



SUMMARY RECORD OF THE 9th MEETING

Chairman: Mr. TREIKI (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya)

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The meeting was called to order at 11.05 a.m.

AGENDA ITEM 104: IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DECLARATION ON THE GRANTING OF INDEPENDENCE TO COLONIAL COUNTRIES AND PEOPLES BY THE SPECIALIZED AGENCIES AND THE INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS ASSOCIATED WITH THE UNITED NATIONS (continued)

Hearing of a petitioner (A/C.4/38/3)

1. At the invitation of the Chairman, Mr. Morrell (Centre for International Policy) took a place at the petitioners' table.

2. Mr. MORRELL (Centre for International Policy) expressed appreciation to the United Nations for its unanimous response to the appeal he had made at the previous session to prevent the International Monetary Fund from granting a loan to South Africa. Although it had not been possible to prevent the granting of the loan, a climate had been created in which 68 nations within the IMF had either opposed the loan or reserved their position.

3. In the United States, the movement had culminated in the submission of an amendment to the IMF bill under which the United States would oppose future loans to any country which practised apartheid. That provision had already been approved by the House of Representatives and was the most important anti-apartheid measure to be approved in the House over the past five years. In Europe the debate over the loan had convinced Sweden and Norway to adopt a critical position on loans to South Africa.

4. Thus the United Nations had rallied world opinion so effectively that there was no doubt that in future loans to South Africa would be difficult, if not impossible. Much of the credit for that achievement went to the Committee and other United Nations bodies, particularly the United Nations Council for Namibia which had played a decisive role on many fronts.

5. The landmarks in that campaign were the following: first, the quality of debate within the United Nations had changed. Whereas in previous years the Western countries had voted against any call to the IMF to cut off South Africa on the grounds that that would inject politics into the IMF, in October 1982 all but three of the Western nations had abstained in the vote, in view of the implications of the problem for human rights.

6. The second landmark in the campaign had been the research sponsored by the United Nations Council for Namibia. The investigations undertaken by the Centre had shown that the loan to South Africa was inconsistent with IMF practice and had weak economic justification since it bypassed the requirement of the IMF charter that genuine financial need be demonstrated and lacked the appropriate safeguards and conditions on the use of IMF funds. That position had also been taken by five of the executive directors of IMF.

7. As to the question of need, the representative of Saudi Arabia in the IMF had noted that South Africa could secure loans from private capital markets without

(Mr. Morrell)

straining its economy since its debt-service burden was very small, its reserve position was relatively strong and its per capita income was relatively high, so that in a sense South Africa was taking advantage of the Fund's cheaper resources.

8. As to the question of conditionality, all IMF stand-by loans required financial adjustment, and a majority of the executive directors had drawn attention to the lack of satisfactory adjustment by South Africa. South Africa had neither fiscal nor monetary adjustment, and structural adjustment of the labour market distortions caused by apartheid was totally lacking. South Africa had made no effort to remove the rigidities in the labour market which caused widespread shortages of skilled labour, pushed up labour costs and fueled inflation. Various executive directors had drawn attention to the need to correct labour market distortions, and had noted that structural modifications should be a part of any stand-by arrangement.

9. Events had confirmed the validity of both objections. South Africa's financial situation had improved so rapidly in 1982 that IMF itself had pressured South Africa to begin repaying the loan early, and in June South Africa had agreed to do so. South Africa had a current account surplus of over \$1,500 million, and its debt-service ratio had dropped to 7 per cent, while in genuinely needy nations such as Mexico and Brazil the ratio was over 100 per cent.

10. The IMF had also acknowledged the problem of lack of adjustment and produced a study criticizing apartheid on economic grounds and drawing attention to the need to ease the impediments and restrictions governing the labour market and allocate government expenditure to education and training. Thus the loan to South Africa could be rejected on economic grounds alone.

11. The research findings made possible by collaboration with the United Nations Council for Namibia had not only helped modify the position of many countries outside the United Nations but also enabled the United Nations itself to act from a position of knowledge. When in June the representative of IMF to the United Nations had informed the Sub-Committee on Petitions that the loan to South Africa had been fully consistent with the IMF's lending criteria, the representatives on the Sub-Committee, armed with that new data, had not accepted the one-sided, incomplete report offered by IMF.

12. If the campaign was to be finally successful, the following steps must be taken: the wording of the resolution concerned with IMF must be broadened to include economic grounds, making it clear that it was not a question of IMF violating its charter but of fully upholding it and complying with the resolutions of the United Nations; a high-level mission must immediately be sent to IMF in accordance with previous resolutions; further research on the economic distortions caused by apartheid must be sponsored; and a seminar of noted economists of varying persuasions must be convened to consider the economic aspects of apartheid and its international dimensions.

13. Mr. Morrell withdrew.

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AGENDA ITEM 18: IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DECLARATION ON THE GRANTING OF INDEPENDENCE TO COLONIAL COUNTRIES AND PEOPLES (continued)

Question of Western Sahara: hearing of petitioners (A/C.4/38/6/Add.7, Add.8 and Add.10)

14. At the invitation of the Chairman, Mr. Cheikh (Front de libération du Sahara) took a place at the petitioners' table.

15. Mr. CHEIKH (Front de libération du Sahara) said that the painful conflict which had been tearing the region apart for eight years had caused antagonism between the Saharan people and Algeria, a fraternal country with which the population of Sahara had great historic, cultural and religious links. The Front de libération du Sahara had already participated in the Committee's work on the same subject in 1966 and 1968. As early as 1966 the Front had energetically defended its allegiance to Morocco, against the wishes of Spain which was trying in vain to make the Sahara part of its territory. At the local level, the activities of the Front had been uninterrupted until 1975, when it had participated in the Green March which had made possible the reintegration of the Sahara in accordance with international law. Thus the Front de libération du Sahara was qualified to speak on behalf of the population and to represent it.

16. Far from planning to take up arms against its own country and reneging on its historic commitments or repudiating its Moroccan origins, the Front was convinced of the justice of its cause, and remained faithful to the memory of its martyrs who had fallen in battle in 1956, 1957, 1958, 1959 and, more recently, 1974.

17. People, especially those who had suffered under colonialism, had good memories. In Africa, the tragic events of Biafra and Shaba would never be erased from the general consciousness. As in those two cases, what was involved in Western Sahara was an attempt at separation and secession, condemned by the entire world. It was a terrible fratricidal conflict, which was preventing the States of the region from fighting disease, chronic malnutrition, ignorance and underdevelopment.

18. Those who had lent themselves to that game knew that the question of Western Sahara was nothing more than a smokescreen for a Machiavellian conspiracy to destabilize north-west Africa in general and Morocco in particular. The imperialists, who had again been weaving hegemonistic intrigues, had continued to sow doubt and confusion among some in positions of leadership, and the duty of the Front was to re-establish the truth. The Front de libération du Sahara had chosen historical legitimacy, like its ancestors, who had fought heroically at the time of the Algeciras Conference of 1885 and the partition of Morocco into zones of influence and occupation.

19. The choice now being made was justified by history, language and religion. Ethnically, the Sahrawi were either Arab-Berber or Negro-Berber like all Moroccans. As for religion, Islam united the Western Saharans to the rest of the Kingdom, and Friday prayers were said in the mosques in the name of the Sultan.

(Mr. Cheikh)

Linguistically, Arabic was the language spoken in the Kingdom in both the north and the south. From the economic point of view, the largest numbers of people from the south flocked to the monthly or yearly markets held in the north. From the point of view of sovereignty, the Saharans had been united from ancestral times by an oath of loyalty to the Sultan of Morocco and that oath determined the configuration of the national territory.

20. Consequently, the ties with the Kingdom had never been broken and not even colonial domination had been able to change that. The Sahrawi people had been fighting for union with Morocco and their territorial integrity since 1956. Immediately after the Green March, the Western Saharans had voted in municipal and legislative elections and reaffirmed their ties to Morocco and their loyalty to the democratic institutions of their country. In 1981, it had been proposed to organize a general and free referendum in the three provinces. It was incomprehensible that the people of Western Sahara should again be asked to decide on union with Morocco when they were participating in all aspects of the life of the country.

21. The people of Western Sahara endorsed the proposals of their Sovereign formulated in Nairobi in 1981 and before the General Assembly in October 1983, and would do everything possible, for the good of the region, to seek out the truth and a just solution to that painful problem. The principle of a referendum had been supported by all, including OAU, and the one thing remaining was to decide on how it should be held. None the less, it was inadmissible to ask the country to enter into negotiations with an artificial entity, a group that called itself Frente POLISARIO.

22. Mr. Cheikh withdrew.

23. At the invitation of the Chairman, Mr. Hamdati (Association of Former Members of the Moroccan Liberation Army in the Saharan Provinces) took a seat at the petitioners' table.

24. Mr. HAMDATI (Association of Former Members of the Moroccan Liberation Army in the Saharan Provinces) thanked the Committee for giving him the opportunity to clarify certain facts in the hope that truth would prevail over distortions and misinterpretations by the enemies of his organization.

25. The members of the Association had engaged in a historic liberation struggle, inherited from their ancestors, which had culminated in the destruction of all the Foci of Spanish colonialism and the reintegration of Western Sahara into its Moroccan homeland. In the course of that struggle many had sacrificed their lives and many others had been imprisoned. The Moroccan Liberation Army had been the one to rise up against colonialism and use all possible means and methods of struggle to fulfil the wishes of the citizens of the Saharan Provinces. By contrast, the group of mercenaries recruited and used by Algeria to create tension in north-west Africa claiming to represent the Saharan people, could not cite a single action it had taken against Spanish colonialism.

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(Mr. Hamdati)

26. In 1956, ten years before the emergence of that group of mercenaries, Morocco had brought the question of Western Sahara before the Committee and had asked Spain to enter into direct negotiations regarding the securing of Morocco's territorial integrity; it had even accepted the idea of a referendum in Western Sahara so that the population of that Territory might freely decide if it wished to be united with Morocco or remain under Spanish administration. All those facts were to be found in United Nations documents, which nowhere mentioned the mercenaries, known only since 1967 under the name of Frente POLISARIO. The Saharan people had demonstrated in many battles their determination to be united with their Moroccan homeland and their loyalty to King Hassan II and to the Islamic traditions and laws he represented, despite Spain's colonialist manoeuvres and the connivance of Algeria, aimed at delaying Morocco's recovery of part of its territory so that they could maintain a political and strategic bridge-head in that area. King Hassan II, the paramount representative of the sovereignty and unity of the Saharan provinces, had submitted the question to the International Court of Justice, which had recognized the ties of the Saharan people to the Moroccan throne. Through the Green March, a great peaceful demonstration of the essentially Moroccan base of the Saharan people, Spain was at last persuaded to enter into negotiations with Morocco. As a result of the struggle and the determination of the Saharan people, Spain had been driven out and territorial unity had been achieved.

27. It had come as a surprise when a proclamation had been issued from Algeria to the effect that a fictitious organization had been formed, and was claiming a continuous history of combat and participation that it had no right to claim. Shortly thereafter, even before the name of that organization had become known, an equally fictitious republic and government had been proclaimed. The distressing situation caused by the drought had provided the opportunity to recruit Bedouin nomads and drifters to form a mercenary army which had attempted to infiltrate parts of the region. There had been many battles won by the Moroccan Liberation Army in the Saharan provinces to stave off the invasion attempts by the Frente POLISARIO and the Algerian army. Consequently, the Moroccan Liberation Army was the legitimate representative of the wishes of the Saharan people. Both the International Court of Justice and the United Nations had supported its position, and the Saharan people had participated in regional and national elections in which they had repeatedly requested the return of their provinces to Morocco.

28. It was surprising and contradictory for the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity to continue to insist upon holding a referendum for self-determination as requested by the enemy. If Algeria genuinely wanted to know what the Saharan people wanted, it had to withdraw its support from an artificial republic and liberation movement and wait for the results of the referendum, which would clearly express the will of the Saharan people.

29. None the less, Morocco accepted the decision adopted by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity meeting in Nairobi in June 1981 to organize a referendum in Western Sahara to allow the Saharan people to express their wishes regarding their future. That acceptance demonstrated

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(Mr. Hamdati)

Morocco's good will and its desire to find a solution to the problem, since holding the referendum actually constituted an action contrary to Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara. The Saharan people reaffirmed their intention to co-operate with all the United Nations and OAU agencies that would be in charge of organizing the referendum. They refused, however, to accept any decision to allow the members of the Frente POLISARIO to participate in that referendum except as individual voters, and they would accept the participation only of people from Western Sahara. The struggle of the Saharan people had been going on for centuries and it would not allow its gains to be wrested from it by ambitious expansionists who were using mercenaries and traitors for their own interests. Western Sahara had been, was and would remain Moroccan.

30. Mr. Hamdati withdrew.

31. At the invitation of the Chairman, Mr. Joummani (Sahrawi Assembly (Jemaa)) took a place at the petitioners' table.

32. Mr. JOUMMANI (Sahrawi Assembly (Jemaa)) said that when the Spanish and French colonialists occupied Morocco the Moroccan monarchs had already consolidated their sovereignty over their Western Sahara. The tribes living in the Saharan region had voluntarily accepted that sovereignty - as was shown by the fact that the Moroccan monarchs had appointed the persons whom the Sahrawi tribes had chosen as chiefs to serve as their representatives in the region. It had only been for the convenience of the Spanish colonialists that the region of Western Sahara had remained separate from Morocco. Throughout the struggle of the Saharan people against the Spanish colonizers, the Moroccan monarchs had supported them, particularly by supplying weapons - which showed that the ties between Morocco and Western Sahara had never been broken.

33. During the period from 1965 to 1967 the colonialists, hoping to win the people's sympathy, had held elections for tribal representatives, who had met in the Sahrawi Assembly (Jemaa). That Assembly had therefore been created eight years before the emergence of the Frente POLISARIO. When the Spanish sought, in 1970, to create an artificial political entity in Western Sahara, the Assembly had rejected the move and had refused to be used for such anti-patriotic purposes. Later, Spain had intrigued with Algeria with a view to dividing Western Sahara between the two countries. Algeria had meanwhile begun to train mercenaries, some of them recruited from among the Saharans who had been driven out their own region by the drought. It was with those mercenaries that the so-called Frente POLISARIO had been created.

34. When the question of sovereignty over Western Sahara was submitted to the International Court of Justice, the Court had handed down an advisory opinion recognizing that, before colonization, the region of Western Sahara had been linked by a bond of sovereignty to the Sultan of Morocco. Spain had made tentative proposals to the members of the Sahrawi Assembly that they should abandon their idea of reunification with the Moroccan homeland.

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(Mr. Joummani)

35. Some members of the Assembly had attended a meeting held in Algeria, with Algerian authorities and young Saharans who had been tricked by that country. At the meeting, they had been invited to remain on Algerian territory with a view to fighting for the creation of a Saharan State. They had naturally rejected those proposals to betray their homeland of Morocco and had decided to return to Western Sahara to fight side by side with their brothers. On their return, and at the request of the members of the Assembly, they had reaffirmed the loyalty of the Saharan people to the King of Morocco and the rejection of any move towards secession.

36. Ninety per cent of the Saharan people lived on Moroccan territory, and only 10 per cent of Saharans supported the Frente POLISARIO. Bearing those figures in mind, it could well be asked why some countries were continuing to support the Front - which consisted for the most part of persons foreign to the region they were claiming to liberate - and on what grounds those countries called upon Morocco to negotiate with the Front, which represented nothing more than the expansionist ambitions of one of the region's countries. The members of the Sahrawi Assembly, elected before the colonialists had abandoned the region, categorically reiterated that Western Sahara was Moroccan and that all Saharans would proclaim that fact in the referendum which King Hassan II had ordered to be held in order to have done, once and for all, with the expansionist plans which were obstructing the wishes of the Saharan people.

37. Mr. Joummani withdrew.

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38. Mr. SHOWKATIAN (Islamic Republic of Iran), speaking in exercise of the right of reply, re-read the paragraph of his speech which had given rise to the accusation by the United States representative that the delegation of the Islamic Republic of Iran had formulated a new definition of terrorism so that the members of the Committee could judge for themselves the truth of what he had said. He restated his position: the United States referred to liberation movements as terrorist groups but failed to recognize that millions and millions of people the world over regarded its deeds on the world scene as acts of terrorism because they created terror and fear among innocent people throughout the third world.

39. With regard to the accusation concerning the execution of Baha'is, he observed that the United States representative was perfectly aware that the Islamic Republic of Iran did not execute the Baha'is but simply brought to justice some criminals who happened to be Baha'is. And with regard to the alleged persecution of Iranian Jews, he declared that the United States representative had lied, and challenged him to produce evidence in support of his claim. As for the 50 United States spies whom the United States representative had described as hostages, the Islamic

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(Mr. Showkatian)

Republic of Iran deemed them detainees, since they had been apprehended while conspiring in Teheran.

40. Lastly, reverting to the Iranian concept of United States terrorism, it should be stressed that United States aggression against Nicaragua, its military intervention in Grenada and its peace-keeping fleets, naval forces and cruise missiles constituted acts of terrorism in accordance with that concept. Moreover, the Special Committee had condemned the United States for those acts of terrorism in different parts of the world.

41. Mrs. BERMUDEZ (Cuba), speaking in exercise of the right of reply, repeated that the invasion of Grenada had been made possible by using United States military bases and installations in colonial territories in the Caribbean. The situation created by the invasion was so serious that the General Assembly had unanimously decided to include in its agenda an item on "the situation in Grenada".

42. The Cuban Embassy in Grenada had been surrounded and harassed by marines, Cuban diplomats had been taken hostage, and the United States had obstructed the evacuation by the Red Cross of Cuban dead, wounded and workers.

43. Mr. BADER (United States of America), speaking on a point of order, said that the matter referred to by the Cuban representative had nothing to do with the agenda item before the Committee and was to be considered by the General Assembly in plenary session.

44. Mrs. BERMUDEZ (Cuba), continuing her statement, said that the United States Government, in violation of the many resolutions and decisions proposed by the Committee and approved by the General Assembly to prohibit the use of bases in colonial territories against those territories or neighbouring independent States, had begun military manoeuvres of a threatening nature close to the Cuban coast, thus further aggravating the situation in Central America, the Caribbean and Grenada in particular, and that responsibility for the consequences of such acts rested entirely with the United States Government.

The meeting rose at 12.50 p.m.