thailand, Togo, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, United Arab Republic, United Republic of Tanzania, Upper

Volta, Yemen, Yugoslavia and Zambia (S/9237 and Add.1-2)

Reports of the Committee established in pursuance of Security Council resolution 253 (1968) (S/8954 and S/9252)

1. The PRESIDENT (*translated from Spanish*): In accordance with the decisions previously adopted by the Council, and with its consent, I shall invite the representatives of Mauritania, Tanzania, Guinea, Somalia, India, Sudan and Saudi Arabia to participate, without the right to vote, in the debate on the question before us.

2. In view of the limited space at the Council table, and in accordance with the practice followed in the past in similar cases, I shall invite those representatives to take the seats which have been reserved for them in the chamber, on the understanding that when they wish to make statements they will be invited to take seats at the Council table.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. S. A. Ould Daddah (Mauritania), Mr. A. B. C. Danieli (United Republic of Tanzania), Mr. A. Touré (Guinea), Mr. M. Warsama (Somalia), Mr. S. M. S. Chadha (India), Mr. M. Fakhreddine (Sudan), and Mr. J. M. Baroody (Saudi Arabia) took the places reserved for them in the Council chamber.

3. The PRESIDENT (*translated from Spanish*): I wish to inform the Council that I have received a letter dated 20 June 1969 from the representative of Burundi in which he asks to be allowed to participate, without the right to vote, in this debate. If I hear no objections, I shall take it that the Council so agrees.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Nsanze Terence (Burundi) took the place reserved for him in the Council chamber.

4. The PRESIDENT (*translated from Spanish*): The Security Council will now continue its consideration of the item concerning the situation in Southern Rhodesia.

5. The first speaker on my list is the representative of Finland, upon whom I now call.

6. Mr. JAKOBSON (Finland): As I said in my previous statement in this debate, our natural disappointment in the slow rate at which the policy of sanctions against the illegal régime in Southern Rhodesia is evolving should not lead us to underestimate the historic significance of the unanimous decision taken a year ago by the Security Council to apply

economic sanctions for the purpose of putting an end to the suppression of the political rights of the black majority in Southern Rhodesia. The Finnish Government strongly believes that the Security Council, having once embarked upon a policy of sanctions, must find the means to carry it through, for the sake of the people of Southern Rhodesia and for the sake of the authority of the United Nations. It is from this point of view that I shall now examine the report of the sanctions Committee which is on the agenda of our meeting.

7. The report shows that the decision taken by the Security Council on 29 May 1968 and contained in resolution 253 (1968) has not yet been fully carried out. It is revealing that by the end of 1968 only eighty-one Member States and four members of specialized agencies had reported to the Secretary-General on the implementation of the resolution. As late as on 6 June 1969, thirty-three States, twenty-nine Members of the United Nations and four members of specialized agencies, had not replied to any of the communications from the Secretary-General requesting information on measures taken to implement the resolution. We are thus conducting a world-wide operation with incomplete intelligence.

8. While it is obvious that the policy of South Africa and Portugal is causing the greatest damage to the system of sanctions, it also appears from the report of the sanctions Committee that other States are carrying on trade with Southern Rhodesia. According to one estimate mentioned in the report, this illegal trade amounted to approximately £44 million in 1968. The report suggests a number of steps that could be taken by States complying with resolution 253 (1968) to increase the effectiveness of the sanctions and thus to stop this illegal trade. In view of the relatively simple structure of Southern Rhodesia's exports, it should also be worth exploring whether it would not be possible to agree on ways and means to interrupt or at least appreciably cut down the export of certain key commodities from Southern Rhodesia through South Africa or Mozambique.

9. Those are questions of the kind which, in the view of my delegation, could be examined in consultations among members of the Security Council, or perhaps, in the first place, within the sanctions Committee. We believe that we should now concentrate on finding more effective measures to ensure full implementation of Security Council resolution 253 (1968) rather than on the far-reaching new proposals contained in the draft resolution presented to the Council at the 1479th meeting by the representative of Algeria, proposals that are bound to divide the Council and, consequently, remain without practical effect. To dismiss the present system of economic sanctions as a failure before agreement could be reached within the Council on what else could be done would be to weaken the credibility of the sanctions now in force and confuse international opinion which has been ready to support the sanctions.

10. Mr. CSATORDAY (Hungary): During this discussion a number of speakers have underlined the complete fallacy of the United Kingdom position on the situation prevailing in Southern Rhodesia. This fallacy has all along been demonstrated in the policy of the United Kingdom Government

towards the illegal minority racist régime in Southern Rhodesia. According to that policy, the rebellion now in power in that Territory is not to be met head on, but rather every effort should be made to reach a compromise settlement with it. Several speakers have underlined the novelty of that approach in British colonial policy. It is in fact the first time that a rebellion is to be not crushed but appeased by the United Kingdom Government.

11. This appeasement has taken various forms during the past three-and-a-half years. Periodic negotiations have taken place from time to time with the rebels by Cabinet Ministers of the British Crown, including the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom. Along with that, the United Kingdom, after admitting its unwillingness to crush the rebellion, has proposed to the Security Council that so-called selective sanctions be applied to the Smith régime. The mere fact that the United Kingdom, while fully maintaining its responsibility towards the Territory, has turned to the United Nations for assistance constitutes the crux of the present ambiguous situation—ambiguous because claiming responsibility over a Territory ruled by a rebellion but not being ready to deal with it, asking for United Nations assistance but trying at every turn to limit it to the minimum, has made the situation even more difficult and resulted in the present deadlock. The United Kingdom policy of playing on two instruments at the same time has resulted in no meaningful United Kingdom action, while it has reduced the utility of the United Nations action.

12. The policy of sanctions has been at the heart of this dubious game. First we had the policy of the so-called selective sanctions. Later came the so-called comprehensive sanctions, which, as I propose to demonstrate later, have so far been anything but comprehensive. This gradual approach, as some speakers have underlined in this discussion, has enabled the Smith régime to adjust to the new situation, to look for alternative outlets for its goods, to make new arrangements for transportation, fuel supply and so on. Consequently the tightening of the sanctions has not really affected the Smith régime, as proven convincingly by the figures quoted by several speakers in our discussion and by the boasts of Ian Smith.

13. The conclusion to be drawn from this situation is clear to all of us. Either we decide on full sanctions against the Smith régime or it is useless to continue to apply sanctions at a snail's pace. The policy of sanctions proposed up to now by the United Kingdom is nothing but shadow-boxing. It is dictated not by the desire to eliminate Smith and his cohorts but by considerations of preserving them in the government of that land for a long time to come by arranging compromises with these racist rebels. The gradually introduced and almost totally ineffective sanctions were primarily meant to strengthen the hand of the United Kingdom negotiators to strike a better bargain with Smith.

14. It is for that reason that the draft resolution [S/9270/Rev.1] submitted by the Afro-Asian nations represented in the Security Council, provides in its operative paragraph 3, for full sanctions by all against the racist régime. My delegation feels that it is high time to embark on this road. We have been strengthened in this conviction by the reaction of the representative of the United

Kingdom, who, referring [1476th meeting] to the statistics cited by the representative of the Soviet Union on United Kingdom investments in Southern Rhodesia during past years, claims that this represented no violation of the sanctions. If we have sanctions which make it possible to invest tens of millions of pounds sterling in the economy of Ian Smith, then it is time to do something about these so-called sanctions.

15. The second reason for the collapse of the policy of sanctions is the non-compliance with our decisions by several Member States. The second report [S/9252] of the Committee established in pursuance of Security Council resolution 253 (1968) states in paragraph 12 that Portugal—on the pretext of not having received from the Security Council an answer to its questions—has in effect refused to comply with resolution 253 (1968) of the Council. In paragraph 14 we read¹ that a number of Member States, including South Africa, have not replied to any communications from the Secretary-General in this matter.

16. However, in the first report of that Committee [S/8954]² we read that all available evidence indicates that South Africa has become by far the main trading partner of Southern Rhodesia. According to estimates provided to it by the Secretariat, the Committee reported that South Africa's imports from Southern Rhodesia amounted to about \$80 million in 1967, and South Africa's exports to Southern Rhodesia to about \$160 million. The preliminary data for January-March 1968 indicated that South Africa's exports to Southern Rhodesia had been expanded further during the first half of 1968. Although no information on the commodity composition of this trade was available, it was estimated by the Secretariat that about \$25 million worth of South Africa's exports to Southern Rhodesia in 1966 and 1967 consisted only of fuels.

17. Acting contrary to the provisions of the International Convention relating to Economic Statistics, the Government of South Africa has adopted the practice of showing a single aggregate for trade with African countries, which would not disclose the individual countries of origin or destination. During his visit to South Africa in March 1969, Ian Smith said that he did not see any reluctance or fear on the part of South Africa to trade with Rhodesia. That is the way the sanctions decided by the Security Council are complied with by a Member State. It is unnecessary to dwell in detail on the role of the ports of the Portuguese colony of Mozambique in handling fuel and other supplies for Southern Rhodesia and forwarding its exports overseas. There is no doubt in the minds of any of the delegations seated around this table that the two Member States referred to have deliberately and defiantly violated Article 25 of the Charter, which states that:

“The Members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the present Charter.”

¹ See *Official Records of the Security Council, Twenty-fourth Year, Supplement for April, May and June 1969*, page 197.

² *Ibid.*, *Twenty-third Year, Supplement for October, November and December 1968*, page 184.

Since South Africa and Portugal are thus clearly violating the Charter of the United Nations, operative paragraph 5 of the draft resolution before us is fully justified in providing that the sanctions envisaged in resolution 253 (1968) should be extended to South Africa and the Portuguese colony of Mozambique, or rather to Portugal.

18. In this connexion we have often been told by some representatives that it is not possible for them to apply those sanctions because of the considerable sacrifices this provision would entail for their countries. That is a curious argument, to say the least. We still recall that the very same countries were well able to ignore the sacrifices when they decided upon the measures of embargo applied against the socialist countries during the cold-war period. There was of course no United Nations resolution to support those discriminatory measures. The only motive behind them was the desire to stifle the economy of the socialist countries and to force them to restore capitalism to its previous power. It is instructive now to watch the same countries ruling out financial sacrifices in the struggle against the racist régimes of southern Africa when they so readily consented to large losses of trade with the socialist world. But then it was a question of fighting not fascism or racist régimes but rather the peoples which bore the brunt of the great struggle against fascism and which resolutely oppose racial discrimination and colonialism.

19. It is certainly astonishing that Governments which never tire of lecturing others on democracy and human rights capitulate so completely the moment selfish economic interests enter the picture. The racist régimes in southern Africa represent the worst as far as denial of elementary human rights, racial superiority and complete refusal of self-determination are concerned. Ian Smith has borrowed the bulk of the South African legal system, an entire set of laws regarding racial segregation; national, political, economic and cultural *apartheid* has been ruthlessly implemented in Southern Rhodesia. In all these matters the view and policies of Vorster and Ian Smith are no different from the ones which Hitler, Rosenberg and other Nazi stalwarts held in their time. The representative of the administering Power calls the fifty-year-old rule of the white settlers the exercise of self-government and proudly states that it prevailed with its endorsement for half a century. In our view it had nothing to do with self-government. Considering that fifty years of so-called self-government have led to the Smith régime and to the tragi-comedy of the farce referendum on 20 June last, one can understand that the United Kingdom means it when it tells us that progress must be inevitably slow. In reply to the representative of the United Kingdom we are bound to emphasize that there can be no compromise with fascism. The Council cannot compromise the good name of the United Nations.

20. My country, as a member of the *apartheid* Committee of the United Nations, feels that it should raise its voice against the arbitrary persecution, imprisonment and execution of the best Zimbabwe people, who fight for their freedom, for their genuine independence and for their fundamental human and national rights as enshrined in the United Nations Charter. Unfortunately the draft resolution remains wanting in this respect.

21. I feel obliged to refer also to the repeated appeals voiced by the representative of the United Kingdom in favour of the unity of the Council in the matter of Southern Rhodesia. The history of this problem in the Council must persuade everyone that the majority of the States represented here, notwithstanding their reservations and serious misgivings, have opted for unity in the past. But this unity, based on the delaying tactics of the administering Power, has led us up a blind alley.

22. Now it is time for the United Kingdom and those who sympathize with it to join the majority and its policies and thereby help to bring about the unity that will lead to results and not to repeated deadlocks as in the past. This is the unity we must seek and this is the unity that will eliminate Smith and his régime. The earlier, formal unity in the Council has served only to embolden the Salisbury racists. A unity based on fundamental principles of the Charter and not on mere expediency is what is needed. No other unity can be accepted.

23. The discussion in the Security Council has clearly shown that world public opinion now demands that we take energetic measures to bring self-determination to the oppressed people of Zimbabwe. The measures applied up to the present time have obviously been inadequate to do this. New and resolute measures are needed, measures which are called for in the text of the draft resolution contained in document S/9270/Rev.1. But it is important to state that all this is not necessarily required; should the United Kingdom exercise its responsibilities, as recalled in operative paragraph 1, and take all necessary measures, including the use of force, to bring an end to the rebellion in Southern Rhodesia, as provided for in operative paragraph 2, there will be no need for the United Nations to do anything more. The choice now lies with the United Kingdom. If the United Kingdom acts resolutely, there will be peace and self-determination for the people of Zimbabwe; if it does not, the Security Council will have no alternative but to apply to the letter the provisions of the draft resolution. My delegation thus will vote for the draft resolution, for the reasons which I have given in this intervention.

24. The PRESIDENT (*translated from Spanish*): The next speaker on my list is the representative of Burundi. In accordance with the Council's previous decision, I invite him to take a seat at the Council table and call upon him to speak.

25. Mr. TERENCE (Burundi) (*translated from French*): Mr. President, I should like to express my gratitude for your kindness in calling upon me at this stage of the debate on Rhodesia. Quite a few of the aspects of this problem have already been raised and debated by the numerous speakers who have preceded me, so that my delegation sees no need to go over the problems which have already been dealt with but will rather try to place the Rhodesian problem in its true perspective and define its essence and the nature of this *apartheid* system that has just been given official status in Rhodesia. It will be necessary to show how deceptive certain views can be if one tries to gloss over the Rhodesian problem and its consequences.

26. To begin with, I may perhaps be permitted to quote a passage from Winston Churchill's book "Reflections and Adventures." I quote:

"... First, a Statesman in contact with the moving current of events and anxious to keep the ship on an even keel and steer a steady course may lean all his weight now on one side and now on the other. . . . Yet his object will throughout have remained the same. His resolves, his wishes, his outlook may have been unchanged, his methods may be verbally irreconcilable. . . . But all this may be capable of reasonable and honourable explanation. Statesmen may say bluntly, 'We have failed to coerce. We have now to conciliate', or alternatively, 'We have failed to conciliate; we have now to coerce'."

27. This Council, which has witnessed the confabulations held between Salisbury and London during the last few years, is now better able than ever to interpret correctly the United Kingdom's aim. As can be gathered from the famous passage which I have just quoted, this policy has been meticulously applied by Mr. Churchill's successors and disciples to Zimbabwe. The waverings of United Kingdom policy are well known, and a large number of delegations have shown how powerless economic sanctions have been since Ian Smith usurped power. The London Government, for its part, has maintained the contrary view and called for a moratorium during which those sanctions would force Smith to realize that he could not keep himself in power.

28. A large number of Governments, including that of Burundi, have constantly warned the United Kingdom against its maternal indulgence towards the usurpers. That attitude has caused the Labour leadership to be sharply accused of weakness and complicity.

29. On many occasions, both in the General Assembly and in the Fourth Committee, the delegation of Burundi has stressed that the shilly-shallying of the mother country has been a premeditated and deliberate contribution to the strength of the rebellion in Rhodesia. This has proved the need to use force to restore legality.

30. Now that nazism has been established in Zimbabwe, will the British Government persist in describing the previous warnings as unrealistic or emotional? The administering Power can now see that the advocates of armed force had no interest in subjecting it to bitter and unjustified criticism. Unfortunately the situation has recently become worse and the gloomy predictions have been fulfilled since the establishment of *apartheid* in Rhodesia.

31. As the economic embargo on which the United Kingdom banked has failed, and as its conciliatory attitude towards Smith has led the latter to inflict a humiliating defeat, what alternative does London propose to try? Will the Security Council let the United Kingdom Government condemn five million Africans to the perpetual wretchedness promised them by the usurper's mock constitution? Or does the Labour leadership prefer to opt for a defeatist solution, since all its compromises with Smith have inevitably driven it towards chicanery and surrender of principle?

32. Like us, the London Government has finally realized that the impunity enjoyed by the Rhodesian rebellion has

given it a long start towards its goal. Since the path of conciliation taken by the United Kingdom has led to a dead end, the proper solution must be sought in coercion, in accordance with the Churchillian political dogma which I quoted earlier on.

33. The advocates of the use of force against Smith are not thirsting to shed human blood, as some may believe. The delegations which advocated the overthrow of the Salisbury rebels by force used to be accused of political immaturity. Some critics even went so far, at least in whispered comments, as to ascribe this demand to an innate and untamed Afro-Asian thirst for blood. On the contrary, the honourable course is to remove any misunderstanding by stating the real reasons for such a solution.

34. Far from trying to slake any thirst for blood, the advocates of force considered it the sovereign remedy for the arrogant rebellion in Rhodesia. In other words, it was an alternative dictated by the needs of the Salisbury situation and the absence of any other effective means, since the great evils rampant in Zimbabwe called for this drastic remedy.

35. The surrender of the Labour Government to the Rhodesian usurper now obviously resembles at every point the credulous concessions made by Chamberlain to the Führer and might well lead to other agreements like those reached at Munich on 29 September 1938.

36. This comparison has seemed to me necessary for a clear forecast of the disastrous consequences of the situation which has just been created in Rhodesia.

37. It might be helpful to recall briefly the episode which preceded the Second World War. While Hitler was expanding his Reich day after day by his invasions in eastern and south-eastern Europe, the British underestimated the gravity of the situation in that part of Europe. Instead of going to the heart of the problem, Chamberlain preferred to shy away from it into sterile negotiations. So at the age of seventy he made his first journey by air and went three times to seek a compromise with Hitler. That is what the present British Prime Minister has done with Smith. At each meeting the founder of nazism very skilfully exploited the weakness of the West and increased his demands; that has likewise been Smith's attitude towards the United Kingdom. Instead of resisting Hitler's expansionism by force, the British took the line of least resistance by urging Czechoslovakia, threatened with imminent annexation, to surrender everything.

38. While the signing of the Munich agreements actually quickened and safeguarded the Führer's expansionist movement to the East, Chamberlain in his ingenuousness plumed himself on his return to London to have "peace in our time" in his briefcase. The peace had not been saved; no diplomatic triumph had been won and it was in fact a crushing defeat, since the Second World War broke out less than one year after the signers of the Munich agreements, Deladier and Chamberlain, returned in triumph to Paris and London.

39. Now, the painful rebuff with which the Rhodesian settlers have just repaid the tender solicitude of the mother

country, the sordid contempt with which they have just responded to its very maternal treatment, the immeasurable danger posed by the twin régimes of Pretoria and Salisbury—all these are so many compelling reasons for shaking off that blissful optimism which has lulled certain Governments to sleep.

40. Will the United Kingdom adopt towards Smith "the position of the retired burglar" which it adopted towards the Italian Duce? If so, the administering Power must understand that such a surrender will be a prelude to a catastrophe of at least the same magnitude as the Second World War, confronting the same great Powers which persist in underestimating the gravity of the situation in southern Africa. In the last analysis the United Kingdom itself will not escape the disastrous consequences of the explosive climate which it will have brought about in Rhodesia. The official establishment of nazism in Rhodesia, yesterday a dangerous possibility and today a monstrous reality, will turn like an overwhelming boomerang against its instigators and inflict consequences for the United Kingdom itself.

41. The ingenuity of the dogmatic South African segregationists, banking on the simplicity of the blacks, has invented the euphemism *apartheid* for a reality identical with nazism both in its ideological essence and in its expansionist aims.

42. I have often pointed out in the General Assembly and the Security Council a striking parallelism, illustrated by facts and evidence as obvious as they are irrefutable, between Hitler's nazism and South African *apartheid*.

43. I shall therefore limit myself to a few examples which prove how closely the doctrine preached and followed by the fanatical pigmentocrats of South Africa resembles Hitlerism's deification of one race. The theoreticians of *apartheid* have eulogized it so fully that I am embarrassed by my choice of quotations. One of the most rabid advocates of *apartheid*, Mr. Malan, stated:

"The history of the Afrikaaners reveals an intention so determined and so precise that one is led to believe that it is the work not of men but of God. We have a divine right to be Afrikaaners; our history is the greatest work of art ever designed by the great architect of the centuries."

44. For the same reason, and following the same procedure as the artisans of racial supremacy in Europe, the South African Nazis have taken as their main mission the deification of their white caste.

"Men of the same blood (said Hitler) should belong to the same Reich. That is why for me the small frontier town of Braunau symbolizes a great mission. . . . A State which at a time of racial contamination jealously seeks to conserve the best elements of its own race must one day become the master of the whole world."

45. The advocates of *apartheid* in South Africa aim at the domination, if not of the whole world, at least of all Africa; and from this point of view one wonders whether Africa alone will suffer or whether the Powers outside Africa will not also be deeply affected.

46. This racist assumption, underlying the theory which would glorify one race by condemning the others to slavery, can be illustrated in another way. I should now like to quote Mr. Raymond Aron, who speaks of the destiny of South Africa as closely linked with that of Rhodesia:

“The only way to perpetuate the subjection of the vanquished is to forbid them access to the skilled professions, to guarantee the representatives of the master people a monopoly of the scientific and administrative posts. This is what the whites are doing in South Africa . . .”.

47. Of course that is what the whites are doing in Rhodesia, since the blacks, who have not gone to school or are not scholastically qualified, are not even permitted to exercise their civic rights and political power. And I will continue my quotation:

“ . . . That is how the nazis would probably have acted in eastern Europe, drawing the logical conclusions from the doctrine that the Slavs, as born slaves, are subhuman and destined to permanent servitude. The doctrine of the essential inequality of men, which an industrial society condemns within homogeneous communities, the racists can apply to relations between communities.”

48. To identify the aims of the South African and Rhodesian whites with those realized by Hitler may seem today to over-estimate Pretoria's plans; but a miscalculation may prove tomorrow that certain members of this Council will have underestimated at the present stage the deadly blows which are now being prepared against Africa.

49. The reabsorption of the African sub-continent which is now being plotted by the apostles of the deification of the white race has been predicted by other authors; and for that reason I should blame myself if I did not quote a passage from *Le Monde* which very clearly expresses the aims of the South African racists:

“It is said that if the Rhodesian rebellion manages to succeed and the sanctions are lifted, the same policy of partition, leaving the whites in control of all the cities and all the industrial power, could extend north of the Limpopo into Rhodesia and perhaps eventually into Angola and Mozambique. In addition to all that, and although it is very seldom admitted in public, there is also talk of encircling Zambia, bypassing Tanzania and reducing those two countries to the status of docile satellites, and then of extending this policy to Katanga.”

50. A moment ago I was talking about the expansionist aims of South Africa; this shows how far their preparation has gone.

51. This expansionist mania which has seized on the inventors of *apartheid* makes it easy to understand how Rhodesia, occupied against the most elementary principles of international law, will give the conqueror a vital springboard for his assault on his future prey—south-eastern and southern Africa.

52. There is no need to prove that such a wily strategy, aimed at the domination of all southern Africa, has literally

taken over and made its own the doctrine of Adolf Hitler, especially the mission of ensuring the victory, “against all false and artificial laws”, of a so-called natural and sacred law: that of the community of blood.

53. Now, all circumstances tend to corroborate the various predictions that the unleashing of a war by nazism is no longer an intention but a certainty, and that if its outbreak is perhaps not just at hand, the question will only be one of timing.

54. Just like the Leader of the National Socialist German Workers' Party, the creators of the monstrous policy of *apartheid* have vowed implacable hatred to a race which lives side by side with them; they preach the same philosophical dogma exalting a superior species of humanity which Hitler formulated as a true religion in his *Weltanschauung*. Just like Hitler, the inventors of *apartheid* have no other watchword but the idolatry of “racial unity based on community of blood”.

55. But although, unlike the Führer, the Nazi schemers are not driven by a need for *Lebensraum* when they dream of conquering half Africa, there are many reasons why they plan to take the offensive.

56. First, to meet the needs to which the standard-bearers of racial inequality and their Rhodesian and Portuguese disciples have been driven in their mad crusade for the perpetuation of colonial dictatorship.

57. Secondly, to ensure the political survival of a Rhodesia dominated by *apartheid*, and to help economically-backward Portugal to escape from its obvious poverty.

58. Thirdly, the enlargement and defence of the white fortress.

59. Fourthly, the acquisition and exploitation of a wider and more diversified market.

60. Fifthly, to bring about the annihilation of the non-whites, who today have been reduced to the status of submen at the mercy of the deified white superman.

61. In its issue of November last *Le Monde Diplomatique* wrote as follows:

“On the whole there is an informal but effective alliance between South Africa, Portugal and the Rhodesian rebel régime, which is supported by powerful trends of opinion. This is essentially South Africa itself . . . governed by men who judge the facts of their situation with shrewd and calculating minds. There was first a growing conviction that the economic power of South Africa would be better exploited if it covered a wider common market, including its own sources of raw materials, such as the oil of Angola, within a kind of common market dominated by Pretoria and Johannesburg. . . .”

“Since 1962 this new aggressive policy has taken two main forms. The first is regular military collaboration with Portugal and Rhodesia, which began even before the

settlers' coup d'état in 1965. . . . The other has been the rebellion of the Rhodesian settlers and South Africa's need, if that rebellion was to survive, to extend its influence northward and to place Rhodesia under its wing by making it a political and economic satellite."

62. The texts and facts that I have just cited are clear evidence of the extent to which the fate of the Rhodesian régime is closely linked with that of South Africa. Hence it would be a mistake to dissociate the expansionist plans which have been jointly and simultaneously concocted in Pretoria and Salisbury. When all is said and done, everything goes to show that Rhodesia is only a bridgehead of nazism, meant to gather this African Eldorado to the white bosom.

63. Having, of course, longer experience in the Nazi adventure, the South African whites provide the mainspring for the ultimate objective pursued by the Pretoria-Salisbury axis. No less certainly, however, the Rhodesians are playing an important part in it. This collusion will create an even greater danger to humanity than racial segregation itself.

64. Since it is a proven fact that *apartheid* is only an imitation of nazism, both in its doctrine and in its expansionist aims, does this Council need anything more in order to predict the same consequences as those brought about by the madness of the German Führer? And if the calamity which will be born from these two hotbeds of nazism is likely to affect even Powers situated outside Africa, the extent of the danger should obviously lead to the creation of a universal coalition.

65. Some persons calculate ingeniously, but incompletely or too subjectively, that this frightful possibility is bound to be confined to Africa alone. Such a policy in no way differs from that of the ostrich which buries its head in the sand at the approach of danger. By the very nature of things, the principal and immediate target of this mad political and racist hunger will be the African countries which are directly exposed to the rapacity of the Pretoria-Lisbon-Salisbury trio. However, those who see farther detect in this separatist mission a long-range plot on a vast scale.

66. We agree that the vital interests and close relations shared by the Governments and circles which are the partners of the racist Rhodesian régime are a source of immediate profits. It is no less true, however, that these advantages can be enjoyed for only a short time. For the protectors of a Nazi caste are even now drawing international condemnation upon themselves and deliberately alienating the emerging continent, just on the eve of tremendous and extremely fruitful collaboration and co-operation between the new Africa and the rest of the world—and all for an opposing cause which is inevitably

doomed to disappear and disintegrate at the hands of those who will benefit by present trends; for, whatever happens, the worshippers of *apartheid* will not escape for ever from the liberation movement which is sweeping the whole world. On the other hand, abandonment by the United Kingdom of its association with the cause of exploitation in Rhodesia in particular and in colonial territories in general will open a new road which will benefit both itself and Africa.

67. If the modern world can only adapt itself in this way to the needs of the century and to the legitimate demands of the victims of foreign domination, it will both make a long-term investment and sing the swan-song of the harsh history of decolonization, the inevitability of which can be discerned amid the vast floods which swallow up the rights of the people of Zimbabwe.

68. It is an established fact that the Africans, no less than other human beings throughout the world, are prepared to brave all obstacles and all hardships, through thick and thin, to regain the inalienable right of all men to liberty.

69. This need, rooted deep in the very nature of all peoples, was very clearly expressed in Roman public law, which provided: "*Salus Populi suprema lex esto*"—Let the welfare of the people be the supreme law.

70. Despite the present obstacles, circumstances and conditions in Africa, a time will come when the Africans can no longer permit themselves to remain for ever under any foreign rod.

71. I have finished. I hope that the appeals of the Afro-Asian group and of the delegations which support it will not be condemned to oblivion. Gladstone used to say: "A speech has often changed my opinion but never my vote". We should like to hope that the opposite will be true in this Council.

72. The PRESIDENT (*translated from Spanish*): There are no other speakers on my list. Before adjourning this meeting, I wish to inform the members of the Council that the co-sponsors of the draft resolution contained in document S/9270/Rev.1 have informed me that they had intended to ask that that draft be put to a vote by the Council during this afternoon's meeting. They have added that, in compliance with a request made by other members of the Council, they have decided to postpone their request for a vote for twenty-four hours; that is, until the next meeting of the Council. In accordance with consultations held previously, this next meeting will be held tomorrow, 24 June, at 3 p.m.

The meeting rose at 5.10 p.m.

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