

**NGLS  
DEVELOPMENT  
DOSSIER**

**DESIGNING A  
PEACEBUILDING  
INFRASTRUCTURE:**

**Taking a Systems Approach  
to the Prevention of Deadly Conflict**

*by Tobi P. Dress, J.D.*



United Nations

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DESIGNING A PEACEBUILDING INFRASTRUCTURE:  
TAKING A SYSTEMS APPROACH  
TO THE PREVENTION OF DEADLY CONFLICT

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United Nations  
New York and Geneva, 2005

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# **Designing a Peacebuilding Infrastructure:**

## **Taking a Systems Approach To the Prevention of Deadly Conflict**

*by Tobi P. Dress, J.D.*

*edited by Beth Peoc'h*

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## TABLE OF CONTENTS

<b>Preface</b>		viii
<b>Foreword</b>		xi
<b>Introduction</b>		xiii
<b>Part I:</b>	<b>DESIGNING A PEACEBUILDING INFRASTRUCTURE</b>	
Ch. 1	Overview	1
Ch. 2	Deconstructing Prevention	11
	<i>a. The Current Peacebuilding and Conflict Prevention Landscape</i>	11
	<i>b. Overview of Interventions and Methodologies</i>	13
	<i>c. De-constructing Conventional Understanding</i>	13
<b>PART II:</b>	<b>STRUCTURAL PREVENTION: INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY BUILDING AND CROSS SECTORAL LINKAGES</b>	
Ch. 3	Capacity Building for Structural Prevention: Strengthening the Capacity of the United Nations and Its Member States	21
	<i>a. The Operational Challenge</i>	22
	<i>b. Strengthening the Institutional Capacity of Member States</i>	25
	<i>c. Creation of National Prevention Policies and Institutions</i>	26
	<i>d. Early Warning Systems: Concept and Overview</i>	28
Ch. 4	The Importance of Interdisciplinary Linkages: Conflict Prevention, Development, Governance and Human Rights	33
Ch. 5	National Institutional Capacity and Rule of Law	37
	<i>a. Legal and Institutional Reforms in Post-Conflict Countries</i>	38
	<i>b. Reconciliation and Rebuilding Justice</i>	41

	<i>c. Truth Commissions</i>	42
	<i>d. Reform of Law Enforcement Institutions and the Security Sector</i>	42
Ch. 6	Human Rights, Minority Rights and Identity-based Conflict	47
	<i>a. Conflict Prevention and Human Rights: The Need for Intersectoral Cooperation</i>	48
	<i>b. Defining Human Rights</i>	49
	<i>c. Highlighting Minority Rights</i>	51
	<i>d. Prevention of Genocide and Ethnic Cleansing</i>	51
Ch. 7	Macroeconomics of Conflict	59
	<i>a. Economic Causes of Conflict</i>	59
	<i>b. Economic Impacts of Conflict</i>	63
	<i>c. Transfer of Small Arms and Light Weapons</i>	64
	<i>d. Corruption, Its Legacies and the Struggle to Contain It</i>	67
	<i>e. The Global Compact</i>	71

### **PART III: CURRENT AND ONGOING INITIATIVES**

Ch. 8	Civil Society as a Force for Accountability, Early Warning and Peacebuilding	79
	<i>a. Civil Society Initiatives and Networks</i>	79
	<i>b. The Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict (GPPAC)</i>	82
	<i>c. Women and Conflict — the Emergence of Leaders from Victims</i>	85
	--Special Impacts and “Collateral Damage”	86
	--Women as Major Stakeholders in Peace	88
	--Women at the Grassroots	90
	--Women at the Peace Table	91
	<i>d. Vulnerable Populations: Children and Armed Conflict</i>	94
	--Making the “Era of Application” a Reality for War-affected Children	95

	<i>--State of the World's Children 2005</i>	98
	<i>e. Peacebuilding and a Free Press and Media</i>	99
Ch. 9	United Nations and Intergovernmental Initiatives	
115		
	<i>a. Introduction</i>	115
	<i>b. The Brahimi Report</i>	118
	<i>c. Secretary-General's Reports</i>	119
	<i>d. In Larger Freedom</i>	120
	<i>--Freedom from Fear</i>	121
	<i>--Reducing the Prevalence and Risk of War</i>	121
	<i>--Freedom to Live in Dignity</i>	123
	<i>--Rule of Law</i>	124
	<i>--Human Rights</i>	125
	<i>--Democracy</i>	125
	<i>e. The Secretary-General's High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change</i>	120
	<i>--The Report</i>	126
	<i>--Use of Force</i>	127
	<i>-- Proposal for a Peacebuilding Commission</i>	127
	<i>--Prevention</i>	128
	<i>--Reform of the UN</i>	129
	<i>f. A Note on the UN System</i>	129
	<i>g. A Technical Cooperation Approach to Conflict Transformation: A Pre-eminent Part of the UN's Work</i>	130
	<i>h. Infusing Awareness and Developing Skills and Capacities</i>	131
	<i>i. Regional Initiatives: Regional and Sub-regional Conflict Prevention Mechanisms</i>	132
	<i>j. Donor Initiatives</i>	135

**PART IV: FRAMING THE FUTURE**

Ch. 10	The Search for Political Will	137
Ch. 11	Recommendations	145

	<i>a. Proposal for a United Nations Research Institute/Think Tank for Conflict Prevention</i>	145
	<i>b. Proposal for an Intersectoral Dialogue on Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding in Conjunction with the Millennium+5 Meetings</i>	149
	<i>c. Proposal for Development of an International Network of Sub-regional Dispute Resolution and Dialogue Centres</i>	154
	<i>d. National Conflict Surveys/Assessments for Member States</i>	157
	<i>e. Support for Early Warning Mechanisms in Africa</i>	157
	<i>f. Convening a Meeting of Donors to Develop New Structures, Strategies and Timeframes for Funding Prevention Programmes</i>	158
Ch. 12	Conclusion	161
<b>Annex I:</b>	The Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict (GPPAC) Regional Meetings	167
<b>Annex II:</b>	Overview of Sub-regional Intergovernmental Organizations	177
	<i>Section 1: Africa</i>	177
	<i>Section 2: Asia</i>	186
	<i>Section 3: Latin, Central and South America and the Caribbean</i>	194
	<i>Section 4: The European Union</i>	199
	<i>Section 5: Security and Cooperation in Europe</i>	202
<b>Annex III:</b>	<i>In Larger Freedom</i>	207
<b>Acronyms</b>		219
<b>Bibliography</b>		224



## **AUTHOR'S PREFACE**

### **A Note on the Allegory of the Caves**

In the allegory of the caves by Plato we are shown a solitary man chained to the wall of a concrete cave. Because of the light filtering in through cracks in the rock, he sees the figures of other human beings moving along the other cave walls. The man sees only shadows but believes them to be actual people because he lacks more complete information on which to base his belief.

Much like the rest of us, he believes he is seeing people in their full forms and experience, when, in fact, he is seeing only a glimmer of them, the parts of them revealed by the particular light of place, time and circumstance.

We relate to other people every day of our lives with less than full information and varying degrees of misinformation about them. Therefore, in order to form relationships we make assumptions, and we speak, act and interact based on those assumptions.

But our relations are strained by the gaps in our information and by the mistrust and lack of certainty we experience. The end result of our troubled attempts to interact with others as individuals, communities, governments and nations, is the uncomfortable sensation of conflict.

We make two types of assumptions whenever we interact with others. First, we make general assumptions about relating itself. For example, we believe that the words we use convey meanings understood by the other party, and that the other party has the same ideas of good faith and fairness that we have.

Secondly, we make assumptions about the Other. As we interact, we

watch, listen and assume, and what we don't know, we fill in. We do so without information about their histories, needs, fears and expectations, just as they are doing with us.

Our communications are often based on shaky foundations and are fortified with beliefs that may be real or illusory. We, as individuals, societies and nations, are largely unaware of our lack of information.

Yet this very lack of information without awareness, coupled with the assumptions we make, create distortions in perception.

It is reasonable to make assumptions and fill in informational gaps in order to communicate. If, however, based on fear, bias or a sense of threat, we fail to perceive or acknowledge our lack of information, we invite contention. Often we nurture our incorrect or exaggerated assumptions and our belief systems based on partial knowledge. Others then feel misunderstood, damaged, humiliated or enraged, and conflict emerges as a signal that several misconceptions have converged.

This is the point of friction, the sharp edge of two different perceptions or two clashing interests colliding.

The nature of conflict is mercurial. It may be due to misunderstandings, or it may be due to less benign causes. While a clash of civilizations is not inevitable, conflict is. The irony is that it is not unmanageable. It is a consequence of existence, and of differing interests, needs and values. It is ever-present and universal. When the resources, awareness and skills for managing it are available, conflict can often be guided towards collaborative interactions, acceptable solutions, and possibilities for coexistence and reconciliation.

However, strained conditions—where civil institutions are weak and

## *Designing a Peacebuilding Infrastructure*

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social formations unstable, where resources are scarce and ethnic and political tensions exacerbated, and where venues and channels for dispute resolution and prevention do not exist—are breeding grounds for armed conflict. Potentially resolvable disputes can then escalate chaotically into civil disruption and life-shattering violence.

The unconscionable part is that much of the time this miasma of grief and loss could be avoided through early and artful use of the right venues, tools and methodologies, combined with the political, social and financial will to put it all in place.

Tobi P. Dress  
Geneva, April 2005

## FOREWORD

It gives me great pleasure to introduce this volume on *Designing a Peacebuilding Infrastructure: Taking a Systems Approach to the Prevention of Deadly Conflict*, by the United Nations Non-Governmental Liaison Service (NGLS).

As aptly stated in Chapter Two, the current dynamic nature of conflict in terms of its character, cause and consequences requires a commensurate shift in analysis and response from the UN, other multilateral organizations, governments, NGOs and civil society organizations. Greater inclusiveness and collaboration can help to ensure more coherent preparedness and more coordinated management of conflicts for the future.

The United Nations has ceded the lead in the political mediation of conflicts and in peace operations, especially with regard to international conflicts, to the regions. In this respect, it is gratifying to note within this *Dossier* the multiplicity of initiatives for peace and security throughout the globe. The current range of initiatives indicate that the moment is mature for integrating existing peace and security issues within a unifying framework in such a way that they retain their essential autonomy and dynamism while reinforcing each other.

The current and ongoing initiatives involving civil society and other actors reflect a global trend away from treating security and peacebuilding issues as the sole preserve of governments. However, there is need for a stronger synergy between peacebuilding structures, both vertically (from regional organizations to the UN level) and horizontally (between and across regions). To that end, a formal structural relationship is necessary.

In terms of delineating an overall framework for a comprehensive

global agenda for peace and security, the various regions need to develop a shared doctrine of norms and values to form the pillars for preventing the deterioration of peace and security in their regions, first, and then throughout the world. To make this a reality, it is critical to develop the capacities of regional initiatives by supporting their early warning systems and by strengthening regional capacities through adequate funding and resources.

The importance of civil society organizations in the process of the establishment of a global peacebuilding infrastructure—evident in their involvement in the regional processes of the Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict—is also critical.

As the Secretary-General has so eloquently indicated, “Education is, quite simply, peacebuilding by another name.” In this respect, an opportunity for training in peace processes and ensuring availability of related tools and research materials through a global network of regional venues would be invaluable. Such programmes are now offered in some venues, such as in the United Nations University for Peace (UPEACE) in Costa Rica, and should become a programmatic feature of regions and sub-regions worldwide. I believe the consultation that has been undertaken by NGLS provides a well-informed blueprint on the areas, issues and methodology for the establishment of a global peacebuilding infrastructure. The information in this *Dossier* will be valuable in establishing such an infrastructure based on the realities of current and future conflicts, regionally and around the globe.

Ambassador Bethuel Kiplagat, PhD, CBS  
Executive Director, Africa Peace Forum  
Nairobi, April 2005

## INTRODUCTION

*Designing a Peacebuilding Infrastructure: Taking a Systems Approach to the Prevention of Deadly Conflict* is the twelfth publication in NGLS's *Development Dossier* series. The series seeks to contribute to the ongoing dialogue of the international development community through dissemination of challenging analyses and reflections from independent observers and authors on current issues on the international development agenda. Recent issues in the series have addressed the growing debate on corporate social and environmental responsibility and on women's global activism.

NGLS's latest *Dossier* focuses on one of the most compelling issues to be addressed in this century—resolving deadly conflict. It explores what we are doing as a human community to address such conflict and what we should be doing as the decade progresses. It highlights the fact that on one hand, there is a vibrant community of agencies and organizations working in the field of peacebuilding, but on the other hand, there is no overarching structure, little cohesion and extensive fragmentation in the field. The *Dossier* also advances the idea that the UN can play a much greater role in peacebuilding than currently acknowledged.

*Designing a Peacebuilding Infrastructure* focuses on conflict prevention and peacebuilding, exploring issues such as structural and institutional prevention; the linkages between and among conflict prevention, development, governance and human rights; the importance of regional mechanisms and early warning systems; and the macroeconomic aspects of conflict, including corruption and small arms transfers. It also highlights the extensive work that NGOs have been undertaking, and the broad scope of innovative civil society initiatives.

The objectives of this *Dossier* are threefold. It offers an overview of the current state of conflict prevention; it aims to broaden the discourse about how conflict and its prevention are perceived and addressed; and it offers a series of recommendations.

This *Dossier* is also meant to serve as a resource tool. Each chapter includes a number of selected resources and current literature, and an electronic version of this publication will be available on the NGLS website.

Finally, it is hoped that this *Dossier* will contribute to informing the discourse on conflict prevention and help provide guidance as we embark together upon the next steps.

Tony Hill  
Coordinator  
UN Non-Governmental Liaison Service (NGLS)  
Geneva, April 2005

**Today, some 50 years after extending the scope of the Geneva Conventions, unprecedented efforts in the areas of mediation, conflict resolution, peace-making and peacekeeping have still not achieved universal peace. War has been transformed into butchery. Humanity is stunned before the rivers of blood...and the mountains of ruins that still exist in our modern world.**

*(People on War, ICRC 2002)*



## **PART I**

### **DESIGNING A PEACEBUILDING INFRASTRUCTURE**

*“We have entered the third millennium through gates of fire.”*

UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan in Oslo, 10 December 2001.

Acceptance speech for the Nobel Peace Prize jointly attributed to the United Nations and the Secretary-General.

## **Chapter 1**

### **Overview**

Armed conflict is a process, not an event. It is a process of destruction or deterioration that can be chronic and disabling over a long period, or rapid and devastating.

Whatever its timeframe and configuration, conflict and its aftermath routinely lead to the breakdown of coping mechanisms, with vulnerable groups often being the hardest hit while simultaneously being overlooked with regard to decision making about conflict and peace planning.

Prevention of conflict is also a process, not an isolated or one-off project, but rather a confluence of attitudes, activities and institutions that, to be sustainable, should not be accidental or serendipitous, but well planned and strategized.

The skills and talents required for peacebuilding are many—they are both analytical and intuitive, broad based and specific, futuristic in orientation, yet requiring a constant eye on the past.

The vehicles for prevention are also many and varied. But rather

than simply more or better vehicles, what is now required is systemic thinking and systems planning to replace the current fragmentation in the fields of conflict prevention and peacebuilding. This requires major changes in perspective and the emergence of attitudes that are conducive to cooperation at an entirely new level than previously imagined. The Peacebuilding Commission recommended by the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change and endorsed by the Secretary-General in his report *In Larger Freedom* would be a major step towards reducing fragmentation and making the field more coherent<sup>1</sup> (see also Chapters 9 and 11).

As a general rule, throughout the last five decades there has been a global military infrastructure in a constant state of preparedness for war. It is augmented by global military bases and universities, security alliances and worldwide intelligence and counterintelligence networks. War planning entails massive amounts of data gathering, strategic and state-of-the-art thinking and planning, and enormous resources and budgets.

Peace planning, however, shares no such stature, often appearing to be accidental, *par hazard*, rather than analyzed, scrutinized and reasoned. This lack of a systems approach to conflict prevention is one of the primary reasons that every new armed conflict seems to come as a surprise to the international community, and why resources are stretched to the limit in meeting post-conflict needs. The world will always be forced into crisis reaction rather than engaged in preventive action if the international community does not collectively create an infrastructure for durable peace planning.

The field of conflict prevention planning, such as it is, operates in a radically different way from military planning. There are countless deeply dedicated NGOs, UN programmes, intergovernmental and regional initiatives, as well as donor agencies that have created entire departments for conflict prevention and collective security

initiatives, and there is a vibrant community of peacebuilders. But despite their best efforts they are drastically underfunded and undersupported for their enormous tasks, they are forced to compete, often for negligible and short-term resources, and they remain a patchwork of individually operating units of interest.

This means that there is an urgent and immediate need for coherence, global networks and subnetworks and an overarching infrastructure for long-term, durable peace planning. To create a more cohesive architecture for peace:

- b · The international community must think in terms of taking a systems approach to the prevention of violent conflict, not only exploring the elements and histories of specific conflicts in particular nations or regions, but looking globally at cross-cutting themes and trends and collectively exploring how the different actors within the conflict prevention community can collaborate more fully.
- b · Violent conflict and its analysis should be approached with the same focus, rigour and professionalism as other serious global priorities, such as environmental degradation and disease. For example, epidemiologists use specific types of medical and scientific inquiry to combat virulent strains of disease. When it becomes clear that a condition has become threatening to a critical mass of people and may take on the proportions of an epidemic, greater resources are allocated to confront the condition, analyze it, and put infrastructure in place to limit its incidence in the future. This is how issues related to armed and violent conflict, which long ago reached pandemic proportions in terms of casualties, displacement and anguish, must be addressed.
- b · Multi- and inter-disciplinary approaches to peacebuilding are essential, including interaction within and amongst the fields of conflict prevention, human rights, development economics, governance and democratization.

Until recently, the sectors within the humanitarian community have been working, largely, independently of each other. Representatives of the fields of human rights, development and macroeconomics, and governance and democratization have all worked independently on their own initiatives, using their own methodologies, approaches and even mutually exclusive vocabularies. This gulf does not serve communities in trouble and in need. Fortunately, this trend has been changing in the last five years and should continue moving towards greater intersectoral cooperation.

- b One of the most important elements in the creation of a peacebuilding architecture is structural prevention, particularly at the national level. This refers to the linked infrastructure of a country, its institutional development, which includes its rule-of-law infrastructure, human rights monitoring and enforcement capacities, its justice, judicial and penal systems, its security sector, and its distributional strategies and central banking and financial systems. All of these elements must be developed in a way that is both fair and perceived as fair (based on accepted universal standards of fairness), and that promotes justice in principle and in practice. It should be conceived with the input of civil society and with civil society uppermost in mind.
  
- b One of the most critical dimensions of structural prevention is the reduction of bias and the creation and strengthening of tolerance-building and human rights institutions. First and foremost, there can be no peace without inclusion, and sustainable security is incompatible with the resentment/rage/revenge cycles experienced by excluded and marginalized groups, whether religious, ethnic, racial, gender-based or founded upon other identity-based characteristics.

With regard to human rights specifically, it has been observed in the past that officials of the human rights and conflict resolution communities have engaged extremely different, and often mutually exclusive, approaches for assisting communities in

need of developmental assistance. It is imperative that these sectors work to close the gaps in their mutual perceptions. Human rights violations such as exclusion and discrimination create a profound fissure in the relationship of human beings with each other and in the relationship between the individual and the State.

Moreover, the recipe for creating militancy and insurrection is not complex. It involves, in part, singling out a particular group and marginalizing or humiliating that group, for example, depriving it of its channels of communication with its constituents. The world was treated to a textbook example of this type of abuse of power and its impacts when in March 2004 the US-controlled Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) in Iraq closed down a minority newspaper, *Al Hawza*, and turned its publishers and followers into “insurgents” and martyrs. The question is: How can world leaders who have been elected and appointed to the highest positions of power be unaware of something this elemental about conflict prevention theory and the basic principles of cause and effect?

- b There are a large number of regional and sub-regional structures and venues for dialogue, mediated negotiation, conflict prevention, resolution and training, but they are underfunded, lack adequate information technology mechanisms and are not linked. There are numerous ways that a network of such structures could be developed in a manner that would be highly effective and not terribly costly, and which could be electronically linked so that regions could support and strengthen each others’ conflict prevention best practices databases. (See Chapter 11, Recommendations.)
  
- b There needs to be a shift in focus from post-conflict reconstruction and aid to structural prevention, even though they are sometimes one and the same. It is true that there are several reasons why there is so much focus on post-conflict aid and reconstruction to the exclusion of preventive action. One reason

is that donors are more reluctant to contribute to preventive action since it is more ambiguous and difficult to evaluate in terms of measurable results. In addition, structural (institutional) prevention projects require long-term commitments, and many donor agencies operate on annual or bi-annual budget cycles. Development once meant the building of wells—now it can mean the building of legal systems. This cannot be achieved based on annual funding cycles. Although the international community has an idea how to provide aid, how to rebuild after war and how to enforce the peace, it has far less understanding of how to prevent armed conflict in the first instance. Such prevention requires a coherence of thinking and action that the conflict prevention community has not yet achieved.

- b In all aspects of early warning, conflict prevention and peacebuilding, local expertise in planning, participation and implementation is paramount. It is those in-country who know about the specific contexts and historical dimensions of a given conflict. Rather than putting so much emphasis on sending “experts” to the field to resolve problems, it is preferable to engage in meaningful technical and knowledge exchange. Global specialists and local experts would then guide and assist each other, rather than one being seen to rescue the other.
  
- b It is essential to acknowledge that no single organization, institution, sector, group, gender or UN department, regardless of its stature, can be expected to singularly shoulder the enormous burden of creating sustainable peace in any given community, let alone worldwide. Peacebuilding is, of necessity and by definition, an inclusive, representative and participatory process, and is, in fact, the ultimate collaborative effort.

There is still no architecture for long-term peace planning because the international community has not yet collectively conceptualized it. There is no Agenda 21 for conflict. Some regions do not even have basic conflict resolution mechanisms built into their regional charters. Instead, countless organizations with limited resources and

multiple mandates struggle to have impact in various parts of the world and on various conflicts, and little bits of UN agencies are carved out like an afterthought—often on an ad hoc and less than full time basis—to explore conflict in relation to their other mandates.

The result of all of the above is that since World War II, excluding injuries and displacement, more than 23 million people in the developing world have been killed as a result of war.<sup>2</sup>

Conflict is not inherently unmanageable. On one hand, the term “conflict” suggests images of destruction and social disintegration. But when the resources, awareness and skills for managing it are available and accessible, conflict can be channeled toward mutually beneficial results.

**Notes:**

1. The Secretary-General's report *In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All* (A/59/2005) is available online ([www.un.org/largerfreedom](http://www.un.org/largerfreedom)).
2. United Nations Research Institute for Social Development (UNRISD), 1995. *States of Disarray: The Social Effects of Globalization*, an UNRISD Report for the World Summit for Social Development. UNRISD: Geneva.

**Additional Selected Resources:**

1. International Crisis Group ([www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?l=1](http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?l=1)).
2. International Alert (IA) ([www.international-alert.org](http://www.international-alert.org)).
3. Saferworld ([www.saferworld.org.uk](http://www.saferworld.org.uk)).
4. International Peace Academy ([www.ipacademy.org](http://www.ipacademy.org)).
5. The European Centre for Conflict Prevention (ECCP), e-mail <[info@conflict-prevention.nl](mailto:info@conflict-prevention.nl)>.
6. Search for Common Ground ([www.searchforcommonground.org](http://www.searchforcommonground.org)).
7. Oxfam ([www.oxfam.org.uk](http://www.oxfam.org.uk)).
8. Africa Peace Forum ([www.amaniafrika.org](http://www.amaniafrika.org)).
9. African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD) ([www.accord.org.za](http://www.accord.org.za)).
10. The Peace and Justice Studies Association (PJSA) ([www.peacejusticestudies.org/index.php](http://www.peacejusticestudies.org/index.php)).



11. Conciliation Resources ([www.c-r.org](http://www.c-r.org)).

12. ActionAid ([www.actionaid.org.uk](http://www.actionaid.org.uk)) and ([www.actionaid.org.uk/wps/page\\_preview.asp?page\\_id=769](http://www.actionaid.org.uk/wps/page_preview.asp?page_id=769)).

13. For more information on peace education programmes, see ([www.evergreen.edu/copred/publications/GD2000intro.html](http://www.evergreen.edu/copred/publications/GD2000intro.html)).

14. See also Wallensteen, Peter, 2003. *Conflict Prevention: Methodology for Knowing the Unknown*. Department of Peace and Conflict Research. Uppsala University: Uppsala.

\*Quote on title page from *People on War*, International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). More information is available online ([www.icrc.org/eng/onwar\\_reports](http://www.icrc.org/eng/onwar_reports)).



## Chapter 2

### Deconstructing Prevention\*

*“For the United Nations, there is no larger goal, no deeper commitment and no greater ambition than preventing armed conflict. The prevention of conflict begins and ends with the protection of human life and the promotion of human development. Ensuring human security is, in the broadest sense, the United Nations’ cardinal mission. Genuine and lasting prevention is the means to achieve that mission.”*

#### **The Current Peacebuilding and Conflict Prevention Landscape**

The scale and speed of social transformation at the end of the twentieth century have engendered marked changes in the character of conflict, with increasing patterns of intra-state, inter-group and identity-based conflicts. Between 1990 and 2003, 55 of the 59 armed conflicts that took place involved war within, rather than between, countries.<sup>2</sup> Emerging conflicts pose new challenges for numerous societies, including those prone to extreme poverty or natural disaster, and those undergoing unprecedented transitions from statist policies and command economies to new forms of democratic governance and market economies.

Traditional approaches to diplomacy and peacebuilding, which typically viewed the nation-state as the sole or fundamental unit in international relations, are increasingly inadequate to deal with the new sources and causes of intra-state and sub-regional conflict.

These shifts in the character, causation and consequences of conflict require a commensurate shift in analysis and response from the UN, other multilateral organizations, governance

institutions, NGOs, and other sectors of civil society. The conflicts, massacres and wars of the last decade, including those ongoing, underscore the fact that current strategies for conflict prevention and reduction are inadequate.

There is growing consensus amongst practitioners and scholars alike that international responses to conflict require greater coherence and coordination. Yet at virtually all levels—from the local to the global—there is little capacity to meet these challenges. Increased attention is now being paid to designing new coordinating structures and models for conflict preparedness and management. Recent thinking on preventive action has come to embrace a number of disciplines, actors and levels of engagement, but without a clear understanding about the roles different actors can play or how their respective efforts are best integrated.

If prevention is framed in a more integrated and cohesive way, governments and the international community will focus more attention, and consequently a greater share of their budgets and resources, on the long-term structural aspects of peacebuilding instead of short-term crisis management. This could begin to solve the problem of cyclical and recurring cycles of violence.

The concepts of preventive action have broadened substantially as academic research, networks, task forces, and training initiatives have begun to look more deeply into what the UN and the international community are doing in conflict prevention, and what still needs to be done. Structures and frameworks for analysis, cooperation and implementation have improved. However, the international community has not yet come to grips with the difficult, yet essential, process of visualizing the entire system of conflict prevention and determining how the numerous elements of that system can work together as a coherent, integrated whole.

Accordingly, a shift in perspective both within and outside of the

United Nations that would entail the development of a “systems approach” to prevention of violent conflict is necessary in order to address the evolving needs of fragile and transitioning States as they experience different types and dimensions of instability.

### **Overview of Interventions and Methodologies**

According to the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict in its *Final Report*,<sup>3</sup> strategies for prevention fall into two broad categories: operational prevention (measures applicable in the face of immediate crisis) and structural prevention (measures to ensure that crises do not arise in the first place, or if they do, that they do not recur).

Structural prevention—or long-term peacebuilding, as opposed to immediate peace *making* efforts—comprises strategies such as institution-building, strengthening international legal systems, and developing national dispute resolution mechanisms. It also includes meeting basic economic, social, cultural, and humanitarian needs, and rebuilding societies that have been shattered by major crises. Further, whatever model of self-governance societies choose, they must meet the three core needs of security, wellbeing and justice, thereby giving people a stake in nonviolent efforts to improve their lives.<sup>4</sup>

Two types of diplomacy are commonly referenced, Track I, which refers to official diplomacy and the use of formal diplomatic channels, and Track II, which is thought to be more informal and to include the notion of citizen diplomacy. There are some organizations, such as the Center for Multi-Track Diplomacy,<sup>5</sup> who believe that there are, in fact, several diplomatic tracks, and that conflict can often be most effectively resolved by approaching the crisis at a number of levels.

### **De-constructing Conventional Understanding**

UN departments and agencies generally conceive of conflict prevention along the following parameters:

- b Humanitarian intervention—undertaking preparedness measures and delivering humanitarian relief for civilian casualties of complex emergencies;
- b Early warning analysis—identifying and analyzing potential outbreaks of violence in a 3-12 month timeframe and advising on the application of a range of preventive, ameliorative or containment measures;
- b Preventive diplomacy and other diplomatic initiatives—the application of high profile or confidential diplomacy, good offices, fact-finding missions and application of varying degrees of pressure; and
- b Peacekeeping operations—the interposition of peacekeeping forces, with the concurrence of concerned parties, to ensure or enforce a cessation of violence.

Within these general measures it is clear that “conflict prevention” is concerned with preventing, reducing, limiting and eliminating violence. However, it must be said that when the term “conflict prevention” is used, often what is really meant is “violence prevention.”

A comprehensive approach to conflict prevention and mitigation must also address structural injustices and develop interventions aimed at poverty alleviation, social empowerment and reducing horizontal inequality. Conflict resolution skills and institutional capacity that can appropriately manage normal social conflict and competing interests in society may also be required. Practitioners and policy makers now agree that in its broadest conception, “conflict prevention” not only aims to achieve the avoidance or cessation of violence encompassing the full conflict continuum, but also includes a range of social, economic and political conditions for sustainable peace.

Preventive action refers to measures to prevent disputes from arising, to

resolve them before they escalate into entrenched conflicts or to limit the spread of conflicts when they occur. Preventive diplomacy, in particular, may take the form of third-party neutral mediation or conciliation. Early warning is an essential component of prevention, and the UN and other organizations monitor political and other developments around the world to detect threats to international peace and security.

With regard to official definitions as accepted within the UN system, the UN website<sup>6</sup> indicates that:

Conflict prevention is one of the primary obligations of Member States set forth in the UN Charter and is intended to prevent human suffering and act as an alternative to costly politico-military operations to resolve conflicts after they have broken out. Although preventive diplomacy is a well-tried means of preventing conflict, and is still the primary political measure for preventing and resolving conflicts, the United Nations' experience in recent years has shown that there are several other forms of action that can have a useful preventive effect, including: preventive deployment; preventive disarmament; development projects in the context of a prevention strategy and humanitarian action.

Preventive deployment—the fielding of peacekeepers to forestall probable conflict—is intended to provide a “thin blue line” to help contain conflicts, in part, by building trust where there is tension. Peacekeeping involves a number of complex dynamics that are not addressed in this *Dossier*, which focuses largely on peacebuilding.<sup>7</sup>

Preventive disarmament seeks to reduce the number of small arms and light weapons in conflict-prone regions. In El Salvador, Mozambique and elsewhere, for instance, this has entailed demobilizing combat forces as well as collecting and destroying weapons as part of an overall peace agreement.<sup>8</sup>

Probably the most critical concept in the context of long-term conflict

prevention is structural prevention referring, as noted, to the institutional infrastructure that exists at national, sub-regional, regional and international levels. This *Dossier* focuses primarily on these structural elements.



\* This chapter is based, in part, on Chapter 10, of Fen Osler Hampson and David Malone, 2002. *From Reaction to Conflict Prevention—Opportunities for the UN System*. “Deconstructing Prevention,” T.P. Dress and Gay Rosenblum-Kumar. International Peace Academy. Lynne Rienner Publishers: London and Boulder.

**Notes:**

1. UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan in his Report on Work of the Organization 1999 (A/54/1).

2. The United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), 2005. *The State of the World’s Children 2005*. New York.

3. Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, 1997. *Preventing Deadly Conflict: Final Report*. Carnegie Corporation of New York: New York.

The *Final Report*, published in December 1997, reports the findings of the Commission’s work over three years. The Commission ceased operations in December 1999, and the Conflict Prevention Project at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars builds on the work of the Commission ([wwics.si.edu/index.cfm?fuseaction=topics.home&topic\\_id=1411](http://wwics.si.edu/index.cfm?fuseaction=topics.home&topic_id=1411)).

4. Ibid.

5. Center for International Development and Conflict Management (CIDCM), University of Maryland. More information is available online ([www.cidcm.umd.edu](http://www.cidcm.umd.edu)).

6. More information is available on the UN website ([www.un.org/Depts/dpa/prev\\_dip/fst\\_prev\\_dip.htm](http://www.un.org/Depts/dpa/prev_dip/fst_prev_dip.htm)).

7. Further information on UN peacekeeping initiatives and current peacekeeping operations can be found online ([www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2005/gapk184.doc.htm](http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2005/gapk184.doc.htm)), ([www.un.org/peace/bnote010101.pdf](http://www.un.org/peace/bnote010101.pdf)) and ([www.peacewomen.org/un/pkwatch/Events/C34/C34O5sessionindex.html](http://www.peacewomen.org/un/pkwatch/Events/C34/C34O5sessionindex.html)).

8. Report of the UN Secretary-General on Work of the Organization (A/54/1) is available online ([www.un.org/Docs/SG/Report99/intro99.htm](http://www.un.org/Docs/SG/Report99/intro99.htm)).

## PART II

### **STRUCTURAL PREVENTION: INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY BUILDING AND CROSS SECTORAL LINKAGES**

*The fundamental challenge is to harness the conflict mitigating potential of governance.<sup>1</sup>*

An emerging body of literature and experience suggests that violent conflict is often inextricably linked to the failure and delegitimization of the State. Conflicts arise inevitably from normal demands on the State. Left unmanaged they often escalate and lead to a range of debilitating outcomes, from protracted social conflict through State disintegration and collapse. Governance is, therefore, one of the key elements in balancing competing interests in society in ways that respect human dignity, foster the rule of law and promote equitable development.

However, in many conflict-prone countries, a critical deficit exists for building capacities that can manage conflict and pre-empt violence. The causes of this capacity deficit, like the causes of protracted conflict itself, are often closely linked to weak and unstable governance structures and fragile relationships between governments and civil society. This lack of capacity to prevent and address violent conflict directly results in immeasurable human suffering, loss of life, displacement and the creation of traumatized populations.



## Chapter 3

### **Capacity Building for Structural Prevention: Strengthening the Capacity of the United Nations and Its Member States**

#### **Introduction**

Managing conflict is one of the primary and enduring responsibilities of all governments and, therefore, one of the pre-eminent areas in which the UN needs to serve its Member States. Starting from this premise, the work of the UN must systemically incorporate conflict awareness dimensions, as well as carefully conceived peace-promoting elements, into its many areas of work. This can be done, in part, by instilling a greater conflict sensitivity into development and governance programming, and mainstreaming conflict awareness into other disciplines. First and foremost, it starts with a shift in awareness and attitudes that acknowledges the centrality of conflict transformation as a key component of the manifold mission of the UN.

As noted, it cannot be overemphasized that no single department, agency, group or gender can alone shoulder the enormous burden of preventing conflict—this is the responsibility of every sector within the UN system. It is equally the responsibility of the international community at large, including other intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), NGOs and civil society organs.

The UN's prevention agenda, in policy and practice, should be expanded well beyond its current set of responses to include a much broader, clearly articulated constellation of inter-disciplinary interventions for the prevention of destructive violence. This can be accomplished, principally, through developing the capacities of States and their civil societies to channel conflict in constructive ways. This approach would aim to:

1. increase government capacities, through specific governance and institution-strengthening modalities; and concurrently,
2. expand the UN's own capacities to assist Member States by infusing all of its work with greater conflict prevention awareness and sensitivity in its formulation, objectives and impacts, including work in policy areas such as economic and social development, ecology and environment, human rights, labour, and democratization and governance.

In addition to the UN's currently accepted role in prevention, such an approach would establish and promote a new, impartial, technical role for the UN in "prevention" by providing information, advisory services and technical assistance for capacity building to assist States in the analysis, development and implementation of their own national strategies for avoiding destructive conflict. The UN could offer interested States a range of support services including assistance in policy formulation, institutional strengthening, civil service training, and educational curriculum development to support and strengthen cultures of constructive conflict management. This could be accomplished, in part, through national conflict assessments of interested Member States (see also Chapter 11, Recommendations; and Chapter 5).

Thus, a principal role of the UN could be to assist interested Member States to proactively strengthen conditions for peace and human security through a combination of normative standard setting, information dissemination and capacity-building activities.

### **The Operational Challenge**

The bodies of the General Assembly, the Security Council and the UN Secretariat have consistently affirmed that effective prevention requires a concerted multi-actor, cross-disciplinary strategy, balancing short-term political exigencies with long-term governance, economic and social factors. The General Assembly has also recognized that a comprehensive approach must fully involve national authorities as well

as the UN system, donors and intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations.

Several components of a process to revise the current “doctrine” on conflict prevention are suggested below. These elements could infuse the structures, policies and practices of the UN system with new analytical and operational dimensions. Given the current level of policy and practice, the field would benefit from undertaking a collaborative process to:

(1) **Legitimate and re-frame the concepts of conflict prevention, management and transformation**, set operational standards for their implementation, and promote awareness, understanding and acceptance amongst Member States.

(2) Growing out of such a collaborative analysis, the next step is to **operationalize a technical cooperation approach to conflict prevention and transformation** that reconceptualizes the way in which prevention is articulated and implemented within development assistance, and makes capacity building for managing conflict an accepted and major element of development cooperation.

(3) A related step is to **fully infuse the international community’s and the UN’s own policy and practice with conflict prevention awareness and sensitivity**, cutting across the diverse policy areas in which the UN Secretariat and specialized agencies are engaged.

This type of “mainstreaming” includes not only developing new projects or adding prevention components to existing interventions; it also involves situating prevention at the centre of decision- and policy-making, planning, budgeting and institutional processes and structures. Mainstreaming requires a re-orientation of goals, strategies and actions which promote necessary and constructive changes in organizations, structures and cultures, to

create organizational environments infused with awareness of, and commitment to, prevention as a pre-eminent and overriding goal of the Organization's work.

(4) The final challenge is to **put such newly developed resources of the UN at the disposal of governments** in order to assist Member States to develop national capacities to attain these standards and to manage all types of disputes, including economic, social, inter-group and inter-ethnic, as well as environmental and ecological, labour, and others, with their own institutions and resources.

Relevant agencies and departments of the UN—which might include the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), the United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM), the United Nations Department of Political Affairs (DPA), the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (DESA), the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCHR) and others—would then be available to further assist States, upon their request, to analyze their in-country situations and develop their own strategies to improve their capacities in conflict prevention and transformation. (See Chapter 11, Recommendations.)

If conflict and its prevention were demystified and legitimized, Member States would be able to see conflict prevention and transformation as something they need, not because they have failed at a task, nor as something that assails their sovereignty. Instead, building conflict management capacity could, in fact, be seen to strengthen State sovereignty by developing internal capacities that obviate the need for interference or “rescue” by the international community.



### **Strengthening the Institutional Capacity of Member States**

The dual tasks of channeling conflicting interests and managing diversity in society are key to social, economic and political affairs of State. “In diverse societies where inter-group interactions have been uncooperative, the fundamental problem has been a failure to develop political and social institutions able to accommodate such diversity....This can become explosive when mass poverty enters the picture.”<sup>2</sup> Thus, particularly in developing and transitional countries, the State has a pivotal role to play in the development and maintenance of effective governance structures that can balance competing interests in ways that promote human dignity, foster rule of law and support equitable development. The challenge is to use the full conflict-mitigating potential of governance policies and institutions to channel and manage conflicts so that societies can find ways to avoid resorting to repression, exclusion, anarchy or violence.

In industrialized countries, the existence of conflict resolving and transforming institutions, skills and knowledge are often accepted as the norm and are infused into the fabric of judicial systems, administrative and regulatory agencies (such as consumer protection agencies, ombuds institutions and environmental agencies), human rights protection systems and parliamentary proceedings. By and large, these systems and institutions are able to moderate competing interests effectively so that they are assumed to be the basic operating institutions of a well-functioning society.

Adoption and adaptation of such principles and institutions within developing and transitional countries has been demonstrably insufficient. Many developing countries that find themselves trapped in cycles of violence do not have the benefit of access to these institutional resources. This is an area in which the UN and UNDP have an opportunity to act as conduits of information, promoters of dialogue and facilitators of change that can assist interested Member States to acquire greater competencies in governance-based conflict management.

### **Creation of National Prevention Policies and Institutions**

From a governance perspective, capacity in conflict management needs to focus on institutional and organizational skill-building that can promote a culture of constructive problem-solving, cooperative negotiation, dialogue and dispute resolution throughout society. As an integral part of an overall governance strategy, such capacity building would impart to society as a whole, and especially to key actors such as government officials and their interlocutors, skills to:

- b. Analyze the structural and proximate causes of conflict, anticipate potential areas of dispute and develop appropriate responses not only for averting violence, but also for proactively promoting peace;
- b. Understand and employ dispute resolution principles and practices, such as third-party neutral mediation;
- b. Strengthen the institutional capacity for managing diversity and conflicting interests; and
- b. Use development tools in ways that mitigate the long-term structural, as well as proximate, causes of conflict.

There are numerous ways that the UN can, at the request of Member States, assist in development of their capacities in conflict prevention and transformation. Within an expanded conception of prevention, the goal would naturally embrace not only the prevention of violence, but equally, the amelioration of conditions that have the potential to lead to violence. For example, the UN could assist national ministries to undertake national surveys or assessments for the purpose of analyzing, within their specific historical and sociopolitical contexts, existing and potential causes of destructive conflict, and to develop corresponding national response strategies. (See Chapter 11, Recommendations.)

Such surveys can examine structural issues, relational issues and

potential sources of conflict such as resource equity and inter-ethnic tensions. The structural component would look at laws, institutions, systems and practices that, by their presence or absence, create susceptibility to violent conflict. Relational issues would be dealt with by exploring the level and types of participation in the polity and how groups in society interact with each other. Based on the issues and needs emerging from the analysis, an integrated conflict transformation strategy could include:

- b. A strategic plan for incorporating conflict prevention/transformation and peacebuilding strategies into relevant current and future national development policies;
- b. Wider use of conflict-sensitive development policies (or conflict impact assessments when appropriate) on existing and proposed development projects to examine the effects of development activities on tensions that can trigger violent conflict, and to seek ways to re-orient projects so that negative effects can be transformed into neutral or peace-promoting impacts;
- b. Formulation of projects to introduce dispute resolution mechanisms that can regulate conflict through acceptable channels, such as creation or strengthening of mediation centres, ombuds offices, human rights structures, improved judicial mechanisms, and other dispute resolution mechanisms;
- b. Awareness-building and educational components that provide training and curriculum development in mediation, group facilitation, negotiation skills, judicial process, human rights, tolerance-building, and bias reduction;
- b. Review of the status and needs of civil society with the aim of initiating local community activities to develop a more balanced, constructive interface between NGOs, civil society, the religious sector, the private sector and government;

- b) Assistance in developing a national multi-cultural policy orientation that counteracts discrimination and marginalization, promotes development equity and fosters employment equity (including public service hiring according to transparent norms and standards); and development of integrated governance capacity-building and training programmes for the public service, legislative branch, judiciary and security sector.

Such a national exercise would generate conflict transformation responses and would also produce useful results on two levels. At the field level, the results could provide governments and donors with practical guidance and concrete activities to integrate cohesion-building and humanitarian, human rights, governance and development interventions over the long term in the service of managing and mitigating potentially destructive conflict. At the policy level, it would lend support and credence to strengthening the inter-linkages amongst these sectors.<sup>3</sup> (See also Chapter 11, Recommendations.)

### **Early Warning Systems: Concept and Overview**

The term early warning systems (EWS) is generically defined<sup>4</sup> as any organized initiative for the systematic collection of information from areas of crisis in order to:

- a) anticipate the start and/or escalation of violent conflict;
- b) develop strategic responses to crisis;
- c) present clear and feasible options to critical actors involved in the conflict—the immediate community, branches and ministries of the government, relief and aid agencies, international bodies, and others—for the purposes of decision making and effective response strategies.

Such work involves various inputs ranging from basic data collection and analysis to immediate risk assessments from the crisis zone. EWS is not a new mechanism; it is the culmination of the evolution of risk assessment over nearly half a century. Such systems

have actually been in existence since the 1950s, with two broad strands existing in the subsequent decades: military/strategic intelligence gathering during the Cold War geared toward pre-emption, and civilian systems used by national and international agencies to forecast humanitarian and natural disasters including famines, droughts and outbreaks of disease—such as the work of the United Nations Humanitarian Early Warning System.<sup>5</sup>

The current emphasis of early warning is on identifying the most salient conflict indicators, assessing likely scenarios during and after crisis, seeking practical openings for peace making amidst the chaos, and providing a balanced situational analysis to act upon. Contemporary EWS have analyzed genocides, human rights violations, terrorism, abuse of minorities, forced displacements, and other complex humanitarian emergencies.

Early warning systems have been broadly divided into four methodological categories.<sup>6</sup> Qualitative early warning involves field-based analysis by researchers in crisis-affected regions to monitor and conduct research. To varying degrees, these field postings are also fact-finding missions. These systems are best exemplified by the work of organizations such as Human Rights Watch (HRW), Amnesty International (AI) and the International Crisis Group (ICG).

Quantitative warning systems are based on the systematic collection and processing of empirical information according to a given set of criteria. Such research can be seen in causal and systems-dynamics models where conflict-causing factors are isolated and attempts are made to reveal links between them and the outbreak of violent conflict. The aim of these models is to identify the conditions and structural contexts under which violence will occur from a pre-defined (baseline) set of indicators. The models review causal relationships between the indicators and their magnitude in relation to the objective of deciding the probability and trend of violent conflict.

Some agencies (such as the Early Recognition of Tensions and Fact Finding Programme of the Swiss Peace Foundation) use both methodologies in parallel and this approach utilizes constant monitoring (qualitative), event data analysis (quantitative), fact-finding missions in the field and external expertise from a network of governments and NGOs.

Finally, there are various networks that provide a contributive role in warning about—and once started, providing ground information on—violent conflicts. Although not a strictly formal system, networks have proliferated as different humanitarian agencies acquire the will and means to improve their communications with others for purposes of early warning. These systems also help organizations tap into already-existing resources to which they might not otherwise have access, and thus have the advantage of being cost effective since repetitive field studies do not have to be undertaken. Examples of such networks include OCHA and (formerly) the Forum on Early Warning and Early Response (FEWER).<sup>7</sup> Apart from publications and seminars, they serve to facilitate and provide access to leading specialists for the exchange and rapid dissemination of analytical information.

Early warning systems have now become an indispensable part of conflict prevention and peacebuilding, and there is added emphasis being given to developing networks that provide scenarios, risks and warnings before international forces have to be deployed. However, there still remain considerable challenges. As illustrated by the genocide in Rwanda, and again in Darfur, even when conflict has reached a violent stage and warnings are clearly present, the response can be non-existent or far too slow. There appeared to be a critical disconnect between early warning and early response in these cases, and the vagaries of geopolitics also affect the response strategy, aid and operations. There are questions as to how effectively early warning systems can quantify and predict conflict, since human behaviour and conflicts arising from man-made

scenarios both have the element of “empirical irregularity” and unpredictability.

Nonetheless, the potential for early warning processes to assist in reducing the incidence of violent conflict is vast. However, they must be more closely engaged with early response strategies, and such systems need to be adequately funded. (See Chapter 11, Recommendations.)

**Notes:**

1. Dress, T.P. and Gay Rosenblum-Kumar, 1999. *Governance in Diverse Societies: Toward Peace and Human Security in the Twenty-First Century*, Inter-sectoral Policy Dialogue Proposal, funded by UN/DESA and the Samuel Rubin Foundation, UN/DESA: New York.
2. World Bank, 2000. *Can Africa Claim the 21st Century?* World Bank: Washington, DC.
3. These sections are based on Chapter 10 of Hampson and Malone, 2002, pp. 229-249.
4. From the *Conflict and Peace Analysis and Response Manual* (2nd Ed. July 1999), Forum on Early Warning and Early Response (FEWER): London. FEWER is no longer in existence. (See note 7.)
5. More information on the United Nations Humanitarian Early Warning System is available online ([www.hewsweb.org/home\\_page/default.asp](http://www.hewsweb.org/home_page/default.asp)).
6. Austin, Alexander. *Early Warning and the Field: A Cargo Cult Science?* Berghof Handbook for Conflict Transformation. Berghof Research Centre for Constructive Conflict Management: Wiesbaden 2004, VS-Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften.
7. FEWER is no longer in existence, and other NGOs, such as International Alert and International Crisis Group, are becoming more involved in early warning research programmes.



## Chapter 4

### **The Importance of Interdisciplinary Linkages: Conflict Prevention, Development, Governance and Human Rights**

If we don't take steps to ensure sustainability of development efforts by assuring stability in development zones, we doom ourselves to repeatedly building and rebuilding the same roads, schools and governance structures, rather than advancing new and dynamic projects. Periods of violent conflict can disrupt or reverse years of development efforts, squandering development funds and deflecting budgets to peacekeeping and emergency aid that might otherwise have been used for social or economic programmes.

Although not fully recognized until recently, it is now widely acknowledged that there is an indisputable link between peacebuilding, governance, development and human rights that needs to be reinforced. Strengthening the connections between the international community's peacebuilding endeavours and development efforts can help forestall social disintegration and the emergence of violent conflict, as well as avoid relapse into violence.

Conflict prevention and resolution principles, tools and skills should be included in all aspects of development planning. The capacity to do this now exists, and can be extremely cost-effective for the long term, while reducing the incalculable human and material losses that result from violent conflict.<sup>1</sup> It is imperative that standards be set and achieved for the creation of conflict-sensitive development policies. Several NGOs, including International Alert, have been leading the way in developing informational and guidance tools for such policies.

There is a need for more and better policy making and programme development based upon constructive, cross-sectoral dialogue on peacebuilding issues, policies and strategies amongst the development, governance, humanitarian, human rights and security sectors, which can lead to more effective collaborative action.

Official EU literature suggests that conflict prevention must be built into aid instruments, policy frameworks, working practices and other aspects of development agendas and policies. The case of Liberia is cited as an instance in which EU development aid was combined strategically with conflict prevention aims to pursue and support opportunities for restoring peace.<sup>2</sup> Further arguments are made to fuse conflict prevention with all governance and development work so as to fully operationalize conflict prevention within a development context.

With regard to the overlap and linkages amongst the various sectors, as noted, the relationship between failed and delegitimized governance and the emergence of conflict is now well recognized. In turn, the destructive impact of such conflict on development is incalculable. With regard to the UN, because of the need for division of labour in an institutional bureaucracy, key issues have traditionally been addressed individually by separate departments and agencies, with some departments believing that conflict prevention was exclusively within their purview. The result has been that critical linkages have not been established and adequately advanced to maximize the peacebuilding capacities of the UN. The importance of the sectoral linkages and the fact that these fields are inexorably intertwined has become painfully apparent. Fortunately, this lack of adequate collaboration within the UN system has been changing over the past five years. Nonetheless, there still need to be more venues and dialogues that elucidate linkages and build coherent strategies for collaboration.

Such dialogues are needed not only within the UN system, but in intergovernmental organizations, donor agencies, NGOs and regional

organizations in order to develop new ways of collaborating to assist the conflictual communities served. Moreover, the work of all of these networks stands to benefit and be further enriched by the perspectives and information available in the broader academic and research communities and amongst conflict resolution, governance, development and human rights practitioners.

There is also very interesting threshold information emerging about the linkages between governance, rights, environment and development. A new field is emerging, sometimes called “liberation ecology” in which communities are demonstrating that they are no longer willing to witness wholesale extraction and exploitation of natural resources in their environments. They have stood up to governments and transnational corporations to prevent, control and manage unfair exploitation. The issue of land reform also emerges as part of this discourse. (See also Chapter 7 on the Macroeconomics of Conflict.)

While conflict prevention thinking and action can be delicate and complex, it is imperative that the international community commit itself to developing a more holistic worldview with regard to the nexus between sectors and between policy and practice.

**Notes:**

1. UNDP/Emergency Response Division (ERD), 2000. *Governance and Conflict Prevention: Proceedings of Expert Group Meeting*, with background discussion paper by Jamal Benomar; proceedings compiled by T. P. Dress. UNDP: New York. See also *Governance Foundations for Post-Conflict Situations: UNDP's Experience*, Management Development and Governance Division, Bureau for Development Policy, UNDP.
2. Saferworld/International Alert, 2004. *Enhancing EU Impact on Conflict Prevention: Strengthening Global Security Through Addressing the Root Causes of Conflict*: London.

**Additional Selected Resources:**

1. Swiss Peace Foundation ([www.swisspeace.org](http://www.swisspeace.org)). Information on its early warning system, FAST, is available online ([www.swisspeace.org/fast/default.htm](http://www.swisspeace.org/fast/default.htm)).
2. More information on the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) is available online (<http://ochaonline.un.org>). See also ReliefWeb ([www.reliefweb.int](http://www.reliefweb.int)) and Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN) ([www.irinnews.org](http://www.irinnews.org)).
3. Institute for Multi-Track Diplomacy, Washington, DC (Amb. John Mc Donald, Chairman and Co-Founder) ([www.imtd.org](http://www.imtd.org)).

## Chapter 5

### National Institutional Capacity and Rule of Law

*“The pursuit of enduring peace will not succeed unless issues relating to sociopolitical structures and dysfunctional governance arrangements are fully addressed.”<sup>1</sup>*

In March 2000, UNDP’s Emergency Response Division (ERD) held a meeting that explored multiple components of governance and their relationships to conflict and its prevention.<sup>2</sup> Issues reported on and discussed included judicial independence, creation of human rights institutions, creation of truth commissions, reform of law enforcement institutions and the security sector, reconciliation and justice in transition, and the financial and macroeconomic aspects of governance, amongst others.

Although this *Dossier* focuses on prevention of conflict rather than post-conflict reconstruction, post-conflict and preventive actions often serve the same purpose, which is to prevent future conflict. There is increasing literature supporting the fact that post-conflict peacebuilding in the area of good governance is pivotal for breaking cycles of violence and replacing them with rule of law, and that this can be achieved even in countries that have had recurring conflict cycles. There are many circumstances that warrant a blending of preventive strategies with post-conflict methodologies.

Therefore, it is relevant to review some of the concepts and ideas that emerged from that discussion, and that have increasingly been part of the public discourse.

### **Legal and Institutional Reforms in Post-Conflict Countries**

*“Creating a culture of legality is the challenge for legal reform efforts.”<sup>3</sup>*

In the past, development assistance in the field of legal and institutional reform traditionally focused on electoral assistance and strengthening the judiciary. It has now been acknowledged that legal reform should be far broader, including substantive, procedural and process reforms. There is also a trend away from absolute power of the executive toward the concept of shared governance, in which civil society and non-governmental actors become partners in governance-building.

A new consensus is emerging around these concepts and the role of the State, emphasizing election of accountable officials, political participation of civil society and establishment of functioning independent judiciaries that are trusted and respected by the populace.

Some of the core questions in this area include how the rule of law interfaces with conflict and its prevention or exacerbation, and the essential elements of national action plans for rule of law and legal institution-building.

For many countries, and particularly for former colonies, legal norms, institutions and processes were instruments of coercion and despotic leadership, and in some cases, still are. Such legal systems need to be completely transformed into instruments that defend, promote and protect free expression, free association and political participation. This is true in all countries, not only in transitional, post-colonial and post-conflict societies. In Russia, for example, a nation that has been transitioning for 15 years, there has been recent activity suggesting movement away from the free press and media visualized by scholars, officials and civil society at the start of the transition. And in the US, scholars and civil society actors are

concerned about the balance between security and civil rights, fearing that in the interest of, or on the pretext of, national security, rights-based principles, fairness and privacy are being compromised. Some commentators believe that while the US is a leading exporter of democracy to the developing world, its own hard-won, long-standing democratic vision is being eroded.

Creating and maintaining cultures of legality are challenges for legal reform efforts. If a culture of legality is not fundamentally based on fairness and principles of justice, it cannot accomplish its mission. Cultures of fairness and legality must also be supported through legislation, training and genuinely transforming the nature of governance. One of the principal questions is how to reconcile the need for implementing international standards while also recognizing and promoting the need for indigenous and culturally relevant models.

Additional queries would include: What is a democratic judge, what is the role of the judge in a democratic society, and how best to encourage governments to invest in their justice systems? Further, what is a humane penal system? Democracy can be forfeited when government leaders do not fully understand the costs of not having a credible, accountable justice and penal system. This is true not only in developing or transitional democracies, but in all societies.

A major problem is the lack of access of the poor to processes involving the wielding of power and influencing parliamentary debate and legislation. Relevant international actors can continue to play a role by providing technical cooperation and assistance in strengthening parliaments and legislative processes and, most particularly, by supporting increased access of the poor to channels for influencing parliamentary decisions.

Another question ripe for analysis is how to promote

constitutionalism. How can constitutions include universal values and international human rights norms and standards while at the same time being culturally appropriate and relevant? Conflicts arise when governance or respect for rule of law breaks down due, amongst other causes, to unsound or ineffective legal or constitutional systems or lack of effective implementation within such systems. Conversely, conflict arising for other reasons may result in the collapse of governance or rule of law.

In thinking about legal and institutional reforms in countries emerging from protracted conflict there are a number of complex problems. In countries such as Cambodia, decades of tragedy wiped out almost all remnants of the fundamental institutions of governance, including the judiciary. More often in post-conflict environments, a judicial branch may exist in name only, or may not be independent of the executive.

As noted, existing bodies of law are sometimes seen by civil society actors as a key part of the system that has oppressed them. In such instances, the issue is not only reforming the laws, but also creating new laws and institutions. In post-conflict societies it is essential to ensure that civil society participates actively in this process. Where rule of law is not upheld, population segments may feel justified in resorting to violence to oppose tyranny and oppression. Unless there are institutions and laws that ensure economic and social rights and development, cycles of violence will continue to self-renew.

The work of UN organs and aid agencies in this arena can help to ensure that judiciaries are independent and distinct from the executive, and that judges, prosecutors and prison officials are adequately trained. It must also continue to explore how to address the issue of corruption at all levels—in the judiciary, the executive branch and legislatures—which may create disincentives for reform.

Some of the key issues involved in advancing legal reform are



strengthening parliamentary processes, establishing watchdog institutions, and equipping the judiciary with codes of ethics and mechanisms for transparency and legal literacy, as well as ensuring the existence of a free press and media. There should also be strong support for the development and use of alternative dispute resolution (ADR) mechanisms that are impartial and coherent with local traditions.

These are areas in which technical assistance and cooperation can achieve powerful results. As noted, one of the ramifications of acknowledging the need for long-term commitment and consistency is that funders may not always be aware of the constraints caused by short-term funding and budgeting cycles, and should develop commensurate structures and funding concepts to meet these relatively new types of needs.

### **Reconciliation and Rebuilding Justice**

There is an inherent tension between the need for reconciliation and the demands of justice. Even in societies working to achieve reconciliation, there needs to be some way of reckoning with the past in order to move beyond it. There are several approaches, from prosecution to truth commissions to national amnesty programmes. Some methods reject notions of collective blame and guilt and focus on prosecution of individual perpetrators. Judicial processes may be prosecutorial or symbolic. Also, there are possibilities of both criminal and non-criminal sanctions. Some of the questions raised in conceptualizing the different types of justice in transition include:

- b' Does post-conflict reconciliation automatically suggest compromise of justice?
- b' How can reconciliation be promoted while adequately addressing perceived historical injustices?
- b' To what extent, if at all, can justice be achieved in societies in which the criminal justice system is dysfunctional or decimated?

These issues are closely related to the legal reforms addressed earlier. Experience has demonstrated that careful analysis of such programmes is crucial, since models that have been successful in some societies have met with disappointment in others.

### **Truth Commissions**

*“Sometimes the problem is one of multiple truths.”<sup>4</sup>*

Truth commissions have been found to be a very useful tool for healing in some post-conflict societies. In others, they have been found to be less effective. For example, in Bosnia, there were three versions of the truth, and numerous questions that remained unanswered. What was the role of the police, the military, of religious leaders, of the educational system?

These questions can offer an opportunity for societies to embark on a period of collective introspection and commissions may be given the tasks of developing detailed recommendations for societal reform. However, there are tradeoffs between reconciliation and justice as part of a greater programme of reconstruction, and there can be grave concerns that abusers will never face justice and that victims will be forgotten. This may create a national illusion in which the real truth disappears.

While there are instances in which truth commissions may be effective and essential to national healing, there are others in which such commissions may be inadequate to address the need for collective understanding of the past and for meaningful national healing.

### **Reform of Law Enforcement Institutions and the Security Sector**

*“Security forces must represent the consensus of the governed.”<sup>5</sup>*

Security sector reform is directly related to the most elemental aspects of the need for human security, and there is a compelling

need to bring the civil-military relations discourse further into the development dialogue. Some of the issues involved include analyzing how to engage in working with this sector, how to extend principles of good governance into this sector, and how to ensure that the security sector, including police and armed forces, are subject to, and perceived as subject to, the rule of law and international human rights standards.

Some of the questions that have arisen in conjunction with security sector issues include: how does security sector reform fit into the public discourse on conflict and governance? How can development actors help to ensure that security forces are part of an integrated solution, rather than part of the problem, particularly in transitional and post-conflict societies?

In all instances, and particularly in post-conflict environments, if a population does not feel protected by its own national police, or, indeed, if citizens feel that they need protection from their own police, this creates such a basic cleavage between the State and the society that other reform measures, such as legal system reform, can be greatly impeded or mooted. As Groenewald and Peake indicate, “The police face major problems of legitimacy in societies where a uniformed officer is more a cause for fear than a source of protection....”<sup>6</sup>

Also as noted in Groenewald and Peake, the police are the most visible institution of the security sector and developing a professional and accountable police service responsive to the needs of local communities is increasingly recognized as important for sound conflict management. “A police that is seen to have changed its character, making a break from repressive practices of the past and working in partnership with communities from which it was historically removed, has profound symbolic resonance.”<sup>7</sup>

The International Peace Academy (IPA), in partnership with Saferworld, a London-based think tank on foreign affairs,<sup>8</sup> has been exploring conceptual frameworks for police reform and studying the concept of community-based policing.

Security sector reform has been embraced with less fervor than some of the other aspects of governance, partly because of its sensitivity and political nature. Nonetheless, the need to engage this sector is incontrovertible. While police reform initially took place largely following conflict, it is increasingly part of a broader agenda of prevention.<sup>9</sup>

This area of reform, like judicial reform and many other areas that are politically delicate, requires sensitive and politically adept technical assistance. While more daunting than some areas of development assistance, it is clearly becoming recognized as an essential aspect of preventive engagement.

**Notes:**

1. This Chapter relies, in part, on proceedings of *Governance and Conflict Prevention: Proceedings of the Expert Group Meeting*. UNDP 2000.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid., p. 20.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid., Johanna Mendelson-Forman, p. 27.
6. Groenewald, Hesta and Gordon Peake, 2004. *Police Reform Through Community-Based Policing*. International Peace Academy in conjunction with Saferworld: New York and London.
7. Ibid.
8. Ibid.
9. Ibid.

**Additional Selected Resources:**

1. Center for Preventive Action of the Council on Foreign Relations ([www.cfr.org/index.php](http://www.cfr.org/index.php)).
2. See also Zartman, William, 1995. "Dynamics and Constraints in Negotiations in Internal Conflicts," Zartman, William (ed), *Elusive Peace: Negotiating an End to Civil Wars*. The Brookings Institution: Washington, pp. 3-29, and Zartman, William (ed.), *Collapsed States: The Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate Authority*, Lynne Rienner: Boulder and London, 1995, pp. 1-14 and 267-273.

3. Cousens, Elizabeth, Chetan Kumar, and Karin Wermester, 2001. *Peacebuilding as Politics—Cultivating Peace in Fragile Societies*. Lynne Rienner: Boulder and London. See “Mapping the Political Cartography of Conflict,” pp. 188-195.

## Chapter 6

### Human Rights, Minority Rights and Identity-based Conflict

*“There is nothing more dangerous than to build a society with a large segment of people who feel that they have no stake in it, who feel that they have nothing to lose.” (Martin Luther King, 1968)<sup>1</sup>*

“Violent conflicts based on identities can... lead to State collapse. The secessionist wars that followed the demise of communism in Central and Eastern Europe, the long-running wars in Africa and parts of Asia, the protracted violence in the Middle East, and transnational terrorism—all highlight profound problems .... Identity-based conflict and terrorism are symptoms and results of the imbalance in the current world order.”<sup>2</sup>

The uncontrolled escalation of violent inter-ethnic conflict is a problem of daunting proportions that is likely to accelerate as some borders become more fluid and ambiguous, others become rigid and impermeable, and emerging and fragile democracies proliferate.

This type of conflict is often based upon perceived historical grievances and inequities, and perceptions of religious, ethnic and cultural oppression, persecution and exclusion. These beliefs, which become the spoken history of a people, do not fade away by themselves. They ebb and surge and lead to perpetual spirals of mistrust, resentment, envy, desire for revenge and ultimately violence. This is partly a function of the non-linear nature of memory, in which collective memory from past years, decades or even centuries, such as recollection of massacres and collective

defeat or humiliation, can be vivid and present, and form part of the identity of a population. This means that fertile conditions continually exist for emergence of identity-based conflict.

Violent inter-ethnic conflict will not decrease until the international community accepts accountability for the fact that localized disputes are often ignored until they become crises, at which time they begin to require massive infusions of resources. Often these conflicts begin as localized misunderstandings and tensions that could be resolved early at local, national or sub-regional levels if there were adequate mechanisms and venues for early warning, dialogue, mediation and grievance settlement. Often such crises are not addressed until they grow into entrenched armed conflicts and become so intractable that they come to the attention of the international community. By then, expensive and often ineffectual crisis intervention operations are required, and opportunities for early preventive action are forever lost.

### **Conflict Prevention and Human Rights: The Need for Intersectoral Cooperation**

It has often been noted that there is a lack of cooperation and joint problem-solving and policy development between the fields of conflict prevention and human rights. It has also been observed that the conflict prevention field has traditionally seen the rights-based community as being too rigid and judgmental, and too eager to promote punishment rather than conflict transformation or reconciliation. Conversely, it is said that the rights-based community has traditionally seen the conflict resolution community as too compromising, too ready to enact settlements that fail to lead to genuine resolution—such as systems of partition—and too willing to allow the weaker parties to a conflict to be bullied by stronger parties in order to reach settlements.

All of these perceptions may contain varying degrees of truth and



varying degrees of exaggeration, but two things are clear; first, the overarching aspiration of both communities is a just peace in which diverse groups coexist with mutual respect and dignity. Secondly, if the human rights and conflict resolution communities cannot work out cooperative strategies for mutual engagement for the benefit of violated or conflicting communities, there is little hope of expecting those disputing communities to resolve their conflicts.

This poses another challenge to the structure of the UN, in which many observers believe that there is inadequate interaction and information exchange amongst the Headquarters' offices, the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights and the UN field offices, and insufficient joint problem-solving between the human rights and conflict prevention communities both within and outside of the UN.

### **Defining Human Rights**

Traditional views limited human rights to civil and political rights. Included amongst these are the right to life, liberty and security; the right not to be discriminated against on the basis of race, colour, sex, language, religion, social class or political opinion; the right to vote; freedom of movement; freedom of speech and freedom of the press; the right to be free from arbitrary invasion of privacy within family and home, and legal rights such as the right to due process of law.

It has been acknowledged that this set of rights is far too limited in scope and that a more multidimensional and holistic approach must be taken. Such an approach includes not only the basic civil and political rights noted above, but also essential social, economic and cultural rights, including the right to an adequate standard of living; the right to education; the right to work and to equal pay for equal work; and the right of minorities to practice and enjoy their own cultures, languages and religions.

Of particular importance is the protection and advancement of the rights of disadvantaged and minority groups, including women, the elderly, children and indigenous peoples.<sup>3</sup> The United Nations has adopted this holistic approach in broadening the scope of human rights, and the international community has repeatedly affirmed the interdependence of both sets of rights.

While human rights institutions form part of the rule of law framework, the importance of human rights and its critical linkages with conflict go far beyond law, and even beyond equity. Human rights violations and perceptions of exclusion and marginalization can be profoundly debilitating and can create fissures in the relationship of human beings with each other and in the relationship between the individual and the State. Few situations are as volatile and intractable as perceptions of discrimination and collective humiliation. To reduce and prevent this type of conflict, the protection of civil and human rights must be institutionally ensured.

Finally, urgent concerns have been surfacing about the global erosion of the rule of law as it applies to human rights, workers' rights and environmental law due to globalization, which often appears to be superceding and eroding these vital principles of international law. This is one of the emerging areas in terms of multi-sectoral rights-based protections that would benefit from greater collaboration amongst and between the labour, environmental and human rights sectors, including, but not limited to, the UNHCHR, the International Labour Organization (ILO) and the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP).

As noted in *States of Disarray: The Social Effects of Globalization*, "There is a perception that the West has intensively marketed the value system of free-market democracy with no instruction manuals," in many cases "...abandoning the clients who have bought the product."<sup>4</sup>

### **Highlighting Minority Rights**

According to Minority Rights Group International (MRG), there is no universally accepted definition of “minorities,” and the word is interpreted differently in different societies. The UN has not yet agreed on a definition of what constitutes a minority, beyond that implied in the title of the UN Declaration on the Rights of Persons belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities. Attempting a more precise statement has been fraught with difficulties: in some cases the motivation for a tighter definition has been to deny certain rights to certain peoples.

MRG focuses its work on non-dominant ethnic, religious and linguistic communities who may not necessarily be numerical minorities, including initiatives with indigenous and tribal peoples, migrant communities and refugees, some of whom may not wish to be classified as minorities. In addition, these groups are not homogeneous—some members face further marginalization due to age, class, disability, gender or other factors. MRG works with some of the poorest and most marginalized groups in society, who may lack access to political power, and face discrimination and human rights violations. It seeks to protect and promote the basic rights of these communities, and believes that recognition of minority and indigenous peoples’ rights is crucial to establishing and maintaining just and peaceful societies.<sup>5</sup>

### **Prevention of Genocide and Ethnic Cleansing**

*“Every statement deploring the failure to act in Rwanda a decade ago should be appended to one that demands action on Darfur today.”<sup>6</sup>*

Genocide is the world’s most egregious human rights problem. Because genocide is often carried out by a country’s own military and police forces, the usual national forces of law and order may promote rather than prevent it and international intervention is usually required. A number of commentators have observed that because the world lacks an international rapid response force, and because of the extent of inaction to date in the face of genocide and

genocidal indicators, this ultimate crime against humanity has largely gone unchecked.<sup>7</sup>

The Office of the UN Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide was established in April 2004. It is hoped that it will be fully operational as quickly as possible, that its resources will be appropriately expanded, and that it will have extensive interaction with the conflict prevention, early warning and human rights sectors, both within and outside of the UN ([www.un.org/Depts/dpa/prev\\_genocide](http://www.un.org/Depts/dpa/prev_genocide)). Some commentators have suggested that there should also be an Under-Secretary for Minority Rights and Conflict Prevention.

It is important for the conflict prevention and human rights sectors to collectively address the fact that human rights violations can also be early warning indicators. For example, if identification cards are required to include information such as the religious or ethnic backgrounds of card carriers, this may be seen as a warning sign of a potential ethnic cleansing campaign.

The language of leaders in speeches and presentations can be another early warning indicator. According to information provided at a conference of the International Society for Political Psychology in Santiago de Compostella, Spain (1994), language used by Adolph Hitler in public speeches was analyzed chronologically and demonstrated that he was “testing the waters” with his constituency by using more and more discriminatory language in a series of public addresses, and analyzing the reaction. Based on the response, he continued to increase his use of this type of language in public communications, laying a verbal foundation for future action.

This kind of indicator can be a powerful tool for prevention if there are channels by which individuals and groups can present such data to bodies in a position to analyze and act on the information. (See also the section on Women and Conflict in Chapter 8, in which

women in the Balkans had early warning information to relay, but had no place to take it. This, and similar situations, are critical opportunities missed.) It is vital that there be adequate information exchange and technical cooperation amongst the Headquarters' offices, including the UNHCHR, the UN field missions, sub-regional bodies, and NGO networks on the important task of community-based early warning. This can help identify and deter incipient intentions with regard to schemes for ethnic cleansing.

One such NGO network, the International Campaign to End Genocide, is a coalition dedicated to creating the international institutions and the political will to end genocide. It has four goals:

1. Providing public information on the nature of genocide and creation of the political will to prevent it;
2. The creation of an effective early warning system to alert intergovernmental bodies, and especially the UN Security Council, NATO and other regional alliances, to potential ethnic conflict and genocide;
3. The establishment of a powerful UN rapid response force in accordance with Articles 43-47 of the UN Charter, as well as regional rapid response forces, and international police ready to be sent to areas where genocide threatens or has begun; and
4. Effective arrest, trial and punishment of those who commit genocide, including the early and effective functioning of the International Criminal Court (ICC), the use of national courts with universal jurisdiction, and the creation of special international tribunals to prosecute perpetrators of genocide.

The Campaign is an international, decentralized effort comprised of numerous organizations.<sup>8</sup> It covers genocide as it is defined in the Genocide Convention: “the intentional destruction, in whole or in part, of a national, ethnic, racial or religious group, as such.” It also addresses political mass murder, ethnic cleansing and related crimes against humanity. In addition to its work for institutional reform of the

UN in these areas, it brings pressure to bear on governments that can act on early warnings of genocide through the Security Council.

The Campaign concentrates on predicting, preventing and punishing genocide and other forms of mass murder. It brings an analytical understanding of the genocidal process to specific situations and attempts to build relevant institutions for the long term. It also works with the governments of Security Council members to create the political will for multilateral, rather than unilateral, intervention.

Building the political will for action is a major challenge. Amongst the defense mechanisms used to justify non-action is denial of the facts. The first task in preventing and ending genocide is ensuring that facts are presented in a clear and indisputable form for policy makers. They must be interpreted so that policy makers understand that genocidal massacres are systematic, or that the indicators of genocide are clear and compelling. Then options for action must be proposed to those who make policy, who must be lobbied to take action—a function of political will.

### **African Authors in Rwanda: Writing by Duty of Memory**

In September 2003 Brandeis University hosted a symposium called “Literary Responses to Mass Violence.” The event brought together writers and scholars to reflect on writing in the wake of some of the major man-made tragedies of the twentieth century. The following are excerpts from the writing of Boubacar Boris Diop, a Senegalese writer and conference participant who was part of a group of African writers who visited Rwanda in 1998.

“This enterprise of extermination did not come about suddenly.... On the contrary, it had been meticulously planned. A very centralized State put its army, paramilitary forces created just for the occasion, and an entire administration at the service of eliminating a part of the Rwandan population for belonging to a certain ‘ethnicity.’”

“...they had to convince both the victims and themselves that the people being slaughtered were totally devoid of humanity, that their presence on this earth was an error of nature. This may be why genocide negationists always seem a bit astonished when you contradict them with facts and figures. In their view, nobody died, because the people everyone is making such a fuss about never had the right to exist at all.”

“...going through the looking glass—the mirror that reflects so many failures and so much cowardice—often leads people to madness and despair rather than mastery of their destiny.” “But did we really need to go to Rwanda to feel the madness of our era? After all, in Africa today, the writer’s work-table is never far from a mass grave.”

Boubacar Boris Diop, 2004. “African Authors in Rwanda: Writing by Duty of Memory.” In *Literary Responses to Mass Violence*. Brandeis University, (excerpted from pp. 109-123).

**Notes:**

1. Martin Luther King, Sermon on Race Relations and Civil Rights in America, 1968, Martin Luther King Papers, King Center, Atlanta.
2. UNRISD, 2003. *Research for Social Change: UNRISD 40th Anniversary Report*. UNRISD: Geneva, p. 44.
3. International Organization for Migration (IOM), *Conflict Resolution, Confidence-building and Peace Enhancement among Somali Women*. 2001. (T. Dress-Cherman, ed.). IOM: Geneva, pp. 77-78.
4. UNRISD, 1995. *States of Disarray: The Social Effects of Globalization*, an UNRISD Report for the World Summit for Social Development. UNRISD: Geneva.
5. More information is available on the Minority Rights Group website ([www.minorityrights.org](http://www.minorityrights.org)). Also see information on the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) minority rights programmes ([www.osce.org](http://www.osce.org)).
6. Statement by Mark Schneider, ICG Sr. Vice President, to the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, “The Responsibility to Protect—The Capacity to Prevent and the Capacity to Intervene,” Washington DC, 5 May 2004.
7. This section is based in part on information from Genocide Watch (coordinates provided below).
8. Current members of the International Campaign to End Genocide include: Genocide Watch, the Leo Kuper Foundation (UK), Physicians for Human Rights (UK), Prevent Genocide International (US), International Alert (UK), the International Crisis Group, (Brussels), the Genocide Studies Program of Yale University/Cambodian Genocide Project, Inc., (New Haven) the Institute on the Holocaust and Genocide (Israel), the



Committee for Effective International Criminal Law (Germany), the Aegis Trust (UK), the Cooperative Baptist Fellowship Global Mission, the Genocide Prevention Center (US), Survivors' Rights International (US), Prévention Génocides (Belgium), CALDH (Guatemala), INFORCE (UK), the Remembering Rwanda Trust (Canada), Minority Rights Group (UK), and Survival International (UK).

The International Campaign's coordinator is Genocide Watch, PO Box 809, Washington, DC 20044, USA, telephone +1-703/448 0222, fax +1-703/288 5525, e-mail <[info@genocidewatch.org](mailto:info@genocidewatch.org)>, website ([www.genocidewatch.org](http://www.genocidewatch.org)).

### **Additional Selected Resources:**

1. Amnesty International ([www.amnesty.org](http://www.amnesty.org)).
2. Human Rights Watch ([www.hrw.org](http://www.hrw.org)).
3. See also the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC, with regard to international humanitarian principles and law) ([www.icrc.org](http://www.icrc.org)).
4. See also *Beyond Intractability* for online resources ([www.beyondintractability.org/iweb](http://www.beyondintractability.org/iweb)).
5. International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance ([www.idea.int](http://www.idea.int)).
6. Human Rights Education Association ([www.hrea.org](http://www.hrea.org)).



## Chapter 7

### Macroeconomics of Conflict<sup>1</sup>

*“War is a racket the same as any other.”*  
(George Orwell, *Homage to Catalonia*, 1938)

#### Economic Causes of Conflict

This chapter emphasizes the linkages between and amongst conflict, macroeconomics and human development. Poverty can both cause and be caused by conflict, and inequity can exacerbate both the momentum towards conflict and its impacts. Given the wealth of recent literature emerging and its immense complexity, this *Dossier* does not go into extensive detail on this issue. This chapter instead aims to briefly outline some of the economic underpinnings of civil conflict and highlight factors and features that are seen to recur, sustaining impetus towards armed and violent conflict.

Recent literature<sup>2</sup> on the root causes of conflict in developing countries have pointed to a few shared observations:

- b · Wars are a major cause of poverty and underdevelopment and while war can retard development, sustained development is seen to reduce the incidence of conflict;
- b · Cultural, ethnic and historical factors notwithstanding, most civil conflicts have an underlying economic cause or component;
- b · Major causes of civil conflict include economic, political and social inequalities between groups, poor governance and inadequate delivery services by the State apparatus, environmental degradation, acute poverty, and un/under-employment—all contributing to fuelling wars;
- b · While the incidence of war has been rising since the 1950s (mostly in African and Asian nations), most wars during the 1990s have been intra-state (secessionist movements,

insurgencies, ethnic/communal clashes) rather than inter-state.<sup>3</sup>

The above observations give form to four basic hypotheses<sup>4</sup> that underpin the role that macroeconomic factors play in a conflict dynamic.

1. The group motivation hypothesis points at the resentment and ambitions—just or otherwise—of a group distinct in its cultural, religious, ethnic, class or geographical composition. Such groups may wish to redress the political or economic power balance, which they perceive as being unfavourable to them. There may have been atrocities committed against them or past injustices and grievances that remain unresolved. These differences between groups are termed as horizontal inequalities.<sup>5</sup> Sri Lanka, Fiji and Bosnia and Herzegovina are countries where a lack of participation in government, discriminatory treatment by the dominant group and past atrocities have all caused deep fissures within the nation-state.

2. The private motivation theory views war as an opportunity as much as an impediment to growth. War may bring with it prospects for immediate economic benefits for the most susceptible demographic group, uneducated, unemployed men. There are opportunities to loot, trade arms and drugs, and initiate production and trade in illicit items such as diamonds, timber and other precious commodities across borders. If a group manages to establish a private “parallel economy” of this sort, with attendant barriers to entry for others and monopolistic profits for those who control it, the economic incentives to wage war could then outweigh the costs for the profiting groups.

3. The failure of the social contract established between a people and its government: The legitimacy of a State is derived in large part by the State’s delivery of social services and an economic infrastructure in which people have reasonable conditions for, and

expectations of, economic betterment. With poor governance, inequitable resource allocation, entrenched corruption and economic discrimination, the authority of the State can be severely challenged, leading to violence and conflict. The Chiapas region in Mexico, South Africa under apartheid, and the insurgencies across India's northeastern states by indigenous populations, all point to a breakdown of this contract.

4. Finally, the Green War hypothesis<sup>6</sup> points to environmental degradation and natural resource management issues that cause protracted civil conflicts in developing societies. Pressure on land use, access to mineral resources and growing scarcity of water are amongst the reasons that the different groups mobilize for conflict (especially in regions with rising population pressures). The 1969 war between El Salvador and Honduras,<sup>7</sup> the struggle over resources in Sierra Leone and the protracted civil conflict over land access, in part contributing to the genocide in Rwanda, have all demonstrated how natural resources and securing access to them can be powerful incentives to wage war.

Economic incentives, in and of themselves, have not always been the primary causes of armed insurgencies within borders and conventional wars, and there is no standard economic remedy to help poor developing nations break out of conflict cycles. However, there is clearly a need to understand the economic underpinnings that give rise to dissent and further—as Karen Ballentine stresses—the need for a broader conceptualization of the opportunity structures leading to such violation, including the military, political, sociological and economic characteristics associated with weak States.<sup>8</sup> In varying degrees, natural resources and economic disparities have interacted with inter-ethnic, political and socioeconomic grievances to shape particular conflicts.

In Sri Lanka and Kosovo, for example, the principal reasons for the conflicts were the systematic exclusion of ethnic minorities from

political power and economic opportunities. The Maoist insurgency in Nepal emanated from the acute poverty and landlessness of the rural poor and helped galvanize the bonded lower class for active recruitment. The civil wars in Angola and Colombia originated from the Cold War with the aim of wresting State control from a competing ideology of wealth distribution and governance.

Recent scholarship on civil wars, notably those in Angola and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), has emphasized the economic dimensions of conflict. War has been identified as frequently being or developing into “an alternative system of profit and power” that favours certain groups at the expense of others. In many of these conflicts, armed violence has been used to control trade, seize land, exploit labour, extract benefits and, in effect, set up a system akin to a parallel economy where the local population develops a gradual stake in rebel operations. In such cases—as David Keen notes—prolonging a war may be a higher priority than winning it.<sup>9</sup>

Self-generated rebel financing of conflicts—predominantly from natural resources within the country—remains for many scholars and aid agencies a major cause for concern. While studying protracted conflicts in Sierra Leone, Angola, Colombia, the DRC and Sri Lanka, amongst others, Keen (2003) sees rebel access to lucrative economic resources serving to strengthen the “spoilers” in any ensuing peace dialogue or process:

[E]conomic resources prolong conflict by creating incentives for rebel self-enrichment; that is, wartime profits become so attractive to rebel groups that they prefer the continuation of war to a speedy settlement, which, by restoring government control over their territories or demanding redress of their ill-gotten gains, may expose them to a net financial loss.<sup>10</sup>

Such conflicts cause local populations to be caught between rebel

forces and government paramilitaries, and often there is systematic repression and atrocities committed by both sides. Both the duration and intensity of the conflict may well be determined by the relative accessibility armed dissident groups have to resources. Predation of mineral resources by the warring groups can also lead to the local community's dependence on the illicit extraction of the commodities that rebels trade in, and can open up multiple points of friction and bring in new players. An example of this is the Colombian intra-state conflict, in which illicit cultivation of coca and unregulated coltan mining have led to significant land displacement and opened up a new front between local agrarian populations and rebel forces.<sup>11</sup> Civil wars and insurgencies also create territories that do not fall within the control of recognized governments. These areas serve as safe havens for rebel forces and transit routes for illegal trade.

Working primarily on the Colombian drug war, Alexandra Guagueta points out that globalization has helped illegal armed groups on all sides translate drug money into military strength. Natural resource extraction, especially in the oil and mining sectors, has been frequently linked to human rights abuse and environmental despoliation by repressive and corrupt States. The author indicates that natural resource extraction has been identified as a major, if sometimes indirect, contributor to armed conflict in Angola, Sudan, Burma, Indonesia and Nigeria.<sup>12</sup> Resource exploitation invariably involves the forcible displacement of civilian communities from areas of extraction. These displacements do not necessarily result from rebel actions: access and ownership of natural resources are inevitably tied to political patronage. Vested interests of the ruling classes in resource access (acting through the legitimacy of, and with the complicity of, the government) can generate dissent.

### **Economic Impacts of Conflict**

In terms of conflict impacts, in the economic arena they are grave and can lead to complete economic destabilization, with soaring rates of inflation that have particularly devastating impacts on the

poor. Unemployment rises, financial and banking systems become inoperative, investor confidence is shattered, and often there is a brain drain as professionals leave to move to more secure areas. There is an acceleration of capital flight, often even prior to crises, as impending problems are forecast. Currency rates can plummet, further eroding the economic system and causing financial chaos that can affect entire populations, with, as always, the most vulnerable and least able to cope being most harshly affected.

Although the international financial institutions (IFIs) such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the Asian Development Bank have been largely responsible for working with countries to develop macroeconomic policies and frameworks, their programmes have often failed to take a holistic approach to framework development. Their programmes have not always taken into account the need for key human development factors such as equity and equitability, the needs and contributions of the poor, of women and of vulnerable groups, of the environment, and of civil society as a whole. It is essential to have clear human development goals underlying national macroeconomic frameworks and to expand the use of conflict-sensitive development and economic policies and programming, together with equitable and rights-based approaches to social and economic development.

In addition, full employment and “decent work” are two of the principal components of an enabling environment for peace and human security. Conversely, high unemployment is a potential risk factor for conflict, in effect, a conflict indicator. Mass labour agitation can also be a conflict indicator.<sup>13</sup>

### **Transfer of Small Arms and Light Weapons**

One of the key economic aspects of conflict is the trade, both legal and illicit, in small arms and light weapons. While this issue has generated considerable discussion and much work has been done, it has been immensely difficult to come to grips with this intractable threat.



In July 2001 the UN held a conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) at UN Headquarters in New York to address the threat to human security posed by such weapons. Opening the conference, Deputy Secretary-General Louise Fréchet indicated that there were an estimated 500 million small arms and light weapons in circulation, many of which are in the hands of legal authorities (which does not necessarily make them less dangerous. See below. [Ed.]), and many of which are in the hands of irregular troops, criminals, drug traffickers and terrorists. She noted that even in societies not torn by conflict, the proliferation of small arms had contributed to a culture of violence and crime by eroding the authority of legitimate but weak governments and undermining respect for international humanitarian law, making peacekeeping more difficult.

The conference ultimately reached agreement on the first voluntary pact to curb the small arms trade, a comprehensive programme of action that includes measures urging governments to require gun tracing laws, regulate arms brokers, ensure export controls, criminalize illicit production and trade of weapons and destroy surplus stocks. Principal areas of debate during the conference included arms transfers to non-state actors and legally binding measures such as placing controls on arms brokers, both of which faced opposition from China and the US, as well as some other Asian nations.

A number of NGOs and participants were dissatisfied with the outcome of the conference because of the lack of progress on a number of issues. NGO perspectives were often at odds with government positions. Amnesty International (AI), for example, indicated that its research had shown that small arms and light weapons were now used by both governments and opposition armed forces in 100 countries to commit systematic gross human rights abuses and violations of international human rights law. Given this reality, AI emphasized that it was unacceptable for a programme of

action to fail to include the specific international duty of Member States to prevent the transfer of arms where there is a strong likelihood that the arms will be used to commit “heinous international crimes.”

Human Rights Watch and other NGOs, as well as several national officials, felt that governments had doomed the conference by focusing only on the illicit arms trade. The organization Gun-Free South Africa argued that eradicating the global scourge of small arms will not be possible without exploring ways to control the manufacture, use, stockpiling and transfer of legal weapons, a view with which many participants agreed.<sup>14</sup>

Following the 2001 Conference, there was a reporting conference in 2003 with a second scheduled for July 2005, leading up to the UN Review Conference in 2006.

There have also been a number of further developments since 2001. The focus of the UN First Committee (Disarmament Committee) has been primarily on the issue of marking and tracing of SALW, which has met with a fair degree of success in that there has been movement towards a standardized system of marking weapons. The goal is that every manufacturer of weapons will mark them the same way, which will allow weapons to be traced back to the manufacturers. This, in turn, will make it more difficult to divert weapons without the transfers being publicly exposed. The 2001 Vienna Firearms Protocol—which supplements the Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, adopted in 2000, that aims to strengthen cooperation amongst States Parties in order to combat the illicit manufacturing of and trafficking in firearms—remains the only legally binding UN instrument, and a lack of State ratification has been a key impediment.

Some governments, including the UK and Finland, have also begun backing the idea of an Arms Trade Treaty, which has been

the main policy issue supported by arms control campaigns. The UK has also been developing its own initiative on transfer controls. Issues that remain controversial include whether there should be a prohibition on arms transfers to non-state actors. Another development since the July 2001 conference has been the anti-terrorist initiatives that have been emerging since the 11 September 2001 attacks on the US. UN Security Council Resolution 1373 of 2001 established the Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC), which has been working on the issue of SALW transfers to terrorist groups.<sup>15</sup>

### **Corruption, Its Legacies and the Struggle to Contain It**

Etymologically the word “corruption” comes from the Latin verb “*corruptus*” (to break) and literally means broken object. The classic definition, used by the World Bank and a leading anti-corruption NGO, Transparency International, views corruption as the use of one’s public position for illegitimate private gains. Abuse of power and personal gain, however, can occur in both the public and private domains, often in collusion with individuals from both sectors. The UN’s Global Programme against Corruption (GPAC), first launched in 1999 by the United Nations Centre for International Crime Prevention (later merged into the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime—UNODC<sup>16</sup>), defines corruption as the “abuse of power for private gain” and includes both the public and private sector. Although perceived differently from country to country, corruption can include conflict of interest, embezzlement, fraud, bribery, political corruption, nepotism and extortion.

On 31 October 2003 the General Assembly adopted the United Nations Convention against Corruption, and in December 2003 it was opened for signature in Mexico. The new instrument introduces a comprehensive set of standards, measures and rules to fight corruption, calls for the most prevalent forms of corruption in both the public and private sector to be made a crime, and, for the first time, requires Member States to return assets obtained through graft.

The Convention complements another treaty, the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, which entered into force on 29 September 2003 and requires ratifying countries to cooperate with each other in combating money laundering, organized crime and human trafficking.

Noting its corrosive effects on societies, the Secretary-General, in his statement to the General Assembly on the adoption of the Convention, said, “Corruption hurts the poor disproportionately by diverting funds intended for development, undermining a government’s ability to provide basic services, feeding inequality and injustice, and discouraging foreign investment and aid,” indicating also that corruption is a key element in economic underperformance, and a major obstacle to poverty alleviation and development.

In April 2004, the Secretary-General focused on corruption as a major theme at an open debate of the Security Council on the role of business in conflict prevention, peacekeeping and post-conflict peacebuilding, with the following statement:

“The economic dimensions of armed conflict are often overlooked, but they should never be underestimated. The role of business, in particular, can be crucial for good and for ill. Private companies operate in many conflict zones and conflict-prone countries. Their decisions—on investment and employment, on relations with local communities, on protection for local environments, on their own security arrangements—can help a country turn its back on conflict, or exacerbate the tensions that fuelled conflict in the first place.

“Private companies also manufacture and sell the main hardware of conflict—from tanks to small arms, anti-personnel mines and even machetes....

“These are complex challenges. They touch on fundamental

questions of sovereignty, democratic governance, corporate accountability and individual integrity. Moreover, many of the transactions involved occur in the shadows, or within the context of failed States that do not have the capacity to regulate activities that are driven by profit but which fuel conflict. Enforcement and monitoring measures aimed at cracking down on such activities often lack teeth, if they exist at all. Supply chains are often so multi-layered as to defy efforts at greater transparency.

“Business itself has an enormous stake in the search for solutions. After all, companies require a stable environment in order to conduct their operations and minimize their risks. Their reputations—not just with the public but with their own employees and shareholders—depend not just on what product or service is provided, but how it is provided. And their bottom lines can no longer be separated from some of the key goals of the United Nations: peace, development and equity. All these are compelling reasons why business should play an active role in tackling these issues, without waiting to be asked.”<sup>17</sup>

In June 2004, the Global Compact (see the following section) held a one-day summit bringing together corporate executives, government officials and representatives from civil society and labour organizations to take stock of the Global Compact and chart its future course. During the summit, the Secretary-General officially announced the adoption of a tenth principle, which aims to combat corruption.

Ongoing initiatives by the Security Council to combat corruption have included imposing targeted sanctions, supporting processes to reduce the trade in conflict diamonds and convening expert panels to assess the role of political economy in triggering or prolonging conflict, as well as authorizing peacekeeping missions to assist in the monitoring of economic sanctions and arms embargos, and supporting efforts to re-establish national authority over natural resources.

The Secretary-General has also established an inter-agency group chaired by the Department of Political Affairs to look at the political economy of armed conflict and provide recommendations on how to improve the response of the UN system and Member States, with the aim of better understanding and more actively influencing the economic incentives and disincentives that drive the dynamics of armed conflict. It is hoped that this will also ensure that these factors are reflected in efforts to prevent conflict, in peace agreements and in the mandates given to peace operations.

Additional initiatives to combat corruption include the United Kingdom's Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), which aims to increase transparency in the extractive industry, as well as a series of *Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises* adopted by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). The Sub-Commission of the Human Rights Commission's draft *Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights* provide a comprehensive restatement of international legal principles applicable to business concerning human rights. Within their respective spheres of activity and influence, transnational corporations and other business enterprises would have the obligation to promote, secure the fulfilment of, ensure respect of, and protect the human rights recognized in international as well as national law.

Other relevant initiatives include programmes by the Organization of American States, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and the Council of Europe, amongst others. The Government of Canada has also been a leading actor in this regard and in 2000 ratified the Inter-American Convention against Corruption.

The NGO community has also been attempting to increase knowledge and disseminate information about the wide-ranging impacts of corruption. Transparency International, the principal NGO working in this area, has a robust and multi-dimensional

programme to address corruption at all levels, raising awareness about the damaging effects of corruption, advocating policy reform, working towards implementation of multilateral conventions and monitoring compliance by governments, corporations and banks. Its *Global Corruption Report 2005* highlights corruption in construction and post-conflict reconstruction.<sup>18</sup>

Another anti-corruption actor, the Utstein Anti-Corruption Resource Centre, assisted by Transparency International's Centre for Innovation and Research, provides links to relevant anti-corruption resources. Its programme includes an anti-corruption portal with well-organized links, annotated literature and additional information and materials.

As information continues to surface about the impacts of corruption on vulnerable societies and the economic incentives and disincentives that drive the dynamics of armed conflict, more research and policy responses will be necessary to fully realize and address the full scope of corruption-conflict linkages.

### **The Global Compact**

Launched in July 2000, the Global Compact, led by Executive Director Georg Kell, brings together multinationals and national business enterprises to join a UN-led international initiative. Working with UN agencies, labour organizations and civil society, the participants support ten principles concerning human rights, the environment, labour and corruption. The Compact seeks to advance responsible corporate stewardship of global trade by businesses and promote the concept of a more sustainable and inclusive global economy. The ten principles aim to serve UN goals for human development, and are organized as follows:

#### Human Rights

Businesses should:

1. Support and respect the protection of internationally proclaimed human rights within their sphere of influence; and
2. Ensure that they are not complicit in human rights abuses.

### Labour Standards

Businesses should:

3. Uphold the freedom of association and effective recognition of the right to collective bargaining;
4. Eliminate all forms of forced and compulsory labour;
5. Work towards the effective abolition of child labour; and,
6. Eliminate discrimination with respect to employment and occupation.

### Environment

Businesses should:

7. Support a pre-emptive approach to environmental challenges (in terms of managing materials production, waste disposal and other externalities);
8. Undertake initiatives that promote greater environmental responsibility; and
9. Encourage the development and diffusion of environmentally-friendly technologies.

### Anti-corruption

Finally, businesses should:

10. Work against corruption in all its forms—including extortion and bribery—by promoting greater transparency and public accountability.

The Global Compact is not a regulatory instrument: It does not have the mandate to “police” corporate behaviour. This initiative relies primarily on the enlightened self-interest of companies, labour



associations and civil society to help the UN achieve its goals for human development. The Compact can best be characterized as a network with the Global Compact Office at its core and with six UN agencies contributing to its efforts, including UNHCHR, UNEP, ILO, UNDP, UNODC and the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO).<sup>19</sup>

**Notes:**

1. With thanks to Saurabh Naithani for his contributions to this section.
2. These observations are based, in part, on Frances Stewart's work on the nature of conflict in developing countries and economic factors that create predisposition to war; work on environmental scarcity and violence by Thomas Homer-Dixon; and the work of Paul Collier and the World Bank Group; as well as various authors in the edited volume by Karen Ballentine and Jack Sherman, 2003, *The Political Economy of Armed Conflict: Beyond Greed and Grievance*. Lynne Rienner Publishers: Boulder and London.
3. Most case studies in this chapter look at intra-state civil conflict, including insurgencies, armed secessionist movements and indigenous uprisings.
4. Stewart, Frances, 2002. "Root Causes of Violent Conflict in Developing Countries." In *British Medical Journal* Vol. 324. 9 February, pp. 342-345.
5. Also see Gurdrun Ostby's paper on *Horizontal Inequality and Civil War*, 2003. International Peace Research Institute (PRIO): Oslo, Norway. See also the PRIO website ([www.prio.no/page/Publication\\_details/Staff\\_alpha\\_ALL/9429/40747.html](http://www.prio.no/page/Publication_details/Staff_alpha_ALL/9429/40747.html)).
6. Also see Thomas Homer-Dixon, 1999. Chapter 2, *The Critical Role of Environmental Resources*.
7. Like many other conflicts in Salvadoran history, the 1969 war with Honduras was rooted in economic disparity and by 1969 some 300,000 Salvadorans had moved across the border and taken up residence in more sparsely populated parts of Honduras. The vast majority of these Salvadorans were squatters, technically illegal immigrants whose sole claim to the land they worked was their physical presence, which became a source of sub-regional tensions.
8. See Ballentine and Sherman (eds.), 2003. Part 3: *Beyond Greed and*

*Grievance: Reconsidering the Economic Dynamics of Armed Conflict.*

9. Ballentine and Sherman, quoting David Keen, 2001. "War and Peace: What's the Difference." In A. Adebajo and C. L. Sriram (eds), *Managing Armed Conflicts in the Twenty-First Century*. Frank Cass: London.

10. Keen, David in Ballentine and Sherman, 2003, p. 225.

11. Guaqueta, Alexandra in Ballentine and Sherman. Chapter 4: *The Colombian Conflict: Political and Economic Dimensions*, p.73.

12. Ibid.

13. For more information on the nexus between under- and unemployment and conflict, see the International Labour Organization's InFocus Programme on Crisis Recovery and Reconstruction ([www.ilo.org/public/english/employment/recon/crisis/publ/wp1.htm](http://www.ilo.org/public/english/employment/recon/crisis/publ/wp1.htm)). Also see Date-bah, Eugenia. 2003. *Jobs After War: A Critical Challenge in the Peace and Reconstruction Puzzle*. ILO: Geneva.

14. With thanks to Michael Page, International Alert, for his assistance with this section.

15. The above information was based in part on the NGLS newsletter, *NGLS Roundup*, no. 80, August 2001.

16. Information on the UN's Global Programme Against Corruption, the Convention against Corruption, and the Convention against Transnational Organized Crime is available on the UNODC website ([www.unodc.org/unodc/en/corruption.html#UN](http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/corruption.html#UN)), ([www.unodc.org/unodc/en/crime\\_convention\\_corruption.html](http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/crime_convention_corruption.html)), and ([www.unodc.org/unodc/en/crime\\_cicp\\_convention.html](http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/crime_cicp_convention.html)).

17. More information is available online ([www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2004/sgsm9256.doc.htm](http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2004/sgsm9256.doc.htm)).

18. Transparency International's *Global Corruption Report 2005* is available online ([www.transparency.org](http://www.transparency.org)).

19. More information on the Global Compact is available online ([www.unglobalcompact.org](http://www.unglobalcompact.org)).

### **Additional Selected Resources:**

1. See Pugh, Michael, Neil Cooper and Jonathan Goodhand, 2004. *War Economies in a Regional Context—Challenges of Transformation*. The International Peace Academy. Lynne Rienner Publishers: London and Boulder, for a discussion of approaches to the political economy of civil wars. Note the discussion of the Central Asian “regional conflict complex” by Jonathan Goodhand (p. 45), the discussions of the problems caused by neoliberalism in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the factors that combined to cause the collapse of Sierra Leone. These included corruption, patronage, the wasting away of State services and sale of State assets, and the neoliberal development policies of IFI's that exacerbated the social stresses created by underdevelopment, weakened the State and caused discontent. Also see the concluding chapter, “Towards a New Agenda for Transforming War Economies,” (Chapter 7, p. 219).

2. See also *From War Economies to Peace Economies in the South Caucasus*, 2004. International Alert: London.

3. See also *Conflict-Sensitive Business Practice: Guidance for Extractive Industries*, which provides a set of tools for companies concerned about improving their impact on host countries to begin thinking more creatively about understanding and minimizing conflict risk, and actively contributing to peace. International Alert, 2005. *Conflict-Sensitive Business Practice: Guidance for Extractive Industries*, International Alert: London, ([www.international-alert.org](http://www.international-alert.org)).

4. For an account of Shell Oil's activities in Nigeria in the mid 1990s and the resulting consequences to the Ogoni environment and community, and

ultimately to Nigeria, see Obi, Cyril, I. Forthcoming 2005. *Environmental Movements in Sub-Saharan Africa: A Political Ecology of Power and Conflict*. UNRISD: Geneva.

5. Also see Moyo, Sam, Forthcoming 2005. *The Politics of Land Distribution and Race Relations in Southern Africa*. UNRISD: Geneva, for a history of possession, colonialism and conflict with regard to land ownership in Zimbabwe and the extent to which past ownership and land usage patterns have contributed to current circumstances.

6. Information on the UK Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) is available online ([www2.dfid.gov.uk/news/files/extractiveindustries.asp](http://www2.dfid.gov.uk/news/files/extractiveindustries.asp)).

7. The OECD *Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises* are available online ([www.oecd.org/dataoecd/56/36/1922428.pdf](http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/56/36/1922428.pdf)).

8. The UN Human Rights Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights “Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights” are available online ([www.unhchr.ch/huridocda/huridoca.nsf/\(Symbol\)/E.CN.4.Sub.2.2003.12.Rev.2.En?Opendocument](http://www.unhchr.ch/huridocda/huridoca.nsf/(Symbol)/E.CN.4.Sub.2.2003.12.Rev.2.En?Opendocument)).

9. Information on the Utstein Anti-Corruption Resource Centre is available online ([www.u4.no](http://www.u4.no)).

10. See also *Guns or Growth? Assessing the impact of arms sales on sustainable development*. Amnesty International, International Action Network on Small Arms, and Oxfam in conjunction with Ploughshares and Saferworld. June 2004. The report is available online ([www.amnestyusa.org/news/document.do?id=D790B5456BC38DBD80256EA90062E5F5](http://www.amnestyusa.org/news/document.do?id=D790B5456BC38DBD80256EA90062E5F5)).

11. Information on the World Bank is available online

([www.worldbank.org](http://www.worldbank.org)). See also the Bank's Low Income Countries Under Stress initiative website ([www1.worldbank.org/operations/licus](http://www1.worldbank.org/operations/licus)).

12. Information on the Centre for Research on Inequality, Human Security and Ethnicity (CRISE) at Oxford University (Frances Stewart, Director) is available online ([www.crise.ox.ac.uk/index.shtml](http://www.crise.ox.ac.uk/index.shtml)).

13. International Action Network on Small Arms (IANSA), 2003. *Implementing the Programme of Action: Action by States and Civil Society*. IANSA: London.

14. Saferworld, 2004. *Taking Control: The Case for a More Effective European Union Code of Conduct on Arms Exports*. Saferworld in conjunction with IANSA: London.

## PART III

### CURRENT AND ONGOING INITIATIVES

#### Chapter 8

#### **Civil Society as a Force for Accountability, Early Warning and Peacebuilding**

*“The partnership between the UN and civil society is...not an option; it is a necessity.”* UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan speaking at the open debate on Civil Society at the Security Council, 22 June 2004.

#### **Civil Society Initiatives and Networks**

There has been a trend within the international NGO community towards building coalitions and partnering on major projects, often with outstanding results. In some cases these joint endeavours are conferences, seminars and expert meetings to further the understanding or knowledge base for particular aspects of conflict. In other cases these joint projects are written contributions to the literature on various aspects of conflict, sometimes for officials and policy makers, other times for field staff.

In 2004 a *Resource Pack on Conflict Sensitive Approaches to Development, Humanitarian Assistance and Peacebuilding*<sup>1</sup> was put together by a coalition of six organizations and consortia, including the African Peace Forum, Saferworld, the Forum on Early Warning and Early Response, International Alert, the Center for Conflict Resolution and the Consortium of Humanitarian Agencies. The resource package provides information on a broad spectrum of issues including understanding and defining conflict and its analysis; an introduction to conflict-sensitive approaches to development, humanitarian assistance and peacebuilding; applying conflict

sensitive approaches at the project and programme levels; implementation, monitoring and evaluation; and institutional capacity building for conflict sensitivity. It is a resource that can be used by and for all audiences and levels, including policy makers and diplomats as well as academic institutions, NGOs and programme implementers. These types of partnerships in the development of conflict literature have been increasing in recent years.

In terms of networking, in 2000 several NGOs that work both at the UN and with partners on the ground in conflict situations formed the Conflict Transformation Working Group, comprised of the Quaker UN Office, the Fellowship of Reconciliation, Saferworld, the World Conference on Religion and Peace, World Vision International, the Mennonite Central Committee UN Office and the Maryknoll Office for Global Concerns. In August 2002 they developed and distributed a series of recommendations entitled *Building Peace from the Ground Up: A Call to the UN for Stronger Collaboration with Civil Society*.<sup>2</sup>

Another innovation, the *Human Security Report*, produced by the Human Security Centre at the University of British Columbia,<sup>3</sup> maps the incidence, intensity, causes and consequences of global violence and policy responses to that violence. Professor Andrew Mack directs both the Centre and the Report. Each year, the *Human Security Report* will focus on a specific thematic issue—the (two-volume) 2005 Report examines trends in global violence, while the 2006 Report will analyze the war/disease nexus, highlighting the often ignored indirect costs of war. Volume I of the 2005 Report will be published by Oxford University Press in the summer of 2005, and will be available online ([www.humansecurityreport.info](http://www.humansecurityreport.info)).

Related resource tools will include the Human Security Gateway ([www.humansecuritygateway.info](http://www.humansecuritygateway.info)), which will provide Human



Security Research—a monthly online compilation of new human security-related research published by university research institutes, think tanks, IGOs and NGOs, as well as Human Security News. The Human Security Bulletin, a bilingual publication of the Canadian Consortium on Human Security, is also available online ([www.humansecuritybulletin.info](http://www.humansecuritybulletin.info)).

There are a large number of organizational alliances and partnerships for conflict reduction, resolution and prevention developing within civil society virtually worldwide. Grassroots organizations in conflictual and post-conflict zones have been particularly effective in galvanizing large groups and forming social transformation movements that have repeatedly had direct impacts on leaders and policy makers. (See also the following section on Women and Conflict.)

Just as NGOs have been experiencing success through multi-actor collaborations, there has been a high level of cooperation both amongst donors and between groups of donors and NGOs. For example, the *Resource Pack* mentioned above was funded by a combination of national agencies within the Governments of Canada, Sweden, the Netherlands and Germany. DFID has also supported numerous collaborations. These types of partnerships are growing and enabling NGOs to undertake innovative activities that require substantial support. NGOs and donors have also been responsible for convening major summits on armed conflict and its roots and ramifications.

For example, the Hague Appeal for Peace, an international network of individuals and organizations, organized the world's largest conference on peace, the Hague Appeal for Peace Civil Society Conference, held in The Hague from 11-15 May 1999. Bringing together over 10,000 people, it served as a launch pad for several major initiatives and campaigns. The Hague Appeal addressed four specific themes: strengthening international human rights,

humanitarian law and institutions; advancing the peaceful settlement of disputes; linking and devising strategies for achieving global disarmament, including nuclear abolition, examining the root causes of war; and developing a new culture of peace. After the conference in 1999, the Global Campaign for Peace Education (GCPE) was launched and remains the main focus of the Hague Appeal's work. More information is available online ([www.haguepeace.org](http://www.haguepeace.org)).

The Barcelona Forum 2004 also brought together large numbers of NGOs that convened meetings on a broad range of issues including peacebuilding and reconciliation. One of the primary convenors on conflict issues, the International Peace Bureau, Geneva, developed a seven-day forum tackling a thematic series of issues each day, including genesis of conflict, reconciliation, mechanisms for national and transnational justice, impunity, small arms and light weapons, issues relating to refugees and reintegration, the psychological consequences of conflict and best practices.

Currently one of the largest NGO-sponsored events, the GPPAC, is being planned to take place in July 2005.

### **The Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict (GPPAC)**

In 2001, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, in his report on the prevention of armed conflict, urged "NGOs with an interest in conflict prevention to organize an international conference of local, national and international NGOs on their role in conflict prevention and future interaction with the United Nations in this field."<sup>24</sup>

In response, the European Centre for Conflict Prevention (ECCP)<sup>5</sup> set in motion an ambitious process of bringing the global conflict prevention community together to form the Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict (GPPAC), and initiated the planning of a global conference on the role of civil society in the prevention of armed conflict and peacebuilding, to be held at UN

Headquarters in New York in July 2005. In advance of the conference, GPPAC has been holding preparatory meetings with civil society organizations in every geopolitical region.

The programme of the Global Partnership is structured in a series of 15 parallel regional processes and each region has established a steering group consisting of civil society organizations, practitioners and NGOs. These processes have led up to regional conferences in which participants build networks and relationships, collect information on best practices and provide input for a regional action agenda. Elements of all of the regional action agendas will then contribute to a Global Action Agenda to be presented to the UN Secretary-General and discussed at the conference in July.

The process culminating in the conference will be carried on well beyond 2005. As indicated in the Partnership materials: “Building capacity for peace is not done at a single conference...it is done by rooting conflict prevention activities at the very core of policy-making tasks on a global level, and between individuals on a personal level. The global partnership is one of many essential steps on the long road to peace.”<sup>6</sup>

The regional PrepComs are still ongoing, and the preliminary programme for the July Summit is built around three plenary sessions that will focus on the conference’s broader themes as well as a series of interactive panel discussions, workshops, and working groups. Overall themes include: highlighting the roles of key actors and challenges in preventing violent conflict; enhancing interaction and strengthening operational mechanisms for prevention and peacebuilding; and moving from ideas to action.

Representatives from NGOs worldwide will be participating in the July Summit, which aims to develop a plan for implementing the Global Action Agenda, and to increase awareness of the contributions

made by, and the challenges faced by, civil society organizations working toward peacebuilding and prevention in their respective regions and contexts. There will be extensive information exchange, formulation of networks, cross-breeding of ideas and inter-regional connections established. The groundwork for all of this has been laid by the NGOs and networks that have joined in this enterprise.

It is hoped that the UN and its Member States will see this process as a positive step in bringing the world together and helping the UN accomplish its multiple roles in every region. If the political will exists, this can be the beginning of a new era of cooperation between and amongst the UN, governments and their civil society partners. For more information on the regional meetings in preparation for the July Summit, see Annex I.

## **Women and Conflict<sup>7</sup>**

### **The Emergence of Leaders from Victims**

***“After the genocide, women rolled up their sleeves and began making society work again.”*** Rwandan President, Paul Kagame\*

As this *Dossier* goes to press, the 49th session of the Commission on the Status of Women (CSW) has just met in New York, grappling with the same issues women struggled with ten years ago at the Fourth World Conference on Women (FWCW) in Beijing, and with the same concerns they have struggled with for decades pre-Beijing and well before the existence of the United Nations. While Beijing may have given them voice, an agenda and a global network, and while it may have reinforced their will to persevere, it did not result in the changes warranted.

Carolyn Hannan, Director of the UN Division for the Advancement of Women, opened the 49th session of the CSW indicating that “Ten years after Beijing, this review called attention to the many areas where women’s equality is still not a reality—continuing high rates of violence against women in all parts of the world including in armed conflict, increasing incidence of HIV/AIDS amongst women, gender inequality in employment, lack of sexual and reproductive health rights and a lack of equal access under the law to land and property, to name a few.”

The gap between the world’s rich and poor—very much a women’s issue—is wider than ever. Poverty, conflict, gross rights violations, malnutrition, illiteracy and unequal water access, together with the chains of debt, inequitable commercial and trade access, inadequate political access and overall lack of representation in politics, commerce and the media, have proven as harsh and intractable as they were ten years ago and, in some cases, generations ago.

Moreover—historically—women trapped in war zones have been portrayed, accurately, as victims. They have less often been portrayed as peace negotiators, mediators and national leaders with impact on the conflicts that affect them. Resolution 1325, passed by the Security Council in 2000, stresses the importance of women’s participation in peace negotiations, calls for the full inclusion of women in all aspects of peace processes, and provides a political framework in which women’s issues and perspectives become relevant to all functions of the Security Council. It was borne out of a burgeoning acknowledgment that women are particularly well placed to be part of peace negotiations, and that their capabilities as peace builders have been overlooked. Significant contributions to the peace process continue to be made by women at all levels, from the grassroots to the peace table, to legislatures, judiciaries, executive branches of government, and to attainment of the Nobel Peace Prize.

The United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM) was instrumental in providing the Security Council with relevant information before the adoption of Resolution 1325, and since then has continued to provide information and to facilitate the Security Council’s direct interaction with women affected by conflict both during the Council’s field missions and at the Arria Formula meeting on Women, Peace and Security, an informal arrangement that allows the Council greater flexibility to be briefed on peace and security issues.

### **Special Impacts and “Collateral Damage”**

An increasing proportion of victims of conflict are civilians (80%), and since women make up the majority of the non-combatant population, they suffer disproportionately from what has come to be called collateral damage.

An increasingly common feature of contemporary war is sexual violence, with women and girls as the principal victims, suffering

rape, sexual slavery and trafficking. Sexual violence against women is often used as a tactic of humiliation and a strategy of war. Women may be raped to dishonour their communities or to punish or demoralize men.

Such atrocities destroy any community and family cohesiveness that may exist in armed conflict environments, and have devastating effects including physical and emotional trauma; sexually transmitted infections, including HIV/AIDS; unwanted pregnancies in circumstances in which it is impossible to care properly for a child; and harm, sometimes permanent, to reproductive health. In some societies rape victims may also be ostracized by their husbands, families and communities.

Recent conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo has illustrated the egregious extent to which women can suffer in war, with sexual violence against women so horrific and prevalent that the situation has been referred to as “the war within the war.”<sup>8</sup> Sexual violence as a feature of conflict has been particularly prominent in the Eastern DRC, as documented in reports from major NGOs including Human Rights Watch (2002), Amnesty International (2004), Médecins Sans Frontières (2004) and International Alert (2005).

The area is occupied by numerous armed groups, both local and foreign: the Rwandan army occupies large parts of the region, and is opposed by Burundian armed groups and Rwandan rebel factions. According to Human Rights Watch, sexual violence against women is inflicted by all sides and used routinely as a weapon of war, sometimes accompanied by mutilation, torture and in some cases murder. In recent years, women in conflict zones around the world have been repeatedly subject to the types of brutal attacks described above in areas including Rwanda, Sudan, Sierra Leone and East Timor, amongst many others. An estimated 250,000 women were raped during the 1994 genocide in Rwanda.

Women are particularly at risk as poverty drives them to go to the fields, forests and markets to provide for their families, making them exceedingly vulnerable to attack, abduction, and separation from their families.

In war zones rapes are also routinely committed by police and authorities; a key feature of this situation is the total impunity with which the crimes are committed. Women may be prevented from seeking justice because they cannot afford to access the legal system, or even because they fear losing custody of their children. This contributes to a climate where violence against women is seen as routine, rather than criminal, and where women do not seek justice because they know they will not achieve it.

Another feature of contemporary war which has had devastating impacts on women is domestic violence, which has been found to increase with societal violence, so that as men return home from war some women become victims within their own homes. In these circumstances the State has failed in its obligations under international law to respect, protect and fulfil the rights of women. The State is responsible for investigating and prosecuting acts of violence against women in war, after war, and at all times. Political will has to be galvanized to ensure that in every UN Member State and every society, these obligations are non-negotiable. This means that in all countries, without exception, they must be understood, acceded to and provided for in national legal codes.

### **Women as Major Stakeholders in Peace**

During armed conflict, women are the ones left to sustain society and are compelled to adjust to new roles as they become widows, carers and sole breadwinners. As conflicts conclude they are catapulted into roles of holding the family and community together, often becoming heads of households and community leaders. Conflict kills more men than women, with women left to handle the aftermath as conflict recedes. When the 1994 genocide in Rwanda ended, leaving an estimated one million people dead, 70% of the



remaining population was comprised of women and girls, with much of the male population killed in the genocide, others having fled to the DRC, and still others in prison as a result of crimes committed during the genocide. Women thus become essential in implementing the outcomes of peace negotiations and rebuilding community cohesion. Their positioning at the centre of the community during war may make them more aware of issues at the root of the conflict and put them in key positions to gather information. They often have a rights-based perspective on conflict and place emphasis on factors such as respecting differences and the rights of minority groups, which are crucial elements of a peace process. They have much to offer in terms of information about impending conflict, and a key role to play not only in conflict prevention and resolution, but also in early warning. Their inclusion is essential for any society that purports to be a democracy. Interestingly, countries with lower percentages of women in parliament have been found to be more likely to use military violence to settle disputes.<sup>9</sup>

A publication of International Alert/Women Waging Peace argues that it is necessary to include women in early warning and situation analysis because “gender indicators—those signs that reflect the changing circumstances of men and women in society—are often the earliest signs of impending conflict.”<sup>10</sup>

Gender indicators are often most evident at the grassroots level, where women can recognize tensions in the community and address them before they turn into conflict situations. Women may be first to sense or experience a lowering of security or build-up of pre-conflict tension or aggression. Elisabeth Rehn and Ellen Johnson Sirleaf report that women affected by conflict in Kosovo and Sierra Leone were sometimes aware of imminent conflict or danger but had nowhere to turn with this information.<sup>11</sup>

Civil society must be included and active in early warning and there should be appropriate venues for receiving and analyzing early warning information. Community members are the eyes and ears of

their nations, and the early warning data they transmit, whether due to increasing gender abuse, economic tensions, rights violations, labour strikes or other indicators, are the precursors of violence, ethnic cleansing and genocide that the global community must be able to hear, and then interpret and analyze, by designing the proper mechanisms to do so.<sup>12</sup> (See Chapter 3, section on Early Warning, and Chapter 11, Recommendations.)

### **Women at the Grassroots**

Women have used their roles in society and their natural leadership capabilities in situations of conflict to demonstrate powerful leadership in peacebuilding at the community level. Their participation in peace processes has mainly been in civil organizing at the grassroots level and it is therefore within communities that women's leadership is most visible. They have organized across regions and internationally, instrumental in all aspects of civil organizing, advocacy and social mobilization.

These efforts have been documented in situations of conflict worldwide. For example, peacebuilding training sessions where women meet to share experiences and gain knowledge have been held by organizations such as the Women's League in Burma with training in Women as Peacebuilders, and Dushirehamwe in Burundi. During the Liberian civil war, the Liberian Women's Initiative was created, mobilizing women across the country to lobby for the disarmament of soldiers and to encourage citizens to vote, becoming a credible movement. During the years of conflict in Sierra Leone, civil society efforts were led by women. The war began in 1991 with the invasion from Liberia of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF). Violence against women was reported to be carried out by both sides and by all forces. From the beginning of this conflict, women mobilized to work for peace. Numerous groups, including the Mano River Women's Peace Network, the Sierra Leone Women's Forum and the Sierra Leone Women's Movement for Peace organized activities that included educating civilians about elections,

pressuring authorities into respecting electoral outcomes and recruiting and training observers. An umbrella organization called Women Organized for a Morally Enlightened Nation (WOMEN) led women's groups to pressure the government to hold democratic elections. When RUF broke the ceasefire in 1999, women organized protests. In 2000, they played critical roles in mass demonstrations, marching with civil society leaders and parliamentarians. These efforts contributed to ending the war.

### **Women at the Peace Table**

Women are routinely overlooked when formal peace negotiations begin. Over the past few decades there has been increasing recognition that women should be a part of political systems, but official peace processes have not evolved at a commensurate pace. In Bosnia the 1995 Dayton peace talks marking an end to three years of civil war that brutally affected women did not involve women. The 1996 peace accord in Sierra Leone, after five and a half years of civil war, with high levels of violence against women, contained no mention of women's rights or interests. Despite their experiences and capacities, after conflict, women are again expected to fulfil their previous pre-conflict roles. Hence, often the elevation in women's roles and increased importance in society during conflict is followed by a decrease in their status.

After three decades of violence in Burundi, peace negotiations began in 1998. Women were prohibited from joining these talks and were even prohibited from entering the room where leaders were meeting. They lobbied politicians, confronting them in the corridors of government buildings. They launched a forceful campaign to convince politicians that gender must be taken into account with women included in the process. They gained international support including that of UNIFEM, Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni, Chairman of the Burundi Peace Initiative, and Nelson Mandela, who acted as a mediator in the Burundi conflict. Their continuous demands resulted in the 19 political parties finally agreeing to include women in peace negotiations. They were thus

involved in negotiations in 2000 and put forward recommendations that were included in the final report. The Arusha Agreement allocated 30% of cabinet posts to women. In 2002 there were four women ministers in the transitional government.

Quota systems have been effective in ensuring that women are present in representative numbers in post-conflict governments. For example, in South Africa the quota system was extremely effective. Women lobbied for 50% representation in government and achieved 25%. The Federation of African Women's Peace Networks (FERFAP) was formed, comprised of 13 women's peace organizations and supported by UNIFEM.

In Rwanda, as of March 2004 women comprised 48.8% of parliament, the highest proportion anywhere in the world. Women at all levels have played a significant part in the post-conflict reconstruction process during the ten years of post-genocide transition, and this is reflected in their percentage of parliamentary seats.

International instruments in recent years reflect the achievements of women at all levels in peace processes. The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) was adopted in 1979 and entered into force in 1981. It promotes international women's rights by declaring that States must incorporate gender equality into legal systems, establish institutions to protect women and eliminate discrimination against women. The next milestones included the International Conference on Population and Development (ICPD) held in Cairo in 1994 and the Beijing Platform for Action (1995), from the FWCW. The Platform for Action outlined critical areas of concern including violence against women, effects of armed and other types of conflict, including for those women living under foreign occupation, and gender equality in power sharing and decision making at all levels.

As mentioned earlier, Security Council Resolution 1325 endorses the

inclusion of civil society representation in peace processes, and indicates that States must increase representation of women at all decision-making levels, support local women's peace initiatives and include women in implementation mechanisms of peace agreements ([www.un.org/Dpcs/scres/2000/sc2000.htm](http://www.un.org/Dpcs/scres/2000/sc2000.htm)).

Regional multilateral institutions such as the European Union and the OSCE have also adopted resolutions for inclusion of women in peace processes. The Organization of American States has created extensive relevant programmes as well.

## **Children and Armed Conflict**

***“Let us put our heads together and see what life we will make for our children.” --Native American Leader and Legend, Sitting Bull***

In 1994, former UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali appointed Graça Machel, the former Minister of Education in Mozambique, as an independent expert to carry out a global assessment of the impact of armed conflict on children. Her report to the UN General Assembly in 1996, *The Impact of Armed Conflict on Children* (A/51/306.Add.1, 06 Sept. 1996), was the culmination of two years of research and field visits to war-ravaged countries. It revealed the extent of children’s involvement in nearly 30 armed conflicts raging around the world. The report broke new ground in many respects.

Using the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) as a guiding framework, it provided the first human rights assessment of war-affected children. It drew particular attention to the situation of children associated with armed forces and groups, such as child soldiers, internally displaced and refugee children, child victims of landmines and sanctions, and the physical and psychological consequences of conflict. It also examined the relevance and adequacy of international standards for the protection of children in conflict situations.

The report found that “millions of children are caught up in conflicts in which they are not merely bystanders, but targets. Some fall victim to a general onslaught against civilians; others die as part of a calculated genocide. Still other children suffer the effects of sexual violence or the multiple deprivations of armed conflict that expose them to hunger or disease...thousands of young people are cynically exploited as combatants.... Boys serve as porters or as messengers.

Girls...may be forced to provide sexual services to soldiers. Both boys and girls are soon forced onto the battlefield, where their youth and inexperience leave them particularly vulnerable. In some cases children are deliberately exposed to horrific scenes to harden them to violence. Some are forced to commit atrocities against their own families as a way of severing all ties with their communities.”<sup>13</sup>

The report called for a global campaign to stop the recruitment of anyone under 18 into the armed forces and encouraged governments and opposition groups to immediately demobilize all such children. It recommended that all peace agreements specifically address the need to demobilize and reintegrate child soldiers into society. It also called on all governments to support the adoption of the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child that would establish the minimum age of 18 for recruitment into the armed forces.

In September 2000 at the International Conference on War-Affected Children convened by the Government of Canada, Graça Machel presented a formal review of progress made and obstacles encountered since publication of her 1996 report. This review exposed the emerging threats to children’s security, including the increase of HIV/AIDS as the single most powerful new factor compounding the dangers for children in armed conflict. It also highlighted the way in which the proliferation of small arms and light weapons ignites and sustains the wars that victimize children.

### **Making the “Era of Application” a Reality for War-affected Children**

The Secretary-General’s reports on children and armed conflict, the Security Council Resolutions adopted on the subject, and the reports of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Children and Armed Conflict have provided the building blocks for the “era of application” that aims to mainstream the issue of children affected by armed conflict as a system-wide priority within the UN.<sup>14</sup>

In February 2005, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan presented his report (A/59/695 - S/2005/72) on children and armed conflict to the General Assembly and Security Council. It provides information on developments in a number of countries of concern worldwide covering the period from November 2003-December 2004. It found that UN field representatives had encountered a number of constraints in the collection of information, including security problems, non-cooperation of parties and the absence of a coherent and functioning mechanism for monitoring and reporting at the country level.

The report recommends that the Security Council take “targeted and concrete measures” where no progress or insufficient progress has been made by those named in the lists of offending parties annexed to his reports to the Security Council. Such measures would include, amongst other penalties, the imposition of travel restrictions, the imposition of arms embargoes, a ban on military assistance and restrictions on the flow of financial resources to the parties concerned.

The report’s proposals represent an action plan for the establishment of a monitoring, reporting and compliance mechanism composed of various bodies and actors who can contribute the benefit of their areas of jurisdiction, competence and expertise.

In 1997, Under-Secretary-General Olara Otunnu was named as the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict, mandated to protect children at every phase of conflict: preventively before conflict erupts, in the midst of conflict, and in post-conflict situations. His third report (A/59/426), presented to the General Assembly in October 2004, assessed the progress that had been made in mainstreaming the concerns of war-affected children in the UN system and identified the gaps that still exist. The report indicates that since 2003, over 11.5 million children were displaced within their own countries, and 2.4 million children have



been forced to flee conflict and take refuge outside their home countries. Approximately 800 to 1,000 children are killed or maimed by landmines every month. In the last decade, over two million children have been killed in conflict situations and over six million have been seriously injured or permanently disabled. The report notes that “the gains that have been made remain fragile and may dissipate if not consolidated and institutionalized. And, at the same time, conspicuous gaps exist in the United Nations system response that must be addressed.”

The report suggests that to bridge this gulf, the international community must now redirect its energies from the normative task of elaborating standards to the enforcement mission of ensuring their application on the ground. The Special Representative has proposed a campaign which encompasses four key components: advocacy and dissemination of norms relating to children affected by armed conflict; developing and strengthening local civil society networks for advocacy, protection and monitoring; the establishment of a monitoring and reporting mechanism to ensure compliance with norms relating to children affected by armed conflict; and the mainstreaming of concerns relating to children affected by armed conflict into the programmes and mechanisms of key institutions, within and outside of the UN.

The key “destinations for action” are the Security Council, the General Assembly, the Commission on Human Rights, the International Criminal Court, regional organizations and national governments.

The Security Council adopted Resolution 1539 in April 2004, which reaffirms its other resolutions 1261 (1999), 1314 (2000), 1379 (2001), and 1460 (2003) that provide a comprehensive framework for addressing the protection of children affected by armed conflict. Specifically, Resolution 1539 requests the Secretary-General to “urgently devise” an action plan for a systematic and comprehensive monitoring and reporting mechanism, which could utilize expertise

from the UN system and the contributions of national governments, regional organizations, NGOs and various civil society actors in order to provide objective and accurate information on the recruitment and use of child soldiers and on the abuses committed against children affected by armed conflict.

The resolution also considers sub-regional and cross-border activities, the linkages between illicit trade in natural and other resources, illicit trafficking in small arms and light weapons, and cross-border abduction and recruitment, and requests the Secretary-General to propose effective measures to control such trade and trafficking.

### **State of the World's Children 2005**

The report of the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), *State of the World's Children 2005: Childhood Under Threat*, focuses on how poverty, conflict and HIV/AIDS threaten the ideal of childhood as a time for children to grow and develop to their full potential.<sup>15</sup>

The impact of armed conflict on children has been high: nearly half of the 3.6 million human beings killed in war since 1990 have been children. The report also outlines where the world stands on a ten-point agenda to protect children from conflict. It examines trends with regard to child soldiers, rape as a weapon of war, war crimes against children, and the damage caused by sanctions, amongst other issues, and finds that although some progress has been made it has been far from sufficient to ameliorate the impact of war on children's lives.

Noting that conflict aggravates existing poverty, the report emphasizes the need for greater global attention and investment in post-conflict situations to ensure a steady and stable transition to development. It calls upon governments, donors, international agencies, as well as communities, families, business and individuals to reaffirm and recommit to their moral and legal responsibilities to children.

## Peacebuilding and a Free Press and Media

***“An important element of modern warfare  
is the management of perceptions.”***

Martin Bell, *Through Gates of Fire*<sup>16</sup>

“We live at a point of intersection between warfare and news, in which, for the first time in history the means of mass destruction have coincided with the means of mass communication....Television is no more morally neutral than the people who control it. ... the camera is a force for good or evil—for revealing the truth or distorting it, for increasing understanding or inflaming hatred, according to who possesses it, and for what purposes it is used.”

“This is how war is waged in the satellite age. Television is not inert but active, a catalyst and dynamic agent of change. Perceptions shape realities as much as realities shape perceptions.”<sup>17</sup>

The media is a double-edged sword. It can be a weapon of violence when it propagates messages of intolerance or disinformation that manipulate public sentiment, and when it enters the realm of “hate media,” which can directly incite a population towards genocide or ethnic cleansing, as suggested by John Marks in his preface to *The Power of the Media*.<sup>18</sup>

This is what Radio Mille Collines did in Rwanda in 1994, what Serbian and Bosnian Serb Media did during the early 1990s, and what many media outlets do on a regular basis to one extent or another, some more subtly than others. Using a blend of popular entertainment and proselytizing by reporters, the government-supported Radio Mille Collines broadcasts demonized one group of people and built resentment and fear amongst the other. The messages implanted and legitimized the belief that genocide was an appropriate self-defence initiative, and hundreds of thousands of people were slaughtered.<sup>19</sup>

When soldiers or rebels seize the reins of power, they generally secure their positions by grabbing control of the broadcast media. Equally, when leaders want to manipulate the perceptions of a population, they do it through the media, which has proved a powerful tool in support of terror, violence, and destruction.<sup>20</sup>

Fortunately the opposite is also true; the press and media have vast positive potential, and can play a proactive, constructive role in peacebuilding without sacrificing objectivity. They can serve as ethical, credible instruments for defusing conflict when the information presented is reliable, respects human rights and represents diverse views. This is the kind of media that upholds accountability and exposes malfeasance, and that enables a society to make well-informed choices, a precursor of democratic governance. It is a media that reduces conflict and fosters human security.<sup>21</sup>

There are numerous examples of journalists promoting peacebuilding in the ways they disseminate information, in the substance of the information, in its analytical integrity and in its accuracy. Along with several examples of national broadcasts for reconciliation, Marks provides two history-making examples.<sup>22</sup> The first was that of the US-Soviet spacebridges (live, two-way satellite television transmissions) that began being broadcast in 1982, launched by the Esalen Institute in California, which sought to promote better understanding between Soviets and Americans. The first spacebridge linked an outdoor rock concert in San Bernardino (with the Talking Heads and the Police) with a studio audience in Moscow. “The idea was to demonstrate to a mass audience that even highly contentious issues could be dealt with in ways that encourage cooperative solutions.”<sup>23</sup>

In the second example provided, in 1977 Walter Cronkite, the anchorman for America’s CBS network, conducted satellite interviews with Egyptian President Anwar Sadat and Israeli Prime

Minister Menachem Begin. Cronkite, who had extensive experience and credibility, acted, in effect, as a mediator attempting to bring two disputing parties to the table. He helped launch the peace process that led to Sadat's historic visit to Jerusalem, which was followed by the first Camp David negotiations.

What was particularly interesting about this methodology was its similarity to those used in standard mediated negotiation processes, in which the mediator attempts to assist the parties to put the problem on the table and work together as a problem-solving team, so that instead of confronting each other as adversaries, they essentially become team members together exploring how to problem-solve difficult issues.

In the course of mediated negotiation, as the process unfolds the parties not only work together—at first grudgingly and with little trust—but often begin to change their perceptions, discard outmoded assumptions, gain understanding of issues that may have earlier seemed mutually incomprehensible, and, in the end, often deepen their abilities to problem-solve interactively.

It is imperative to fully consider the immense reach of the media to inform mass populations. As this volume indicates, “The fact is that media has become so pervasive and influential that anyone currently working in the field of conflict resolution must consider both edges of the sword. A project that launches without examining the media environment is more liable to fail. Similarly, any effort to resolve or prevent deadly conflict that ignores the media as an opportunity is in itself incomplete.”<sup>24</sup>

Radio broadcasts have the capacity to reach and inform masses of people in both rural and urban areas, and donor countries such as Canada have been paying close attention to the role of the media by encouraging its participation in peacebuilding. Agencies that

advocate for children's rights, good governance, reduction of small arms transfers, human rights and peace education can also utilize the media to spread their messages and disseminate information.<sup>25</sup>

*The Power of the Media* offers a number of particularly moving examples of the media at its best and most constructive. Some of the examples of programming, largely through use of radio, include the following.

**The Talking Drum Studio in Sierra Leone** is a multi-media production studio producing various types of radio broadcasts aimed at a range of audiences including children, refugees, displaced persons and ex-combatants, together with the general public. Operated by Search for Common Ground - Sierra Leone, its broadcasts attempt to reduce violence by focusing on themes of peace, reconciliation and democratization, and are carried by most of the radio stations in the country. Some of its highlights include:

- b · **Lost and Found Atunda Ayenda**, a soap opera about the youth of Sierra Leone and how they became involved in the war. It discusses the conditions that drew people into the war and the difficulties they had getting out of it. The programme uses entertainment to reach young people. It provides them with a framework for analyzing their situation and serves to promote education as a means to build peace and awareness around the issue of reintegration of ex-combatants and wider concerns of social reintegration with youth.
- b · **Troway Di Gun**, hosted by two ex-combatants who have both disarmed and are undergoing their own reintegration processes, also seeks to inform ex-combatants about the reintegration process, to provide information about opportunities and identify obstacles to reintegration, and provides a forum for ex-combatants to discuss their own concerns.

- b · **Golden Kids News**, a children’s news broadcast reported and partially produced by youngsters, engages children from diverse backgrounds who serve as producers, “cub reporters” and presenters, and who identify issues for and about children and advocate on their behalf. Creating a forum for children to discuss issues of concern to them and to present events important to them, it has become one of the most popular programmes in the country.
- b · **Home Sweet Home**, sponsored by UNHCR, focuses on information for returnees, refugees and internally displaced people (IDPs). Providing drama intertwined with information, dialogue and education, it provides information on government policies about resettlement, safe areas, reconciliation and other issues relevant and timely for listeners.
- b · **Salon Uman** is a programme about key issues affecting women in post-conflict Sierra Leone, in collaboration with local human rights groups, and includes issues relating to discrimination, sexual- and gender-based violations and other issues not usually discussed by women publicly, helping to create sensitization to some of these issues for the nation’s women and for the listening public at large.

The above types of programming interweave common themes that include accurate, balanced information as a way of rebuilding a sense of common identity through the understanding that the listeners face common challenges. Another element in the messages communicated by Talking Drum Studios is one of self-confidence—that individuals, communities and the nation are capable of overcoming their problems and that progress is easier in a spirit of reconciliation.

In Indonesia, **Reporting for Peace Training** is a project that was initiated by Internews Indonesia, helping print and radio journalists report on conflict constructively. According to co-founder Fiona

Lloyd, “one careless word or one inaccurate detail can ignite a conflict. Equally, one clear, balanced report can help to defuse tension and neutralize fear.”<sup>26</sup>

The training is based on assumptions that the media can play a vital role in “lowering the temperature” and promoting solutions-oriented dialogue, which demands rigorous journalistic standards, while also challenging mainstream media’s assumptions. The project believes that the media can intervene positively in pre- and post-conflict situations by challenging the hardening of attitudes and stereotyping and by promoting understanding, reconciliation and healing.

**In the Democratic Republic of Congo, Radio Okapi: Voice of Dialogue** is a radio network set up in 2002 to provide reliable, accurate, non-partisan information to the Congolese listening public. It is a joint project of the UN Peace Observer Mission in the Congo and the Swiss-based Fondation Hirondelle, an organization of journalists that operates media services in crisis areas. Its programmes promote the process of dialogue and peacebuilding in Congo, broadcasting in French and the four most commonly spoken languages, and has become the largest and most popular radio network in the nation. The project has a delicate mandate, embracing a conflict resolution and peacebuilding role, while simultaneously adhering to a policy of impartiality articulated in its Code of Ethics. Most staff are recruited from the community (as with most of the programmes discussed above) and trained as readers, producers and interviewers.

**The Cambodian Journalists Training Project** works to improve the flow of accurate, reliable information in an effort to strengthen Cambodia’s fledgling democracy, and to encourage political dialogue rather than violence and create an independent, open, accountable radio media. It was launched by the Canada-based Institute for Media Policy and Civil Society (IMPACS).



The Institute for War and Peace Reporting (IWPR) in London also undertakes extensive training for journalists working in conflict zones. The Institute's publication *Regional Media in Conflict: Georgia, Cambodia, Bosnia, South Africa* describes their work with innovative programmes in these countries.<sup>27</sup>

Ethical journalism and media are amongst the most effective and persuasive vehicles for communicating to large populations with credibility and fairness. The services they can perform in the interests of bridge-building and the results of their work over time can be incalculable. It will be important to perform local and national evaluations of this type of programming over time and study its short- and long-term impacts in conflictual and post-conflict societies. Needless to say, in societies in which the press and media are not "free" (which entails a separate definitional discussion on the issue of press freedom that can apply to much of the world, not only conflict and development zones), such programming may be closely monitored or entirely prohibited.

Although not usually thought of as a principal structural tool or institution of peacebuilding, it may be exactly that, and if so, more attention and resources will need to be directed to this emerging field. According to a BBC radio broadcast in January 2005, "African voters have more confidence in their local radio reporters than they do in their politicians." For the media, this is a hefty burden, and a priceless opportunity.<sup>28</sup>

**Notes:**

**NGO Initiatives**

1. *Resource Pack on Conflict Sensitive Approaches to Development, Humanitarian Assistance and Peacebuilding* is available online ([www.conflictsensitivity.org/resource\\_pack.html](http://www.conflictsensitivity.org/resource_pack.html)) or ([http://network.idrc.ca/en/ev-60789-201-1-DO\\_TOPIC.html](http://network.idrc.ca/en/ev-60789-201-1-DO_TOPIC.html)).

2. *Building Peace from the Ground Up: A Call to the UN for Stronger Collaboration With Civil Society* is available online ([www.globalpolicy.org/ngos/aid/2002/0802buildingpeace.pdf](http://www.globalpolicy.org/ngos/aid/2002/0802buildingpeace.pdf)).

3. More information on the *Human Security Report* and the Human Security Centre at the Liu Institute for Global Issues at the University of British Columbia is available online ([www.humansecuritycentre.org](http://www.humansecuritycentre.org)).

4. The Secretary-General's Report on the Prevention of Armed Conflict (A/55/985, S/2001/574) is available online ([www.un.org/Docs/sc/reports/2001/sgrep01.htm](http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/reports/2001/sgrep01.htm)).

5. The European Centre for Conflict Prevention (ECCP) is a non-governmental organization that promotes effective conflict prevention and peacebuilding strategies, and actively supports and connects people working for peace worldwide. It currently serves as the International Secretariat for the Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict.

6. The Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict, International Secretariat: The European Centre for Conflict Prevention (ECCP), PO Box 14069, 3508 SC Utrecht, The Netherlands, telephone +31-(0)30/242 7777, fax +31-(0)30/236 9268, e-mail <[info@conflict-prevention.nl](mailto:info@conflict-prevention.nl)>, website ([www.gppac.net](http://www.gppac.net)), ([www.conflict-prevention.net](http://www.conflict-prevention.net)).

## **Women and Conflict**

\* International Alert/Women Waging Peace, 2004.

7. With thanks to Research Assistant Emily Thomas for her contribution to this section.

8. Amnesty International, 2004, the DRC Conflict, ([http://web.amnesty.org/pages/cod-040803-background\\_1-eng](http://web.amnesty.org/pages/cod-040803-background_1-eng)).

9. This section is based, in part, on International Alert/Women Waging Peace, 2004. *Inclusive Security, Sustainable Peace: A Toolkit for Advocacy and Action*. November 2004, p. 5, website ([www.womenwagingpeace.net/toolkit.asp](http://www.womenwagingpeace.net/toolkit.asp)).

10. Ibid.

11. Rehn, Elisabeth and Ellen Johnson Sirleaf. Progress of the World's Women 2002 Volume One: *Women, War, Peace: The Independent Experts' Assessment on the Impact of Armed Conflict on Women and Women's Role in Peacebuilding*. UNIFEM. 2003. Kumarian Press, Inc.: Connecticut.

12. As part of its work on conflict prevention and peacebuilding, the United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM) is initiating a global series of pilot projects on Early Warning Indicators. The Pacific pilot in the Solomon Islands was the first to be initiated, in January 2005, and will run for an initial period of 12 months. More information on UNIFEM programmes is available online ([www.unifem.org](http://www.unifem.org)).

## **Children and Armed Conflict**

13. Machel, Graça, 2001. *The Impact of War on Children*. Hurst and Company for UNICEF and UNIFEM: London.

14. The UN Secretary-General's reports on Children and Armed Conflict

(A/53/482), (A/54/430), (A/55/163 - S/2000/712), (A/55/442), (A/56-342 - S/2001/852), (A/56/453), (A/57/402 - S/2002/1299), (A/58/328), (A/59/695 - S/2005/72) are available online ([www.un.org/documents](http://www.un.org/documents)) and ([www.un.org/Docs/sc/unscl\\_resolutions.html](http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/unscl_resolutions.html)).

Security Council Resolutions on Children and Armed Conflict 1261 (1999), 1314 (2000), 1379 (2001), 1460 (2003), 1539 (2004) are available online ([www.un.org/Docs/sc/unscl\\_resolutions.html](http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/unscl_resolutions.html)).

The reports of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict are available online ([www.un.org/special-rep/children-armed-conflict/English/index.html](http://www.un.org/special-rep/children-armed-conflict/English/index.html)).

15. United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), February 2005. *The State of the World's Children 2005*. UNICEF: New York. The report is available online ([www.unicef.org/swoc05/english](http://www.unicef.org/swoc05/english)). See also the UNICEF webpage on child protection ([www.unicef.org/protection/index.html](http://www.unicef.org/protection/index.html)).

## **Media and Conflict**

16. Bell, Martin, 2004. *Through Gates of Fire—A Journey into World Disorder*. Weidenfeld & Nicolson: UK, p. 32.

17. *Ibid.*, pp. 32, 35.

18. Howard, Ross, Francis Rolt, Hans van de Veen and Juliette Verhoeven, 2003. *The Power of the Media—A Handbook for Peacebuilders*. European Centre for Conflict Prevention (ECCP) in cooperation with the European Centre for Common Ground and the Institute for Media, Policy and Civil Society (IMPACS): Utrecht, The Netherlands, p. 21.

19. *Ibid.*

20. *Ibid.*, as quoted in Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA). *An Operational Framework for Media and Peacebuilding*. CIDA: Canada.

21. Ibid., Howard et al.

22. Ibid., p. 14.

23. Ibid.

24. Ibid.

25. International Organization for Migration (IOM), 2001. *Conflict Resolution, Confidence-building and Peace Enhancement among Somali Women*. IOM: Geneva.

26. Fiona Lloyd. Training Manual *Broadcasting from the frontline: skills, techniques and challenges for radio journalists*.

27. Davis, Alan, 2000. *Regional Media in Conflict: Georgia, Cambodia, Bosnia, South Africa*. The Institute for War and Peace Reporting: London.

28. "Correspondents Look Ahead," BBC Radio 4, 1 January 2005.

## **Additional Selected Resources:**

### **NGO Initiatives**

1. For directories of peace and conflict prevention organizations, see also ([www.geocities.com/peacepract/organizations\\_and\\_institutes\\_con.html](http://www.geocities.com/peacepract/organizations_and_institutes_con.html)).

2. The Conflict, Development and Peace Network (CODEP) ([www.codep.org.uk](http://www.codep.org.uk)).

3. More information on the Peace and Justice Studies Association (a merger of the Consortium on Peace Research, Education and Development (COPRED) and the Peace Studies Association) is available online ([www.peacejusticestudies.org](http://www.peacejusticestudies.org)).

4. More information on the Henry L. Stimson Center in Washington, DC is available online ([www.stimson.org](http://www.stimson.org)).
5. Fund for Peace ([www.fundforpeace.org](http://www.fundforpeace.org)).
6. Responding to Conflict ([www.respond.org](http://www.respond.org)).
7. Global Action to Prevent War ([comments@globalactionpw.org](mailto:comments@globalactionpw.org)).
8. Lawyers Committee on Nuclear Policy ([www.lcnp.org](http://www.lcnp.org)).
9. Directory of Organizations for Conflict Prevention in Asia and the Pacific (Japan) ([www.conflict-prevention.org](http://www.conflict-prevention.org)).
10. The African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD, South Africa) ([www.accord.org.za](http://www.accord.org.za)).
11. Arias Foundation for Peace and Human Progress ([www.arias.or.cr/Eindice.htm](http://www.arias.or.cr/Eindice.htm)).
12. Education for Conflict Resolution, Inc. ([www.workitout.org](http://www.workitout.org)).
13. For information on creating human rights mediation and dispute resolution programmes; community court-based mediation programmes; or related academic programmes, contact <[mediative\\_resources@earthlink.net](mailto:mediative_resources@earthlink.net)>.

## **Women and Conflict**

1. The United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM) website provides a wide range of information on women and conflict ([www.unifem.org](http://www.unifem.org)). UNIFEM also hosts a web portal on Women, Peace and Security ([www.womenwarpeace.org](http://www.womenwarpeace.org)) in conjunction with the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom's PeaceWomen Project (see below).
2. The Division for the Advancement of Women (DAW) website provides a

large number of resources, including policy guidance, country information on the national action plans developed in response to the Beijing Platform of Action, and CEDAW country reports, as well as numerous publications ([www.un.org/womenwatch/daw](http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw)).

3. The Women's International League for Peace and Freedom website includes a women, peace and security NGO web ring. It also provides a web portal with country breakdowns and links to various regional initiatives. The PeaceWomen Project monitors and works toward rapid and full implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on women, peace and security. More information is available online ([www.peacewomen.org](http://www.peacewomen.org)).

4. See also Pietilä, Hilka, 2002. *Engendering the Global Agenda: The Story of Women and the United Nations*. NGLS: Geneva. Also available online ([www.un-ngls.org/documents/publications.en/develop.dossier/dd.06/contents.htm](http://www.un-ngls.org/documents/publications.en/develop.dossier/dd.06/contents.htm)).

5. Women Waging Peace supports the efforts of women working for peace in conflict areas around the world ([www.womenwagingpeace.net](http://www.womenwagingpeace.net)).

6. Mano River Women's Peace Network ([www.marwopnet.org](http://www.marwopnet.org)).

7. Femmes Africa Solidarité ([www.fasngo.org](http://www.fasngo.org)).

8. Women's League of Burma ([www.womenofburma.org](http://www.womenofburma.org)).

9. The Federation of African Women Peace Networks (FERFAP) was established in 1998 in Kigali. It aims to create an institutional framework for women's organizations to engage in peace processes. Contact: FERFAP, BP 2758, Kigali, Rwanda.

10. Women's Movement for Peace in Sierra Leone, PO Box 220, 18 Gloucester St., Freetown, Sierra Leone.

## **Children and Armed Conflict**

11. The Convention on the Rights of the Child and the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child are available online ([www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/k2crc.htm](http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/k2crc.htm)) and ([www.unhchr.ch/html/menu2/6/protocolchild.htm](http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu2/6/protocolchild.htm)).

12. Information on *Guidelines on Children and Armed Conflict* by the European Union is available online (<http://europa.eu.int/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/r10113.htm>).

13. UNICEF has published *The Impact of Conflict on Women and Girls in West and Central Africa and the UNICEF Response*, available online ([www.unicef.org](http://www.unicef.org)).

14. *Violation Against Children in Armed Conflicts: An Action Plan for Monitoring, Reporting and Response*, by Watchlist on Children and Armed Conflict, is available online ([www.watchlist.org/advocacy/policystatements/vacdac.pdf](http://www.watchlist.org/advocacy/policystatements/vacdac.pdf)).

## **Media and Conflict**

15. Search for Common Ground (SFCG) emphasizes cooperative solutions to conflict and has created innovative media programming in several conflictual countries. Most of its work at present is within sub-Saharan Africa ([www.sfcg.org](http://www.sfcg.org)).

16. The Institute for War and Peace Reporting (IWPR) works to strengthen local journalism in areas of conflict by training reporters, facilitating dialogue and providing reliable information. It aims to support peace, democracy and development in societies undergoing crisis and change ([www.iwpr.net/home\\_index\\_new.html](http://www.iwpr.net/home_index_new.html)).

17. Internews works to improve access to information for people around the world. It trains journalists and media professionals, supports independent



radio and TV stations, promotes an open and accessible Internet and liberalized telecommunications policies, supports fair media laws and policies, and works to facilitate improved health and conflict reporting. More information is available online ([www.internews.org](http://www.internews.org)).

18. Also see the Article 19 Global Campaign for Free Expression ([www.article19.org](http://www.article19.org)).

19. Also see, with regard to the press and media:

- b Institute for Media, Policy and Civil Society ([www.impacs.org](http://www.impacs.org));
- b International Centre for Journalists ([www.icfj.org](http://www.icfj.org));
- b Media Action International ([www.mediaaction.org](http://www.mediaaction.org));
- b OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media ([www.osce.org/fom](http://www.osce.org/fom));
- b The Panos Institute ([www.oneworld.org/panos](http://www.oneworld.org/panos));
- b Soros Foundation Network ([www.soros.org](http://www.soros.org));
- b Reporting the World ([www.reportingtheworld.org](http://www.reportingtheworld.org)).

20. Finally, one of the key organizations undertaking critical work in this area is the BBC World Service Trust ([www.bbc.co.uk/worldservice/trust/index.shtml](http://www.bbc.co.uk/worldservice/trust/index.shtml)).



## Chapter 9

### United Nations and Intergovernmental Initiatives

#### Introduction

As has been noted elsewhere in this *Dossier*, many observers and members of the international community find it perplexing that the United Nations, with its mandate to prevent future generations from the scourge of war, has a multitude of agencies on issues from meteorology to intellectual property, but lacks a UN agency on conflict analysis and prevention.

The recent report from the Secretary-General's High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change (see below) proposes, amongst numerous other measures, the creation of a Peacebuilding Commission that was endorsed by the Secretary-General in his March 2005 report. Although discussions will take place on the proposed Peacebuilding Commission during the Millennium Summit+5 in September 2005, there is no certainty that such a commission will be created, and there is no firm timeline for the creation of this body.

It is imperative that the UN demonstrate its political will to prevent conflict by, at the very least, creating an interdisciplinary think tank that could function as a nucleus and focal point for information, materials and knowledge exchange, and could serve to connect the UN, academia and the NGO and CSO communities through the exchange and development of knowledge and useful databases for best practices, analytical tools and resources. (See also Chapter 11, Recommendations.)

It should be noted that the UN and several other multilateral agencies have undertaken departmental and inter-agency initiatives

on specific aspects of conflict and its mitigation, and the UN's work in this area has grown and evolved substantially within the last five years, becoming more systematic, more sophisticated and less ad hoc.

While the UN's Department of Political Affairs (DPA) has served as the focal point for conflict prevention and post-conflict peacebuilding, a number of UN agencies have also undertaken initiatives to develop programming and policy in this area, most notably, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). There have also been recent initiatives to strengthen DPA's internal preparedness, together with creation of a Policy Analysis Unit to facilitate a department-wide prevention process and outreach throughout the UN system. Especially noteworthy amongst these efforts are:

- (1) the UN/Regional Organizations Meetings on Conflict Prevention, which have been convened over the past two years to establish stronger working relationships and new mechanisms for cooperation amongst the agencies;
- (2) the inter-departmental Framework Team for Coordination, an innovative inter-agency mechanism for joint analysis and policy formulation of preventive measures for specific country situations; and
- (3) the DPA/UN Staff College's Early Warning/Preventive Measures training course, which aims to strengthen the professional capabilities of UN staff worldwide to anticipate, respond to and deter conflict.

Many other UN system agencies, including the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCHR), UNDP, the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the United Nations

Department of Economic and Social Affairs (DESA), the International Labour Organization (ILO), the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), the United Nations Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR), the United Nations Research Institute for Social Development (UNRISD), the United Nations University (UNU), the UN Staff College, and the World Food Programme (WFP), amongst others, are taking measures to reframe some of their policies and positions in response to conflict and to develop the capacities of staff to address conflict.

These developments and partnerships are more inclusive and extensive than they have been in the past. But much remains to be done in terms of developing methodologies for UN agencies to become far more mutually reinforcing with regard to prevention of conflict.<sup>1</sup>

The following programmatic descriptions are from the United Nations website ([www.un.org/Depts/dpa/about\\_dpa/fr\\_about\\_dpa.htm](http://www.un.org/Depts/dpa/about_dpa/fr_about_dpa.htm)).

Within DPA, the substantive responsibility for the prevention of conflicts is vested in the regional divisions, assisted by the Policy Planning Unit. In order to improve the efficiency of UN preventive action, the different departments and agencies are working together through several UN instruments for cooperation in conflict prevention:

- b' The UN Interdepartmental Framework for Co-ordination on Early Warning and Preventive Action initiates and coordinates early preventive action amongst the different UN agencies, departments, offices and programmes. The Framework Team deals with situations where broad-based, multi-sectoral support is needed.
- b' The Joint UNDP/DPA Programme on Building National Capacity for Conflict Prevention was initiated in November 2003. The objective is to assist UN Country Teams and national

actors in select countries in building their capacity for the peaceful settlement of potentially violent disputes, and to further ensure that conflict prevention is integrated into UN programming mechanisms on the ground.

- b. The DPA Prevention Team provides an intra-departmental forum for the development of preventive action options. Senior officials meet regularly to discuss situations that have a potential to develop into a complex emergency or conflict and where there may be a case for UN preventive and peacemaking involvement.
- b. As Convener for the Executive Committee on Peace and Security ([www.un.org/Depts/dpa/prev\\_dip/fr\\_preventive\\_action.htm#ecps](http://www.un.org/Depts/dpa/prev_dip/fr_preventive_action.htm#ecps)), the Department also promotes discussion at the interdepartmental and inter-agency levels and makes decisions on options for useful preventive or other action.
- b. On the tenth anniversary of the Rwandan genocide, 7 April 2004, the Secretary-General unveiled his plan to prevent future massacres. The plan can be summarized under five headings: preventing armed conflict; protection of civilians in armed conflict; ending impunity; early and clear warning; and the need for swift and decisive action in response to warnings of genocide.
- b. As noted, the United Nations Staff College and DPA are leading a training programme on early warning and preventive measures. The primary aim of this project is to build institutional capacity by improving professional and analytical skills and awareness of UN staff and its partners in the areas of early warning and preventive measures ([www.unssc.org/web1/programmes/ewpm](http://www.unssc.org/web1/programmes/ewpm)).

### **The Brahimi Report**

In August 2000, the Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (also known as the Brahimi Report, named after the Panel's Chair, Ambassador Lakhdar Brahimi) was released. It recommended restructuring the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO); establishing a new information and strategic analysis unit; and setting up an integrated task force at Headquarters to plan and support each peacekeeping mission from its inception.

Speaking at the annual UN Department of Public Information (DPI) Conference of Non-Governmental Organizations in September 2002, Ambassador Brahimi stressed the importance of joint UN and NGO collaboration, recognizing the vital role of local leadership. “If there is one lesson that years of experience in peacekeeping and peacebuilding have taught us, it is that a peace and reconstruction process stands a far better chance of success when it is nationally owned, rather than led by external actors.”<sup>2</sup>

He emphasized the importance of supporting fledgling government institutions in post-conflict societies. “We must all recognize that the international community’s role is often dramatically transformed in the post-conflict stage, and this requires that we change the manner in which we do business,” he said. While humanitarian efforts are receiving the most attention, Ambassador Brahimi emphasized, “we must ensure that reconstruction and rehabilitation are not neglected.”

### **Secretary-General’s Reports**

The Secretary-General has made conflict prevention the cornerstone of his quest to promote a more peaceful, equitable and prosperous world. In June 2001, he submitted his first report on the prevention of armed conflict (A/55/985-S/2001/574, A/55/985/Corr.1-S/2001/574/Corr.1) both to the General Assembly and the Security Council for their consideration. The report reviews the progress that has been achieved in developing the conflict prevention capacity of the United Nations, and presents 29 specific recommendations on how the efforts of the UN system in this field could be further enhanced. The specific contributions that can be made by the General Assembly, the Security Council, the Economic and Social Council, the International Court of Justice and the Secretary-General are explored, as is the cooperation between the United Nations and outside actors, such as regional organizations, civil society organs and the business community. The report also examines how the United Nations family of departments, programmes, offices and agencies interact in the furtherance of the prevention of armed conflict.

In September 2003, the Secretary-General submitted his interim report on the prevention of armed conflict (A/58/365 -S/2003/888). It indicates that the UN system has launched a number of efforts to assist Member States in building their capacity for the prevention and peaceful settlement of disputes and for building sustainable peace and development. It has also undertaken efforts to strengthen its own capacity for providing such assistance. However, the report notes that this initial progress is not sufficient: the United Nations is only at the beginning of a fundamental process of mobilization and building of partnerships.

### **In Larger Freedom**

“Treaties prohibiting torture are cold comfort to prisoners abused by their captors.... War-weary populations despair when, even though a peace agreement has been signed, there is little progress towards government under the rule of law. Solemn commitments to strengthen democracy remain empty words to those who have never voted for their rulers, and who see no sign that things are changing.” —*In Larger Freedom, Section III.*

On 21 March 2005, the Secretary-General released his report, *In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All*, in response to recommendations put forward by the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change (see below) and the report of the Millennium Project *Investing in Development: A Practical Plan to Achieve the Millennium Development Goals*. The Secretary-General’s 62-page report outlines contemporary challenges and the necessity of collective action, and gauges progress being made in achieving the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) in light of their 2015 target date.

*In Larger Freedom* was released six months in advance of the High-level Plenary Meeting of the 60<sup>th</sup> Session of the General Assembly (Millennium Summit +5), being held in September 2005, so that Heads of State and Government would have time to consider



suggested proposals. It is divided into four principal sections with the first three setting out priorities in the fields of development, security and human rights while the final section deals with renovation of the UN itself.

The following sections extracted from the report (in some cases condensed or paraphrased) highlight some of the key areas that relate to issues raised throughout this volume. They are laid out in more detail in Annex III.

**Freedom From Fear: Agreeing on a New Security Consensus**

Threats to peace and security in the 21<sup>st</sup> century include international war and conflict, terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, organized crime and civil violence, as well as poverty, disease and environmental degradation. “These are not theoretical issues, but ones of deadly urgency,” the report spells out. In order for the United Nations to be “transformed into the effective instrument for preventing conflict that it was always meant to be,” it must act on several key policy and institutional priorities, including: preventing terrorism; making progress on disarmament and non-proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons; reducing the prevalence and risk of war; adopting a resolution on use of force; and strengthening the rule of law, human rights and democracy.

“Our record of success in mediating and implementing peace agreements is sadly blemished by some devastating failures. Indeed, several of the most violent and tragic episodes of the 1990s occurred after the negotiation of peace agreements—for instance in Angola in 1993 and in Rwanda in 1994. These two points drive home the message: if we are going to prevent conflict we must ensure that peace agreements are implemented in a sustained and sustainable manner.” (Paragraph 114)

**Reducing the Prevalence and Risk of War:** Currently, half of the

countries emerging from violent conflict revert to conflict within five years. “Yet, at this very point there is a gaping hole in the United Nations institutional machinery: no part of the United Nations system effectively addresses the challenge of helping countries with the transition from war to lasting peace.” Member States should “create an intergovernmental Peacebuilding Commission, as well as a Peacebuilding Support Office within the UN Secretariat,” so that the UN system can better meet the challenge of helping countries successfully complete the transition from war to peace. They should also take steps to strengthen collective capacity to employ the tools of mediation, sanctions and peacekeeping. (Paragraph 114)

“No task is more fundamental to the United Nations than the prevention and resolution of deadly conflict. Prevention, in particular, must be central to all our efforts, from combating poverty and promoting sustainable development; through strengthening national capacities to manage conflict, promoting democracy and the rule of law, and curbing the flow of small arms and light weapons; to directing preventive operational activities, such as the use of good offices, Security Council missions and preventive deployments.” (Paragraph 106)

A Peacebuilding Commission could perform functions including: in the immediate aftermath of war, improving UN planning for sustained recovery, focusing on early efforts to establish the necessary institutions; helping to ensure predictable financing for early recovery activities; improving the coordination of the many post-conflict activities of the UN; providing a forum in which the UN, major bilateral donors, troop contributors, relevant regional actors and organizations, the IFIs and the government of the country concerned can share information about their respective post-conflict recovery strategies, in the interests of greater coherence; and extending the period of political attention to post-conflict recovery. (Paragraph 115)

The report notes that the Peacebuilding Commission should not have an early warning function. More relevant to the Peacebuilding Commission, however, is the issue of risk reduction. It “would be valuable if Member States could at any stage make use of the Peacebuilding Commission’s advice and could request assistance from a standing fund for peacebuilding to build their domestic institutions for reducing conflict, including through strengthening the rule-of-law institutions.” (Paragraph 115)

One strand of thinking is that in issue areas that require extensive collaboration between political/military, humanitarian and development actors both within the United Nations system and without, the Peacebuilding Commission could provide an important mechanism for regularizing best practice and agreeing on division of labour between the respective operational actors.

Under certain circumstances, the Charter gives authority to the “Security Council to use military force, including preventively, to preserve international peace and security. As to genocide, ethnic cleansing and other such crimes against humanity, are they not also threats to international peace and security, against which humanity should be able to look to the Security Council for protection?” (Paragraph 125)

“The task is not to find alternatives to the Security Council as a source of authority but to make it work better. When considering whether to authorize or endorse the use of military force, the Council should come to a common view on how to weigh the seriousness of the threat; the proper purpose of the proposed military action; whether means short of the use of force might plausibly succeed in stopping the threat; whether the military option is proportional to the threat at hand; and whether there is a reasonable chance of success.” (Paragraph 126)

Other priorities outlined for achieving greater security include

more effective cooperation to combat organized crime, preventing illicit trade in small arms and light weapons and eradicating landmines.

**Freedom to Live in Dignity: Strengthening the Rule of Law, Human Rights and Democracy in Concrete Ways**

Section III of the report points out that Member States, through the Millennium Declaration they adopted in 2000, agreed they would promote democracy and strengthen the rule of law, as well as respect all internationally recognized human rights and fundamental freedoms. Action is called for in the following priority areas:

**Rule of Law:** The international community should embrace the “responsibility to protect,” as a basis for collective action against genocide, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. All treaties relating to the protection of civilians should be ratified and implemented. Steps should be taken to strengthen cooperation with the International Criminal Court and other international or mixed war crimes tribunals, and to strengthen the International Court of Justice. The Secretary-General also intends to strengthen the Secretariat’s capacity to assist national efforts to re-establish the rule of law in conflict and post-conflict societies. (Paragraphs 135-139)

The High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change endorsed what it described as an emerging norm that there is a collective responsibility to protect (A/59/565, para. 203). “While I am well aware of the sensitivities involved in this issue, I strongly agree with this approach. I believe that we must embrace the responsibility to protect, and, when necessary, we must act on it. This responsibility lies, first and foremost, with each individual State, whose primary *raison d’être* and duty is to protect its population. But if national authorities are unable or unwilling to protect their citizens, then the responsibility shifts to the international community to use diplomatic, humanitarian and other methods to help protect the human rights and wellbeing of civilian populations.” (Paragraph 135)

“Effective national legal and judicial institutions are essential to the success of our efforts to help societies emerge from a violent past. Yet the UN, other international organizations and member Governments remain ill-equipped to provide support for such institutions... we lack appropriate assessment and planning capacities, both in the field and at Headquarters. To help the United Nations realize its potential in this area, I intend to create a dedicated Rule of Law Assistance Unit... in the proposed Peacebuilding Support Office to assist national efforts to re-establish the rule of law in conflict and post-conflict societies.” (Paragraph 137)

“Justice is a vital component of the rule of law. Enormous progress has been made with the establishment of the International Criminal Court, the work of the two ad hoc tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, and the creation of a tribunal in Sierra Leone and hopefully soon in Cambodia as well. Other important initiatives include commissions of experts and inquiry, such as those set up for Darfur, Timor-Leste and Côte d’Ivoire. Yet impunity continues to overshadow advances made in international humanitarian law, with tragic consequences in the form of flagrant and widespread human rights abuses continuing.” (Paragraph 138)

**Human Rights:** The report points out that the system for protecting human rights at the international level is under considerable strain, and that change is needed if the UN is to sustain long-term, high-level engagement on human rights issues across the range of its work. The report recommends that the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights be strengthened with more resources and staff, and that it should play a more active role in the deliberations of the Security Council and of the proposed Peacebuilding Commission. Indeed, human rights must be incorporated into decision making and discussion throughout the work of the Organization. The concept of “mainstreaming” human rights has gained greater attention in recent years, but it has still not been adequately reflected in key policy and resource decisions.

**Democracy:** *In Larger Freedom* proposes the creation of a Democracy Fund to provide assistance to countries seeking to establish or strengthen their democracies. “Threats to democracy have by no means ceased to exist. The transition to democracy is delicate and difficult and can suffer severe setbacks. The United Nations assists Member States by supporting emerging democracies with legal, technical and financial assistance and advice. Similarly, the Organization’s work to improve governance throughout the developing world and to rebuild the rule of law and State institutions in war-torn countries is vital to ensuring that democracy takes root and endures.” (Paragraph 150)

“The United Nations should not restrict its role to norm-setting but should expand its help to its members to further broaden and deepen democratic trends throughout the world. To that end, I support the creation of a Democracy Fund at the United Nations to provide assistance to countries seeking to establish or strengthen their democracy.” (Paragraph 151)

This report is the most comprehensive report by the Secretary-General to date, and in a spirit of reflection and contemplation, he has laid out not only his current objectives, but his long-term aspirations for the UN system and the international community, and for the advancement of the living conditions of all nations, societies and peoples.

**The Secretary-General’s High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change**

“The past year has shaken the foundations of collective security and undermined confidence in the possibility of collective responses to our common problems and challenges. It has also brought to the fore deep divergences of opinion on the range and nature of the challenges we face, and are likely to face in the future.”—Thus began the Terms of Reference for the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change commissioned by the Secretary-General in November 2003.

### **The Report**

In December 2004 the Panel presented its wide-ranging recommendations to the Secretary-General in a 95-page report with 101 recommendations, entitled *A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility*.<sup>3</sup> The report offered “a new vision of collective security, one that addresses all of the major threats to international peace and security felt around the world.” The Panel addressed some of the most controversial global issues, such as when the use of force is justified.

### **Use of Force**

Besides reaffirming the right of self-defence and warning that “nightmare scenarios” may call for more proactive and decisive measures by the Security Council, the report endorses the idea of a collective responsibility to protect civilians from genocide, ethnic cleansing and other comparable atrocities. This responsibility, it says, belongs first and foremost to sovereign States but, when they are unable or unwilling to fulfil it, the wider international community should intervene—acting preventively where possible, responding to violence if need be, and working to rebuild shattered societies. The primary focus should be on halting violence through diplomacy and protecting people through actions such as sending humanitarian, human rights and police missions. “Force, if it needs to be used, should be deployed as a last resort,” and should be authorized by the Security Council.

The Panel proposed five criteria to guide the Council in deciding whether to authorize use of force: seriousness of threat, proper purpose, last resort, proportional means, and balance of consequences (i.e., whether military action is likely to have better or worse results than inaction).

### **Proposal for a Peacebuilding Commission**

The report also addresses issues that arise during and after violent conflict, including the capacities needed for peace enforcement,

peacekeeping, peacebuilding and the protection of civilians. It finds the global supply of available peacekeepers dangerously low, and calls on countries to provide and support military deployments more readily. Developed States especially, it says, should do more to have suitable contingents ready for peace operations, and provide the financial and logistical resources to mobilize them when and where they are needed. It urges the creation of a new UN body, the Peacebuilding Commission, which would identify countries at risk of violent conflict, organize prevention efforts, and “marshal and sustain the efforts of the international community in post-conflict peacebuilding.”

### **Prevention**

The report contains a number of proposals for preventing conflict and other global threats, with development as the first line of response. Development, it says, “serves multiple functions. It helps combat the poverty, disease and environmental degradation that kill millions and threaten human security. It is vital in helping States prevent or reverse the erosion of State capacity, key to meeting almost every class of threat. And it is part of a long-term strategy for preventing civil war, and for addressing the environments in which both terrorism and organized crime flourish.”

The Panel criticizes the “shockingly late and shamefully ill-resourced” global response to HIV/AIDS, and calls on the international community to rebuild global public health capacity, disease monitoring and response—as a defence both against naturally occurring epidemics and against terrorists using biological weapons. It also draws attention to “the gap between the promise of the Kyoto Protocol and its performance,” and urges new negotiations on a long-term strategy for reducing global warming beyond 2012, when the obligations in the Protocol expire.

The report also includes detailed proposals for strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation regime, as well as additional steps to



prevent the spread of biological and chemical weapons. It lays out the principal elements of a comprehensive counter-terrorism strategy. The Panel reached consensus on a definition of terrorism,<sup>4</sup> the lack of which, it says, has until now prevented the UN from “exerting its moral authority and sending an unequivocal message that terrorism is never an acceptable tactic.”

### **Reform of the UN**

The Panel found that the UN “has been much more effective in addressing the major threats to peace and security than it is given credit for, but that nonetheless major changes are needed” if it is to be “effective, efficient and equitable in providing collective security for all” in the 21<sup>st</sup> century. Amongst the most significant changes recommended is the expansion of the Security Council. The Panel suggests two options: one involving six new permanent members with no veto, the other based on new four-year, renewable seats that would be regionally distributed.

The report also recommends changes in the General Assembly; the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC); the Commission on Human Rights; and in the UN’s relations with regional organizations. It also proposes strengthening the Secretary-General’s role in peace and security. It suggests that to be more effective, the Secretary-General should be given substantially more latitude to manage the Secretariat. It also recommends the addition of a second Deputy Secretary-General, who would focus on peace and security, and prepare early warning reports and strategy options for decision by the Secretary-General.

### *A Note on the UN System*

It must be said that the UN’s programmes on conflict have evolved and matured over the past five years. Nonetheless, if the information provided earlier from the UN website gives the impression that there is a high level of inter-agency interaction in this area and adequate staff to fulfil the Organization’s remit on

prevention, this is not yet the case. In fact, some commentators who have been frustrated with what they see as the UN's slow progress in this arena have raised the idea of "mainstreaming" the concept of prevention throughout the Organization, much as women's issues were mainstreamed in the 1990s. Such mainstreaming would require a thorough re-assessment of the major policy areas of UN specialized agencies as to how their traditional spheres of work relate to the amelioration of destructive conflict.

For example, how can UNICEF's community development initiatives be employed to promote prevention? How does prevention relate to the field of public health and the work of the WHO? How do World Bank projects promoting political and economic reforms and development ensure sensitivity to the distributional effects of their policies and programmes and consequent conflict-inducing potential?

How can UN bodies identify constituencies for peacebuilding and harness their assistance in the formulation of development, technical assistance and governance-building programmes? How can technical cooperation strengthen institutions, within and outside of national governments, to help defuse and obviate traditional types of intra-state conflict? Where is the nexus of conflict prevention with refugee protection and re-integration, and with human rights protection and promotion, and how can they be mutually reinforcing? Such organizational introspection requires in-depth, innovative strategic planning together with long-term organizational development strategies.

**A Technical Cooperation Approach to Conflict Transformation:  
A Pre-eminent Part of the UN's work**

UN responses to fragile situations and violent conflict would benefit greatly if they were informed by a technical cooperation approach to "conflict prevention" that enlarges the way in which the currently

accepted definition is operationalized. The goal of conflict transformation, to transform negative or violent interactions into constructive relationships, requires a re-orientation and expansion of responses and attitudes.

### **Infusing Awareness and Developing Skills and Capacities**

Conflict resolution tools and techniques can open channels for dialogue to reduce mistrust and hostility. They include confidence-building measures to be used in cooperative negotiation for all levels of problem-solving. These practical working tools can be employed to facilitate communication within and amongst ministries, agencies and tiers of government; between government and civil society; and between and amongst governments. Conflict resolution and transformation principles and techniques can empower governments and the governed to competently engage with each other in constructive communication and joint problem-solving.

The articulation and acceptance of such an approach toward dealing with conflict would greatly benefit from an intergovernmental process of information-sharing and consensus-building, not unlike that which has taken place in other fields of endeavour, such as environmental protection, human rights and gender equality. Such a process could establish norms and standards to which national governments can aspire, setting their own criteria and objectives.

The UN Secretariat could facilitate such a process, at the request of governments, with the aim of: (1) gaining clarity and consensus on the use of various methodologies for conflict prevention and transformation; (2) disseminating such information broadly to promote the understanding and use of such principles and practice at local, national and international levels; and (3) providing technical assistance, upon the request of Member States, in developing and implementing programmes for building the conflict resolution capacities and institutions of governments, such as UNHCHR

provides technical assistance in formulating human rights programmes, policies and institutions.

While the benefits of dispute resolution tools are recognized for facilitating political negotiations, it is not as widely understood that progress in social and humanitarian areas is equally hampered by competing and conflicting interests that can be mitigated by similar tools and mechanisms. Training, information and resources need to reach staff at Headquarters, regional commissions, specialized agencies, country offices and, particularly, staff members preparing for peace-keeping, peacebuilding and humanitarian missions, so that they can apply these skills to both the substantive content of their work and the internal processes of UN operations. Such extensive training and awareness raising amongst staff would change the perception of conflict resolution as a remote and discrete concept applied only to high-level diplomatic efforts into a fully infused characteristic of the work and organizational life of the UN.

### **Regional Initiatives: Regional and Sub-regional Conflict Prevention Mechanisms**

Conflicts are not tidy and do not always remain within borders. They spill chaotically across borders, cultures, nations and societies, and it is imperative that there be regional and sub-regional mechanisms to build and maintain transnational cooperation. Such regional mechanisms do exist, but vary widely in their interests, efforts, abilities and resources.

Some of these networks have developed excellent concepts for regional cooperation, including joint early warning initiatives, but lack the resources to implement their programmes. Given the critical nature of these programmes, there should be a global priority given to adequately resourcing such initiatives. Other regional groupings largely fail to engage or permit third-party involvement in their dialogue processes. This immediately precludes attempts at third-party neutral mediated negotiation, one

of the best time-tested types of dialogue for resolution of disputes, and therefore severely restricts possibilities for success.

Overall the current global network of regional and sub-regional mechanisms is not adequate to the task of promoting regional peace. Most countries seem to be part of regional complexes rather than regional communities. This is certainly true in a number of regions, including Africa. In August 2001, a meeting was convened at the International Peace Academy in which the concept of regional approaches to conflict management in Africa was explored by a number of scholars and diplomats.<sup>5</sup> The conceptual overview [by Barnett Rubin<sup>6</sup>] suggested that the nature and complexity of conflicts can be defined and clarified through a four-point Regional Conflict Formation framework.

First, conflicts are regional. Most conflicts consist of networks of conflictual circumstances that can link entire regions into regional conflict formations, linked through a variety of negative processes that can include invasion, State collapse, cross-border solidarities, looting, arms trafficking and forced population movements. Second, such conflict formations include regional military, political, economic and social networks that can be linked to global networks. Third, regional strategies require that conflict elements should be treated comprehensively, addressing all factors promoting the conflict. Finally a regional approach needs to include regional and/or sub-regional actors with varying roles, and must include the relevant components, including States, regional or sub-regional intergovernmental organizations and civil society networks.

Under-Secretary-General Olara Otunnu, Special Representative to the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict, and Omar Bahket, Director of UNDP's Emergency Response Division, served as discussants. The discussion indicated that regional approaches should complement rather than replace national and global approaches to conflict management and that they should demonstrate respect

for the opinions and roles of countries concerned and emphasize good partnerships between the Security Council and sub-regional organizations without abandoning national approaches. The discussants also highlighted some of the obstacles to creation of regional approaches, including differing perceptions as to what actually constitutes a region. They offered the caveat that in some cases regional strategies may be unsustainable because a group of neighbouring countries that might be perceived as a region might in fact not be animated by a common sense of purpose or values.

The meeting concluded with the notion that the UN and the Security Council should contribute to building regional capacity, supporting a common approach by regional actors and enhancing their roles as mediators, facilitators and monitors of peace initiatives as well as “antennae for tension spots,” suggesting an early warning role for them as well.

Prior to this, *Sustainable Peace* by Connie Peck<sup>7</sup> was published as a project of the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict. In his foreword to the book, David Hamburg, Co-chair of the Commission, made the following observations:

The proposed structure would integrate the most successful conflict prevention instruments, drawing widely on international experience and expertise, but ensuring that they are tailored to local needs and circumstances. The horizontal transfer of knowledge and experience within regions is a distinctive feature of this proposal, in which regional actors who have found solutions to their problems or developed successful models of good governance could assist their neighbours within the context of a regional effort aided, as necessary, by global support.

There have been a number of other discussions on the concept of developing national, sub-regional and regional dispute resolution mechanisms, venues and centres, including work done in this area by Gareth Evans in the mid-1990s.

The key element for success is that such centres be credible as “neutral territory venues” so that actors from all sides of a dispute, conflict or political disagreement can feel comfortable and “safe” bringing their points of view to the table. (Also see Chapter 11, Recommendations.)

However, new organizations continue to form and to initiate various efforts at mutual cooperation, protection, peacebuilding and early warning. Annex II provides brief snapshots of some of these key mechanisms, region by region.

### **Donor Initiatives**

In recent years donor agencies have become far more than financial contributors to conflict reduction. They are now amongst the principal driving forces in the areas of humanitarian assistance, post-conflict reconstruction, conflict prevention (to some extent) and peacebuilding, not only with regard to funding, but with regard to policy, project planning and design, and evaluation and monitoring.

National development agencies, major foundations and even smaller foundations and individual philanthropists are forming partnerships and networks to assist in moving a peacebuilding agenda forward on a global basis. Working with each other and with civil society and non-governmental organizations to carry out innovative programmes, they are now on the cutting edge of conflict resolution thinking, planning and action.

Entire units of national development agencies are now dedicated to conflict issues, with staff who have developed expertise and skills to plan, implement and analyze programming for various geopolitical regions, as well as on cross-cutting themes.

**Notes:**

1. The above section includes information from interviews with UN staff and officials, NGO staff and officials, scholars, practitioners, and others, together with information from relevant meetings and conferences.

2. *NGLS Roundup*, no. 66, February 2001.

3. *A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility* ([www.un.org/secureworld](http://www.un.org/secureworld)).

4. In its report *A More Secure World*, the Panel describes terrorism as “any action, in addition to actions already specified by the existing conventions on aspects of terrorism, the Geneva Conventions and Security Council resolution 1566 (2004), that is intended to cause death or serious bodily harm to civilians or non-combatants, when the purpose of such an act, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population, or to compel a government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act.”

5. The International Peace Academy Seminar Report (8 August 2001) is available online ([www.ipacademy.org/PDF\\_Reports/REG\\_APPR.pdf](http://www.ipacademy.org/PDF_Reports/REG_APPR.pdf)).

6. *Ibid.*

7. Hamburg, David, in Connie Peck, 1998. *Sustainable Peace: The Role of the UN and Regional Organizations in Preventing Conflict*. A project of the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.: Oxford, p. xv.

**Additional Selected Resources:**

1. Also see Barnett R. Rubin, *Regional Approaches to Conflict Management in Africa*, Presentation to UN Security Council Meeting, August 2001 ([www.cic.nyu.edu/conflict](http://www.cic.nyu.edu/conflict)).

2. Pugh, Cooper and Goodhand, 2004. *War Economies in a Regional Context*, p. 17.



## PART IV FRAMING THE FUTURE

### Chapter 10

#### The Search for Political Will

*“Who would want to stay? In a place where you are never welcomed, only tolerated? Just tolerated. Like you are an animal finally house-trained. Who would want to stay?”* (Zadie Smith, *White Teeth*)<sup>1</sup>

Despite the efforts of the UN, other multilaterals, NGOs, and numerous civil society organs, religious institutions and many others over the past 60 years, an enormous gap remains in long-term peace planning, and needs to be filled with a coordinated, well-planned system for engaging preventive diplomacy and peacebuilding efforts.

Frameworks for analysis, cooperation and implementation have substantially improved within the last decade, but the international community has not yet come to grips with the difficult, yet essential, process of visualizing an entire system of conflict prevention and determining how the numerous elements of such a system might work together as a more coherent, integrated whole.<sup>2</sup>

The challenge is not just to expand research, allocate more resources or develop new mechanisms of inter-agency cooperation (although these are critical); it is to fundamentally re-conceptualize the shape of the field of peacemaking and prevention. This involves imagining how the world's conflicts will look in future decades and what tools, networks and systems will be required to

prevent and diffuse them. We cannot assume that the world in 25 years will look the way it does now. A useful place to begin is with an interdisciplinary dialogue about, and an assessment of, the potential dynamics and contours of future conflicts. (See Chapter 11, Recommendation on an intersectoral dialogue in conjunction with the Millennium+5 Review.)

Some overarching questions for the next two decades include the following:

- b · Will the majority of conflicts in the future be predominantly intra-state, as they have been until recently, or will we again see an increase in the incidence of inter-state conflict, and/or will there frequently be sub-regional spillover?
- b · What role will pressures for accountability, devolution of power and group rights and representation play in future conflicts?
- b · To what extent will conflict be fuelled by illicit business interests, including corruption and unregulated movements of small arms and other types of weapons?
- b · To what extent will conflicts be propelled by civil/political rights violations, including the exclusion and marginalization of minorities within States, by inequitable access to resources and services, and to ideological or religious cleavages that have not been reconciled?
- b · To what extent will privatization and globalization trends contribute to social violence and unrest, particularly in situations in which vulnerable population segments in developing and transitional economies lose access to employment, housing, security and adequate social safety nets so that States can accommodate national goals?

Together with thinking about how international conflicts will

evolve in the future, there is a need to think more deeply about how local, national, regional, and international capacities can be harnessed to create venues for dialogue and to provide opportunities for proactive community participation in prevention, dispute analysis and resolution. This will increasingly include the mediation not only of disputes and violence, but also of conflicting ideas, ideologies and values so that pluralism is acknowledged and accepted, and peaceful coexistence can increasingly become the norm.

In addition, there is also a need to explore how the development of the terms and conditions of peace agreements and protocols can make better use of input from involved communities, so that they become durable and self-sustaining and contribute to reintegration.

These are just a few of the many issues that should be part of a collective debate about, and approach to, prevention. Much of this discourse will undoubtedly occur at the GPPAC Summit in July 2005, and clearly NGOs worldwide have demonstrated their commitment to responding to these questions and turning their responses into initiatives. How will the UN, other intergovernmental organizations, and each Member State demonstrate their commitment to addressing the above questions?

The above-referenced quote by Zadie Smith, from her novel *White Teeth*, reflects the despair of the moveable human, the person who has relocated out of economic, political or social discomfort or danger into the greater, or different, discomfort of isolation, being unwanted, being alien. But in every society there are aliens right there at home, people who may have lived in one spot all of their lives, possibly for generations, and yet due to myriad factors find themselves alien in their own environments, and find themselves oppressed, humiliated or even brutally massacred, as has happened repeatedly throughout ancient and modern history. And at these times, when people, or a people, need a

place to turn, a place for recourse, there are few options, because the international community has not yet developed a plan, a real plan, with teeth, for preventing genocide, fratricide, wide-scale brutality and mass displacement and homelessness.

Thus far, this *Dossier* has discussed structural prevention, human rights, security sector reform, and countless other concepts, factors and elements. But this volume is not really about any of these elements in and of themselves; it is about how we plan to live together as a collectivity in a month, a year, ten years and in the far future that we hope to inhabit.

The elements discussed throughout are essential but are not enough. They have to be mutually reinforcing to create a fundamental infrastructure in which peaceful coexistence can flourish, forming something greater than the sum of their parts.

The theory of coexistence is meant to include the idea that no matter where we are, and from where or whom we come, which clan, tribe, ethnicity, race, ideology, religion or belief system, we can move amongst each other with an assurance of mutual respect, dignity, reciprocity and equal rights to cohabit comfortably within the populated space.

For this to happen, however, the essentials—human rights institutions, fair development policies, poverty reduction initiatives, security sector reform, stronger adherence to the fundamental UN mandate, independent judiciaries, appropriate education—must all be put in place, in all countries, with supporting structures at sub-regional and regional levels, and with political will starting at the international level and spreading out through the global system, with structures that are mutually reinforcing.

### *Coexistence*

Together with the ideas of peacebuilding and creating cultures of

peace and prevention, there is a growing coexistence movement in which scholars and practitioners are exploring not only the mechanics and mechanisms for building and keeping the peace, but also what a genuinely peaceful society looks like, in terms of its shared collective values. Coexistence has often been understood as a minimalist philosophy, but this conception of coexistence is changing. Coexistence work is attaining a more proactive focus, reflecting the belief that a society established on coexistence principles is one in which the existence of varying identities are seen to contribute positively to the social, economic and moral development of a vibrant and cohesive society. This approach assumes the right of individuals and groups to be both equal and different, as well as the need for groups and individuals to recognize their ultimate interdependence. A recent Oxfam definition suggests that coexistence work is about “recognizing each other’s status and rights as human beings, developing a just and inclusive vision for each community’s future, and implementing economic, social, cultural or political development across former community divides.”<sup>3</sup>

According to Mari Fitzduff (Professor and Director, Masters Program in Coexistence and Conflict, Brandeis University), in her article, *Meta-Conflict Resolution*,<sup>4</sup> it is likely that disputing parties will differ in what they see as important and in what order they would like to proceed toward resolution. For example, it is not uncommon to find that those who currently hold most of the power favour psycho-cultural approaches, while those who see themselves as having been excluded from power—e.g., Palestinians in the Middle East, Catholics in Northern Ireland, Albanians in Macedonia and Tamils in Sri Lanka—prioritize structural approaches that deal with the equalization of power within a territory, or with political secession that will hopefully supply a group with its own territory and power.

In addition, countries in which democracy does not exist often

lack the necessary processes to resolve conflicts without violence, hence the need for conflict resolution practitioners to work with those undertaking democracy and governance work. It should be noted, however, that the existence of democracy in a country is in itself no guarantee that community conflicts will not arise. Unfortunately, some systems of democracy such as majority rule are often counterproductive to the prevention or management of conflicts.

It is important, therefore, for conflict resolution practitioners to be aware of the variety of democratic possibilities that exist and to ensure that these receive adequate attention by those who are responsible for governance. The decentralization of power can also provide a way to recognize diversity, and at the same time, engage groups in central participatory and decision-making processes. Thus, consideration needs to be given to possible processes of federalism and devolution of power, which can be developed to accord with emerging needs for greater autonomy and responsibility at local levels. Such arrangements can often defuse political conflict by helping to accommodate collective identities within a State framework.

Conflict resolution practitioners can also help by encouraging initiatives that give minorities legitimate representation and an effective voice in society through systems that integrate power-sharing possibilities.

Moreover, constitutions that favour certain sectors of society are likely to be a hindrance to the development of effective strategies for countering conflict. Conflict resolution practitioners can assist by ensuring that discussions around any new or amended constitution are comprehensive, as they were in the case of the post-apartheid South African constitution. Such a process can ensure that there is a constitution that legitimizes the rights and welfare of all citizens in divided societies.<sup>5</sup>

Somehow, we, as a human community, are not envisioning enough major structural and attitudinal change. We are allowing the bar to remain too low. It is not enough, and has never been enough, to provide the war-torn with blankets, water and dry goods and think that we have done our duty. We will have done our duty when their environment is no longer war-torn, when other challenges are occupying their interests, rather than the challenge of survival in trauma, which civilians in conflict zones are reliving over and over, in a kind of attenuated half-life, waiting for rescue.

**Notes:**

1. Smith, Zadie, 2000. *White Teeth*. Hamish Hamilton: London.
2. Nicolaides, K., 1996. "International Preventive Action: Developing a Strategic Framework." In Rotberg, R. (ed) *Vigilance and Vengeance: NGOs Preventing Ethnic Conflict in Divided Societies*. Brookings Press: Washington DC.
3. Babbitt, Eileen et al., 2002. *Imagine Coexistence—Findings and Recommendations for UNHCR*. Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy. Tufts University: Medford, Massachusetts, p. 16.
4. Professor Fitzduff's article, *Meta-Conflict Resolution*, is available online ([www.beyondintractability.org/m/meta-conflict-resolution.jsp](http://www.beyondintractability.org/m/meta-conflict-resolution.jsp)).
5. Ibid.

**Additional Selected Resources:**

1. UN/DESA: Conflict Prevention, Peacebuilding and Development ([www.un.org/esa/peacebuilding](http://www.un.org/esa/peacebuilding)).
2. The UNHCHR Human Rights Education database provides a collection of resources on institutions and materials relevant to human rights education ([www.unhchr.ch/hredu.nsf](http://www.unhchr.ch/hredu.nsf)).
3. The United Nations Institute for Training and Research ([www.un.org/unitar](http://www.un.org/unitar)).
4. War-torn Societies Project ([www.wsp-international.org](http://www.wsp-international.org)).
5. Also see Refugees International's *Lives on Hold: The Human Cost of Statelessness*, February 2005, available online ([www.refugeesinternational.org](http://www.refugeesinternational.org)).



## Chapter 11

### Recommendations

#### **(a) Proposal for a United Nations Research Institute/Think Tank for Conflict Analysis and Prevention**

*“Conflict prevention has no home within the UN system.”*

Jack Patterson, Quaker United Nations Office<sup>1</sup>

This recommendation proposes that a think tank on conflict analysis and prevention be established within the UN system in conjunction with the Peacebuilding Commission recommended by the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change and endorsed by the Secretary-General. The Peacebuilding Commission is envisioned as being engaged largely on post-conflict issues, while the think tank would also focus on prevention in the first instance. This think tank could be established as an independent entity or as part of such a commission.

The United Nations is divided into agencies, departments and sub-units that address a wide range of global issues, with entire agencies dedicated to specific subject areas, focusing on children (UNICEF), development (UNDP), food and agriculture (FAO), health (WHO), refugees (UNHCR), human rights (UNHCHR), environment (UNEP), population (UNFPA), maritime issues (International Maritime Organization), meteorology (WMO) and intellectual property (WIPO), amongst numerous others.

Within some of these departments and agencies (primarily in UNDP) there are a handful of staff in various contexts and committees addressing conflict peripherally in relation to their principal mandates, such as conflict and development, conflict and its impact on refugees, the relationship between conflict and human rights, conflict

and children, and conflict and governance, and there are individual bureaus units doing specialized work in the area. But most of the principal organs of the UN have no specific competence in conflict analysis, resolution, prevention or transformation.

It is increasingly difficult for many observers of the UN to understand why there is still no UN agency, or at least UN research organ, wholly dedicated to conflict and its analysis, reviewing and analyzing related issues and responsible for state-of-the-art research on conflict and its genesis, its cycles, its timing, cultural components, signals, effects, ethics, and interpretations. There is no UN agency working on a full-time basis to analyze which conflict prevention interventions have worked, which have not, and why, lessons learned, peace processes that succeeded, treaties that failed, and why. There is not even a system-wide database on conflict prevention issues, concerns, principles, best practices, or lessons learned, although there are various UN, NGO and academic databases.

The UN needs a conflict centre with dedicated staff working on issue analysis and knowledge transfer and exchange. Such a centre would form linkages, partnerships and associations with NGOs and academic institutions worldwide, but would possess its own internal capability and not rely exclusively on outside research to undergird the UN's own policy and practice. The strength and vitality of this centre would be in the interaction and synergy created between and amongst UN staff and policy makers, scholars and academicians, civil society organizations and practitioners, all developing, creating and exchanging information for the unified goal of understanding violent conflict, and using that understanding to create innovative policies and programmes.

This concept raises numerous questions. How might such a centre form linkages with all relevant UN agencies? How would it strengthen, support and maximize the work being done by NGOs and academics on related issues, and how would it benefit from the vast

experience civil society organizations and practitioners have already accrued, and from the high-quality research being carried out within academia?

A UN Centre on the Study and Transformation of Conflict would initially be largely an analytical, research-based unit, with theorists and practitioners in consultation and exchanging information on a regular and continuous basis through expert meetings, policy dialogues and other appropriate fora. Every UN agency would have liaison staff for exchanging information and lessons learned, who would bring an understanding of conflict and its prevention and resolution back to their agencies to be incorporated into their own mandates, as relevant. There would be extensive interaction with conflict-related NGOs and with related regional structures, such as the OAS, EU and African Union dimensions on prevention, exchanging information, research methodologies and training modules and providing knowledge and mutual assistance.

It has been noted by some officials within the UN that while there is no such agency per se, the idea of conflict prevention is addressed throughout the UN system through infusion theory, that is, that the issue can be mainstreamed as a core principle within all components of the Organization, as was done in the 1990s with the concept of gender mainstreaming.

However, while infusion and mainstreaming are critical, before a concept or principle can be infused, it must be understood, subjected to scrutiny and analysis and adapted accordingly. The idea of infusion or mainstreaming of conflict prevention practice and principles within the UN system is very important, but at this point, would still be more theoretical than practical. More importantly, the concept of mainstreaming, by itself, is not feasible. For example, in terms of gender, there is a Secretariat division (DAW/DESA) for policy and an agency counterpart (UNIFEM), that have been working on the mainstreaming principle and promoting it, and which have served as the

guiding agencies on gender issues in terms of policy-making, creation of a knowledge base, and creation of field-level programmes. There is no such entity focusing on the policy and operational aspects of conflict prevention.

It should be noted, however, that UNDP has been proactive over the past five years in terms of exploring and shifting the conflict prevention paradigm to a more developed one with practical programmes that mirror a shift on the ground. There are now more partnerships on projects with the Department of Political Affairs, which is the political arm of the UN responsible for resolution of disputes through high-level diplomacy on behalf of the Secretary-General. These are constructive indicators of the UN's understanding that more must be done and of the UN's willingness to entertain and develop innovative ideas and expand its programmes accordingly.

It must also be said that it is increasingly detrimental to the credibility of the UN that, while it has so many specialized agencies, even those, as mentioned above, for intellectual property and maritime functions (this is in no way intended to diminish their importance), it has as yet no commensurate venue for the function written into its Charter as its pre-eminent mission, "to protect future generations from the scourge of war." Without a comprehensive UN war and peace studies and analysis centre, it is not clear how this scourge will be diminished. And if such a step is not taken within the near future, in twenty-five years, these same paragraphs will still apply, just as the information in the Carnegie Commission Report published in 1997, and launched at the UN, is by and large still as valid today as it was then. This is a warning signal that the efforts being made do not suffice.

While encouraging, the recent efforts emerging within the UN for prevention are inadequate in terms of sheer economics due to the cost of post-conflict humanitarian aid, peace operations and reconstruction efforts. A much more cohesive and comprehensive venue for preventive

action, with full-time staff and vibrant programmes, would ultimately channel funds now targeted for post-conflict aid and peacekeeping into development and good governance programmes.

Such a think tank for the study of conflict should be initiated in New York, possibly with satellite units in Geneva and Nairobi, and, in time, should be followed up by the development of an intersectoral peace planning unit or the type of Peacebuilding Commission envisaged in the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change and endorsed by the Secretary-General's report.

The continual repetition of history demonstrates that ongoing structures are insufficient. This is what Darfur tells us, and this is what we have been told by the civilian populations of Sierra Leone, Somalia, Rwanda, Burundi, Bosnia, Kosovo, Georgia, Cambodia and Chechnya, amongst other countries and regions where there have been few interlocutors to speak for those trapped in war zones.

**(b) Proposal for an Intersectoral Dialogue on Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding to be held in conjunction with the Millennium+5 Summit as Part of the Human Security Agenda**

It is proposed that an intersectoral dialogue on conflict prevention and peacebuilding be held in conjunction with the September 2005 Millennium+5 Summit.

Although there have been several major NGO/civil society summits on conflict prevention, and there will be an international civil society summit in July 2005, remarkably, there has never been a UN Summit exclusively on prevention. There have been UN summits on children, the environment, women, habitat, food security, sustainable development, the Social Summit (which included some substance related to conflict) and a number of others, but there has been no UN summit wholly dedicated to the pre-eminent issue of conflict reduction and transformation.

The Millennium +5 Summit in September 2005 will provide the UN and its Member States with an opportunity to convene meetings to assist the UN in deciding how to best expand and structure its further work and planning in the area of conflict prevention, including discussion of the Peacebuilding Commission that was recommended by the High-level Panel and endorsed by the Secretary-General.

Some of the core questions that might be explored in meetings in conjunction with the Millennium +5 Summit include:

- b · What structural changes should be made within the UN system to accommodate the increased need for understanding of, and action on, armed conflict and its transformation?
- b · What is (and should be) the level of resources allocated by the UN to analysis and understanding of conflict and its amelioration?
- b · What type of leadership role should the UN take in exploration of deep conflict and how should this role be expanded and interlinked with other actors?
- b · How many experts are there within the UN system solely dedicated to the issue of conflict and its prevention, and to ethnic cleansing and genocide? How are they supported?
- b · How does the UN support, and to what extent, conflict-related NGOs (particularly grassroots, national and sub-regional) working to prevent, reduce and transform conflict? How and to what extent does the UN system support the outreach efforts of UN organs created to link and liaise with non-governmental and civil society organizations?
- b · What changes must be made within the UN system, structurally and substantively, to signal a meaningful commitment to prevention of deadly conflict, not only by the Secretary-General, who has consistently demonstrated his commitment to this issue, but by

heads of agencies, departments and units throughout the system?

Specific objectives of discussions in conjunction with the Millennium + 5 Summit could include:

- b. Providing a framework for strengthening national and sub-regional institutional capacity for conflict prevention and long-term peacebuilding and reinforcing governance and development programmes that support this objective;
- b. Forging cross-disciplinary linkages amongst the fields of conflict resolution, governance, civil society building, human rights and development, and creating a framework for actors in these fields to work collaboratively on preventive action to strengthen their work, avoid duplication and rectify fragmentation of their efforts;
- b. Infusing conflict resolution concepts and tools into development and governance strategies, agendas and programmes;
- b. Strengthening the international community's work in conflict prevention through a multi-sectoral analysis of current responses to conflict and its prevention, the sharing of lessons learned, and an exchange of best practices and knowledge gained, both theoretical and practical, amongst practitioners and policy makers with diverse experiences;
- b. Establishing channels for ongoing inter-agency collaboration and providing a forum through which academic research communities and conflict resolution, governance, development and human rights specialists can exchange perspectives with UN/IGO/bi-lateral aid agencies with regard to conflict and its amelioration (which could be facilitated through the proposed UN think tank); and,
- b. Creating a framework for exchange of information, regionally and inter-regionally on conflict resolution practices and

principles, educational programmes, training modules, literature, electronic information and other resources (which could also be facilitated through the proposed UN think tank).

Finally, some of the specific issues that need to be addressed by the UN, whether within the GPPAC Summit, the Millennium Meetings or future analytical sessions to follow up on these meetings, include analysis and exploration of the following issues, amongst others:

**On Governance, Democratization and Reinforcement of the State**

- b' Exploring the relationship between delegitimization or failure of State governance institutions and emergence of armed conflict;
- b' Addressing the capacity-deficit for managing conflict by strengthening institutional structures and capabilities that facilitate peaceful dispute resolution and democratization;
- b' Strengthening regional and national capacities to mitigate conflict;
- b' Fostering mechanisms for constructive State/civil society interaction, including relations with press, media and the private sector, which can serve to diffuse potential conflict triggers;
- b' Infusion of conflict prevention principles, tools and approaches into governance agendas and programmes.

**On Sustainable Development and Conflict**

- b' Continued exploration of the impact of development assistance on conflict and use of aid to foster conflict transformation and diminish cycles of violence;
- b' The use of conflict impact assessments and/or conflict-sensitive development policies in project formulation and evaluation;
- b' Assisting development workers to increase their capacities to



anticipate and respond to crisis and to work more effectively within conflictual situations;

- b' Re-thinking donor funding policies to facilitate collaboration, rather than competition, amongst actors;
- b' Infusion of conflict prevention principles, tools and approaches into development agendas and programmes.

**On Conflict and Human Rights**

- b' Protection of human rights as an essential and non-negotiable component of conflict prevention;
- b' Reversing the exclusion and marginalization of minority, indigenous and disenfranchised populations and understanding these factors as triggers for conflict, often in conjunction with economic incentives;
- b' Building capacity for State and civil society/non-state interface on human rights;
- b' Infusing a conflict prevention dimension into human rights programmes and projects in part through closer linkages between the human rights and conflict prevention sectors.

**On Linking Preventive Measures and Human Security**

- b' Integrating the development and security discourses into a comprehensive human security policy and re-focusing attention from post-conflict aid to early warning, early action and systemic prevention;
- b' Increasing and properly funding mechanisms for early warning and conflict analysis, focusing on earlier entry points for collective action, and utilizing local expertise;
- b' Utilizing the potential of the full spectrum of relevant actors

including IGOs, regional organizations, international NGOs, and national, community and local NGOs to collaborate on early prevention practice as well as policy;

- b' Development-oriented pre-emptive and post-conflict disarmament initiatives.

The benefit of such an analytical process is that it will facilitate policy articulation, information exchange and capacity building for the international community in the many policy areas involved in conflict prevention and, as such, will signal the beginning of a renewed and more robust commitment to this basic Charter issue.

### **(c) Proposal for Development of an International Network of Regional and Sub-regional Dispute Resolution and Dialogue Centres<sup>2</sup>**

While there is enormous machinery in place worldwide for strategic (and unstrategic) military planning, military training, weapons and human resources deployment and intelligence gathering, there is virtually no long-term, planned, coordinated system for engaging similarly in peace planning on a global basis. Likewise, there is virtually no dedicated resource allocation or organized system for early dispute resolution and training in related skills and capacities. There are numerous programmes, and several databases, but there is no coordinated global infrastructure for practical problem-solving related to peaceful settlement of disputes. Therefore, this chapter proposes a model for developing a cross-regional network of “neutral territory venues” for dialogue, conflict resolution, planning and prevention, negotiated mediation and related training.

This model envisions the establishment of a worldwide, computer-linked network of regional and sub-regional conflict prevention centres, using regional and sub-regional structures and venues that already exist. The network would include dispute resolution and dialogue centres for

engaging in early dispute analysis and mitigation, in regional and sub-regional peace planning and in conflict resolution training. This network would include and build upon existing institutions and networks of NGOs, relevant academic programmes and national, sub-regional and regional organs already working in the field to strengthen the impact of their work, create linkages, and raise awareness.

These centres would function as training grounds, as neutral territory venues for dialogue and peace planning, drawing on panels of trained mediators and facilitators respected in their regions for their capacity for objective analysis and impartiality. They would be available to engage in mediation and other third-party dispute resolution technologies at multiple levels of interaction to reduce inter-group, inter-ethnic and transborder misunderstandings and tensions. They would provide a venue and resource base for skill-building in mediative processes for government, community and civil society representatives, including central and local government officials across many disciplines, including jurists, religious leaders, NGO officials and staff, educators, academics, development practitioners, representatives of the media and others. They would also function as repositories for the development of local expertise and resource libraries, and as training centres for the trainers themselves. They could also link with programmes designing peace studies and conflict analysis curricula for schools and universities.

A network to address conflict management such as the one described need not require the proliferation or creation of new institutions or structures. Conflict prevention mechanisms could be built into the frameworks of existing offices such as national ombuds offices, offices of development organizations, within academic institutions or as part of other non-governmental or civil society organizations.

Such neutral venues can also be created as partnerships that bring together divergent perspectives in socially constructive ways, medi-

ating not only disputes, but also ideas and ideologies. Over time, such networks of programmes and venues for conflict amelioration could increase the capacity for dialogue, mediated negotiation, conciliation, multi-party facilitation and tension reduction at national, sub-regional, regional and international levels, and further develop into peace planning networks.

The types of peace planning and conflict prevention functions discussed in this recommendation are primarily aimed at developing the long-term capacities of institutions and societies to discuss and address structural problems and injustices and to understand how the manifestations of these injustices trigger overt violence. They would adapt their roles according to the needs of the region or sub-region, focusing on the development of structural foundations, networks and systems that, over the long term, substantially reduce the outbreak of armed conflict by offering viable non-violent alternatives to officials and representatives of communities at risk.

Training would be a key component of such a network. Interested government officials, legislators and jurists would have access to training, dialogues, and knowledge and technology transfer and exchange. Officials from transitional and less developed nations could also use such venues as resources for strengthening techniques of negotiation, facilitation and other consensus-building skillsets, not only for dispute prevention and resolution, but to level the playing field in commercial and diplomatic negotiations on trade, debt relief, investment and related issues.

Such venues are not envisaged as UN centres, but as UN partners. The UN, with its growing expertise, convening power, and ability to promote knowledge and information exchange, would hopefully support and form partnerships on conflict issues with such centres. These centres would operate as local and regional actors within a global network and would benefit from each others' experiences, successes and lessons learned.

**(d) National Conflict Surveys/Assessments for Member States**

This is a recommendation by which various parts of the UN already involved in conflict analysis and conflict prevention capacity building, (e.g. UNDP's Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Development and the Department of Economic and Social Affairs) could assist governments to undertake national conflict analysis assessments or surveys for the purpose of analyzing, within their specific historical and socio-political contexts, existing and potential causes of destructive conflict, and to develop corresponding national response strategies. It would entail looking at both long and short-term, operational and structural policies and institutions and subsequently assisting interested governments in upgrading their strategies for structural and operational prevention.

Since several indices are already being developed and utilized on various related issues (such as those of Transparency International and the World Bank on national corruption; DESA on ethics; and the World Bank on governance), the first step would be a study of what surveys are already being carried out, of the extent to which the information collected can be utilized as conflict data and indicators, and of how to proceed specifically with national indices related to structural prevention for the benefit of interested Member States.

**(e) Support for Early Warning Mechanisms in Africa**

As described in Chapter 9 and in Annex II on regional mechanisms, a number of sub-regional and regional dispute resolution organizations have emerged in the last few years in hopes of developing and strengthening African efforts in early dispute resolution, peacebuilding, and long-term prevention of armed conflict. While organizations, ideas and commitments have been growing throughout sub-Saharan Africa as demonstrated by the emergence of these initiatives, one key pattern has been repeatedly noted: most of these organizational mechanisms include early warning programmes, but are largely unable to

operationalize them due to lack of funding.

Given the dearth of past programmes in the region for both early warning and responsive early action, the political will now being demonstrated through the emergence of these organizations, and the nature of early warning as one of the most critical aspects of prevention, it is recommended that in the intersectoral dialogue outlined in proposal (b) above, and in the funders meeting outlined in proposal (f) below, funders consider joint projects to support and reinforce the early warning dimensions of African regional and sub-regional mechanisms, including those of the African Union, ECOWAS/ECOWATCH; IGAD/CEWARN; ECCAS, and WANEP, amongst others.

**(f) Convening a Meeting of Donors to Develop New Structures, Strategies and Timeframes for Funding Prevention Programmes**

In order to support new UN and CSO/NGO initiatives to strengthen their work in prevention and convene substantive meetings as proposed earlier, it is recommended that as soon as possible a meeting of conflict prevention funders be convened to consider the issue of redirecting more attention to prevention. It would explore how to structure programmes and funding cycles and timeframes accordingly, discuss jointly funded programmes, and explore relevant criteria and evaluation models for funding longer-term structural programmes. It would examine current funding cycles to evaluate whether they meet the needs for long-term prevention projects.

Such a meeting might be convened by a combination of international, regional and national donor agencies and other relevant actors, and would include funders from all sectors, including national departments, regional structures, foundations and other major donors, together with experts and representatives of conflict prevention/CSO networks.

The Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict<sup>3</sup> does not believe in the unavoidable clash of civilizations or in an inevitably violent future. War and mass violence usually result from deliberate political decisions, and the Commission believes that these decisions can be affected so that mass violence does not result. To undertake preventive action, the Commission believes that we must develop an international commitment to the concept of prevention, a habit of preventive investment.

First, deadly conflict is not inevitable. Violence on the scale of what we have seen in Bosnia, Rwanda, Somalia, and elsewhere does not emerge inexorably from human interaction. Second, the need to prevent deadly conflict is increasingly urgent. The rapid compression of the world through breathtaking population growth, technological advances and economic interdependence, combined with the readily available supply of deadly weapons and easily transmitted contagion of hatred and incitement to violence, make it essential and urgent to find ways to prevent disputes from turning massively violent. Third, preventing deadly conflict is possible. The problem is not that we do not know about incipient and large-scale violence; it is that we often do not act. Examples from “hot spots” around the world illustrate that the potential for violence can be defused through the early, skillful, and integrated application of political, diplomatic, economic and military measures.

**Notes:**

1. Jack Patterson, Quaker United Nations Office, GPPAC expert meeting, 18 October 2004, New York.
2. Based originally on proposals by the author to the United States Institute for Peace, 1988-1992, and presentation to the American Society for International Law, 1994.
3. Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict. 1997. *Preventing Deadly Conflict: Final Report*. Carnegie Corporation of New York: New York.



## Chapter 12

### Conclusion

***There is no conflict that cannot be resolved. Violent conflict is created and sustained by human beings, and it can be ended by human beings.***

(Former US Senator George Mitchell, lead mediator for Northern Ireland, as quoted in *The Power of the Media: A Handbook for Peacebuilders*.<sup>1</sup>)

This *Development Dossier* has attempted to demonstrate that current responses to conflict have thus far been inadequate and that the case-by-case nature of our collective response to conflict remains too fragmented and has not coalesced into a global action plan, system or infrastructure for long-term peace planning.

It emphasizes that responses to conflict are still largely reactive rather than preventive, and that incalculable resources have been focused on post-conflict humanitarian aid and peace enforcement operations, largely to the exclusion of preventive efforts, which are harder to fund, harder to measure and evaluate, more amorphous and ambiguous, and yet absolutely essential. It is no wonder that donors, as a whole, have not come up with more strategies to fund preventive, rather than reactive, initiatives. There has not been an adequate discourse on monitoring, measuring and evaluation, which means that donors often cannot adequately justify the funding of preventive programmes. (See Chapter 11, Recommendations.)

Nonetheless, they are called upon to do so. Even the best and most well-intentioned post-conflict aid cannot make a damaged family or community whole. People who have lived through armed conflict and have been directly affected by it are broken, and post-conflict aid may ameliorate the hunger or medical emergencies, but not the unending

trauma. By the time aid arrives, family members have been divided or have disappeared or died, infants have become victims of malnutrition, rule of law has broken down, disease has broken out and financial and banking structures have dissipated into non-existence. This system of aid after, rather than prevention before, is not working. In fact, it is a response that says we have failed to prevent, so we will mop up.

Both the report of the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change (A/59/565) and the Secretary-General's report in response, *In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All*, suggest that it is time to undertake far-reaching reforms in a number of areas, with security figuring high amongst them.

The UN has a much greater role to play in peacebuilding processes than is currently acknowledged. While the Secretary-General has repeatedly demonstrated his commitment in this area, commensurate policy and practice have not filtered down through the system (or have been impeded by lack of resources, political, turf-related or administrative considerations and resistance).

In this regard, the UN's first role should be to catalyze a process to develop a consistent, coherent approach to conflict prevention that addresses global, regional, sub-regional and national needs. The role of the UN should, in part, be to create frameworks that facilitate the non-violent mediation of disputes by developing its own capacities and those of Member States to manage conflicts, and by infusing its own policies and operations with an overarching focus on conflict prevention throughout its manifold areas of policy and practice. It should demonstrate its commitment to prevention by creating a UN Centre for Conflict Analysis, by holding appropriate and inclusive expert meetings on peacebuilding and preventive action, and by expanding and accelerating its work in capacity building for national and regional structural prevention.

## *Conclusion*

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If the UN chose (and it is a choice) to take a more proactive approach to conflict, as outlined in the recommendations above, it is conceivable that within a decade there would be less need for continuous and extremely expensive humanitarian and peacekeeping operations, and increasingly more resources available for long-term, structural capacity building. Over time, the result would be to begin to improve governance, diminish cycles of violence and foster cultures of preventive action, followed by cultures of genuine, optimal coexistence.

If this were the case, it is possible that in twenty-five years there might be no more Darfurs, Sierra Leones, Kosovos, Bosnias, Angolas, Guatemalas, Burundis, Rwandas or Cambodias. The names of these countries would once again simply be their names, and not synonyms for massacre, genocide or cruelty. The UN could more fully become the visionary agency it was meant to be and could be allocating its resources for futures planning, poverty reduction, environment, human rights and healthcare, amongst other issues, rather than remaining a crisis-driven agency endlessly clearing up the inhumane effects of armed and deadly violence.

This volume highlights the fact that most questions about the field of conflict prevention urgently await coherent answers, and that humanitarian tragedies within the civilian population due to armed conflict will not be ameliorated until policy makers within the international community formulate more systemic, systematic, holistic preventive technologies. To do this requires a broader discourse. Current efforts notwithstanding, the UN and the international community have yet to achieve an integrated, collaborative long-term strategy for strengthening national, regional and international capacities to effectively manage conflict.

As the UN Secretary-General said in his Programme for United Nations Reform, “The prevalence of intra-state warfare and multifaceted crises in the present period has added new urgency to the

need for a better understanding of their root causes. It is recognized that greater emphasis should be placed on timely and adequate preventive action. The United Nations of the twenty-first century must become increasingly a focus of preventive measures.”<sup>22</sup> This cannot happen without a home for conflict prevention within the UN system.

This is not to say that advancements have not been made. There are a number of indicators of various types of progress in terms of creation of regional mechanisms, increasingly stronger intersectoral linkages, and more conflict sensitivity in development work. In particular, outstanding work is being done by NGOs, from grassroots to global. It is they who are taking the lead in defining and expanding preventive action and working in pre- and post-conflict zones and directly in the midst of conflict, enriching peacebuilding practice, often as they put their own lives at risk.

It is hoped that some of the information and proposals outlined above can serve as catalysts for discussion, for envisioning systems not yet created, and for developing a systems approach to the prevention and transformation of violent and destructive conflict.

As Gareth Evans recently said in a presentation to a meeting of donors, “We have come a long way in reducing the despair of human conflict. But we have miles to go before we sleep.”<sup>23</sup>

**Notes:**

1. Howard, Ross, Francis Rolt, Hans van de Veen and Juliette Verhoeven, *The Power of the Media - A Handbook for Peacebuilders*. 2003. European Centre for Conflict Prevention in cooperation with the European Centre for Common Ground and the Institute for Media, Policy and Civil Society (IMPACS): Utrecht, The Netherlands, p. 21.
2. *Renewing the United Nations: A Programme for Reform*—UN Secretary-General's Report—14 July 1997 (A/51/950).
3. Gareth Evans, remarks to the Donor Forum of Chicago, October 2004.



## ANNEX I

### **The Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict (GPPAC) Regional Processes**

In preparation for the July Summit, the GPPAC has held a series of 15 parallel regional processes throughout the world and each region has established a steering group consisting of civil society organizations, practitioners and NGOs. These processes have led up to regional conferences in which participants build networks and relationships, collect information on best practices and provide input for a regional action agenda. Elements of all of the regional action agendas will then contribute to a Global Action Agenda to be presented to the UN Secretary-General and discussed at the conference in July.

#### **The Regional Meetings**

The 15 regions involved include: Central and East Africa, Southern Africa, West Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean, North America, South Asia, the Pacific, Southeast Asia, Northeast Asia, Central Asia, the Middle East and North Africa, the Western Commonwealth of Independent States, the Caucasus, the Balkans and Northern and Western Europe.

**Eastern and Central Africa:** (26-29 October 2004, Nairobi, Kenya). The Eastern and Central African Regional Conference propounded ten key recommendations, including the creation of a specialized regional intergovernmental conflict prevention and peacebuilding agency; a post-conflict reconstruction and peacebuilding fund; implementation of the Nairobi Declaration on Small Arms and Light Weapons; special courts to prosecute and legislation to criminalize rape and sexual violence; codes of conduct and ethics for the extractive industries, States and other actors in the region; establishing counseling centres for trauma and stigmatized victims of violent conflict; submitting themselves to the Peer

Review Mechanism of the New Partnership for Africa's Development (APRM/NEPAD); and the establishment of a regional Peace Prize, amongst others.

*GPPAC Regional Initiator for Eastern and Central Africa: Nairobi Peace Initiative-Africa (NPI-A), Florence Mpaayei, e-mail <fmpaayei@npi-africa.org>, website (www.npi-africa.org).*

**Southern Africa:** (16-18 February 2005, Pretoria, South Africa). The Regional Action Agenda points to a number of key challenges in the region, including: governance and constitutionalism; socioeconomic instability; vulnerable groups; proliferation of small arms; and HIV/AIDS. It notes that there is a need to effect a paradigm shift from State and military security to human security and from reacting to violent conflict to the prevention of violent conflict. Within the regional context, their final draft states, "Although there are differing perspectives regarding the African political condition, there is general consensus in the Southern African region that this political condition is a result of the failure to transform the historically inherited structures of governance, and the unequal international political economy. The historical perspective is steeped in the uncomfortable slope of colonial relations that bind political, economic and social developments to forces beyond the region's geographic presence.

"Contemporary conflicts in the region pose limited yet unacceptable threats of violence. These conflicts are largely characterized by: internal political, social and economic disputes, regional conflict systems, the role of civilians as both perpetrators and principal targets, humanitarian disasters and human rights abuses."

*GPPAC Regional Initiator for Southern Africa: the African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD), Senzo Ngubane, e-mail <senzo@accord.org.za>, website (www.accord.org.za).*



**The West European Regional Conference:** (31 March-2 April 2004, Dublin, Ireland). The conference outlined the Dublin Action Agenda on the Prevention of Deadly Conflict, which articulates common ground amongst European CSOs committed to conflict prevention and puts forward key recommendations. It indicates that fulfilling an expanded version of human security can only be achieved on the basis of a truly cooperative endeavour, and that major global problems can only be addressed through efforts and policies developed collectively through multilateral fora—and not unilaterally. According to the Dublin Action Agenda, “Without a culture shift towards prevention over the longer term, security for the people, true multilateralism and new partnerships, local ownership and inclusion of people from different backgrounds, no conflict prevention effort can be sustainable.”

*GPPAC Regional Initiator for Northern and Western Europe: European Centre for Conflict Prevention (ECCP), Paul van Tongeren, e-mail <info@conflict-prevention.net>, website (www.conflict-prevention.net).*

**Latin America and the Caribbean:** (28-29 June 2004, Buenos Aires, Argentina). Operating under the theme of “The Role of Civil Society in Peace Building, Regional Security and Conflict Prevention in Latin America and the Caribbean,” the conference identified what they viewed as the most relevant regional and sub-regional issues in relation to security and the prevention of armed conflict. One recommendation made was strengthening coordination of strategies amongst federal and local governments, especially regarding border areas. Also encouraged was the review of the scope and specificity of military and police positions, and adapting them to the rule of law and the international treaties on human rights.

A second regional conference took place in Caracas, Venezuela, in late February 2005, which sought to finalize the Action Agenda for the region. The Regional Steering Group met immediately after the

regional meeting to determine upcoming networking, lobby and research activities. Its future research will focus on a number of themes, including structural conditions leading to or aggravating conflict: social inequality and exclusion; the impact of natural disasters, environmental problems and conflicts caused by access and management/exploitation of natural resources; and institutional weaknesses, including democratic governance and parallel structures of power, amongst others.

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**The West African Action Agenda:** (30 August - 2 September 2004, Accra, Ghana). The Regional Conference for Conflict Prevention and Good Governance Organizations and Practitioners in West Africa discussed subjects such as the possibilities for using elections as a tool for stability in West Africa and the role of CSOs in ensuring individual and collective security in the region. Noting the low ranking of West African States on the *2004 Human Development Index*, participants identified the following issues as the major challenges for the region: poor governance (including the unequal distribution of resources, weak justice systems and unjust laws); small arms proliferation; insufficient knowledge and training to enhance efficient electoral processes; a lack of sufficient infrastructure for communication; religious extremism; and weak civil society structures and mechanisms for collaboration.

*GPPAC Regional Initiator for West Africa: West Africa Network for Peacebuilding (WANEP), Emanuel Bombande, e-mail <ebombande@wanep.org>, website (www.wanep.org).*

**South Asia:** (11-13 September 2004, Kathmandu, Nepal). The conference was held under the theme of “The Role of Civil Society

in the Prevention of Armed Conflict: An Action Agenda for South Asia.” The conference’s preamble to its Action Agenda states: “[This] is the cradle of one of the oldest civilizations, with enormous diversity, deep-rooted cleavages and stratification on the basis of gender, caste, class, race, ethnicity and religion. In over five thousand years of its history it has been the scene of innumerable armed conflicts, social turmoil, and widespread violence against its people. It has also faced two hundred years of colonial rule that compounded its political and social divisions by imposing new cleavages.... In modern times the forces of globalization have contributed significantly to social, political, economic and cultural tumult. Events following September 11, 2001 and the ‘war against terror’ have added a new dimension of unprecedented consequences resulting in further polarization of societies. It has aggravated latent cleavages such as communalism, fundamentalism, and gender violence and further marginalized disadvantaged groups including minorities, indigenous people and women. Consequently South Asia today is one of the most conflict-ridden and violence-prone regions of the world. The South Asian people are not just facing patriarchal dominance and majoritarian and hostile State systems, but also social and political systems that have increased structural violence leading to widespread and multilayered conflicts.”

Their Action Agenda proposes that civil society organizations of South Asia should encourage a paradigm shift in international relations from national and State security to human security and people-centred development over neo-liberal economic reforms and globalization; dialogic modes of negotiation for conflict resolution over State sponsored terror and confidence building over spread of fear.

*GPPAC Regional Initiator for South Asia: Regional Centre for Strategic Studies (RCSS), Sridhar Khatri, e-mail <edrcss@sri.lanka.net>, website (www.rcss.org).*

**The Balkan Region:** (4-6 November 2004, Igalo, Montenegro). The

Action Agenda of the Balkan Regional Conference on Conflict Prevention and Peace Building, built on local consultations and national conferences in Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia, noted that the key to a more peaceful Balkans is the building of peaceful coexistence between the various communities of the region and demilitarized societies where conflicts are managed in a non-violent way. Their goal is ultimately to contribute to prosperous, sustainable peace throughout the Balkan region and to building societies where effective conflict management and prevention mechanisms and processes are institutionalized on local, national and regional levels, including promotion and protection of rights of ethnic, national, gender, sexual and other minorities. Also highlighted was social reconciliation and the rebuilding of relationships as part of conflict prevention and peacebuilding work in the region, with CSOs playing a crucial role in reconciliation processes on local and regional levels.

*GPPAC Regional Initiator for the Balkans: Nansen Network in the Balkans, Tatjana Popovic, e-mail <nansen@sezampro.yu>, website (www.nansen-dialog.net).*

**Northeast Asia:** (1-4 February 2005, Tokyo, Japan). The conference, working under the theme of the “Role of Civil Society in the Prevention of Violent Conflict,” adopted the Northeast Asia Regional Action Agenda, which calls for building a regional system for peaceful coexistence through disarmament and demilitarization; promoting humanitarian assistance and development assistance; building a society that recognizes justice, human rights and diversity; and realizing a sustainable economy and economic justice.

*GPPAC Regional Initiator for Northeast Asia: Peace Boat, Yoshioka Tatsuya, e-mail <gppac@peaceboat.gr.jp>, website (www.peaceboat.org).*

**Western Commonwealth of Independent States:** (7-9 March 2005,

Odessa, Ukraine). The conference, working under the theme of “Promotion of Alternative, Nonviolent Methods for Conflict Prevention and Dispute Resolution - Developing Partnerships with Civil Society in Post-totalitarian Countries,” finalized the region’s Action Agenda.

In addressing sub-regional priorities for conflict prevention and peacebuilding, the Regional Action Agenda focuses on the unresolved Transdnistria (Moldova) conflict, and the issues faced by the return of Crimean Tatars to Ukraine.

The Regional Action Agenda highlights five areas of regional concern:

- b` the need to overcome regional xenophobia and intolerance;
- b` the promotion of alternative dispute resolution practices;
- b` developing new State-to-State relationships amongst the new States of the region;
- b` effects of migration within the region; and
- b` developing civil society.

*GPPAC Regional Initiator for the Western Commonwealth of Independent States: Nonviolence International, Andre Kamenshikov, e-mail <akamenshikov@mail.ru>, website (www.nonviolenceinternational.net).*

**Middle East and North Africa:** (February 2005, Beirut, Lebanon). The Regional Steering Group of the Middle East and North Africa established the Arab Partnership for Conflict Prevention and Human Security, an interim network that will work towards the establishment of an official network in the coming months. It will also work towards drafting the Regional Action Agenda. Participants noted that the Middle East and North Africa is home to a number of local and international conflicts. The numerous ethnic and religious differences also contribute to social conflict, and occasionally burst out in acts of violence. While the Middle East is not the only region

suffering from violent conflict, its strategic location often gives local conflicts wider impact. One of the main conclusions of the Regional Steering Meeting was the need to create structural mechanisms to deal with conflict and work for peace. It was suggested that cross-border networking and cooperation of civil society organizations would stimulate a stronger and more active role for them in conflict prevention and peacebuilding. The main issues for the Regional Action Agenda are capacity building and empowerment; dialogue, tolerance, religion and awareness raising; and human security issues.

*GPPAC Regional Initiator for the Middle East and North Africa: The Forum for Development, Culture & Dialogue (Interim secretariat of the Arab Partnership for Conflict Prevention and Human Security), Samuel Rizk, e-mail <samrizk@cyberia.net.lb>.*

**The North America** Regional Action Agenda includes ideas and recommendations of Canadian, Mexican, and US civil society experts and is seen as a guide and toolkit. It provides a number of guiding principles, including a shift to prevention; human security; responsibility to prevent and protect; local ownership; multilateralism—above all through a “strengthened and reformed” United Nations; and building a culture of prevention and a culture of peace, amongst others. Among its recommendations, it calls for networking and coalition building; education and training; and operational and structural prevention for CSOs, governments, regional organizations, and the UN. The private sector is called upon to adopt a statement of commitment to consider the “impact of their business practices on local and national communities, including the potential to create or exacerbate conditions that could lead to violent conflict, as part of a contextual analysis for any proposed business activity.” The private sector is also called upon to “engage CSOs and governments in dialogue on conflict issues in particular countries or regions, playing a positive role in early warning and early response.”

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*InterAction, Gottlieb Duwan, e-mail <gduwan@interaction.org>, website (www.interaction.org).*

PrepCom meetings were also held over the first four months of 2005: including the Caucasus Regional Conference in Tbilisi, Georgia, in February 2005; the Southeast Asia Regional Conference in Manila, the Philippines; and the Central Asia Regional Conference, both held in March 2005, as well as the Pacific Regional Conference, held in Fiji in April. These meetings focused on human security, civil society and early warning, amongst other issues.

*GPPAC Regional Initiator for the Caucasus: International Centre on Conflict & Negotiation (ICCN), Tina Gogueliani, e-mail <iccn@iccn.ge>, website (www.iccn.ge).*

*GPPAC Regional Initiator for Southeast Asia: Initiatives for International Dialogue (IID), Augusto N. Miclat Jr., e-mail <gus@iidnet.org>, website (www.iidnet.org).*

*GPPAC Regional Initiator for Central Asia: Foundation for Tolerance International (FTI), Raya Kadyrova, e-mail <Fti@infotel.kg>.*

*GPPAC Regional Initiator for the Pacific: Citizens Constitutional Forum, Jone Dakuvula, e-mail <jdakuvula@ccf.org.fj>, website (www.ccf.org.fj).*

*International Secretariat: European Centre for Conflict Prevention, Paul van Tongeren, Executive Director, e-mail <info@conflict-prevention.net>.*

The regional action agendas, as well as other research and background papers, are available online ([www.gppac.net](http://www.gppac.net)).



## ANNEX II

### Overview of Sub-regional Intergovernmental Organizations and Their Initiatives<sup>1</sup>

#### Section 1.

#### Conflict Management and Peacebuilding in Africa

##### Introduction

Despite anticipation of peace and security at the end of the Cold War, Africa has been plagued by violent conflicts shattering much of the continent. Any study of today's African conflicts must be analyzed in view of the consequences of both colonialism and the Cold War on the continent.

Throughout the 1990s, the nature of conflicts in Africa changed and evolved. As the number of inter-state conflicts diminished, intra-state conflicts rose dramatically. Intra-state conflicts, however, did not remain within national borders; destabilizing forces, including networks of armed groups, spilled over borders, impacting entire sub-regions, as was the case in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Liberia and Sudan.

Because of the changing nature of conflicts and the increasing interrelatedness between national and regional relations, a complete rethinking of the security architecture of the continent is required. The various African organizations attempting to address conflicts face substantial challenges in their regions. Indeed, most organizations addressing conflict had initially been created to address economic and social issues. These included the Organization of African Unity (OAU, a pan-African organization that became the African Union in 2002) and the regional organizations highlighted below. In order to accommodate new demands related to the need to

address conflict dynamics in their regions, these organizations began expanding their mandates to include conflict management though often with limited expertise and inadequate institutional, financial, human and technical resources.

In light of the limited involvement of international organizations in particularly urgent cases, African organizations accepted the responsibility of taking matters of conflict management and peacebuilding into their own hands. A key underpinning for including such matters within their mandates was the understanding that economic prosperity would never be a viable goal if security issues remained unaddressed. Various mechanisms were put in place ranging from early warning systems to partnerships with civil society (although limited) for conflict management capacity building to armed peacekeeping forces.

### **African Mechanisms: Regional and Sub-regional Summaries**

#### ***The Organization of African Unity (OAU)***

Created in 1963, the OAU's primary focus was on pan-African political and economic issues. However, in the post-Cold War era the OAU expanded its mandate to include security matters, mainly as a result of the growing hesitation by international organizations to intervene adequately in conflicts such as the disasters in Rwanda and Somalia. In 1993, African Heads of State agreed on the creation of the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution (MCPMR), after concluding that addressing conflict management and peacebuilding would be fundamental prerequisites to social and economic development. In 2001, African leaders ratified a new Constitutive Act for the foundation for the African Union (AU) to replace the OAU. The AU met for its inaugural session on 10 July 2002.

Peace and security matters are handled at the AU level by the new Peace and Security Directorate. Its sub-departments include a

Conflict Management Division and a Peace Support Operations Division. The African Union Peace and Security Council was inaugurated in May 2004 and is the principal conflict management mechanism on the continent. The Conflict Management Centre has three divisions: the Early Warning Systems Unit; Regional Desk Officers; and a Field Operations Unit. As part of the African Union Mechanism, a Peace Fund was also set up with the goal of supporting peacekeeping missions.

As of March 2005, the African Union Mission in Darfur (AMIS) has approximately 2,200 soldiers in place in Darfur. An AU-led assessment mission undertaken in mid-March found that an 8,000-strong AU peacekeeping force with an enhanced mandate would be needed to protect the nearly two million displaced people in the western Sudanese region and to bring stability to the area. However, additional support from the international community is needed as this would pose a considerable burden on the African countries that are providing the troops.

The New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) was created in 2001. Its goal is to "develop values and monitor their implementation within the framework of the AU." Amongst its main objectives are the promotion of improved principles and practices in areas of economic development, sustainable economic growth and governance, as well as the management of conflicts. NEPAD also initiated the Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation in Africa. It aims to provide a comprehensive framework for the security and stability of the continent, as well as specific measures for the development of a process of economic integration and socioeconomic transformation.

NEPAD is also developing a Peer Review Mechanism that falls under its "Democracy and Political Governance Initiative," which aims to foster policies, standards and practices to further political stability, high economic growth, sustainable development and

accelerated regional integration. The Peer Review Mechanism demonstrates the will of African nations to identify intra-state sources of conflict and prevent and reduce intra- and inter-state conflicts.

### **Current Challenges to the AU's Conflict Management and Peacebuilding Efforts**

The Mechanism suffers from financial and structural limitations and the Conflict Management Centre is faced with inadequately trained staff and is too reliant on external consultants. The work of the Early Warning Unit, a particularly vital component, is seriously impeded by outdated information-sharing systems and a lack of experts and appropriately trained personnel.

**The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)** was created in 1975 as a sub-regional group addressing economic issues. The organization's fifteen members are Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Côte d'Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Niger, Nigeria, Mali, Togo, Senegal and Sierra Leone. As a consequence of the civil war in Liberia that erupted in 1989, leaders of ECOWAS nations took steps to institutionalize security and conflict prevention measures. Various initiatives were created, starting with the peacekeeping missions of the ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), which operated in Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea-Bissau. In December 1999, the ECOWAS Authority of Heads of State and Government met in Togo and created the Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security, with a mandate to improve the capacity of ECOWAS to deal with conflicts in the region. The Mechanism is composed of three principal divisions, the Mediation and Security Council, the Defense and Security Commission, and the Council of Elders. ECOWAS is equipped with readily deployable peacekeeping units to be sent into emergency and crisis situations in the region. Such units include both military and observation teams.

ECOWAS has also developed an early warning mechanism, ECOWATCH, which monitors political and economic indicators. The four early warning offices, in Benin, Burkina Faso, Liberia and Gambia, attempt to foresee potential or imminent eruptions of violence. However, there are current operational difficulties arising from insufficient funding.

**The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD)** was formed in 1986 as the Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development (IGADD). Member States include Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan and Uganda. IGADD was created to focus on drought, desertification and food security. However, in 1996 Heads of State decided to address issues of security, and reconfigured IGADD into the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), which expanded its mandate to include matters of security and sustainable development. IGAD's primary goal is to "expand areas of regional cooperation, increase the members' dependence on one another and promote policies of peace and stability in the region in order to attain food security, sustainable environmental management and sustainable development." Article 18 of the agreement on the establishment of IGAD indicates, "Member States shall act collectively to preserve peace, security and stability, which are essential prerequisites for economic development."

Initiatives are undertaken in four key areas: reinforcement of capacity-building initiatives within the Secretariat and for principal stakeholders in governmental structures of Member States (funded by the European Union and Sweden); post-reconstruction efforts with a focus on fighting the illicit trafficking of small arms and light weapons (funded by the UK's Department for International Development and organized in partnership with the NGO Saferworld); and developing a conflict early warning system and response mechanism in the region—Conflict Early Warning and Response (CEWARN).

IGAD's conflict management and peacebuilding initiatives have so far focused on Somalia and Sudan, and at times on Ethiopia and Eritrea. In 1997, with financial assistance from Canada, the EU, Norway and the US, leaders of IGAD called a summit which led to revival of conflict management efforts in the Sudan. In 1999, IGAD leaders initiated the creation of the permanent Nairobi Secretariat mandated specifically for the Sudan Peace Process.

However, various limitations are impeding the efficiency of the Secretariat, including a dearth of technical expertise, insufficient financial resources, inflexible decision-making structures and a lack of coordination between the IGAD Secretariats in Djibouti and Nairobi.

In 2004, IGAD organized a meeting to establish an Eastern Africa Stand-by Brigade (EASBRIG), to be implemented within the overall AU framework of the African Stand-by Force. An agreement signed by IGAD leaders in April 2005 establishes the EASBRIG, a 5,500-strong rapid reaction force to help end civil wars on the continent. It will be part of the African Union's (AU) 15,000-strong African Standby Force, and seeks to be operational by June 2006. Its forces will be deployed on the orders of the AU's Peace and Security Council. The AU has set 2010 as its target date for creating the African Stand-by Force, which will be deployed to prevent conflict, disarm and demobilize fighters, ensure that cease-fires are honoured, distribute humanitarian assistance and perform other peacebuilding functions in troubled areas.

**The Southern African Development Community (SADC)**, created in 1980, was formerly named the Southern African Development Coordination Conference and its initial mandate centred on the need to address the economic, political and military supremacy of South Africa in the region during apartheid. In 1997, Heads of State gathered in Namibia to sign the Declaration and treaty of the reformed organization, the South African Development Community (SADC), which includes 14 Member States: Angola, Botswana, the

Democratic Republic of Congo, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. Its overall goal focuses on increasing regional cooperation.

However, reflecting regional dynamics, SADC is extremely divided and thus few initiatives have materialized. This has been due partly to the dominance of South Africa in the region, and, ironically, to the conflicting responses to conflicts in the region, including the wars in the DRC, Angola and Lesotho.

With regard to conflict management efforts initiated by SADC, the Organ on Politics, Defense and Security was created in 1996. However, a clear direction and strategy to define Southern Africa's security machinery is still missing and Member States have been unable to agree on common responses to the various conflicts in the region. There are also funding problems and staffing shortages.

Interventions in major conflicts such as that of the DRC highlight the divisions that characterize SADC. Indeed, it can be said that three sub-groups have been formed around the DRC conflict. The first involves States that chose not to intervene or support any military intervention in the DRC, including Botswana, Mozambique and South Africa. The second consists of Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe. The third group is comprised of States that wished to remain neutral, including Tanzania, Zambia, Lesotho, Swaziland, Mauritius, the Seychelles and Malawi. Zambia initiated mediated negotiations between parties to the conflict.

**The East African Community (EAC)** was created in 1967 with a vision of economic integration for Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda. After decades of political divisions and stalemates, the EAC was resurrected in 1999. The organization's treaty aims at improving "the standard of living of the population by facilitating an adequate and economically, socially and ecologically sustainable

development process.” The overarching goal remains that of enhancing economic integration amongst the three nations, with the underlying motivation resting on a hope for cooperation that would lead to peaceful relations amongst them. Consequently, EAC serves as a framework for the establishment of peacebuilding initiatives in the region.

Conflict management and peacebuilding initiatives include units dealing with potential border issues and clashes between Member States, joint military training exercises, workshops on improving civil-military relations, and various programmes for sharing expertise. There is also interest in developing cross-country peacekeeping units.

**The Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS)** was created in 1983 and embraces 11 nations: Angola, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, the Republic of Congo, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Rwanda and Sao Tome and Principe.

Initially gathered to further economic development, in 1996 heads of Member States decided to initiate an early warning system. In addition, in collaboration with the UN Standing Advisory Committee on Security Questions in Central Africa, established in 1992, ECCAS created the “Conseil de Paix et de Sécurité de l’Afrique Centrale” (COPAX) as a structure to help prevent and resolve conflicts in the region.

**The West Africa Network for Peacebuilding (WANEP)**, a major civil society network, was created in 1999 with an overarching goal of facilitating the building of coalitions amongst practitioners and organizations specializing in conflict prevention and peacebuilding. WANEP currently has over 300 member organizations from 16 countries and has offices in ten African nations including Liberia, Sierra Leone, Ghana, Burkina Faso, Senegal, Gambia, Togo,



Nigeria, Côte d'Ivoire and Guinea. Programmes initiated by WANEP include the West Africa Peacebuilding Institute; the Active Non Violence and Peace Education Programme; the Justice Lens Project; the West Africa Early Warning and Response Network and the Women in Peacebuilding Network.

WANEP collaborates with regional intergovernmental organizations, has been working in collaboration with ECOWAS, and was recently awarded a grant to work with ECOWAS and NGOs to increase the capacity and effectiveness of initiatives in conflict prevention and good governance.

### **Conclusion**

Despite the growing number of conflict management and peacebuilding initiatives in Africa, many of the mechanisms and programmes initiated so far have encountered a range of obstacles. Since most were initially established for economic and political reasons, the steps towards building a new security architecture across the continent have often been ad hoc responses to the eruption of sub-regional violent conflicts.

Today, these structures are hampered by grossly inadequate financial support, limited expertise and inadequately trained personnel within the units upon which hopes for the development of sound conflict management policies rest. The lack of funding also results in deficient structural and material tools to further the efforts being made, such as inadequate infrastructures for information sharing amongst various units and even between sub-regional organizations, which undeniably affects current and prospective programmes.

To further respond to the growing needs for popular participation and democratic governance, developing and improving partnerships with civil society actors already active in conflict resolution and peacebuilding should be supported.

## **Section 2.**

### **Conflict Management and Peacebuilding in Asia**

#### **Asian Mechanisms: Sub-regional Summaries<sup>2</sup>**

##### **South Asia**

South Asia's induction into the community of independent nations in the mid-twentieth century was through harsh post-colonial experiences that have contributed to this region's troubled bilateral relations and internal civil strife. At present, there is moderate to severe unrest in the shape of armed insurgencies, political unrest, ethno-religious conflicts and border disputes in nearly all of the States that form the Indian subcontinent (including India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and Nepal). The protracted Sri Lankan civil war has de-escalated but is no closer to resolution; there are ongoing ethnic and religious tensions in Pakistan; close to 10,000 people have died in Nepal since 1996 in the Maoist conflict; and Bangladesh's problems with governance and chronic civil unrest stem in part from severe corruption and a politically-polarized nation where retribution after elections can be deadly. India is confronted by a range of armed ethnic insurgencies in the northeast, the separatist movement in Kashmir and persistent nation-wide communal Hindu-Muslim violence that elevated to a new level after the Gujarat clashes in 2002 that left over 3,000 dead.

The record of non-governmental bodies and initiatives with regard to fostering peace in this region has been dismal. This is primarily because South Asia is a regional complex rather than an evolved regional community, and at the present level of cohesiveness (or lack thereof), peace is simply regarded as an absence of inter-state war. There is political reluctance to pursue peace and confidence-building through anything but Track I diplomacy (although this is changing

between India and Pakistan). Tensions and misperceptions are still significant in South Asia and their root causes go beyond geopolitical causes; nearly all insurgencies are ethno-religious in nature with extra-territorial dimensions. The few breakthroughs that have come about have all resulted from strong and sustained political initiatives by respective governments in the region. Bilateral initiatives have been the principal vehicle of conflict resolution and (limited) peace-building in South Asia.

South Asian leaders created the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) in 1985 with the aim of reinforcing social links and promoting economic development. It was also believed that SAARC could gradually initiate modest peace initiatives within the region. However, many would argue that regional peacebuilding through SAARC is repeatedly held hostage by the two largest South Asian States—India and Pakistan—and their preoccupation with the territorial dispute in Kashmir and other bilateral security issues. In addition, in India, there is a reluctance to let SAARC facilitate and lead the peace and security dialogue based on the notion of sovereign equality, since India considers that this would undermine its proper role in the region. The asymmetry of regional power is reflected in the failure of SAARC nations to defend any common regional posture, there being no regional policy in the UN from SAARC regarding nuclear de-escalation, no shared stand on the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and severe disagreements between India and Pakistan in recent World Trade Organization (WTO) summits.

SAARC has in recent years stepped up economic linkages amongst Member States. Smaller nations within the region have been more proactive in demanding economic integration and in 1995 the South Asian Preferential Trade Agreement (SAPTA) was set up to grant trade preferences amongst neighbours. SAARC has also facilitated ministerial and technical summits that have created breakthroughs not otherwise possible: the Indo-Pakistani agreement on the non-

attack of nuclear facilities during the Dhaka Summit in 1985; the India-Bangladesh talks on land and insurgency issues in 1986; and the Nepal-Bhutan talks on refugees in 1993, have all helped to improve bilateral relations. These efforts have all been within the SAARC framework of observing sovereign equality, territorial integrity, non-use of force, non-interference in the internal affairs of other States and peaceful settlement of disputes.

At present, Norway has been the key facilitator of dialogue between the Sri Lankan State and the ethnic-Tamil LTTE group and has been actively engaged in attempting to bring about a compromise. India and the United States are firmly backing the Nepalese Government with financial and logistical aid to combat those who they term terrorists. And while there is no breakthrough between India and Pakistan, the idea of creating “softer” borders in Kashmir to allow the ethnic population to travel and interact is gaining currency.

### **Southeast Asia**

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has taken the lead in fostering regional cooperation and sustaining peace in a region that has seen economic growth in parallel with political upheavals, acute civil disorder and increasingly potent cross-border security issues. At the time of its inception in 1967—in a world shaped by recent post-colonial experiences and Cold War dynamics—Southeast Asia was severely fractured with almost all States in territorial disputes with neighbouring countries, a regionally divisive war raging in Viet Nam, Burma embroiled in armed conflict on its borders, and insurgents in Malaysia, Thailand and the Philippines. ASEAN was a response by far-sighted regional leaders who wanted to disentangle from superpower rivalry and lay the foundation for regional cooperation.

ASEAN members assisted with the re-unification of Viet Nam in 1975, and more recently, supported the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) in 1992 that made an elected government

viable. All Southeast Asian countries are now members of ASEAN and this region has not seen an open inter-state conflict between members. ASEAN's approach toward regional peacebuilding and stability rests on the following features:

- a) It calls for dialogue and inter-state consultations instead of power posturing and diplomatic confrontation, and is known to be a strict adherent to bilateral management of all issues;
- b) The organization actively seeks to further strengthen and deepen integration of the ASEAN economy. While primarily aimed at increasing the volume of trade, the efficiency of commerce and greater investment in the region, this process serves to strengthen the fabric of peace by raising the stakes of each ASEAN member in the prosperity of all;
- c) While the region eschews internationalization of bilateral disputes and trans-border security concerns, it has been seen to work very closely with the United Nations and its various partner agencies and affiliates, such as the Asian Development Bank, the World Bank and the IMF (particularly after the financial crisis in the region in 1997).

The organization was severely criticized by the international community for backing Indonesia for the sake of regional solidarity when Indonesian military-supported militias terrorized East Timor. East Timor has since fought a long battle with a politically hostile ASEAN to gain observer status in the organization. There are tensions between the ASEAN Charter's mandate to observe State sovereignty of its members and its responsibility towards the Southeast Asian people. There have also been calls to develop healthier civil-military relations and address human rights violations committed by paramilitary forces in this region, especially in the context of the current US-led Southeast Asian war on terrorism. Since the Bali bombings in October 2002, ASEAN has increased its cooperation with the United States and Australia.

### **Northeast Asia**

While the end of the Cold War brought about drastic changes in other regions of Asia in terms of receding threat perception and increased optimism for peacebuilding prospects, the Northeast has remained in a grim state of conventional stand-offs and power posturing. The two Koreas still remain technically at war, tensions are very much alive between Mainland China and Taiwan/Republic of China (ROC), there are maritime territorial disputes between the ROC, Japan, Mainland China and Russia, and the sub-regional States see an emerging China asymmetrically influencing regional stability. This region does not have any multilateral security institutions—no inter-governmental bodies, economic initiatives or other multilateral institutions—of its own to speak of after more than a decade since the dissolution of the Soviet Union. It is, however, a part of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). Some commentators have pointed to existing border disputes, an inevitable arms race, lingering historical animosities and a difference in economic systems with weak inter-regional trade linkages as evidence that this sub-region is not conducive to regional cooperation and peacebuilding at present.

However, during the 1990s, a number of notable agreements were made, including a Sino-Russian border demarcation process that increased the sense of stability in the sub-region; a series of high-level Sino-Russian border summits; and closer cooperation between Chinese, American and Russian officials (particularly through the APEC framework). Two principal venues for official dialogue on Northeast Asian security issues are the two regional institutions that have emerged over the last decade, APEC and the ASEAN Regional Forum. APEC was formulated partly to bring Northeast Asia into the global economy and initiate more inter-regional trade and commerce. However, until recently, security matters have always taken precedence over economic issues. The ARF is driven by Southeast Asian nations and brings the foreign ministers of the Asia-Pacific together every year for a security dialogue. Observers believe that

the Northeast receives less attention partly because its security positions are seen to be so rigid. There have been talks of forming an Association of Northeast Asian Nations (ANEAN), a nuclear-free zone, and an economic development zone, together with the introduction of a regional development bank. All of these proposals have had limited cross-regional appeal and are slowly progressing at present.

The most functional arrangement has been the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO), and this is the farthest this region has come to multilateral cooperation. Created to implement the agreed framework between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) and the United States, under which the North would freeze and finally dismantle its existing nuclear programme, it uses a unique hybrid of bilateral and multilateral approaches to confidence-building by involving four sub-regional States and a dozen or so financial supporters. China has traditionally relied on unilateral and bilateral approaches to security and confidence-building. In recent years, the Northeast has seen an increase in the second type of multilateral confidence-building measures, including transparency initiatives, better information sharing amongst armed forces and enhanced communications through frequent political dialogues. A more congenial environment for security cooperation is being formed at the Track II level with some relatively positive developments. The Katmandu Process was sponsored by the UN Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in the Asia and Pacific and has witnessed active involvement by both DPRK and the ROK. The Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP) also addresses regional security, and is comprised of research and policy organizations in Australia, all of Northeast Asia, the EU, and Southeast Asian States, amongst others. It has expanded the peace and security dialogue for this region.

### **Central Asia**

Central Asia is confronted by numerous sub-regional problems, including the artificial demarcation of borders during the Soviet era, a rapidly expanding population (not matched by the region's stagnant, closed economies) and water-sharing disputes. The region has witnessed heavily repressive and corrupt regimes that are often closer to feudal societies than democracies.

Ethnic fragmentation across arbitrary borders has also fostered communal tensions between ethnic Slavs and indigenous peoples, and amongst different ethnic groups within borders—the bloody war in Tajikistan and the recent massacres in the volatile Ferghana Valley (a valley region divided amongst Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan) attest to this reality. Major parts of the Kyrgyz-Uzbek border remain contested and the Kyrgyz-Tajik border is yet to be entirely demarcated. Observers claim that the lack of regional cooperation is of greatest concern with regard to water-sharing issues that will probably exacerbate regional instability in the future. Water usage and distribution from the Syr Darya and Amu Darya rivers flowing through Central Asia to the Aral Sea are major sources of political discord between the nations that control the upwaters (Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan) and the downstream States.

A basic sense of regional cooperation and peacebuilding does seem to have taken root amongst the leadership here and three institutions are currently operating to achieve some sense of Central Asian stability and peace: the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), the Central Asian Union and the Economic Cooperation Organization. The 1992 CIS Tashkent Summit adopted the Collective Security Treaty signed by the Central Asian States (except a neutral Turkmenistan), Russia and Armenia to regulate military growth. A later agreement between CIS Member States and Russia has seen these countries cooperate in protecting the Tajik-Afghan border and has helped to maintain a common peacekeeping force in Tajikistan.

All of the Central Asian States are also active participants in the NATO



Partnership for Peace Programme. The United Nations and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) have been credited with the de-escalation of Tajikistan's civil war. Furthermore, the World Bank, the IMF, the EU and the Asian Development Bank are all active partners for development within Central Asia. This displays an inclination by Central Asian governments to involve multilateral and foreign players in the region's stability planning and economic development. Peacebuilding is—similar to the dynamic in Northeast Asia—very much a summit-based activity, and the 1997 Treaty on Eternal Friendship in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan led to an agreement to form a Central Asian peacekeeping battalion linked to the UN and NATO's Partnership for Peace Programme. These developments demonstrate Central Asian interest in emerging from military dependence on Russia and forging its own pacts to attain regional peace and security.

Another notable initiative has been the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia (CICA) that serves as the leading international security forum in Central Asia. Initiated in 1992 at the proposal of the Kazakhstani President, CICA has issued a declaration of principles and a declaration for eliminating terrorism and promoting dialogue, and forged the Almaty Act of 2002. This measure—apart from the usual emphasis on conventional security issues—addresses wider regional cooperation matters, taking into account environmental concerns, the need for enhanced non-governmental confidence-building measures, the need to establish a Nuclear Free Zone in Central Asia and measures to conform to the UN Charter and international law. The official mechanism for confidence-building is known as the Almaty Directives, which call for meetings of Heads of State every four years and meetings of foreign affairs ministers every two years, together with the creation of special working groups to study specific questions and disputes.

### **Section 3.**

#### **Mechanisms in Latin, Central and South America and the Caribbean<sup>3</sup>**

The Organization of American States (OAS) serves as the chief political forum for this region and, consequently, an important venue for addressing inter-state (and perhaps increasingly, intra-state) and sub-regional conflicts. Created in 1948, it is comprised of 34 Member States. These States come together to discuss a variety of issues affecting the Southern Hemisphere, including democracy and institution building, human rights, drug trafficking, judicial reforms, political affairs and regional conflicts. Historically, the OAS Charter has focused on disputes between States, but more recently it has been developing new instruments that give broader meaning to its role as a body for resolving regional conflicts, and it has increasingly sought to assist States with internal unrest. The basis for this expansion began in 1985 with the Protocol of Cartagena<sup>4</sup> and has since been supported by various resolutions.

The political mechanisms of the OAS have three levels of engagement with member countries in Central and South America and the Caribbean. The first is the *Mandates*, which define what the organization can and cannot do and the means at its disposal to act upon resolutions. A key mandate is the Inter-American Democratic Charter, which defines conflict and legitimizes intervention where democratic systems have been threatened, and, in some cases, where the unrest has the potential to spill over into bordering countries. Some of the mandates that directly influence the organization's work in peacebuilding and conflict resolution are:

- b' **The OAS Charter**, which defines democracy as an indispensable condition for development, peace and stability in the Hemisphere and emphasizes the responsibility of the

Member States to search for peaceful resolutions to disputes;

- b. **Resolution No. 1080 of 1991 on Representative Democracy**, which created mechanisms and procedures to address and resolve “any occurrences giving rise to the sudden or irregular interruption of the democratic political institutional process or of the legitimate exercise of power by the democratically elected government in any of the Organization’s Member States;”
- b. **The meeting of Government Experts in Peace Education in Colombia in 1999**, which identified the promotion of dialogue and conflict prevention and resolution as important elements for the consolidation of democratic practices in the region;
- b. **The Inter-American Democratic Charter of 2001**, which systemizes and strengthens the above mandates by linking key concepts such as democracy, human rights and sustainable development, and defines democracy as the unifying principle of conflict prevention and resolution. It also highlights the importance of developing early warning systems as well as provisions by States to promote more citizen participation in public affairs; and,
- b. **The Special Conference on Security in Mexico City in 2003**, at which the OAS States recognized, in the Declaration of Security in the Americas, the importance of enhancing women’s participation in all efforts to promote peace and security. This includes integrating a gender perspective in all policies, programmes and activities of inter-American agencies, organs and affiliates. The importance of dialogue and sustained national efforts to address and resolve internal conflict was also acknowledged at this conference.

The *institution* itself addresses conflicts and is comprised of a Permanent Council that serves to develop consensus. In addition, diplomatic tools are routinely employed to resolve and mediate disputes before mandates are invoked or interventions are proposed.

However, as with organizations in other regions, territorial sanctity and sovereign rights of Member States are considered pre-eminent.

The Unit for Promotion of Democracy (UPD) was created in 1991 to better carry out mandates regarding the promotion and consolidation of democracy and in turn, the peaceful resolution of intra-state and sub-regional conflicts. The OAS/UPD has been involved with various field missions ranging from peacebuilding to peacekeeping. In Nicaragua, the UPD was involved with the demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants and training of mediators for local Peace Commissions; in Guatemala, the UPD provided technical support and capacity-building assistance to the government and civil society; in Colombia it developed mechanisms to address the land rights of indigenous people. In Haiti the UPD has been involved with promoting conflict resolution measures at the community level. Building on its 12 years of field experience, a new programme called the *Special Programme for the Promotion of Dialogue and Conflict Resolution* was created within the UPD in 2001 and provides Member States access to conceptual frameworks, methodologies and techniques in the fields of dialogue promotion and conflict prevention. The OAS has clearly taken the lead in promoting peace and democratic governance in the region.

For example, OAS's work in Nicaragua began in the mid-1980s, when the Presidents of Costa Rica, El Salvador, Honduras, Guatemala and Nicaragua initiated a series of summits to discuss peace and democratization of the war-scarred Central America region. In 1989, a commission was established to oversee demobilization of the Nicaraguan Resistance and peaceful reintegration of ex-combatants into society. The OAS worked in partnership with the UN and assumed responsibility for relocating ex-combatants inside Nicaragua and established a mission that successfully demobilized over 22,000 combatants while repatriating 18,000 Nicaraguans from Honduras and Costa Rica. The mission also engaged in institutional capacity building in Nicaragua, food distribution in war-torn areas,

monitoring the security of the demobilized areas, and social reintegration projects such as construction of schools and health centres. In addition, the OAS mission acted as a mediator between the government forces and groups that had subsequently rearmed after 1990.

Similarly, the OAS has intervened at various points in Haiti, resulting in agreement to send in a human rights observation mission in the early 1990's. The OAS presence was expanded to include UN observers. Technical support was also provided to the Haitian Government to reform and train the National Police, strengthen the judicial system and establish an Ombudsman's office. In Venezuela, the OAS worked in conjunction with the Carter Center in Atlanta to address outstanding issues and minimize violence.

Recent trends and events over the past decade suggest that the primary sources of conflict in the Americas will remain internal to societies; while there have been minor disputes across international boundaries, most armed conflict has been undertaken by military forces, political factions, rebel and revolutionary groups, and the social and economic elites. In such an atmosphere, OAS missions will continue to devote their energies to localized and sub-regional armed struggles, chronic low-intensity violence and recurring political tensions within Member States. In a working paper in 2001, the OAS defined the source of this chronic unrest as stemming from "rigid systems of social and economic privileges [existing] alongside persistent and widespread poverty," and has indicated that "poor governance and corruption coupled with weak institutions and inadequate social services, health care and education have led to situations of constant tension and repeated outbreaks of violence."<sup>5</sup> It is often the process of change involving the clash between inflexible non-democratic systems of governance designed to protect the elites and civil society at large that has fuelled conflicts in this region. Further, as issues of drug and human trafficking, illegal arms, and natural resources' trade continue to emerge, the difference between intra-

state and inter-state conflict becomes less distinct. This trend could likely cause conflicts between Member States over matters of responsibility, monitoring and unilateral actions.

So far, the OAS's emphasis has been on institutionalizing democratic governance and capacity building, increased engagement of the considerable civil society forces across the Americas, and encouraging Member States to address the basic development needs of the marginalized in the region.

Mercosur is a sub-regional organization which is also involved in conflict resolution and prevention, and was created by Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay in March 1991 with the signing of the Treaty of Asunción. It was originally set up with the ambitious goal of creating a common market/customs union between the participating countries on the basis of various forms of economic cooperation that had been ongoing between Argentina and Brazil since 1986. In 1996, association agreements were also signed with Chile and Bolivia establishing free trade areas with these countries as well. During this period, Mercosur also created a common mechanism for political consultation, which was formalized in 1998, in which all six countries participate as full members of the "Political Mercosur." A Dispute Settlement Court has also been created with a view to strengthening Mercosur's institutionalization.

## **Section 4.**

### **The European Union**

In June of 2001 the European Union formalized its Programme for the Prevention of Violent Conflicts, based on work done during the Swedish Presidency of the EU, in part through Sweden's Ministry for Foreign Affairs. As indicated by the late Anna Lindh, at that time Minister for Foreign Affairs of Sweden, conflict prevention is at the heart of the EU and enhancing the EU's capabilities for prevention has grown into a question of great importance. Working with the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the Council of Europe and intensifying its relations with the UN are all part of the process of increasing the EU's political commitment to using a range of resources and instruments to contribute to a global partnership for prevention. In the document endorsing the programme, the EU underlined its political commitment to pursuing conflict prevention as one of the primary objectives of EU external relations and resolved to continue to improve its capacity to prevent violent conflicts.

Since that time the EU has substantially built up its conflict prevention and resolution portfolio. The Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) outlining the EU's common voice on international policy came into force in 1993. The European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), which forms part of the CFSP, came into force in January 2003 and covers all matters relating to EU security.

The principal committees and units responsible for security include the EuropeAid Co-operation Office of the European Commission, which addresses issues including development, good governance and civil society capacity building. Related committees in the Council of Europe include the Political and Security Committee; the Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management (CivCom); and the Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit. There have also been a number of

key policy statements since 2000, several of which specifically address conflict prevention. There is a set of policy and programmatic tools including: (a) country and regional strategy papers, in which conflict prevention is systematically integrated as a cooperation area; (b) conflict prevention teams with experts in history, security, development and governance, who can assess potential conflict issues and propose prevention strategies and cooperation activities; (c) a list of indicators for root causes of conflict; (d) analysis of country situations through early warning strategies; and (e) regular reporting from delegations as a monitoring and early warning mechanism.

In 2003 EU commitment to the prevention of violent conflict was furthered considerably through a number of new policy and institutional developments, including a number of policy papers, seminars, political instruments, various types of diplomatic engagement, civilian operations and increased conflict prevention commitments.

According to the NGOs Saferworld and International Alert in their report *Enhancing EU Impact on Conflict Prevention: Strengthening Global Security Through Addressing the Root Causes of Conflict*,<sup>6</sup> recent conflicts have exposed differences in how best to enhance global security. The US-led approach to the “war on terror” has triggered a resurgence of unilateralist, military responses for promoting security, even at the risk of undermining the international security system developed through the United Nations. The publication of the EU’s European Security Strategy (ESS) entitled *A Secure Europe in a Better World* in December 2003 has served as a counterbalance that acknowledges the changed security environment but remains committed to multilateralism and respect for international law.

According to International Alert and Saferworld, it is essential that the EU advance a multilateral approach to managing crises complemented with serious efforts to address the root causes of conflict and reduce access to the tools of violence. Their report outlines a series of practical steps to advance the EU’s efforts to prevent violent conflict



and to ensure that the EU develops a better balance between short-term crisis management and longer-term prevention.

The paper outlines four key areas that would help the EU enhance its capacity to prevent violent conflict:

- b Linking crisis management with conflict prevention;
- b Addressing the root causes of violent conflict;
- b Tackling weapons transfers and organized crime; and
- b Engaging civil society in the prevention of violent conflict.

“The benefits of mainstreaming conflict-sensitive approaches in development aid programmes are now being understood by governments and international organizations as well as by NGOs. Governments and multilateral agencies have developed their own conflict analysis tools for planning and assessing the impact of specific projects on conflict dynamics.”<sup>7</sup>

Such an approach includes understanding the operational context, understanding the interaction between the proposed intervention and the existing context, and using this understanding to avoid negative impacts and maximize positive impacts.<sup>8</sup>

On the whole, the EU, in conjunction with other partners, has been building strong, multi-dimensional machinery for addressing prevention and early warning, particularly since 2003, as well as addressing more traditional post-conflict and humanitarian programming.

## **Section 5.**

### **Security and Cooperation in Europe**

#### **The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)**

The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) is the world's largest regional security organization, with 55 participating States from Europe, Central Asia and North America. It is active in early warning, conflict prevention, crisis management and post-conflict rehabilitation. Its approach to security is comprehensive in that it addresses a broad range of security-related issues including arms control, preventive diplomacy, confidence- and security-building measures, human rights, democratization, election monitoring and economic and environmental security. Its approach is cooperative; all OSCE participating States have equal status, and decisions are based on consensus.

Its structures and institutions include the OSCE Headquarters in Vienna, with offices in Copenhagen, Geneva, The Hague, Prague and Warsaw. Its field activities include 18 missions and 3,000 staff in Southeastern Europe, the Caucasus, Eastern Europe and Central Asia. They work on the ground to facilitate political processes, prevent or settle conflicts and promote civil society and the rule of law.

The OSCE also provides a forum for consultation and negotiation amongst the participating States, and its decision-making bodies include the Permanent Council; the Forum for Security Cooperation; the Senior Council/Economic Forum; and periodic OSCE Summits.

#### **Structures and Institutions**

The Organization has developed several structures and institutions to follow up on the political decisions negotiated by the participating States, including a Parliamentary Assembly; an Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights; the High Commissioner

on National Minorities; a Representative on Freedom of the Media; the Court of Conciliation and Arbitration; and Arms Control and Confidence- and Security-Building Measures.

OSCE also has a Conflict Prevention Centre (CPC) in Vienna that was created in 1990, serving as the focal point for the OSCE's role in the politico-military dimension and providing support for implementation of Confidence- and Security-Building Measures (CSBMs). The Centre supports activities related to early warning, conflict prevention, crisis management and post-conflict rehabilitation.

The OSCE has been a constructive force for conflict resolution, human rights and minority rights throughout much of Europe.

### **Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)**

The DAC Network on Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operation (CPDC) of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) provides an international forum that brings together conflict prevention and peacebuilding experts from bilateral and multilateral development agencies, including from the UN system, EC, IMF and World Bank. Experts meet to define and develop common approaches in support of peace. The CPDC is a subsidiary group of the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC). The OECD website provides publications, guidelines, manuals, policy briefs and other resources ([www.oecd.org/dac/conflict](http://www.oecd.org/dac/conflict)).

**Notes:**

1. With thanks to Aurora Deuss of UN/DESA for contributing the section on African mechanisms, and also to IPA staff for their assistance.
2. With thanks to Saurabh Naithani for contributing the section on Asian mechanisms.
3. With thanks to Janet Murdock, OAS staff, and Saurabh Naithani for contributing the section on mechanisms in Latin, Central and South America and the Caribbean.
4. The Protocol of Cartagena defines representative democracy as “an indispensable condition for the stability, peace and development of the region.”
5. Woodrow, Peter, 2001. OAS/UPD Working Paper. *The Role of the Organization of American States and the Unit for the Promotion of Democracy in Conflict Resolution*, p. 1.
6. Saferworld/InternationalAlert, 2004. *Enhancing EU Impact on Conflict Prevention: Strengthening Global Security Through Addressing the Root Causes of Conflict*: London.
7. Ibid., p. 17.
8. Ibid., p. 16.

**Additional Selected Resources:**

1. See also the Africa Governance Inventory (AGI) web portal developed by UN/DESA ([www.unpan.org/asi.asp](http://www.unpan.org/asi.asp)).
2. More information on the Southern African Women’s Peace Forum is available on the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom website ([www.peacewomen.org/contacts/int/dir\\_s/sawpf.html](http://www.peacewomen.org/contacts/int/dir_s/sawpf.html)).

3. Tabyshalieva, Anara, 1999. *The Challenge of Regional Cooperation in Central Asia*, ([www.usip.org](http://www.usip.org)).
4. Cutler, Robert M., 2004. *Economics and Security in Central Asia*, ([www.fas.harvard.edu/~asiactr](http://www.fas.harvard.edu/~asiactr)).
5. Fukushima, Akiko, *Multilateral CMBs in Northeast Asia: Receding or Emerging?* ([www.stimson.org/japan](http://www.stimson.org/japan)).
6. Association of Southeast Asian Nations ([www.aseansec.org/home.htm](http://www.aseansec.org/home.htm)).
7. Tavares, Rodrigo, 2004. *The Role of Regionalization in Peacebuilding and Conflict Management in South Asia*, ECPR.
8. *Central Asia: A Last Chance for Change*, International Crisis Group (ICG) Briefing, April 2003.



## ANNEX III

### *In Larger Freedom*

The following annex (in relevant part) was attached to *In Larger Freedom*, the March 2005 report of the UN Secretary-General in order to highlight areas that require review and decisions by Governments and Heads of State when they come together in September 2005 for the High-level Plenary Meeting of the 60<sup>th</sup> Session of the General Assembly.

#### **Annex**

#### **For Decision by Heads of State and Government**

1. The Summit will be a unique opportunity for the world's leaders to consider a broad range of issues and make decisions that will improve the lives of people around the world significantly. This is a major undertaking—one worthy of the world's leaders collectively assembled.
2. In the twenty-first century, all States and their collective institutions must advance the cause of larger freedom—by ensuring freedom from want, freedom from fear and freedom to live in dignity. In an increasingly interconnected world, progress in the areas of development, security and human rights must go hand in hand. There will be no development without security and no security without development. And both development and security also depend on respect for human rights and the rule of law.
3. No State can stand wholly alone in today's world. We all share responsibility for each other's development and security. Collective strategies, collective institutions and collective action are indispensable.
4. Heads of State and Government must therefore agree on the nature of the threats and opportunities before us and take decisive action.

**I. Freedom from want**

5. In order to reduce poverty and promote global prosperity for all, I urge Heads of State and Government to:

(a) Reaffirm, and commit themselves to implementing, the development consensus based on mutual responsibility and accountability agreed in 2002 at the International Conference on Financing for Development held in Monterrey, Mexico, and the World Summit on Sustainable Development held in Johannesburg, South Africa. Consistent with that historic compact, centred on the Millennium Development Goals:

(i) Developing countries should recommit themselves to taking primary responsibility for their own development by strengthening governance, combating corruption and putting in place the policies and investments to drive private-sector led growth and maximize domestic resources to fund national development strategies;

(ii) Developed countries should undertake to support these efforts through increased development assistance, a more development-oriented trade system and wider and deeper debt relief;

(b) Recognize the special needs of Africa and reaffirm the solemn commitments made to address those needs on an urgent basis;

(c) Decide that each developing country with extreme poverty should by 2006 adopt and begin to implement a comprehensive national strategy bold enough to meet the Millennium Development Goals targets for 2015;

(d) Undertake to ensure that developed countries that have not already done so establish timetables to achieve the target of 0.7 per cent of gross national income for official development



assistance by no later than 2015, starting with significant increases no later than 2006 and reaching at least 0.5 per cent by 2009;

(e) Decide that debt sustainability should be redefined as the level of debt that allows a country to both achieve the Millennium Development Goals and reach 2015 without an increase in its debt ratios; that, for most HIPC countries, this will require exclusively grant-based finance and 100 per cent debt cancellation, while for many heavily indebted non-HIPC and middle-income countries it will require significantly more debt reduction than has yet been on offer; and that additional debt cancellation should be achieved without reducing the resources available to other developing countries and without jeopardizing the long-term financial viability of international financial institutions;

(f) Complete the World Trade Organization Doha round of multilateral trade negotiations no later than 2006, with full commitment to realizing its development focus, and as a first step provide immediate duty-free and quota-free market access for all exports from the least developed countries;

(g) Decide to launch, in 2005, an International Financial Facility to support an immediate front-loading of official development assistance, underpinned by commitments to achieving the 0.7 per cent ODA target no later than 2015; and to consider other innovative sources of finance for development to supplement the Facility in the longer term;

(h) Decide to launch a series of “quick win” initiatives so as to realize major immediate progress towards the Millennium Development Goals through such measures as the free distribution of malaria bednets and effective anti-malaria medicines, the expansion of home-grown school meals programmes using locally produced foods and the elimination of user fees for primary education and health services;

(i) Ensure that the international community urgently provides the resources needed for an expanded and comprehensive response to HIV/AIDS, as identified by UNAIDS and its partners, and full funding for the Global Fund to fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria;

(j) Reaffirm gender equality and the need to overcome pervasive gender bias by increasing primary school completion and secondary school access for girls, ensuring secure tenure of property to women, ensuring access to reproductive health services, promoting equal access to labour markets, providing opportunity for greater representation in government decision-making bodies, and supporting direct interventions to protect women from violence;

(k) Recognize the need for significantly increased international support for scientific research and development to address the special needs of the poor in the areas of health, agriculture, natural resource and environmental management, energy and climate;

(l) Ensure concerted global action to mitigate climate change, including through technological innovation, and therefore resolve to develop a more inclusive international framework for climate change beyond 2012, with broader participation by all major emitters and both developing and developed countries, taking into account the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities;

(m) Resolve to establish a worldwide early warning system for all natural hazards, building on existing national and regional capacity;

(n) Decide that, starting in 2005, developing countries that put forward sound, transparent and accountable national strategies and require increased development assistance should receive a sufficient increase in aid, of sufficient quality and arriving with sufficient speed

to enable them to achieve the Millennium Development Goals.

## **II. Freedom from fear**

6. In order to provide effective collective security in the twenty-first century, I urge Heads of State and Government to pledge concerted action against the whole range of threats to international peace and security, and in particular to:

(a) Affirm and commit themselves to implementing a new security consensus based on the recognition that threats are interlinked, that development, security and human rights are mutually interdependent, that no State can protect itself acting entirely alone and that all States need an equitable, efficient and effective collective security system; and therefore commit themselves to agreeing on, and implementing, comprehensive strategies for confronting the whole range of threats, from international war through weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, State collapse and civil conflict to deadly infectious disease, extreme poverty and the destruction of the environment;

(b) Pledge full compliance with all articles of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, and the Chemical Weapons Convention in order to further strengthen the multilateral framework for non-proliferation and disarmament, and in particular:

(i) Resolve to bring to an early conclusion negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty;

(ii) Reaffirm their commitment to a moratorium on nuclear test explosions and to the objective of the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty;

(iii) Resolve to adopt the Model Additional Protocol as the norm for

verifying compliance with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons;

(iv) Commit themselves to expediting agreement on alternatives, consistent with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons principles of the right to peaceful uses and the obligations for non-proliferation, to the acquisition of domestic uranium enrichment and plutonium separation facilities;

(v) Commit themselves to further strengthening the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention;

(vi) Urge all chemical-weapon States to expedite the scheduled destruction of chemical-weapon stockpiles;

(c) Develop legally binding international instruments to regulate the marking, tracing and illicit brokering of small arms and light weapons; and ensure the effective monitoring and enforcement of United Nations arms embargoes;

(d) Affirm that no cause or grievance, no matter how legitimate, justifies the targeting and deliberate killing of civilians and non-combatants; and declare that any action that is intended to cause death or serious bodily harm to civilians or non-combatants, when the purpose of such an act, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population or to compel a Government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act, constitutes an act of terrorism;

(e) Resolve to implement the comprehensive United Nations counter-terrorism strategy presented by the Secretary-General to dissuade people from resorting to terrorism or supporting it; deny terrorists access to funds and materials; deter States from sponsoring terrorism; develop State capacity to defeat terrorism; and defend human rights;

(f) Resolve to accede to all 12 international conventions against terrorism; and instruct their representatives to:

(i) Conclude a convention on nuclear terrorism as a matter of urgency;

(ii) Conclude a comprehensive convention on terrorism before the end of the sixtieth session of the General Assembly;

(g) Commit themselves to acceding, as soon as possible, to all relevant international conventions on organized crime and corruption, and take all necessary steps to implement them effectively, including by incorporating the provisions of those conventions into national legislation and strengthening criminal justice systems;

(h) Request the Security Council to adopt a resolution on the use of force that sets out principles for the use of force and expresses its intention to be guided by them when deciding whether to authorize or mandate the use of force; such principles should include: a reaffirmation of the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations with respect to the use of force, including those of Article 51; a reaffirmation of the central role of the Security Council in the area of peace and security; a reaffirmation of the right of the Security Council to use military force, including preventively, to preserve international peace and security, including in cases of genocide, ethnic cleansing and other such crimes against humanity; and the need to consider—when contemplating whether to authorize or endorse the use of force—the seriousness of the threat, the proper purpose of the proposed military action, whether means short of the use of force might reasonably succeed in stopping the threat, whether the military option is proportional to the threat at hand and whether there is a reasonable chance of success;

(i) Agree to establish a Peacebuilding Commission along the lines suggested in the present report, and agree to establish and support a

voluntary standing fund for peacebuilding;

(j) Create strategic reserves for United Nations peacekeeping; support the efforts by the European Union, the African Union and others to establish standby capacities as part of an interlocking system of peacekeeping capacities; and establish a United Nations civilian police standby capacity;

(k) Ensure that Security Council sanctions are effectively implemented and enforced, including by strengthening the capacity of Member States to implement sanctions, establishing well resourced monitoring mechanisms, and ensuring effective and accountable mechanisms to mitigate the humanitarian consequences of sanctions.

### **III. Freedom to live in dignity**

7. I urge Heads of State and Government to recommit themselves to supporting the rule of law, human rights and democracy—principles at the heart of the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. To this end, they should:

(a) Reaffirm their commitment to human dignity by action to strengthen the rule of law, ensure respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms and promote democracy so that universally recognized principles are implemented in all countries;

(b) Embrace the “responsibility to protect” as a basis for collective action against genocide, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity, and agree to act on this responsibility, recognizing that this responsibility lies first and foremost with each individual State, whose duty it is to protect its population, but that if national authorities are unwilling or unable to protect their citizens, then the responsibility shifts to the international community to use diplomatic, humanitarian and other methods

to help protect civilian populations, and that if such methods appear insufficient the Security Council may out of necessity decide to take action under the Charter, including enforcement action, if so required;

(c) Support the 2005 treaty event, focusing on 31 multilateral treaties, and encourage any Government that has not done so to agree to ratify and implement all treaties relating to the protection of civilians;

(d) Commit themselves to supporting democracy in their own countries, their regions and the world, and resolve to strengthen the United Nations capacity to assist emerging democracies, and to that end welcome the creation of a Democracy Fund at the United Nations to provide funding and technical assistance to countries seeking to establish or strengthen their democracy;

(e) Recognize the important role of the International Court of Justice in adjudicating disputes among countries and agree to consider means to strengthen the work of the Court.

#### **IV. The imperative for collective action: strengthening the United Nations**

8. To make the United Nations a more effective and efficient instrument for forging a united response to shared threats and shared needs, I urge Heads of State and Government to:

(a) Reaffirm the broad vision of the founders of the United Nations, as set out in the Charter of the United Nations, for it to be organized, resourced and equipped to address the full range of challenges confronting the peoples of the world across the broad fields of security, economic and social issues, and human rights, and in that spirit to commit themselves to reforming, restructuring and revitalizing its major organs and institutions, where necessary, to enable them to respond effectively to the changed threats, needs

and circumstances of the twenty-first century;

### **General Assembly**

(b) Revitalize the General Assembly:

(...)

(iii) Establishing mechanisms enabling the Assembly to engage fully and systematically with civil society;

### **Security Council**

(c) Reform the Security Council to make it more broadly representative of the international community as a whole and the geopolitical realities of today, and to expand its membership to meet these goals, by:

(i) Supporting the principles for the reform of the Council and considering the two options, models A and B, proposed in the present report, as well as any other viable proposals in terms of size and balance that have emerged on the basis of either model;

(ii) Agreeing to take a decision on this important issue before the summit in September 2005. It would be far preferable for Member States to take this vital decision by consensus. If, however, they are unable to reach consensus, this must not become an excuse for postponing action;

### **Economic and Social Council**

(d) Reform the Economic and Social Council by:

(i) Mandating the Economic and Social Council to hold annual ministerial-level assessments of progress towards agreed development goals, particularly the Millennium Development Goals;

(ii) Deciding that it should serve as a high-level development



cooperation forum, reviewing trends in international development cooperation, promoting greater coherence among the development activities of different actors and strengthening the links between the normative and operational work of the United Nations;

(iii) Encouraging it to convene timely meetings, as required, to assess threats to development, such as famines, epidemics and major natural disasters, and to promote coordinated responses to them;

(iv) Deciding that the Council should regularize its work in post-conflict management by working with the proposed Peacebuilding Commission;

### **Proposed Human Rights Council**

(e) Agree to replace the Commission on Human Rights with a smaller standing Human Rights Council, as a principal organ of the United Nations or subsidiary body of the General Assembly, whose members would be elected directly by the General Assembly by a two-thirds majority of members present and voting; (...)

### **System-wide coherence**

(g) Ensure stronger system-wide coherence by resolving to coordinate their representatives on the governing boards of the various development and humanitarian agencies so as to make sure that they pursue a coherent policy in assigning mandates and allocating resources throughout the system;

(h) Commit themselves to protecting humanitarian space and ensuring that humanitarian actors have safe and unimpeded access to vulnerable populations; resolve to act on proposals to accelerate

humanitarian response by developing new funding arrangements to ensure that emergency funding is available immediately; and support the Secretary-General's effort to strengthen the inter-agency and country-level responses to the needs of internally displaced persons;

(i) Recognize the need for a more integrated structure for environmental standard-setting, scientific discussion and monitoring, and treaty compliance that is built on existing institutions, such as UNEP, as well as the treaty bodies and specialized agencies, and that assigns environmental activities at the operational level to the development agencies to ensure an integrated approach to sustainable development;

**Regional organizations**

(j) Support a stronger relationship between the United Nations and regional organizations, including by, as a first step, developing and implementing a 10-year plan for capacity building with the African Union, and by ensuring that regional organizations that have a capacity for conflict prevention or peacekeeping consider the option of placing such capacities in the framework of the United Nations Standby Arrangements System.

## ACRONYMS

ACCORD	African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes
ADR	Alternative Dispute Resolution
AI	Amnesty International
ANEAN	Association of Northeast Asian Nations
APEC	Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
ARF	ASEAN Regional Forum
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
AU	African Union
CEDAW	The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women
CEWARN	Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
CICA	Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia
CIDA	Canadian International Development Agency
CIS	Commonwealth of Independent States
CivCom	Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management
COPAX	Conseil de Paix et Sécurité de l’Afrique Centrale
CPA	Coalition Provisional Authority
CPCC	Canadian Peacebuilding Coordinating Committee
CRC	Committee on the Rights of the Child
CRIES	Regional Coordination for Economic and Social Research
CSCAP	Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific

CSO	Civil Society Organization
CSW	Commission on the Status of Women
CTC	Counter-Terrorism Committee
DAW	Division for the Advancement of Women
DESA	Department of Economic and Social Affairs
DFID	UK Department for International Development
DPA	Department of Political Affairs
DPRK	Democratic People's Republic of Korea
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
EAC	East African Community
ECCAS	Economic Community of Central African States
ECCP	European Centre for Conflict Prevention
ECOMOG	ECOWAS Monitoring Group
ECOSOC	Economic and Social Council
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
ESDP	European Security and Defence Policy
ESS	European Security Strategy
EU	European Union
EWS	Early Warning System
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization
FERFAP	Federation of African Women's Peace Networks
FEWER	Forum on Early Warning and Early Response
FFD	Financing for Development
FTI	Foundation for Tolerance International
FWCW	Fourth World Conference on Women
GA	General Assembly
GPAC	Global Programme Against Corruption
GPPAC	Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict
HIPC	Highly Indebted Poor Country

## *Acronyms*

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HRW	Human Rights Watch
ICPD	International Conference on Population and Development
ICC	International Criminal Court
ICCN	International Centre on Conflict and Negotiation
ICG	International Crisis Group
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
IFI	International Financial Institution
IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority on Development
IGADD	Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development
IGO	Intergovernmental Organization
IID	Initiatives for International Dialogue
ILO	International Labour Organization
IMO	International Maritime Organization
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IMPACS	Institute for Media, Policy and Civil Society
INGO	International Non-Governmental Organization
IOM	International Organization for Migration
IPA	International Peace Academy
IWPR	Institute for War and Peace Reporting
KEDO	Korean Peninsular Energy Development Organization
MCPMR	Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution
MDG	Millennium Development Goal
MICIVIH	International Civilian Mission in Haiti
MRG	Minority Rights Group International
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NEPAD	New Partnership for Africa's Development
NGLS	Non-Governmental Liaison Service
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NPI-A	Nairobi Peace Initiative-Africa
NPT	Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
OAS	Organization of American States
OAU	Organization of African Unity
OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
ODA	Official Development Assistance
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OSCE	Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
PRM	Peer Review Mechanism
RCSS	Regional Centre for Strategic Studies
ROC	Republic of China
ROK	Republic of Korea
SAARC	South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation
SADC	South African Development Community
SALW	Small Arms and Light Weapons
SAPTA	South Asian Preferential Trade Agreement
UNAIDS	Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNEP	United Nations Environment Programme
UNFPA	United Nations Population Fund
UNHCHR	United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

## *Acronyms*

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UNICEF	United Nations Children’s Fund
UNIFEM	United Nations Development Fund for Women
UNHEWS	United Nations Humanitarian Early Warning Service
UNITAR	United Nations Institute for Training and Research
UNIDO	United Nations Industrial Development Organization
UNODC	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
UNRISD	United Nations Research Institute for Social Development
UNU	United Nations University
UPD	Unit for Promotion of Democracy
WANEP	West Africa Network for Peacebuilding
WFP	World Food Programme
WHO	World Health Organization
WIPO	World Intellectual Property Organization
WMO	World Meteorological Organization
WOMEN	Women Organized for a Morally Enlightened Nation
WSP	War-torn Societies Project
WTO	World Trade Organization

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## **UNITED NATIONS NON-GOVERNMENTAL LIAISON SERVICE (NGLS)**

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The information produced by NGLS both in published form and electronically combines public information on UN and NGO events and issues, practical “how to” guides to the UN system for NGOs, and substantive analysis of issues on the international agenda. NGLS’s publications are distributed to some 7,000 NGOs worldwide, around 50% based in developing countries, and to over 1,000 development professionals in the UN system, governments and bilateral agencies. All NGLS’s publications are also available on its website ([www.un-ngls.org](http://www.un-ngls.org)). As part of its outreach activities, NGLS also disseminates information on a range of activities on the UN agenda to NGO electronic mail networks and listservs. NGLS also provides advice, guidance and support to the organizations of the UN system as they seek to develop constructive working relationships with the non-governmental community.

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## **Preamble to the United Nations Charter**

We the peoples of the United Nations, determined to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind, and to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small, and to establish conditions under which justice and respect for the obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international law can be maintained, and...to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom and for these ends to practice tolerance and live together in peace...and...that armed force shall not be used, save in the common interest....



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