NPT/CONF.2005/SR.21

2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

19 July 2005

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Summary record of the 21st meeting
Held at Headquarters, New York, on Friday, 27 May 2005, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. de Queiroz Duarte . . . . . (Brazil)

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The meeting was called to order at 10.45 a.m.

Organization of work

1. **The President**, referring to rule 44, paragraph 3, of the rules of procedure, said that a request for observer status had been received from the European Commission. He took it that the Conference wished to accede to that request.

2. *It was so decided*.

Report of the Credentials Committee (*continued*) (NPT/CONF.2005/CC/1)

3. **Mr. Piperkov** (Bulgaria), speaking as Vice-Chairman of the Credentials Committee, introduced the final report of the Credentials Committee (NPT/CONF.2005/CC/1), which indicated that 90 States parties had submitted formal credentials in due form, 32 had submitted provisional credentials in the form of telefax copy from their Head of State or Government or Minister for Foreign Affairs, and 28 had communicated the designation of representatives by notes verbales or letters from their Permanent Mission in New York. Since the preparation of the report, formal credentials had been received from Finland, Guatemala and Ukraine, and an addendum would be issued to that effect. The Committee had decided to accept the credentials of all States parties participating in the Conference on the understanding that original credentials in the form required by rule 2 of the rules of procedure would be forwarded to the Secretary-General of the Conference as soon as possible.

4. **The President** said he took it that the Conference wished to take note of the report of the Credentials Committee.

5. *It was so decided*.

Reports of the Main Committees (*continued*)

Report of Main Committee I

6. **Mr. Parnohadiningrat** (Indonesia), speaking as Chairman of Main Committee I, introduced the report of that Committee (NPT/CONF.2005/MC.I/1). Main Committee I had held six formal meetings and a number of informal meetings between 19 and 25 May 2005. After an initial general exchange of views on the agenda items allocated to it, it had considered various proposals. Its subsidiary body, established by the Conference and chaired by Ambassador Caughley (New Zealand), had focused on nuclear disarmament and security assurances. The Committee had discussed various issues within its mandate but had been hindered in its progress by time constraints. States parties had submitted documents and proposals reflecting the entire spectrum of the Committee's work, and delegations had made themselves available for numerous informal meetings in addition to their attendance of formal meetings. As stated in paragraph 9 of the report, the Committee had been unable to reach a consensus on the text of the Chairman's Working Paper of Main Committee I (NPT/CONF.2005/MC.I/CRP.3) and the Working Paper of the Chairman of Subsidiary Body 1 (NPT/CONF.2005/MC.I/SB/CRP.4), as they did not reflect fully the views of all States parties. Nevertheless, the Committee had agreed to annex the papers to the report.

7. **The President** said he took it that the Conference wished to take note of the report of Main Committee I.

8. *It was so decided*.

Report of Main Committee II

9. **Mr. Molnár** (Hungary), speaking as Chairman of Main Committee II, introduced the report of that Committee (NPT/CONF.2005/MC.II/1). As stated in the report, between 19 and 24 May 2005, there had been three plenary meetings of the Committee, two meetings of its subsidiary body and one meeting proportionally shared between the two. At its meeting of 24 May 2005 (NPT/CONF.2005/MC.II/SR.4), the Committee had taken note of the oral report of the Chairman of the subsidiary body. He noted that the last sentence of paragraph 7 of the report should be amended as follows: "The Committee took note of his oral report." At the same meeting, he had made a statement to the effect that the Committee had not reached consensus on attaching the Chairman's draft (NPT/CONF.2005/MC.II/CRP.3) to its final report and forwarding it to the Conference for further consideration. The Committee had taken note of the Chairman's statement and agreed to adopt its final report.

10. **The President** said he took it that the Conference wished to take note of the report of Main Committee II, as orally revised.

11. *It was so decided*.

Report of Main Committee III

12. **Ms. Borsiin Bonnier** (Sweden), speaking as Chairman of Main Committee III, introduced the report of that Committee (NPT/CONF.2005/MC.III/1). Main Committee III had focused on articles III(3) and IV of the Treaty, while its subsidiary body, chaired by Ambassador Labbe (Chile), had focused on articles IX and X. Although both the Committee and its subsidiary body had worked in a spirit of consensus until the end, no consensus had been reached on the substantive parts of the draft report of Main Committee III (NPT/CONF.2005/MC.III/CRP.4). Consequently, the report now before the Conference was primarily technical in nature.

13. **The President** said he took it that the Conference wished to take note of the report of Main Committee III.

14. *It was so decided*.

Consideration and adoption of Final Document(s) (NPT/CONF.2005/DC/1)

15. **Mr. Costea** (Romania), speaking as Chairman of the Drafting Committee, reported orally on the work of that Committee. In accordance with rule 36 of the rules of procedure, the Conference had established a Drafting Committee composed of representatives of the States represented in the General Committee. Also in accordance with that rule, members of other delegations had participated in its deliberations. Mr. Ibrahim (Egypt) and Mr. Paulsen (Norway) had served as Vice-Chairmen. The draft final document contained in NPT/CONF.2005/DC/CRP.1 had been submitted to the Committee. In its one formal meeting on 25 May 2005 and in open-ended informal consultations under the guidance of the Conference President, the Committee had considered and agreed to recommend to the Conference for adoption the draft Final Document of the 2005 Review Conference (NPT/CONF.2005/DC/1).

16. **The President** said he took it that the Conference wished to take note of the oral report of the Drafting Committee.

17. *It was so decided*.

18. **The President** said he took it that the Conference wished to adopt the draft Final Document section by section.

19. *It was so decided*.

20. *The section entitled "Introduction" was adopted*.

21. *The section entitled "Organization of the Conference" was adopted*.

22. *The section entitled "Participation in the Conference" was adopted*.

23. **The President** said that the section entitled "Financial arrangements" would be deferred until the afternoon pending finalization of the schedule of division of costs contained in NPT/CONF.2005/51.

24. *The section entitled "Work of the Conference" was adopted*.

25. *The section entitled "Documentation" was adopted*.

26. *The section entitled "Conclusions and recommendations of the Conference" was adopted*.

27. **The President** said it was regrettable that the Conference had been unable to reach consensus in either the Main Committees or their subsidiary bodies and, therefore, to make any recommendations. The document currently under consideration would become part I of the Final Document, while part II would contain documents issued at the Conference and part III would contain summary records of the public meetings of the Conference and its Main Committees and a list of participants. As requested by the representative of France, the adoption of the Final Document as a whole would be deferred until the afternoon when it would be available in all the official languages.

28. **Mr. Meyer** (Canada) noted that, at the beginning of the current Conference, the Secretary-General of the United Nations had warned against complacency and had reminded participants of the ever-present danger of a nuclear-weapon explosion despite the great security benefits that the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) had bestowed for more than 35 years. Regrettably, the Conference had not risen to the Secretary-General's call. The pursuit of short-term, parochial interests had overridden the collective long-term interest in sustaining the Treaty's authority and integrity, precious time had been squandered by

procedural brinkmanship, more than one State had displayed intransigence on pressing issues, with the priorities of the many being subordinated to the preferences of a few. A delinquent State's refusal to be held accountable by its peers and a State's defection without sanction had weakened the NPT community. The Conference had been hampered by a lack of will to break with the status quo and adopt new ways of conducting business. The Review Conference must not be reduced to a theatre in which delegations played at nuclear non-proliferation.

29. If there was a silver lining in the otherwise dark cloud of the Conference's failure, it lay in the hope that leaders and citizens would mobilize for prompt remedial action. In that regard, it was important to realize that if the Treaty's authority was to be sustained the disarmament and non-proliferation challenges facing the world in other forums needed to be tackled urgently.

30. NPT States parties must honour their political commitments. To deny or denigrate past agreements was to undermine political commitments made in implementation of the Treaty and to cast doubt upon their credibility. If Governments simply ignored or discarded commitments whenever they proved inconvenient, they would never be able to build an edifice of international cooperation and confidence in the security realm.

31. With regard to nuclear disarmament, reactivation of multilateral activity was a key priority. The impasse at the Conference on Disarmament needed to be overcome immediately so that crucial NPT-related issues, such as the proposed fissile material cut-off treaty (FMCT), could be advanced. If that proved impossible, consideration would need to be given to taking forward some of its work in other multilateral institutions. His Government would also be consulting with other concerned States in preparation for the Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty in September 2005, to ensure that it was fully activated.

32. In the realm of nuclear non-proliferation, his Government would: consistently promote adoption of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and Additional Protocol as the safeguards standard under the NPT and as a condition of supply; lend practical support to strengthening national export controls, especially on proliferation-sensitive technologies, and to international cooperation in that regard, thereby encouraging legitimate nuclear trade and putting an end to clandestine supply networks; and support the development of new multilateral nuclear fuel cycle initiatives that addressed non-proliferation concerns while reinforcing the benefits to all States of the peaceful use of nuclear energy.

33. His Government would work with like-minded partners from all regions to overcome the problems facing the NPT and hoped that other States parties would be similarly motivated by the disappointing showing of the Conference and join in a collective effort to avoid the apocalyptic fate ever latent in the nuclear threat. His Government was not prepared to stand idly by while the crucial pillars of the NPT were undermined. To that end, an authoritative meeting on the NPT should be held for at least one week each year to enable States parties to discuss matters more frequently. The issues that had divided the Conference would need to be addressed by political leaders. The United Nations summit to be held in September 2005 would provide a good opportunity in that regard. Solutions to the problems of disarmament and non-proliferation already existed; all that was needed was the political will to implement them. It was important to look ahead to what could and must be accomplished.

34. **Mr. Mine** (Japan) said that the States parties should take the extremely regrettable outcome of the Conference seriously and renew their determination to explore ways of strengthening the credibility and authority of the NPT regime. That said, the Conference had not been entirely unsuccessful. High-level delegates from many States parties had come together to exchange views on the challenges facing the NPT, with a large number of States parties taking the view that the nuclear issue in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea posed a serious threat to the international community. The NPT regime, now more than ever, was of immense importance to international peace and security. Its further universalization and reinforcement was imperative. States parties should therefore redouble their efforts to strengthen the NPT regime so that the lack of a consensual final document would not erode its authority and credibility. The period leading up to the next Review Conference was crucial in that regard.

35. His Government called on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to dismantle all its nuclear programmes in a permanent, thorough and transparent manner subject to international verification. It would continue to work with other partners to resolve the issue peacefully through the six-party talks. The Islamic Republic of Iran, through its negotiations with France, Germany and the United Kingdom, must also agree to provide sufficient objective guarantees that its nuclear programme was exclusively for peaceful purposes. Japan would continue to work collectively and individually towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons. To that end, his Government would: continue to submit to the General Assembly a draft resolution identifying practical and incremental steps towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons; make every effort to bring about the early entry into force of the CTBT and the immediate commencement of FMCT negotiations; seek to strengthen IAEA safeguards by promoting the universalization of the Additional Protocol and strengthening export controls; continue its efforts with regard to the Asian Senior-Level Talks on Non-Proliferation (ASTOP), which it had hosted twice; promote disarmament and non-proliferation education to gain the understanding and support of young people and civil society as a whole; join collective efforts to prevent nuclear terrorism by promoting full implementation of Security Council resolution 1540 (2004), strengthening the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material by amendment and bringing into effect the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism; promote the implementation of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East through dialogue and cooperation with the countries in the region; and work towards further universalization of the NPT, calling on India, Pakistan and Israel to accede to the NPT as non-nuclear-weapon States promptly and without conditions.

36. **Mr. Rastam** (Malaysia), speaking on behalf of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, said that the non-aligned States parties had come to the Conference with every hope that a consensus could be reached both on outstanding procedural issues, and on substantive questions regarding the three pillars of the Treaty. In five working papers and various statements, the non-aligned countries had formulated the positions determined at their Thirteenth Summit held in Kuala Lumpur in February 2003. They had stressed the importance of maintaining a balanced approach to the three pillars of the NPT and of non-selective implementation of the Treaty. They had also called for universal accession to the Treaty. The non-aligned countries had made concessions, offered compromises and worked for consensus. They had reaffirmed their commitment to implementing their obligations under the Treaty and those emanating from the 1995 and 2000 Conferences, and they expected other States parties to do likewise. Those considerations had governed their approach to, inter alia, the agenda, the programme of work and the establishment of subsidiary bodies of the Review Conference. It was regrettable indeed that a consensus could not be reached on the outcome document, owing to States parties' diverging views on fundamental questions.

37. **Mr. Fathalla** (Egypt) expressed regret that the Review Conference had been unable to achieve an agreed outcome that reflected States parties' commitment to strengthening the objectives of the Treaty. In the interest of achieving a consensus, Egypt had maintained from the outset, that the agenda should be a road map for fair, balanced and impartial treatment of all the issues before the Conference. Throughout the Conference, it had stressed the importance of non-selective implementation of the three pillars of the Treaty. It had also called for a just, impartial and comprehensive review of the implementation of the NPT, with special emphasis on universal accession and full implementation by States parties of their obligations under the Treaty, and of the outcomes of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and the 2000 Review Conference. Such a comprehensive review would include examination of new developments related directly to the implementation of the Treaty. In conclusion, he said that the political will of States parties and an objective approach would be crucial to the success of future review conferences.

38. **Mr. Paranhas** (Brazil) said that his delegation shared the deep sense of frustration felt by many others. The Conference should have reaffirmed the commitments undertaken at previous Conferences and sent a strong message on the central Treaty's central role and States parties' determination to work towards the balanced implementation of its three pillars. Unfortunately, a precious opportunity had been missed, owing to lack of will, inflexibility and selective approaches. The international community should reflect on its collective responsibility to uphold the

NPT regime and take a vigorous multilateral approach to questions related to international peace and security.

39. **Mr. Caughley** (New Zealand) said that, like the representative of Canada, he was reminded of the Secretary-General's warning that visions of a world "in larger freedom" could be put beyond the reach of humankind by a nuclear catastrophe. The circumstances in which the Conference was being held called for collective attention. Unresolved procedural questions, differences over the status of the agreed outcome of previous Conferences and inefficiencies in the preparatory process had held up progress, as had failure to utilize the rules of procedure to facilitate the work of the Conference. His delegation was deeply frustrated by the lack of any practical means of addressing profound proliferation concerns and by the limited return on efforts to build on the 13 practical steps and to accelerate their implementation.

40. Greater progress should have been achieved in determining the implications and consequences of withdrawal from the Treaty. The outcome of the Review Conference must be viewed in the context of the broader malaise and paralysis in multilateral diplomacy. The Treaty would be undermined unless those circumstances were rectified and civil society was allowed to play a greater role in disarmament issues. The lost opportunity at the Conference should serve as a wake-up call to the international community, in particular, regarding the need to make further progress in the Conference on Disarmament.

41. **Mr. Kayser** (Luxembourg) speaking on behalf of the European Union, the acceding countries (Bulgaria and Romania), the candidate countries (Croatia and Turkey), the stabilization and association process countries (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia and Montenegro and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia), and, in addition, the European Free Trade Association country member of the European Economic Area, Norway, said that the common position adopted by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the 25 Member States of the European Union could have provided the basis for a consensus. That common position, presented during the Conference, advocated a structured and balanced review of the operation of the NPT, including the implementation of undertakings by the States parties and the identification of areas for achieving further progress in future. The European Union had not only introduced proposals in the three Main Committees but had also submitted working papers on the issues of withdrawal and the Cooperative Threat Reduction-Global Partnership initiative established by the Group of Eight.

42. The European Union attached particular importance to the three pillars of the Treaty, the situations in the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and in South Asia and the Middle East, the nuclear-weapon-free zones, the question of withdrawal from the Treaty, security assurances and universalization of the Treaty, all of which deserved considerable attention. It was therefore disappointing that a number of States parties had prevented the substantive proposals before Main Committees II and III from receiving the same treatment as those before Main Committee I, ruling out a balanced reflection of the Treaty's three pillars in the Conference documents. The European Union regretted that, despite its consistently flexible and constructive approach, it had not been possible to resolve procedural issues more quickly or to reach a consensus outcome. Nonetheless, the Conference had managed to hold an in-depth and comprehensive debate and the Main Committees had been able to examine substantive issues on the basis of the working papers before them, including those submitted by the European Union on its common position.

43. The European Union reaffirmed its support for the decisions and resolution adopted at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference. The Final Document and the programme of work just adopted provided a framework for the preparatory process for the next review conference, in which the European Union would participate with the same sense of responsibility it had always shown. In conclusion, he suggested that the first session of the Preparatory Committee in 2007 should be held in Vienna, to mark the 50th anniversary of IAEA, and that the second and third sessions should be held in New York and Geneva, respectively.

44. **Mr. Streuli** (Switzerland), expressed his delegation's deep disappointment at the meagre results of the Review Conference and, in particular, the stubborn defence of certain national positions. Failure to achieve the obligations under the three pillars of the NPT posed a global threat. Nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear States alike would pay the price for slowness to implement disarmament initiatives: the risk of accidents would increase and the incentives for

proliferation would be greater. The breach of non-proliferation obligations would undermine trust between States and weaken the multilateral system. Proliferation would also impede cooperation for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and retard development in developing countries. His delegation hoped that the lessons learned from the 2005 experience would motivate States parties to overcome narrow national positions and encourage them to take a global view of the issues. It called for the rapid initiation of negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on the fissile material cut-off treaty as a first step in that direction.

45. **Ms. Paulsen** (Norway) expressed her delegation's profound disappointment at the lack of a strong substantive outcome. At a time when the integrity of the global arms control regime was being challenged, the international community should have been able to address such issues as non-compliance, defection from the NPT and acquisition of weapons of mass destruction by terrorists. It was regrettable that the overemphasis on procedural issues by certain delegations had delayed and undermined the substantive deliberations of the Conference, precluding genuine negotiations of the final declaration.

46. Her Government remained a strong advocate of multilateralism and hoped that the issues before the Conference would be revisited at the High-level Plenary meeting of the General Assembly in September.

47. **Ms. Sanders** (United States of America) observed that much had changed since the 2000 Review Conference. After committing numerous violations of its international legal obligations, North Korea had summarily withdrawn from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and had declared itself a nuclear-weapon State. Iran's nuclear weapons programme and its violations of its obligations as a member State of IAEA had been exposed and, after having pursued a clandestine nuclear programme in breach of the Treaty, Libya had made the strategic decision to give up its weapons ambitions in 2003. While the illicit A. Q. Khan network, which had been supporting those regimes, had been shut down, the North Korean and Iranian programmes were still in existence and other sources of supply remained open for business. In addition, the possibility of weapons of mass destruction falling into the hands of terrorists had become the most immediate security challenge facing the world.

48. Within the framework of its National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction, the United States was taking robust and comprehensive measures to counter the threat posed by the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction by dangerous regimes or terrorists. The Proliferation Security Initiative had been launched in May 2003 in order to deter or impede proliferation through the prohibition of certain shipments of weapons of mass destruction. More than 60 countries had indicated their support for that initiative and the United States was working with partner countries to broaden and deepen international cooperation. It was also fully committed to the implementation of Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) and urged States that had not yet done so to make every effort to comply with their relevant reporting requirements.

49. Iran's single-minded pursuit of uranium enrichment capability raised a key question for States parties to the Treaty, since the fact that enrichment and reprocessing equipment and technology provided access to weapons-grade nuclear material clearly added to the danger of weapons proliferation. Consequently, in February 2004, President Bush had suggested that States should take action to close a loophole in the Treaty which permitted States to pursue enrichment and reprocessing activities for peaceful purposes while planning to use that capacity to manufacture nuclear weapons. The Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Group of Eight were currently discussing that proposal and the Director-General of IAEA had convened a panel to study multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle. The Group of Eight had also launched its own initiative, entitled the Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction.

50. In order to reinforce the global nuclear non-proliferation regime, the United States had, in 2004, called on all States to press for universal adherence to the IAEA Additional Protocol and for recognition of that instrument as the new enhanced standard for nuclear safeguards and as a criterion for nuclear support. In that connection, the Agency should establish a special committee on safeguards with a view to preparing a comprehensive plan for strengthened safeguards and verification.

51. Article IV of the Treaty acknowledged the benefits of peaceful nuclear cooperation, and the United States fully supported such activities through substantial funding and technical cooperation. However, peaceful nuclear programmes pursued by States parties to the Treaty must conform to the obligations set forth in articles I, II and III. Any right to receive benefits under article IV was also conditional on the fulfilment of the Treaty's non-proliferation obligations.

52. Although the 2005 Review Conference had not been able to reach consensus, it had broken new ground. It had been the first Conference to examine in detail indicators of non-compliance with article II and had also explored the linkages between the right to the peaceful use of nuclear energy and the obligations contained in articles I, II and III. An exchange of views had taken place on how States parties, IAEA and the Security Council should go about holding States accountable for failure to comply with their obligations under the Treaty and, for the first time, the issue of notifications of withdrawal had been seriously discussed.

53. Furthermore, notwithstanding the absence of specific recommendations, there had been serious consideration of, and often broad agreement on, steps to strengthen the implementation of the Treaty. Although efforts to bring to the plenary Conference the discussion of the serious challenges to security and the non-proliferation regime posed by the non-compliance of Iran and North Korea with their obligations had been blocked, records of that discussion remained. Many delegations, including her own, had voiced their support for efforts undertaken by the United Kingdom, France and Germany, supported by the European Union, to reach a diplomatic solution to the Iranian nuclear problem. Such a solution must include the permanent cessation of all enrichment and reprocessing efforts as well as the dismantlement of related equipment and facilities. In addition, States parties had expressed their support for the Six-Party Talks and, in that context, the United States had submitted a proposal that addressed the stated concerns of North Korea and provided for the complete, verifiable and irreversible dismantlement of the latter's nuclear programmes. Lastly, the Conference had addressed the important topic of article IV and her delegation had taken that opportunity to make clear its abiding commitment to fulfil its obligations under that article. The United States had reduced the role of nuclear weapons in its deterrence strategy and was in the process of cutting its nuclear stockpile almost in half.

54. Her delegation hoped that the important discussions that had taken place at the Conference would continue in other forums and would make a lasting impression on the global non-proliferation regime. Building a political consensus took time and the United States would cooperate with all States parties committed to strengthening the Treaty and the nuclear non-proliferation regime.

55. **Mr. Meric** (Turkey) expressed his great disappointment at the failure of the Conference to produce a substantive outcome. States had missed an opportunity to address the current challenges facing the Treaty and to restore its relevance, and he hoped that that experience would not set a precedent for future review conferences and preparatory meetings. However, despite the negative outcome of the Conference, the Treaty was still a unique and irreplaceable multilateral instrument which should continue to play a vital role. States must continue to support the regime established by the Treaty and make every effort to protect its integrity and credibility.

56. **Mr. Gala López** (Cuba) said that his delegation wished to associate itself with the statement made by the representative of Malaysia on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement. Cuba attached great importance to the issue of nuclear disarmament and took the view that the only safe and effective method of preventing the proliferation of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction was to ensure their total elimination. However, non-proliferation was not an end in itself but rather a step towards nuclear disarmament. Questions relating to proliferation should be resolved by political and diplomatic means within the framework of international law, including the Charter of the United Nations. His delegation rejected the selective application of the Treaty, which revolved around the three essential pillars of non-proliferation, disarmament and the peaceful use of nuclear energy.

57. Cuba had participated actively in the work of the Conference and had, in particular, sought the adoption of a final document which reaffirmed and expanded upon the unequivocal commitment of nuclear-weapon States to eliminate all their nuclear arsenals in a transparent, irreversible and verifiable manner. Unfortunately, that had not been possible.

58. The 2005 Review Conference had dedicated a great deal of its allotted meeting time to procedural issues, which had meant that less time had been available for the discussion of substantive issues. Furthermore, discussions on agenda item 16 had been undermined by the decision of the primary nuclear Power to call into question the explicit mention of the outcomes of the 1995 and 2000 Review Conferences, which had been reached by consensus. That situation was a further illustration of the complexity of the modern, unipolar world, which was characterized by unilateralism and the tendency of some to hold up certain selective and discriminatory measures, such as the Proliferation Security Initiative, which contravened the fundamental principles of international law and the Charter of the United Nations, as examples of so-called effective multilateralism.

59. The events of the 2005 Review Conference reflected a regrettable trend observed in similar multilateral forums which had also been influenced by the hegemonic and obstructive attitude of the primary nuclear Power, which had employed a variety of manoeuvres to disguise its lack of political will to move towards general and complete disarmament, in particular nuclear disarmament, under strict international control. In the face of such a situation, it was all the more necessary to preserve multilateralism and to conduct international relations on the basis of strict respect for the principles of international law and the Charter of the United Nations.

60. **Mr. Baali** (Algeria) said that his delegation wished to associate itself with the statement made by the representative of Malaysia on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement. It was regrettable that, given the numerous threats and challenges facing the Treaty and in spite of the efforts deployed by all participants, the Conference had not lived up to States' expectations. His delegation had taken part in the Conference with an open and constructive spirit and had been guided by its longstanding commitment to the Treaty as the cornerstone of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation and by the achievements of the 1995 and 2000 Review Conferences. Accordingly, it would have liked to see a more substantive outcome that would have allowed for an effective review of the Treaty and enabled States parties to pursue the cause of nuclear disarmament.

61. Algeria reaffirmed its full commitment to the Treaty and was determined to spare no effort to preserve its three essential pillars, since the only way to guarantee the authority and credibility of the Treaty was to pursue the full implementation of all its provisions and to ensure its universality. It was hoped that States parties would continue to show the political will necessary to create better conditions for the review process. Nuclear weapons were and would continue to be the most dangerous threat to mankind, and their elimination must therefore remain States' primary objective.

62. **Mr. Antonov** (Russian Federation) said that it might have been possible to reach consensus on a final document had there been sufficient flexibility and resolve on the part of certain delegations. Despite the lack of such consensus, the work accomplished had been useful. Both the statements by participants and the working papers distributed to delegations had shown a wide range of views on ways of meeting the States parties' obligations under the NPT, which was natural given the significant changes that had taken place during the past few years in the area of international security. At the same time, many fundamental points united all parties in support of the Treaty, and, no one had said that the Treaty was obsolete or proposed drafting a new instrument to replace it. On the contrary, everyone had emphasized the importance and value of the Treaty as the basis for the nuclear non-proliferation regime.

63. Of equal importance had been the emphasis placed by all States parties on their commitment to strict observance of their obligations in the areas of non-proliferation, disarmament and cooperation in the peaceful use of nuclear energy. An especially important general conclusion that had emerged from the Conference was that the new challenges recently posed to the nuclear non-proliferation regime must be met on the basis of the NPT. Delegations had also underscored the need to strengthen the IAEA safeguards system, which was important for building confidence in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and promoting the non-proliferation regime.

64. His Government considered the NPT to be an important element of the international security system. For 35 years, the Treaty had proved effective first and foremost in preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons. In his greetings to the Conference, President Vladimir Putin had noted that the Russian Federation was fulfilling all its disarmament obligations. The Government was successfully concluding agreements

in that area and was prepared to take further constructive steps.

65. During the past month, the Conference had succeeded in making an objective and balanced analysis of the functions of the Treaty. On that basis, State parties would be able to continue to work together to fulfil the obligations under the NPT and further strengthen the Treaty. His delegation stood ready to take part in such work.

66. **Mr. Park** In-kook (Republic of Korea) said that the Review Conference had failed to reach a consensus on substantive elements of the Final Document. It was regrettable that such fundamental gaps in perceptions of and approaches to substantive matters had appeared and had prevented the Conference from addressing the urgent matters before it, including issues relating to North Korea, in an effective manner. In that connection, he re-emphasized the importance of the Six-Party Talks and called upon North Korea to return to them as soon as possible.

67. It was also unfortunate that procedural matters designed to facilitate the Review Conference had instead become obstacles to it. However, he did not believe that the failure to agree on a Final Document was a failure of the Treaty itself, since it had become apparent in recent years that its importance as a cornerstone of the non-proliferation regime was increasing rather than diminishing. The Conference had provided States parties with a good opportunity to reaffirm their diverging views on substantive issues and progress had also been made with regard to article X of the Treaty. In that connection, the entire outcome of the Conference, particularly the record of discussions on substantive matters, should be used constructively in the context of the next review process.

68. **Mr. Smith** (Australia) said he was deeply disappointed that delegations had been unable to reach consensus on a substantive outcome to the Conference. It was most regrettable that a lengthy debate on procedural issues had prevented the Conference from commencing its substantive discussions and that, once those discussions had begun, there had been insufficient time or, in some cases, will, to deal effectively with key issues of interest to all. States parties had been denied an opportunity to deal more effectively with the grave threats posed by proliferation and to advance nuclear disarmament. In addition, Australia was particularly disappointed that the considerable efforts made by the Vienna Group of 10 to develop what should have been broadly acceptable language on non-proliferation and peaceful use issues had been thwarted.

69. Nevertheless, the failure to agree on a substantive outcome did not undermine the ongoing contribution of the Treaty to international peace and security. With 189 States parties, it continued to be the most widely supported multilateral arms control treaty in existence and had established an international set of standards that outlawed the spread of nuclear weapons and provided a framework for their eventual elimination. Notwithstanding its disappointment at the outcome of the Conference, Australia stood ready to redouble its efforts to tackle ongoing proliferation challenges.

The meeting rose at 12.40 p.m.