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EXPLANATORY STATEMENT BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL CONCERNING
HIS FURTHER REPORT (S/20412) CONCERNING THE IMPLEMENTATION
OF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS 435 (1978) AND 439 (1978)
CONCERNING THE QUESTION OF NAMIBIA

1. On 23 January 1989, I submitted to the Security Council a further report (S/20412) on the question of Namibia. Part II of the report was submitted in pursuance of Security Council resolution 629 (1989).
2. The report contained my recommendations for the implementation of the United Nations plan for Namibia with effect from 1 April 1989, as decided by the Security Council in paragraph 1 of its resolution 629 (1989). In preparing my report I was conscious of the urgent need for the Council to adopt, without further delay, the necessary enabling resolution so that this date could be met. The recommendations in my report were intended to aid the Security Council to take this decision. We are now very close to the absolute minimum lead-time required for the effective mobilization of the United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) and its emplacement in Namibia.
3. Since the submission of my report, I have held extensive consultations with the various parties. During these consultations concerns were raised about some of the recommendations contained in my report. I should like to address these concerns in this explanatory statement.
4. In paragraph 54 of my report, I recommended to the Security Council a concept of operations which in the circumstances seemed to me to offer the best available prospect of ensuring the early independence of Namibia through free and fair elections in accordance with the timing decided by the Council. I should like to reiterate that, under this concept of operations, the authorized upper limit for the military component of UNTAG would remain at 7,500, as stipulated in the explanatory statement of 28 September 1978 (S/12869) and approved by the Security Council in its resolution 435 (1978). While confirming this fundamental provision for the military component of UNTAG, I recommended to the Security Council that budgetary provisions should at this stage be presented to the General Assembly on the basis of a military component of 4,650 personnel consisting of 3 enlarged infantry battalions, 300 military observers, about 1,700 logistic troops and headquarters staff of about 100, all ranks. These would be the number of troops

initially deployed in Namibia while at the same time the figure of 7,500 would be maintained as the authorized upper limit of the military component. The 3 enlarged battalions would provide the Force Commander with 15 line companies (i.e. troops available for operational duties in the field), which is only 3 fewer than the 18 line companies which would have been provided by the six smaller battalions envisaged in the earlier deployment plan. Under the concept of operations outlined in my report, the reserve battalions would be available at short notice for service in Namibia, in order to meet any unforeseen developments in regard to the overall mandate of UNTAG.

5. The mandate of the military component of UNTAG, as approved in Security Council resolution 435 (1978), remains unchanged. Paragraph 54 (a) of my report specifies only the tasks on which it is envisaged that the Force Commander would concentrate. No tasks have been eliminated. Moreover, final and definitive decisions concerning functional priorities and deployment can be taken only in the light of the circumstances prevalent at the time of implementation. In this connection, I intend to keep under constant review throughout the transitional period both the deployment of the military component of UNTAG and its size in relation to its ability to carry out its full mandate in the actual situation on the ground. I will not fail to inform the Security Council if the situation requires the deployment of additional military personnel to Namibia. I have been assured by all the members of the Security Council, including the permanent members, that they will extend their fullest co-operation to me in terms of paragraph 54 (g) of my report and that they will respond promptly to any need for additional military personnel which I might deem warranted, up to the authorized upper limit of 7,500.

6. In paragraph 47 of my report I stated that, in accordance with standard peace-keeping practice, the military observers deployed with UNTAG will not carry weapons. Following representations made to me by a number of delegations, I have decided to make an exception to this standard peace-keeping practice and have accordingly given the Force Commander of UNTAG discretion to authorize the military observers deployed with UNTAG to carry weapons of a defensive character, as and when necessary.

7. In paragraph 55 of my report, I stated that the estimated cost of the civilian and military components of UNTAG will be approximately \$416 million, excluding the cost of the operation of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees for the return of Namibians currently in exile, for which I intend to launch a separate appeal. This statement was based on my judgement that such an appeal would be the best means of securing the necessary funding in time. Concern has been expressed that a separate appeal of this nature might not raise adequate funding in time for the operation of the High Commissioner and that this in turn could delay the early return of Namibians currently in exile to participate in the electoral process. I continue to believe that these fears are unfounded but I will not hesitate to recommend alternative arrangements if, contrary to my expectations, there is a shortfall in funding for the operations of the High Commissioner. These will be conducted as an integral part of the UNTAG operation under the relevant provisions of the United Nations plan.

8. I remain convinced that the recommendations contained in my report, as clarified by this explanatory statement, offer the best available prospect of fulfilling my mandate of ensuring the early independence of Namibia through free and fair elections under the supervision and control of the United Nations, while at the same time enjoying the necessary financial support of members of the Organization. It is my fervent hope that the Security Council can now proceed to approve my report and thus make its final determination for the emplacement of UNTAG in Namibia on 1 April 1989 in accordance with the decision it has already taken.

