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PRELIMINALY REPORT BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON HIS VISITS TO THE GOVERNMENTS OF INDIA AND PAKISTAN

1. I submit hereunder a preliminary report to the Security Council on my visits to the Governments of India and Pakistan.

2. At the 1253th meeting of the Security Council on 5 September 1955, after the adoption of the Council's resolution, I made the following statement:

"I deeply deplore the continuation and broadening of the flighting between India and Paliston over Kashmir, which has made necessary this meeting of the Council and the resolution just adopted. The situation grows graver by the hour. I accept, therefore, with utmost seriousness the responsibility entrusted to me by this resolution. I shall exert every effort bound the ends we all seek, including a very early visit to the area, in the light of consultations with the two parties."

3. I left Mew York at 2000 hours on 7 September for Rawalpindi and New Dolhi. At the Kennedy International Airport, I made the following statement:

"As I have stated to the Security Council, I am going out to India and Pakistan in connexion with the resolution adopted unanimously by the Council yesterday. In it, I was requested to exert every effort to give effect to the Council's resolution of 4 and 5 September relating to the conflict between India and Pakistan over Kashmir.

"Both of these resolutions call for an end to the fighting in which those two countries are now so tragically enjaged.

"I have accepted this responsibility without hesitation because of the enormity of the threat to the peace of the world in this raging conflict between two of the great countries and peoples of Asia. I have no illusions about this mission: the issues are infinitely complicated and difficult and the situation out there is extremely grave.

"Kashmir has posed a baffling problem for the United Nations for 17 years. I need, then, say only that I will do my very best and hope that 그렇게 이번에 가지 않는 것이 많은 것을 얻을 것 같아. 것 같아. 말 것 같아. 나는 것 같아.

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> my mission will prove helpful. On its completion, I will, of course, report to the Security Council, and will have nothing public to say about it until then."

b. I arrived in Davalpindi at 1100 hours on 9 September. Luring my stay there, I had two meetings with President Ayub Khan and a series of meetings with the Foreign Minister of Pakistan and members of the Foreign Office. During these meetings, we discussed all aspects of the present crisis in the context of the Security Council resolutions of 4 and 5 September.

5. I left Rawalpindi at 0300 hours on 11 September and arrived in New Delhi, via Karachi and Bombay, at 1150 hours on 12 September. In New Delhi, I had meetings over a period of two days with Prime Minister Shestri and his colleagues. I also met with President Radhakrishnar. We again discussed all aspects of the present crisis in the context of the Security Council resolutions of k and 5 September.

6. In the light of these discussions, I sent the following appeal to President Ayub Khan and Prime Minister Shastri:

"The acute suffering of the peoples of India and Pakistan resulting from the existing tragic coeffict situation between the two countries, the grave implications of the fighting for the economies of the two countries and for their future relations, and the potential threat which that conflict poses to world peace, afford compelling reasons for pursuing vigorously the search for an enduring solution to the nutual problems of India and Pakistan.

"Under prevailing conditions, the first essential step in that search, and an indispensable prerequisite to further efforts, must be an inneciate and unconditional cessation of hostilities in the entire area of the conflict. The call for an immediate cease-fire in the Security Council resolutions of 4 and 6 September is in line with the well-established tradition of the United Nations, which invariably requires fighting to cease unconditionally as a necessary prelude to further measures towards the restoration of lasting peace. The immediate objective must be to give effect to these resolutions.

"In the light of the frank and useful talks I have had in Rawalpinii and New Delhi in the last few days, I now request your Excellency to order a cease-fire without condition, and a cessation of all hostilities in the entire area of the current conflict between India and Pakistan to take effect on Tuesday, 14 September 1965, at 1300 hours, Rawalpindi time [1330 hours, New Delhi time]. I have addressed an identical request to Prime Minister Shastri /to President Ayub Khan]. I assume, of course, that all of your commending officers in the field would be given their orders by you considerably in advance of this time. I have heard and understand, in

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the course of my talks, the difficulties on both sides to a simple cease-fire, but I make this request to you, nevertheless, because of my strong conviction that it is just and right - for your country and your people as well as for the world at large. I have no doubt that your positive response would win for you the gratitude of the world.

"As soon as this request has been acted upon positively, I am confident that the Security Council will wish to provide the necessary assistance in ensuring the supervision of the cease-fire and the withdrawal of all armed personnel on both sides back to the positions held by them before 5 August 1965, as called for by the Security Council resolution of 6 September.

"I am sure also that the Council will wish to explore, as a matter of urgency, methods for achieving enduring peace between India and Pakistan. On the basis of my talks with your Excellency, I am confident that, with the well-being of your own country and people at heart as well as the peace of the world, you will find it possible to respond favourably to this appeal to carry out the Security Council resolutions of 4 and 6 September. I would ask you to be good enough to communicate your response to me urgently, and in any case, not later than 0750 hours New Delhi time, 0700 hours Ravalpindi time, on Tuesday, 14 September 1965. This message will be held private and confidential until your reply has been received.

"In conclusion, may I assure you of my earnest wish to be of continuing assistance in the solution of the outstanding problems and of my warmest good wishes."

The foregoing message was delivered at 2050 hours New Delhi time, 2000 hours Rawalpindi time, on Sunday, 12 September.

7. At 1700 hours on 15 September, the Indian Government asked whether it would be possible to put back the time for the receipt of their reply since they needed more time for consideration and consultation. In the interest of a favourable outcome, I decided to needed to this request and so informed the Government of Pakistan. To be realistic, I also put back the time the cease-fire was to become effective to 1330 hours New Delhi time, on Wednesday, 15 September.

3. I received the following reply from Frime Minister Shastri on 14 September:

"I thank you for your letter of 12 September 1955 and appreciate greatly the sincere concern which you have expressed about the likely repercussions of the existing situation on the welfare of the peoples of India and Pakistan. "Ever since India attained independence in 19%, we have concentrated attention on the economic development of our country with a view to eradicating poverty and providing a reasonable stendard of living to our people. Such resources as we could mobilise have been devoted to this vital task. All these years, we have actively and purposefully pursued a policy of nonalignment and of peaceful co-existence. We have sought peace and friendship with our neighbours. Our faith in the forces of peace was so genuine and so strong that we did not pay the requisite attention to building up adequately the defence forces of the country. It was only after the Chinese invasion on our northern borders in 1962 that we realised how essential it was for us to be prepared for defending our territorial integrity.

"So far as Pakistan is concerned, our effort has always been to promote good neighbourly relations. There has not been a single occasion, during the last 18 years, when India has deviated from the path of peace in her relationship with Pakistan, let alone thinking of any aggressive action. In fact, on more than one occasion, both I and my distinguished predecessor have offered to enter into a no-war pact with Pakistan so that there is no possibility of a clash of arms between the two countries. The response from Pakistan has been disappointing in the extreme. Our proposal for a no-war pact has been repeatedly turned down. An atmosphere of conflict and tension has been continuously maintained through a variety of ways, including firing across the Cease-Fire Line, repeated border incidents elsewhere and a campaign of hate against India through the controlled press and radio of Fakistan. Important men, occupying responsible positions in that country, have openly and repeatedly declared their intention to use force against India in achieving their objectives. Not content with that, the rulers of Pakistan have launched naked aggression against India three times since 1947, twice in our State of Jammu and Kashmir and once in our State of Gujurat.

"Mr. Secretary-General, we fully understand the concern of the Security Council over the present situation and we greatly appreciate its efforts towards the restoration of peace. I cannot, however, help expressing here that, if the same concern had been shown immediately when Pekistan launched a massive attack on India on 5 August 1965 by sending thousands of armed infiltrators equipped with Pakistani arms and ammunition and officered by men of the regular forces of Pakistan, about which there is irrefutable

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evidence, for the purpose of capturing vital positions, such as airports and police stations, cutting off lines of communications, destroying bridges and other public property and creating disorder with a view to seizing power from the lawfully established Government, in accordance with a predetermined plan of invasion, the situation would not have assumed its present serious proportions.

"I would not go further into this aspect of the matter, but must add that having been attacked by Pakistan, we had to take action to defend ourselves. I must also stress, and I hope it will be appreciated, that at every stage whatever action our armed forces took was dictated solely by the requirements of self-defence to meet the aggression of Pakistan.

"Whatever may be the context, Mr. Secretary-General, we greatly welcome your visit and we recognise the importance of your mission from the point of view of peace, not only in the Indian Sub-Continent but, indeed, in the world as a whole. India has always believed in peace and her adherence to peaceful methods stand unshaken.

"In deference to the wishes of the Security Council and to the appeals which we have received from many friendly countries, we accept your proposal for on immediate cease-fire. We would, therefore, be prepared to order a cease-fire effective from 6.30 a.m., Indian standard time, on Thursday 16 September 1965, provided you confirm to me by 9 a.m. tomorrow that Pekistan is also agreeable to do so.

"In your letter, it has been suggested that the Government of India and Fakistan should give the requisite orders to their field commanders with a view to ensuring an effective cease-fire from the appointed time and date. This will, however, be effective only in respect of the armed forces in uniform engaged in the present combat. The problem of thousands of armed infiltrators who have crossed over into our State of Jammu and Keshmir from the Pakistan side, will, I am afraid, continue to remain on our hands. Armed as they are with dengerous weapons of destruction, such as machine-guns and hand grenades, they do even now, as I write this letter, make sudden depredations in an effort to damage vital installations and other property and harass the people of the State of Jammu and Kashmir.

"That this invasion by armed infiltration in civilian disguise was conceived, planned and executed by Pakistan is new well established: your own report, Mr. Secretary-General, brings this out clearly. And yet, as we understand from you, Pakistan continues to disclaim all responsibility. S/6683 English Page 6

> We are not surprised at this denial, because even on an earlier occasion when Pakistan had committed aggression by adopting similar methods she had at first denied her complicity, although at a later date she had to admit her involvement. We must urge that Pakistan should be asked forthwith to withdraw these armed infiltrators. Until that is done, our security forces will have to deal with these raiders effectively.

> "Mr. Secretary-General, may I remind you that it was only the other day, in April this year, that Pakistan had launched an armed attack supported by tanks and other armour in our State of Gujurat. Despite grave provocation, we had then acted with great self-restraint and had taken no counter measures. Eventually, a cease-fire agreement was signed, in which, among other things, both sides had expressed the solemn hope that the tension between the two countries would get reduced.

> "Subsequent events have shown that Fakistan never meant what she had agreed to expressly and specifically in that Cease-Fire Agreement. It has come to us as a great shock that even from the month of April 1965, plans for invading India in enother sector had been prepared and training was being imparted to the armed personnel for war-like operations on our territories. Within less than five weeks of the signing of the Indo-Pakistan Cease-Fire Agreement relating to the West Fakistan Gujurat border, Pakistan attacked India once again.

"In the light of our own experience during the last few months, we will have to insist that there must be no possibility of a recurrence of armed attacks on India, open or disguised. Let me make it perfectly clear, Mr. Secretary-General, that when consequent upon cease-fire becoming effective, further details are considered, we shall not agree to any disposition which will leave the door open for further infiltrations or prevent us from dealing with the infiltrations that have taken place. I would also like to state categorically that no pressures or attacks will deflect us from our firm resolve to maintain the sovereignty and territorial integrity of our country, of which the State of Jammu and Kashmir is an integrel part.

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"In conclusion, Mr. Secretary-General, I must point out that the menacing forces of aggression are unfortunately at large in Asia, endangering the peace of the world. If the Security Council does not identify the aggressor and equates it with the victims of aggression, the chances of peace will fade out. The situation which the Security Council is being called upon to handle has grave and vital implications in respect of peace and political stability in Asia. What is involved is the welfare of millions of human beings who have suffered for long and who are now entitled to relief and to a better standard of living. If the forces of aggression are not checked effectively, the world may find itself embroiled in conflict which may well annihilate mankind. We sincerely hope that the forces of peace will win and that humanity will go forward towards ever increasing progress and prosperity. It is in this spirit that we are agreeing to your preposal for a cease fire."

9. The following reply from President Ayub Khan, dated 13 September, was received the next morning, the fourteenth:

"1. I am in receipt of your letter of 12 September, requesting that I order a concertire to take effect at 1800 hours on 14 Sentember.

"2. I fully appreciate the weight of the considerations that have led you to make this suggestion. I am aware, too, of the dangers implicit in the present conflict and, in particular, of the likelihood of this conflict assuming wider dimensions involving a threat to world peace.

"5. The current war is not of Pakistan's seeking. The records of the United Nations during the last seventeen years bear testimony to the fact that Pakistan has accepted every proposal of the United Nations or its mediators to settle the Kashmir dispute peacefully, while India has rejected every one of those proposals. The responsibility of unleashing the present war lies squarely on India which is seeking to perpetrate her stranglehold on the State of Jammu and Kashmir by means of a military decision. It is this Indian design that lies at the root of the present conflict. It was in pursuance of this same design that India attacked Pakistan on 6 September. This was an act of naked aggression. It is astonishing that the cease-fire resolution of the Security Council of 6 September, which you are urging us to implement, completely ignores this basic fact. "b. Nevertheless, Pokistan is not against a cease-fire as such. In fact, in order to save the Sub-Continent from being engulfed in what would clearly be an appolling catastrophe, we would welcome a cease-fire. But it must be a purposeful cease-fire: one that effectively precludes that catastrophe and not merely postpones it. In other words, it should provide for a self-executing arrangement for the final settlement of the Kashmir dispute which is the root cause of the India-Pakistan conflict.

"5. While you propose a 'cease-fire without condition' you go on to add that the Security Council would, soon after the cease-fire, proceed to implement its resolution of 6 September. The provisions of the Security Council resolutions of 4 September and 6 September that the cease-fire be followed immediately by withdrawal of all armed Fakistan personnel to the Pakistan side of the Cease-Fire Line and the consolidation of the Cease-Fire Line through the strengthening of the United Nations Observer Group would result in restoring India's military grip over Kashmir. We would thus merely revert to the same explosive position which triggered the present conflict.

"6. Moreover, India has committed wanton aggression against Pakiston. The foregoing cease-fire proposals, if implemented, would in effect reward the Aggressor.

"... We would therefore urge that, if the conflict is to be resolved and this Sub-Continent spared the horror of an even wider war, the Cease-Fire must be accompanied by action which would resolve the real cause of this conflict. This would be possible if the Cease-Fire is followed immediately by complete withdrawal of the Indian and Pakistan forces from the State of Jammu and Kashnir, the induction of a United Hations sponsored Afro-Asian force to maintain order in the State and the holding of a plebiscite in the State within three months.

"C. What we suggest is just and fair and necessary in the present circumstances. In making this suggestion, we are not imposing any disability on India which we are not curselves prepared to accept. In our judgement, the only honourable way to resolve this conflict over Kashmir is for both India and Pakistan, as well as the United Nations, to fulfil their pledge to the people of Kashmir contained in the UNCIP resolutions of 13 August 1940and 5 January 1949 and permit them, in exercise of their inherent right of self-determination, freely to decide the question whether their State should join India or Pakistan. This is the only way in which we can achieve enduring peace between Pakistan and India." 10. After receiving the above replies from President Ayub Khan and Prime Minister Shastri, I addressed to each of them, on 14 September, the following message:

"I have received Your Excellence's reply to my message of 12 September in which, in pursuance of the mandate given to me by the Security Council, I requested you to order a cease-fire without condition and a cessation of all hostilities in the entire area of the current conflict. I appreciate the positive attitude toward a cease-fire expressed in your reply, an attitude which has also been expressed by Frime Minister Shashri [Fresident Ayub Khen].

"I note, however, that both Governments have added to their replies to my request for an unconditional cease-fire conditions and gualifications upon which I have no right under the Security Council resolutions to five firm undertakings. These aspects of the replies of the two Governments must be referred to the Security Council for its ungent consideration, and they will be so referred immediately by me.

"Pending the Security Council consideration of the conditional parts of the replices, I would egain ask you in all cincerity, in the interests of the two countries and of world paces, to order a cease-fire and cessation of all postilities in the entire area of the current conflict.

"Since certain delays have transpired, I would set the effective time and date of such cease-fire for 0550 hours Hew Delhi time, 0500 hours Revalpindi time, on Thursday, 15 September 1955.

"I would ask Your Excellency to be good enough to send me an innediate response to this message."

11. I received from Prime Minister Shastri on 15 September the Colloving reply to my message of 14 September:

"Thank you for your message of 14 September, which was conveyed to me late last night.

"You have said that you cannot give any undertakings. I fully appreciate and understand this and in fact I did not ask you for any. It was, however, essential for us to state clearly our stand in rejard to certain matters which are of vital importance to us.

"I reaffirm my willingness, as communicated, to order a simple cease-fire and cessation of hostilities as proposed by you, as soon as you are able to confirm to me that the Government

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of Pakistan has agreed to do so as well. The actual time when the cosse-fire would become effective would depend upon the time when you are able to convey to me the agreement of the Government of Pakistan to a cease-fire."

 The reply of President Ayub Khan to my message of 14 September is incorporated in a communication reproduced in paragraph 14 below.
I left New Delhi at 1430 hours on 15 September to return to New York.
Before leaving the sub-continent, I addressed a third message to President Ayub Khan and Prime Minister Shastri. This message reads as follows:

"The desperate nature of the situation brought about by the intensification of the war between India and Pakistan impels me to make a further effort to help your two countries to find a path to peace. The Security Council within a three-day period, from 4 to 5 September, has twice called for a cease-fire. I have made two direct appeals to the same end. And a number of Governments and Heads of State have also made direct appeals to you, as well as offers of good offices, with a view to bringing this tragic conflict to an end.

"The replies from both Governments to my message of 12 September have shown clearly the desire of both for a cease-fire, but both pose conditions which make the acceptance of a cease-fire very difficult for the other side. For this reason, to my profound regret, it has so far been impossible to obtain a cease-fire as required by the Security Council resolutions of 4 and 6 September.

"It is worth again considering why such unusual efforts on a world scale have been made to end this conflict. Clearly it is because there is almost universal recognition that war between Indic and Pakistan can lead only to disaster for the two countries themselves and for the world at large.

"I have just completed a round of very frank and open talks with you and President Ayub Khan /and Prime Minister Shastri/. I have implored your Excellency, for the sake of your own people and in the interests of the broader peace, to agree as a first step, to stop the fighting, which in the circumstances of today can solve nothing and lead nowhere but to common disaster. I fully realize the extreme difficulty for both Governments of the situation which has led to the present crisis. I do not underestimate for a moment the strength of the feelings involved on both sides or of the intricacy and seriousness of the problems underlying them. I know very well that these problems may take years of patient efforts to tackle and to solve. I have found, however, that both sides have in common a genuine desire for peace, and it must be on that common desire that they must base themselves if they are over to be able to advance from the present mutually disastrous situation.

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"It follows that the first step must be to stop fighting and to rease all forms of active hostility on both sides. Since it became clear that my appeal. to both sides for a cease-fire has failed to have an effective result, I have been searching for some other approach that might be acceptable to both sides. In my search, I remembered another period, when the eyes of the world were turned in anxiety and fear upon the developments in this part of the world, the veried of late 1962. On that occasion, the President of Pakistan and the Frime Minister of India issued, on 27 November 1962, the following joint statement on behalf of their Governments: "The President of Pakistan and the Frime Minister of India have agreed that a renewed effort should be made to resolve the outstanding differences between their two countries on Kashmir and other related matters, so as to enable India and Pakistan to live side by side in peace and friendship. In consequence, they have decided to start discussions at an early date with the object of reaching an honourable and equitable settlement. These will be conducted initially at the ministerial level. At the appropriate stage, direct talks will be held between Mr. Kehru and President Avub'.

"This was an act of statesmanship which did much to bring calm to the situation in the two countries themselves and to ease the anxieties felt in the world at large. If the subsequent talks did not bring a colution of the basic problems, at least the immediate crisis was weathered and the storm avoided.

"I have referred to this statement because I believe that the abatement of the present crisis might now best be achieved by a new effort by the two Governments themselves to reach an honourable and equitable settlement. I have so far refrained from making a specific proposal for a meeting of the Heads of the two Governments at this time, either with or without my presence, because I know well the often expressed reservations of both sides with regard to such a meeting. However, I wish now to suggest, in a situation as grave or graver than the one which faced both Governments in November 1962, that your Excellency should give urgent consideration to such a meeting.

"For my part, I am at your disposal for any role which may accist the two Governments in their efforts to stop the fighting and to take the first steps upon the path of mutual accommodation. In this regard, I may remind you of the number of offers you have had from world leaders who are willing to be available to you for any conciliatory assistance you may wish. Indeed, if you seek the ways of peace, most of the world stands ready to assist you.

"I am now obliged to return to New York urgently to report to the Security Council, but I hope to receive an early reply to this suggestion, and I wish to make it clear that I am available at any time to assist in efforts to attain the goal of pence and harmony, which, despite all the difficulties, I firmly believe we all have at heart. I have addressed a similar message to President Ayub Kahn /to Prime Minister Shastri.

"May I be to frank as to say that this appeal is made also because I cannot believe that the leader of either country would wish to bear responsibility for the catastrophe that will visit upon your countries and the world if there is any other reasonable course open to you. What I here propose to your Excellency clearly is such a course, and I make bold to say that you owe it to your countries and to all the peoples of the world to follow it.

"With warmest personal regards and my prayers that the leaders of both countries may find it possible to choose the way of peace."

14. The reply of President Ayub Khan to my message of 15 September, which also replies to my appeal of 14 September for an unconditional cease-fire, was received at United Mations Headquarters, New York, late in the morning of 16 September. It reads as follows:

"1. Your message of 15 September has been delivered to me today.

"2. You propose that since you have found it impossible to bring about a cause-fire as required by the Security Council, we agree as a first step to stop fighting and, following the agreement of 1962, I nect Prime Minister Shastri in a new effort, through bilateral negotiations to reach an honourable and equitable settlement of the Kashnir dispute and other related differences. You have been good enough further to offer your our good offices in this regard.

"5. While we are agreeable to stop fighting in principle I should like to point out that despite our most earnest efforts, the Ministerich level talks that followed the 1962 agreement proved barren and abortive in face of a firm refusal by India to arrive at an honourable settlement of the Kashmir dispute. On the other hand, India let loose a reign of terror and repression in the State and proceeded to adopt measures to "integrate" the State of Jammu and Kashmir in the Indian Union. In adopting these measures India showed ence again that she has no regard for her own solern agreements and treats them merely as screps of paper whenever it suits her.

"4. I am fully conscious of the gravity of the present situation and also of the dangers implicit in the catastrophe that threatens to engulf the Sub-Continent particularly because of the certainty that as time goes on the present conflict would be bound to assume graver and wider dimensions.

"5. However a cease-fire can be meaningful only if it is followed by such steps as would lead to a durable and honourable settlement in order to preclude the recurrence of a catastrophe such as now threatens the Sub-Continent. To bring about such a settlement, it would be necessary to evolve an effective machinery and procedure that would lead to a final settlement of the Kashair dispute."

15. I plan to submit a further report to the Security Council shortly after my return to New York.