

United Nations
**GENERAL
ASSEMBLY**

THIRTY-EIGHTH SESSION

*Official Records**



COPY
FOR REFERENCE
ONLY - DO NOT
CIRCULATE

FIRST COMMITTEE
25th meeting
held on
Friday, 4 November 1983
at 3 p.m.
New York

VERBATIM RECORD OF THE 25th MEETING

Chairman: Mr. VRAALSEN (Norway)

CONTENTS

GENERAL DEBATE ON ALL DISARMAMENT ITEMS (continued)

Statements were made by:

- Mr. Rakotoniaina (Madagascar)
- Mr. Solarz (United States of America)
- Mr. Lusaka (Zambia)
- Mr. Petrovsky (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics)
- Mr. Lehne (Austria)
- Mr. Martynov (Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic)

*This record is subject to correction. Corrections should be sent under the signature of a member of the delegation concerned *within one week of the date of publication* to the Chief of the Official Records Editing Section, room DC2-750, 2 United Nations Plaza, and incorporated in a copy of the record.

Corrections will be issued after the end of the session, in a separate fascicle for each Committee.

Distr. GENERAL
A/C.1/38/PV.25
15 November 1983

ENGLISH

The meeting was called to order at 3.05 p.m.

AGENDA ITEMS 43 TO 63, 139 TO 141, 143 AND 144 (continued)

GENERAL DEBATE

Mr. RAKOTONIAINA (Madagascar) (interpretation from French): I should first like to extend to you, Sir, the heartiest congratulations of the delegation of Madagascar on your election as Chairman of the First Committee. We sincerely hope that you will be successful in discharging your heavy responsibilities during this session. Our congratulations go also to the other officers of the Committee.

The greatest experts have spoken out, in other international forums and, more recently, in the United Nations, about the threat that a nuclear war would pose to the survival of mankind. This warning is particularly serious today because of the very disturbing international political climate.

In our view, the most pressing task now is to maintain peace by strict respect for the principles of the Charter, which, among other things, prohibits the use or the threat of the use of force. In the present circumstances, when increasing tension could lead to nuclear escalation, no effort should be spared to eliminate without delay the risk of a nuclear confrontation; for the fate of mankind would be at stake. But passing concerns about the political situation should not make us lose sight of our commitment to general disarmament, in particular nuclear disarmament - an essential condition for eliminating the danger of nuclear war and strengthening international peace and security.

In this connection, the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament clearly defines the actions which it is possible, indeed urgent, to take. It is to be deplored, however, that the hopes aroused by the adoption of this historic document by consensus have now given way

(Mr. Rakotoniaina, Madagascar)

to fear and uncertainty because the gears of the arms race are still turning. And this mad race, in its headlong rush forward, has now reached outer space, with unpredictable military and political consequences.

No one would deny that the arms build-up, in particular in nuclear weapons, does not strengthen international security. Quite to the contrary, it weakens international security and acts to the detriment of efforts to relax international tension and establish relations based on peaceful coexistence and confidence among States - indispensable conditions for fruitful international co-operation. Unfortunately, the view that possession of nuclear weapons is a deterrent is held by strategists and certain political circles. In practice, this is reflected in the lip service paid to the principle of disarmament while every effort is actually made to avoid the concrete actions that are proposed. This regrettable situation may be seen in the work of the multilateral bodies dealing with disarmament.

Not so very long ago, in this very room, distinguished persons cited statistics about the number of resolutions proposed by the First Committee that had been adopted by the General Assembly. That number increases each year, at a striking rate. But all these resolutions have remained dead letters, even those that were adopted by overwhelming majorities or unanimously. That is hardly encouraging. The same can be said of the Committee on Disarmament, whose structure and effectiveness as the sole multilateral disarmament negotiating body the General Assembly has been determined to revitalize. On that Committee's agenda there are such important questions as the prohibition of nuclear weapons, the cessation of the arms race, the prevention of nuclear war and other matters related to that question, the security of non-nuclear-weapon States, chemical and radiological weapons, the prevention of an arms race in outer space, and the global programme for disarmament.

(Mr. Rakotoniaina, Madagascar)

These are all subjects urgently requiring solutions, but no real progress has yet been made. It would seem that debates have been only on peripheral issues, and at times these debates have led to polemics on doctrines having to do with security. It is disappointing to say the least that every time an initiative is taken concerning the establishment of a new order in international political and economic relations the political will seems to be lacking, for some countries seem unable to understand the aspirations and interests of others.

The many countries that see security in disarmament find it inadmissible that the security of the world should be subordinated to the security interests of a handful of States. The unhealthy state of international relations is undoubtedly reflected in work on disarmament, but the fact remains that the arms race is clearly at the root of the atmosphere of distrust and suspicion which has obstructed any large-scale joint undertaking.

It is now more important than ever to stop the arms race. In our opinion the first step is for the nuclear-weapon States simultaneously to put a quantitative and qualitative freeze on their existing nuclear arsenals. The cessation of nuclear tests would make a significant contribution to ending the improvement of nuclear weapons and the development of new types of weapons. The primary goal is to curb the arms race.

The arguments which have been advanced on verification of observance of a nuclear test ban treaty do not stand up to the technical and scientific briefings which have been given at various times. All that is needed in order to reach agreement on a nuclear test ban is the political will. In addition, the nuclear-weapon States parties to the 1963 partial nuclear test ban Treaty are legally committed under that instrument to

"the conclusion of a treaty resulting in the permanent banning of all nuclear test explosions". (ENDC/100/Rev.1, p. 2)

(Mr. Rakotoniaina, Madagascar)

Even the nuclear-weapon States have recognized that the problem of distinguishing between nuclear weapon tests and nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes could be resolved by negotiation.

Once the arms race has been stopped, specific action will have to be taken to reverse the trend. In this context, the super-Powers should substantially reduce their nuclear arsenals, when the other nuclear Powers would follow suit, so that real progress could be made towards general and complete disarmament.

In the meantime, the nuclear-weapon States should give clear, categorical, guarantees in a binding international instrument that non-nuclear-weapon States will not be threatened or attacked with nuclear weapons. It is only fair that the non-nuclear-weapon States which formally renounce the acquisition of nuclear weapons should not have to be satisfied with unilateral declarations which are not incorporated in an instrument with the same binding legal force as the one they have themselves signed.

While the international community is trying to prevent nuclear war and end the arms race, competition for military purposes in outer space would increase the danger of nuclear war. Therefore, it is essential to try to ban for ever the use of outer space for hostile purposes. Any activities in outer space, the common heritage of mankind, should be for peaceful purposes and serve the interests of all nations.

The creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones is considered by all to be an important disarmament measure, but it is viable only if all the countries in a particular zone are agreed on the objectives, aims and principles of agreements or arrangements which are concluded, and all nuclear-weapon States agree to respect the status of such zones and refrain from using or threatening to use nuclear weapons against the States in those zones.

(Mr. Rakotoniaina, Madagascar)

Africa has committed itself to turning that continent into a nuclear-weapon-free zone. It is in the interest of international peace and security, and therefore of all peoples, in view of the indivisibility of security, to help Africa to fulfil its aspirations in this respect. Consequently, any co-operation which strengthened South Africa's nuclear capacity would be directly contrary to the determination of the African countries to work for peace and development, and would constitute an unfriendly act with unpredictable repercussions.

The First Committee will soon be considering, as in past years, a report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean. Efforts to ensure implementation of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace, adopted by the General Assembly in 1971, have not always borne fruit.

Following the expansion of the Ad Hoc Committee in 1979, we had hoped that the Conference would be convened and would achieve the objectives set out in the Declaration. However, the Committee continues to encounter stalling tactics which prevent its setting a date for the Conference, because some countries do not want to commit themselves to participate, and put forward as preconditions the need first to reconcile positions and improve the international situation. I shall not weary the Committee with comments on the irrationality of those arguments, but we hope that in the interests of peace and security reason will finally prevail.

The essential tasks of our time are to prevent nuclear war and halt and reverse the arms race. If we succeed, tensions will be reduced, confidence will be restored, differences will be reconciled and co-operation between States will no longer be an empty phrase. The United Nations, under the Charter, has a primary and decisive role to play in this ambitious and promising enterprise; but this means that the moral authority of the United Nations must be restored, so that it may better serve the interests of all mankind.

Mr. SOLARZ (United States of America): Today I should like to address the troubling and troublesome question of the use of illegal chemical weapons and what needs to be done about it.

Since August 1980 the Government of the United States has reported periodically to this Committee, to the Secretary-General and to Member States on its findings regarding chemical warfare in Afghanistan and South-East Asia. I refer members in particular to the reports "Chemical Warfare in Southeast Asia and Afghanistan", released on 22 March 1982 and distributed in United Nations document A/37/157, and "Chemical Warfare in Southeast Asia and Afghanistan: An Update", released in November 1982 and distributed in United Nations document A/C.1/37/10.

The United Nations is a singularly appropriate institution to address this question, because the use of illegal chemical weapons poses a threat to every nation in the world, but most of all to those developing countries least able to protect themselves against such attacks. Since the First World War, it is, indeed, only in developing nations that such weapons have been used. I submit that only if we speak out and take appropriate action here will the terror end over there.

Based on United States Government reports, as well as on international studies on this issue, we believe that the Soviet Union and its allies have violated the 1925 Geneva Protocol on chemical weapons and the 1972 Convention on biological and toxin weapons. It is a long way from the walls of the Kremlin to the rugged mountains of Afghanistan, the serene hills of Laos and the lush jungles of Kampuchea, but by some evil logic, and in callous disregard of human life, the Government of the Soviet Union has decided to use chemical weapons to further its expansionist foreign policy aims, or at least to test these weapons on Asian peoples.

(Mr. Solarz, United States)

My Government realizes full well that these are serious charges, as do the other Governments that have made them. Yet there are still countries which question their validity. Similarly, while many experts who are technically qualified to make judgements on this matter have concluded that chemical warfare has taken place, there are others who challenge the validity or relevance of that conclusion. In such circumstances, it is perhaps understandable why so many Governments and individuals should be genuinely perplexed about the accuracy or validity of these charges.

There can be little doubt that most Governments genuinely share the abhorrence with which the United States regards chemical warfare, or that they share our commitment to end it once and for all. Allow me, then, to review my Government's evidence and to tell this Committee why, in spite of the conflicting claims, we believe that beyond a shadow of a doubt illegal chemical weapons have been used in South-East Asia and Afghanistan.

First, as of late last year several thousand refugees had reported over 200 chemical warfare attacks in Laos, over 100 in Cambodia and around 60 in Afghanistan. The earliest attacks took place in Laos in the mid-1970s, and the most recent in South-East Asia this past summer. The refugees described substances of various colours having been released from airplanes or helicopters on to villages or resistance forces. In many cases, according to the reports, the symptoms associated with trichothecene poisoning appeared in both humans and animals soon after the attacks took place.

Secondly, scientific analysis by highly sophisticated methods of scrapings of agent residue taken from rocks and vegetation in reported attack areas in Laos, Kampuchea and Afghanistan have revealed concentrations and combinations of mycotoxin trichothecenes never before observed anywhere in nature. Mycotoxins are not present in control samples taken from areas surrounding the point of attack.

(Mr. Solarz, United States)

The testing of these samples was conducted by both United States Government and independent university scientists. The samples have been shared with other Governments.

Thirdly, scientific analysis by highly sophisticated methods of 20 samples of blood, urine and tissue from reported victims of chemical warfare attacks have shown unprecedented concentrations and combinations of trichothecenes. The toxins were not found in control samples taken from individuals with a life history similar to that of the victims and who did not report being attacked.

Fourthly, doctors who have worked as part of the international and private relief effort along the borders to which the victims of chemical warfare have fled almost uniformly report finding signs and symptoms which are not consistent with any known disease, but which do conform to symptoms associated with trichothecene poisoning. These doctors include citizens not just of the United States, but of France, India, the Philippines and Canada.

Fifthly, testimony from defectors who served in the Lao, Vietnamese and Afghan armed forces, and some of whom were involved in actual attacks, describes in minute detail the procedures employed in chemical warfare attacks and documents supervision by Soviet personnel.

If chemical warfare is occurring, as my Government is convinced it is, the Soviet Union is surely responsible. It is highly doubtful that Viet Nam, Laos and Afghanistan have by themselves the scientific or technical capacity to manufacture these illegal substances. The Soviet Union does have that capacity. Can anyone doubt who has provided chemical weapons to those countries?

A number of people and nations have attempted to deny or explain away the accumulating evidence. Given the scientific complexity of the issue and the difficulties of collecting data, fair-minded Governments and individuals can be

(Mr. Solarz, United States)

excused if they are somewhat uncertain. On close examination, however, none of the alternative hypotheses that have been put forward stand up to critical examination.

Most easily dismissed is the Soviet Union's own defence, which is hardly a defence at all. Moscow's undocumented charges of slander, distortion and fabrication by the United States are not worth a reply. The United Nations own group of experts examined the Soviet critiques and gave them no credence whatsoever.

Some observers have taken issue with the testimony of refugees, which they suppose to be the principal foundation of the United States Government's case. These accounts are unreliable, it is said, because they are offered by individuals who have a political or personal axe to grind or who are in the grip of some sort of cultural hysteria.

Even if my Government were relying solely on refugee testimony - which it most certainly is not - the stories of the victims are not to be dismissed. They come from a wide variety of Khmer, Hmong and Afghan refugees, several thousand in number, ranging from little children to the elderly, who came from a variety of locations over a period of several years. The fact that many refugees do not report chemical attacks belies the theory of mass hysteria, thus lending greater credence to the accounts of the victims.

Regrettably, many people continue to regard refugee reports as inherently unreliable. History should teach us to open our ears. Refugees have a record of being excellent sources of information on inaccessible societies and situations.

The first early reports of the Holocaust occurring in Nazi-occupied Europe were brought by people fleeing the terror. Despite the tendency of those who received these reports to dismiss them as implausible and inconceivable, they turned out to be true. Tragically, millions died before the horror ended.

(Mr. Solarz, United States)

I could cite other, more recent, cases where the stories of refugees in Asia, Africa and Latin America had been initially dismissed but were subsequently confirmed. It strains credulity to believe that the refugees escaping yellow rain in Asia, alone among all the victims of repression, are uniquely engaged in a monumental hoax.

Finally, there are claims that mycotoxins are naturally present in South-East Asia as a result of fungi growing on vegetation and on pollen excreted by bees. This would explain, it is argued, why trichothecenes have been found in the scrapings and medical samples. However, I refer representatives to the following conclusion of a Canadian toxicologist who prepared a report for the Department of External Affairs of the Government of Canada:

"Potential producers of trichothecenes exist in South-East Asia, but neither naturally occurring diseases due to these toxins occur, nor are there any detectable levels of mycotoxins in the natural environment."

The concentrations found in the yellow rain samples are orders of magnitude higher than those found by sophisticated techniques to have occurred naturally. The combination of trichothecenes in the yellow rain samples are unique. And, it should be remembered, trichothecenes are known to exist in nature only in temperate climates.

The truth is that, no matter how hard those who prefer to see, hear and speak no evil may try, the evidence simply cannot be explained away. I must confess that I, too, was originally sceptical of the validity of the yellow rain case when it was first presented by our own Government. But on the basis of a thorough review of the evidence - Congressional hearings in which I have participated, and conversations with doctors who have treated yellow rain victims, scientists who

(Mr. Solarz, United States)

have examined the physical evidence, and the victims of yellow rain attacks themselves - my doubts have vanished.

Other countries have conducted their own investigations. We hope that more will do so. I have already made reference to the studies conducted for the Government of Canada, the principal conclusions of which are as follows:

First, the events that are reported to have taken place at the time of alleged chemical warfare attacks cannot be explained on the basis of naturally occurring diseases.

Secondly, to judge on the basis of eyewitness reports, it appears that three different types of agents have been employed as warfare agents, one of them being yellow rain; the others are green and white.

Thirdly, most of the features ascribed to yellow rain attacks are consistent with trichothecene mycotoxicosis.

Fourthly, although certain types of mycotoxins occur in Thailand and probably also in surrounding countries, there is no history of evidence that they result in diseases with the symptomatology of trichothecene poisoning.

The Governments of other countries have come to conclusions similar to those of the Government of the United States. Member countries of the United Nations have expressed their concern about the use of these weapons in General Assembly resolutions 35/144 C, 36/96 C, 37/89 D, and 37/98 E. Predictably - and to no one's surprise - the Soviet Union and its allies voted against all those resolutions.

The United Nations own Group of Experts has played an important investigatory role. Formed in December 1980 in accordance with United Nations General Assembly resolution 35/144 C under the auspices of the Secretary-General, the Group submitted its interim report a year later. By resolution 36/96 C, the General Assembly extended its mandate for another year.

(Mr. Solarz, United States)

That Group of Experts, consisting of impartial experts from non-aligned countries, submitted its final report to the General Assembly on 1 December 1982. That report regarded as "unlikely to be valid" the Soviet interpretation that the presence of trichothecenes in samples tested was somehow connected with United States use of Agent Orange in Viet Nam. The Group of Experts did conclude, however, that on the basis of interviews with doctors and victims and of examination of physical samples, "it could not disregard the circumstantial evidence suggestive of the possible use of some sort of toxic chemical substance in some instances".

The Group of Experts did not reach a more definitive judgement because it was not permitted to make an on-site investigation in Laos, Kampuchea and Afghanistan. The inability of the Group of Experts to arrive at a more definitive conclusion should not be laid at the door of the Group. It was due solely to the rejection by the authorities controlling those countries of the Group's request to undertake such investigations.

If the allies of the Soviet Union are really innocent of the charges, why did they not permit an independent inquiry to clear their name? If United Nations agricultural experts are welcomed in Laos, why are not chemical weapons experts also welcomed? The areas in which these alleged attacks have taken place do not contain vital military installations knowledge of which would jeopardize the security of those countries. What do they have to hide?

The Government of the United States believes it important that impartial and objective investigators have access to the affected areas. The rulers in Moscow, Hanoi, Vientiane and Pnom Penh do not appear to share that belief. It seems clear that they know full well that such an investigation would not be exculpatory.

(Mr. Solarz, United States)

My Government hopes that appropriate arrangements will soon be in place to allow the continued investigation of any further report of chemical weapons use. Meanwhile, the only responsible course for those Governments which believe that such weapons have been used is to speak out and to act in accordance with the preponderance of evidence.

We must not minimize the implications of this affront to the international conscience and of this retreat into inhumane barbarism.

The first implication concerns warfare itself. For over five decades chemical and toxin weapons had been successfully eliminated from the battlefields of the world. In the Second World War fear of retaliation was an effective deterrent to the use of chemical warfare among the developed countries, and remains so today. Developing countries, however, do not possess the means to retaliate. Condemnation of the Governments responsible for using chemical weapons is therefore the only recourse they have.

(Mr. Solarz, United States)

The second implication bears on international law. The prohibition of the use of chemical weapons has, by reason of the practice and affirmations of States, become a part of the rules of customary international law which are binding on all States. Toxins - biologically-produced chemical substances - fall within the prohibitions of both the 1925 Geneva Protocol and the 1972 biological and toxin weapons Convention. Unless those that cynically violate these agreements are called to account, the continued viability of those agreements will be called into question.

Thirdly, violation of the world's oldest arms control agreement, the 1925 Geneva Protocol, puts other arms control and disarmament agreements in potential - I repeat, potential - jeopardy. Some have argued that Soviet defiance of international norms through the use of chemical and toxin weapons proves that arms control cannot work. If the Soviets blatantly violate two important international treaties, some ask, what will keep them from violating other arms control agreements as well?

By this logic one would soon adopt a defeatist attitude regarding any arms control agreement. My Government cannot and will not accept such a gloomy scenario. It believes that arms control agreements with effective verification and compliance mechanisms are both possible and necessary.

The position of the Government of the United States is clear. Let me repeat that we are committed to the development of a convention that would prohibit the development, production, stockpiling, acquisition, retention and transfer of chemical weapons. The convention should mandate the declaration and destruction of all existing stockpiles of chemical weapons and of facilities for their production and stockpiling, and it should include effective verification provisions to provide

(Mr. Solarz, United States)

confidence that all parties are complying with all provisions of the convention. My Government deeply regrets that the Government of the Soviet Union has been unwilling to negotiate seriously on verification procedures, specifically on-site inspection, on which such an agreement clearly and unmistakably depends.

Until such a convention is concluded, the Government of the United States will continue to work with other members of the international community in an effort to stop the outrage of chemical warfare in South-East Asia, Afghanistan and anywhere else. Moreover, we support efforts to strengthen the 1972 biological and toxin weapons Convention and to enforce the existing legal constraints on the use of these weapons.

In December 1982 the United Nations General Assembly recommended by an overwhelming vote that the States that are parties to the biological and toxin weapons Convention be called on to hold a special conference to establish effective procedures for compliance with its provisions. In addition, the General Assembly requested the Secretary-General to establish procedures to investigate promptly possible violations of the 1925 Geneva Protocol. We believe it is important that both resolutions be implemented promptly, and we will continue to participate in follow-on action.

Having said that, I cannot stress too strongly that the use of chemical weapons in Afghanistan and South-East Asia, in violation of international law and any moral standard, should stir all nations of the world. This is not a propaganda match between East and West. This is not simply a quarrel between the super-Powers. This is a conflict between right and wrong, between morality and immorality, and between humanity and inhumanity. One would hope that the United Nations would make clear on which side it stands.

(Mr. Solarz, United States)

As a representative of the United States Government and a member of the United States Congress, I wish to convey the deep concern that my colleagues in the Congress and the American people as a whole feel about this issue, and it is in that spirit that I would like to conclude with the timeless words of the English poet, John Donne, who wrote:

"No man is an island, entire of itself; every man is a piece on the continent, a part of the main. If a clod be washed away by the sea, Europe is the less, as well as if a promontory were: Any man's death diminishes me, because I am involved in mankind. And therefore never send to know for whom the bell tolls; it tolls for thee."

I cannot resist the obvious paraphrase: ask not on whom the yellow rain falls - it falls on thee.

Mr. LUSAKA (Zambia): Since this is the first time that my delegation has made a statement under your chairmanship, Sir, I wish to begin by congratulating you on your unanimous election. Your election to the Chair is ample proof of the confidence that we all repose in you to steer our deliberations to a successful conclusion. I wish also to congratulate the other officers of the Committee on their election to their respective posts.

We are meeting once again at a time when the arms race has become the greatest peril facing mankind. The arms race has manifested itself in the quantitative and qualitative development of nuclear and conventional weapons. To these have been added new generations of chemical weapons with greater lethality and accuracy. There is also the danger of extending the arms race into outer space. The cumulative effect of these developments, born out of the arms race, has been to increase greatly the dangers to the survival of the human race.

(Mr. Lusaka, Zambia)

The dangers posed by the arms race have been widely recognized and this recognition has manifested itself in widespread demonstrations against nuclear war. There have also been bilateral and multilateral negotiations designed to lead to preliminary advances towards general and complete disarmament. To our dismay, no progress has been registered on this score over the past year.

(Mr. Lusaka, Zambia)

This development has been most disturbing in that, as in the past, it has made agreement very difficult in either intermediate-range or strategic nuclear arms talks. Nor, for that matter, has progress been made at the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction talks in Vienna.

At the same time, there has been marked emphasis on the concept of deterrence as the keeper of peace in Europe. But, as a concept, deterrence has been rendered a vague and meaningless slogan used only to justify the frenetic, runaway arms race through the sorry belief that the more nuclear weapons there are the better are the chances against the outbreak of a nuclear holocaust. But the opposite is true: the accumulation of more and better nuclear weapons has brought in its wake all kinds of doctrines that seem to condone the application of nuclear weapons as instruments of war.

In consequence, the two super-Powers are even contemplating putting their monstrous nuclear armaments on a "strike on warning" basis. This, in my delegation's view, is a very ominous development because a nuclear war could be inadvertently triggered off by miscalculation or indeed just by plain human error.

The concentration of nuclear weapons in the arsenals of the two blocs of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Warsaw Pact is, therefore, of immense concern to my delegation. Something must be done without delay to defuse the explosive situation. In this regard, we welcome the proposal by Sweden to hold a conference in Stockholm on confidence-building measures in Europe next year. We believe that confidence-building measures would go a long way to advance the cause of disarmament and, in the final analysis, world peace.

This Committee is once again seized of a host of disarmament issues which require urgent solutions. One such issue is, as I have already said, the prevention

(Mr. Lusaka, Zambia)

of nuclear war. Here the choice is between survival and annihilation. This naturally calls for a complete prohibition of the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

The prevention of nuclear war requires other intermediary measures such as the freeze on the development, production and deployment of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems pending conclusive negotiations on general and complete disarmament. The need for such a freeze derives from the fact that the arms race does not in any way show signs of abating. As a consequence, nuclear arms and their purported use far exceed the limits of legitimate self-defence, especially in the arsenals of the two super-Powers. In fact, the two could even cut their nuclear inventory by more than 50 per cent without adversely affecting their respective national security interests.

In order for us to advance towards disarmament, we should be in a position to incorporate a complete cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems. This should also include a ban on all further deployment of nuclear weapons and cessation of the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes. This would be serving the cause of disarmament, as it would hold at constant levels the existing nuclear positions now held respectively by the United States and the USSR. It would also serve the human cause in a tangible way through the conversion of nuclear industries into industries for development, construction and peace throughout the world.

In 1963, the need to curb the arms race led to the partial test-ban Treaty which outlawed nuclear tests in the atmosphere, under water and in outer space. Much to our chagrin, there have been more nuclear tests conducted underground than those made in the other environments prior to 1963. This development has been most

(Mr. Lusaka, Zambia)

unsettling. In order to arrest it, it urgently requires a comprehensive test ban which would prohibit all nuclear testing in all environments. Such a comprehensive test ban is one of the most important components of a nuclear freeze, for it would meet a number of contingencies most relevant to the freeze status. For example, it would make it difficult for most States to develop an operational capability to build or use nuclear weapons. The ban would also retard the development of weapons of the current nuclear Powers. In this regard, it should be recalled that the parties to the partial test-ban Treaty of 1963 made a commitment to negotiate a comprehensive test ban. The fruits of that commitment are still unattained, as efforts in the United Nations Committee on Disarmament aimed at negotiating a comprehensive test ban have been frustrated by some of those who are in a position to make a meaningful contribution to the ban by virtue of their awesome nuclear capability. We urge those Powers retarding progress in negotiations on that question to re-examine their conscience with a view to permitting the Committee on Disarmament to advance expeditiously towards the realization of a comprehensive test ban. We also urge all others who have sought to abstain from participating in those negotiations concerning the test ban to think again about their positions. As nuclear Powers and as members of the Committee on Disarmament, we believe that they have assumed certain responsibilities of a global nature which affect the future of mankind and human civilization.

Although it is recognized that the nuclear arms race has overshadowed the race in conventional weapons, it would be an error of gross magnitude to minimize the threat of conventional war. The truth of the matter is that conventional wars have been waged more than 140 times since the dawn of the nuclear age in 1945. These wars have brought havoc beyond description to the world in the period following the Second World War.

(Mr. Lusaka, Zambia)

In this connection, how can we forget that there are today wars in Chad, the Middle East, the Persian Gulf, Afghanistan, Kampuchea, Korea, Cyprus, Central America and now Grenada? This is not to mention the wars of national liberation in southern Africa whose continuation is the full responsibility of the apartheid régime of South Africa. The tensions and conflicts in these regions are not direct products of a nuclear confrontation but are rather the products of an unabating conventional arms race.

As the theatre of conventional warfare, the plight of third-world countries is exacerbated by the increasingly debilitating economic effects that large military spending has on them. World-wide military spending has assumed a deadening familiarity. Hundreds of billions of dollars are annually squandered on arms. Although great Powers and other militarily significant States account for a preponderant share of these figures, third-world countries are also forced to spend their meagre resources on arms which they would not otherwise do if they lived in secure and peaceful conditions. In the process, their development programmes suffer immeasurably since they are suffocated by lack of development funds. There is, therefore, an integral relationship between development and disarmament. For third-world countries, disarmament is not only a measure of physical survival but also a measure of economic viability and development.

Renewed attention to chemical and biological weapons raises the grim prospect that future wars would be even more destructive. Chemical weapons possess some characteristics of both conventional and nuclear weapons. Consequently, these weapons have the property of blurring the distinction between conventional and nuclear warfare, thereby increasing the danger of one sliding into the other. These weapons need urgently to be banned in order to spare our troubled world the agony of a slide back into the abyss of misery and devastation.

(Mr. Lusaka, Zambia)

The question of strengthening the security of non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons - otherwise known as negative security guarantees - is of paramount importance to Zambia. Such guarantees should immediately be made part and parcel of the conduct of international relations as a first step towards the conclusion of an international convention on the matter. We are anxious to see progress in the Committee on Disarmament in this field, which touches upon the security concerns of the overwhelming majority of the world's countries.

Zambia is also gravely concerned about the recent disquieting developments in regard to the arms race in outer space. The two super-Powers are intent on developing anti-satellite weapons in outer space with which each would be able to destroy those of the adversary in case of an outbreak of war. Anti-satellite weapons add a qualitative and exceptionally dangerous dimension to the arms race by increasing still further the risk of nuclear war.

The development of an arms race in outer space would violate not only the 1963 partial test-ban Treaty but also the 1967 outer-space Treaty, which explicitly committed all the parties to it, including the United States of America and the USSR, to undertake

"not to place in orbit around the Earth any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction, install such weapons on celestial bodies" - for example, the moon - "or station such weapons in outer space in any other manner". (resolution 2222 (XXI), annex, article IV)

The exploitation of outer space as yet another environment for the deployment of nuclear weapons is only another lap in the nuclear arms race between the two super-Powers. This lap must be aborted urgently before it drives the competitors and all of us non-competitors to the abyss of a nuclear catastrophe.

(Mr. Lusaka, Zambia)

Zambia has been unrelenting in its commitment to the denuclearization of Africa. African countries are united in their determination to let their continent remain a nuclear-weapon-free zone. However, this aspiration has been rudely shaken lately by South Africa's acquisition of nuclear capability.

Our opposition to South Africa's acquisition of nuclear capability derives from our traditional abhorrence of nuclear weapons wherever they may be. It also derives from the fact that South Africa's nuclear arsenal is an instrument of blackmail vis-à-vis the whole of Africa, which is diametrically opposed to that country's repressive and oppressive apartheid system and its illegal occupation of Namibia. Furthermore, South Africa's nuclear capability seriously jeopardizes the attainment of the objective of a denuclearized African continent and poses a grave danger not only to the security of African States but also to world peace and security as a whole.

We therefore call upon all States to respect the aspiration of all the African peoples to denuclearize Africa. In this regard, nuclear collaboration by any State, corporation, institution or individual with racist South Africa is a condemnable crime. All collaboration in the military and nuclear fields with racist South Africa must therefore be terminated, in accordance with General Assembly resolutions. In addition, the international community must see to it that South Africa submits its nuclear installations and facilities to inspection by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

Given the gravity of the threat that is posed to the international community by South Africa's nuclear capability, it is imperative that the question of South Africa's nuclear capability be considered substantively in the Committee on Disarmament. The Security Council, for purposes of disarmament, should also consider enforcement measures to prevent that racist régime, or indeed similar régimes, from acquiring arms or arms technology.

(Mr. Lusaka, Zambia)

Apart from our commitment to the denuclearization of Africa, we also fully subscribe to the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned. The establishment of such zones constitutes an important collateral disarmament measure. Among such zones is that referred to in General Assembly resolution 2832 (XXVI), of 16 December 1971, on the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace.

It is a matter of great concern to my delegation that, despite the unrelenting efforts of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean, the Declaration has to date not been put into effect. Efforts to hold a conference in Colombo to discuss the matter have come to nothing precisely because of the uncompromising attitude of some Western Powers which like to make the solution of certain disputes in the area a pre-condition of the Conference's taking place. We consider that attitude to be a reflection of the insensitivity of those States to the security preoccupations of the littoral and hinterland States of the Indian Ocean. We therefore wish to reiterate our call that the Conference in Colombo should not be held hostage to the solution of some irrelevant disputes in the Indian Ocean area. The Conference should be held on its own merit in 1984.

What we are seeking is a world of sanity. A disarmed world is that world of sanity. This is our quest.

Mr. PETROVSKY (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (interpretation from Russian): The Soviet delegation would like first of all to express its satisfaction at the fact that the discussion which has been taking place in the Committee has been concentrating on the truly principal questions of concern to millions of people throughout the world: the aggravation of tension and the growth of the danger of nuclear war.

(Mr. Petrovsky, USSR)

Our discussion also reflects the principal demand of the exceptionally alarming times in which we live - that is, that the development of events be halted, the nuclear threat removed and the arms race curbed. Effective and fast-acting means of doing this must be found, and this is impossible without a definition of the reasons for and a knowledge of the objective picture of the situation. In order to cure an ailment it is necessary first, of course, to make a correct diagnosis.

During the discussion we have occasionally heard the view expressed that the source of the difficulties is a confrontation of two Powers and two blocs, the Soviet Union and the United States, the Warsaw Treaty and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), which, it is claimed, bear equal responsibility for the arms race and the lack of progress towards ending it. Such a way of presenting the question not only does not correspond to the facts, but, objectively speaking, makes the search for ways of overcoming the extremely dangerous development of the international situation more difficult.

(Mr. Petrovsky, USSR)

The contemporary situation in the world is determined primarily by an intensive opposition between two basic political courses which are pursued by States without regard to which system of co-ordinates they find themselves in, East or West, North or South. If we were to discern the prime differences between these courses, it would be the attitude to the cardinal question of our time: the problem of the prevention of nuclear war.

The first course, espoused by the overwhelming majority of Member States of the United Nations, is that, leaving aside any ideological or other considerations, joint practical measures should be taken to resolve the problem. In these conditions when, as Mrs. Indira Gandhi said at this session:

"Scientists, scholars and some notable soldiers have vividly described the outcome of a future nuclear war" (A/38/PV.9, p. 6)

Only such an approach is in keeping with the demands of political realism.

Meanwhile, attempts are being made to declare advocates of this position as nothing less than dreamers, out of touch with life; whereas the realists, it is claimed, are those who, if not in words at least certainly in practice, do not place the prevention of nuclear war above all other considerations. The latter are pursuing a militaristic course with the intention of disregarding the interests of other States and peoples, trying to impose the rule of might in international relations, resurrecting imperialistic arrangements and halting social processes in the world.

It is this course which is the source of the confrontation. No matter how hard the American representatives try, inter alia, at this session, and also at today's meeting to manipulate the facts, asserting that their country was not the initiator and is not still the principal source of the arms race, the facts point to the opposite conclusion.

(Mr. Petrovsky, USSR)

In the mid-1940s not only was the United States the first to manufacture nuclear weapons, but it used them against Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Since then, the nuclear chariot of Washington has been marking out its path with warning signs of lethal danger. One of these signs was represented by Bikini atoll, which has been turned into a place unfit for human habitation as a result of United States nuclear testing there. In looking at those who have been expelled from that atoll, mankind will find food for thought.

At the end of the 1940s the United States was the first to deploy nuclear weapons in Europe, and transferred B-29 aircraft to Britain as their means of delivery. This was the start of the deployment of nuclear weapons in Europe.

In the 1950s it became the initiator of the strategic arms race by setting in motion a broad programme for the construction of intercontinental strategic bombers and, in the 1960s, of ballistic missiles. Having raised its strategic forces to high quantitative levels, the United States then proceeded to engage in their rapid qualitative upgrading. In the 1960s it carried out an intensive rebuilding and modernization of all the components of its strategic forces. As far back as the second half of the 1960s the Pentagon proceeded to equip submarine-launched ballistic missiles with independently targeted warheads. The United States was the first to use independently targeted warheads on its intercontinental ballistic missiles.

We are constantly being told here that the United States has reduced its nuclear megatonnage. But at the same time, nothing is said about the fact that in the 1970s when, according to the information of the United States representative, the United States was virtually sitting twiddling its thumbs, the nuclear potential of the strategic offensive forces of the United States in terms of quantity of

(Mr. Petrovsky, USSR)

warheads was approximately doubled, and reached some 10,000 units, with a significant rise in strike accuracy and the possibility of the retargeting of missiles.

All of this sharply increased American capacity for striking at the strategic potential of the other side. At the same time, in the United States preparations proceeded on a technical basis for the next phase in the build-up of strategic arms. The efforts of the Soviet Union and its allies in the 1970s were only designed solely to eliminate the supremacy in the sphere of strategic nuclear armaments which the United States had in the 1960s, and to prevent it from regaining such supremacy in subsequent years.

We must point out, however, that at all stages the Soviet Union has always preferred political solutions to military and technological solutions. When on the threshold of the 1970s it became evident that there was a danger of the introduction of the MIRV-type of missile, we proposed that the door should be shut on this destabilizing and costly trend in the arms race; subsequently we were guided by the same considerations of principle in proposing that before new spirals in the strategic arms race could begin, the deployment of new types and systems of such weapons as the B-1 bomber, the cruise missile and the Ohio submarine should be ruled out.

At the present time there is an approximate equality between the Soviet Union and the United States and between the Warsaw Treaty and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in strategic nuclear weapons, intermediate-range nuclear missiles, and conventional armaments. But, of course, formulas such as equality, balance and parity do not mean that both sides have equal amounts of identical armaments. Because of the specific features in the make-up of the armed forces,

(Mr. Petrovsky, USSR)

this cannot be so. For example, although in the strategic forces of the Soviet Union there are more land-based intercontinental missiles, the United States, which has traditionally emphasized the development of strategic aviation, has an edge over the Soviet Union in that arm of the services.

There are also objective disproportions in respect of general parity in conventional weapons. For example, the NATO bloc has an advantage in terms of the general numerical strength of manpower and the number of divisions ready for action, while being at a disadvantage in terms of the number of tactical aircraft.

(Mr. Petrovsky, USSR)

The existence of parity is well known to American leaders and was officially recognized by Washington in the 1970s. In such circumstances it is surprising to hear the American representative come here and say that the United States is seeking "to restore a stable military balance and to do what is necessary to assure deterrence and reduce the risk of war" (A/C.1/38/PV.7, p. 27).

The facts reveal a quite opposite picture. The present Administration is clearly striving for military supremacy and to establish a nuclear first-strike potential. It is planning to spend almost \$2 trillion on its military programmes over the next five years. Intercontinental ballistic missiles of the MX type are being developed or are already being deployed, together with Midgetmen, nuclear submarines armed with new Ohio-type missiles and new strategic B-4 bombers, not to mention stealth and cruise missiles, both land-based and sea-based. There are plans to increase the overall quantity of strategic nuclear warheads from 15,000 to 20,000 by 1990 and the number of warships to 600. The tactical air force will have approximately 3,000 new planes, and land-based forces will have more than 7,000 new tanks.

While there are already more than 1,500 American military bases and facilities on foreign territories, work is going forward on the establishment of new springboards in Asia, Africa, the Middle East and Central America for the use of armed forces against any country that rejects the diktats of Washington. It is evident that the United States war machine that has been built up under the pretext of the alleged Soviet threat is being used to an ever wider extent for interference in the internal affairs of other States and to impose upon peoples the systems and arrangements that suit Washington.

As for what the representative of the United States had to say today about the principles of law and morality, there has been no doubt for a long time about what the United States means by its attachment to those principles. American researchers have had their hands full studying the use of force and the threat of

(Mr. Petrovsky, USSR)

use of force by the United States in the recent past. There have been between 200 and 600 such instances, and that nicely disposes of the United States notions of morality.

In Viet Nam law and morality, as understood by Washington, were inculcated with napalm and toxic chemicals. In Lebanon they are being hammered home with salvos of gunfire from warships. In El Salvador they are being introduced through genocide. In Grenada, the main instrument of American fist-fight law - the Marines and their weapons - have been given battle training which they will put to use in the Middle East and, eventually, in other places too.

Eloquent evidence of the United States desire for military supremacy can be found in the history of efforts in the field of arms limitation. The Baruch Plan, introduced at the dawn of the nuclear age, was the first American proposal. That plan provided for the establishment of an international control organ through which the United States, which then had a guaranteed majority of votes in the United Nations and the Atomic Energy Commission, intended to institute control over all nuclear facilities and all the nuclear energy production of other countries. It wanted control over everyone and everything and, in substance, no control over the United States fissionable materials and the atom bombs that were already being prepared. That, at least, was the idea of the Baruch Plan, which clearly indicated the desire of the United States to use multilateral machinery to consolidate its own nuclear monopoly, not in military terms only, but in the uses of nuclear energy generally.

To counter that plan, the Soviet Union submitted in 1946 a proposal for the prohibition of the production and use of weapons employing nuclear energy for purposes of mass destruction and for guarantees of the exclusively peaceful uses of such energy. However, that proposal was rejected by the United States.

(Mr. Petrovsky, USSR)

The desire to attain one-sided advantages, first expressed in the Baruch Plan, continues to be a prominent part of United States nuclear policy. That policy, which is marked throughout by a double standard, manifests itself in disregard of the lawful security interests of the other side and in the use of negotiations to leave the United States armaments programme untouched while limiting to the fullest possible extent the opportunities of the other side to take responsive action.

The propagandistic underpinning of that policy is strengthened by the deliberate sowing of confusion among the public, by giving an appearance of comprehensiveness to American projects and by blasphemously labelling weapons devised for the mass destruction of human beings "protectors of peace". Madison Avenue, the centre of the American advertising industry has a great deal to learn from the experts in Washington about the marketing of such shoddy political goods. One such propaganda ploy is the justification of the establishment of new armaments with the argument that they will serve as bargaining chips in negotiations and, thus, be a way of getting results. Aside from the absurdity of the notion of arming in order to disarm, it should be pointed out that it has been impossible to achieve agreements on any of the many types of weapons that are being manufactured on that pretext.

All of this is mere juggling with words. Another example of this is the myth according to which the Soviet Union has a monopoly on a whole class of medium-range weapons in Europe of which the West allegedly has no counterpart. At the same time the forward-based United States weapons are forgotten, along with the British and French nuclear armaments. Under the SALT I and SALT II agreements intercontinental ballistic missiles are deemed to be those with a range of approximately 5,500 kilometres, that is, those that can attain the territory of the Soviet Union from the territory of the United States, and vice versa.

(Mr. Petrovsky, USSR)

Intermediate-range weapons in Europe would be considered those with a range of 1,000 kilometres and above, not intercontinental but capable of striking at the vital centres in the territory of the Soviet Union when launched from the territory of the Western European countries of NATO or from the adjacent seas. The existence of weapons of this type - and NATO has 162 such missiles, land-based and sea-based, and about 700 aircraft - means that for several years there has been an approximate balance in Europe, with a ratio of 1:1 in terms of delivery vehicles and 1:1.4 in favour of NATO in terms of warheads. This ratio did not change even when the numerical strength of the Soviet missiles known in the West as SS-20 increased up to 1982, when the Soviet Union unilaterally introduced a freeze on the deployment of intermediate-range nuclear weapons in the European part of the Soviet Union, because as each new missile became operational, one old missile was removed, sometimes even two.

During the period when negotiations have been taking place on the limitation of nuclear weapons in Europe the Soviet Union has removed from service not merely a dozen of its medium-range missiles in Europe. Today I would emphasize that the SS-5 missile has been completely withdrawn from service, a missile formerly deployed in the European zone which in fact had a range no less than that of the SS-20 and in terms of warheads was considerably larger. In actual fact the Soviet Union is unilaterally reducing the number of its medium-range missiles.

It is appropriate to recall also that implementation of the Soviet proposals would have led to the Soviet Union having considerably fewer missiles and warheads than before 1976, when the SS-20 was not in service. In these circumstances what kind of supremacy is the Soviet Union supposed to have? The United States would like to put itself in a position of supremacy by deploying close to the Soviet Union nuclear weapons capable of striking at targets deep inside Soviet territory.

(Mr. Petrovsky, USSR)

All the United States steps in the negotiations have been designed on this clearly invalid basis, starting with the so-called zero option, including the intermediate versions and leading up to the latest proposals which were put forward in the portentous statement of the President of the United States in the United Nations on 26 September.

A great deal has been said about the flexibility of the new United States approach, but this flexibility does not go beyond mere words. The substance of the United States policy remains unchanged: securing for itself a significant military edge by the deployment of the new missiles in Europe. As a result, in the Geneva talks a deadlock remains, as before, and we must say this quite openly. While displaying false optimism and trying to placate the peoples by saying that everything is going normally in the negotiations, Washington is stubbornly pressing on to ensure that its Pershings and cruise missiles will be deployed in Western Europe in the near future. So the situation is now critical and it cannot be described in any other way. The United States is bringing the entire world to the threshold of a new and exceedingly dangerous spiral in the arms race.

Here we must be absolutely clear. The emergence in Western Europe of new United States missiles will make it impossible to continue the negotiations now taking place in Geneva. On the other hand, the Geneva negotiations can be continued if the United States does not proceed actually to deploy these missiles.

As far as the Soviet Union is concerned, during the two years of negotiations it has shown convincingly that it is prepared to agree to a broad range of bold solutions. The Soviet proposals contain all the necessary elements for a mutually acceptable agreement not detrimental to anyone's interests - not to those of the Soviet Union and its allies or to those of the United States or the Western European States. We have shown and are still showing flexibility in the quest

(Mr. Petrovsky, USSR)

for concrete solutions while maintaining one unalterable condition: the balance of forces in Europe in terms of medium-range nuclear weapons must not be upset. On our side there is no desire for supremacy, but we will not permit a NATO supremacy in these systems.

In the framework of such an approach based on principle, we are prepared to seek equitable arrangements. A routine confirmation of this was provided by some additional steps announced by Mr. Andropov in replies to questions by Pravda in an interview published on 27 October, on which we have already reported in detail to members of the Committee in our statement on 31 October. Unfortunately, many of our proposals, including some very substantial ones, have for some curious reason gone unnoticed by the United States side. Yesterday's statement by the representative of the United States, in which he tried to accuse the Soviet Union of attempting to achieve supremacy in tactical nuclear weapons in Europe, showed that the Washington experts do not seem to have any idea about the whole range of our proposals relating precisely to that category of armaments. How could they not know that the delegation of the United States spent many years on the Vienna negotiations on mutual reductions of forces and armaments in Central Europe, and rejected all the proposals by the socialist countries to include tactical nuclear weapons in the reductions and limitations discussed there? Can the representative of the United States be unaware of that?

I would also ask him who is to blame for the fact that there was no development in response to the very timely and constructive proposal by Sweden for the establishment in Europe of a zone free of battlefield nuclear weapons. As far as the Soviet Union is concerned, not only did it support that idea but it also proposed that the width of the zone should be 500 or 600 kilometres instead of 300 kilometres: in other words, 250 or 300 kilometres from east to west on each

(Mr. Petrovsky, USSR)

side of the line of contact between the Warsaw Treaty countries and the NATO countries. Furthermore, how can the United States side be unaware that during the Geneva negotiations the Soviet Union has been calling for a genuine zero solution of the problem of nuclear weapons in Europe - the complete elimination from the continent of both medium-range and tactical nuclear weapons?

A very clear example of Madison Avenue propaganda and the double standard is to be found in the United States approach to the strategic arms limitation talks (START).

(Mr. Petrovsky, USSR)

The present Administration, which also failed to ratify the SALT II treaty, has made proposals designed to give the impression that the United States seeks radical reductions in strategic weapons. But these reductions would affect primarily the Soviet Union and, if its plan were put into effect, the United States would in terms of delivery vehicles achieve an advantage of one and a half times and in terms of nuclear warheads a threefold advantage. For its part the United States, by withdrawing its obsolete weapon-systems from service would have an opportunity to deploy unimpeded all the new weapons designed for first-strike nuclear capability.

The United States "flexibility" in the negotiations, was demonstrated merely by adjusting the conditions for the START agreements to suit the intended programme for the build-up of the American strategic arsenal.

The latest example of such "flexibility" is the American proposal for "reduction through modernization" (build-down). This formula, which is at first sight quite incomprehensible, on closer inspection turns out to be merely a cover for a build-up of the arms race. In the first place, it involves replacement of old nuclear weapons by new, even more dangerous, weapons. At the same time, the ratio between warheads being introduced and removed is so arranged that the reduction would affect primarily land-based ICBM warheads, which historically - as I have pointed out - are predominant in the Soviet strategic arsenal, and, to a much lesser extent, would require a reduction of submarine-based warheads and strategic air forces, on which the United States relies.

As justification for such an American approach, we constantly hear arguments about strengthening "strategic stability": land-based ICBMs - the Soviet Union having slightly more of these than the United States - are arbitrarily and one-sidedly declared to be "destabilizing systems" which should come first in line

(Mr. Petrovsky, USSR)

for basic cuts. At this point, a question is in order: on what basis is the United States arrogating to itself a monopoly right to hang such labels on the strategic weapons of both sides, while surreptitiously shifting the notion of stability to suit the specific needs of its own strategic forces? How, for example, can we regard as a "stabilizing" element a cruise missile of unprecedented accuracy and extremely difficult to intercept by early-warning systems once it has been launched and whose numerical strength and deployment are extremely difficult to monitor with national technical means of verification? How can one calculate as part of the stabilizing systems sea-based ballistic missiles which are capable of striking from unexpected directions and with shorter flight times than ICBMs and are just as accurate? It is clear that a selective restriction of some weapons in the context of START is quite as unacceptable as an arbitrary removal of other weapons beyond the framework of the agreements. We favour an integrated limitation and reduction of all the components of strategic potential, on the basis of the principle of identical security and equality.

The Soviet position at the START negotiations provides for a reduction of Soviet and American strategic delivery vehicles by approximately 25 per cent compared with the ceilings established in SALT II, and also a substantial reduction of nuclear warheads to equal agreed levels. Such a reduction, which would assure a military strategic balance at much lower levels, would rule out the acquisition by either party of one-sided advantages or supremacy.

With regard to confidence-building measures designed to strengthen the stability of the strategic situation and prevent the outbreak of crisis situations, there is no need for persuasion. The widely touted American proposals do not, unlike the Soviet proposals, in any way limit the military activities of either

(Mr. Petrovsky, USSR)

side but may reduce them to an exchange of information about certain types of activity. The point is not that the American proposal differs from the Soviet proposal on this, it is, rather, that the United States, without any serious grounds for doing so, has rejected the earlier and much more far-reaching proposals of the Soviet Union. These proposals are: prohibition of flights of heavy bombers and the movement of aircraft carriers of one side in agreed zones adjacent to the territory of the other side, and, in due course, it would be necessary to notify each other of the mass take-off of heavy bombers and forward-based aircraft; it would also be necessary to establish, in the case of missile-equipped submarines, zones in which any anti-vessel activity of the other side would be prohibited.

Many countries in their statements in the First Committee have expressed concern also with the state of affairs in a number of other areas of arms limitation. The answer to the question of who is to blame for this is easier to arrive at if one considers the facts. In 1978 the United States unilaterally broke off the Soviet-American negotiations on the limitation of the sale and supply of conventional weapons; in 1979, on the limitation and subsequent reduction of military activities in the Indian Ocean; and in 1980, on the tripartite negotiations on a comprehensive nuclear-test ban.

In the statement of the United States reference was made several times to the need to prohibit chemical weapons - and it has shown rather naive activity in this matter. But today's statement of the American representative was useful in that it helped us get to the substance of all this and understand that the attainment of agreement does not figure at all in the plans of the United States. Today's statement was more eloquent than all others we had heard before. It really

(Mr. Petrovsky, USSR)

revealed the substance of the American position and in that respect it is helpful. But if the United States were in actual fact and not merely in words to want the conclusion of a convention and reach agreement, well, it would not be that complicated, particularly since the Soviet proposals for the prohibition of chemical weapons include something the United States has already agreed to in bilateral negotiations.

(Mr. Petrovsky, USSR)

However, as today's statement has shown us, Washington does not need agreement, it simply needs a screen behind which it can go on building up its own arsenals of chemical weapons, the biggest arsenals of such weapons in the world. This demagoguery is simply an attempted cover-up.

They then bring out myths about incidents of the use of chemical weapons of Soviet manufacture in Afghanistan and South-East Asia. We would have thought that these myths had already been proved to be totally ludicrous; they certainly do not withstand contact with reality. The Group of Experts on Chemical Weapons working at the United Nations reached the conclusion that it was impossible to confirm that such weapons had been used and direct pressure on the experts and attempts by the United States special services to feed them specially prepared witnesses were of no avail in changing the Group's position. In a recent Australian press release we read that so-called poisoned leaves from Laos bore no traces of chemicals - it was all pure imagination. The conference of the American Association for the Advancement of Science reached the conclusion, as we read in the British press, that the State Department's samples which it claimed proved the use of chemical weapons in South-East Asia have not the remotest connection with chemical weapons. No matter how hard the United States representatives have tried to deceive everybody, it is well known that the Soviet Union has never used chemical weapons and has never transferred them to anyone, but has consistently advocated and still advocates the need for the complete elimination of the means of chemical warfare.

As for this propagandistic hullabaloo whipped up by Washington over the alleged use of chemical weapons of Soviet manufacture, there is no doubt that another purpose is being pursued here. The purpose is to force people to forget

(Mr. Petrovsky, USSR)

the real facts concerning the use of chemical weapons by the United States Army in Viet Nam in the 1960s and 1970s and to try to lull public opinion in connection with plans to equip the American Armed Forces with new binary weapons.

The United States approach to the question of the prohibition of chemical weapons convincingly demonstrates that Washington has been sabotaging - we cannot use any other word - the preparation of a draft convention on the prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons. The medieval alchemists used to try and find ways to turn base metals into gold. Now the Washington alchemists are trying to present the ignoble position of the United States as something noble.

I think a very similar response could be made on the United States position on the nuclear test ban. The United States has been virtually refusing to engage in negotiations, thus disregarding the obligations that it assumed under the 1963 partial nuclear test-ban Treaty. I would go further than that: it is not just disregarding them but is not carrying out its Treaty obligations in that respect.

We cannot fail to be concerned by the general trend of the policy of the current United States Administration towards disruption of the system of arms limitation agreements reached earlier and its tendency to cancel out all the positive experience that has been accumulated in this field in previous years. This applies particularly to the SALT II treaty. Washington has not applied it and has now virtually cut out the ground from under it. Nothing has been done to implement the Soviet-American treaties on the limitation of underground nuclear weapon tests and underground nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes, which the United States refuses to ratify, raising the question of their review. What about the 1925 Geneva Protocol? Let us see a clear picture of the way things stand.

(Mr. Petrovsky, USSR)

For 50 years the United States refused to ratify that Protocol and quite blatantly violated the generally accepted rules of international law prohibiting the use of chemical weapons. Then, having become a party to the Protocol, the United States unilaterally reserved its right to be the first to use a number of chemical warfare agents and now, under the pretext of the elaboration of verification procedures, is doing its utmost to disrupt this important instrument of international law from within.

This is the substance of the American position on this question: to weaken existing barriers to the arms race and prevent the establishment of new ones, on which Washington is now basing its plans for military supremacy with this - supremacy which the United States intends to use to impose systems that it prefers and for the suppression of the will of other peoples and countries. However, these aims cannot be achieved. The material and technological capacities of the parties are now such that any violation of parity will be restored as inevitably as the level of fluids balances out in communicating vessels.

Military rivalry is not the choice of the Soviet Union. We do not seek confrontation with the United States. But we cannot remain indifferent to actions that are pushing the world towards the edge of the nuclear abyss and we stress the need to curb the forces of war and thus avert nuclear madness, so that all those who cherish peace can be heard.

This requires a realistic, responsible approach enabling the overcoming of the tension in international relations that has now reached such a dangerous level.

Yuri Andropov has emphasized that

"mankind is not doomed to destruction. The arms race must and can be stopped. Mankind deserves a better lot than to live in a world torn apart by conflicts and stifling under the burden of death-dealing weapons."

(Mr. Petrovsky, USSR)

As you, Mr. Chairman, have rightly observed, the atmosphere is of great importance for international relations and one of our main tasks is to try to improve it, as this would help produce results from ongoing negotiations on the limitation and reduction of arms. Many speakers in this Committee have said this and we entirely agree with them.

(Mr. Petrovsky, USSR)

It was precisely for that reason that the Soviet Union submitted to the General Assembly a draft declaration condemning nuclear war. The Declaration on the Preparation of Societies for Life in Peace, unanimously adopted by the General Assembly in 1981, states that wars are born in the minds of men, therefore it is essential to create barriers in their minds that would prevent a nuclear catastrophe. According to Albert Einstein, the danger of such a catastrophe flows from the fact that, having discovered atomic energy, the human race has failed to learn to think in accordance with that new reality. At the current session of the General Assembly, Ministers and heads of delegations of non-aligned countries have rightly expressed concern over the possibility of legitimizing nuclear weapons and making them appear as something ordinary. In this connection, it is particularly important to recognize and to bring home to everyone a demand, prompted by common sense and a sense of responsibility for the fate of the world, that the very notion of nuclear war and all designs to unleash it must be rejected as criminal and incompatible with human conscience and morality.

Law, morality and conscience in any civilized society not only reject and condemn attempts on human life but also rightly qualify the premeditated preparation for murder as a grave crime, and this is generally recognized as an effective measure of crime prevention. Accordingly, premeditated preparation for unleashing nuclear war is nothing other than a crime, but in this case a crime involving billions of human lives. After the victory of the United Nations in the second world war, the nazi criminals who had unleashed that war were condemned at the Nuremberg trials. What tribunal will pass a post factum verdict on nuclear war, the gravest crime against humanity, if we fail to prevent it? Those who take part in preparations for unleashing such a war must be put on trial by the peoples of the world now.

(Mr. Petrovsky, USSR)

The condemnation of nuclear war would constitute a forceful reminder by the United Nations that all nations have a common interest in escaping nuclear war and this is what should underly the concept of universal security, as was rightly pointed out by Ms. Theorin, the representative of Sweden.

As for the statements made here with respect to the need to renounce not only nuclear war but any war and any use of force in violation of the United Nations Charter, I should like to reiterate that the Soviet Union is consistently advocating that the non-use of force in relations among States should become an immutable law governing international affairs. The proposals made by the Soviet Union and other socialist countries for the conclusion of a world treaty on the non-use of force in international relations and for a treaty on the mutual non-use of force and the maintenance of relations of peace between the Warsaw Treaty States and the States members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) are aimed at precluding the use of both nuclear and conventional weapons, but it is precisely through the fault of those who are now trying to question the necessity of condemning nuclear war that those treaties have not so far been concluded and that work on negotiating their texts is being blocked.

Fabricated arguments are also being used by the United States and the other NATO nuclear Powers to justify their negative attitude on the question of following the example set for them by assuming the obligation not to be the first to use nuclear weapons. As Ambassador Garcia Robles of Mexico has rightly observed

"the result [of this], from the moral, psychological and pragmatic points of view"

would be very substantial in terms of diminishing the nuclear threat. One's attitude towards the issue of a freeze of nuclear arsenals puts to the test one's will to adopt measures to reduce the threat of nuclear war in physical terms.

(Mr. Petrovsky, USSR)

Agreeing on a freeze, like using the emergency brake on a train, would immediately halt the dangerous process of the unchecked nuclear arms race. An altogether different political climate would ensue, making it easier to reach agreements on reducing the stockpiles of those weapons.

The whole course of the discussion has shown that, save for a few well-known exceptions, the overwhelming majority of delegations attach priority to the task of freezing nuclear weapons, the speedy fulfilment of which is the objective of the Soviet Union's proposal submitted at this session. However, we have also heard some objections, in particular to the effect that "deep reductions in nuclear arms" are preferable to a freeze. This position amounts to pushing at an open door. The Soviet Union has repeatedly indicated its readiness to go far beyond a freeze. The Soviet proposals concerning a programme of nuclear disarmament are before the Committee on Disarmament. That they are not being given serious consideration is entirely the fault of the United States and some of its allies.

Furthermore, there is no contradiction between the beginning of a reduction process and a freeze; on the contrary, should there be no freeze another spiral of the qualitative arms race - that is, the production of even more sophisticated and powerful means of destruction, which is possible even within lower quantitative ceilings - would threaten to upset the stability of the military strategic situation to an even greater degree, make peace even less stable and greatly increase difficulties in working out arms limitation agreement.

In the absence of convincing arguments, the representatives of certain countries have claimed here that a freeze is unacceptable because it is not verifiable. Meanwhile, many competent specialists in the field of nuclear weapons, including high-ranking United States politicians, have stated on more than one occasion that compliance with freeze obligations could be effectively verified by

(Mr. Petrovsky, USSR)

national technical means. Among those who have arrived at this conclusion in the United States are the former Secretary of Defense, Mr. Clifford, the former Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, Mr. Colby, the former Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Mr. Warnke, Mr. Harriman, the prominent politician, and many others.

The argument over verification is all the more untenable when one takes into consideration the willingness expressed by the Soviet Union to work out, if necessary, certain additional verification measures in that field on the basis of co-operation, taking due account of the results of earlier and on-going arms limitation talks.

The work of the First Committee has been characterized by, among other things, its increased attention to the problem of preventing an arms race in outer space. We are gratified to note that this issue now rightfully ranks among the most urgent problems of disarmament. Its solution has been advocated by representatives of a great number of socialist and non-aligned States, as well as by a number of Western countries.

Against this background, all the more visible are the attempts by those to whom we have addressed our new proposals to evade a straight answer to them, including a specific answer as to willingness to adopt verifiable substantive measures to prevent the militarization of outer space.

(Mr. Petrovsky, USSR)

The conclusion of a Treaty on the non-use of force in and from space - a draft of which has been submitted by the Soviet Union to the present session - would establish a political and legal régime for the non-use of force in and from outer space and would, at the same time, ensure reliable material guarantees for such non-use. For instance, provisions contained in the Soviet draft treaty to the effect that tests of any anti-satellite systems should be prohibited, that the development of new anti-satellite systems should be banned and that the existing systems should be eliminated make it possible to find a comprehensive and radical solution to the anti-satellite weapons problem. If anyone is not clear about the meaning of these direct words, we can clarify them: this prohibition would cover both Soviet satellite killers and United States systems based on F-15 aircraft, as well as others.

Is the United States side willing to say "yes" to this solution? Or is American talk about a priority United States concern over anti-satellite systems nothing more than another round - this time a space round - in a scare tactic using the "Soviet threat" for the sole purpose of providing a cover for its own militaristic outer space programmes?

The situation with regard to verification is no less clear. The verification provisions contained in the Soviet draft treaty ensure reliable implementation of the obligations to be assumed under it by the parties. Nevertheless, we are prepared - if it becomes necessary in the course of specific work on the treaty - to prepare and agree upon some additional measures to ensure mutual confidence by the States parties to the treaty that it will be observed.

(Mr. Petrovsky, USSR)

Reflecting as they do the interests of the majority of United Nations Member States, the Soviet proposals constitute major reference points for urgent joint efforts of States designed to stop the growth of the nuclear war threat. In the alarming international situation of today, the entire vast potential of the United Nations as an instrument for maintaining international security must be tapped. As you rightly noted, Mr. Chairman, at the beginning of our deliberations:

"We have a duty towards the Charter, and towards the peoples of the world who are deeply concerned about the present situation, to act together in a sense of common purpose and common destiny." (A/C.1/38/PV.3, p. 8-10)

As for the Soviet Union, it expresses its willingness to join in the efforts of all countries, irrespective of their socio-political systems, and of all those who advocate security through agreements and co-operation as well as practical steps that could prevent the worst from happening. This opportunity should not be wasted, while there is still time.

Mr. LEHNE (Austria): It is Austria's firmly held belief that the successful pursuit of disarmament measures presupposes a comprehensive approach. This position is based on an awareness of the growing interdependence of the nuclear, conventional and other aspects of the arms race.

The strategic doctrines of the major military alliances are determined largely by the relative strengths and weaknesses of the various components of their military power. An emerging imbalance in one area tends to spur on the arms race with regard to other areas also. Developments in one category of armaments may have immediate repercussions on other types of weaponry. The militarization of outer space - now threatened - would, for example, have a severe impact on the strategic nuclear balance. Different armaments, such as chemical weapons and the

(Mr. Lehne, Austria)

neutron weapon, can serve the same military purpose. Conversely, the same launcher delivers nuclear, conventional or chemical warheads. The rapid development of weapon technology will lead to a further blurring of the borderlines between various types of warfare.

In this situation it seems evident to the Austrian delegation that the objective of disarmament negotiations - undiminished security at the lowest possible level of armaments and military forces - will be reached only if the relationships between the different elements of military power are taken into account at each step of the disarmament process. We are convinced that simultaneous and concerted efforts in all major areas of armaments are required for the achievement of real and lasting progress.

The Austrian delegation has, in its contribution to the general debate, presented its views on matters related to nuclear disarmament. I should now like to comment on some of the other substantive items on the agenda.

Since 1945, 105 major wars have been fought in 66 countries and territories. These wars have caused 16 million deaths. All of them have been fought with conventional weapons. Of the \$800 billion of global military outlays a year, over 80 per cent is spent on conventional forces. And many of these weapons can hardly be called "conventional" any more. Rapid technological developments have multiplied their destructiveness and range, posing new problems for the defence of the less-powerful countries which do not possess the latest in military hardware. By far the greatest part of the conventional military build-up is still taking place in the States members of the two major military alliances. But in recent years the East-West confrontation has increasingly spilled over to the third world, causing regional arms races and further darkening the prospects for economic development in the affected regions.

(Mr. Lehne, Austria)

Preventing nuclear war remains our paramount objective; but the ongoing acceleration of the conventional arms race and the seeming inability of the international community to come to grips with this problem have also become a matter of serious concern. We note with some satisfaction, however, that awareness of the need to stop the conventional arms build-up appears to be growing. The expert study on all aspects of the conventional arms race constitutes an important step towards a stronger involvement of the United Nations in this area. We hope that the Expert Group's final report will clarify many of the complex issues and prepare the ground for future efforts to ensure conventional disarmament.

The great differences in the military situations in various parts of the world make the regional approach particularly suitable for conventional disarmament. Austria is convinced that in many regions security and disarmament arrangements tailored to the specific geopolitical conditions could create a climate of confidence and co-operation and provide an effective barrier against the interference of outside Powers.

As far as Europe is concerned, I must express Austria's profound regret that the Vienna negotiations on the mutual reduction of forces and armaments and associated measures in Central Europe have in more than 10 years of work not produced tangible results. Austria, like all countries in Central Europe, has a vital interest in a reduction of these vast military forces and arsenals and in the establishment of a genuine balance at the lowest possible level. The prevailing climate of tension makes a breakthrough in Vienna even more urgent. We appeal to the parties to these negotiations to spare no effort to conclude a first-phase agreement in the near future.

(Mr. Lehne, Austria)

The successful conclusion of the Madrid follow-up meeting to the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, has proven that even in a crisis situation sincere negotiating efforts can succeed. We are convinced that the Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures to begin in January 1984 in Stockholm will open new prospects for increasing confidence and, on this basis, for subsequent disarmament on our continent. Austria will do its best to contribute actively to the success of this undertaking.

Austria has already, in the State Treaty of 1955, renounced the possession of chemical weapons. Since then we have for many years been following with some impatience the slow progress of negotiations on a convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons. The especially cruel and insidious character of chemical warfare, its severe ecological implications and the fact that nowadays it threatens primarily the unprotected civilian populations make a ban on these weapons a matter of the highest priority. The use of chemical weapons has been prohibited for more than half a century, and their military value has greatly declined in the conditions of modern warfare. In view of these facts, it becomes evident that the high level of mistrust is the only remaining reason why huge stockpiles of these weapons still exist in the arsenals of several States.

(Mr. Lehne, Austria)

Austria has noted with great satisfaction that in recent years the negotiations in the Committee on Disarmament have intensified and have yielded substantial progress towards drawing up a draft convention. This year again the gaps between positions could be narrowed, and some obstacles to an agreement could be removed. We realize, however, that the complexity of the substantive issues has increased with the intensity of the negotiations and that it threatens at times to overwhelm the negotiating process. If we are to achieve a decisive breakthrough to a draft convention, these issues will have to be streamlined, and all sides will have to display considerable political will to resolve the remaining differences.

Austria attaches the utmost importance to the early conclusion of a ban on chemical weapons. We therefore call on all States to refrain from measures to upgrade their chemical warfare capabilities and from any other activities which could be detrimental to the negotiations. Bearing in mind the central importance of reducing suspicion and fear among States, we strongly support the ongoing efforts to set up a mechanism to monitor compliance with the Geneva Protocol of 1925.

Within recent years, the danger of an extension of the arms race into outer space has become a matter for serious concern. It is true that the use of satellites for military purposes is not a recent development. It dates back to the very beginning of space exploration. Nor are all these activities harmful. The essential role of satellites in the verification of arms control agreements has long been recognized. Early-warning, surveillance and communications systems based on satellites contribute to greater strategic stability and facilitate rational decision-making in international crises.

(Mr. Lehne, Austria)

It therefore appears neither feasible nor desirable under present international circumstances totally to eliminate those activities. The objective should be rather to make their positive potential accessible to countries other than the two leading space Powers. It is for those reasons that the Austrian Government continues to be interested in the idea of an international satellite monitoring agency, and hopes that that project will remain under active consideration.

Unfortunately, the increasing dependence of the two major Powers on the use of outer space, and the mad logic of the arms race, have led in recent years to intensive programmes in the field of anti-satellite and anti-ballistic missile technology. These efforts threaten to undermine the stability of the strategic balance and to trigger an immensely dangerous and wasteful armaments competition in outer space. As none of the weapon-systems appear to be fully operational at the present time, there is still hope for countering this trend, but no more time must be lost. The international community must take prompt action to initiate negotiations on legislative measures to prevent an arms race in outer space. An ad hoc working group of the Conference on Disarmament, as the Committee on Disarmament is soon to be renamed, is in our view the appropriate forum for such negotiations. We also believe that these multilateral efforts should be complemented by a resumption of the bilateral talks between the United States and the Soviet Union on the subject.

Peaceful co-operation in outer space promises a better future for mankind. Military confrontation in outer space could be the beginning of the bitter end of humanity.

Mr. MARTYNOV (Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic) (interpretation from Russian): My delegation has already had the opportunity to state its position on a number of items on the agenda of this Committee, among them the condemnation and prevention of nuclear war, the prevention of an arms race, and other issues. Today we should like to state our views on a question which occupies a very important place in the vital sphere of arms reduction and the elimination of the threat of war: the question of the prohibition of chemical weapons.

Early in the twentieth century, chemical weapons killed tens of thousands of people and maimed many thousands more, and the peoples of South-East Asia and the whole of mankind still have fresh in their memories the numerous casualties, enormous human suffering and great environmental damage - which are difficult to put a monetary value on - resulting from the United States aggression against the peoples of Indo-China and its protracted war against them. During that time, the targets for chemical attack covered more than 40 per cent of the lands and forests of South Viet Nam, and as a result of that chemical warfare 2 million people suffered.

According to data found in the Library of Congress of the United States, the quantity of toxic chemicals used by the United States in Viet Nam amounted to six pounds per inhabitant of Viet Nam. The claim that the substances used were "mere defoliants" is a cynical distortion and is very far from the truth. Malignant tumors, reproductive disorders and growth-retardation in children are only a few of the consequences of that use, as has been attested to by American veterans of the Viet Nam war.

The position of the Soviet Union in respect of chemical weapons is clear and unambiguous: there is no place for such weapons on earth. They must be outlawed

(Mr. Martynov, Byelorussian SSR)

through efforts by the international community. Unlike the imperialist Powers, the Soviet Union has never had recourse to chemical weapons and has never placed such weapons in other hands. Unlike the United States, the Soviet Union did not need to think for 10 years before it ratified the 1925 Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare.

(Mr. Martynov, Byelorussian SSR)

The Soviet Union is not, unlike a number of other States, including the United States, trying to undermine the effectiveness of this Protocol. The Soviet Union was one of the first to ratify it and has consistently sought to enhance the effectiveness of the Protocol and to broaden as far as possible the circle of parties to it. It is precisely the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries that should take credit for the initiative in 1969 that led to the inclusion of the question of chemical weapons on the agenda of the General Assembly and submitting a draft international convention on the subject. They have also taken other initiatives to bring about consideration of this question in other international forums.

On the other hand, it is precisely certain Western countries that from the outset have done their utmost to hamper the effective discussion of this question by delaying and impeding its consideration. It was precisely the United States that unilaterally broke off negotiations with the Soviet Union on the prohibition of chemical weapons. It was precisely the United States that was the only one of the more than 150 States Members of the United Nations to vote against the adoption by the General Assembly of resolution 37/98 A, calling upon all States to refrain from the production and deployment of new types of chemical weapons and from stationing them in the territories of States where there are no such weapons at present.

In other words, the situation is now that in all international forums where the question of chemical weapons is under consideration the position of the United States is the principal obstacle to progress. The policy of blocking progress is becoming more and more obvious, notwithstanding the fact that the chemical capability of the United States at the present time would destroy the entire

(Mr. Martynov, Byelorussian SSR)

population of the earth several times over, in the recent past the United States has been particularly vigorously engaged in the creation of new types of chemical weapons and preparations for large-scale manufacture of such weapons. Judging by the statements of the Washington Administration, the rearmament of the United States forces with the latest types of chemical weapons is to be carried out, as was stated in Congress in September 1981 by a highly-placed Pentagon official:

"so that we may have the capability of waging a large-scale chemical war in Europe against the countries of the Warsaw Treaty".

The United States Secretary of Defense has openly declared that the United States will constantly threaten the Soviet Union with the use of chemical weapons and views them as an integral part of any potential conflict. Some time back, in an interview on Voice of America, he allowed it to be understood that the American leaders are studying the question of the revision of international agreements and treaties prohibiting the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons. This was certainly quite evident at the thirty-seventh session of the General Assembly. Of course, Washington would like to force the peoples of the world to forget that it was precisely the United States, not any other country, that actually used chemical weapons; and on a scale unprecedented in human history. But the United States Administration is even more concerned now with its attempts not to permit the prohibition of chemical weapons and with the need to prepare the political and psychological ground for the rehabilitation and possible subsequent use of those weapons. But then, of course, evil aims require the use of evil means.

The chemical arms build-up of the United States is taking place against a background of sordid, slanderous fabrications against the Soviet Union. However,

(Mr. Martynov, Byelorussian SSR)

those insinuations are absolutely groundless and one does not need spectacles to see what lies behind them - and this is true also of serious-minded people inside the United States.

Let me give members a few examples showing the groundless nature of the claims being made by the American side. Reference has been made in particular to alleged incidents of lethal effects to persons who died after drinking poisoned well water in the region of the notorious yellow rain, but only several tons of microtoxins per hectare of watershed would have had to be used for such casualties to occur. In that case, vegetation, roofs of houses and leaves of trees would have been covered with a thick coating of chemicals, and there would have been no point in engaging in sophisticated testing and analysis methods such as those on which are based the statements made by the American side.

Moreover, reference is made to blood tests on white blood cells. The analysis carried out by the United States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases showed apparently in 8 out of 10 of the "victims" a lower number of white blood cells. At the same time, the scientists reliably ascertained that in the case of a single insertion of the toxin into a mammal such as would occur with a chemical attack the number of white blood cells would, on the contrary, temporarily increase. However, the reduction of the white blood cells, which is known in medical parlance as leucopenia, is observed only with repeated insertion into the organism of those toxins over a period of days. The scientific data available show that leucopenia occurs only after protracted daily intake in food of products contaminated with those toxins. The data on the alleged lower white blood cell count in the "victims" simply show that they could have been eating sub-standard food over a long period. Moreover, the drop in white blood cell count could be the

(Mr. Martynov, Byelorussian SSR)

effect of sources other than microtoxins. Leucopenia is observed in the case of poisoning through phenol, and particularly dioxin, which to this day is still present in considerable quantity in the Indo-Chinese environment - the result of chemical warfare waged in the region by the United States army. Leucopenia is noticed in persons who have been afflicted with virus ailments, including influenza.

(Mr. Martynov, Byelorussian SSR)

Moreover, the use of chemical weapons is always demonstrable in substantial terms. Physical and biological proof of recourse by the United States of chemical warfare in South-East Asia from 1961 through 1972 has remained until the present time. On the other hand, although allegations about the propensity of the Soviet Union to use chemical weapons in Afghanistan and in South-East Asia have been disseminated for some years, no factual evidence has actually been adduced so far to support such claims. The so-called witnesses, for some reason, do not happen to have any shrapnel fragments or fragments of mines, not a single missile, not a single canister or cylinder.

With regard to the similarity of the symptoms of poisoning described by "witnesses" from various places in Laos, Thailand and Kampuchea, well, then, we should not be surprised at the similarity since these communications were obviously prepared by the same people anyway. The United States is claiming that in the samples which it has observed there are toxins present, but in very small quantities, 175 parts per million. But what about the other 999,825 parts per million? The Australian defence ministry provided an answer to this, having studied samples presented to them from the alleged site of a chemical attack which is supposed to have taken place in February 1982 in Thailand. The answer was quite clear: they were samples of pollen.

An even more eloquent answer was provided by Dr. Michelson, a former consultant on chemical and biological warfare acts to the White House, the Defense Department and the Arms Control Agency. He proved that the notorious samples of yellow rain were nothing other than bee excrement. Such refutations by prominent scientists and figures could be repeated many times, but we will not do that now.

(Mr. Martynov, Byelorussian SSR)

The conclusion to be drawn from what we have said is plain. The claims by the American side are a collection of unfounded assertions and accusations without the slightest evidence to back them up. These affirmations cannot withstand scientific criticism and also defy elementary logical analysis.

The leading American botanist and ecologist, Mr. Westing, warned that the United States will be primarily to blame for a possible chemical arms race because Washington has been using its propaganda to create an atmosphere in which the Congress would finance military programmes for chemical weapons. The lie has been backed by emotions and even enhanced with a little touch of poetry, as we heard today. But the United States cannot refute the facts and the proof which we have adduced. Neither can it hide a fact which should be well known to the United States Congress, which is, that the only country to have used chemical weapons since the signing of the United Nations Charter has been the United States. It is a pity that the United States Congressman did not have any words of regret for his constituents who had suffered precisely from the American use of chemical weapons against the peoples of Indo-China. But he is perhaps unaware of the full truth about this and it is difficult for him to know about this, because as soon as he had set forth his prefabricated slander, he was promptly escorted from the room.

We were not surprised by the statement made today by the representative of the United States. Finding his country in a hot frying pan and being condemned by the overwhelming majority of the Member States of the United Nations for barbarous aggression against one of the Members of the United Nations, Grenada, the representative of the aggressor could fall back on nothing better than the well-known tactic of "Stop thief".

The interests of all peoples, including the people of the United States, require that a red light be turned on to halt the arms race in this extremely

MD/ed/plj (R)

A/C.1/38/PV.25
83-85

(Mr. Martynov, Byelorussian SSR)

dangerous sector - that is, the chemical arms race. Chemical means of mass destruction must be outlawed, and this session of the General Assembly must make its proper contribution to ensure that this happens.

The CHAIRMAN: Some delegations have asked to speak in exercise of the right of reply, and I shall now call on them. Before doing so I would remind them that they are limited to two statements each; the first statement should be limited to ten minutes and the second to five minutes. I would appeal to the speakers to be as brief as possible.

Mr. MIDDLETON (United Kingdom): In his remarks this morning, the representative of Argentina made a number of statements concerning the United Kingdom which demand a reply. The allegations he made were not new and they do not gain any force by being repeated. They have been answered on a number of other occasions. Furthermore, this question is to be debated in the General Assembly next week. For that reason, and in deference to the appeal you have just made, Mr. Chairman, I will be brief.

The statement by the representative of Argentina purported to be made under agenda item 43, relating to the Treaty of Tlatelolco. Therefore the first point I wish to stress is that the United Kingdom gives full support to that Treaty, which it regards as a major and valuable piece of arms control legislation. We should like to see it enforced in the entire region, but to achieve this all the eligible States in the region must become parties to the Treaty, including Argentina and Cuba, whose representatives spoke this morning. When the delegation of Argentina refers to the zone created by the Treaty, it always omits to make clear that it is not yet in force - in part because of its failure to become a party.

The Argentine delegation this morning again made references to the alleged introduction of nuclear weapons into the zone covered by the Treaty. It has been a long-standing practice of successive British Governments, for reasons of security and weapon safety, neither to confirm nor to deny the presence or absence of nuclear weapons in a particular place at a particular time. This is the practice

(Mr. Middleton, United Kingdom)

also followed by other nuclear-weapon States. But, we have made clear in this case that we have scrupulously observed our obligations under Protocols I and II of the Treaty, first, in not deploying nuclear weapons in territories for which we are internationally responsible within the Treaty's zone of application and, secondly, in not deploying such weapons in the territories for which the Treaty is in force.

Reference was made to "a gigantic base" being constructed on the Falkland Islands. It was alleged that there was nothing which permitted one to believe that nuclear weapons were not present. We were asked whether Argentina did not have the right to feel threatened. In a separate statement, the representative of Cuba referred to "aggression" against the Falkland Islands. It is hardly necessary for me to remind the members of the Committee that the Falkland Islands were subject to a flagrant act of unprovoked aggression by Argentina in violation of the United Nations Charter. Argentina refused to act in accordance with the mandatory Security Council resolution which called upon it to withdraw its forces. British actions in self-defence were totally in accord with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter and were at a level and of a kind appropriate to the situation. It is the continued refusal of Argentina to declare formally that hostilities are at an end which is preventing the re-establishment in the region of a climate of peace and stability. The Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, Sir Geoffrey Howe, made it quite clear on 28 September in the General Assembly that our military dispositions in the Falklands were designed solely to defend the Falkland Islands and their inhabitants against the possibility of a new attack. Talk of a "gigantic base" is manifest nonsense.

Furthermore, if we are meant to understand from the remarks of the representative of Argentina that Argentina feels under threat of nuclear attack, I should remind the Committee once again that the United Kingdom stated categorically

(Mr. Middleton, United Kingdom)

at the outset of the Falklands conflict that it was inconceivable that we would use nuclear weapons in such a conflict.

Finally, reference was again made to the use of nuclear-propelled submarines in warlike actions. Once again, I am bound to point out that both the Treaty's full title and article 5 of the Treaty make it clear that methods of propulsion are not governed by the Treaty and that nuclear-propelled submarines are thus permitted. The presence of nuclear-powered vessels in the areas in which the Treaty is in force is consistent with the obligations that we have assumed under the Additional Protocols.

Mr. PHAM NGAC (Viet Nam): This afternoon our Committee heard the statement by the representative of the United States on chemical weapons. His slanders and charges are all familiar to members of this Committee. My delegation would not waste time on repeating our rejections of them, which we have stated several times in this Committee. I have only two remarks to make.

First, the representative of the United States talks about morality, but his lecture on morality stopped short of mentioning the millions of victims of United States chemical warfare in Indo-China and the thousands of American war veterans who were victims of United States toxic chemicals in the same war. He also stopped short of mentioning the most recent crimes the United States has committed against the heroic Cuban people and the naked aggression against Grenada.

Secondly, we have noticed that there were two persons who repeated slanders about the alleged use of chemical weapons in South Asia: the representative of the Pol Pot régime, which committed genocide against the Kampuchean people, and the representative of the United States, which waged the most murderous war against my people. I should like the members of this Committee to draw for themselves the necessary conclusions.

Mr. SAIGNAVONGS (Lao People's Democratic Republic) (interpretation from French): A few moments ago the representative of the United States once again made accusations against my country with regard to the use of chemical weapons. It may be recalled that last year, when the report of the Secretary-General came before our Committee for consideration, we noted that United Nations experts had expressed doubts that the United States accusations against my country were well-founded. The United States is repeating those accusations this year, and by way of proof, is quoting the testimony of refugees. Everybody knows, especially the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, that the refugee situation, especially as regards refugees from Laos, is due mainly to economic causes. Moreover, the situation of the refugees in refugee camps in Thailand is well known; some and especially those who have given testimony are trying to enter the United States, which is precisely why they have co-operated: to ingratiate themselves with United States authorities so that things will be made easy for them.

(Mr. Saignavongs, Lao People's
Democratic Republic)

As regards the testimony of refugees, it might be further pointed out that an Australian sociologist Grant Evans inquired into the situation of the refugees in camps in Thailand and those who had been in Laos and he checked the alleged use of chemical weapons. He said:

(spoke in English)

"The refugees' evidence to support the charges of chemical warfare cannot be verified in any meaningful way and where the stories can be checked they appear to be fabrications."

(continued in French)

Furthermore, in the samples which the United States military personnel analysed, they claimed to have found toxic substances which are not found in the natural state, although independent scientists such as Dr. Mathew Masenson of Harvard University believe that these substances are just the natural excrement of bees. Experts in the research laboratories of the Department of Defence in Australia have examined some of these samples and their conclusions are as follows:

(spoke in English)

"No significant toxicity could be found and that the items were faked."

(continued in French)

So much for the so-called proof that the United States has submitted in support of its allegations against my country.

In addition, the United States has accused us of wishing to exterminate Mung rebels, belonging to the second largest ethnic group in Laos. During the national liberation, the people's army put down those rebels although they were well armed and well trained by the American Central Intelligence Agency, and we did not use chemical weapons then. What would my Government have to gain from using chemical weapons against a handful of rebels?

(Mr. Saignavongs, Lao People's
Democratic Republic)

Furthermore, as regards the policies of my Government towards ethnic minorities, and especially as regards the Mung ethnic group, United States non-governmental organizations such as the Mennonites and the Quakers, who have their offices in Vientiane, were quite familiar with the policies of my Government. The United States has also kept its Embassy in Vientiane. If American diplomats were doing their job properly, I would assume that they would be familiar with the policies of my Government concerning these minorities.

Another point is that the United States has spoken about morality and crimes in this connection. The authorities of the United States can rest assured that our hands are cleaner and our conscience is easier than theirs.

It seems that the Government of the United States is suffering from amnesia. Fortunately there are the media there to awaken the American conscience. American television is now showing scenes from the war in Viet Nam and those documentaries show the bombing of towns and villages by B-52 bombers, in which everyone is killed - men, women and children - and even the wretched water buffalos feeding peacefully in the fields.

There are also scenes showing the use of chemical weapons known as Agent Orange, the torture of wretched peasants by United States marines, and even massacres, such as those at the village of My Lai, where Marines wiped out everyone, including women, children and old people.

A few days ago, during the invasion of Grenada, United States planes bombed a hospital and sick people were killed. This is how the United States Government defends human rights and democracy.

To this amnesia might be added the psychological phenomenon known as projection: the United States always seems to be projecting on others, attributing to others, its own past or present conduct.

(Mr. Saignavongs, Lao People's
Democratic Republic)

Finally, the United States criticizes us for not allowing a group of experts into our country to look into accusations. My Government has nothing to hide; when it comes to humanitarian questions, my Government is co-operative. Last year, for example, it allowed into the country a group of people belonging to the National League of Families of American Prisoners and Missing in Action and even granted them facilities so that they could go to the areas concerned to seek the remains of those who had fallen in the war in Indo-China. And recently it also allowed independent persons to enter the country to investigate charges of the alleged use of chemical weapons. I wish to reaffirm that my Government will never let in any groups of people, whoever they may be, on the basis of slanderous allegations.

Mr. ESPECHE GIL (Argentina) (interpretation from Spanish): The representative of the United Kingdom has just made a statement in response to which I think we must make a clarification in view both of what he actually said and of what he left out, which is even more important. Let us take them one by one.

The representative of the United Kingdom referred to the presence of nuclear submarines in the region of the Malvinas Islands, South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands, but he omitted to refer to the relevant paragraph in resolution 170, adopted by consensus at the eighth general conference of the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, which was distributed in document A/38/496 during this session of the General Assembly, and representatives may consult the text in that document. The representative of the United Kingdom preferred to omit such a reference, perhaps because that resolution clearly reflects the concern of Latin American countries which led to a statement by the representative of the United Kingdom expressing displeasure when that Declaration was adopted in Jamaica.

(Mr. Espeche Gil, Argentina)

The representative of the United Kingdom speaks of minimizing his country's massive military presence in the Malvinas Islands but omits to mention the plans to extend that militarization to South Georgia Island and also appears to be unaware of the unanimous concern of the non-aligned countries at this massive military build-up in the Malvinas Islands, expressed in the last New York Declaration issued at the ministerial level. Moreover, it appears that the representative of the United Kingdom has temporarily forgotten that there are more than 4,000 British servicemen in the Malvinas which is more than twice the civilian population in the islands. He seems also to have forgotten that there are aircraft carriers, nuclear submarines, destroyers and frigates and that a military airport is being expanded where there are Phantoms, Jaguars, Buccaneers, and Sea King helicopters, all of which are fully equipped, including nuclear weapons. All of this was omitted by the representative of the United Kingdom who referred to statements by Mr. Howe which stated quite specifically that the purposes for this military build-up by the British in the islands were for their defence. I wonder why the representative of the United Kingdom did not also mention what was said in Washington by the United Kingdom Secretary of State for Defence to the effect that this militarization of the Malvinas Islands would be included within the framework of East-West confrontation. That too might have been mentioned.

The representative of the United Kingdom also said that the use of nuclear weapons against Argentina by the United Kingdom was unthinkable. But why is it inconceivable if Mrs. Margaret Thatcher considers that British promises made during the tensions of war are not to be believed? There is a contradiction there which the representative of the United Kingdom failed to mention.

However, there is another question of importance. The representative of the United Kingdom affirms that his country punctiliously carries out the provisions of

(Mr. Espeche Gil, Argentina)

the Tlatelolco Treaty, but what are such statements worth? I do not think that what is said here is of any value. What the representative of the United Kingdom is saying is that his country has refrained from deploying nuclear weapons in the islands - that the United Kingdom has refrained from deploying them. But "deploying" is a technical term, and if we look at article 1 of the Tlatelolco Treaty, we will see that many other words are used, and in this connection the representative of the United Kingdom had nothing to say. The introduction of British weapons into the area of the Tlatelolco Treaty is omitted by the representative of the United Kingdom, which means that these weapons have been and still are there in violation of the Tlatelolco Treaty.

The consequence of all this, and here I agree with the representative of the United Kingdom, is that this question is going to be taken up in the General Assembly next week. The General Assembly will be considering the issue of the Malvinas Islands under item 25 of its agenda, and members will recall that last year the General Assembly adopted resolution 37/9 which calls on both Governments to resume negotiations to find a peaceful solution as speedily as possible to the dispute over sovereignty. The United Kingdom voted against that resolution because it does not want a peaceful solution. It wants to maintain its colonial domination over the islands because it has strategic objectives there. Hence the military build-up.

That is why we believe that the only way to produce an atmosphere of peace and stability, which was referred to by the representative of the United Kingdom, is by means of negotiations, which the General Assembly of the United Nations would like to see take place, as would the non-aligned countries and Latin America. We would therefore invite the representative of the United Kingdom to convey to his Government the fact that these negotiations are vital, as has been emphasized by

(Mr. Espeche Gil, Argentina)

the General Assembly, and that we do not need an increased nuclear and conventional military build-up in the Malvinas, because this represents a threat to my country, to my region and to international peace.

Mr. NUÑEZ MOSQUERA (Cuba) (interpretation from Spanish): I feel that what has been said by the representative of Argentina gives great cause for concern for all of us who believe that we live in security in a nuclear-weapon-free zone. Now I should like to refer to another aspect of the problem, and that is the fact that the representative of a Western democracy, the representative of the United Kingdom, should use words that run counter to the view of the overwhelming majority of States represented here. He seeks to minimize the effectiveness of nuclear-weapon-free zones by claiming that the Tlatelolco Treaty has been signed by a very few States and not even by Cuba. If we look at document A/38/132 of the General Assembly, the final report of the seventh conference of Heads of State or Government of non-aligned countries, held at New Delhi at the beginning of the year, the following is stated:

(spoke in English)

"The Heads of State or Government noted the existence in Latin America of an area in which nuclear weapons are proscribed by the Treaty of Tlatelolco signed by 22 Latin American States, but they considered that it could not be effected until conditions have been created to enable all Latin American States to sign and ratify it, and all nuclear Powers to respect it." (A/38/132, para. 163).

(continued in Spanish)

The reasons why certain countries, particularly Cuba, could not sign this Treaty were stated this morning by the representative of Cuba in this Committee. It is surprising that a representative of a Western democracy should try to

(Mr. Nuñez Mosquera, Cuba)

disregard the view of more than 100 countries represented here and it is a matter of regret if the United Kingdom is in any way responsible for the fact that all Latin American States have not signed the Tlatelolco Treaty. It seems to me that the United Kingdom should in the first place help to ensure that the hostile acts in that region against Latin American countries cease. It should also ensure that no threatening military manoeuvres are carried out by nuclear-weapon States close to the frontiers of States within that nuclear-weapon-free zone. It should help to ensure that all remaining colonial situations in Latin America come to an end and that the military bases of nuclear-weapon States within the area of application of the Treaty of Tlatelolco are dismantled.

(Mr. Nuñez Mosquera, Cuba)

We know that the United Kingdom owes a great debt of gratitude to the United States for the support it received in its act of aggression against the Malvinas Islands, but that is no justification for perfidious Albion's maintaining colonial situations and military bases, in violation of the nuclear-weapon-free zone established by the Latin American States.

Mr. GUNDERSEN (United States of America): I had not intended to make any comments in exercise of the right of reply but I shall address one issue quickly.

I find rather curious and ironic the way in which the discussion has turned: sudden requests to speak by allegedly independent voices; many rights of reply. As everyone in this room knows, we in the United States welcome such free and unfettered debate on all topics, including chemical weapons. It is not surprising that some delegations have difficulties with such a discussion. I note parenthetically that similar debate, including statements such as that made by the United States today, is not possible in any of the countries that have so stated when exercising their right of reply or during their statements. I challenge them to welcome us to their countries to have a similar discussion, because it is only when those countries are accountable to their people - we are all imperfect; none of us has a monopoly of virtue - that we shall be able to obtain some sort of truth, and I would ask them about their own accountability.

I also note without surprise that those representatives love to quote - selectively - United States sources. It is very understandable. They want credibility, so they quote Western and United States sources. I am not surprised that Pravda is not often quoted - Pravda meaning "truth". There is a Russian saying about there being no truth in Pravda. Perhaps that is appropriate.

(Mr. Gundersen, United States)

Lastly, we should discuss what is and what is not germane. We are happy to discuss any of these questions, but we are not discussing Grenada here today, or any of these other items. I hope that in the future we shall try to maintain the cogency and saliency of our discussions and keep to the point.

Mr. MIDDLETON (United Kingdom): As I said at the beginning of my previous statement, the question of the Falkland Islands will be discussed in the General Assembly next week, and that was why I deliberately concentrated on the questions relating to the Treaty of Tlatelolco. I was under the impression that the original Argentine statement was meant to be related to that Treaty and not to be a general attack on the United Kingdom or a statement bringing in many other questions not directly related to the Treaty.

I propose to leave to the appropriate forum the answers to some of the questions which have been raised. However, I want to comment on two of the statements which have been made. One referred to my often repeated remark that it was inconceivable that the United Kingdom would use nuclear weapons in a conflict in the Falklands. Once again the Argentine representative has misquoted what the Prime Minister, Mrs. Margaret Thatcher, said in her address to the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. I recommend those who wish to know what was meant to look at that statement.

Secondly, we said it was inconceivable that we would use nuclear weapons in such a conflict, and the representative of Argentina cannot deny that that turned out to be the case.

Finally, there was a remark which perhaps other representatives as well as I found difficult to follow. It was said that we had used the word "deploying" in relation to nuclear weapons and that this was a technical term; and because it was

(Mr. Middleton, United Kingdom)

a technical term it was of no value; and it appeared to be interpreted by the delegation of Argentina to mean that these weapons had been introduced into the Falkland Islands. I repeat that we have made it clear that we have scrupulously observed our obligations under Protocol I of the Treaty in not deploying nuclear weapons in Territories for which we are internationally responsible within the Treaty's zone of application. That is a very clear statement, and I believe that the meaning of "deploying" is perfectly well understood.

Mr. MARTYNOV (Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic) (interpretation from Russian): The fact that the representative of the United States thought it necessary in his latest statement to engage in unfounded political attacks again confirms that he is incapable of refuting the substance of the question.

As regards the possibility of making in my country statements such as the United States representatives made this afternoon and earlier is that in my country war propaganda is prohibited by the Constitution, which is very much in keeping with the provisions of the Helsinki Final Act.

Mr. PETROVSKY (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (interpretation from Russian): I have already taxed the patience of representatives today by speaking at excessive length so I shall be very brief now. There is an old Russian proverb that a black horse cannot be washed white. What has happened shows the truth of that proverb. No matter what sophistry, demagoguery and tricks were used by the United States representative, he was unable to hide the truth about the situation in the disarmament negotiations and the dangerous, reckless course which the United States is now pushing world events along.

(Mr. Petrovsky, USSR)

However, today's rather protracted discussion has been useful in the following sense. First, the remarks of the representatives of the United States have shown clearly that all those fine-sounding words about disarmament which they have used so much in the recent past are simply a veil hiding the face of those who strive to achieve a dictatorial power and a position of military supremacy. Secondly, the exchange of views today clearly shows who is seeking confrontation, and that, no matter what sophistry is used to hide this fact, the truth is that it is the United States that is seeking confrontation, in order to fish in troubled waters, achieve its imperialist aims, achieve dominion and suppress the will of other peoples.

I hope you will excuse me for using such unparliamentary language, but our debates in this Committee and other Committees of the Assembly are taking place at too serious a time in history for us to be able to tolerate such hogwash as we have heard today, such totally unfounded verbiage.

Mr. ESPECHE GIL (Argentina) (interpretation from Spanish): This afternoon we have heard a representative ardently defending on-site verification of the fulfilment of disarmament commitments. In exercise of the right of reply, the representative of the United Kingdom, who no doubt believes in the need for verification - a belief shared by my delegation - said that it was inconceivable that the United Kingdom could have used nuclear weapons. Why? Because he said so and therefore all of us must believe him.

However, it appears that in matters of disarmament there are two standards - verification is wanted for some things but not for others. We should like verification of what the United Kingdom says, but it does not allow that. It does not want inspectors to go in and see whether there are nuclear weapons. We simply must believe it, because that is what it says.

As Ambassador Carasales said this morning, this is a very serious question of considerable importance for other areas which might be considering the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones. We think that statements by nuclear-weapon States should be verifiable. The United Kingdom has not been able to deny that there are British nuclear weapons in the zone and the area of the Malvinas, South Georgia and South Sandwich Islands.

Secondly, I ask the British delegation to be consistent at least in what it says here in this room. Mr. Richard Luce said a few days ago in the First Committee that the way to solve international disputes was to sit down at a negotiating table and negotiate. That is what we are asking the United Kingdom to do in connection with the sovereignty dispute over the Malvinas, South Georgia and South Sandwich Islands.

The meeting rose at 6.40 p.m.