
2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

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Acting President: Mr. Parnohadiningrat (Indonesia)

President: Mr. Duarte (Brazil)

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The meeting was called to order at 10.45 a.m.

Opening of the Conference by the Chairman of the third session of the Preparatory Committee

1. **The Acting President**, introducing the final report of the Preparatory Committee for the 2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT/CONF.2005/1), said that the Conference provided an opportunity for States parties to ensure that the Treaty remained the cornerstone of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime.

2. The Committee had held three sessions between April 2002 and May 2004; 153 States parties had participated in one or more of those sessions, together with States not parties to the Treaty, specialized agencies, international and regional intergovernmental organizations, non-governmental organizations and members of academia who had participated in accordance with the agreed modalities. At each session, one meeting had been set aside for presentations by non-governmental organizations.

3. The Committee had reached agreement on a number of issues relating to the organization of the Conference, including the choice of President, the draft rules of procedure and the financial arrangements; its recommendations were reflected in the report. However, it had been unable to agree on a provisional agenda or on matters relating to a final document or documents of the Conference.

4. Most of the Committee's meetings had been devoted to a substantive discussion of all aspects of the Treaty and of the three clusters of issues contained in annex VIII to the final report of the Preparatory Committee for the 2000 Review Conference (NPT/CONF.2000/1). Meetings had also been set aside for discussion of three specific blocks of issues: implementation of article VI of the Treaty and paragraphs 3 and 4 (c) of the 1995 decision on principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, as well as the agreements, conclusions and commitments listed in the section entitled "Article VI and the eighth to twelfth preambular paragraphs", contained in the final document of the 2000 Review Conference; regional issues, including with respect to the Middle East; and the safety and security of peaceful nuclear programmes.

5. The Chairmen of the first and second sessions of the Committee had prepared factual summaries which were annexed to the draft reports on those sessions (NPT/CONF.2005/PC.I/CRP.1 and NPT/CONF.2005/PC.II/CRP.1, respectively); at its third session, however, no agreement had been reached on any of the substantive recommendations made.

Election of the President of the Conference

6. **The Acting President** announced that the Committee, at its third session, had unanimously recommended the election of Mr. Sérgio de Queiroz Duarte of Brazil as President.

7. *Mr. Duarte (Brazil) was elected President of the Conference by acclamation.*

8. *Mr. Duarte (Brazil) took the Chair.*

Statement by the President of the Conference

9. **The President** said he was confident that with flexibility and understanding the Conference would achieve agreement on the outstanding procedural issues so that the substantive issues could be tackled without delay.

10. Perceptions of lack of compliance with commitments eroded States parties' trust in the Treaty's effectiveness, and divergent views on the best way to realize its objectives continued to shadow the prospects for a more stable, predictable environment of peace and security. The emergence of terrorism as a tool of political extremism added an even more worrisome element to that equation. Agreements would be effective and lasting only if they addressed the security concerns and legitimate interests of all parties thereto. Such considerations lay at the centre of the debate on how to devise realistic ways to meet old and new challenges to the integrity and credibility of the rules and norms established by the Treaty; to ignore those challenges would be detrimental to the sustainability of the non-proliferation regime.

11. The Conference was an opportunity to strengthen confidence in the multilateral process and find solutions that would be acceptable to all Parties and be welcomed by the people of all nations. Perhaps more than ever, genuine cooperation, wisdom and enlightened statesmanship were needed. He hoped that history would judge positively the wisdom of the decisions taken.

Address by the Secretary-General of the United Nations

12. **The Secretary-General** recalled that 1945, the year in which the United Nations had been founded, had also marked the beginning of the nuclear age with the horrific explosions in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The dangerous Cold War era that had followed might have ended, but nuclear threats remained; he firmly believed that the current generation could build a world of ever-expanding development, security and human rights, but such a world could be put irrevocably out of reach by a nuclear catastrophe in a major city.

13. In that event, the first question would be whether the catastrophe was an act of terrorism, an act of State aggression or an accident; all were possible. Tens, if not hundreds, of thousands of people would perish in an instant and many more would die of radiation exposure. World leaders' attention would be riveted on that existential threat, collective security mechanisms could be discredited and hard-won freedoms and human rights could be compromised. The sharing of nuclear technology for peaceful uses could halt; development resources would dwindle; world financial markets, trade and transportation would be hard hit, with major economic consequences; and millions of people in poor countries would be driven into deeper deprivation and suffering. As shock gave way to anger and despair, the leaders of every nation — not merely those represented at the Conference — would ask what events had led to the catastrophe and whether they could have done more to reduce the risk by strengthening the regime designed to do so.

14. In the modern world, a threat to one was a threat to all and States shared the responsibility for each other's security; they were all vulnerable to the weakest link in nuclear security and safety, and they were all responsible for building an efficient, effective and equitable system to reduce the nuclear threat.

15. For the past 35 years, the Treaty had been a cornerstone of global security and had confounded the predictions of its critics. Nuclear weapons had not spread to dozens of States; indeed, more States had given up their ambitions for such weapons than had acquired them. States had joined nuclear-weapon-free zones; he welcomed recent progress towards the establishment of a new such zone in Central Asia. A watchful eye had been kept on the supply of materials necessary to the production of nuclear weapons, and

many States had been able to benefit from the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

16. Efforts, including the recent Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions (the "Moscow Treaty"), had been made to dismantle weapons and reduce stockpiles; the Security Council, in its resolution 1540 (2004), had affirmed the responsibility of all States to secure sensitive materials and control their export; and the General Assembly had adopted the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism in April 2005.

17. But the fact was that the nuclear non-proliferation regime had not kept pace with the march of technology and globalization and had been placed under stress by the developments of recent years. International regimes did not fail because of one breach, however serious or unacceptable, but rather because of many breaches whose accumulation rendered the gap between promise and performance unbridgeable. States parties to the Treaty must narrow that gap.

18. He had no doubt that many truths would be heard during the Conference. Some would stress the need to prevent proliferation to volatile regions, while others would argue for universal compliance with and enforcement of the Treaty; some would say that the spread of nuclear fuel cycle technology posed an unacceptable threat, while others would counter that access to the peaceful uses of nuclear technology must not be compromised; and some would depict proliferation as a grave threat, while others would argue that existing nuclear arsenals were a deadly danger. He challenged delegations to recognize all those truths and to accept that disarmament, non-proliferation and the right to peaceful uses were all vital, that they were too important to be held hostage to the policies of the past, and that they all imposed responsibilities on all States.

19. In order to rise to those challenges, States parties must strengthen confidence in the Treaty's integrity, particularly in the face of the first withdrawal by a State, by addressing violations directly. They must make compliance measures more effective, including through universal accession to the Model Additional Protocol to the Treaty as the new standard for verification. They must reduce the threat of proliferation to non-State actors by establishing effective national controls and enforcement measures. And they must come to grips with the fact that the

regime would not be sustainable if scores more States developed the most sensitive phases of the fuel cycle and thereby acquired the technology to produce nuclear weapons on short notice, leaving other States to feel that they must do the same and increasing the risks of nuclear accident, trafficking and use by terrorists and by States themselves.

20. In order to prevent such an eventuality, ways must be found to reconcile the right to peaceful uses with the imperative of non-proliferation. States that wished to exercise their undoubted right to develop and use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes must not insist that they could do so only by developing capacities that might be used to create nuclear weapons, but neither should they be left to feel that the development of such capacities was the only way to enjoy the benefits of nuclear energy.

21. A first step would be to expedite agreement to create incentives for States to voluntarily forgo the development of fuel cycle facilities; he commended the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and its Director-General for working to advance consensus on that vital question and urged all States to do the same. However, the only way to guarantee that nuclear weapons would never be used was for the world to be free of them; it was time to move beyond rhetorical flourish and political posturing. Some of the initial steps were obvious: prompt negotiation of a fissile material cut-off treaty for all States was vital. All States should affirm their commitment to a moratorium on testing and to the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. The High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change had wisely endorsed the recommendation that all nuclear-weapon States should de-alert their existing weapons (A/59/565, para. 121) and give negative security assurances to the non-nuclear-weapon States.

22. But more must be done; many States still lived under a nuclear umbrella, whether their own or that of an ally, and ways must be found to lessen and ultimately overcome their reliance on nuclear deterrence. The former Cold War rivals should commit themselves irreversibly to bringing down the number of warheads in their arsenals to hundreds, not thousands. That could be achieved only if every State had a clear picture of the fissile material holdings of every other State and was confident that that material was secure. All States, nuclear and non-nuclear alike, must therefore increase their transparency and security.

23. It must also be borne in mind that States' attitudes to the Treaty were linked to broader questions of national, regional and global security, including the resolution of regional conflicts. The more confidence States had in the collective security system, the more prepared they would be to rely on non-proliferation rather than on deterrence and the closer they would be to universal accession to the Treaty. In his report, "In larger freedom: towards development, security and human rights for all" (A/59/2005), he had offered Member States a vision of a revitalized system of collective security for the twenty-first century; when world leaders meet in September 2005, they must take bold decisions to bring that vision closer to reality.

24. He had proposed an ambitious agenda, but the consequences of failure were too great to aim for anything less and the promise of success was plain for all to see: a world of reduced nuclear threat and, ultimately, one free of nuclear weapons. But such a world could not be achieved if States parties accepted only some of the truths that would be uttered during the Conference; as J. Robert Oppenheimer, one of the "fathers" of the atomic bomb, had warned, "The peoples of this world must unite, or they will perish... The atom bomb has spelled [this] out for all men to understand".

Address by the Director-General of the International Atomic Energy Agency

25. **Mr. ElBaradei** (Director-General of the International Atomic Energy Agency) said that the core of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) could be summed up in two words: security and development. Although the States parties to the Treaty held differing priorities and views, he trusted that all shared the two goals of development for all through advanced technology and security for all through the reduction and ultimate elimination of the nuclear threat. Those shared goals were the foundation on which the international community had built the landmark Treaty in 1970. They had agreed to work towards a world free of nuclear weapons, and, while working towards that goal, to prevent the acquisition of nuclear weapons by additional States and make the peaceful applications of nuclear energy available to all. Those commitments were mutually reinforcing. They were still as valid as they had been when first made — and were even more urgent. If the parties could not work together, each acknowledging the development

priorities and security concerns of the other, the result of the Conference would be inaction.

26. In the five years since the 2000 Review Conference, the world had changed and fears of a deadly nuclear detonation had reawakened, driven by new realities: the rise in terrorism, the discovery of clandestine nuclear programmes and the emergence of a nuclear black market. Those realities had heightened awareness of vulnerabilities in the NPT regime: the acquisition by more and more countries of sensitive nuclear know-how and capabilities; the uneven degree of physical protection of nuclear materials from country to country; the limitations on the verification authority of IAEA, particularly in countries without additional protocols in force; the continuing reliance on nuclear deterrence; the ongoing perception of imbalance between the nuclear haves and have-nots; and the sense of insecurity persisting, unaddressed, in a number of regions, most worryingly in the Middle East and the Korean Peninsula. If the global community accepted that the benefits of peaceful nuclear technology were essential to the world's health, environment and social and economic development, it must ensure that a framework was in place that would effectively prevent the military applications of nuclear technology from leading to self-destruction. The Treaty had worked well for 35 years, but unless it was regarded as part of a living, dynamic regime, capable of evolving to match changing realities, it would fade into irrelevance, leaving the world vulnerable and unprotected.

27. Although the twin goals of security and development remained the same, the mechanisms for achieving those goals must evolve. The States parties should, first of all, reaffirm the goals established in 1970 and send a clear-cut message that their commitment to those goals had not changed: that they had zero tolerance for new States developing nuclear weapons, but would ensure that all countries had the right to use nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. Without those commitments, the present Conference would be a meaningless exercise.

28. Second, they should strengthen the verification authority of IAEA. In recent years, the additional protocol to comprehensive safeguards agreements had proved its worth. With better access to information and locations, IAEA got better results. As Director-General of IAEA, he would welcome an acknowledgement by the Conference that the additional protocol was an

integral part of IAEA safeguards in every State party to the Treaty. Effective verification consisted of four aspects: adequate legal authority, state-of-the-art technology, access to all available information, and sufficient human and financial resources. But verification was but one part of the non-proliferation regime. For the regime as a whole to function effectively, there must also be effective export controls, effective physical protection of nuclear material and effective mechanisms for dealing with cases of non-compliance, and those components must be well integrated. The whole purpose of verification was to build confidence. In cases where proliferation concerns existed, he would urge States to be open and transparent. Even if such measures went beyond a State's legal obligations, they would pay valuable dividends in restoring the confidence of the international community.

29. Third, the States parties should improve control over proliferation of sensitive parts of the nuclear fuel cycle, specifically, activities involving uranium enrichment and plutonium separation. As experience had shown, effective control of nuclear materials was the bottleneck inhibiting nuclear weapons development. Without question, improving control of facilities capable of producing weapon-usable material would go a long way towards establishing a better margin of security. There was no incompatibility between tightening controls over the nuclear fuel cycle and expanding the use of peaceful nuclear technology. In fact, reducing the risks of proliferation could pave the way for more widespread use of peaceful nuclear applications.

30. Whatever the optimum fuel cycle control mechanism might look like, it should be different from the present mechanisms, and it should, above all, be equitable and effective. The Secretary-General's High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change had urged negotiations without delay on an arrangement, under the IAEA Statute, for the Agency to serve as a guarantor of two fuel-cycle-related services: the supply of fissile material for fuel and the reprocessing of spent fuel. The guaranteed provision of reactor technology and nuclear fuel to users that satisfied agreed non-proliferation requirements was clearly a prerequisite for acceptance of any additional controls on the fuel cycle. The High-Level Panel had also urged that, while the arrangement was being negotiated, a voluntary time-limited moratorium on new fuel cycle facilities

should be put in place. Such a moratorium would signal the willingness of the international community to address that vulnerability in the regime and provide an opportunity for analysis and dialogue. An international group of experts to examine various approaches for the future management of the fuel cycle, which, as Director-General of IAEA, he had appointed, had made a good start. If requested, IAEA would be pleased to pursue more detailed work on the relevant legal, technical, financial and institutional aspects of the fuel cycle, perhaps beginning with the development of approaches for providing assurance of supply.

31. Fourth, the international community must secure and control nuclear material. A number of international and regional initiatives were under way to help countries improve their physical protection of nuclear material. The International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism had just been adopted by the General Assembly. Parties to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material were working to amend the Convention to broaden its scope. Efforts had been initiated to minimize and eventually eliminate the use of high enriched uranium in peaceful nuclear applications. The Conference should voice its support for such initiatives.

32. Fifth, the States parties must show the world that their commitment to nuclear disarmament was firm. As long as some countries placed strategic reliance on nuclear weapons as a deterrent, other countries would emulate them. In 2000, the nuclear-weapon States had made an unequivocal undertaking to achieve the total elimination of nuclear weapons. It was vital that they should continue to demonstrate that commitment through concrete action. Given current realities, it was also essential for disarmament discussions to include States not parties to the Treaty, namely, India, Israel and Pakistan. Nuclear disarmament could succeed only if it was universal. With regard to a possible disarmament road map, it was clear that nuclear-weapon States could make further irreversible reductions in their existing arsenals and take concrete action to reduce the strategic role currently given to nuclear weapons.

33. Sixth, verification efforts must be backed by an effective mechanism for dealing with non-compliance. In that regard, both the Treaty and the IAEA Statute relied on the Security Council. In a case of non-

compliance or of withdrawal from the Treaty, the Council should consider promptly the implications for international peace and security and take the appropriate measures.

34. Lastly, the international community should use all available mechanisms to address the security concerns of all. Clearly, not every State viewed its security as assured under the current NPT regime. The means to achieving security were often region-specific. In some regions, security had been advanced by the creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones. The Conference should encourage the establishment of additional nuclear-weapon-free zones, in parallel with the resolution of long-standing conflicts, in areas such as the Middle East and the Korean Peninsula. The use of security assurances would also help to reduce security concerns.

35. Measures to improve security must be accompanied by an unequivocal commitment to the development component. Nuclear science played a key role in economic and social development. Nuclear energy generated 16 per cent of the world's electricity with almost no greenhouse gas emissions. Radiotherapy was widely used to combat cancer. Other nuclear techniques were used to study child malnutrition and fight infectious diseases and produce higher-yielding, disease-resistant crops. The promise that such advanced nuclear technologies held for addressing the needs of the developing world could not be abandoned. The Conference should reaffirm the commitment to ensure the assistance and funding necessary to support peaceful nuclear applications in developing countries.

36. It was clear that the priorities and perceptions of security differed, sometimes sharply, among States parties to the Treaty, but the only way to address all security concerns was through joint and collective action. Nuclear-weapon States continued to rely on nuclear weapons in part because they had developed no alternative to nuclear deterrence. In order to accelerate the complete elimination of all nuclear weapons, the international community must channel its creativity and resources towards the development of an alternative system for collective security in which nuclear deterrence did not figure. Non-nuclear-weapon States were either dependent on their alliances with nuclear-weapon States — again under a security umbrella dependent on nuclear deterrence — or felt insecure and unprotected because of the absence of such an alliance. There, too, a solution must be found

through an inclusive and equitable collective security system.

37. In an era of globalization and interdependence, security strategies founded on the priorities of individual countries or groups of countries could only be a short-term solution. As the Secretary-General had recently stated, collective security today depended on accepting that the threats which each region of the world perceived as the most urgent were in fact equally so for all. The Review Conference offered an opportunity to acknowledge the vulnerabilities of all and focus on shared goals, to put in place a paradigm of a new collective security system to achieve those goals and enable all to live in freedom and dignity. The multilateral dialogue in which the States parties were engaged was, much like democracy, slow, unwieldy and at times frustrating, but it was far superior to any other approach in terms of the prospect of achieving equitable and therefore durable security solutions. In short, it remained the best, if not the only, option. The opportunity came only once every five years. If the Conference failed to act, the NPT framework might be the same in 2010, but the world certainly would be different: by 2010 would-be proliferators would continue to innovate and sensitive nuclear technology would continue to spread; the arsenals of nuclear-weapon States would continue to be modernized; and extremist groups would continue their hunt to acquire and use a nuclear explosive device — or, even worse, succeed. Clearly, the Conference could not accomplish everything in one month, but it must set the wheels of change in motion. Humanity deserved no less.

Adoption of the rules of procedure

38. **The President** said that consultations conducted prior to the Conference in accordance with the mandate given him by the Preparatory Committee had revealed the continuation of divergent views on the status of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in relation to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. States parties were prepared to uphold the procedure applied by the Chairmen of the second and third sessions of the Preparatory Committee, but a number of States parties wished to discuss the general question of withdrawal as provided for in article X of the Treaty. It was the intention of the President, under his own responsibility, not to open a debate on the status of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and to retain the nameplate of that country temporarily

in his custody. He had therefore asked the Secretariat to hold the nameplate in the conference room for the duration of the Review Conference. That action was in no way meant to prejudice the outcome of ongoing consultations on the issue or the consideration of questions related to article X of the Treaty.

39. The Preparatory Committee had not reached an agreement on a provisional agenda for the Conference. Some progress had since been made in narrowing divergences, but agreement had not yet been reached on an agenda. Nonetheless, the consultations had clearly shown that States parties were prepared to proceed with business and to formalize the decisions of the Preparatory Committee on a number of organizational and procedural issues. He intended to act accordingly.

40. He then drew attention to the draft rules of procedure, contained in annex II of the final report of the Preparatory Committee (NPT/CONF.2005/1), which had been submitted to the Conference by the Chairman of the third session of Preparatory Committee. In the absence of objections, he took it that the Conference wished to adopt the draft rules of procedure.

41. *It was so decided.*

Election of Chairmen and Vice-Chairmen of the Main Committees, the Drafting Committee and the Credentials Committee

42. **The President** said that, at its third session, the Preparatory Committee had agreed to recommend that Main Committee I should be chaired by a representative of the Group of Non-Aligned and Other States (Indonesia); Main Committee II should be chaired by a representative of the Group of Eastern European States (Hungary); and Main Committee III should be chaired by a representative of the Western Group (Sweden). It had also agreed to recommend that the post of Chairman of the Drafting Committee should be assumed by a representative of the Group of Eastern European States and the post of Chairman of the Credentials Committee by a representative of the Group of Non-Aligned and Other States. The following candidates for the posts of Chairman had been endorsed by the respective Groups of States: for Main Committee I, Mr. Parnohadiningrat (Indonesia); for Main Committee II, Mr. Molnár (Hungary); for Main Committee III, Ms. Borsiin Bonnier (Sweden); for the

Drafting Committee, Mr. Costea (Romania). So far no candidate had been proposed as Chairman of the Credentials Committee.

43. *Mr. Parnohadiningrat (Indonesia), Mr. Molnár (Hungary), Ms. Borsiin Bonnier (Sweden) and Mr. Costea (Romania), were elected Chairmen of Main Committee I, Main Committee II, Main Committee III and the Drafting Committee, respectively.*

44. **The President** said that, in accordance with rule 5 of the rules of procedure, the Conference should proceed to elect two Vice-Chairmen for each of the three Main Committees, the Drafting Committee and the Credentials Committee. So far the following nominations for the posts of Vice-Chairmen had been received: for Main Committee I, Mr. Lew Qwang-chul (Republic of Korea); for Main Committee II, Mr. Taiana (Argentina); for Main Committee III, Mr. Melo (Albania); for the Drafting Committee, Mr. Paulsen (Norway); and for the Credentials Committee, Ms. Panckhurst (New Zealand) and Mr. Piperkov (Bulgaria).

45. *Mr. Lew Qwang-chul (Republic of Korea), Mr. Taiana (Argentina), Mr. Melo (Albania), Mr. Paulsen (Norway), Ms. Panckhurst (New Zealand) and Mr. Piperkov (Bulgaria) were elected Vice-Chairmen of Main Committee I, Main Committee II, Main Committee III, the Drafting Committee and the Credentials Committee, respectively.*

Election of Vice-Presidents

46. According to rule 5 of the rules of procedure, the Conference should proceed to elect 34 Vice-Presidents of the Conference. The following nominations had been received for the posts of Vice-President: for the seven posts allotted to the Group of Eastern European States: Czech Republic, Lithuania, Poland, Serbia and Montenegro, Slovakia, Slovenia and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia; for the 10 posts allotted to the Western Group: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland; for the 17 posts allotted to the Group of Non-Aligned and Other States: Algeria, Chile, China, Cuba, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Jamaica, Kuwait, South Africa and Zambia, with further nominations to come after consultations.

47. *Algeria, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Chile, China, Cuba, Czech Republic, France,*

Germany, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Kuwait, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Poland, Serbia and Montenegro, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and Zambia were elected Vice-Presidents of the Conference.

Appointment of the Credentials Committee

48. **The President** said that, according to rule 3 of the rules of procedure, the Conference should proceed to appoint six members of the Credentials Committee on the proposal of the President of the Conference, in addition to the Chairman and two Vice-Chairmen elected. Accordingly, he proposed the following members of the Credentials Committee: Croatia, Kazakhstan, Malta, Serbia and Montenegro, and Switzerland.

49. *Croatia, Kazakhstan, Malta, Serbia and Montenegro, and Switzerland were elected members of the Credentials Committee.*

50. **The Chairman** said he hoped that candidates for the remaining posts of Chairman of the Credentials Committee, Vice-Chairmen of the Main Committees and the Drafting Committee and Vice-Presidents of the Conference would soon be put forward.

Confirmation of the nomination of the Secretary-General of the Conference

51. **The President** said that, at its first session, the Preparatory Committee had decided to invite the Secretary-General of the United Nations, in consultation with members of the Preparatory Committee, to nominate an official to act as provisional Secretary-General of the 2005 Review Conference. At its third session, the Secretary-General had nominated Mr. Jerzy Zaleski, Department for Disarmament Affairs, to serve in that capacity.

52. *Mr. Zaleski was confirmed as Secretary-General of the 2005 Review Conference.*

Requests for observer status

53. **The President**, speaking with reference to rule 44, paragraph 3, of the rules of procedure, said that requests for observer agency status had been received from the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean, the

Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization, the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, the International Committee of the Red Cross, the Commission of the African Union, the League of Arab States and the Organization of the Islamic Conference. He took it that the Conference wished to accede to those requests.

54. *It was so decided.*

The meeting rose at 11.55 a.m.