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General and complete disarmament

Follow-up to the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the *Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons*

Reducing nuclear danger

Nuclear disarmament

Report of the Secretary-General

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* A/60/50 and Corr.1.

I. Introduction

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to requests contained in the following resolutions adopted by the General Assembly at its fifty-ninth session on 3 December 2004: resolution 59/83, “Follow-up to the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the *Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons*”; resolution 59/79, “Reducing nuclear danger”; and resolution 59/77, “Nuclear disarmament”.
2. In paragraph 3 of resolution 59/83, the General Assembly requested all States to inform the Secretary-General of the efforts and measures they had taken on the implementation of the resolution and nuclear disarmament, and requested the Secretary-General to apprise the General Assembly of that information at its sixtieth session.
3. In paragraph 5 of resolution 59/79, the General Assembly requested the Secretary-General to intensify efforts and support initiatives that would contribute towards the full implementation of the seven recommendations identified in the report of the Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters (A/56/400) that would significantly reduce the risk of nuclear war and to continue to encourage Member States to endeavour to create conditions that would allow the emergence of an international consensus in favour of holding an international conference, as proposed in the United Nations Millennium Declaration, to identify ways of eliminating nuclear dangers, and to report thereon to the General Assembly at its sixtieth session.
4. In paragraph 21 of resolution 59/77, the General Assembly requested the Secretary-General to submit to the General Assembly at its sixtieth session a report on the implementation of the resolution.

II. Observations

5. Nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation remain at the forefront of the international peace and security agenda. Dangers resulting from the acquisition, possession and possible use of weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons and radiological dispersal devices, or “dirty bombs”, are challenges the international community continues to confront. To effectively reduce such threats, efforts must be exerted at unilateral, bilateral and multilateral levels. Nuclear-weapon States bear the responsibility to reduce existing arsenals, and some progress has been made in this respect. Steady implementation of the Moscow Treaty by the Russian Federation and the United States of America has contributed to the strengthening of international peace and security. Applying the principles of transparency, irreversibility and verification to the Treaty would immeasurably strengthen the international nuclear non-proliferation regime. The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland undertook a five-year research programme to study techniques and technologies with the potential for application to the verification of any future arrangement for the control, reduction and ultimate elimination of nuclear weapon stockpiles. Its summary findings were released in a working paper presented to the 2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Equally important are continued efforts of the international community to strengthen and achieve universal

adherence to, full compliance with, and effective implementation of the provisions of existing arms control and disarmament agreements.

6. Member States bear the ultimate responsibility for effectively upholding multilateral disarmament and non-proliferation regimes and fully discharging their related functions. The 2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons was held from 2 to 27 May 2005 in New York. The divergences of views that deadlocked agreement on the Conference's agenda throughout the preceding year continued into the Conference itself. The Conference concluded with no agreement on substantive issues. States Parties missed the opportunity to address a number of important threats and challenges to the international nuclear non-proliferation regime. Action is required on many fronts, including strengthening confidence in the integrity of the Treaty; achieving further irreversible cuts in nuclear arsenals; ensuring that measures for compliance are made more effective; acting to reduce the threat of proliferation not only to States, but to non-State actors; and finding durable ways to reconcile the right to peaceful uses with the imperative of non-proliferation. Notwithstanding the action needed to revitalize the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, it remains the cornerstone of the global non-proliferation regime and the essential foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament and the reduction of nuclear dangers.

7. Despite a further increase in the number of ratifications of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty since last reporting, the Treaty still lacks the ratifications required for its entry into force. Tensions around this issue impacted on the 2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and were among the obstacles to agreement within those deliberations. The next Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, the fourth of its kind, will take place from 21 to 23 September 2005 in New York. The occasion will provide a timely opportunity for ratifiers and signatory States to reaffirm their resolve to nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. The Secretary-General reiterates his call to the States that have not yet signed and ratified the Treaty, especially those States for which ratification is necessary for the entry into force of the Treaty, to do so at the earliest possible date. Pending the entry into force of the Treaty, it is essential that States uphold the moratorium on nuclear weapon test explosions and other nuclear explosions.

8. The Conference on Disarmament has yet to break the impasse that would allow it to resume substantive work. It is critical that the Conference succeed in doing so, particularly at a time when the relevance of multilateral disarmament machinery has been called into question. The Secretary-General encourages the States members of the Conference to overcome the differences in their views and positions and to agree on a substantive programme of work enabling negotiations to begin without further delay.

9. Full implementation of the seven recommendations identified in the summary of the discussions of the Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters (A/56/400) for reducing nuclear dangers requires further efforts. In response to the request contained in General Assembly resolution 59/79, the Secretary-General continues to support initiatives and actions taken to this effect. With regard to the proposal contained in the United Nations Millennium Declaration for convening an international conference to identify ways of eliminating nuclear dangers,

consultations with Member States demonstrate that the conditions that would allow the emergence of an international consensus to hold such a conference remain elusive.

10. The threat of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, their means of delivery and related materials has added to the challenges faced by multilateral non-proliferation and disarmament efforts. The nuclear fuel cycle has taken on proliferation risk dimensions that were not fully envisioned when NPT was established 35 years ago. International concern has been heightened by the emergence of a clandestine nuclear black market, determined efforts to acquire the technology to produce fissile material useable in nuclear weapons and terrorists seeking to acquire weapons of mass destruction. The unanimous adoption of Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) is aimed at preventing non-State actors from acquiring or developing weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery. The United Nations Secretariat is fully committed to assisting Member States in meeting these challenges, including providing secretarial support and technical assistance to the Committee established pursuant to the Security Council resolution.

III. Information received from Governments

11. As regards resolution 59/83, entitled “Follow-up to the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the *Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons*”, all Member States were invited, by a note verbale dated 25 February 2005, to inform the Secretary-General of the efforts and measures they had taken with regard to the implementation of the resolution. To date, replies have been received from Chile, Guatemala, Japan, Mexico, Panama and the Syrian Arab Republic, the texts of which are reproduced below. Any additional replies received from Member States will be issued as addenda to the present report.

Chile

[Original: Spanish]
[13 May 2005]

12. Chile welcomed the 1996 advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the interpretation of article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which enshrines the obligation to pursue negotiations in good faith leading to complete nuclear disarmament.

13. Although the Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference (1995) extended the Treaty indefinitely, Chile, like most of the non-nuclear-weapon States, believes that the extension can in no way be interpreted as legitimizing nuclear-weapon States' indefinite possession of such weapons. Quite the opposite, in fact: the central aim of the Treaty is to eliminate them.

14. The negotiations for which this article provides are equally incumbent on nuclear-weapon States parties and on non-nuclear-weapon States parties, which could suffer the effects of the use of such weapons. Chile voiced this view once again at the 2005 Review Conference.

Guatemala

[Original: Spanish]
[9 May 2005]

15. I wish to inform you that Guatemala has not taken any action regarding resolution 59/83, as it possesses no nuclear weaponry.

Japan

[Original: English]
[9 May 2005]

Commitment to the three non-nuclear principles

16. The Government of Japan continues to firmly commit itself to the “three non-nuclear principles”, which describes the policy of not possessing, not producing and not permitting the introduction of nuclear weapons into Japan. The successive Cabinets of Japan, including the incumbent cabinet under Prime Minister Koizumi, have repeatedly articulated that Japan will continue to uphold these principles.

Submission of resolutions on nuclear disarmament to the General Assembly

17. Every year from 1994 to 1999, Japan submitted to the United Nations General Assembly a draft resolution which called for nuclear disarmament with a view to the ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons. Since 2000, Japan has annually submitted a draft resolution entitled “A path to the total elimination of nuclear weapons”, reflecting the concrete and practical disarmament steps agreed to in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference. Japan’s draft resolutions, aiming at the realization of a peaceful and safe world free of nuclear weapons, have been adopted with the overwhelming support of the international community. It is to be noted that 2004 marked the greatest number of votes in favour of the resolution in 10 years.

Efforts for the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty

18. Japan emphasizes the importance of the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), which constitutes one of the major pillars of the NPT regime. From this point of view Japan has made various efforts, including the following:

(a) Japan has seized every high-level opportunity to convince States that have not yet signed or ratified the CTBT, especially those States listed in annex II, of the importance of its early entry into force;

(b) On 3 September 2003, then Minister for Foreign Affairs, Yoriko Kawaguchi, attended the Third Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, and made a strong personal appeal to call for the signing and ratification of the Treaty as early as possible. Furthermore, prior to that Conference, together with the President of the Conference, Foreign Minister of Finland, Mr. Tuomioja, and Foreign Minister of Austria, Ms. Ferrero-Waldner, Minister Kawaguchi sent a joint letter to the remaining 12 countries, whose ratification was a prerequisite for its entry into force, encouraging them to

ratify the Treaty as soon as possible, following which joint démarches were made by Japan, Finland and Austria;

(c) In September 2004, Japan, together with Australia, Finland and the Netherlands, co-hosted the CTBT Friends Ministerial Meeting. The Joint Ministerial Statement issued at this meeting underlined that the progress on the early entry into force of the CTBT would also contribute to a positive outcome of the 2005 NPT Review Conference;

(d) In April 2005, prior to the 2005 NPT Review Conference, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Nobutaka Machimura, sent his letters to 11 States whose ratification is required for the Treaty to enter into force;

(e) As part of the establishment of the International Monitoring System (IMS), the construction of domestic monitoring facilities in Japan has been steadily progressing under the supervision of its CTBT National Operation System. The three domestic monitoring facilities were formally certified by the Provisional Technical Secretariat of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) Preparatory Commission to date;

(f) Ambassador Yukio Takasu, Permanent Representative of Japan to the CTBTO Preparatory Commission, was elected as chairman of the Commission for 2004 and made every effort towards the achievement of the CTBT's early entry into force;

(g) Japan has encouraged countries that have not yet ratified the CTBT to do so by, for example, providing technical assistance in the field of earthquake monitoring technology for the establishment of the International Monitoring System;

(h) Japan also took the initiative, together with Germany, to hold the Seminar on Civil and Scientific Applications of CTBT Verification technologies at the Japanese-German Center Berlin in May 2004.

Activities in preparation for the commencement of negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty

19. Japan emphasized the importance and urgency of the commencement of negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty (FMCT). As a concrete contribution to this end, Japan presented, on 14 August 2003, a working paper on FMCT to the Conference on Disarmament, aimed at deepening discussions on the substantive issues of FMCT, and facilitating the early commencement of FMCT negotiations.

20. Japan regards it as a primary task to reach an agreement on a programme of work at the Conference on Disarmament, thereby realizing the early commencement of negotiations on FMCT. Japan has been making its utmost efforts to break the current stalemate at the Conference on Disarmament. Japan has redoubled its endeavours for this purpose during its Presidency of the Conference from 18 August to 31 December 2003; during this period, on 4 September, the then Foreign Minister Kawaguchi visited the Conference on Disarmament and appealed for the early resumption of substantive discussion, stressing the need and the urgency for the commencement of negotiations on FMCT.

Contribution to the 2005 NPT Review Process

21. In order to make tangible contributions to the preparatory process for the 2005 Review Conference and to clearly explain its position on nuclear disarmament, Japan has presented to each session of the Preparatory Committee the following working papers:

- NPT/CONF.2005/PC.I/WP.7
- NPT/CONF.2005/PC.II/WP.15 and NPT/CONF.2005/PC.II/WP.18
- NPT/CONF.2005/PC.III/WP.11, NPT/CONF.2005/PC.III/WP.17 and NPT/CONF.2005/PC.III/WP.18.

In addition, in February 2005, Japan hosted the Tokyo seminar on the NPT entitled “Towards the 2005 Review Conference” in order to provide a timely opportunity to pave the way to a successful outcome for the 2005 NPT Review Conference.

Cooperation for denuclearization in the Russian Federation

22. At the Kananaskis Summit in June 2002, G-8 leaders announced the “G-8 Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction” to address non-proliferation, disarmament, counter-terrorism and nuclear safety issues. Japan committed itself, for the purpose of the Partnership, to make a contribution amounting up to a little more than 200 million United States dollars, out of which \$100 million is to be allocated to the G-8 disposition programme of Russian surplus weapon-grade plutonium and the rest to projects for dismantling Russian decommissioned nuclear submarines. Meanwhile, with the cooperation of Japan, 20 kilograms of weapon-grade plutonium, equivalent to two to three nuclear warheads, was successfully disposed of with the aid of advanced technology developed by Russian scientists, for the first time in the world. In December 2003, Japan and the Russian Federation launched the first cooperation project to dismantle a Victor III class decommissioned nuclear submarine under the Partnership, which was successfully completed in December 2004. At present Japan and the Russian Federation are making great efforts to conclude an implementing arrangement for dismantling five additional decommissioned nuclear submarines.

Efforts to promote disarmament and non-proliferation education

23. In August 2002, the Group of Governmental Experts of Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Education submitted the report on disarmament and non-proliferation education to the United Nations Secretary-General. The resolution, requesting the implementation of this report, was adopted without a vote at the fifty-seventh session of the General Assembly.

24. Since 1983, Japan has invited more than 550 participants in the United Nations disarmament fellowship programme to Japan, including the cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, providing these young officials, who will be responsible for future disarmament diplomacy, with an opportunity to witness the horrendous and long-lasting consequences caused by atomic bombs. Japan will continue to contribute to this programme.

25. Japan believes that the international community should be well informed of the destructive effects of nuclear weapons. In accordance with the wish of the people of Japan that such weapons never be used again, the Government of Japan has

supported, on a number of occasions, the efforts of local governments and non-governmental organizations to organize exhibitions relating to atomic bombs in foreign countries, including the Hiroshima-Nagasaki A-bomb exhibition in Aubagne, France, in September 2004 and in Compton, United States of America, in March 2005. Such an exhibition is also held at the United Nations with the support by the Permanent Mission of Japan to the United Nations.

26. To elucidate the current state of disarmament and non-proliferation and to gain broad understanding and support of the issue, the Government of Japan published a book entitled “Japan’s Disarmament and Non-proliferation Policy” in March 2004.

27. In its efforts to implement the aforementioned recommendations suggested in the report, Japan invited prominent educators on disarmament and non-proliferation to visit Japan in November 2002, in January 2004 and in February 2005. The educators lectured in Tokyo, Hiroshima and Nagasaki, on the necessity of nuclear disarmament, and also exchanged opinions with the victims of atomic bombs and non-governmental organizations.

Mexico

[Original: Spanish]
[17 May 2005]

28. Mexico reaffirms that the only way to guarantee that nuclear weapons will not be used is to eliminate them completely. Consequently, it reiterates the historic importance of the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice, which confirms the legal obligation of all States, particularly the nuclear Powers, to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects.

29. Against that background, Mexico actively promotes nuclear disarmament. The holding of the Conference of States Parties and Signatories to Treaties that Establish Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones at Tlatelolco, Mexico City, from 26 to 28 April 2005, clearly demonstrates the Mexican Government’s belief in strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation regime and in advancing the aim of completely eliminating nuclear weapons.

30. This successful conference adopted a political Declaration, paragraph 9 of which contained an expression of firm support by the members of nuclear-weapon-free zones for the unanimous conclusion of the International Court of Justice that there existed an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects, under strict and effective international control.

31. Similarly, in paragraph 5, the members of nuclear-weapon-free zones reaffirmed the importance of achieving the universality of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and urged those States that were not parties thereto to accede to it without delay or conditions as non-nuclear-weapon States.

32. The Declaration also expressed concern over the lack of progress to date on the application of nuclear-disarmament measures agreed to by all States parties at the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and urged all States to comply immediately with the obligation

set forth in article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty to undertake to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control, recalling in particular the unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament, to which all States parties are committed.

33. In the run-up to the fifty-ninth session of the General Assembly, the ministers for foreign affairs of the New Agenda Coalition published a joint article in the *International Herald Tribune* pointing out that non-proliferation was vital, but not sufficient, to eliminate the nuclear threat.

34. During the fifty-ninth session of the General Assembly, the New Agenda Coalition submitted, in the First Committee (disarmament and international security), resolution 59/75 on accelerating the implementation of nuclear-disarmament commitments, with the aim of furthering the aims of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.

35. The resolution called upon all States to comply fully with commitments made regarding nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation and not to act in any way that might be detrimental to nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation or that might lead to a new nuclear arms race.

36. It also called upon all States to spare no efforts to achieve universal adherence to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, and called upon all States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to accelerate the implementation of the practical steps for systematic and progressive efforts to achieve nuclear disarmament agreed upon at the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

37. Mexico continues to demonstrate full support and flexibility in the efforts to ensure that the Conference on Disarmament includes in its programme of work the establishment of a subsidiary body to deal with nuclear disarmament.

38. As a member of the New Agenda Coalition (Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, South Africa and Sweden), Mexico is pressing for urgent implementation of the nuclear-disarmament measures agreed at the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and urging progress on the unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States to destroy their nuclear arsenals.

39. In that connection, Mexico recently attached its name to the joint editorial published in the *International Herald Tribune* on the first day of the 2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 2 May 2005, which emphasized that disarmament and non-proliferation are mutually reinforcing processes: what does not exist cannot proliferate. For that reason, the New Agenda advocates complete elimination of nuclear weapons.

40. Furthermore, on 3 May, during the general debate, Mexico emphasized that the time had come to find ways to step up nuclear disarmament, which required a clear expression of political will on the part of nuclear-weapon States and a schedule of concrete and verifiable steps.

41. Mexico will present a national report regarding article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. In so doing, it will promote accountability and transparency as vital components of nuclear disarmament.

Panama

[Original: Spanish]
[5 May 2005]

42. The Republic of Panama recognizes the importance of negotiating legally binding multilateral instruments in this field. Consequently, Panama is party to the multilateral and regional conventions on disarmament and non-proliferation, particularly in the nuclear field. Panama accordingly does not develop, produce, test, deploy, stockpile, transfer or use or threaten to use nuclear weapons. However, as a non-nuclear State, it is concerned at other States' failure to fulfil many of the commitments assumed internationally, particularly commitments relating to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

43. Panama's geographically strategic position has made it a transit country. It acknowledges that simply regulating demand for and/or supply of nuclear weapons, their means of delivery or related materials is not enough.

44. The Republic of Panama has consequently been focusing its efforts on preventing and/or regulating the passage through its territory of nuclear weapons (and other weapons of mass destruction), their means of delivery or related materials. Lists of controlled substances, hazardous materials and goods and dual-use goods are held and managed by the appropriate authorities with the aim of guaranteeing secure and legitimate trade through the Republic of Panama. The bodies responsible for operational measures to prevent, detect and deter illicit trafficking and the proliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons, their means of delivery and related materials are acting to prevent the entry of such materials into Panamanian territory.

45. Joint efforts are also being undertaken with the private sector to ensure that it receives information on its obligations under these international laws and commitments.

46. Since shipping is of special significance to the Republic of Panama, its Government is developing a national maritime security strategy as an instrument to provide a basis for national and international maritime security measures and procedures.

47. Aside from implementing the International Code for the Security of Ships and Port Facilities (ISPS Code), Panama is involved in the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). Panama hopes that such initiatives will be adopted multilaterally.

48. Action has been taken to ban Panamanian citizens or any persons or bodies in Panamanian territory from direct or indirect involvement in providing facilities, financial assets, economic resources or financial services for the use of third persons committing or attempting to commit terrorist acts using nuclear, biological and/or chemical weapons, their means of delivery and related materials.

49. Panama reciprocally provides maximum assistance and interchange of information in criminal investigations and proceedings connected with natural or

legal persons involved in trafficking nuclear, biological and/or chemical weapons, their means of delivery and related materials.

50. Finally, the Republic of Panama wishes to reiterate that international efforts must focus not only on countering proliferation, but also on nuclear disarmament, since the existence of nuclear weapons remains one of the greatest threats to international security in general, and to the security of non-nuclear-weapon States in particular.

Syrian Arab Republic

[Original: Arabic]

[20 April 2005]

51. The advisory opinion issued by the International Court of Justice on 8 July 1996 affirmed that the unique characteristics of nuclear weapons, and in particular their destructive capacity, their capacity to cause untold human suffering, and their ability to cause damage to generations to come, render them potentially catastrophic. According to the Court, the destructive power of nuclear weapons cannot be contained either in space or time. They have the potential to destroy all civilization and the entire ecosystem of the planet.

52. The emergence of new ideologies and the issuance of numerous threats to use these weapons in the shadow of a tense international climate highlight the need to eliminate these weapons and demand the adoption, for the purpose of bringing this about, of a legally binding international instrument on negative security guarantees for non-nuclear-weapon States.

53. The Syrian Arab Republic, in accordance with the principles governing its policy of enhancing international peace and security and with the purposes and principles of the United Nations, and as part of its overall perspective on general and complete disarmament, has spared no effort in supporting United Nations resolutions relating to disarmament. It became a party in 1968 to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and agreed to be bound by its safeguards regime. On 29 December 2003, the Syrian Arab Republic called on the Security Council to hold consultations on a serious and constructive initiative, submitted to the Security Council on behalf of the Arab Group, to make the Middle East a zone free of weapons of mass destruction, based on its conviction that possession of these destructive weapons by any State in the Middle East or the world constitutes a threat to the region and is to be considered a source of grave concern to the peoples of the region and the world. The Syrian Arab Republic believes that it is urgent that, through this initiative, there be established a mechanism related to the concerns of the region and the world about security and international peace, and calls through it for pressure on Israel, the one State in the region that does possess an enormous arsenal of these weapons and threatens its neighbours, to comply with the resolutions of the international community.

54. The Syrian Arab Republic reaffirms General Assembly resolution 59/83 entitled "Follow-up to the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the *Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons*", and calls for the adoption of practical measures for the elaboration of a phased programme for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons within a specified time frame and under effective international control.