



Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/20442
2 February 1989

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

**REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE UNITED NATIONS
IRAN-IRAQ MILITARY OBSERVER GROUP**

(for the period 9 August 1988 to 2 February 1989)

Introduction

1. In its resolution 619 (1988) of 9 August 1988, the Security Council approved the report of the Secretary-General contained in document S/20093 on the implementation of operative paragraph 2 of resolution 598 (1987); decided to set up immediately, under its authority, a United Nations Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group (UNIIMOG) and requested the Secretary-General to take the necessary steps to that effect in accordance with his above-mentioned report; further decided that UNIIMOG should be established for a period of six months, unless the Council decided otherwise; and requested the Secretary-General to keep the Security Council fully informed of further developments.

2. The present report covers the period from the inception of UNIIMOG on 9 August 1988 to 2 February 1989. A preliminary account of UNIIMOG's activities during the first 10 weeks of this period has already been submitted to the Security Council in my interim report of 25 October 1988 (S/20242). The purpose of the present report is to provide the Council with a comprehensive account of the manner in which UNIIMOG has carried out the mandate entrusted to it by the Council.

Mandate and terms of reference

3. As indicated in my report to the Security Council of 7 August 1988 (S/20093), UNIIMOG's mandate is contained in operative paragraph 2 of resolution 598 (1987). In accordance with this mandate, the Group's terms of reference are:

(a) To establish with the parties agreed cease-fire lines on the basis of the forward defended localities occupied by the two sides on D Day but adjusting these, as may be agreed, when the positions of the two sides are judged to be dangerously close to each other;

- (b) To monitor compliance with the cease-fire;
- (c) To investigate any alleged violations of the cease-fire and restore the situation if a violation has taken place;
- (d) To prevent, through negotiation, any other change in the status quo, pending withdrawal of all forces to the internationally recognized boundaries;
- (e) To supervise, verify and confirm the withdrawal of all forces to the internationally recognized boundaries;
- (f) Thereafter, to monitor the cease-fire on the internationally recognized boundaries, investigate alleged violations and prevent, through negotiation, any other change in the status quo, pending negotiation of a comprehensive settlement;
- (g) To obtain the agreement of the parties to other arrangements which, pending negotiation of a comprehensive settlement, could help to reduce tension and build confidence between them, such as the establishment of areas of separation of forces on either side of the international border, limitations on the number and calibre of weapons to be deployed in areas close to the international border, and patrolling by United Nations naval personnel of certain sensitive areas in or near the Shatt al-Arab.

4. As reported in paragraph 20 below, discussions have been concluded or are currently under way with the Governments of Iraq and the Islamic Republic of Iran in connection with the status of UNIIMOG. The object of these discussions is to conclude agreements embodying the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, as well as the experience of previous United Nations peace-keeping operations, so as to ensure the independent functioning of UNIIMOG and especially "the freedom of movement and communications and other facilities that are necessary for the performance of its tasks" (see S/20093, para. 5 (c)).

Composition, command and deployment

5. The command of UNIIMOG continues to be exercised by the Chief Military Observer (CMO), Major-General Slavko Jovic (Yugoslavia). The Assistant Chief Military Observer (ACMO) on the Iranian side is Brigadier J. Kelly (Ireland) and on the Iraqi side Brigadier V. M. Patil (India).

6. As of February 1989, the strength of UNIIMOG, including headquarters staff at Baghdad and Teheran, was as follows:

United Nations Military Observers (UNMOs):

Argentina	10
Australia	15
Austria	6
Bangladesh	15
Canada	15
Denmark	15
Finland	15
Ghana	15
Hungary	15
India (including the ACMO)	15
Indonesia	15
Ireland (including the ACMO)	15
Italy	15
Kenya	15
Malaysia	15
New Zealand	10
Nigeria	15
Norway	15
Peru	7
Poland	15
Senegal	15
Sweden	15
Turkey	15
Uruguay	12
Yugoslavia	11
Zambia	9
	<u>350</u>
<u>Air unit</u>	
New Zealand	18
<u>Military police unit</u>	
Ireland	37
<u>Medical section</u>	
Austria	4
TOTAL	<u>409</u>

In addition to the above, a signals unit, which at maximum strength numbered 525, all ranks, was provided by Canada at the beginning of the operation to ensure adequate communications for UNMOG pending the establishment of a United Nations civilian-operated communications system. This unit was progressively redeployed, vacating the Islamic Republic of Iran on 20 November 1988 and Iraq on

15 December 1988. There may be further additions to the military strength of UNIIMOG when deployment of the air unit is completed. It is also intended to add a small naval unit when agreement has been reached with the parties on patrolling by UNIIMOG of the Shatt al-Arab and adjacent waters in the Gulf.

7. One hundred and seventeen international and 41 local civilian staff members are presently in the mission area. This is considerably less than the number of posts authorized. An appreciable saving has been achieved through an extremely cautious recruitment policy under which posts remain unoccupied until the need for them is clearly established. Initial economies have also resulted from the fact that UNIIMOG still depends to a large degree on the host countries in such areas as land and air transport and building maintenance. Additionally, certain difficulties in recruitment of specialists such as communications experts have resulted in forced savings.

8. The deployment of UNIIMOG as of January 1989 is shown in the annexed map.

9. As I reported in October 1988, it had originally been envisaged that UNIIMOG's group headquarters would be divided between Teheran and Baghdad, with its Iran Detachment Headquarters in Bakhtaran and the Iraq Detachment Headquarters alongside Group Headquarters in Baghdad. In the event, Teheran proved to be a more practicable location than Bakhtaran for the Iran Detachment Headquarters. It also proved somewhat cumbersome to have separate group and detachment headquarters in each capital. The Chief Military Observer therefore merged group and detachment headquarters in both cities and there is now a single UNIIMOG headquarters at Baghdad and another at Teheran. This also had the advantage of enabling the CMO to release more UNMOs for patrol duty on the cease-fire line. The organization of the civilian support staff has been adjusted in a similar manner, resulting also in some economies.

10. The CMO and his senior staff (the "command group") continue to spend alternate weeks in Baghdad and Teheran. Following successful negotiations, both parties have now agreed to allow the United Nations communications aircraft to cross the cease-fire lines, thus enabling General Jović and his staff to fly directly between the two capitals. The first such flight took place on 30 November 1988. Additionally, another United Nations aircraft made a direct flight on 13 December 1988. This arrangement has resulted in savings of both time and money for UNIIMOG.

11. The UNMOs in the field are deployed in four sectors on the Iranian side, with headquarters at Saggez, Bakhtaran, Dezful and Ahwaz, and three on the Iraqi side, with headquarters at Sulaimaniyah, Ba'quba and Basra. Each sector headquarters controls a number of team sites, which are located as far forward as possible in order to minimize the time spent by UNMOs travelling between team sites and the cease-fire line. The length of the cease-fire line monitored by a team site varies from 70 kilometres in the southern parts of the cease-fire line to 250 kilometres in the mountainous north.

Operations

12. The activities of UNIIMOG during the weeks before the cease-fire came into effect and immediately thereafter were described in detail in my interim report of 25 October 1988 (S/20442, para. 9). As I reported to the Security Council at that time, the UNMOs operate in mobile patrols of two UNMOs each, usually by vehicle but sometimes by helicopter, by boat in the southern marshes or by mule-back and on foot - and more recently on skis - in the mountainous north. The patrols' primary task is to check that the side to which they are assigned is complying with the cease-fire. They do this through their own regular observation of the forward defended localities (FDLs) and by investigating complaints received from the other side. Wherever possible, they negotiate a return to the status quo with the commanders on the spot. Where this is not possible, the matter is referred to the relevant sector headquarters so that it can be taken up with the liaison authorities of the side concerned. The patrols also receive complaints of alleged cease-fire violations by the other side. These are referred up the chain of command so that they can be checked by the UNMOs on the side where the violations are alleged to have occurred. UNMOs from the two sides communicate directly by radio across the cease-fire lines and also meet regularly in no man's land. This has proved to be a most effective way of dealing expeditiously with alleged cease-fire violations and such humanitarian and confidence building measures as the exchange of war dead found on the battlefield. The two sides have agreed to the opening of three crossing points to enable United Nations personnel and vehicles to cross from one side to the other, as their duties require. UNIIMOG intends to use these crossings as soon as it no longer needs to rely on host country vehicles and drivers for transportation.

13. It will be recalled that before the cease-fire came into effect I had proposed to the two sides that a number of activities should be considered to constitute violations of the cease-fire. As of 20 January 1989, UNIIMOG had received 1,960 complaints of alleged cease-fire violations. Most of these were very minor in nature and only approximately 25 per cent of them have been confirmed by UNIIMOG as violations. It is noteworthy that the number of alleged and confirmed violations per month has been steadily declining as UNIIMOG has gained the trust and respect of both parties. This decline was especially pronounced during the last month. Cease-fire violations have generally consisted of the movement of troops or the establishment of observation posts or other positions forward of the FDLs and engineering works to strengthen defensive positions. In all such cases UNIIMOG endeavours to persuade the side concerned to stop work and restore the status quo. Sometimes UNIIMOG succeeds in this endeavour, sometimes not, but again it is noteworthy that its success rate is steadily increasing.

14. One of the most serious incidents which has occurred during the period under review was the flooding by the Islamic Republic of Iran of no man's land in the Khusk region (Ahwaz sector) in order to create a water obstacle between the forward positions occupied by the two armies, which in this area lie immediately to the east of the internationally recognized boundary. This violation of the cease-fire, which began on 13 September 1988, was confirmed by UNIIMOG on 16 September and the Islamic Republic of Iran was requested to stop the flooding. Despite an initially positive response the flooding was resumed shortly after 19 September and now

covers an area extending over 60 kilometres in length and 2 to 3 kilometres in width from the Salmon Canal in the north to within a few kilometres of the Shatt al-Arab in the south. This has seriously increased tension along the cease-fire line in recent months and led on 11 December 1988 to an exchange of artillery, small arms and rocket fire which caused two fatal casualties on the Iranian side and could have become extremely serious. The incident was prevented from escalating by the prompt and efficient reaction of the UNMOs on the spot. In addition, the rapid arrival of the two ACMOs on the scene elicited a positive response by both sides to UNIIMOG's request for restraint. The two sides, however, continue to undertake extensive engineering efforts to build up embankments on both sides of the flooded area. It is also of concern that although there were very few allegations by either side of firing across the cease-fire lines in the early months of the mandate, UNIIMOG has recently reported a disturbing increase in such firing incidents in the area of the flooding. The Chief Military Observer has ordered increased patrolling in the area and has temporarily reinforced the Ahwaz and Basra sectors with additional UNMOs. In the past few days, the Iranian authorities have indicated that they are trying to solve the problem of the flooding. The area concerned nevertheless remains the most volatile in the UNIIMOG area of operations.

15. A further source of tension along the cease-fire line is the continuing fires in three oil wells in no man's land on Iranian territory in the area of Dehloran. The CMO has for some months endeavoured to persuade the Iraqi authorities to agree to the necessary measures for the fires to be extinguished.

16. At some points on the cease-fire line the opposing forces remain dangerously close and in one case only 10 metres separate them. UNIIMOG's mandate, as described in paragraph 3 above, requires the Group to persuade the two sides in such cases to move back from their FDLs, pending withdrawal to the internationally recognized boundaries and, it is hoped, the establishment of an area of separation either side thereof. The CMO has identified a number of potentially sensitive areas and has submitted a proposal to both sides for a mutually beneficial package of moves to reduce the risk of an outbreak of hostilities at these locations. There have been some local successes and limited withdrawals as a result of persuasion by UNMOs and as weather conditions have forced both sides to move back to winter positions in some areas.

17. The CMO has pursued a number of other initiatives to build confidence between the two sides, notably the exchange on 4 October 1988 of a small number of prisoners taken by both sides since the cease-fire, the negotiation of agreement for locust spraying along the cease-fire line and the exchange of war dead found in no man's land or behind the FDLs, of which 1,237 had been returned to the respective countries by 20 January. It will be recalled that in order to facilitate the discussion of such matters, I had proposed to the two sides the establishment of a mixed military working group which would meet regularly under the chairmanship of the CMO. Agreement has now been reached with both sides for the working group to begin work and it is expected that its first meeting will take place very shortly at a location in no man's land which was established for that purpose some time ago.

Logistics

18. UNIIMOG headquarters at Baghdad and Teheran were temporarily housed in the Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia (ESCWA) building and in a hotel, respectively. Both host Governments have since provided more permanent facilities for UNIIMOG headquarters and the Group is now operating in its own building in both capitals. At sector headquarters and team sites, office and residential accommodation have normally been provided by the host Governments in locations occupied by their own forces. In some cases this has created a restricted environment for the UNMOs, especially during their limited leisure hours. The CMO has assured both Governments that UNIIMOG personnel will fully respect their security and other concerns and has urged them to permit the UNMOs the freedom of movement necessary for them to carry out their duties and to enjoy a modicum of recreation.

19. The two Governments were most co-operative in meeting UNIIMOG's requirements for land and air transport, pending the acquisition of its own vehicles and aircraft. UNIIMOG has now taken delivery of most of the vehicles it needs on both sides and it is hoped that the necessary authorizations will be forthcoming to enable UNIIMOG to become self-sufficient in land transport in the very near future. As regards aircraft, the Group already has use of a Jetstream aircraft generously provided by the Government of Switzerland as a communications aircraft for the CMO, an Andover aircraft of the Royal New Zealand Air Force, which is used for freight and passenger duties, and a contracted Twin Otter aircraft used mainly for observation duties on the Iraqi side. An additional Twin Otter is ready to be deployed on the Iranian side as soon as the required arrangements for its base and flight plans have been concluded. It is hoped that negotiations will shortly be completed for the deployment of 12 helicopters, which the Group urgently needs to enhance its patrolling capability, especially in certain parts of the cease-fire line to which access is difficult.

Relations with the parties

20. As with all peace-keeping operations, an essential condition for UNIIMOG's ability to fulfil its mandate is that it should receive the full co-operation of the parties, especially as regards the freedom of movement and communications and other facilities needed to carry out its duties. A preliminary agreement on the status of UNIIMOG was concluded with the Government of Iraq on 5 November 1988 but a similar agreement with the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran is still under discussion. It is hoped that the conclusion of this essential agreement will contribute to the early solution of difficulties that have arisen concerning UNIIMOG's freedom of movement and its use of satellite communications on Iranian territory, as well as to related customs and licensing difficulties which have had a negative effect on UNIIMOG's operational ability to fulfil its mandate.

Financial aspects

21. By its resolution 43/230 of 21 December 1988, the General Assembly authorized the Secretary-General to enter into commitments for UNIIMOG at a rate not to exceed \$7,986,000 gross (\$7,889,900 net) per month, with prior concurrence of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions, for the 12-month period beginning 9 February 1989, should the Security Council decide to continue the Force beyond the period of six months authorized under its resolution 619 (1988). In the event that the Council decides to extend UNIIMOG beyond its current mandate period, the costs to the United Nations for its maintenance during the extension period would be within the commitment authorized by General Assembly resolution 43/230, assuming continuance of UNIIMOG's existing responsibilities.

22. At the beginning of January 1989, unpaid assessed contributions to the UNIIMOG Special Account for the mandate period ending 8 February 1989 amounted to \$33.9 million, representing 63 per cent of the total sum assessed, while voluntary contributions received in cash amounted to \$11 million.

23. UNIIMOG was originally established on 9 August 1988 for a period of six months. If the Security Council were to decide to extend its mandate for a further period of six months, it would be necessary, since the accounts of the Organization are updated on a calendar-month basis, to undertake a complicated process of adjusting the UNIIMOG accounting records at the end of each mandate period in order to establish the cost of the Group during that period. In the interest of administrative efficiency and in order to reduce the work-load involved in adjusting the accounts at the end of each mandate, it would be preferable if the mandate were to be extended until the end of a calendar month. It is for this reason that I recommend in paragraph 43 below that the mandate be extended for a period of 7 months and 22 days, i.e. until the last day of September 1989.

Implementation of Security Council resolution 598 (1987)

24. Immediately after my appeal of 8 August 1988 to the Islamic Republic of Iran and to Iraq to observe a cease-fire, I extended to them a formal invitation to send their representatives to Geneva for direct talks under my auspices for the purpose of reaching a common understanding of the other provisions of the resolution and the procedures and timings for their implementation. These talks, held at Geneva during the period between 25 August and 13 September 1988, took the form of a series of meetings in which the foreign ministers of both the Islamic Republic of Iran and Iraq participated.

25. Two other rounds of joint meetings at the ministerial level have since taken place. One was held in New York on 1 October 1988 and another at Geneva during the period between 31 October and 11 November 1988. Together, these rounds of talks included a total of 11 plenary meetings between the foreign ministers of the Islamic Republic of Iran and Iraq. Each of these meetings was conducted either under my chairmanship or that of Ambassador Jan Eliasson, whom I appointed as my Personal Representative on Issues Pertaining to the Implementation of Security Council Resolution 598 (1987) on 1 September 1988.

26. In the course of my talks with the two foreign ministers in New York during July and early August 1988, I had endeavoured to develop a timetable, procedures and certain other understandings concerning the implementation of the resolution as a whole. As members of the Council will recall, I had presented to the two parties in their respective capitals in September 1987 an outline plan for the implementation of the resolution as an integrated whole. In October 1987 I had tabled the implementation plan in greater detail and in July 1988 I had more fully elaborated that plan.

27. Some 10 days before the opening of the direct talks at Geneva on 25 August I provided the parties with specific ideas from the elaborated implementation plan relating to arrangements for the cease-fire. These were addressed in depth by the parties in the course of the talks. It should be noted that, as the talks proceeded, the dialogue became more substantive. My presentation to the foreign ministers of the Islamic Republic of Iran and Iraq, during the joint meeting on 1 October 1988, covered the following substantive points drawn from the elaborated implementation plan:

(a) Consolidation of arrangements governing the cease-fire, including freedom of navigation through the Strait of Hormuz;

(b) Withdrawal of forces to the internationally recognized boundaries within a time-frame of some two weeks;

(c) The setting into motion of a procedure for the release and repatriation of prisoners of war to be concluded within a specific time-frame;

(d) The urgency of proceeding with the unimpeded clearing of the Shatt al-Arab.

28. In this regard, the parties appear to concur in principle on some of these suggestions or aspects thereof, viz.:

(a) Freedom of navigation on the high seas and in the Strait of Hormuz for the ships of both sides;

(b) The expeditious withdrawal of forces to the internationally recognized boundaries;

(c) The Third Geneva Convention as it pertains to the issue of prisoners of war;

(d) The usefulness to both sides of restoring the Shatt al-Arab to navigation.

However, it should be emphasized that the common ground between the parties on the issues listed above should not be construed as having gone substantially beyond a convergence of views in principle.

29. At present, the parties continue to hold divergent views on what constitutes a cease-fire. They have different views also on when the withdrawal of forces to

the internationally recognized boundaries should begin. On the question of the restoration of the Shatt al-Arab to navigation, the parties have different positions as to the context and manner in which that matter should be addressed. These divergencies emerge in the context of a disagreement on the wider issue of the framework for the conduct of the direct talks. The divergent views of the parties illustrate the necessity of creating trust and confidence between them.

30. I have therefore suggested to the parties a number of measures to build confidence between them. They have recently taken some limited but significant steps. Following intensive contacts which I had with both sides and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), memoranda of understanding were signed on 14 November 1988 by the Islamic Republic of Iran and Iraq and ICRC concerning the release and repatriation of sick and wounded prisoners of war. It is my hope that the exchange of such prisoners will continue in the period ahead. The concurrence of the parties to participate forthwith in the Mixed Military Working Group which I had earlier proposed is encouraging. The lifting of certain unilateral restrictions on civil aviation in the area may be seen in a similar light.

31. In the periods between the rounds of direct talks, I have been in continuous contact with the parties, in an effort to move forward with the full implementation of resolution 598 (1987). These contacts have been essentially in the form of separate discussions and consultations with the two Governments. Most recently I and my Personal Representative met in mid-December 1988 at Geneva with the Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of Iraq and with the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations Office at Geneva, and in mid-January 1989 in Paris again with the Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of Iraq and with the Foreign Minister of the Islamic Republic of Iran. To both sides, I expressed my concern at the present state of affairs.

32. Following these meetings, I requested my Personal Representative to visit Teheran and Baghdad for consultations with the authorities there. From 24 to 27 January 1989 he was in the Islamic Republic of Iran where he met with Prime Minister Mousavi, with Foreign Minister Velayati, Deputy Foreign Minister Lavasani and other senior officials. From 27 to 30 January 1989 he was in Iraq, where he met with President Saddam Hussein, Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz and other senior officials. I am of the view that the visit was most useful for the continuation of our efforts within the framework of Security Council resolution 598 (1987). I am moreover confident that the exchanges which took place during the visit and the indications received from both sides can add momentum to the peace process.

Observations

33. The cease-fire which was announced on 8 August 1988 and came into effect on 20 August 1988, together with the discontinuation of all military activities on land, at sea and in the air and withdrawal to the internationally recognized boundaries without delay, constitute a first step towards a negotiated settlement as demanded by Security Council resolution 598 (1987). As explained in my letter

to the Permanent Representatives of the Islamic Republic of Iran and Iraq of 8 August 1988, the direct talks between the two foreign ministers to be held under my auspices immediately after the establishment of the cease-fire were aimed at reaching a common understanding of the other provisions of the resolution and the procedures and timings for their implementation.

34. It is in this spirit that talks have been conducted under my auspices at Geneva and in New York since 25 August 1988 and those of my Personal Representative, Ambassador Jan Eliasson, since his appointment on 1 September 1988.

35. The Islamic Republic of Iran and Iraq have different understandings of what are the constituent elements of the cease-fire and what are the subjects which fall within the framework of each of the operative paragraphs of the resolution. This discrepancy and the underlying issues involved have made it difficult to proceed with the full and rapid implementation of Security Council resolution 598 (1987). It is important for the authority of the Security Council that this resolution not remain partially implemented.

36. I believe that it is still possible to reach with the two parties the common understanding referred to in paragraph 33 above. My efforts and those of my Personal Representative have been intensive and uninterrupted since the cease-fire came into effect. Throughout the past few months, we have worked continuously in order to develop the basis for mutual trust and at the same time to overcome the major issues of divergency. We have also continued to explore different procedures which might best serve the peace process.

37. It is my strong hope that further steps of a confidence-building character, similar to those outlined in paragraph 30 above, may be taken by each of the parties in the near future, thus enhancing the prospects for the peace process as a whole.

38. The implementation of Security Council resolution 598 (1987) requires that all concerned show renewed positive determination and that they intensify their efforts to make clear to each other their objectives. The implementation of the resolution will bring peace to both countries and contribute to security and stability for the region as a whole.

39. For this to be achieved, we have to look at Security Council resolution 598 (1987) in a wider context. The resolution has to be implemented in conformity with the principles of international law as it pertains to respect for territorial integrity, non-acquisition of territory by force, the inviolability of internationally recognized boundaries and non-interference in internal affairs of other States. The underlying principle is the fulfilment in good faith of international obligations and in particular of those set out in the Charter of the United Nations.

40. Similarly, the implementation requires that restoration of normality be allowed as soon as possible. Both countries should benefit fully from the fruits of peace at the earliest possible time. Pragmatic arrangements, particularly with regard to the economic life of the two countries, may well be needed to hasten the return to normality.

41. The desire for good neighbourly relations and lasting stability in the region - so strongly and clearly expressed to me and to my Personal Representative by the leadership of both countries - would indeed be poorly served if territory, economic resources or human beings were used as bargaining chips in the peace process.

42. I and my Personal Representative are ready to assist the parties in the same spirit that moved the Security Council when it unanimously adopted resolution 598 (1987). I am looking forward to pursuing the discussions with the two foreign ministers soon. At such time, I shall explore with them how to proceed in the most effective manner. For the talks to be successful, both sides have to accept that there will be neither victor nor vanquished at the negotiating table and that the integrity, dignity and honour of both countries will be preserved. This I consider to be the solid foundation for serious and productive peace talks between the Islamic Republic of Iran and Iraq under my auspices.

43. Meanwhile, it will be clear to the members of the Security Council that the continued presence of UNIIMOG is an essential condition for further progress towards the full implementation of resolution 598 (1987). Both the parties have assured me of their support for UNIIMOG and of their agreement that its mandate should be extended. I accordingly recommend to the Security Council that the mandate be renewed and that, for the reasons stated in paragraph 23 above, the renewal should be for a period of 7 months and 22 days, that is, until 30 September 1989.

44. Finally, I take this opportunity to pay tribute to Major-General Slavko Jović, the Chief Military Observer, and to all the men and women under his command, both military and civilian, for the skill and determination with which they set up UNIIMOG and made it operational in a very short time, and for the manner in which they have since carried out their difficult assignment. Their performance has been of a very high order, reflecting credit on themselves, on their countries and on the United Nations.