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FIRST COMMITTEE 18th meeting held on Monday, 31 October 1983 at 3.00 p.m. New York

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# VERBATIM RECORD OF THE 18th MEETING

Chairman: Mr. VRAALSEN (Norway)

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GENERAL DEBATE

Statements were made by:

Mr. Garcia Robles (Mexico)
Mr. Wegener (Federal Republic of Germany)
Mr. Findlay (Australia)
Mr. Rose (German Democratic Republic)
Mr. Petrovsky (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics)
Mr. Djokic (Yugoslavia)
Mr. Kostov (Bulgaria)
Mr. Erdembiley (Mongolia)
Mr. Carasales (Argentina)
Mr. Vito (Albania)
Mr. Weedy (Afghanistan)
Mr. Fields (United States of America)
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The meeting was called to order at 3.05 p.m.

# AGENDA ITEM 50 (continued)

REVIEW OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE RECOMMENDATIONS AND DECISIONS ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY AT ITS TENTH SPECIAL SESSION: COMPREHENSIVE PROGRAMME OF DISARMAMENT

The CHAIRMAN: In accordance with a decision taken by the Committee, we shall hear this afternoon those delegations that have inscribed their names on the list of speakers on the question of the comprehensive programme of disarmament. After all those delegations have spoken, we shall resume the general debate and the exchange of views on disarmament items.

Mr. GARCIA ROBLES (Mexico) (interpretation from Spanish): When the Secretariat, in accordance with its practice in these cases, asked me how long my statement would be, I said that I estimated that it would run anywhere from 5 to 10 minutes; I believe that it is wrong to tax the patience of representatives.

On 16 August - if my memory is correct - in the Geneva Committee on Disarmament I made some observations that I felt were relevant to a better understanding of the draft programme that had been prepared by the Committee. Also, in my statement before this Committee on 17 October this year I repeated the essential points of that earlier statement. Today I wish once again to refer to two paragraphs of those statements.

In one of those paragraphs I said the following:

"I should like to stress at the beginning that the programme proposed is much less ambitious than the one that in 1982 was submitted to the second special session of the General Assembly on disarmament. That should be obvious to anyone who compares the two documents. In addition, as indicated in the report, the text of some paragraphs is still outstanding, as is the

## (Mr. Garcia Robles, Mexico)

location of others. There remain differences of opinion regarding the desirability of including certain paragraphs since there is a need to avoid duplication. No agreement has as yet been reached on the important question of the stages of implementation, nor was there enough time to consider the draft introduction which, as Chairman of Working Group I of the special session of the General Assembly in 1982, I prepared at the time. Thus, obviously, if it is decided to use it for the revised programme that has been submitted to the Assembly, a number of substantial modifications need to be made to bring it into line with the contents of the new document. Finally, it can be said that all delegations have, expressly or tacitly, reserved the final positions of their Governments until the Governments have had occasion to study the programme as a whole and state their views on it."

(A/C.1/38/PV.3, p. 31)

NR/mt/ap (R)

#### (Mr. Garcia Robles, Mexico)

Then I stated that, in spite of all the limitations, the draft programme, with the text completely free of brackets, could allow Governments to have an idea of the maximum they could strive for in this matter in the light of the prolonged discussions in Geneva,

"if it is felt that, as obviously appears desirable, the comprehensive programme of disarmament on which we have worked for the past three years should be adopted by a consensus of all the States Members of the United Nations." (ibid., p. 31)

I concluded that part of my statement by saying:

"Consequently, it seems to me that the General Assembly should take this situation into account when after considering the content of the new texts in the draft programme - in the preparation of which the Group bore in mind that the draft programme should not represent any step backward, no matter how small, from the Final Document - it decides what its general policy must be.

"It seems to me that the General Assembly will have to make a choice between two possible courses of action. One course is to adopt the draft programme in spite of its modest nature at this thirty-eighth session after, of course, resolving the outstanding problems. This it could do in accordance with whatever procedure it deemed most appropriate. For example, it could create an open-ended working group that would work simultaneously with the First Committee of the General Assembly, whose work would be supplemented by these meetings for informal consultations. On the other hand, the matter could be returned to the Committee on Disarmament, but in this case it should be fully realized that it would be an illusion to believe that the multilateral negotiating body could consider this matter once again with any chance of success at all before at least three years had elapsed." (ibid., p. 32)

### (Mr. Garcia Robles, Mexico)

In view of the long period of time that has elapsed already at this thirty-eighth session of the General Assembly and in view of the fact that I am convinced that all the delegations and all the Foreign Ministries of the various Governments will have had an opportunity to read carefully and become acquainted with this programme and its contents, I believe that the time may have arrived for certain delegations that would play a key role in the possible resolving of pending problems to tell us how they view the situation.

What I have in mind more specifically is the negotiations between the delegations of the two States which have been negotiating in Geneva on questions of nuclear weapons. There are two sets of negotiations: one on the so-called intermediate-range nuclear weapons and the other on strategic nuclear weapons. The paragraphs referring to these negotiations are paragraphs 5 and 6. Paragraph 5 states:

"USSR-United States strategic arms negotiations.

"(Consultations between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America on the text are under way.)" (<u>A/38/27, p. 156</u>) Then we have paragraph 6, which reads as follows:

"Bilateral negotiations on the limitation and reduction of nuclear weapons in Europe.

"(Consultations between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America on the text are under way.)" (<u>ibid</u>.) That Geneva document is dated 19 August 1983; that is, it was issued more than two months ago. I wonder whether the delegations of those two States, which possess the largest arsenals of nuclear weapons, could tell us whether those consultations, which they appear to have been holding at that time, yielded any results. That is my first question.

# (Mr. Garcia Robles, Mexico)

If there has been any result and it is positive, I think it would be a very important addition if we could include in this draft a specific text for paragraphs 5 and 6. However, if there has been no result from those consultations, I believe it would be very useful if the representatives of those two States would inform us here whether they believe that in the near future those consultations might lead to a positive result. When I say "positive result", I have in mind solely a result in the form of a text which could be approved by both delegations. Of course that text would subsequently have to be considered by the First Committee as a whole.

It would be a tremendous step forward if those two paragraphs, which are of major importance, were included, because of the questions they deal with and because of what other delegations have specifically stated in Geneva, as indicated in the Committee's report - that is, that their position on the entire question of the reduction and elimination of nuclear weapons and, in short, on the section pertaining to nuclear weapons in the disarmament measures, will depend on what is contained in those two paragraphs.

Therefore, from a practical standpoint, so that we may know what we are about at the very outset of our deliberations, I should be most grateful to the representatives of those two countries if they would give us some specific information today in that regard. Clearly, after that, it would be extremely useful to hear the views of all those other representatives who may already have had an opportunity to form some idea with regard to the draft programme submitted to us by the Committee on Disarmament, especially those representatives who did not take part in the work in Geneva. There are 118 such delegations in fact, and it would be extremely useful for us to hear their views on this matter as well.

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Mr. WEGENER (Federal Republic of Germany): For my delegation the comprehensive programme of disarmament has always constituted a project of great importance and an essential element of the multilateral disarmament process. For many years this process has pursued the path of specific rather than general disarmament, while the objective of general and complete disarmament, to which we all subscribe, continues to elude us and moves into a more distant future. In this well-known predicament the comprehensive programme of disarmament is designed to provide the conceptual linkage between the multitude of specific disarmament measures and to remind us of the place of each individual disarmament measure in the achievement of the final objectives. The comprehensive programme is meant to create a rational overall structure of disarmament endeavours in fulfilment of the Final Document, the necessary framework by way of a phased approach to negotiations in the field of arms control and disarmament.

# (Mr. Wegener, Federal Republic of Germany)

Our firm belief in the usefulness, and indeed necessity, of the final elaboration of the comprehensive programme has motivated my delegation to take as active a role as it can in the negotiations on the Programme. As a first major fruit of its enthusiastic co-operation in this work, my delegation introduced, as the main sponsor, a complete outline of the comprehensive programme on 31 July 1981 in the Committee on Disarmament under code number CD/205. I am also proud to recall that during the intensive labours of the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, my delegation was in the forefront of those who tried to move negotiations ahead, bad circumstances notwithstanding, reflecting, on occasion, the view of the entire Western countries group on the subject. When agreement of all concerned proved impossible during that second special session and the comprehensive programme of disarmament was sent back to Geneva, my delegation, in a deliberate effort to contribute to the further process of negotiation, proved its eagerness to provide constructive views whenever it was afforded an opportunity to make those views known both in informal consultations and in the meetings of the relevant working group.

Despite the fervent hopes of my delegation and many others, this session of the General Assembly does not have a complete draft programme before it. We share the regret of many others that four years of intensive effort by all concerned have not yielded the desired results.

Progress, however, should not be underestimated. The difficult debates in preceding periods, and especially the work at the second special session, have provided negotiators with an important learning experience. They have now moved away from some over-complicated, all too ambitious texts. In a sustained effort during the final weeks of the summer session 1983 of the Committee on Disarmament,

# (Mr. Wegener, Federal Republic of Germany)

a text was put together which certainly is not complete and does not meet original expectations, but reiterates and reinforces common positions as enshrined in the Final Document of the first special session on disarmament. The new draft, more readable and more to the point, better geared to the needs of final consensus, takes due account of the fact that future developments in the field of security policy, in particular the future course of arms control and disarmament negotiations, cannot be foreseen with ultimate certainty. Those texts, therefore, leave room for flexibility and offer a new and promising starting point for their ultimate completion. While a number of essential problems and diverging views remain, they can, in the view of my delegation, be dealt with in a co-operative and open-minded fashion within a limited additional time-frame.

We all know that delegations and groups of delegations, during previous negotiations on the comprehensive programme of disarmament, have brought different concepts to bear and have pursued different objectives on some of the detailed items. We must all give each other credit for having negotiated in good faith in keeping with our instructions. It would be futile and in the end self-defeating to incriminate now those who allegedly have not shown a sufficient spirit of compromise and have been unable to move away from positions spelled out at earlier stages.

Being the first delegation to speak after Mr. Garcia Robles, the representative of Mexico, who has presided over our negotiating efforts on the comprehenisve programme during the entire period since the first special session, I know that I express a shared feeling if I credit Mr. Garcia Robles with the progress that has been achieved so far. That progress has only been possible because of his tireless efforts and his imaginative endeavours both as a Chairman of the <u>ad hoc</u> Working Group in Geneva, and as a Chairman of Working Group I at the

# (<u>Mr. Wegener, Federal Republic</u> of Germany)

Group in Geneva, and as a Chairman of Working Group I at the second special session. I should like to express my sincere admiration and deep gratitude to the Mexican Ambassador for his commitment, his hard work and his ceaseless efforts to find compromise solutions and to guide us on the road to the comprehensive programme of disarmament.

We owe it to his sense of dedication, as well as to the continuing value of the idea of a comprehensive programme of disarmament that we must continue our work to lead it to a good end. Several alternatives have been mentioned as to the format and the procedure which should be chosen for this purpose. It is in keeping with the constructive attitude of my delegation that we could accept any of those suggested formats. In deciding about the direction to follow, we should be mindful of the importance of the programme, of the desirability to have it available at an early date, and we should also consider the resources of time and manpower required to finalize negotiations. When we resume our negotiations on the comprehensive programme of disarmament in the framework which this General Assembly will have to decide upon, we should certainly draw lessons from past experiences. We might examine ways of restructuring our negotiations to some extent, and of accommodating different views based on different conceptual approaches. Our future work should be firmly based upon the existing consensus texts designed to govern our work, such as, especially the elements of a comprehensive programme as laid down by the United Nations Disarmament Commission in 1979, the most specific characterization of the comprehensive programme and its contents contained in a multilateral consensus document as of today. Should it be necessary to refine our working methodology further, in the spirit of those consensus texts, my delegation would be happy to co-operate in the search for an appropriately modified methodology.

# (<u>Mr. Wegener, Federal Republic</u> of Germany)

If it is the general desire of other delegations, we, for our part, are prepared to continue to try to reach agreement on a comprehensive programme of disarmament in whatever format might appear most appropriate in a spirit of openness and co-operation.

<u>Mr. FINDLAY</u> (Australia): Australia has participated during the past four years in negotiations on the comprehensive programme of disarmament both in Geneva in the Committee on Disarmament, and in New York at the second special session. We were a sponsor of the key document, CD/205, already mentioned by the representative of the Federal Republic of Germany. And we have watched the changing fortunes of the programme over those years.

We were disappointed that despite strenuous efforts at the second special session it was not possible to agree on a comprehensive programme and the draft had to be sent back to the Committee on Disarmament for further work. Despite that setback, the Committee was able again this year to invest renewed energy in negotiations and to succeed in producing a draft that is without brackets and on which there is some measure of agreement.

However, as the Chairman of the relevant Working Group, Mr. Garcia Robles of Mexico, noted in his statement of 17 October, the current draft is very different from that originally envisaged when negotiations first began. It is largely based on the language of the Final Document of the first special session on disarmament and it is much less ambitious and comprehensive than was intended.

In addition, as the draft now stands, certain texts, such as those on the Indian Ocean zone of peace, for example, are still to be negotiated, and delegations have entered reservations on various parts of the draft and on the draft as a whole.

(Mr. Findlay, Australia)

Australia, for its part, is not entirely satisfied with the wording on the comprehensive test ban. We are also concerned at the less than prominent place accorded to verification in the programme.

However, despite those reservations, Australia is willing, as always, to continue work on the comprehensive programme, at any time.

In this connection, we have noted the options set out by Mr. Garcia Robles in his statement of today and we can concur with either of them. We have also heard Mr. Garcia Robles. describe the current draft programme as "a modest one".

As we see it, were the CPD to be referred back to the Committee on Disarmament, this could have the advantage of allowing the Committee on Disarmament to continue work on the programme when the circumstances are more promising and when a comprehensive programme of disarmament can be produced which more nearly meets the aspirations of the international community. <u>Mr. ROSE</u> (German Democratic Republic): The comprehensive programme of disarmament is under discussion. The delegation of the German Democratic Republic attaches great importance to the preparation of that programme. It could only be conducive to the promotion of the process of arms limitation and disarmament if States were able to reach agreement on a long-term orientation as well as on the next steps to be taken. Some say that the tense international situation is not likely to promote such a project. But, on the other hand, it can rightly be said that, particularly now, the firm will should be demonstrated not to allow a downhill development to result in catastrophe.

The text that has been submitted does not contain everything that my delegation would deem necessary. This is true, above all, in regard to the concrete formulation of the most pressing tasks. Nevertheless, in a spirit of understanding, we are ready to accept this text as a basis for further negotiation. Some paragraphs still have to be brought more in line with the objectives of the Final Document of the first General Assembly special session devoted to disarmament. We think that this should be possible, with the goodwill of all sides involved.

In this context, my delegation also would like to express its appreciation of the contribution made by Ambassador Garcia Robles. Because of his dedication and determination, it has in the main been impossible to advance the project despite all the obstacles that came up. In his statements of 17 October and today he has set forth his ideas for further activities.

There are still a considerable number of obstacles to be overcome on the way to the conclusion of a document by consensus. The time-limits which would be set for a working group within the framework of the First Committee cannot be

# (<u>Mr. Rose, German Democratic</u> Republic)

overlooked. The delegation of the German Democratic Republic is, however, ready to participate in such a working group. Should the Committee decide to entrust the Geneva Committee on Disarmament again with the finalization of the programme, we hope that it will be possible to carry out this work within a relatively short period of time.

The German Democratic Republic will set forth in the negotiations its detailed ideas on the final wording of the text. They relate, above all, to a number of substantive questions, but our starting point remains that the objectively most urgent measures are actually reflected in the programme so far as possible.

In this connection, let me make a few additional remarks on the practical approach to the questions of arms limitation and disarmament. The statements of some delegations have gone into great detail. There has been talk about rationalization and realism and about the need for proposals to be suitable for negotiations. There have been complaints about the increasing number of resolutions and the inadequate observance of the different functions of multilateral bodies. That sounds quite reasonable at first sight. Who could oppose an increase in the effectiveness of dealing with disarmament issues? Nevertheless, we have to raise some basic objections to such a concept. What is called realism in this connection means nothing else but actually renouncing the tackling of those demands and tasks which arise, as a matter of urgency, from the international developments and which, difficult as their solution may be, must be tackled by all means. To put it in other words: realism cannot mean adapting to a policy that seeks to prevent any genuine step towards arms limitations and disarmament.

# (<u>Mr. Rose, German Democratic</u> Republic)

Has any thought been given to the reasons for the increase in the number of draft resolutions submitted to the First Committee, for instance? There would be considerably fewer resolutions if a stop could be put to entrusting the United Nations with tasks that can much more easily be solved by scientific institutions. As to the larger number of resolutions dealing with practical actions, we see here one of the underlying reasons for the obvious contradiction between the increase in real problems and the decrease in the readiness of a number of States to participate constructively in solving them. Therefore, we have all these "reiterations" and "reaffirmations". It would be easy to give many examples; everybody in this room is familiar with them.

Why, for instance, should we be ready to allow the backward moves by one State to be forced upon us in regard to the treaty on the prohibition of all nuclear-weapon tests and in regard to renouncing the call for immediate negotiations? And why does the Geneva Committee on Disarmament not live up to its functions as the sole multilateral negotiating body? Because it seems that a few States do not want to have such negotiations and obviously are even trying to exclude the word "negotiations" from the Geneva Committee. They handle the valuable principle of reaching consensus in such a manner that the idea of reaching, <u>de facto</u>, all decisions of the First Committee in accordance with this principle does not present itself at all as an attractive idea.

In brief, we oppose taking away from the multilateral disarmament body all the genuine problems and tasks that have to be solved, in the interest of mankind. It is the right and the duty of all States to bring up these problems so long as they have not been solved. This requires - as has often been said before - the political will of all sides. Organizational tricks will certainly not be a way of tackling those problems.

<u>Mr. PETROVSKY</u> (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (interpretation from Russian): Today, pursuant to the work plan of the First Committee, the Soviet delegation would like to share some of its thinking on the question of the comprehensive programme of disarmament with the members of the First Committee.

By virtue of its complex nature and the fact that it addresses the longer term, this question is different from the majority of the items of the Committee's agenda, which deal with urgent measures to avert the danger of nuclear war and halt the arms race. The Soviet delegation, while attaching primary significance to these items, also persistently advocates the preparation and implementation of decidedly more far-reaching steps in the sphere of the limitation of armaments and disarmament, up to and including general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.

On the initiative of the Soviet Union, the question of general and complete disarmament was placed on the agenda of the United Nations a quarter of a century ago. The goal of general and complete disarmament has now become generally recognized and has been embodied in a number of important decisions of the United Nations, among others the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. In the West, people do not much like to recall the Soviet proposal for the preparation of a treaty on general and complete disarmament, but that proposal exists and is still valid. Of course, a comprehensive programme of disarmament does not have the same standing as a plan, still less a treaty, on general and complete disarmament. None the less, this programme could play an important role in the context of efforts to achieve the ultimate goal of general and complete disarmament in a world system in which international peace and security would prevail and in which the new international economic order would be strengthened and consolidated.

Proceeding from this premise, the Soviet Union, like the other socialist countries, participated in a constructive spirit in all the negotiations on the programme, in the United Nations Disarmament Commission in 1979, in the Committee on Disarmament, and at the second special session of the General Assembly on disarmament.

What are the net results of these negotiations today? From the beginning of work on the programme it was apparent that a group of countries, and in particular the United States, were unwilling to agree to the inclusion in the programme of many highly important practical measures to halt the arms race, particularly the nuclear arms race, and it became obvious that they wanted virtually to revise the priorities that were laid down in this respect in the Final Document of the first special session. As a result, as all representatives know, the second special session of the General Assembly on disarmament was unable to adopt the text of a programme.

During the negotiations in the Committee on Disarmament in 1983 it proved possible, to some extent, to bring the positions of the sides closer together on various questions, mainly by using provisions of the Final Document of the first special session. Here we have to acknowledge that great credit should go to the Chairman of the <u>Ad Hoc</u> Working Group on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, the representative of Mexico, Ambassador Garcia Robles.

At the same time, it is quite evident that serious difficulties exist with regard to a number of cardinal provisions of the programme. The most important question on which agreement is necessary for the text of the comprehensive programme is the prevention of nuclear war. We are firmly convinced that here we cannot limit ourselves to the preparation of a text of a general plan, making no provision for specific measures.

The question of the prevention of nuclear war is at the present time crucial in the sphere of arms limitation and disarmament. The immediate adoption of urgent measures to lessen the danger of an outbreak of nuclear war is in the interests of all, since the threat of nuclear war confronts the whole of mankind, dramatically and specifically, with the well-known Shakespearean question, "To be, or not to be"?

It is urgently necessary to provide also clear wording on the question of the nuclear test ban. In our opinion it is necessary to draft a text that will adequately reflect the primordial significance of the conclusion of an international treaty on this matter. It is also necessary to take a clearly defined stand on other crucial issues, such as the approximate time-frame for the implementation of the programme and the allocation of the appropriate disarmament measures to the various stages of the programme. The lack of such provisions in the programme would make it worthless and, to speak bluntly, make it nothing more than a down-graded version of the Final Document of the first special session.

A question arises naturally as to the reason for all these difficulties. There is but one answer: it is the lack of political will on the part of a number of States, in particular the United States. The preparation and implementation of a comprehensive programme of disarmament does not tally at all with the American programmes for arms build-up, the purpose of which is the attainment of military supremacy so that the United States can impose its will and dominate other countries and peoples.

Massively building up its military power under the pretext of the bogus Soviet threat, Washington is using it for aggressive imperialist purposes. The act of banditry of the United States against Grenada clearly demonstrates the hypocritical nature of the foreign policy of the present United States Administration and its total contempt for the legitimate rights and interests of other States and for the generally acknowledged norms of international law referred to in the comprehensive

programme of disarmament. What kind of comprehensive programme of disarmament is likely to be of any interest to a country which is bent on building up and using military force, which has embarked upon a course of aggression, thereby committing a crime against mankind and the world as a whole, and which in its nuclear madness is pushing the world towards the abyss.

We consider it necessary to counter this recklessness and addiction to adventurism with an extensive programme of specific actions to consolidate peace, build up trust and mutual understanding, limit armaments and achieve disarmament. Proceeding from this position of principle, we are prepared in the future, as in the past, to make a constructive contribution to the quest for mutually acceptable solutions to the existing problems, and this fully applies to the comprehensive programme of disarmament.

The First Committee must now decide on new ways of working on this programme. As far as my delegation is concerned, we would have no objections to the continuance of work on the text of a comprehensive programme of disarmament during this session of the General Assembly, within the appropriate organizational framework, should the majority of members of the First Committee deem this advisable. We also feel that the Assembly could once again request the Committee on Disarmament to continue work on the preparation of a comprehensive programme of disarmament. At the same time it should be stressed that, given the conditions prevailing in the world at the present time and their serious implications for mankind, there is a greater need than ever before for practical steps to be taken with urgency to avert the threat of nuclear war and return the world to the path of political and military détente.

As we have frequently emphasized, the current negotiations in Geneva on the limitation of nuclear armaments in Europe between the Soviet Union and the United States of America are of particular significance in this respect. The Soviet Union is doing everything possible to ensure success in this regard. This is demonstrated by the new Soviet proposals put forward at the negotiations on the limitation of nuclear armaments in Europe, as mentioned in the replies of Mr. Andropov to the questions of <u>Pravda</u> on 27 October of this year. As Comrade Andropov emphasized, we have shown and shall continue to show flexibility in the quest for concrete solutions at those negotiations, but on one unalterable condition, namely, that the balance of medium-range nuclear armaments in Europe must not be disrupted. The levels of such weapons on both sides can and must be radically reduced, but in such a way that the correlation between them remains unchanged.

This means, first of all, that there must be no deployment of new United States missiles in Europe, since that would radically shift the military-strategic

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#### (Mr. Petrovsky, USSR)

balance in favour of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Secondly, both sides must take due account of nuclear weapons of that range without any - I emphasize, any - exceptions.

Within the framework of this just demand the Soviet Union is again demonstrating its flexibility. As members of the Committee know, the Soviet Union has already sought an agreement on the bilateral reduction of medium-range nuclear weapons in Europe to identical levels, with regard to both delivery vehicles – missiles and aircraft – and the warheads carried by them. In order to guarantee equality with regard to the warheads on the missiles of the Soviet Union on the one hand and of Great Britain and France on the other, the Soviet Union has declared its willingness to have fewer missile launching facilities than are already in existence on the NATO side. We are not bothered by the fact that with such an approach, and bearing in mind the quantity of warheads on British and French missiles at the present time, the Soviet Union would have approximately 140 launchers of SS-20 missiles in Europe – in other words, considerably fewer than the medium-range missile launchers of Britain and France.

Not long ago we stated that, in order to reach a mutually acceptable agreement including renunciation by the United States of the deployment of missiles in Europe, the Soviet Union would eliminate all its missiles in the European zone subject to reduction instead of re-basing them in the east. In this connection, it might be asked whether, while dismantling its missiles in its European region, the Soviet Union might not build up the number of such missiles in its eastern regions, which could then be shifted from east to west at some future date. There are no grounds at all for such apprehensions. However, in order to eliminate completely any doubts in this regard our head of State, Mr. Andropov, has stated that there will be no transfer of Soviet missiles from east to west.

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Moreover, if an agreement is reached on the limitation of nuclear armaments in Europe and it enters into force, from that time on the Soviet Union will cease the deployment of SS-20 missiles in the eastern areas of the country and will firmly base itself on the condition that in the Asian region there will be no substantial changes in the strategic situation. This means, above all that the United States will not deploy new medium-range nuclear weapons in regions from which they could reach the eastern part of the territory of the Soviet Union.

The third new initiative of the Soviet Union relates to negotiations on the number of aircraft. It is sometimes said that our proposal that each side, after reductions, should have no more than 300 medium-range nuclear-weapon delivery vehicles considerably cuts into the American medium-range aircraft totals. The Soviet side wishes to assure the Committee that it has no desire to encroach on the United States totals, although for the sake of the record it should be pointed out that Soviet medium-range aircraft are not based in other countries from which they could reach the territory of the United States. But, here again, the Soviet Union is prepared to demonstrate additional flexibility and to establish equal total levels of aircraft delivery vehicles for medium-range weapons for the Soviet Union and NATO on a mutually agreed and mutually acceptable quantitative range, even if it is substantially different from what we originally proposed. The concrete values of those levels could be agreed in due course, and the make-up of the aircraft delivery vehicles could be specified.

Lastly, if the United States renounced the deployment of its missiles in Europe within an appropriate deadline and thereby made it possible to continue negotiations and seek mutually acceptable solutions, the Soviet Union could proceed now to reduce its SS-4 missiles - and we have more than 200 of them - and complete their elimination in the period 1984-1985. And if it proved possible to conclude an agreement in Geneva on an equitable basis as we have frequently advocated, then of course a significant part of our current SS-20 rockets would be destroyed.

There is a way out of the deadlock in the Geneva talks; it simply has to be used. Were the United States to show a true desire to enter into a mutually acceptable agreement, we believe it would not take long to reach such an agreement. We certainly do not lack the will to achieve that aim. At the same time it must be made quite clear that the emergence in Western Europe of the new United States missiles will make it impossible for the current Geneva talks to continue. On the other hand, the Geneva talks on the limitation of nuclear armaments in Europe can be continued if the United States does not proceed to actual deployment of the missiles.

The latest Soviet proposals in the negotiations on the limitation of nuclear armaments in Europe are an eloquent indication of the flexible approach which the Soviet Union pursues in all forums where questions of the limitation of armaments and of disarmament are considered, and we expect the same flexibility, not bogus and merely verbal but genuine flexibility, from the other participant in the negotiations. That is the only way to achieve practical results in all the spheres of arms limitation and disarmament, including the sphere of the comprehensive programme of disarmament.

<u>Mr. DJOKIC</u> (Yugoslavia): The Concluding Document of the second special session of the General Assembly on disarmament reaffirmed the determination of Member States to continue to work for the urgent conclusion and adoption of the

#### (Mr. Djokic, Yugoslavia)

comprehensive programme of disarmament, and the Committee on Disarmament was requested to continue negotiations on the programme and to submit a revised draft to the General Assembly at its present session. We have before us now the report of the Committee on Disarmament, which in one segment refers to that programme.

The report testifies to the efforts undertaken by the Committee aimed at fulfilling the task entrusted to it by the second special session of the General Assembly on disarmament. I would not wish to overlook on this occasion the role played by the Chairman of the <u>Ad Hoc</u> Working Group on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, Ambassador Garcia Robles of Mexico. However, the report also shows that there has been no progress in the elaboration of a comprehensive programme of disarmament, that the negotiations are at a stalemate, that areas where agreement has been reached have not been expanded and that the major differences could not be overcome, while some have even become deeper.

Of particular concern is the fact that some of the participants in negotiations on the programme are attempting to question certain crucial positions and conclusions contained in the unanimously adopted Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly on disarmament, claiming that those positions and conclusions, in spite of their unequivocal meaning, should be interpreted in a different way. We see such practice as unwillingness on the part of those participants to fulfil their share of the responsibility for the elaboratiuon of the programme and one of the important causes of the present unfavourable state of negotiations in this sphere.

In the Committee on Disarmament, as well as in some General Assembly bodies, we have on several occasions expressed views concerning some issues related to the comprehensive programme of disarmament. This time I should like to mention only some of them.

## (Mr. Djokic, Yugoslavia)

The comprehensive programme of disarmament should, in our opinion, be exactly what its title implies: it should be comprehensive and it should be a programme of disarmament. In this aspect it is essentially different from all other documents in the field of disarmament adopted by the international community in the post-war period. It must be an important element in the elaboration of the international strategy for disarmament, the bases of which were laid down by the first special session of the General Assembly on disarmament, and it should offer a framework for substantive negotiations in the field of disarmament. It should, further, be a carefully-worked-out package of interrelated measures of disarmament, which would lead the international community towards the goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control. The programme should specify concrete action by the international community in the field of disarmament and encourage, to the greatest extent possible, negotiations at all levels on individual specific issues of disarmament. The programme should determine its goals and the principles on which it is to be based, as well as its priorities. It should determine the measures the implementation of which would lead to the achievement of its goals and certain mechanisms which would ensure consistent adherence to the obligations assumed.

We consider to be significant the continuation of negotiations on the elaboration of a comprehensive programme of disarmament. The importance of the programme and the efforts undertaken so far make us duty-bound to work resolutely towards the achievement of acceptable solutions. Of course, the essential prerequisite is the readiness of all to contribute most directly to the success of negotiations, since it is obvious that there can be no results if the present positions remain inflexible. The programme should be formulated, in our opinion, according to priorities which would be supplemented and which would be negotiated

# (Mr. Djokic, Yugoslavia)

or agreed at subsequent stages. It is fundamentally necessary, in our view, to ensure understanding of the implementation of the agreed programme, the constant supplementing of the programme and permanent negotiations on specific new disarmament measures. Such a dynamic and flexible approach could help remove the suspicions that unrealistic demands are being made for the creation of rigid programmes, fixed once and for all.

We therefore call for continuation with urgency of work on a comprehensive programme of disarmament and we consider that the Committee on Disarmament is the appropriate and competent body to conduct further negotiations on this matter. <u>Mr. KOSTOV</u> (Bulgaria): I should like to express some of the views of the Bulgarian delegation concerning the comprehensive programme of disarmament.

We have before us the report of the <u>Ad Hoc</u> Working Group established by the Committee on Disarmament in paragraph 88 of document A/38/27. This report contains texts of the comprehensive programme of disarmament which have been formulated by the Working Group and submitted to the Committee on Disarmament in pursuance of the recommendation contained in General Assembly resolution 37/78 F, on the understanding that delegations could not take final positions until agreement was reached on outstanding points of difficulty and until the document was complete. Now these texts are before us for further consideration.

My delegation views positively the work done by the Committee. At the same time, we are well aware of the considerable difficulties which had to be surmounted by the Committee in order to have the document under consideration prepared in its present form. This was made possible thanks to the active and constructive efforts of the socialist, the non-aligned and several other countries, which consistently upheld the necessity of elaborating a comprehensive programme of disarmament. I should like to pay a special tribute, for his personal contribution on this matter, to the chairman of the <u>Ad Hoc</u> Working Group, Ambassador Garcia Robles of Mexico, who again displayed his rich experience, remarkable diplomatic skills and steadfastness in pursuit of the goals of our work.

The People's Republic of Bulgaria is committed to the idea of the elaboration of the comprehensive programme of disarmament. Hence the Bulgarian delegation in the Committee on Disarmament exerted a lot of effort towards its realization. Two Bulgarian representatives served as co-ordinators of the contact group on principles.

We regard the comprehensive programme of disarmament as a useful and necessary means of mobilizing and co-ordinating the efforts of the international community of

#### (Mr. Kostov, Bulgaria)

nations towards the attainment of the ultimate goal in the field of disarmament, namely, general and complete disarmament under effective international control. This has always and consistently been the goal of the socialist countries, the People's Republic of Bulgaria included, and they have invariably spared no effort in striving to achieve this objective. As is well known, as early as 1962 the Soviet Union proposed the conclusion of a treaty on general and complete disarmament and submitted the draft of such a treaty. At that time my country gave its whole-hearted support to this initiative as well as to the opening of concrete negotiations on its implementation. Regrettably, the obstructionist position of the Western States at that time succeeded in blocking it.

The first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament underlined the need for formulating a comprehensive programme of disarmament, as well as its scope and objectives. The concrete elaboration of such a programme was also one of the priorities of the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. It may be recalled that, owing to the peremptory objection of two Western nuclear-weapon Powers to having the question of a nuclear weapon test ban, which is of vital significance for the entire international community, reflected adequately in the draft programme, the session failed to fulfil its mandate.

The draft comprehensive programme of disarmament now under consideration is a reflection of the complex conditions in which it was prepared. The negative attitude of the United States and other member States of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) concerning the settlement of a number of disarmament issues, nuclear disarmament in particular, again prevented the programme from being elaborated as a detailed, fully-fledged document. That is why the draft is incomplete and, in the words of Ambassador Robles, guite modest.

### (Mr. Kostov, Bulgaria)

In this connection, it is the view of my delegation that the inadequate reflection in the programme of such issues as the immediate cessation and prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests, the prevention of nuclear war, and so on, as well as the total absence of any texts concerning the establishment of zones of peace in the Indian Ocean and in the Mediterranean region, limits to a large extent the impact of the document and contradicts its very intent. Opposition to the elaboration of these questions, as prescribed in the Final Document of the first special session on disarmament, is in essence a retreat from the Final Document and signals a desire to undermine, if not to torpedo, the very idea of the United States of America and NATO aimed at the stockpiling and modernization of armaments rather than their limitation and reduction and the related stalling of negotiations on a number of urgent disarmament issues cannot be interpreted otherwise than as a rejection of the very idea of general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

The actual intention of these States to use their military might in order to impose their will on a global scale finds fresh proof in the outrageous act of massive armed aggression committed by the United States of America against the small, peaceful and non-aligned State of Grenada, which has provoked the justified indignation of the overwhelming majority of Member States.

Returning to the question of the comprehensive programme of disarmament, the question now is whether the world community should accept this situation and perforce downgrade its lofty objectives in the field of disarmament. We are still of the opinion that the interests of all mankind and of world peace and security do not allow such an outcome. My delegation shares the position of the overwhelming majority of Member States that the international community urgently needs a clear-cut, meaningful and effective comprehensive programme of disarmament to

### (Mr. Kostov, Bulgaria)

direct the efforts to ensure the adoption of resolute and urgent measures to check the arms race and avert the danger of nuclear war.

In our opinion, to be effective the programme should include specific stages as well as target dates with a view to the steady implementation without delay of concrete, practical measures directed at achieving the final goal of general and complete disarmament.

In this respect we deem it of crucial importance to preserve every positive result achieved thus far along these lines. In view of the foregoing, we firmly support the approach displayed by the socialist and non-aligned States in the Committee on Disarmament designed to prevent any retreat in drafting the programme from the text, adopted by consensus, of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. Moreover, in order to be effective, the comprehensive programme of disarmament should be fully responsive to the imperatives of the day and should direct attention to the most topical and pressing goals in the area of disarmament. As is well known, over the last several years the non-aligned, the socialist and other countries have put forward very substantive initiatives and proposals which meet this requirement.

In conclusion, my delegation welcomes the progress made by the Committee on Disarmament in drafting the comprehensive programme of disarmament and is ready to participate in the efforts towards the further elaboration of the programme. We are also ready to continue, in co-operation with all countries that share our position, the search for ways and means of overcoming the current difficulties and reaching an agreement that will bring us closer to the initial idea of the comprehensive programme of disarmament. For this purpose we are ready to discuss with maximum flexibility the proposals for further work in this direction. <u>Mr. GARCIA ROBLES</u> (Mexico) (interpretation from Spanish): The statements we have heard are rather encouraging, even though only one of the two States which have the largest nuclear-weapon arsenals has spoken. Nevertheless, I venture to hope that the silence of the other does not mean a negative position with regard to the programme.

As I have said in before Geneva and here, and as I have repeated today, there are several issues which must still be resolved before the programme can be adopted at this session. However, we should not exaggerate the difficulties inherent in the solution to the problem if there is the political will on all sides.

If we look at the programme we see that the first thing is the introduction. It was not adopted in Geneva because there was not time, as is stated in the Committee's report, but let me add that, as the author of this draft, I have no paternal pride in this text and am prepared for it to be amended in any way that the Committee may wish. There would be no problem at all.

The objectives were all adopted; there is not a single bracket or blank left in the text in this respect.

With reference to the problems over the principles, as can be seen from the footnote on page 3 of the annex to document CD/415, the only thing that remains to be decided is the arrangement of certain paragraphs in this section.

The priorities were all adopted.

Next is the section on disarmament measures. The first section deals with nuclear weapons. Here, as I have already indicated, the main difficulty to be settled - and we must not deceive ourselves as to its importance - is in paragraphs 5 and 6, because aside from the importance of those paragraphs, is the fact that some delegations of countries possessing nuclear weapons reserved their position on the text of other paragraphs in the hope that the text of paragraphs 5 and 6 would be prepared. As the French say, it is the first step that is

### (Mr. Garcia Robles, Mexico)

difficult. I believe that in this case the first step should be taken, not only for the sake of the comprehensive programme of disarmament but also because this may well provide an opportunity for the two super-Powers to break the deadlock which exists in the Geneva negotiations.

I have before me the texts of these two paragraphs prepared and discussed informally in Geneva by the representatives of the United States and the Soviet Union. In my view, the differences between the texts drafted by the two delegations in Geneva for paragraph 5 are far from irreconcilable. I am convinced that, by means of new consultations between the two representatives or, if they so wish, with the assistance of the Chairman of this Committee or the Chairman of the Working Group, or both, it might well be possible to produce a text satisfactory to both delegations. Therefore, I venture to make that suggestion. There is another possibility. The two delegations might prefer to submit informally to the First Committee, for its information, the texts that each of them would like to see as paragraphs 5 and 6 of the Geneva draft. In my view, that would be most useful.

The CHAIRMAN: I should like to draw the Committee's attention to the fact that we have decided to earmark our meeting tomorrow afternoon for those representatives who would like to make comments or state their views on the comprehensive programme of disarmament, and already we have a number of speakers inscribed for that. I suggest, therefore, that we hear no speakers on this matter until we have considered how to proceed. I take it that that is acceptable to the Committee.

I wish to encourage those delegations which wish to speak on this matter but have not yet put their names on the list of speakers to do so during this meeting or at the latest during tomorrow morning's meeting.

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AGENDA ITEMS 43 to 63, 139 to 141, 143 and 144 (<u>continued</u>) GENERAL DEBATE

<u>Mr. ERDEMBILEG</u> (Mongolia) (interpretation from Russian): Since at the beginning of this meeting there was an exchange of views on the comprehensive programme of disarmament, on which the <u>Ad Hoc</u> Working Group of the Committee on Disarmament did such constructive work, under the skilled and experienced leadership of Ambassador Garcia Robles, the Mongolian delegation would like to point out that at a plenary meeting of the Committee on Disarmament earlier this year my delegation stated its views on the relevant sections of the draft programme under "Other measures", particularly on measures designed to prevent the use of force in international relations.

We would like the future comprehensive programme to reflect the idea that was expressed at one time by Mongolia, namely, the proposal for the conclusion of a convention on the mutual non-use of force and non-aggression between the States of Asia and the Pacific. However, we must note with regret that, because of the obstructionist tactics of certain representatives and countries, no agreement was reached on this matter in the Committee on Disarmament. The Mongolian delegation will in future continue to do its utmost to ensure that generally acceptable language is found on this question, which is of particular interest to us, and also on all other issues for inclusion in the future comprehensive programme of disarmament.

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### (Mr. Erdembileg, Mongolia)

Coming now to my main statement, I wish first, Sir, on behalf of the Mongolian delegation, to welcome your election as Chairman. I would also like to congratulate the other officers of the Committee. We are quite sure that the work of the First Committee will proceed in an even more organized manner than usual and that the Committee will fulfil its responsibilities successfully during this session of the General Assembly.

The First Committee is now continuing its consideration of the important business on its agenda, in which questions of the prevention of nuclear war, the curbing of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament hold a prominent place. The present course of international events, which is characterized by further aggravation of tension and the mounting threat of nuclear war, requires from the United Nations the adoption with urgency of decisive and irreversible measures to curb the arms race, particularly the nuclear arms race, and bring about disarmament, particularly nuclear disarmament.

Today the peoples of the world, deeply concerned by the threat of nuclear disaster hovering over them, clearly realize the sinister implications of the reckless policies of the opponents of détente and disarmament. They are keenly aware of the course developments are taking in this critical year, 1983, which can truly be described as a crucial one in the sense that a decision will be taken as to whether or not there is to be another round in the arms race, which is fraught with far-reaching consequences for world peace and security.

In the present situation, the spiralling arms race is being further accelerated, adding to the existing massive nuclear arsenals new and even more sophisticated types of weapons of mass destruction. Together with this, programmes are being carried out to build up other types of armaments based on the latest technology, including weapons for use in space, and also to strike at the earth

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from space. We must not lose sight of the fact that the basic emphasis is on the establishment of new types and systems of weapons which would guarantee the acquisition of nuclear first-strike potential. Closely related to all this is the escalation in the West of strategic concepts and doctrines which admit the possibility of waging a limited or protracted nuclear war.

The militaristic policy of the present United States Administration, which is bent on attaining military supremacy with the support of some of its allies in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), is reflected in the practical preparations being made for the deployment on the territory of Western Europe of new United States intermediate-range missiles. The peoples of the countries of Europe, and not only of that continent, are profoundly aware that such a dangerous step could lead to an exacerbation of nuclear confrontation and increase the risk of an outbreak of war. This accounts for the widespread mass anti-nuclear movement, whose participants resolutely oppose the deployment of the new United States missiles.

The Mongolian People's Republic believes that the principal condition of the successful outcome of the ongoing Soviet-American negotiations on the limitation of medium-range nuclear weapons in Europe and strategic arms reduction talks is strict compliance with the principle of equality and equal security. It is this fundamental principle, in our opinion, that underlies the proposals of the socialist countries in the documents adopted at the Prague and Moscow summit meetings of the Warsaw Treaty countries and recently reaffirmed during the meeting of the Foreign Ministers of those countries in Sofia last month.

The Government of the Mongolian People's Republic welcomes and wholly supports the joint position of the socialist countries as set out in the communiqué of the Sofia meeting as follows:

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### (Mr. Erdembileg, Mongolia)

"... if agreement is not reached at the talks by the year's end, it is essential that the talks should be continued with a view to reaching it, on the condition of the renunciation by the United States and its NATO allies of their schedule for deploying new medium-range nuclear missiles".

I wish to emphasize that this position was also confirmed by the Berlin statement, on 27 October, of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance.

The sincerity of this statement is demonstrated by the willingness of the Soviet Union, on such conditions, to continue its unilateral freeze on medium-range nuclear weapons deployed in the European part of its territory and the unilateral reduction of such weapons, that began at the same time as the freeze. This constructive and flexible approach of the Soviet Union was again confirmed in the statement of Mr. Andropov on 27 October.

It is important that the other party should also show a similar sense of responsibility and realism when taking part in these vitally important negotiations. Proposals such as the zero option and the intermediate solution, or other such bogus initiatives, which disregard the underlying principle cannot promote the attainment of mutually acceptable agreements.

The possibility of reaching a mutually acceptable arrangement even in this complex situation is demonstrated by the successful outcome of the Madrid meeting of States participating in the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe.

We attach great significance to the forthcoming Conference on Confidence and Security Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe, the success of which would significantly improve the political climate in Europe.

The present complex situation urgently makes necessary increased efforts of all kinds to halt the dangerous development of events. The elimination of the threat of nuclear war is truly a common human endeavour. The United Nations, as an

important instrument for the maintenance of international peace and security, is called upon to play an important role in eliminating the threat of a nuclear catastrophe. In this respect, the Government of the Mongolian People's Republic whole-heartedly supported the timely and highly relevant proposals of the Soviet Union at this session of the Assembly on the condemnation of nuclear war and a freeze on nuclear weapons. We believe that the General Assembly must resolutely, unconditionally and for all time condemn nuclear war and declare to be criminal acts the formulation, propounding, dissemination and propaganda of political and military doctrines and concepts intended to justify the "legitimacy" of the first use of nuclear weapons and in general the "admissibility" of unleashing nuclear war.

The adoption of such a declaration, in our opinion, would be an immensely important political act and would help create a favourable climate for the attainment of concrete agreements on the limitation and reduction of nuclear armaments up to and including their complete elimination. This was the aim which the Soviet Union was pursuing when it took upon itself a unilateral obligation not to be the first to use nuclear weapons. It is unnecessary to emphasize the significance of the adoption of such an obligation by those nuclear Powers which have not yet done so. At its last regulr session the General Assembly made precisely such an appeal.

The purpose to which I have referred is also served by the proposal of the socialist countries for the conclusion of a treaty on the mutual non-use of military force and the maintenance of relations of peace between the States parties to the Warsaw Treaty and the member States of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), which should be open to all other countries.

In addition to measures of a political nature, the socialist countries have always advocated the adoption of practical measures to curb the nuclear arms race. In present world conditions a freeze on nuclear weapons, as proposed by the Soviet Union, would be a truly meaningful step conducive to the reduction and complete elimination of nuclear weapons. We believe that the General Assembly must appeal urgently to all nuclear-weapon States to agree to a freeze and to appropriate controls on all of their nuclear armaments, both quantitatively and qualitatively. Such a freeze would lead to the cessation of the accumulation of all components of nuclear arsenals and would include an obligation not to deploy new types of nuclear armaments, the establishment of a moratorium on all testing of nuclear weapons and of other new types of delivery vehicles and the cessation of the production of fissile materials for nuclear warheads.

The Mongolian People's Republic advocates the prompt initiation of genuine negotiations on the cessation of the production of all types of nuclear weapons and the gradual reduction of existing stockpiles of such weapons until they are completely eliminated. Such negotiations should be aimed at elaborating a programme for phased nuclear disarmament, and within that framework agreements should be reached on arrangements for the cessation of the development and production of new nuclear-weapon systems and of fissile material for such weapons, as well as for the cessation of the production of the means of delivery of nuclear weapons. All of this would create the conditions necessary for progress towards the complete elimination of nuclear armaments.

We must, however, note with regret that in the Committee on Disarmament the efforts of the socialist countries and of groups of non-aligned and neutral States that advocate the reaching of mutually acceptable agreements in this regard are being obstructed. No start has so far been made in the Committee on Disarmament on concrete negotiations on the prohibition of nuclear neutron weapons. The urgent

need for a solution to this problem is dictated by the fact that efforts are steadily being made to deploy this weapon, not just in Western Europe but in other parts of the world, including the continent of Asia. The overwhelming majority of States Members of the United Nations regard the urgent need for agreement on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests as a reliable barrier against the further qualitative upgrading and quantitative build-up of that weapon of mass destruction. For many years the General Assembly has called upon all States, and in particular the nuclear Powers, to do their utmost to bring about a comprehensive nuclear-test ban. However this vitally important matter still remains on the agenda. The principal reason for that state of affairs is to be found in the position taken by the United States and some of its allies members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Their negative approach and obstructionist tactics, policies and actions designed to enable them to proceed to further qualitative upgrading of their nuclear weapons have led to the breaking off of the tripartite negotiations on a nuclear test ban. Because of their stubborn adherence to such a position it is difficult to look forward to the early resumption of those negotiations. In addition, those countries are to blame for the fact that no start has yet been made in the Committee on Disarmament on practical negotiations leading to the drafting of a text of such a treaty. The situation is further aggravated by the non-participation of China and France in the work of the Committee's Ad Hoc Working Group, whose mandate, in the opinion of the majority of the participants in that Group, should be expanded to attain its principal aim, namely, the elaboration of appropriate norms of international law. The urgent and pressing nature of this question and the need for its solution require the participation in the negotiations of all nuclear-weapon States without exception. Any future treaty must include the prohibition of all test explosions

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## (Mr. Erdembileg, Mongolia)

of nuclear weapons in all environments and for all time. Such a treaty must, of course, be univeral in nature. Those are the principal aims that must be achieved in this important matter.

In order to elaborate and conclude such a treaty as soon as possible the socialist countries have proposed that a moratorium on peaceful nuclear explosions be agreed to pending the elaboration of appropriate arrangements for the conducting of such explosions. In arriving at such mutually acceptable arrangements a large part will be played by such constructive ideas and proposals as those contained in the document submitted by the Soviet Union, which sets forth basic provisions for a treaty on the general and complete prohibition of the testing of nuclear weapons. That document, in our opinion, reflects the positive gains that have been made over the many years during which this problem has been considered in various forums. It also takes due account of the additional considerations advanced by many States, including questions relating to verifying compliance with any future treaty. In this respect we should like to state our positive position with regard to the initiative of Sweden, which has submitted to the Committee on Disarmament a draft treaty on this question.

The strengthening of the régime of nuclear non-proliferation would be conducive to the drawing up of measures to create nuclear-weapon-free zones in various parts of the world, an aim being pursued by proposals for nuclear-weapon-free zones in northern Europe, in the Balkans, in the Middle East and in Africa. In order to convert the Indian Ocean into a zone of peace it is urgent that a start be made as soon as possible on practical preparations for the convening of an international conference on that matter.

The importance which the Mongolian delegation attaches to the forthcoming Review Conference on the Non-Proliferation Treaty is primarily connected with the nuclear ambitions of Zionist Israel and the racist régime of South Africa and also of certain other States.

At this session of the General Assembly the Soviet Union has presented yet another important initiative, which calls for the conclusion of a treaty on the prohibition of the use of force in space and from space against earth. The Government of the Mongolian People's Republic fully supports this proposal, since we feel that it offers a real opportunity to block the militarization of space. The Mongolian delegation intends to return to this question in a separate statement at a later stage of the Committee's work.

The Mongolian delegation cannot fail to make its views known on the recent open act of aggression by the United States against Grenada. The General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party and Chairman of the Presidium of the Great People's Khural, Comrade Tsedenbal, in his statement of 27 October on behalf of the Government of Mongolia and the Mongolian people, condemned with profound indignation this open military intervention of the United States in the affairs of independent, sovereign Grenada. The sovereignty of a full Member of the United Nations has been trampled underfoot, in flagrant violation of the principles of the Charter and the norms of international law. The Government of the Mongolian People's Republic, as Comrade Tsedenbal went on to emphasize, considers that the United States is entirely to blame for the violation of the sovereignty of Grenada. The People's Republic of Mongolia joins in the demand of peace-loving people that all the interventionist forces of foreign States be immediately withdrawn from the territory of that State and that the people of Grenada be given a chance to resolve their own internal problems themselves. <u>Mr. CARASALES</u> (Argentina) (interpretation from Spanish): In my statement today I should like to refer specifically to the work done by the Committee on Disarmament, whose report was introduced a few days ago by its Chairman, Ambassador Jorge Morelli Pando of Peru.

It is common usage to express critical judgement with regard to the effectiveness - or rather the lack of effectiveness - of the only multilateral negotiating body on disarmament matters. Emphasis is at all times placed on the lack of concrete results in its activities and this year has been added, as an example of the fact that it does not work, the information that it took two months to adopt its 1983 agenda. Those two facts cannot be denied, but any clear assessment of the work done by a body as important as the Committee on Disarmament must go beyond what seems obvious at first sight in order to assess more thoroughly the underlying reality.

Let us set aside the fact that the number of meetings of the Committee has increased fivefold compared with four years ago. That growing number of additional meetings does not indicate only a greater number of statements, although a few comments might be in order on that matter also. A very large part of the effort is employed in an exercise which perhaps might be summed up generally as procedural and mainly designed to mobilize the Committee on Disarmament for the negotiation of several of the substantive items on its agenda.

It would not be wrong to say that a large majority of the States Members of the Committee on Disarmament have a strong desire to engage in the preparation of draft conventions regarding fundamental questions which have for a long time been of concern to the international community. The specific function of the Committee is to negotiate agreements, and that is what the Committee can and must do. It is clear, however, that not everyone is prepared to do this. The mere inclusion of the word "negotiation" as the objective in the mandate of a working group

## (Mr. Carasales, Argentina)

immediately arouses the strongest resistance in certain sectors. At other times the very idea of establishing a working group is unacceptable. In other words, the activity of the Committee on Disarmament is often hampered by an extremely limited assessment by some members of the questions which should be the subject-matter in the preparation of a treaty.

In fact, this reluctant approach is evident with regard to the incorporation of new items on the agenda of the Committee, as happened this year in connection with the problem of the prevention of nuclear war. It was precisely the resistance to dealing with this item that resulted in the Committee's difficulties in organizing its work and caused the long delay which has, quite justifiably, today been the subject of criticism. It was something, however, that was beyond the control of the great majority of members of the Committee. What it is difficult to accept is that it is those who formulate the criticisms who are often the ones who cause the delays.

I shall not at this time pass judgement on the reasons given for negative attitudes. Suffice it to say that those who adduce those reasons believe them to be valid, but I must confess that it is very difficult to understand this almost systematic opposition to the Committee's resolutely embarking upon what is in fact its primary task - negotiation. Without negotiation there can be no agreement. To deliberate or discuss informally is not really to negotiate, and the Committee is not the deliberative body charged with tackling these questions within the disarmament machinery. In negotiation all positions and points of view can be taken into account and, the process may last several years or even decades - in fact, it can even end in failure. What is important is serious and conscientious efforts to achieve agreement, to seek specific solutions to problems of concern to all people and to try to dispel the threats which hover over the future of mankind with ever-increasing intensity.

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### (Mr. Carasales, Argentina)

In this Geneva undertaking there is something which is not always clearly understood. The Committee on Disarmament is governed by the strictest rule of consensus. Each and every member enjoys what amounts to a veto. Quite clearly, therefore, it is not easy to take decisions on question of paramount importance which often involve the security of States. There are no majorities. There must be unanimity, or at least an absence of opposition. If we link this reality to the resistance of some countries, the meagre results of the work of the Committee can be quite easily explained. The main reason for the lack of results from Geneva is not any intrinsic lack of effectiveness but rather the lack of political will, which has so often been mentioned, on the part of some. All of this is compounded by a rarified political climate, which we see deteriorating every day.

# (Mr. Carasales, Argentina)

The bilateral negotiations which all of us have been following with great interest but about which we have received very little of the genuine information called for in General Assembly resolution 37/78 A seem to be a dialogue of the deaf which even looks likely to break down completely. With deep misgivings the world watches a succession of proposals and counter-proposals, which are rejected as soon as they are formulated, regardless of their merits. The deadlines are coming closer every day, while the prospects for success seem increasingly remote. The impression is that it is impossible to find any common ground.

The problem is no longer whether proposals are compatible. At first sight several of them seem reasonable, or at least to provide the basic elements of a settlement. What is lacking is the minimum basis without which agreement, in particular with regard to disarmament and security, is impossible, namely, trust between parties. If this trust is lacking, and if suspicion and animosity dominate the climate of negotiations, no proposal from the other side will be acceptable. Hence it would seem that the key to breaking the deadlock, the dramatic break-through which might open the door to new possibilities, should be sought in areas other than the number of missiles or the quantity of nuclear warheads. The first change must be in attitude, rather than in figures.

In this context, which clearly is most unfavourable, the Committee on Disarmament has worked in 1983 with greater determination and effort than the results achieved would indicate.

In the field of chemical weapons some progress has been made, although perhaps not so much as we would all wish. The extreme complexity of the subject becomes increasingly clear as the negotiations proceed. In any event, the frustrations of the Committee on Disarmament do not stem from the issue of chemical weapons.

Appreciable progress has been made with respect to radiological weapons. The substance of a draft treaty seems to be emerging, and while certain fundamental

## (Mr. Carasales, Argentina)

points still remain to be settled, it seems that the day is not far off when we may finally see an agreement concluded on this question. This is not true with regard to attacks against nuclear plants, where many problems still remain.

Considerable difficulty attaches to the question of a nuclear test ban. On the one hand the question has been under discussion for many years and there have been many statements at the highest level advocating the need to reach agreement on this score as soon as possible. Yet on the other hand the matter is no longer a priority for one of the main and essential protagonists of this agreement. The Committee is trapped by this anomalous situation. It has a working group, established after many years of fruitless effort, but its mandate is extremely limited and the situation I have just described suggests that it has to work in a vacuum, as if it were conducting academic discussions divorced from reality, useful only as a source of personal information, or with some possible relevance in the probably rather distant future. We must therefore wonder whether this kind of exercise is justified, when it is impossible to deal with all the aspects of the problem, or to draft texts for a convention which is ruled out from the start.

The prevention of an arms race in outer space is another curious case. One need not be an expert to see that the day when outer space is used for war purposes is coming closer and closer. There is considerable proof that the militarization of outer space has already occurred. Yet some members of the Committee on Disarmament claim that there is nothing to negotiate on with respect to this matter, and that no new agreement is necessary. This year the Committee was on the point of establishing a working group to deal with this subject, but here again at the price of the kind of mandate that would enable it to deliberate but not to negotiate. The words spoken by the Secretary-General on the opening day of Disarmament Week are very relevant in this connection. The possibilities of

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reaching meaningful agreement on this question are not great at any time, but they are somewhat greater when it comes to the prohibition of weapons that have not yet been developed or deployed. With regard to outer space, this may still be true, but very soon the situation will change. Hence the need to act openly and decisively in this field now, not tomorrow, in the body empowered to do this work, the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva, and not in any other forum.

With regard to negative security guarantees the Committee has reached a veritable deadlock. It does not seem possible to emerge from the area of unilateral statements that are not legally binding, all of them different in scope and full of provisos of all kinds, based largely on a subjective approach, statements which, taken together, provide no guarantees whatsoever for the non-nuclear-weapon States. In this field we need a radical change in the position of nuclear-weapon States, and until that happens, the activity of the Disarmament Commission will be no more than endless circlings round an unmoving axis.

The comprehensive programme of disarmament seems to be turning into an increasingly remote goal. What we thought would be the most important achievement of the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament has, under the tireless leadership of Ambassador Garcia Robles been the subject of revisions which have made it more modest in its scope and its provisions, but even in these circumstances it has been impossible thus far to arrive at the essential consensus. The statements on this subject made today, and those made in the near future will show us whether there are any grounds for a more optimistic view. Otherwise the only alternative will be to refer the subject back to the Committee and await better times. We hope that this indispensable change in the international situation will occur in the near future. There could be no better proof of that than the establishment of a meaningful and dynamic disarmament programme. BG/14/dkd (R)

### (Mr. Carasales, Argentina)

Finally, I should like once again to emphasize the absolute need to give preferential and urgent attention to the prevention of nuclear war. The question is one of great magnitude and paramount importance, and Argentina's special concern about it is well known. I shall revert to this question at another time. Today I merely wish to emphasize the fact that present international circumstances quite clearly emphasize the absolute need to undertake this task most energetically. What was obvious in the past requires immediate action today. We may all have to pay a terrible price for the time now being wasted in sterile debates.

I would not wish to complete my statement without referring to an event soon to take place - the Conference on Confidence and Security Building Measures, and Disarmament in Europe, to be held in Stockholm next January. Europe is not alone in looking to that Conference with great hopes. What happens there will have a considerable effect not only on the old world but also on other parts of the world. Its deliberations and conclusions, furthermore, may contain useful elements that could be applied in other continents. We believe it would be of great benefit if the work of that Conference could be followed, as closely as possible by officially accredited observers.

In 1984 the Committee on Disarmament will become the Conference on Disarmament. The change in name will not entail any financial or procedural changes. On the other hand, this is not merely an attempt to enhance its importance. It represents recognition of the fact that the problems which that body must solve are of vital importance, and that therefore efforts are needed at the high level appropriate to an international conference. It would undoubtedly be desirable for that change of status to go hand in hand with a change in the political will of States, so that 1984 may finally become for the Committee on Disarmament a time of positive achievements and substantial progress on the extremely important topics before it. <u>Mr. VITO</u> (Albania)(interpretation from French): Allow me, first of all, on behalf of the delegation of the People's Socialist Republic of Albania, to congratulate you, Sir, on your election as Chairman of the First Committee.

For years now, this Committee has had long discussions on the problem of disarmament, which is of vital importance because it has a direct bearing on international peace and security.

During this session also, in the debate on agenda items on disarmament, representatives of many progressive and peace-loving countries have expressed the concern of their peoples and Governments at the very tense and threatening world situation. But the delegation of the Socialist People's Republic of Albania wishes to reiterate the question which is directly linked to the substance of this problem: Are all the Governments represented in this Assembly truly concerned to an equal extent with disarmament, and what specific steps are being taken to bring it about?

The facts show that, while inside and outside the Assembly, in conferences and other forums, there are lengthy discussions on disarmament, proposals are made, resolutions and decisions are adopted, not only is no real step forward being taken, but on the contrary, the arms race is pursuing its frantic course. Material and human resources in astronomical quantities are being squandered on the production of new weapons of extermination. Moreover, expert bodies of the super-Powers are now calculating how many persons would be killed or would survive if a lightning nuclear war were declared, and how far the destructive force of weapons would extend in a long war, restricted or global. Even if their calculations are incomplete, they are sufficient to give an idea of the vast sums being spent on arms and the danger they pose to mankind. It is important to point

out that while such vast sums are being spent on destruction and death, we live in a world where in one year tens of millions of persons die of hunger and epidemic diseases and hundreds of millions of others are unemployed and live in poverty and total ignorance.

In these circumstances, we must speak openly to the peoples about the world situation; we must not gamble with their desires and hopes for genuine disarmament . and the removal of the threat of war.

The course of events show that not only is there no stability and tranquillity in the world today but on the contrary, as a result of the expansionist policy of the two super-Powers, the United States and the Soviet Union, and the aggravation of their rivalry for domination and hegemony, the international situation is very tense and dangerous.

Although there is no general conflagration, local wars have broken out in many parts of the earth. Afghanistan, Lebanon, the entire Middle East, Central America, southern Africa and others are open fronts, on which whole armies clash, equipped with artillery, tanks, aircraft and missiles, inflicting carnage, destruction, suffering and misery on the peoples. Wherever there are confrontations and bloodshed, the super-Powers participate directly or indirectly, American imperialism and Soviet social-imperialism, that is to say, world reaction. They brutally interfere in the internal affairs of other countries and instigate States and peoples to engage in fratricidal wars, exploiting them to alleviate the burden of the crisis which has them in its grip.

Even while a debate is taking place here in the United Nations on disarmament and international security, the United States of America has been carrying out its military invasion of Grenada. That act of piracy reveals the true face of United States imperialism. It is a clear expression of the gun-boat diplomacy that it

pursues towards peace-loving countries and peoples. My delegation firmly condemns this fascist act of aggression which is a flagrant violation of international law and Grenada's sovereignty and independence.

Moreover, the peoples of the world are increasingly threatened by the aggressive policy of United States imperialism, which has made interference in the internal affairs of other countries, high-handedness and diktat current practices in international affairs. It has bared its claws and built military bases in all corners of the world, and cannot repress its ambitions and expansionist aims. For the same ends the Soviet social-imperialists also are pursuing a reckless policy of preparation for and instigation of war based on military potential and the force of arms, threatening the freedom and independence of peoples.

The two imperialist super-Powers, the United States and the Soviet Union, are pursuing a more aggressive militarist course, consolidating and constantly upgrading their war machines and those of the military blocs over which they preside. Their war industries are working at full capacity and their arsenals of all sorts, including chemical, bacteriological, radiological and nuclear weapons, are constantly being increased. To this end they increase their military budgets year after year, pouring in more money, while at the same time putting constant pressures on their partners to do likewise. The many manoeuvres of the military forces of the United States, the Soviet Union and their allies, as well as the aggressive blocs of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Warsaw Treaty, are testimony to the fierce rivalry and frantic war preparations in which they are engaged.

Such manoeuvres have preceded war and aggression in the past. Behind them there lie the dangerous plans and designs which these Powers have against other countries, particularly their neighbours. It is for this reason that the danger has not diminished, even if the organizers of such manoeuvres inform the public of when they are starting, or even if the observers of other countries are invited to take part. The traffic in weapons is steadily increasing, and not only provides the super-Powers and other imperialist Powers with immense profits, but is also used as a means of expansion, diktats and military and economic pressure on other countries in order to burden the peoples with the dire consequences of the grave crisis which is now taking place.

It is more evident now than ever before that the frantic arms race in which the two super-Powers are engaged has gone beyond the boundaries of earth and has even reached into space, the militarization of which for war-like purposes is assuming alarming dimensions. Obviously, in circumstances such as these, true disarmament cannot be attained by disregarding or circumventing these realities. Although the super-Powers are, with each passing day, more and more discredited in the eyes of the peoples by their activities and their policies, the representatives of Moscow and Washington do not hesitate, even here, from the rostrum of the United Nations, to speak out and pose as ardent supporters of disarmament and to boast of their desire for peace, détente and international stability. It is not a random occurrence if, even in the work of this Assembly, the American and Soviet representatives have striven yet again to proclaim the so-called efforts which they have undertaken and the measures which their countries are ready to take for disarmament, and to advocate their proposals and counter-proposals, which succeed each other endlessly.

But their objective is the same, namely, to deceive the peoples and to nourish their illusions and vain hopes. Whenever the super-Powers wish to justify the

escalation of the arms race, they accuse each other of striving for unilateral supremacy and disrupting the equilibrium. The theory of the maintenance of balance, or the establishment of a new balance, is designed to subjugate other countries to the super-Powers and to use them as a pretext for new steps which have taken the arms race to unheard of levels. It further increases the dangers to the peoples of the world, under the threat of destructive war. The two super-Powers have loudly talked at great length of the need for a balance in Europe. In this framework, this year, there has been an endless succession of debates, replies, proposals and counter-proposals on the question of the deployment of Euromissiles. In fact, both Powers are claiming that this problem occupies a key position in relations between them and in international affairs generally.

The leaders of Washington and Moscow increasingly reiterate that they will renounce or will deploy missiles in European countries, treating those countries as if they were under their rule. Everything which is happening in the framework of their fierce rivalry and their collaboration highlights not only the intention of the two super-Powers to keep their respective zones of influence and to have Europe under their thumb by backing this up with force of arms and nuclear missiles, but also the danger of turning Europe into a battlefield. Successive proposals made by the leaders of the super-Powers have nothing to do with the reduction of their nuclear potential and conventional weapons in Europe.

Behind these proposals there lurks the bargaining which is designed to secure a new balance that will give them supremacy over the others. That is why the number of missiles to be dismantled or to be deployed, 162 or 75, is not of particular importance because, as they themselves admit, they already have enough of them to annihilate Europe. Both parties, the Americans and the Soviets, have in

practice deployed their missile systems. The question is not of destroying them, but of deploying new, more advanced missiles, in line with their strategy for world dominion.

Reality has dispelled the illusions whereby the signing of the Helsinki Charter and the Madrid meetings had removed political and military tension and peace was becoming consolidated in Europe. Europe is more unstable than ever, under the permanent military and political threat of the two imperialist super-Powers and the danger of nuclear war fostered by them.

In these circumstances, it is clear to the European peoples, that foreign troops and conventional nuclear weapons, which are increasing in number, are not there to protect the peace or to protect Europe. They are there in order to make sure that Europe is increasingly under the control of the super-Powers.

The peoples of Europe are profoundly aware of the danger posed by the presence of bases and aggressive forces of the super-Powers in Europe, and do not want to become the victims of their hegemonistic ambitions. It is evident for the peoples of Europe that neither American nor Soviet tutelage, nor the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) nor the Warsaw Treaty, can guarantee their freedom and independence, but, rather, it is their resolute opposition, the dismantling of military bases, and the destruction of all the political and economic chains by which Washington and Moscow have bound them, that can achieve that aim.

Comrade Enver Hoxha, the leader of the Albanian people, has said:

"Peace and security in Europe, in the Mediterranean or the Middle East, the development and prosperity of the European States, the defence of their culture, their traditions and their civilization, cannot be guaranteed and strengthened unless we oppose the hegemonistic policy of American imperialism and Soviet social imperialism, unless we give them no chance to exploit the political and economic links which exist with them to strike and attack other

countries, and to endanger the freedom and independence of peoples and international peace and security."

The Albanian people and the Socialist People's Republic of Albania have constantly condemned the aggressive and militaristic policy of the super-Powers and the other reactionary forces. We have unmasked war preparations and warlike planning. We are of the view that if we do not resolutely oppose this policy, we cannot hope for concrete results in the field of disarmament, because the super-Powers have created a monopoly over nuclear weapons and supremacy in conventional weapons, not to disarm but in order to establish their hegemony over the world and dominate the peoples. Their demagogy has not changed and does not change the strategy of the United States and the Soviet Union, nor their rivalry or counter-revolutionary collaboration.

Neither agreements, nor accommodations, nor bipartite talks, nor covert or overt plans, none of these can resolve the grave problems of disarmament, since they do not express the will of the peoples.

Nobody can attach any faith to the proposals and agreements of the super-Powers on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, on earth or in outer space, because they cannot have any character other than that given to them by the policies and aggressive strategies of those Powers. We therefore believe that even the proposals for the establishment of denuclearized zones, no matter how worthy the intentions of their sponsors, cannot have any practical effect, either for the security of the peoples and countries of the zones, or for the international community as a whole, because it is the imperialist super-Powers which are the ones that actually possess nuclear weapons. AW/ed/ap (R)

(Mr. Vito, Albania)

In conclusion, I wish to emphasize yet again that the Socialist People's Republic of Albania, and the Albanian people, continue to favour the measures leading to genuine and effective disarmament. Like all the peoples of the world, they are determined adversaries of imperialist war. In order to stay the hand of the imperialist warmongers, it is above all essential that the sovereign countries and peoples renew their vigilance and decisively oppose the aggressive hegemonistic and expansionist policy of American imperialism and Soviet social imperialism and all reactionary forces which are in their service. Only in this way can true disarmament be achieved. <u>Mr. WEEDY</u> (Afghanistan): Allow me at the outset to congratulate you, Mr. Chairman, on your election to preside over this important Committee. Your diplomatic skill gives us every reason to believe that the outcome of the current session will be successful. I should also like to take this opportunity to congratulate the other officers of the Committee on their election.

This year again the First Committee is taking up its work in an atmosphere gravely menacing to peace and security. The aggressive policies of the United States Government have endangered the peace and security of various parts of the world.

The United States Government, in complete disregard of all the norms of international law, has invaded Grenada. The persecution of the people of that country is continuing. This brazen act of piracy has added to the already tense situation in the Caribbean and in Central America. This premeditated invasion, which is reminiscent of the colonial era, is another chapter in the already long list of acts of aggression by the United States in the region. We condemn that aggression in the strongest terms. The presence of a large American naval force under the pretext of military manoeuvres threatens the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Latin American countries. The shameful war of aggression waged by United States imperialism against the heroic people of Nicaragua is a source of major concern and constitutes a grave impediment to peace and security.

The United States Government is doing its utmost to deploy its forces around the world under the cover of any possible pretext. It is spreading its military forces and deploying its naval forces in the vital regions of the world. This policy of super-armament and consistent confrontation has negative repercussions, especially in the nuclear age. It is the threat of nuclear war which has endangered the very existence of mankind and the perhaps even the existence of any form of life on our planet.

# (Mr. Weedy, Afghanistan)

One after another new generations of nuclear weapons are invented and perfected. These new systems, which have on the one hand greater destructive capacity and on the other extreme accuracy and speed, will destabilize the existing parity and whip up the arms race to a faster pace. A great part of modern scientific and industrial resources is squandered to create additional means of destruction. This is being done at a time when the existing nuclear arsenals are more than enough to destroy our planet several times over.

In addition to the large arsenals of the great Powers, the small countries, one after the other, are gradually acquiring nuclear weapons. Despite the fact that their destructive capacity and their means of delivery are relatively limited, they constitute a great danger to their neighbours. Among these newly emerging nucleear Powers, Israel and South Africa, which are in collusion with each other, pose a great danger to the security of the Middle East and Africa respectively.

The survival of mankind is threatened by the ever-increasing stockpiles of nuclear weapons and the possibility of a nuclear war. The most vital questions before humanity are those of the prevention of nuclear war, the cessation of the nuclear arms race and the promotion of disarmament.

As regards the prevention of nuclear war, we believe that commitment to the non-first-use of nuclear weapons is a realistic approach and can play an effective role. In this regard the unilateral commitment of the Soviet Union, proclaimed in 1982, is of great importance. It is a matter for great regret that other nuclear Powers have failed to follow the Soviet Union's example in this respect. We note with great concern the attitude of the proponents of the doctrines of nuclear deterrence, limited nuclear war, protracted nuclear war and so on. These doctrines, which consider a nuclear war inevitable, create an unprecedented danger to the survival of mankind. It is an accepted fact that a nuclear war will not remain limited and that there will be no winner in such a war. It is our hope that

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## (Mr. Weedy, Afghanistan)

the proponents of these inhuman doctrines will realize the danger inherent in them. My delegation attaches great importance to the prevention of an arms race in outer space. In this regard we condemn the United States plans to deploy the so-called anti-missile defence system in outer space, which will open up a new arena for the arms race and gravely endanger world peace and security. This new system, which is directed at further improving the offensive forces of the United States, will enable it to refine further its ability to deliver a first nuclear strike, an objective towards which it has long been working. Those plans to use outer space as a launching area for the domination of the world pose a grave danger to the survival of mankind and will cause a spiralling arms race in this new frontier.

The arms race is not confined to the great Powers alone. Small countries are pressured by imperialist Powers or forced by circumstances to spend large amounts of their meagre resources in acquiring modern weapons. The arms race has crippled the economies of a number of developing countries which need the resources spent on armaments for use in combating their age-old social and economic backwardness.

It is a matter for great regret that the imperialist forces have dragged the reactionary régimes in our region into unbridled militarization. While colossal amounts of natural and human resources are wasted on the arms race in its various aspects, a number of people in the third world are confronted with hunger, famine, malnutrition, disease and illiteracy. There is a great need to stop spending on the means of destruction and start diverting the resources released to meeting the most urgent needs of the peoples of the world.

The Democratic Republic of Afghanistan is a staunch supporter of disarmament, in both its nuclear and its conventional form. With regard to nuclear disarmament, we believe that the first step should be initiated by putting an immediate freeze

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# (Mr. Weedy, Afghanistan)

on the production of new types of nuclear weapons. That action should be followed by the gradual reduction of nuclear arsenals and, possibly, the ultimate destruction of all nuclear weapons.

We support the prevention of the use or the stockpiling of chemical weapons. This is a matter of great importance, especially in the light of the latest efforts of the United States Administration to acquire new types of lethal binary chemical weapons. The horror and carnage caused by the use of chemical weapons by the United States forces in South-East Asia are a vivid example of the destructive and indiscriminate effects of those weapons. The United States Government, in order to justify the acquisition of new types of chemical binary weapons, has long been fabricating insinuations about the so-called use of those weapons in South-East Asia and in Afghanistan. Those malicious fabrications have been refuted on various occasions. My delegation will speak further on this question when the Committee begins its consideration of chemical weapons. We support the conclusion of a convention on chemical weapons.

As a hinterland State of the Indian Ocean, my country attaches great importance to the realization of the concept of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace. We believe that all foreign military bases should be dismantled in order to safeguard the peace and security of that region.

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#### (Mr. Weedy, Afghanistan)

Deliberate attempts by certain delegations to consider the events of December 1979 in Afghanistan as a turning point in the process of détente are completely false and contrary to reality. A glance at the history of 1979 shows ample reason to refute these claims. In order to refresh the memories of members of the Committee I would recite some of the events which took place prior to December 1979.

In 1979 the member countries of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, under pressure from the United States, drastically increased that organization's military budget; the negotiations between the United States Government and the Soviet Union on the Indian Ocean were suspended; the United Kingdom and the United States suspended their trilateral negotiations with the Soviet Union; the United States Government deployed its rapid interventionist forces in our region; the naval forces of the United States made their presence felt in the Persian Gulf; the establishment of new military bases was negotiated with the countries of the Middle East; plans to expand the military facilities of Diego Garcia were undertaken. To this list could be added the failure of the United States Government to ratify the SALT II agreement. These are a few of the actions perpetrated by the imperialist forces against peace and détente. Imperialists can always find a pretext for escalating tension and launching a spiral of the arms race.

It is high time to heed the demands of humanity, which has put the securing of peace and the prevention of a nuclear war as its main objective. To this end, the peace movement, active both last year and this year, is of great importance.

My delegation, for its part, will continue to support measures which will make the achievement of peace and disarmament a reality. <u>Mr. FIELDS</u> (United States of America): As this is the first time I have spoken during the current session, Sir, allow me to add an expression of my personal pleasure at seeing you in the Chair to that expressed by Ambassador Adelman in his introductory remarks on behalf of the United States. May I also extend our congratulations to the other officers of the Committee. We look forward to a fruitful association with them during this current session.

In his statement of 25 October, the representative of the Soviet Union dealt with the issue of chemical weapons and a number of other topics. Today I should like to put forward the views of the United States regarding the prohibition of chemical weapons. I may return to other topics at a later time.

First of all let me say that we can certainly agree with the Soviet representative that in concentrating our efforts on reducing nuclear weapons we should not disregard the danger stemming from chemical weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. The use of chemical weapons has long been viewed with revulsion by the Government and people of the United States, and indeed by all civilized nations of the world. The fundamental objective of United States policy in this area is to ensure that chemical weapons are never used. The most effective way to achieve this objective would be through a complete, effective and verifiable prohibition of chemical weapons, including the destruction of existing stockpiles and production facilities.

Regrettably, for reasons I shall develop later, such a prohibition has thus far eluded us. In these circumstances we cannot ignore the fact that the Soviet Union possesses a formidable chemical-weapon capability; therefore, until an acceptable agreement is achieved, the United States must, unfortunately, possess a credible chemical-weapon capability to maintain a stable balance and thereby deter a chemical attack.

The United States naturally must assess its needs in the field of chemical weapons in the light of what has happened in years past. For a long period the

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# (Mr. Fields, United States)

United States - in contrast to the Soviet Union - has refrained from steadily improving its chemical-weapon capability. Since 1969 the United States has not produced a single chemical weapon. In fact, large quantities of these munitions have been destroyed and are being destroyed. To our profound regret, the Soviet Union has not matched our unilateral action with similar restraint.

We therefore have no alternative but to take limited steps to modernize our chemical-weapon capability, but we are continuing to exercise restraint. We will not seek to match the excessive stockpiles of the Soviet Union. Indeed, the United States stockpile will continue to decrease even under the modernization plan. We will not build a massive chemical warfare military organization on the Soviet model, nor do we plan to deploy additional stocks on the territory of other States. What we earnestly desire, as President Reagan has said, is the final elimination of these weapons once and for all.

The Soviet representative spoke as if the Soviet Union did not produce chemical weapons, did not store them in Eastern Europe or elsewhere outside its own territory and even as though the Soviet Union had no chemical-weapon programme at all. Does the Soviet representative believe that the secrecy which shrouds Soviet military programmes enables him to persuade the world community that Soviet stockpiles are old, obsolete and deteriorated, and stored in caves in the deep interior regions of the Soviet Union?

The Soviet representative chose to characterize the efforts of my Government in seeking a chemical-weapon ban as less than serious. He has even characterized the United States-sponsored workshop on the verification of destruction of chemical-weapon stockpiles as an ostentatious activity. In reference to our verification position he has also accused us of setting up artificial barriers to progress and as deliberately demanding unacceptable verification to cover our reluctance to eliminate chemical weapons.

## (Mr. Fields, United States)

These charges are patently untrue and the Soviet representative should know that they are. He must certainly be aware of the serious effort put forth by the United States in negotiating a ban on chemical weapons in the Committee on Disarmament during its 1983 session. The facts speak for themselves and no amount of misrepresentation or distortion can change them one iota.

The United States commitment to the objective of a chemical-weapon ban is a long-standing one. It has been affirmed at the highest level of the United States Government. Vice-President Bush, when he spoke to the Committee on Disarmament last February, urged the acceleration of the efforts towards the achievement of a complete, effective and verifiable ban on the development, production, stockpiling and transfer of chemical weapons. Shortly thereafter, the United States introduced a comprehensive document containing our detailed views on the contents of such a chemical-weapon ban. The document was welcomed in the Committee on Disarmament as a major contribution to its work in this area.

To ensure that our views were understood we sought out various interested delegations to clarify our position and expand on the technical details. We followed these informal consultations with a more formal series of question-andanswer sessions. These sessions also were well received and appeared to be useful and constructive. Later we introduced a major paper focussing on the verification of stockpile destruction. The paper, which took into account specific concerns raised by the Soviet Union, was designed to facilitate resolution of key verification issues. At the same time we brought in experts from the United States to extend the dialogue on our papers. Interested delegations participated in intensive discussions with our experts on all facets of the work in those papers.

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## (Mr. Fields, United States)

Realizing that there is no better demonstration of our approach to the verification of stockpile destruction than demonstration at the site itself, we invited our colleagues in the Committee on Disarmament, together with representatives of observer States, to the United States chemical weapons destruction facility in Tooele, Utah. Far from being an "ostentatious activity", as the Soviet representative alleges, the workshop is a serious effort to assist progress towards the prohibition of chemical weapons. It will provide an opportunity for a more detailed examination of the process of stockpile destruction and of possible procedures for monitoring compliance relevant to provisions in a chemical weapons ban. It is our hope that it will expedite the resolution of problems in the verification area by promoting clearer understanding of their technical dimensions and graphically presenting workable solutions to them. We are indeed gratified that more than 30 States have accepted our invitation.

Moreover it has been inferred that we have engaged in discussions of "secondary technical details". Let me assure the Committee that the technical details relating to verification are not secondary; they are primary. This is not a United States view alone, but a widely held opinion, an opinion held by the majority of our colleagues in the Committee on Disarmament. Vague generalities, detours into meaningless abstractions or hollow artifices will solve none of these complex issues. Only realism, efforts in good faith and determined political will can do the trick.

The Soviet Union maintains that the United States has hardened its position on verification. In developing its position the United States cannot act and certainly has not acted in a vacuum. Thus, for example, as regards our attitude towards the Soviet position on voluntary inspections, we could not but take into account the total lack of co-operation by some States with the United Nations experts who, under a mandate from the General Assembly, investigated reports of chemical weapons in South-East Asia and other areas.

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## (Mr. Fields, United States)

The Soviet representative recalled the Warsaw Pact proposal for a regional prohibition of chemical weapons, a so-called chemical-weapon-free zone for Europe. The problems with this approach were described by the representative of the Federal Republic of Germany to the Committee on Disarmament in his February 1983 statement in the Committee. This proposal addresses only a part of the world-wide concern over these terrible weapons. In any event, if the proposed arrangement were to be effective it would have to include verification measures very similar to those required for an adequately verifiable general prohibition of chemical weapons. In fact, such measures would have to deal with an additional problem, namely, the ease and promptness with which a nearby State possessing chemical weapons could reintroduce them into the proposed zone. As to the Soviet proposal for freezing the production and deployment of chemical weapons, such a freeze would also require verification measures more complex and extensive than those needed for a complete prohibition of chemical weapons. In short, rather than being in favour of interim measures designed, as the Soviet representative has maintained, to expedite negotiations on such a prohibition, these proposals would have precisely the opposite effect. Our efforts should continue to be devoted to our fundamental objective of achieving a complete prohibition of chemical weapons.

Reference was made to the bilateral negotiations on banning chemical weapons conducted between the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics for three years, ending in the summer of 1980. We believe that all nations, large and small, have a stake in these negotiations. I think it is fair to say also that my Government is convinced that a multilateral forum offers the best chance and hope of concluding a ban on chemical weapons at this time.

We cite these items of concrete evidence of our efforts to achieve a chemical weapons ban not to exaggerate our role in the negotiation or minimize the many

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### (Mr. Fields, United States)

contributions of others delegations, but to set the record straight and to challenge others to join in a constructive undertaking in the Committee on Disarmament to produce a chemical weapons ban in which the world community can put its confidence and so that we can all rest easier in the knowledge that these odious weapons will never again threaten people.

We have sought to chart a course in these negotiations towards that end. Our invitation to Tooele is intended to be an aid in navigating that course towards the port which we are all trying to reach. I wish not to engage in rhetoric, but to challenge those that question our sincerity and determination to demonstrate their interest in the achievement of an effective and verifiable ban on chemical weapons by responsible behaviour and efforts in good faith at the negotiation table. If that challenge is accepted, we can surely reach the objective on which, I hope, we can all agree.

<u>Mr. VIDAL</u> (Dominican Republic) (interpretation from Spanish): May I congratulate you, Sir, on your election to the post of Chairman of this First Committee at the thirty-eighth session of the General Assembly, as well as on the effective manner in which you have been presiding over the work of the Committee. The delegation of the Dominican Republic is certain that with your diplomatic skill you will ensure that the items assigned to the First Committee will be handled with the wisdom, equanimity and effectiveness which, because of their importance, they merit.

I should like also to extend my delegation's congratulations to the other officers of the Committee.

The continuing deterioration in the international situation brings the objectives of the United Nations into sharp focus. The establishment of peace and the replacement of the arms build-up by a system of collective international

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security guaranteed by the United Nations Charter is something that seems ever further from everyday reality despite the fact that those that are part of this reality advocate and proclaim constantly and by every means available to them their readiness to apply the principles that will bring about peace and nuclear and conventional disarmament, as well as the pressing need to establish a system of education for peace at every level of human conduct.

The efforts made by the General Assembly to create and enhance awareness of the peoples and Governments of the world regarding the dangers of the arms race and arms build-up have produced concrete effects which are reflected quite clearly in the thinking of modern man. In this connection, we support the World Disarmament Campaign and believe that it follows the guidelines established by the General Assembly at the second special session on disarmament. Also, the celebration of Disarmament Week is another manifestation of the efforts to increase the awareness of mankind, which is frustrated and feels powerless in the face of the threat of its own destruction.

Humankind is beginning to think in terms of the future possibility of the destruction of the human race and is quite legitimately reacting with anguish to the situation which is beyond its control and outside its will and is determined to devote its energies and intellect to the development of new and better methods of coexistence.

The world, its various forms of life and the work of 4.5 billion years of life are hostage to the possibility of nuclear destruction. All of us are thus held hostage and, therefore, depending on how effectively we can handle nuclear disarmament, we will be taking the path of human survival or destruction. Every minute that we live may well be the last. Human civilization deserves an opportunity to live out its time, to exist in a world to which it is entitled by right. We have the responsibility to guarantee for future generations the enjoyment of the growth of human civilization, of scientific, artistic and technological achievements free from the threat of self-destruction. At present we have barely managed to avoid that insane course towards self-destruction, and we continue to be the prisoners of this machinery of death. Unfortunately, we cannot delegate this responsibility to future generations.

As has well been stated in this Committee's debates, the role of the United Nations to achieve understanding in the field of disarmament cannot be a mediocre one; that is a luxury which we cannot afford. It must be active, effective and swift, so that it will succeed in achieving that which neither a single individual, a single State or a single Government can achieve by itself, namely, to stop the spiralling arms race.

General and complete disarmament cannot be limited to the question of extermination by nuclear or conventional weapons. We must continue to educate for peace. Governments must adjust their conduct to a new era of interdependence in international relations based on peace and freedom from war and its tragic consequences. It is necessary to take concrete steps to prohibit nuclear weapons and achieve adherence to the provisions of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

The highest priority must be the conclusion of a treaty on the general and complete prohibition of nuclear testing. Clearly a delay in the conclusion of that treaty cannot be justified. Its adoption would help guarantee the continuation of scientific and technical progress instead of hindering it. Negotiations designed to achieve a complete freeze on the research, development and production of nuclear weapons and the gradual reduction of nuclear arsenals until their complete and total destruction should not be confined to any specific forum; rather, they should be conducted in, and be an integral part of, all those deliberations in which the future of mankind is being considered. There is no such thing as a duplication of effort, since we believe that participation in, reference to and discussion of this question, wherever they may take place, are not only recommended and necessary but in fact also essential to the very survival of mankind.

It is regrettable that multilateral negotiations on nuclear disarmament have not yet begun, since they are the most effective means and offer the best guarantee of ensuring that the position of all the parties concerned will be considered. States continue to submit to the process of multilateral negotiations a large number of initiatives and conflicts. Yet nuclear disarmament has been left out of multilateral negotiations, despite the fact that this is a matter that involves the priority interest of all States since it affects their very existence.

The spread of the arms race to outer space is already prohibited by the universally accepted principle of the peaceful use of outer space. Not only is outer space a weapon-free zone, as stated in the Treaty on principles governing the activities of States in the exploration and use of outer space, but furthermore any attempt to use outer space other than for the benefit of mankind would run counter to the provisions of that international instrument.

On that basis we support the start of negotiations for the conclusion of agreements and new treaties whereby the international community will adopt specific guidelines worked out on the basic principle that, as in the case of the sea-bed, outer space is also the common heritage of mankind.

The Dominican Republic has always supported all initiatives designed to achieve disarmament that have emerged from this Committee. We have supported all those aimed at the conclusion of treaties to limit the arms build-up, the prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests, the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons, and the prevention of nuclear war.

As a developing country, we attach importance to the links between the arms build-up and development. Thus, we welcome with satisfaction the establishment of a Disarmament Fund for Development. We hope that this novel idea will halt the growing arms budgets at present being adopted by many Governments.

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The budget of the Dominican armed forces was prepared to take care of essential needs. Our national budget grants priority to the provision of measures of social assistance and industrial and agricultural development, in compliance with the provisions of resolution 37/95 B of 13 December 1982 on the reduction of military budgets.

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The Government of the Dominican Republic is in an excellent position to co-operate with the group of qualified experts envisaged by the resolution I have mentioned, and to take part in the technical work of preparing an index of prices and purchasing-power parities with regard to military expenditures. My country will co-operate fully and scrupulously in efforts to achieve the objectives of resolution 37/95 B. The Government of the Dominican Republic supports all efforts to establish a fair and rational plan for the limitation of the military budgets of Member States.

The success of the United Nations World Disarmament Campaign is directly related to the effective functioning of the executive organ of this world Organization. To the extent that States invest their confidence in, support and comply in every respect with the decisions of the Security Council, it will be possible to replace the arms built up by a system of international collective security. If it were not necessary to incur exorbitant military expenditure for defence because of the effective functioning of collective security through respect for the United Nations Charter, it would be possible to make the greatest contribution to the development of mankind. Not only would we open the way to a better future world, but with the redirection of these energies towards scientific and technological progress an improvement of the quality of human life would inevitably follow.

If the protection of the national sovereignty of each one of the Member States were no longer within its exclusive competence, and if its defence truly and effectively became a legal obligation of the international community as a whole, disarmament would immediately begin to become a reality. It is necessary to offer an effective alternative, tested by States, before it is adopted as a valid means

of defending their national sovereignty. The first step is faithful adherence to and compliance with the decisions of the Security Council by all the Member States, as is mandatory because of the legal nature of those decisions. Collective security, as an alternative to the arms build-up, is established in the United Nations Charter as a viable institutional structure. However, as long as there are obstacles to its application disarmament will continue to be merely an aspiration, a desperate appeal to the United Nations.

We noted with satisfaction the statements made during the general debate in the General Assembly and the general debate in the First Committee by delegations which have put forward new initiatives for the conclusion of agreements and treaties in the sphere of the limitation of armaments and of disarmament. All the nations of the world must direct all their energies towards general and complete disarmament.

## The meeting rose at 6.15 p.m.