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REPORT BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE OBSERVANCE OF THE CEASE-FIRE
UNDER SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 211 OF 20 SEPTEMBER 1965

Adendum

1. This report presents information relating to the observance of the cease-fire which has been received from United Nations Observers since the circulation of the last report on the subject (S/6710/Add.4) on 18 October 1965.

Rajasthan area

2. As indicated in my report of 18 October (S/6710/Add.4, paras. 66-71), a number of positions held by Pakistan forces on the Indian side of the international border in the Rajasthan area were recently under attack by Indian troops and the Chief Officer of UNIPOM had approached the military authorities of both sides with a view to stopping the fighting. His efforts to maintain the cease-fire in what he considered to be probably the most potentially dangerous sector of the conflict between India and Pakistan are summarized below.

3. During his first visit to the desert area, from 10 to 14 October, General MacDonald regarded the situation there to be most disturbing. Indian troops had just launched a series of attacks against positions held by Pakistan forces on the Indian side of the international border and these attacks were continuing. Indian authorities contended that Pakistan had occupied those positions after the cease-fire came into effect. The Indian divisional commander at Jaisalmer informed General MacDonald that he had orders to push hard against the Pakistan infiltrators holding villages on the Indian side of the border, and General MacDonald was convinced that he would do so. On the other hand, the Pakistan command insisted that Pakistan troops had taken those villages before the time of the cease-fire and were determined to fight if necessary to hold them.

4. On 14 October, General MacDonald flew to New Delhi and met with the Chief of the Army Staff, Indian Army. The COAS agreed to the following:

(a) If Pakistan would agree to withdraw its troops to its side of the international border in the desert area, Indian troops would be withdrawn to their side of the border;

(b) If Pakistan troops would withdraw to their side of the border, the COAS would ensure that Indian troops would not occupy the vacated villages on the Indian side;

(c) The COAS would order his troops to stop any offensive action until 19 October in order to enable General MacDonald to seek an agreement on tactical readjustment.

5. Later on the same day, General MacDonald flew to Rawalpindi and met there with the Pakistan Commander and Chief of General Staff. General MacDonald was given the written reply of the Commander, dated 12 October, to his letter of 8 October setting forth his proposals for tactical readjustment. General Musa agreed in principle to General MacDonald's proposals, but suggested that instead of asking both sides to step back, the burden of withdrawal in each instance should be on the force in occupation of territory belonging to the other side. An identical letter had been addressed to the COAS, Indian Army, and the latter, in a reply dated 11 October, had also agreed in principle to the proposed tactical readjustment. During the meeting, General MacDonald proposed that in view of the current clashes in the Rajasthan area, negotiations for tactical readjustment should begin with that area. The Pakistan officers stated that they would prefer an over-all arrangement on tactical readjustment comprising the whole of the line supervised by UNIPCM Observers. General MacDonald then proposed that agreements be negotiated sector by sector, beginning with the Rajasthan area, but that the implementation of such agreements be withheld until agreements were reached for all sectors. The Pakistan Commander stated that the Pakistan reply to this proposal would be given after General MacDonald had conveyed to the Indian side the Pakistan suggestion that the burden of readjustment should fall on troops on the wrong side of the border.

6. On 15 October, Observers in the Chor sector reported that during the past forty-eight hours, Indian troops had continued their advances in the Rajasthan area, supposedly on orders from higher authorities.

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7. On the same day, General MacDonald sent an urgent message to the COAS, Indian Army, (a) informing the COAS that Pakistan had agreed in principle to tactical readjustment; (b) asking that the COAS instruct his armed forces to cease all offensive action and forward movement as previously agreed; (c) asking that the Indian tactical commander be available in the Barmer area for discussing arrangements for tactical readjustment negotiations which would hopefully begin on 17 October; (d) suggesting that in addition to the criteria contained in his letter of 8 October, it may be anticipated that the main burden of tactical withdrawals will fall on the force which is in occupation of territory belonging to the other side; (e) recommending that discussions for tactical readjustment be held on an area-by-area basis starting with the Chor-Barmer sector, but that execution of the agreement should await general agreement for all sectors.
8. On 15 October also, an Observer in the Chor-Barmer sector who had proceeded to the village of Nawatala reported that the village had been attacked on 14 October by Indian troops and occupied by them the next day. When the Observer told the Indian major that the village previously had been definitely occupied by Pakistan troops, the Indian local commander replied that he had instructions to clear Pakistan infiltrators from Indian territory. The Observer later received the same reply from the Indian battalion and brigade commanders. The report of the Observer was brought to the attention of the Indian COAS by General MacDonald in a message dated 16 October.
9. On 16 October, the COAS, Indian Army, replied to General MacDonald's message of 15 October on behalf of the COAS, who was away on tour. He confirmed that instructions had been issued to cease all offensive action and forward movement until 19 October and that a local tactical commander would meet General MacDonald at Barmer on 17 October. Regarding, however, the suggestions on tactical readjustment negotiations set forth in sub-paragraphs 7 (d) and (e), he stated that they would be put to the COAS and a reply to them would be forthcoming by 17 October.
10. On the same day, the CGS, Pakistan, called General MacDonald on the telephone and asked whether the latter had received any reaction to their proposal concerning tactical readjustment. When informed of the Indian message referred to in paragraph 9 above, the CGS expressed disappointment that their proposal had not been accepted by India. However, when General MacDonald urged the CGS to

permit him to start negotiations on tactical readjustments on 17 October, as planned, the CGS agreed that General MacDonald could discuss the tactical readjustment proposals with his local commander, but he would not agree to any joint meetings with the Indian commander until a basis for negotiations had been established.

11. On 17 October, Observers at Chor reported that following the Indian advances in the Kelnor sector, the Pakistan local command had been planning retaliatory action. The observations made led them to believe that an attack by Pakistan forces on the Gadra front appeared imminent.

12. Early in the morning of 17 October, General MacDonald left for the desert area where he stayed until the afternoon of the next day. In a meeting with two Pakistan brigadiers, General MacDonald established an agreed basis for negotiations, but the Pakistan officers would not agree to meet the Indian officers until the proposals in sub-paragraph 7 (d), and preferably also in sub-paragraph 7 (e), were agreed upon. The Indian divisional commander with whom General MacDonald met twice appeared to be agreeable in principle to the negotiations.

13. On 18 October, General MacDonald received a message from the Pakistan CGS to the effect that reliable information indicated that Indian troops in Rajasthan were being reinforced by one fresh infantry division and that a major offensive to be launched on 19 October was being planned by India. During his visit to the desert area on 21-22 October, General MacDonald had received reports from the Observers about a substantial build-up of Indian forces in the Jaisalmer sector. Observers on the Pakistan side report that Pakistan forces on that side have also built up their strength in this area.

14. On 19 October, General MacDonald saw the Indian COAS in New Delhi. He stated that he believed he had established a workable basis for discussions leading to a tactical readjustment. However, the Pakistan command would not agree to any bilateral discussions until Indian agreement would be forthcoming to their formula that withdrawal should be confined to the force which was in occupation of territory belonging to the other side. The COAS pointed out that any formula acceded to would inevitably be applied along the entire border, including Kashmir. Therefore, he would have to consult with his Minister. Despite

General MacDonald's observation that the readjustments would be so small that political involvement would be minimal, the COAS insisted on the need to consult his Minister. However, he did agree that his undertaking to stop offensive action and forward movement would be extended for a further period and promised to notify General MacDonald of his decision by wire.

15. On 20 October, General MacDonald addressed a message to the Pakistan CGS, (a) informing him that the Indian military authorities were considering the Pakistan counter-proposal regarding tactical readjustment and that this might take three or four days; and (b) expressing the hope that during this crucial period both sides would refrain from offensive or provocative actions.

Other incidents reported from 18 to 22 October

16. Incidents reported by United Nations Observers in the various sectors during the period from 18 to 22 October are summarized below.

(a) Rawalakot-Funch sector

17. The Indian local command at Funch complained on 12 October that a Pakistan Patrol had crossed the CFL five miles west of Funch at 0900 hours on 12 October and returned later towards the Pakistan side of the CFL. The complaint also alleged that a second Patrol had crossed the CFL at the same place at 1400 hours on 12 October and occupied an area located at approximately five miles west of Funch. An investigation carried out by Observers disclosed that Pakistan troops were at 1600 hours on 13 October at approximately 100 yards on the Indian side of the CFL in the area mentioned in the complaint.

(b) Kotli-Galuthi sector

18. A complaint of the Pakistan local command at Kotli received by Observers on 16 October alleged that Indian troops had fired with machine-guns and three-inch mortars on two Pakistan positions located approximately one mile on the Indian side of the CFL and about 3 1/2 miles south of Galuthi between 1900 and 2100 hours on 13 October and between 2215 and 0300 hours during the night of 13/14 October. This complaint was confirmed by the Observers in the area, who also reported that Pakistan troops had returned the fire with 3.7 howitzers at 0245 hours on 14 October. (Paragraphs 8 and 9 of Indian complaint circulated as S/6805 also refer.)

19. On 18 October, the Pakistan local command at Kotli complained that Indian troops had fired with 106 mm recoilless rifles on a Pakistan position located approximately one mile on the Indian side of the CFL and six miles west of Mendhar between 1415 and 1715 hours and again at 2320 hours on 18 October. The Observers in the area did not hear the firing, but stated that Pakistan field artillery had fired four rounds at 2315 hours on 18 October.

20. On 19 October, Observers stationed in the Mendhar area reported that Pakistan troops had opened fire with field artillery, 81 mm mortars and small arms on three Indian positions located between one half mile and one mile on the Indian side of the CFL and 6 1/2, 8 and 9 miles, respectively, west of Mendhar at 1730 hours on 19 October.

(c) Kotli-Maushera sector

21. The Pakistan local command at Kotli complained that Indian troops had shelled with field artillery Pakistan positions located one mile on the Indian side of the CFL and two miles north-northeast of the Kotli-Maushera road between 1225 and 1240 hours on 18 October and between 0330 and 0335 hours on 19 October, and another Pakistan position located half a mile on the Indian side of the CFL and half a mile north of the Kotli-Maushera road between 2035 and 2100 hours on 18 October. The Observers stationed in the area did not confirm the shelling mentioned above, but reported that Pakistan artillery had fired from an area forward of Khuiratta, on the Kotli-Maushera road, six miles northwest of the CFL, between 0410 and 0420 hours on 19 October.

22. On 20 October, the Indian local command at Maushera complained that Pakistan troops had shelled an Indian position located half a mile on the Indian side of the CFL and half a mile west of the Kotli-Maushera road between 1745 and 1830 hours on 19 October and again between 2350 and 0010 hours during the night of 19/20 October, and another Indian position located three miles on the Indian side of the CFL and 4 1/2 miles east of the Kotli-Maushera road between 0900 and 0145 hours on 20 October. The Observers stationed in the area confirmed the shelling by Pakistan artillery during the afternoon of 19 October and indicated that Indian artillery had returned the fire. They also reported some shelling from both sides later in the night of 19/20 October, but could not ascertain which side had fired first.

(d) Jammu-Sialkot sector

23. On 19 October, the Pakistan local command at Sialkot complained that Indian troops had crossed the CFL in an area west of Akhnur during the night of 13/14 October. The Observers who investigated the complaint reported that they had seen three Indian soldiers forward of the front lines on 18 October at 1300 hours.

(e) Pasrur-Dera Manak sector

24. On 19 October, Observers in the sector reported that their attempt to have the demolition charges removed from Jassur bridge (see S/6710/Add.4, para. 39) had failed, as the Indian corps commander refused to remove the charges.

(f) Lahore-Kasa sector

25. Following the shooting incident in the Dograi area on 16 October (S/6710/Add.4, para. 51), Observers in the area arranged a meeting between the opposing commanders on 17 October during which both sides agreed to move back their forces. The agreement provided that the Pakistan troops should pull back approximately 100 yards on the east bank of the Bambansala Ravi Bedian canal (i.e. away from the Indian-controlled east-end of Bhaini bridge), fill in the vacated trenches and remove the mine in this area; that the Indian troops in turn should vacate the listening post they had established fifty yards forward of their protective wire; and that the ground given up by both sides should be declared no man's land. On 21 October, the Observers reported that both sides had carried out their parts of the agreement.

(g) Rukhanwala-Kasur-Narla-Bopa Rai sector

26. On 15 October, at 1220 hours, three Pakistan sabre jets flew over the Hussiniwala area (GR 8459), well inside the Indian border.

27. On 16 October, Observers confirmed that Pakistan troops had moved 100 yards forward of the positions they had held on 24 September in the area where the Ferozepore road crosses the international boundary (GR 8239).

28. Exchanges of fire took place sporadically in the general area west of Burj Rajoka (GR 8445 and 8544) from 1320 hours on 16 October through the night of 16/17 October (see the Pakistan complaint in document S/6800, sub-para. (3)).

Observers in the area reported that both sides had fired with small arms and mortars

and that the Indian troops had also used field artillery. The Observers could not ascertain the cause of the firing which they said started with small arms only.

29. An exchange of fire by small arms and probably mortars took place in the same area west of Burj Rajoke between 2200 and 2230 hours on 13 October. The Observers heard the firing, but could not determine which side had started it.

30. During the night of 19/20 October, there were three exchanges of fire in an area near Jahman (GR 7782). The Observers could not ascertain which side had started the firing.

31. Exchanges of fire took place in two areas northwest of Jahman (GR 762845 and 758841) during the nights of 19/20 and 20/21 October. Both sides admitted firing, but the Observers could not ascertain which side had fired first. Observers from both sides in this sector are attempting to negotiate an agreement between the Indian and Pakistan commands to cut tall crops growing in area GR 7681 west of Jahman so as to create a clear field of view and reduce patrolling in no man's land, since crop cutting by civilians in this area has tended to cause tension and fear of infiltration.

(h) Rahim Yar Kher-Jaisalmer sector

32. With reference to the Indian attack on Ghotaru (IQ 7367) (see S/6710/Add.4, para. 67), Observers in the area reported on 19 October that Indian troops had not captured the village but had moved two miles forward of their former positions at Asu Tar (IQ 85). Pakistan forces continued to occupy dominating ground in the Ghotaru area.

(i) Chor-Barmer sector

33. On 18 October, Observers reported that since 15 October Pakistan troops had carried out forward reconnaissance in the area of Kelnor, which had recently been taken by Indian forces (see S/6710/Add.4, para. 70).
