
**2005 Review Conference of the Parties
to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation
of Nuclear Weapons**

14 June 2005

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Summary record of the 8th meeting

Held at Headquarters, New York, on Thursday, 5 May 2005, at 3 p.m.

President: Mr. de Queiroz Duarte (Brazil)

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05-33367 (E)

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The meeting was called to order at 3.10 p.m.

General debate (*continued*)

1. **Mr. Freeman** (United Kingdom) said that the new global threats since 2000 and the challenges to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) had served only to underline its importance and strengthen his Government's support for it. The NPT had been an international success story. The United Kingdom continued to implement the decisions of past review conferences and abide by its undertakings on non-proliferation, the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and disarmament.

2. Recent challenges to the non-proliferation regime by a few signatory States should not prevent the great majority of States parties from enjoying the benefits to be gained from the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, under article IV of the Treaty. Those which had taken advantage of that provision to develop clandestine nuclear-weapon programmes had challenged the rest to work together to contain their activities and prevent future abuses of the Treaty. The United Kingdom called on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to stop developing nuclear weapons, declare all its past nuclear activity, and verifiably and irreversibly dismantle its entire nuclear programme, while returning to negotiations. The proliferation implications of the nuclear programmes of the Islamic Republic of Iran were also disquieting. However, France, Germany, the United Kingdom and representatives of the European Union were working with it to develop long-term arrangements to rebuild international confidence in its intentions and to persuade it to suspend all enrichment and reprocessing activity and to reconsider its decision to construct a heavy-water reactor.

3. The possibility that terrorist groups could obtain and use weapons of mass destruction was a further worrying development. Every effort must be made to dismantle any remaining elements of the clandestine international supply and procurement network that had come to light in late 2003, and to shut down other illegal nuclear suppliers and networks.

4. The work of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) underpinned the Treaty. The Agency stood in the front line against those who would evade or deny their international obligations. The United Kingdom called on all non-nuclear-weapon States to

conclude IAEA safeguards agreements and additional protocols to them, both of which should become a future condition for supply of sensitive nuclear materials. The 2005 report of the IAEA Expert Group on Multilateral Nuclear Approaches had shown that effective ways must be found to control the spread of enrichment and reprocessing technologies without compromising the benefits of legitimate civil use.

5. All Governments should employ a broad range of approaches to counter proliferation and complement the provisions of the Treaty and the excellent work of the IAEA. Strong, comprehensive export controls were necessary. State interdiction, under the Proliferation Security Initiative, of illicit transport of nuclear supplies and technologies also had a role to play. Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) and the recently adopted International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism offered further tools. The forthcoming amendment and strengthening of the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material in would also help prevent the acquisition of sensitive materials by terrorists.

6. The United Kingdom welcomed the report of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change (A/59/565) and the Secretary-General's response to it in his "In larger freedom" report (A/59/2005), in which he made recommendations for the current Review Conference that should be carefully scrutinized.

7. Recent positive developments that deserved mention included the decision of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya to dismantle its illegal weapons-of-mass-destruction programmes. The United Kingdom called on others engaged in such programmes in clear contravention of their treaty obligations to follow that country's example.

8. As a nuclear-weapon State, the United Kingdom recognized its particular obligations and reaffirmed its unequivocal undertaking to eventually eliminate its nuclear arsenals. British nuclear weapons were for deterrence only and had a political, not a military, role. All reductions in nuclear-weapon levels, whether achieved unilaterally, bilaterally or multilaterally, hastened the final goal of global disarmament. The United Kingdom had, since the end of the cold war, reduced the explosive power of its nuclear forces by more than 70 per cent, and had completely dismantled its Chevaline warheads since 2000. It reiterated its

intention to abide by the moratorium on nuclear testing. It looked forward to the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) and to the early negotiation, without preconditions, of a fissile material cut-off treaty in the Conference on Disarmament.

9. Standing by all the security assurances it had given to non-nuclear-weapon States in the past, the United Kingdom, as evidence of its support for nuclear-weapon-free zones, had ratified or would ratify the protocols to the relevant treaties establishing such zones. It would continue to work nationally, bilaterally, regionally and multilaterally to strengthen the non-proliferation regime.

10. **Mr. Kaludjerović** (Serbia and Montenegro) observed that the successful outcome of the Review Conference would buttress the entire network of international nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation agreements, of which the NPT, with its prevention and verification systems, was the cornerstone.

11. The Conference could not afford to set modest goals but rather had to achieve the broadest possible cooperation to ensure full compliance by all States parties, which shared responsibilities as well as benefits. The ultimate benefit of the Treaty, which both aimed to rid the world of nuclear weapons and fostered the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, would be a more secure and more developed world. The Treaty must achieve universality; and its system of controls had to be expanded by making IAEA additional protocols part of the required standard for verification.

12. As a successor State and first-time participant in a Review Conference, Serbia and Montenegro endorsed the Treaty and all previous consensus decisions. As a non-nuclear-weapon State, it sought the elimination of all types of weapons of mass destruction. It was the obligation of the nuclear-weapon States to gradually achieve the goal of nuclear disarmament.

13. His Government attached great importance to the early entry into force of the CTBT, which it had ratified in 2004, and it supported an early start to negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on a fissile material cut-off treaty. As part of its fruitful cooperation with IAEA, it was in the process of concluding an additional protocol and was working on

the management of radioactive waste. It also welcomed the adoption of Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) and the adoption by the General Assembly of the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism.

14. Aware of the need for a strong national export-control regime, his Government had begun to implement legislation on foreign trade in arms, military equipment and dual-use goods. It was also fully committed to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy under a strict verification regime.

15. **Mr. Own** (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya) recalled that, following the path of international dialogue and cooperation, his country had in December 2003 voluntarily agreed to get rid of all equipment and programmes leading to the production of internationally prohibited weapons. Since then, it had ceased all testing and uranium enrichment and all importing of nuclear materials; it had dismantled its equipment and systems under IAEA supervision and with the assistance of IAEA, the United States and the United Kingdom. His Government had ratified the CTBT, concluded an IAEA additional protocol retroactive to December 2003, and applied for membership in the Missile Technology Control Regime.

16. Already in 1989, his Government had officially condemned weapons of mass destruction, thereby demonstrating that it was a country dedicated to peace and security and to the goals of the NPT. The international community must take vigorous action, applicable to all States without exception, to do away with weapons of mass destruction and foster instead the development of all the world's peoples.

17. The Libyan initiative required a response from the nuclear-weapon States: the necessary assurance to the non-nuclear-weapon States that weapons of mass destruction would not be used against them. Yet tens of thousands of nuclear weapons were still in place, thousands of them in a state of full preparedness. As obligated under article VI of the NPT, the nuclear-weapon States must begin to eliminate their nuclear arsenals. The Conference on Disarmament should be urged to start negotiations immediately on a non-discriminatory fissile materials cut-off treaty, and to revive the ad hoc committee on negative security assurances that it had established in 1998.

18. All States, whether parties to the NPT or not, should forswear nuclear aggression and nuclear intimidation. In the Middle East, only Israel was not a party to the NPT, and the nuclear weapons in its possession threatened and terrorized the entire Arab region and made a mockery of the NPT. It was urgent for Israel to ratify the Treaty and place all its nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards; and in the meantime other nuclear-weapon States should, pursuant to article I of the Treaty, refuse to supply Israel with nuclear material or assistance. All States parties should also hasten the formal establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East.

19. Under article IV of the Treaty, all States were entitled to pursue nuclear research and produce nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. The nuclear States should help the developing countries to meet their legitimate needs for nuclear energy and a free transfer of technology.

20. The Review Conference should make a number of recommendations. It should highlight the importance of the full observance of articles I and VI of the Treaty. Nuclear-weapon States should be called upon not to share or export nuclear technology or know-how except for peaceful purposes; to cease to update their own nuclear-weapon systems or produce new weapons; and to begin to eliminate their own nuclear arsenals within a specific time frame. No nuclear missiles should be kept in a state of preparedness, and all such missiles should be withdrawn from foreign military bases. Negotiations should begin on a treaty on dismantling nuclear weapons and eliminating double standards in nuclear policy. The funds currently spent on arsenals should be used instead to improve living standards, health care and education in poor countries and to achieve the Millennium Development Goals.

21. **Mr. Mahiga** (United Republic of Tanzania), after recalling decisions taken at previous Conferences, said it was regrettable that the 13 practical steps for the implementation of article VI had not been put into effect, as they provided a feasible way of moving forward and were crucial to the future of the NPT. The NPT had faced its greatest challenges in recent years. Nuclear-weapon States continued to rely on the doctrine of nuclear deterrence, upgrading both their weapons and delivery systems, while the threshold for using such weapons had been lowered. Factors such as the withdrawal of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea from the NPT in 2003 and the illegal transfer of

nuclear technology by non-State actors did not bode well for the NPT, while its indefinite extension had not brought about the expected results. Nuclear weapons needed to be eliminated, in an irreversible, transparent and verifiable manner, and the three nuclear-weapon States which had not joined the NPT should do so.

22. His Government was fully committed to the NPT objectives, as demonstrated by its ratification of the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty, the CTBT and the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material. It had also signed an IAEA Additional Protocol.

23. Nuclear proliferation needed to be curbed decisively, collectively and in a timely manner. He stressed the equal importance of the three pillars of the NPT; attempts to separate those pillars or implement the NPT selectively could have a damaging impact on the Treaty. Regrettably, there had been little progress on nuclear disarmament since 1995. The important role played by nuclear-weapon-free zones in efforts towards nuclear disarmament could not be overemphasized: they strengthened peace and security and built confidence among States. The recent Conference of States parties to treaties establishing such zones had further demonstrated the commitment of those States to a world free from nuclear weapons. He stressed the urgent need for States in the Middle East to establish such a zone and called on Israel to accede to the NPT and place its nuclear facilities under full-scope IAEA safeguards. Reaffirming support for Mongolia's nuclear-weapon-free status, he hoped that the nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia would be established soon.

24. Emphasizing that negative security assurances were considered a temporary measure pending total elimination of nuclear weapons, he again called on nuclear-weapon States to honour their obligation to conclude a legally binding agreement containing such assurances. Simply signing the protocol to a nuclear-weapon-free zone treaty was inadequate and was not legally binding.

25. IAEA played a key role in enhancing nuclear safety and should be given the necessary human and financial resources to improve its performance. In addition, all States parties should sign an additional protocol, as proposed in 2000. His delegation nonetheless reaffirmed the inalienable right of States parties to develop research, production and use of

nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination. Export controls had worked against the interests of developing countries, denying them the science and technology needed for development.

26. A moratorium on nuclear testing provided no guarantee against future testing. It was therefore regrettable that the CTBT, the only true guarantee, had not yet entered into force. He called on States that had not yet done so to ratify it as soon as possible, particularly those whose ratification was required for its entry into force. It was every State party's obligation to ensure that the current Conference had a successful outcome, as its success was a crucial step towards achieving freedom from fear, as outlined in the Secretary-General's report entitled "In larger freedom: towards development, security and human rights for all" (A/59/2005), and reforming the United Nations for enhanced international peace and security.

27. **Mr. Carrera** (Cuba) said that his Government had deposited its instrument of accession to the NPT in 2002, demonstrating its political will and commitment to strengthening multilateralism and international disarmament treaties and contributing to efforts to safeguard the United Nations and preserve global peace and security, even though the world's major nuclear Power maintained a policy of hostility towards Cuba that did not exclude the use of armed force. Cuba had previously had reservations concerning the NPT because it considered it to be a discriminatory mechanism under which States had unequal rights and commitments. It was regrettable that the small percentage of States parties possessing nuclear weapons had not fulfilled their NPT obligations regarding nuclear disarmament or their unequivocal undertaking to total elimination made at the 2000 Conference. As a State party to the NPT, Cuba's position remained unchanged, only now it would work from within the Treaty to attain the total elimination of nuclear weapons. For Cuba, the NPT was only a step towards that goal.

28. Military doctrines based on the possession of nuclear weapons were unsustainable and unacceptable. The new strategic defence doctrines of the United States and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), including international security concepts based on military alliances and nuclear deterrence policies and the expansion of the right to use, or threaten to use, force in international relations, were very worrying, particularly for poor and non-aligned

countries. Indeed, the so-called strategic pre-emptive doctrine contradicted the very spirit of the NPT. The only way to avoid the disastrous consequences of using nuclear weapons was to negotiate a comprehensive and multilateral Convention encompassing disarmament, verification, assistance and cooperation. The Conference on Disarmament was the appropriate framework for such negotiations, which Cuba was ready to start immediately. Although Cuba had only recently joined the NPT, his Government had never had the intention to develop or possess nuclear weapons, nor had it based its defence plans on the possession thereof. Indeed, the principles of the 1959 Revolution were diametrically opposed to anything contributing to their existence. Cuba was interested only in the peaceful use of nuclear energy under IAEA verification. It would therefore continue to defend the inalienable right of States parties to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and to receive transfers of material, equipment and information to that end, and it would fulfil all its NPT obligations. Cuba's Safeguards Agreement with IAEA, and its Additional Protocol, had entered into force in June 2004.

29. His Government rejected the selective implementation of the NPT, whereby disarmament and peaceful uses were neglected in favour of horizontal non-proliferation, and called for Conference discussions and documents to reflect a balance between the three pillars, with particular emphasis on reviewing the implementation of article VI. The Conference was a unique opportunity for nuclear-weapon States to reaffirm their unequivocal undertaking to eliminate their nuclear arsenals and for all States parties to set new goals to that end. Priority must also be given to negotiating a universal, unconditional and legally binding instrument in which nuclear-weapon States undertook not to use, or threaten to use, nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States, an issue which the Conference must address.

30. His Government was concerned about the deterioration in recent years of the multilateral disarmament machinery owing to the unilateral and obstructionist attitude of the main nuclear Power, which infringed international law and disregarded multilateral disarmament and arms control treaties. It was worried about a number of new initiatives, such as the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), which claimed to combat the nuclear terrorism threat but was

actually a non-transparent and selective mechanism that violated the fundamental principles of international law, the Charter and the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. Such initiatives were detrimental to multilateralism and international cooperation, and aimed to dismantle existing international disarmament, arms control and non-proliferation treaties and bodies. While his Government shared the general concerns about weapons of mass destruction falling into terrorist hands, a selective and discriminatory approach that focused on horizontal proliferation while ignoring vertical proliferation and disarmament was not the solution; the only guarantee was the total elimination of all weapons of mass destruction.

31. Terrorism must be fought without double standards. A crusade could not be waged against international terrorism while the leader of that crusade harboured terrorists in its own territory; international terrorism could not be eliminated if some types of terrorist act were condemned, while others were silenced, tolerated or justified. Cuba was in favour of an international coalition against terrorist use of weapons of mass destruction, but only within the framework of international cooperation, the United Nations and the relevant international treaties. Respect for international law and the Charter was the only guarantee for international peace and security. The world must be governed by a collective security system offering full guarantees for all, not by the law of the jungle or doctrines and initiatives that violated the Charter.

32. **Mr. Chem** (Cambodia) said that Cambodia's Constitution prohibited the manufacture, use and storage of nuclear, chemical or biological weapons. Cambodia had actively participated in the 37th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting in 2004 and reiterated its full support for efforts to boost implementation of the Treaty on the South-East Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (Treaty of Bangkok), urging the nuclear-weapon States to sign its Protocol at the earliest opportunity. Like many States parties, Cambodia believed that IAEA played a fundamental role in applying, and verifying compliance with, the international safeguards obligation laid down in article III and in strengthening the regime. Moreover, the Model Additional Protocol was the ideal instrument for making the IAEA system more efficient and effective. In the light of past experience, the international community should make

every effort to rid the world of the threat of nuclear weapons. In that regard, Cambodia reiterated its full support for the total elimination of such weapons for the sake of future generations.

33. **Mr. Capelle** (Marshall Islands) said that, situated in a part of the world where three global Powers had tested nuclear weapons, the Marshall Islands had a unique and credible voice on the importance and urgency of non-proliferation. His delegation shared the view expressed by the Director-General of IAEA that the core of the NPT could be summed up in two words: security and development. Security for all by reducing — and ultimately eliminating — the nuclear threat, and development for all through advanced technology. His delegation acknowledged the development priorities and security concerns of States parties, but wished to emphasize human rights issues. For most people, security meant healthy land and resources and a healthy body, not the presence of weapons. Global leaders did not have the right to take away the security of others in order to feel more secure themselves. The Marshall Islands had experienced nuclear war 67 times, with more radiation being released there than anywhere else on the planet. Needless to say, it was still suffering from the adverse consequences of nuclear testing. Non-proliferation was one of his country's fundamental goals, as non-proliferation of weapons also meant non-proliferation of illness, forced relocation, environmental degradation and profound disturbances in social, cultural, economic and political systems. The Marshall Islands knew that from first-hand experience. The nuclear era had affected his country so profoundly that its inhabitants had even had to develop new words to describe the gross abnormalities that exposure to radiation had caused to the environment, animals and human beings. The Marshall Islands would not wish that fate on anyone and had therefore devoted itself to nuclear non-proliferation.

34. His delegation called on the United Nations to address the damage caused in the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands by detonation of nuclear weapons by the Administering Authority. The trust territory relationship had been terminated following reports by that Authority that the damage and injuries caused by the testing programme were minor and limited. In the light of declassified documents revealing that not to be the case, he urged the current Conference to recommend that the former Authority fully address all

the said damages and injuries. His delegation would push for such language to be included in the Conference's final report. The Pacific Island Forum leaders in 2004 had called for the United States fully to meet its obligations to provide fair and adequate compensation and ensure the safe resettlement of displaced populations. They had also urged States that had tested nuclear weapons in French Polynesia and Kiribati to take full responsibility for the impact of their activities on the local people and environment.

35. While still suffering from the lingering consequences of radiation exposure, the Marshall Islands welcomed the fact that, as a result of long-term cooperation, fewer nuclear weapons existed and fewer States possessed them than in the past and that the NPT had been improved, updated and extended. His country had recently signed an IAEA Safeguards Agreement and Additional Protocol. It also recognized the importance of the Proliferation Security Initiative, Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) and the Global Threat Reduction Initiative.

36. The Heads of State of the Pacific island countries maintained a strong communal interest in the reduction and eventual elimination of nuclear weapons and in protecting the Pacific region from environmental pollution. The Marshall Islands applauded the efforts of the Pacific Islands Forum to work with nuclear shipping States on prevention, response, liability and compensation and continued to seek their assurances that the Pacific region would not have to deal on its own with the aftermath of accident. His delegation hoped that progress would be achieved on the 2005 Mauritius Strategy for the Further Implementation of the Programme of Action for the Sustainable Development of Small Island Developing States, which emphasized the need to develop and strengthen international regulatory regimes for the transport of radioactive material by sea.

37. While States parties were entitled to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, the rights guaranteed by article IV of the Treaty must not be misused to justify the development of uranium enrichment and processing capabilities. It joined others in favouring restraints on the use of modern technology for purposes that might be in contravention of non-proliferation commitments under the Treaty.

38. In conclusion, he stressed the role of education in improving citizens' understanding of nuclear weapons

and their effects and said that, as former President of the College of the Marshall Islands, he had established a programme to serve that purpose. He looked forward to working with other interested parties on education-related issues.

39. **Mr. Rivasseau** (France) said that the questions of the universality of the NPT, its effective implementation and the repercussions of withdrawal should be highlighted at the Conference. He called for a productive approach towards non-proliferation and the prevention of terrorist risks through, inter alia, strengthened national and international instruments. In that connection, his delegation welcomed the adoption of the European Union Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, the Group of Eight Action Plan adopted at Sea Island, Georgia; Security Council resolution 1540 (2004); the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism; and the Proliferation Security Initiative. He urged those States parties which had not already done so to accede to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material.

40. Together with Germany and the United Kingdom, and with the support of the Secretary-General of the Council of the European Union, France was addressing the problem of the clandestine nuclear programme in the Islamic Republic of Iran. It was also supporting diplomatic efforts by other States to resolve the situation in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and had put forward ideas and proposals within the framework of the Conference, the European Union, the Group of Eight and IAEA.

41. While many States parties feared that strengthening the non-proliferation regime would infringe on the right to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, the real danger lay in uncontrolled proliferation by a handful of States, often with the support of clandestine networks. States parties, including developing countries, that failed to meet their non-proliferation obligations, to implement IAEA safeguards or to use nuclear energy for exclusively peaceful purposes should not be entitled to the benefit provided under article IV of the Treaty. France was in favour of a number of measures designed to strengthen the non-proliferation regime, including recognition of IAEA comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocols as a verification standard (France and the other European Union countries had concluded additional protocols on 30 April 2004) and a

strengthened multilateral system with a stronger role for the Security Council. In that connection, it supported closer cooperation between the Council and IAEA, which might take the form of regular reports to the Security Council by the Director-General of IAEA, as proposed by the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change.

42. States must also assume greater responsibility for the transfer of nuclear items. Where non-proliferation obligations were not honoured, nuclear cooperation should be denied pending the application of appropriate remedial measures under IAEA supervision. While recognizing the need to tighten controls over the export of sensitive technology, his delegation did not advocate a total ban on the export of fuel cycle technologies but rather the adoption of criteria for common controls. The Conference should also recognize the useful role played by supplier groups. His delegation supported the expansion of those groups and urged them to share their experience in export controls with non-members and with the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004). The rules governing the transfer of less sensitive equipment and facilities, particularly to developing countries with considerable energy needs, should not be unnecessarily restrictive or hamper economic growth and sustainable development. Countries conducting electronuclear programmes for peaceful purposes should be guaranteed access to the fuel cycle or fuel itself at market prices.

43. The Conference should consider the consequences of withdrawal from the Treaty and hold State parties accountable for any violations committed prior to their withdrawal. The Security Council should be notified of a State party's intention to withdraw and examine each case, and intergovernmental agreements on the transfer of nuclear items should prohibit the use of previously transferred nuclear materials, facilities, equipment or technologies in the event of withdrawal from the NPT. States withdrawing from the Treaty must be required to freeze, under IAEA control, and then dismantle and return, nuclear items purchased from a third country for peaceful uses prior to withdrawal.

44. Reiterating the importance attached to universality by the European Union in its common position of 11 November 2003 and its Common Strategy of 12 December 2003, he called on India, Israel and Pakistan to make every effort to comply with

international standards on non-proliferation and export control.

45. While the 2005 Review Conference should accord priority to proliferation crises threatening international peace and security, disarmament obligations must not be overlooked. Since its accession to the Treaty, France had taken a number of steps in the field of nuclear disarmament and general and complete disarmament. He stressed his country's commitment to the provisions of article VI of the Treaty and to the programme of action for implementing it outlined in decision 2 on the principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference. It was unfortunate, however, that at a time when nuclear-weapon States were undertaking strong commitments, a number of States parties were accelerating the development of their illegal nuclear programme.

46. France had signed the CTBT in 1996 and ratified it in 1998. It had dismantled its nuclear testing centre in the Pacific and, as early as 1996, had halted the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons, shut down its fissile-material production plants in Pierrelatte and Marcoule and begun the lengthy process of dismantling them. It had drastically cut its nuclear arsenal, eliminating all its surface-to-surface nuclear weapons, reducing the number of its ballistic-missile nuclear submarines and decreasing its total number of delivery vehicles by two thirds since 1985. In conclusion, he called for the universalization and entry into force of the CTBT, and for the initiation of negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty.

47. **Mr. Koonjul** (Mauritius) expressed concern at the selective implementation of NPT provisions. Non-proliferation was apparently being given higher priority than the other two pillars, particularly disarming. Plans by nuclear-weapon States to develop new types of nuclear weapon systems or improve nuclear weapon technology caused uneasiness among non-nuclear-weapon States. In that connection, he highlighted the importance of legally binding instruments that provided effective guarantees against the use or threat of force, particularly the protocols to the treaties establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones and the July 1996 advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice. Lack of progress in the Conference on Disarmament had also sown scepticism among the non-nuclear-weapon States. A fissile material cut-off treaty that banned production for nuclear weapons and other

nuclear explosive devices would be a catalyst to nuclear disarmament and, at the same time, provide security guarantees to non-nuclear-weapon States. Negotiations on a non-discriminatory, multilateral, internationally and effectively verifiable treaty should begin as soon as possible under the auspices of the Conference on Disarmament.

48. His delegation welcomed the adoption of the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism as a deterrent to illicit trade in highly sensitive nuclear equipment and material and called for enhanced cooperation to strengthen regional and national capacities aimed at preventing deadly nuclear materials and weapons from falling into the wrong hands.

49. Nuclear science played a key role in economic and social development — including in the fields of medicine, agriculture and industry — and the transfer of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes must be guaranteed. A climate of cooperation in the international community at large would encourage States to provide objective guarantees that their nuclear programmes were being used for exclusively peaceful purposes, and to take other confidence-building measures. IAEA must also be given the necessary resources and technical expertise to verify compliance with Treaty obligations, enhance its safeguard system and promote the peaceful uses of nuclear science and technology through its technical cooperation programmes.

50. His delegation strongly advocated the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones and had participated in the recent Conference of States Parties of Signatories of Treaties that Establish Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones, held in Mexico City. Mauritius had been one of the first countries to sign and ratify the Treaty of Pelindaba, aimed at establishing an African nuclear-weapon-free zone, for which nine additional ratifications were still required. He hailed the adoption by the five Central Asian States parties of a negotiated text on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone and expressed the hope that a similar instrument would soon be agreed to for the Middle East.

51. The transport of radioactive materials and waste by sea posed a particularly grave threat to small island developing States. Accidents could cause irreparable damage to the ecological system and affect the economic survival of small island States dependent on

fisheries and marine-related activities. The Mauritius Strategy for the Further Implementation of the Programme of Action for the Sustainable Development of Small Island Developing States adopted at the International Meeting to Review the Implementation of the Programme of Action for the Sustainable Development of Small Island Developing States, held in Mauritius January 2005, highlighted the need for regulatory regimes to monitor the transport of hazardous waste.

Election of Vice-Presidents *(continued)*

Credentials of representatives to the Conference *(continued)*

(a) Appointment of the Credentials Committee *(continued)*

Election of Chairmen and Vice-Chairmen of the Main Committees, the Drafting Committee and the Credentials Committee *(continued)*

52. **The President** said that the Group of Non-Aligned and Other States had nominated candidates from Bangladesh, Malaysia, Mexico, the Philippines and Senegal to serve as Vice-Presidents.

53. If he heard no objection, he would take it that the Conference wished to approve those candidatures.

54. *It was so decided.*

55. **The President** said that, at its 1st meeting, the Conference had appointed five out of six members of the Credentials Committee. On the recommendation of the Group of Non-Aligned and Other States, he wished to propose that Guyana should become the sixth member of the Credentials Committee.

56. *It was so decided.*

57. **The President** informed the Conference that three posts of Vice-President, the post of Chairman of the Credentials Committee and posts of Vice-Chairman of Main Committee I and Main Committee II and the Drafting Committee were still vacant. He appealed to States parties to submit candidates for the remaining posts as soon as possible.

58. *The meeting rose at 5.20 p.m.*