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Chairman: Mr. Ashe (Antigua and Barbuda)
Acting Chairman of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions: Mr. Saha

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The meeting was called to order at 10 a.m.

Agenda item 124: Proposed programme budget for the biennium 2006-2007 (continued)

Strengthened and unified security management system for the United Nations (A/60/7/Add.9, A/60/291 and Add.1, A/60/317 and Corr.1 and A/60/424)

1. **Mr. Veness** (Under-Secretary-General for Safety and Security), introducing the report of the Secretary-General on a strengthened and unified security management system for the United Nations (A/60/424), said that the primary responsibility for ensuring the safety and security of United Nations staff and premises lay with host countries. However, in certain countries, the Organization itself had to shoulder part of that burden in order to mitigate risks to its staff, particularly the persistent threat posed by elements of international terrorist groups that openly identified the United Nations as a target. While the Department of Safety and Security did not hunt terrorists or other criminals, it must work closely with host Governments to gain sufficient awareness and understanding of all material threats to the Organization.

2. The need for an enhanced and cohesive security management system had been apparent for some years and, as of September 2001, had become critical. However, there had been dramatic developments in technical security activity and expertise at the global level since that time, and the United Nations, which had been left behind by those advances, must now take rapid steps to modernize its outdated security operation to ensure the continued implementation of its mandates. The Department was therefore working vigorously to identify and resolve shortcomings in its security systems, particularly where such improvements would have immediate life-saving implications.

3. The Department's priorities for the biennium 2006-2007 were Headquarters safety and security, regional operations coordination and field support. It was seeking to create a world-class, flexible and effective security service, composed of a geographically representative team of outstanding security professionals and capable of enhanced field support in the most challenging environments. Since the work of the Department was potentially sensitive

and could be counterproductive if misunderstood, it welcomed the guidance of the General Assembly contained in, inter alia, its resolution 59/276. Efforts to implement that resolution had been under way since January 2005 and could be grouped into three main areas, namely, operational effectiveness, integration and expansion.

4. Maximum reliance on host Governments was central to operational effectiveness, since their capacity to deal with perceived threats and risks to United Nations activities was an essential consideration when preparing threat and risk assessments and the related security plans. The decentralized framework of designated officials and security management teams in the field was one of the operational strengths of the system, which was being extended by the appointment of designated officials at duty stations where the threat to the Organization might previously have been less obvious. Host Governments had welcomed that initiative, particularly in view of the advantages of having a single point of contact for United Nations security matters.

5. Although progress had been made on many fronts since January 2005, gaps still remained. In order to enhance the quality of security management, an accurate analysis of the prevailing situation was essential. Therefore, taking into account the guidance contained in General Assembly resolution 59/276, the Department was reviewing the way in which it carried out threat and risk assessments. In future, pertinent information would be gathered from host Governments, open sources and United Nations personnel and fed into a continuous and objective analytical process. As a result, security measures would become increasingly cost-effective, country- or activity-specific, would be calibrated to the threat and to host Government capabilities and would focus on the safety of United Nations personnel and their dependants. The Department was also addressing shortcomings in technical security procedures, training and compliance tools. It was currently reviewing security phases and would shortly begin considering the safety dimension of its mandate, as well as the complex human resources management questions associated with recruitment.

6. In the area of integration, the Department had been cooperating with the Department of Peacekeeping Operations with a view to introducing a unified security management system for all civilian personnel.

Through the Inter-agency Security Management Network, it had continued to work closely with United Nations agencies, programmes and funds. The Network had developed a robust security management accountability framework, which had been submitted to the High-Level Committee on Management in early October 2005. In order to ensure the safety and security of offices away from Headquarters, the Department was liaising with the relevant directors-general and executive secretaries.

7. In the immediate future, the Department would be focusing on upgrading all aspects of physical security at Secretariat facilities worldwide. Needs at Headquarters were being addressed as expeditiously as possible in accordance with the provisions of General Assembly resolution 56/286 and the Department fully endorsed the essential steps taken to enhance the security of delegates and staff members through the implementation of an improved access control system. The so-called “global access control” project would address physical protection measures at offices away from Headquarters and, in accordance with the provisions of resolution 59/276 and the subsequent deliberations of the Fifth Committee, the Department would be submitting a report on that issue at the Assembly’s resumed session. The Department’s objective was to strengthen security as quickly as possible while ensuring that available funds were used to address essential needs ahead of recommended requirements.

8. As a result of its cooperation with the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and offices away from Headquarters, the Department of Safety and Security had been able to use security resources systematically in response to the stream of humanitarian crises and higher-risk operations that had characterized 2005. Significant resources had been allocated to meet security needs in high-risk areas such as Iraq, Afghanistan and the Sudan, and the Department was committed to keeping those situations under review in order to achieve a balance between threat and response levels.

9. In order to expand and improve its operations, the Department needed to recruit new staff. Over the preceding six months, more than 6,000 applications had been screened and hundreds of interviews had been conducted. In order to meet short-term needs, early availability and certain technical skills had been accorded primary importance in the selection process.

However, wide geographical representation was one of the most significant comparative advantages of the United Nations, as well as a potential asset for security professionals. Much remained to be done to ensure that the Department of Safety and Security was staffed by a full-time, professional workforce that fulfilled more appropriate geographical, age and gender criteria. To that end, the Department’s newly appointed Executive Officer had been asked to urgently assess the current situation, diagnose any shortcomings in the current recruitment process and recommend remedial actions.

10. The previous year had been particularly challenging for the Department, which had been called upon to provide security support to numerous field operations and to the largest gathering of world leaders in history. One of its staff members had also been killed in a terrorist attack in Somalia. Consultations had been vital to its work, and priority attention had been given to the involvement of staff associations and unions. The expert advice and practical support of Member States had also been invaluable and further efforts would be made to deepen and strengthen links with them. The Department’s ultimate objective was to prioritize service delivery in the field and to ensure that host Governments, designated officials, programme managers and world-class security personnel worked together to create a secure environment in which the Organization could implement its mandates.

11. **Mr. Fareed** (Director of the Secretariat of the United Nations System Chief Executives Board for Coordination), introducing the report of the Secretary-General on coverage of staff by the malicious acts insurance policy and on security spending by organizations of the United Nations system (A/60/317 and Corr.1), said that the report had been submitted pursuant to paragraphs 43 and 55 of section XI of General Assembly resolution 59/276. The steps taken to obtain a more complete understanding of the overall coverage of United Nations staff under the malicious acts insurance policy were described in section II of the report. While the data collection process had been difficult on account of time constraints, the overall results of the consultations had been positive. The United Nations System Chief Executives Board for Coordination would continue working to ensure that all staff members were covered by the policy, but any expansion of coverage might have financial implications.

12. In March 2005, a survey had been launched in order to obtain a clearer picture of security spending by each organization of the United Nations system. Given that the organizations of the system currently utilized different budgeting and accounting systems for tracking security-related expenditure, it had been necessary to establish a common accounting framework for reporting such expenditure. Paragraphs 7 and 8 of the report detailed the steps that had been taken to that end. The results of the survey had shown that security spending had increased significantly during the reporting period. The Board intended to develop a better understanding of the breakdown of security-related expenditure and would be conducting a further survey for that purpose.

13. The work undertaken in both the areas covered by the report was ongoing and further information would be provided to the Committee once a more comprehensive strategy had been developed. The Board was also proposing to initiate steps to establish, on a system-wide basis, a standardized accounting and budgeting framework for security-related expenditure.

14. **Ms. Azarias** (Director of Internal Audit Division I of the Office of Internal Oversight Services), introducing the report of the Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) on the utilization and management of funds approved by the General Assembly in its resolutions 58/295 and 59/276 for strengthening the security and safety of United Nations premises (A/60/291), said that OIOS had conducted an audit of security and safety projects at Headquarters and at the United Nations Office at Geneva with a view to determining whether the resources approved by the Assembly in its resolutions 58/295 and 59/276 had been used as intended and had been managed efficiently and effectively in compliance with established procedures. The report before the Committee provided updated information on the implementation status of the projects mentioned in the previous report of OIOS (A/59/396) and also reviewed the progress of new projects.

15. Of a total of 18 projects at Headquarters, 7 had been fully implemented, 3 had been deferred with a view to their incorporation into the capital master plan and 8 were currently under implementation with a completion target date of 31 December 2005. Of those 8 projects, 1 was proceeding satisfactorily, 1 had been delayed and subsequently interrupted because the relevant contract had expired, and the remaining 6 had

been combined into one contract, entitled "security strengthening project at United Nations Headquarters", which was currently being executed by a private contractor. That contract was now at least six months behind schedule and had incurred additional costs of almost \$2.6 million. The contractor had submitted a claim for compensation and had requested an eight-month contract extension to complete the construction work by February 2006.

16. While project implementation in Geneva was progressing well, the initial objectives and time lines had proven too ambitious. However, Geneva's decision to prioritize projects and to focus on a number of activities commensurate with its capacity had yielded positive results. Nevertheless, project management must be strengthened at the United Nations Office at Geneva. In particular, the draft security plan must be approved as soon as possible to confirm the assessment of the necessary security level and ensure that accountability was appropriately assigned. OIOS had found that the Office at Geneva had complied with United Nations procurement procedures in all but one case. However, its contracts with suppliers contained no penalty clauses and the consortium had failed to enter into a formal commitment to complete the projects within certain costs and time lines.

17. The report of OIOS contained eight recommendations calling for improvements in a number of areas. In general, management had accepted those recommendations and OIOS would continue to monitor their implementation.

18. When finalizing reports, OIOS provided programme managers with ample opportunity to comment on its findings and recommendations and incorporated any comments received into the report itself. However, OIOS was concerned that the comments provided by management during the finalization of its reports differed from those reflected in the Secretary-General's response. The report contained in A/60/291/Add.1 was a case in point and OIOS would be taking the matter up with management as a matter of urgency.

19. **Mr. Belov** (Programme Planning and Budget Division of the Office of Programme Planning, Budget and Accounts), introducing the note by the Secretary-General containing his comments on the report of OIOS (A/60/291/Add.1), said that the note had been submitted in accordance with paragraph 3 of General

Assembly resolution 59/272 and contained supplementary comments on some of the findings and recommendations of OIOS where considered necessary for further clarification. He agreed that the process of finalizing the report of OIOS needed to be refined and stood ready to work together with the Office to that end.

20. **Mr. Saha** (Acting Chairman of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions), introducing the related report of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (ACABQ) (A/60/7/Add.9), said that the Advisory Committee viewed document A/60/424 as an interim report, since it fell short of meeting all the requirements of the requested implementation report. Although the security management system was still evolving and undergoing change, a comprehensive report should be submitted once the Department of Safety and Security had become fully operational, which should occur in the coming months.

21. The Advisory Committee had received considerable information on the difficulties experienced by the Department of Safety and Security in the area of personnel matters, some of which echoed the concerns expressed by the Advisory Committee in its first report on the proposed programme budget for the biennium 2006-2007 (A/60/7). The Advisory Committee had been informed that the matter was now in hand and trusted that the recruitment process would be completed expeditiously.

22. The results of the review of the level of the post of the Deputy to the Under-Secretary-General should be included in the comprehensive implementation report, and a review of the post of the head of the Division of Safety and Security Services should also be conducted in that context. The implementation report should also contain information on the revised security management accountability framework as well as on the review of all existing host country agreements.

23. The Advisory Committee had taken note of the information provided in document A/60/317 and Corr.1, and paragraph 17 of its report raised a number of additional questions. In particular, it had requested that information on why some co-located organizations with seemingly similar security concerns had significantly different security expenditure patterns should be provided to the Fifth Committee.

24. **Ms. Galvez** (United Kingdom), speaking on behalf of the European Union; the acceding countries Bulgaria and Romania; the candidate countries Croatia and Turkey; the stabilization and association process countries Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia and Montenegro and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia; and, in addition, the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine, said that the establishment of a new structure to ensure that safety and security were managed in a coherent, consistent and effective manner in the United Nations was a priority for the European Union. The Organization could only deliver its programmes in the field swiftly and effectively when risks to United Nations personnel were adequately managed. The Under-Secretary-General for Safety and Security and his team were to be commended for their achievements in bringing the new Department into being, including the recruitment of a large number of staff in a relatively short period of time. The European Union looked forward to receiving a comprehensive report on the implementation of General Assembly resolution 59/276 at the Assembly's sixty-first session. It would also expect to take up at that time the issues of malicious acts insurance and security spending by organizations of the United Nations system, since it was clear from the relevant report (A/60/317) that more work was required before those matters could be considered by the Committee.

25. The European Union welcomed the level of cooperation between the new Department of Safety and Security and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations. Given the size and complexity of the missions managed by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, it was reassuring that arrangements were in place to ensure both a clear line of command and coordination in the field. In that connection, the Secretariat should brief troop-contributing countries about the mechanisms for coordination between the two departments. Furthermore, it should indicate whether there was a similar spirit of cooperation with all the agencies, funds and programmes with which the Department of Safety and Security worked in the field. The European Union would also welcome further information on the status of the revised United Nations security management accountability framework, which should be completed as soon as possible. In addition, it wished to receive an update on the implementation of the recommendations of OIOS contained in document A/59/702.

26. The European Union looked forward to the swift assessment by the Department of Safety and Security of the most urgent amendments required to host country agreements and trusted that the negotiation of memorandums of understanding to stand alongside those agreements where necessary would not be too time-consuming.

27. With regard to the report of OIOS on the utilization and management of funds approved for strengthening the security and safety of United Nations premises (A/60/291), the European Union remained concerned about the slow rate of disbursement and the lack of progress in implementing the relevant projects. It noted, in particular, the delays and cost escalations in New York and the likelihood that, in Geneva, some \$6.4 million of appropriated funds might remain unexpended by the end of the biennium 2004-2005 owing to delays in strengthening project management capacity. It was alarmed to see that the contracts concluded by the Organization contained no penalty clauses for non-compliance. It expected the Secretariat, when considering security and safety strengthening projects, to take account of the capital master plan.

28. Lastly, she noted that the report requested by the General Assembly on information and communication technology security, business continuity and disaster recovery had yet to be completed. In preparing its proposals, the Secretariat should focus on strategy and contingency planning, rather than on requests for new posts, since systems administrators should already be in place.

29. **Ms. Taylor Roberts** (Jamaica), speaking on behalf of the Group of 77 and China, said that the Group acknowledged the efforts of the Under-Secretary-General for Safety and Security and his Department to create a strengthened and unified security management system for the United Nations. While that task was formidable, it was of vital importance for ensuring the safety and security of all United Nations personnel, operations and premises.

30. Member States had emphasized the need for a comprehensive approach to the issue of safety and security. Yet, the report before the Committee (A/60/424) failed to incorporate some of the elements referred to in General Assembly resolution 59/276. The Group noted the progress made by the Department of Safety and Security in filling headquarters posts but

was concerned about the delays in recruiting Field Service staff, which should have been the first priority.

31. The General Assembly had decided to review the security and safety officer posts approved in resolution 59/276 in the light of a comprehensive report to be submitted by the Secretary-General to the Assembly at its current session addressing all elements contributing to the Organization's security planning, including the updating and revision of host country agreements as well as the different capacities of host countries to provide security to the United Nations. However, the Assembly had since been informed that the updating and revision of host country agreements would take several years. The Secretariat should explain what the implications of the new time frame would be for the review of the aforementioned posts and why it had commenced recruitment prior to the completion of the new profile for security officers referred to in document A/59/365.

32. The General Assembly had also decided to defer consideration of the Secretary-General's proposal for a global access control system, pending the receipt of a detailed report on the matters specified in paragraph 44 of section XI of resolution 59/276. While a team had subsequently been established to undertake a comprehensive review of the project, the results of the review had not been presented to the General Assembly, nor had the Secretary-General sought the Assembly's approval of the preliminary design for the project. Nevertheless, one element of the project, the installation of turnstiles at entrances to the Headquarters complex, was already under way. That was a matter of concern to the Group.

33. The Secretary-General had been requested to submit to the General Assembly at its current session a revised United Nations security management accountability framework. That document would be crucial in ensuring the cohesion of the security management system and should be completed as soon as possible. Furthermore, the Group noted that the Secretary-General had yet to report on the measures available for disciplinary action in cases of non-compliance with security standards, norms and procedures, as requested by the Assembly in resolution 59/276.

34. The Group was concerned that the Secretariat had largely ignored the General Assembly's call for recruitment to the Professional posts created by

resolution 59/276 to be made on a wide geographic basis. In recruitment to all categories of posts, the Secretariat should bear in mind the need to maintain the Organization's international character. The Group noted the Secretariat's intention to review the adequacy of the current level of the post of Deputy to the Under-Secretary-General for Safety and Security. However, it was the post itself that the General Assembly had planned to review.

35. The report of the Secretary-General (A/60/424) referred to a number of matters that would be addressed in separate reports to be submitted to the Assembly at its current session. The Secretariat should indicate whether those reports would be available within the time frame proposed. The Group would take up the issue of threat and risk assessment, which the report did not address, in informal consultations.

36. While the General Assembly had expressed concern that some staff working in the field were not covered by the malicious acts insurance policy, the report contained in document A/60/317 did not address that issue. Regarding security spending by organizations of the United Nations system, the Group shared the concerns expressed in the related report of ACABQ (A/60/7/Add.9) and expected to receive further information on the matter. It noted that the recent application of Minimum Operating Security Standards had adversely affected the utilization of conference facilities at the Economic Commission for Africa (ECA). It therefore urged the Department of Safety and Security to work with ECA to minimize the impact of the security guidelines on the Commission's effective functioning. Lastly, it looked forward to discussing the recommendations made in the report of OIOS on the utilization and management of funds approved for strengthening the security and safety of United Nations premises (A/60/291).

37. **Mr. Berti Oliva** (Cuba) said that the Under-Secretary-General for Safety and Security faced a difficult task and was to be commended for his work thus far. His delegation attached great importance to the safety and security of United Nations staff and premises. The adoption of section XI of General Assembly resolution 59/276 had been the result of protracted negotiations. It was therefore regrettable that the Secretary-General's report (A/60/424) did not meet the requirements stipulated in the resolution.

38. The Secretariat had made numerous errors in filling the new posts created by resolution 59/276. For example, it was not clear what efforts were being made to comply with paragraph 18 of section XI, in which the Secretary-General was urged to preserve the international character of the Organization in the recruitment of safety and security staff. The Secretariat stated that it had encountered difficulties in finding suitable candidates to fill the new posts but did not indicate what those difficulties were. Furthermore, no data was provided on the vacancy situation by duty station, although that information was available in the related report of ACABQ (A/60/7/Add.9, annex I). The Secretariat should explain the reference in paragraph 4 of the Secretary-General's report to the significant lead times involved in arranging additional accommodation in New York for the central staff of the Department of Safety and Security. In addition, it should indicate how many temporary personnel had been recruited for the Division of Regional Operations and under what mandate that had been carried out.

39. The Secretary-General's report referred to a number of actions to be taken in the last quarter of 2005. However, fewer than 40 days remained before the end of the year. The Secretariat should therefore provide up-to-date information on the status of those actions, so that the General Assembly could properly assess the achievements of the new Department of Safety and Security.

40. The General Assembly had emphasized that the primary responsibility for ensuring the safety and security of United Nations staff and premises rested with host countries. In that connection, his delegation wished to know when the updating and revision of host country agreements would be completed; those agreements were one of the elements that would be taken into account by the Assembly when it reviewed the security and safety officer posts approved in resolution 59/276. The Secretariat should also indicate what steps it would take in the event that staff recruited to fill those posts did not meet the criteria stipulated in the new profile for security officers which was about to be finalized. In addition, it should explain how paragraphs 35 to 39 of section XI of the resolution were being implemented, since there was no reference to threat and risk assessment in any of the reports before the Committee. While the Under-Secretary-General had alluded to the matter in his introductory

statement, his delegation would like more detailed information in that regard.

41. The General Assembly had expressed concern that some field staff were not covered by the malicious acts insurance policy. However, that issue was not properly addressed in the relevant report of the Secretary-General (A/60/317). The Secretariat should indicate what measures were being taken to rectify the situation.

42. Lastly, his delegation wished to know whether the installation of turnstiles at entrances to the Headquarters complex was being done within the framework of the access control project. It noted that the progress report on the review of the project would not be submitted to the General Assembly until its resumed session and that the Assembly had yet to approve the project design.

43. **Mr. Amolo** (Kenya) said that his delegation supported the efforts of the Department of Safety and Security and acknowledged that it was still in the process of development. As the Secretary-General stated in his report (A/60/424, para. 45), the primary responsibility for the security of all United Nations personnel rested with host Governments. His Government took that responsibility very seriously and, to that end, it had significantly strengthened the diplomatic police unit. It recognized that, for the Department of Safety and Security, maximum reliance on host Governments was central to operational effectiveness. His delegation warmly welcomed the cooperative approach taken by the new Under-Secretary-General for Safety and Security and supported his proposal for the appointment of designated points of contact for security matters.

44. In discussing security, the primary focus should be on security in the field. With regard to recruitment, the new posts created by resolution 59/276 should be filled expeditiously and on a wide geographic basis. In that connection, the Secretariat should consider the use of local and regional human resources. His delegation noted with satisfaction the excellent cooperation between the Department of Safety and Security and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations. It would welcome regular briefings of troop contributors about the mechanisms for coordination between the two Departments, as proposed by the representative of the United Kingdom. Lastly, the Department of Safety and Security must endeavour to minimize the adverse

effects of applying Minimum Operating Security Standards at the Economic Commission for Africa.

45. **Mr. Mazumdar** (India) said that the question of the global access control system should be given further consideration, for two reasons. Firstly, it appeared that the Headquarters component of the system was being implemented without reference to paragraph 44 of resolution 59/276. Secondly, a number of new posts had been approved in the resolution without consideration of the implications of the implementation of the global system.

46. **Mr. Al-Ahmad** (Qatar) said that, like all other States, Qatar was concerned about the safety and security of the Organization and its staff, which were its most valuable asset. No organization could be expected to perform its tasks without a minimum level of safety and security and a comprehensive conceptual framework was therefore needed to facilitate the handling of all the technical and logistical aspects of the matter. However, increased spending on safety and security must not be at the expense of the Organization's other activities.

47. The Department of Safety and Security had clearly been making big efforts over the past year, especially with regard to the needs at Headquarters. He hoped that other duty stations and field missions and their personnel would receive similar attention. Host countries also had treaty responsibilities for the safety and security of United Nations personnel, but it must be remembered that there were wide differences in their capacities to discharge those responsibilities.

48. Assembly resolution 59/276 provided that all safety and security projects should take into account the capital master plan, but the Secretary-General's report did not confirm that the team working on the access control project would do so. His delegation would welcome clarification from the Secretariat on that point. It also drew attention to the General Assembly's decision that the Under-Secretary-General for Safety and Security should be appointed with full respect for the principle of equitable geographical representation.

49. **The Chairman** invited the representatives of the Secretariat to reply to the questions raised by members of the Committee and to bear in mind the comments on the new turnstiles made at the 23rd meeting by the representative of Jamaica, speaking on behalf of the Group of 77 and China.

50. **Mr. Veness** (Under-Secretary-General for Safety and Security) said that it would probably be more helpful to the Committee for him to go into the complex issue of the interface between the capital master plan, the strengthened security system at Headquarters, and the global access control project in the informal consultations.

51. However, he would like to emphasize that the capital master plan addressed the question of relocation during refurbishment of the Secretariat building, a project headed by the Department of Management. The project on strengthened security at Headquarters was also headed by the Department of Management. Its implementation, of which the installation of the turnstiles was one manifestation, had been determined by earlier General Assembly resolutions on the strengthening of physical security at Headquarters in response to the events of 11 September 2001. His own Department was providing technical assistance to both projects and unequivocally supported the judgement and decisions of the Department of Management.

52. The global access control project, under the leadership of the Department of Safety and Security, dealt mainly with situations at locations away from Headquarters. The Department had just received a report on the initial survey conducted at all such locations and was now formulating a process for project management that was consistent with the latest security and safety principles.

53. **Mr. Reuter** (Executive Director of the Capital Master Plan) said that he endorsed the comments of the Under-Secretary-General for Security and Safety. The projects on the strengthening of safety and security at Headquarters could certainly be integrated into any global access control system which the Secretary-General might introduce. As the representative of OIOS had pointed out, there were 18 such Headquarters projects authorized under General Assembly resolution 56/286, of which 7 had been completed, 3 had been deferred for consideration as elements of the capital master plan, and the remaining 8, which were experiencing some contract management difficulties, had been scheduled for completion within the approved budget by 31 December 2005. Six of those eight had now been combined under a single contract, to be completed by February or March 2006: a new on-site security control centre; additional physical security barriers for automobiles; upgrading of the physical barrier surrounding the site; securing of

all utility points and manholes; additional perimeter lighting; and the turnstiles. None of those six projects was in conflict with the ambitious global access control system referred to in paragraph 44 of section XI of resolution 59/276. If it was decided that the security controls at the Headquarters site should be integrated into such a system, the technology could easily be adapted.

54. **Ms. Taylor Roberts** (Jamaica), speaking on behalf of the Group of 77 and China, said that the comments which she had made at the Committee's 23rd meeting concerning the turnstiles project related to procedure rather than to the technicalities of the installation. The problem was one of lack of communication. The Member States must be kept informed of all safety and security projects, and new projects must be consistent with those already approved. They must be kept informed in particular of any matters affecting access, such as new turnstiles and identification cards. It was now apparent from what the Executive Director had just said that the turnstiles project was not in conflict with the global access control system, but the Member States could not have known that fact or whether the turnstiles were a temporary measure or part of a future permanent system.

55. **Mr. Van Schalkwyk** (South Africa) said that his delegation would welcome clarification from the Secretariat of the distinction between "physical security" and "access control". Clarification of the question of procedure raised by the representative of Jamaica would also be helpful. The turnstiles project seemed to show that yet again Headquarters was being given greater consideration than other United Nations locations. The problem might indeed be one of lack of communication, but as a global body the United Nations must take a global approach to such questions. It would be a waste of resources to install a turnstiles system which might later have to be replaced or which might prove incompatible with conditions at another duty station.

56. **Mr. Mazumdar** (India) said that his delegation endorsed the comments of the representatives of Jamaica and South Africa. It was not a question of the size or technicality of the current access control projects but of whether they were intended only for Headquarters or as part of a global system. Before proceeding further, the Committee must await the detailed report requested in section XI, paragraph 44,

of resolution 59/276, which should clarify the matters about which Member States had expressed concern.

57. **Mr. Berti Oliva** (Cuba) said that the Secretariat should state the source of the General Assembly's authorization for the safety and security projects to proceed.

58. **Mr. Reuter** (Executive Director of the Capital Master Plan) said that the six projects which he had described had been authorized under Assembly resolution 56/286 as urgent measures to strengthen security at Headquarters. They had not been integrated into the global access control system referred to in resolution 59/276 because, as the Under-Secretary-General for Security and Safety had pointed out, the information on which the formulation of such a system should be based had only just come to hand.

Agenda item 123: Programme budget for the biennium 2004-2005 (*continued*)

Estimates in respect of special political missions, good offices and other political initiatives authorized by the General Assembly and/or the Security Council: United Nations Office in Timor-Leste (A/60/7/Add.10 and A/60/425)

59. **Mr. Thatchaichawalit** (Office of Programme Planning, Budget and Accounts), introducing the report of the Secretary-General (A/60/425), said that in its resolution 1599 (2005) the Security Council had decided to establish the United Nations Office in Timor-Leste (UNOTIL) until 20 May 2006. On the basis of an exchange of letters between the Secretary-General and the Chairman of the Advisory Committee, UNOTIL had been funded since 21 May 2005 partly under the commitment authority provided by General Assembly resolution 58/273 and partly from savings under the United Nations Advance Mission in the Sudan (UNAMIS). The current report described the complete budgetary requirements for the period 21 May to 31 December 2005, which were estimated at about \$22 million net or \$23.9 million gross. The requirements provided for 15 military advisers, 60 civilian police advisers, 45 other civilian advisers, a mission staffing complement of 371 posts, and other operational and logistical support. The proposal was for a total of 101 international staff, 233 national staff and 37 United Nations Volunteers. The staffing changes reflected in the complete budget proposal included the establishment of an additional P-4 post of

Gender Adviser and the upgrading of the post of Chief of Staff from P-5 to D-1. The other requirements related to non-staff costs.

60. In accordance with the established practice, the 2006 requirement for UNOTIL would be included in the consolidated budget proposal for 2006. The General Assembly was requested to approve a 2005 budget for UNOTIL amounting to approximately \$22 million and to appropriate some \$15.7 million net or \$17.6 gross under the programme budget for 2004-2005.

61. **Mr. Maycock** (Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions) said that consideration of the budget for UNOTIL had been made difficult by the results-based budgeting framework and by missing information, which the Advisory Committee had eventually received and had included in annexes II to IV to its report (A/60/7/Add.10). He wished also to draw attention to the letter from the Chairman of the Advisory Committee contained in annex I to the same report, which explained that the Advisory Committee did not consider that the granting of a commitment authority on 30 June 2005 implied approval of posts or positions for UNOTIL, and that it would examine all relevant details, including staffing, only when the full UNOTIL budget was presented. However, when the Secretariat had presented that budget, it had treated the posts or positions as already approved.

62. Similarly, in the absence of approved posts or positions at particular levels, the Advisory Committee had not considered proposals for post reclassification, but had instead regarded such proposals as requests to create new posts or positions at particular levels. Although the Advisory Committee was recommending approval of most of the posts or positions requested by the Secretary-General, it had qualified its recommendations in the cases of the Chief of Staff, the Chief Administrative Officer and the Gender Adviser, as explained in paragraphs 17 to 21 of its report.

63. **Mr. Meyer** (Brazil) said that the United Nations presence in Timor-Leste, which had helped to create a new, independent State, would help to develop national institutions and promote respect for human rights. Long-term development assistance from the United Nations, neighbouring countries and other donors was the best way to consolidate peace and bring its benefits to the population. The mandate given to UNOTIL by

the Security Council, in its resolution 1599 (2005), included emphasizing proper transfer of skills and knowledge to enable Timor-Leste's public institutions to deliver services in accordance with the international principles of the rule of law, justice, human rights, democratic governance, transparency, accountability and professionalism. To fulfil that mandate, UNOTIL must receive all the necessary financial, budgetary and administrative resources. The large investment already made in Timor-Leste must be protected.

64. His delegation noted that resource requirements for the period beyond 31 December 2005 would be included in a consolidated report containing the budget proposals for all special political missions. The Advisory Committee should clarify the impact of its recommended budget reduction and the reasons for recommending against the appointment of a Chief of Staff and Gender Adviser at the levels originally requested. His delegation agreed with the Advisory Committee that the additional information received from the Secretariat, the use of a modified results-based budgeting framework with quantified outputs, and the data on the activities of other partners present in Timor-Leste showed more clearly how the activities envisaged would contribute to the objectives of UNOTIL.

65. **Mr. Lantu** (Indonesia) said that too little time had been available to examine the report of the Secretary-General (A/60/425), which contained budget estimates for UNOTIL. The report of the Advisory Committee on those estimates (A/60/7/Add.10) had provided helpful information, but had raised concerns which his delegation shared. The budget presentation should have drawn closer links between UNOTIL, as a follow-on mission, and its predecessor, the United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor (UNMISSET), and should have clarified the relationship between UNOTIL and other partners in the effort to achieve sustainable development. It should also have contained more quantitative data, without which it was difficult to measure progress.

66. Given the commitment of the office to capacity-building in Timor-Leste, his delegation trusted that the proposed changes to its staffing would not affect the number of local staff. It concurred with the Advisory Committee that, rather than recruiting additional senior staff, the office should rearrange its organizational structure to meet its human resources needs and, in particular, that its small size did not warrant the

appointment of a Chief Administrative Officer at the D-1 level.

67. **Mr. Kozaki** (Japan) said that the transition from UNMISSET, a peacekeeping mission, to UNOTIL, a one-year special political mission, must ensure smooth and rapid progress towards a sustainable development assistance framework. His delegation agreed with most of the Advisory Committee's recommendations regarding the proposed budget of UNOTIL.

68. **Mr. Yoo Dae-Jong** (Republic of Korea) noted that information to supplement the original budget proposals for UNOTIL, which had been too vague and had been missing several of the basic requirements of results-based budgeting, had only been provided at the request of the Advisory Committee. His delegation therefore wondered what role the Office of Programme Planning, Budget and Accounts was supposed to play in guiding and coordinating the budget process. It noted in that connection that UNOTIL was merely the first in a series of special political missions whose budget proposals the Committee must consider at the Assembly's current session.

69. His delegation took note of the remaining observations of the Advisory Committee and hoped that the forthcoming consolidated report on special political missions would be in line with the principles of results-based budgeting and would contain all the necessary information. It concurred with the Advisory Committee's view that results-based budgeting had no meaning unless targets were established and that quantitative measures of progress should be included in the performance report for the mission. The transition from UNMISSET to UNOTIL had neglected the opportunity to exploit synergies between the two missions, thus wasting existing experience and resources. His delegation shared the Advisory Committee's view that the posts mentioned in the proposed budget should be treated not as existing posts, but as requests for new posts.

70. **Ms. Galvez** (United Kingdom), speaking on behalf of the European Union; the acceding countries Bulgaria and Romania; the candidate countries Croatia and Turkey; the stabilization and association process countries Albania, Serbia and Montenegro and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia; and, in addition, Ukraine, said that the Union noted with interest the observations and recommendations of the Advisory Committee and wished to reiterate its support

for the work of UNOTIL. It would make further comments on the matter during informal consultations.

71. **Mr. Guterres** (Timor-Leste) expressed the hope that, despite the Advisory Committee's doubts about some aspects of UNOTIL, the Secretariat and Member States would find suitable solutions to enable the mission to continue the essential support that the United Nations provided for Timor-Leste and its society. He was confident that UNOTIL would find the right approach to capacity-building, which was his country's main preoccupation.

72. **Mr. Thatchaichawalit** (Office of Programme Planning, Budget and Accounts) said that the budget reduction of \$108,100 proposed by the Advisory Committee would lead to the post of Chief of Staff remaining at the P-5 rather than D-1 level, and to the post of Gender Adviser remaining occupied by a national rather than an international official.

73. The current biennium was the first in which results-based budgeting had been introduced for special political missions. That format was therefore a work in progress which would be improved in liaison with the Department of Political Affairs and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations. Regular training on results-based budgeting would continue. In the transition from UNMISSET to UNOTIL, many staff had been retained. The provisions made for the liquidation of UNMISSET had operated until October 2005, thereby ensuring a smooth transition between the two missions.

Agenda item 151: Financing of the United Nations Mission in the Sudan (*continued*) (A/C.5/60/L.7)

Draft resolution A/C.5/60/L.7

74. **Mr. Sach** (Controller), responding to an earlier request by the representative of Japan for further details about the use of assessed contributions for disarmament, demobilization and reintegration activities, confirmed that the estimate of \$12,700,000 to cover operational requirements in those areas until 30 June 2006 was considered sufficient. Requirements for the period from 1 July 2006 onwards would depend on the progress of the mission. The agreement of the Security Council would be sought for any additional allocation of funds.

75. *Draft resolution A/C.5/60/L.7 was adopted.*

Agenda item 121: Financial reports and audited financial statements, and reports of the Board of Auditors (*continued*) (A/C.5/60/L.6)

Draft resolution A/C.5/60/L.6

76. *Draft resolution A/C.5/60/L.6 was adopted.*

Agenda item 136: Administrative and budgetary aspects of the financing of the United Nations peacekeeping operations (A/60/437 and A/60/551)

77. **Mr. Sach** (Controller), recalled that the General Assembly, in its decision 59/563, had decided to revert to the issue of the updated financial position of closed peacekeeping missions as at 30 June 2005 in the main part of its sixtieth session, and summarized the information contained in the relevant report of the Secretary-General (A/60/437) indicating which closed missions had funds available, which were in deficit and which had been used as a source of loans to active peacekeeping missions, to the General Fund or to the United Nations Tribunals. The Secretary-General had recommended that the General Assembly should approve the retention of the cash balance available from 13 closed peacekeeping missions in the light of the experience of the Organization's cash requirements during 2004/05.

78. When the report of the Secretary-General had been prepared, the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) and the United Nations Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS) had been expected to account for most of the borrowing from closed missions. However, current projections for the period until the end of January 2006 indicated that MONUC would need only \$25 million, while \$75 million was required by the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), the United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG), the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR).

79. The regular budget situation was much more uncertain than it had been at the Committee's 4th meeting, when he had forecast an available cash balance of \$294 million based on expected payments of \$400 million in the last quarter of 2005. Since then, payments of \$30 million had been received, but the financial situation of Member States with outstanding

assessments made further significant payments unlikely. As a result, he predicted a cash deficit of approximately \$30 million, which could be made up only by drawing on the balances in the accounts of closed missions.

80. **Mr. Maycock** (Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions) said that the recommendations of the Advisory Committee, contained in paragraphs 12 and 13 of its report (A/60/551), indicated once again that postponement of the return of available cash to Member States was a policy decision to be determined by the General Assembly.

81. **Ms. Russell** (United Kingdom), speaking on behalf of the European Union; the acceding countries Bulgaria and Romania; the candidate countries Croatia and Turkey; the stabilization and association process countries Albania, Serbia and Montenegro and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia; and, in addition, Iceland, Liechtenstein and the Republic of Moldova, said that the European Union maintained its long-standing position that funds, including accrued interest and other income, should be returned, in full and without conditions, to Member States.

82. It regretted that late payment of assessments, essentially by the biggest contributors and a handful of others, and non-payment of assessments by some other Member States, was forcing the Organization to consistently retain funds. Cross-borrowing from the accounts of closed missions in order to keep the Organization, the international tribunals and active peacekeeping operations viable simply masked the real issue of arrears and the Fifth Committee's inability to address that issue substantively. Until it did so, troop-contributing countries, many of which paid assessments in full and on time, would not receive full or speedy reimbursement.

83. Noting the explanation of the cash-flow situation given by the Controller, the European Union sympathized with his position, but stressed that the decision by the General Assembly to allow the Secretary-General to retain cash balances from closed peacekeeping missions in previous years was exceptional, and should not become the norm. The Organization's current financial straits made it unlikely that the Committee would be able to make much progress on the issue during the main part of the Assembly's sixtieth session. If further consideration

was deferred until the second part of the resumed session, the European Union would like an accurate updated report from the Secretary-General on all the funds available to him, along with a recommendation for alternatives to simply retaining funds from the accounts of closed peacekeeping missions.

84. **Mr. Sach** (Controller) said that, while he appreciated the expression of sympathy with his position, the problem was an institutional one that was not confined to a single person or function and which could only be resolved by the membership at large.

The meeting rose at 12.40 p.m.