



## Security Council

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### **Fifth progress report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire**

#### **I. Introduction**

1. The present report is prepared pursuant to Security Council resolution 1528 (2004) of 27 February 2004, by which the Council established the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI) for an initial period of 12 months as from 4 April 2004. This report covers major developments since my report of 18 March 2005 (S/2005/186) and includes an update on the status of the peace process, as requested by the Council in paragraph 18 of its resolution 1572 (2004) of 15 November 2004. The Council has also received the fortnightly reports prepared by the Monitoring Group established under the Accra III Agreement comprising the representatives in Côte d'Ivoire of the United Nations, the African Union and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS).

#### **II. The peace process**

2. During the reporting period, the momentum initially gained in the peace process following the signing of the Pretoria Agreement has slowed as only limited progress has been made towards its implementation.

3. President Thabo Mbeki of South Africa, the African Union mediator, convened a meeting of the Ivorian parties in Pretoria from 3 to 6 April to discuss the action plan formulated following his visit to Côte d'Ivoire on 6 December 2004. The meeting, which brought together Laurent Gbagbo, President of Côte d'Ivoire; Seydou Diarra, Prime Minister of Côte d'Ivoire; Henri Konan Bédié, President of the Democratic Party of Côte d'Ivoire; Alassane Ouattara, President of the Rally of Republicans; and Guillaume Soro, Secretary-General of the Forces nouvelles, resulted in the signing on 6 April of the Pretoria Agreement on the Peace Process in Côte d'Ivoire (S/2005/270, annex I).

4. The Pretoria Agreement includes a joint declaration by the Ivorian parties on an immediate and final cessation of all hostilities and an end to the war throughout the country. The parties also agreed to proceed immediately with the disarmament and dismantling of militias and armed groups throughout the country. A meeting of the chiefs of staff of the Ivorian National Armed Forces (FANCI) and of the Forces nouvelles was to be held to prepare the national disarmament, demobilization and reintegration plan and to provide recommendations for the restructuring of the army.

The Agreement also envisages the training of 600 Forces nouvelles elements to provide security in the north once the cantonment of the Forces nouvelles begins. Furthermore, under the Agreement, certain laws deemed to be not in conformity with the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement of 27 January 2003 (S/2003/99, annex I) were to be amended before 30 April. The Forces nouvelles also agreed to return to the Government of National Reconciliation.

5. The Ivorian parties also reaffirmed the need to hold presidential elections in October 2005 and legislative elections immediately thereafter. To that end, it was agreed that the United Nations would be invited to participate in the preparations of the general elections. The reconstitution of the Independent Electoral Commission was envisaged under the Agreement in conformity with the provisions of the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement. The Pretoria Agreement also called on President Mbeki, in consultation with the Chairperson of the African Union and myself, to make a determination on the issue of eligibility for the presidency in Côte d'Ivoire.

### **III. Implementation of the Pretoria Agreement**

6. FANCI and the Forces nouvelles met in Bouaké from 14 to 16 April in the presence of the Prime Minister, representatives of the impartial forces and the South African mediation. A communiqué issued on 16 April indicated that a seminar would be held in Yamoussoukro on the national disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme and the restructuring of the armed forces. Following a meeting of the Quadripartite Commission, comprising FANCI, the Forces nouvelles, UNOCI and the Licorne forces, held in Daoukro on 19 April, FANCI and the Forces nouvelles from 21 to 24 April withdrew their heavy weapons from the boundaries of the zone of confidence to agreed locations.

#### **Eligibility to the presidency of the Republic**

7. The resolution of the question of eligibility for the upcoming presidential elections was a significant step forward in the peace process. In April, President Gbagbo held a series of consultations on the issue with national stakeholders. In line with the determination conveyed by President Mbeki to the Ivorian parties on 11 April, President Gbagbo declared on 26 April, using the special powers conferred on him by article 48 of the Ivorian Constitution, that all candidates nominated by the political parties signatory to the Pretoria Agreement would be allowed to participate in the presidential elections.

8. President Gbagbo also declared on 26 April that the use of his emergency powers would not be limited to the issue of presidential eligibility and announced that the production of voters' lists and voter registration cards would be the sole responsibility of the National Institute of Statistics. This announcement was strongly criticized by opposition parties, which expressed serious doubts about the neutrality of the Institute and its ability to successfully carry out such electoral tasks. The opposition parties also strongly objected to the declaration by President Gbagbo regarding the use of special powers, noting that, according to the ruling by President Mbeki, it should be limited to the issue of presidential eligibility. Consequently, on 20 May, Alassane Ouattara and Henri Konan Bédié requested President Mbeki to make an additional determination on the issue.

### **Legislative reforms**

9. Some progress has been made in the revision of several laws which were deemed not to be in conformity with the spirit and letter of the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement. The laws concerning the composition of the Independent Electoral Commission and the funding of political parties have been agreed upon by the Council of Ministers, but still need to be adopted by the National Assembly. There are still divergent views within the Council of Ministers over whether any other laws envisaged in the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement should also be amended. In this regard, Prime Minister Diarra has sought confirmation from President Mbeki on the need to revise other key pieces of legislation, including the nationality code and the laws on identification and land tenure.

### **Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration**

10. On 14 May, in Yamoussoukro, the chiefs of staff of FANCI and the Forces nouvelles agreed on modalities for the national disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme, with the disarmament and demobilization phases envisaged to take place from 27 June to 10 August. It was also agreed that a special commission would develop a plan for the restructuring of the armed forces by 26 September. A total of 48,064 persons are expected to benefit from the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme, including 5,500 FANCI and 42,564 Forces nouvelles personnel. Demobilized combatants will receive a safety net package of approximately \$940 with 25 per cent paid upon demobilization, 25 per cent paid 45 days later and the remainder paid 90 days after demobilization.

11. The cost of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme is estimated at \$150 million. The Government of National Reconciliation is expected to provide about 30 per cent of the cost, the World Bank is considering the provision of an \$80 million loan, and other donors are also providing funding. However, there is currently a \$19 million funding shortfall for the programme.

12. On 18 May, the Forces nouvelles indicated that they would not disarm, until a number of conditions had been met. These include the disarmament and dismantling of militias and the adoption by the National Assembly of the amended law on the composition of the Independent Electoral Commission, the nationality code and the law on identification. In addition, the Forces nouvelles have insisted that adequate security guarantees be provided during the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process and that the requisite funding be secured before the process starts. This has cast serious doubts on whether the process will start on 27 June as currently scheduled.

### **Disarmament and dismantling of the militias**

13. The continued presence of organized and armed militias poses a major security risk that has the potential to disrupt the entire peace process. The disarmament of the militias is a priority, particularly with regard to the forthcoming electoral campaign with its potential for politically motivated violence. While a symbolic handover of weapons involving four of the main pro-Government militias operating in the west took place in Guiglo on 25 May, under the supervision of the chief of staff of FANCI, several of the militia members expressed a reluctance to disarm in the absence of adequate guarantees for their future. The Forces nouvelles have also

questioned the prospects for progress, citing reports that many militia members have simply gone into hiding with their weapons and ammunition.

14. Under the Pretoria Agreement, Prime Minister Diarra was given responsibility for developing a plan for the disarmament and dismantling of the militias with the support of Units of the Ivorian Defence and Security Forces to be selected and placed at his disposal by President Gbagbo. The Prime Minister has repeatedly requested the direct assistance of the impartial forces in this exercise to ensure that it is carried out transparently. UNOCI is discussing with the Prime Minister how it might be able to assist in this task within its capacity.

#### **Training of Forces nouvelles to provide security in the north**

15. As envisaged in the Pretoria Agreement, UNOCI is developing a training programme for 600 individuals from the Forces nouvelles to provide security in the north as soon as the cantonment of the Forces nouvelles commences. Teams of United Nations civilian police officers will continue to provide advice and mentoring to those personnel.

#### **Security of the Government of National Reconciliation ministers**

16. The UNOCI special protection group has continued to provide security for Forces nouvelles ministers of the Government of National Reconciliation. Since several Forces nouvelles ministers did not participate in the work of the Government of National Reconciliation during the reporting period and were often absent from Abidjan, UNOCI was able to provide an adequate level of support to the reduced number of ministers needing security protection. As recommended in my third and fourth progress reports on UNOCI (see S/2004/962 and S/2005/186), the special protection group will require an additional 76 gendarmes if it is to provide effective protection to Government ministers. Meanwhile, the Government of South Africa has provided training for Ivorian gendarmerie officers and Forces nouvelles elements in South Africa for the protection of members of the Government of National Reconciliation. While this is a welcome development, the proposed involvement of the UNOCI special protection group in the security plan developed by the South African mediation team will need to be clarified in order to ensure the optimal deployment of personnel.

#### **Completion of the board of directors of Ivorian Radio and Television**

17. The Pretoria Agreement provides for the restoration of Ivorian Radio and Television to the status it held prior to 24 December 2004 and the appointment of a new board of directors. On 28 April, President Gbagbo issued two decrees restoring Ivorian Radio and Television to its original status and reinstating its board of directors.

## **IV. Elections**

18. The Pretoria Agreement calls upon the United Nations to play an enhanced role in the organization of the upcoming general elections. In a letter addressed to me dated 23 May, the Permanent Representative of Côte d'Ivoire to the United Nations reiterated a request from his Government that the United Nations provide expertise and other assistance for the organization of the presidential and legislative

elections. Furthermore, in a letter dated 23 May addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2005/340), the Permanent Representative of South Africa conveyed the wish of President Mbeki, in his capacity as mediator for the peace process, to request the United Nations, on behalf of the Ivorian people, to participate in the organization of general elections. The letter also indicated that the mediator hoped that the Security Council would soon agree on the appointment of a competent authority who, acting in the name of the international community and invested with the necessary powers and uncontested moral authority, would guarantee transparency and strict respect for the rules governing the election. It will be recalled that, in order to ensure that the upcoming elections would be credible and meet international standards, the Ivorian parties, in consultation with the South African mediation, had agreed on the appointment of such an authority.

19. In this connection, by its resolution 1603 (2005) of 3 June, the Security Council requested that I designate, as an exceptional arrangement, after consultations with the African Union and President Mbeki, a High Representative for the elections in Côte d'Ivoire, autonomous from UNOCI, to assist in particular in the work of the Independent Electoral Commission and of the Constitutional Council, without prejudice to the responsibilities of my Special Representative for Côte d'Ivoire. The High Representative is mandated to verify, on behalf of the international community, that all stages of the electoral process, including the establishment of a register of voters and the issuance of voters' cards, provide all the necessary guarantees for the holding of open, free, fair and transparent presidential and legislative elections, within the limits laid down in the Constitution of Côte d'Ivoire. The High Representative is also mandated to provide, in close cooperation with UNOCI and the mediation, all necessary advice and guidance to the Constitutional Council, the Independent Electoral Commission and other relevant agencies or institutes to help them prevent and resolve any difficulty which may jeopardize the holding of the elections, with the authority to make necessary determinations in this regard. I am presently considering candidates for the position of High Representative and intend to revert to the Council with my decision on this matter shortly.

20. The office of the High Representative would comprise a limited number of electoral experts. While the office would be autonomous from UNOCI, the mission would be expected to cooperate closely with it, including through the sharing of information and the provision of technical advice and administrative support. A small reinforcement of the electoral component of UNOCI will therefore be needed in order to carry out the new tasks foreseen under the Pretoria Agreement.

21. An electoral review mission, led by the Electoral Assistance Division of the Department of Political Affairs, was deployed to Côte d'Ivoire from 20 May to 3 June to further assess and review preparations for the 2005 elections and prepare recommendations on the support to be provided by the United Nations. The mission found that the preparations for the elections had been subject to delays and that, unless the current slow pace of implementation was significantly increased, it would not be possible to meet the scheduled date of 30 October. As noted above, the Independent Electoral Commission does not currently enjoy the full support of all political actors in Côte d'Ivoire, as the revised law on its composition has yet to be adopted and a reconstituted Commission has yet to be established. The situation is further compounded by the continuing ambiguity surrounding the respective roles and responsibilities of the National Institute of Statistics and the Independent

Electoral Commission, following President Gbagbo's declaration of 26 April (see para. 8 above).

22. A new voter registration system being proposed by the National Institute of Statistics has not yet been tested and there is a risk that unforeseen operational problems could cause delays. Furthermore, the Independent Electoral Commission would normally play a key role in defining the modalities for the voter registration process and in supervising it. It would therefore not be advisable to proceed with the exercise until a reconstituted Commission has been established. Decisions also need to be taken urgently with regard to voter registration methodology, institutional responsibilities and the types of documentation that should be presented by those intending to register to vote.

23. In the present circumstances, producing a comprehensive budget for the electoral process or a realistic electoral calendar is not possible. As a result, donors are reluctant to provide funds for the elections. The Ivorian parties need urgently to take the steps necessary to establish the reconstituted Independent Electoral Commission and to resolve other key outstanding issues if the electoral process is to remain on track.

24. In preparation for holding the national elections, on 18 April, in Paris, four opposition parties — the Rally of Republicans, the Democratic Party of Côte d'Ivoire, the Movement of Forces of the Future and the Union for Democracy and Peace in Côte d'Ivoire — created a common electoral platform known as the "Rally of Houphouëtistes for Democracy and Peace".

## **V. Restoring security**

25. As at 13 June, the force level of UNOCI stood at 6,042 against an authorized strength of 6,240. The major shortfall is in the helicopter unit, for which a troop contributor is still actively being sought. As a result, UNOCI aviation support currently lacks the flexibility of dedicated military assets, critical for movement and timely employment of reserves, patrolling of the borders, monitoring of the arms embargo and medical evacuation of injured United Nations troops.

26. UNOCI troops continued to carry out their mandated tasks throughout the country, consistent with the operational priorities imposed by the mission's limited resources. These tasks include ensuring the security of United Nations personnel, equipment and installations; monitoring the ceasefire and movement of armed groups and preventing hostile actions, in particular within the zone of confidence; assisting the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process; and monitoring the implementation of the arms embargo.

27. During the reporting period, no violations of the ceasefire were reported, and there were no major violations of the zone of confidence by either of the belligerent forces. The situation in Abidjan remained relatively calm and there was an overall decline in the activities of the "Young patriots". However, there was an increase in criminality and targeted political violence in the city.

28. As indicated in paragraphs 6 and 10 above, FANCI and the Forces nouvelles have resumed contacts, thereby helping to reduce tensions between the military forces. While the withdrawal of heavy weapons from the zone of confidence was a

positive development, continuing lawlessness in the zone continues to be of serious concern.

29. The UNOCI and Licorne forces continue to cooperate closely at all levels. The UNOCI military component has also continued to cooperate with the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) and the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL), including through the sharing of information, situation assessments, liaison, visits and coordination between the joint mission analysis cells, in particular to prevent cross-border movements of weapons or armed groups.

#### **Situation in the west**

30. The continuing violence in the western part of Côte d'Ivoire remains a major cause for concern and, if left unchecked, risks undermining the gains made since the signing of the Pretoria Agreement. In this regard, the Duékoué area has been the scene of a series of inter- and intracommunal clashes resulting in numerous deaths, destruction of property and the displacement of thousands of people.

31. Between 30 April and 2 May, 25 people were killed and 41 injured in Duékoué, Yrozon, Blody and Tao Zeo and more than 9,000 people, mostly from the Guéré community, were displaced. Subsequently, during the night of 31 May, traditional hunters known as "Dozos", armed with machetes and rifles, attacked the villages of Guetrozon and Petit Duékoué. At least 41 people were killed and 61 injured during the attacks on the villages whose inhabitants are predominantly of Guéré origin. On 1 June, seven people of northern Dioula origin were killed in Duékoué, allegedly by Guérés, in apparent retaliation for the attack of 31 May. Further attacks occurred in the next few days bringing the death toll to at least 70. It appears that FANCI soldiers in Guetrozon did little to stop the initial attacks. Several thousand people fled Duékoué, while 10,000 took refuge in the town at a Catholic mission. The situation in the area remains tense. In my statement of 2 June, I urged the Ivorian authorities to conduct a full inquiry into the incident and ensure that the perpetrators of the attack are quickly brought to justice.

32. On 1 June, UNOCI deployed personnel from the Bangladeshi contingent to the area to help the Ivorian Defence and Security Forces stabilize the situation. The UNOCI presence was subsequently reinforced in and around Duékoué, where some 350 troops are now providing support to the Defence and Security Forces. In addition, UNOCI and Licorne launched a joint surveillance operation in the Duékoué area and the zone of confidence. While the strengthening of the UNOCI presence around Duékoué has helped to stabilize the situation, it has placed an additional strain on the mission's already overstretched military capacity.

33. In an effort to address the critical situation in the west, my Special Representative for Côte d'Ivoire has met with Government officials, including Prime Minister Diarra and senior members of the President's office, to discuss ways of strengthening security around Duékoué. President Gbagbo has requested that UNOCI work closely with the Ivorian Defence and Security Forces. The authorities have also asked that joint patrols by these forces and impartial forces be reinstated. UNOCI has also emphasized to the authorities their primary responsibility for ensuring the security of civilians in Government-controlled areas and, in particular, the need to promote dialogue and reconciliation between different communities in the west.

34. Furthermore, on 8 June, my Special Representative for Côte d'Ivoire called on the Ivorian authorities to launch an investigation as soon as possible into the attacks around Duékoué and indicated the readiness of the UNOCI Human Rights Unit to provide assistance as required. On 9 June, my Special Representative accompanied the members of the monitoring committee established under the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement to the Duékoué area, where they visited the village of Guetrozon and the Catholic mission. Prime Minister Diarra also visited the area on 3 June, as did President Gbagbo on 14 June.

#### **Monitoring the arms embargo**

35. In accordance with the provisions of Security Council resolution 1572 (2004) of 15 November 2004, UNOCI started inspection visits to monitor the arms embargo on 21 March. Since then, inspections of FANCI and Forces nouvelles military installations and airports, airfields, seaports and border crossings have been conducted, with no violations being reported. It should be noted that the capacity of UNOCI to monitor the arms embargo is limited by a lack of dedicated expertise and resources, insufficient intelligence and the continued failure of FANCI and the Forces nouvelles to provide UNOCI with a comprehensive list of their armaments, as called for by Security Council resolution 1584 (2005) of 1 February 2005.

#### **Small arms control**

36. At the request of the Prime Minister, the post-conflict unit of the United Nations Development Programme, in collaboration with the Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Section of UNOCI, organized a meeting on small arms and light weapons from 17 to 20 May in Grand Bassam. The meeting resulted in the adoption of a pilot programme on small arms and light weapons control, an institutional framework for the national commission on small arms and light weapons and a number of documents related to this topic. This is an encouraging development, and UNOCI will continue to work closely with the Government and other partners on implementing the pilot programme and other arms control measures.

## **VI. Redeploying State administration**

37. UNOCI continues to facilitate, in cooperation with ECOWAS and other international partners, preparations for the redeployment of State administration throughout the country. The National Commission for the Restoration of State Authority organized a seminar in Grand Bassam from 18 to 21 May, attended by a wide range of national stakeholders, at which guidelines and a time frame for the restoration of State administration were adopted. Renewed calls were made for urgent donor support for this exercise, which is estimated to cost \$300 million. In this connection, the Prime Minister intends to convene shortly a round table with major donors to mobilize donor assistance for the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme, the national elections and the redeployment of State administration.



## **VII. Re-establishing the rule of law and protecting human rights**

### **Civilian policing**

38. As at 13 June, the UNOCI civilian police component stood at 218 officers out of an authorized strength of 350. These officers are deployed in Abidjan, Daloa, San-Pédro, Man, Bouaké, Yamoussoukro, Bondoukou, Korhogo and Abengourou. The full deployment of police personnel is expected to be completed in July 2005.

39. During the period under review, the police and military components of UNOCI continued to participate in mixed patrols with FANCI, the Ivorian national police and the gendarmerie in Abidjan. Furthermore, UNOCI civilian police operating from Bouaké, Daloa, Yamoussoukro and Bondoukou participated in joint patrolling in the zone of confidence. UNOCI civilian police officers have assisted the UNOCI military component in carrying out its mandated tasks related to the protection of civilians under imminent threat of violence in the zone of confidence.

### **The justice system**

40. During the period under review, the UNOCI Rule of Law Unit met regularly with the local judiciary, including the National Union of Magistrates and local prison officials. The Unit's efforts focused on developing measures to help strengthen the independence of the judiciary and to address problems of corruption. The Unit has also been providing assistance to the local judiciary in dealing with cases of death in custody, torture, ill-treatment and arbitrary killings of detainees by elements of the security forces.

### **Prisons**

41. UNOCI has prepared a training programme for corrections officers and submitted it to the Ivorian authorities for approval. UNOCI and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) have also intervened at the Daloa prison to help improve the delivery of food and health care to prisoners after the deaths of several inmates due to malnutrition. In order to improve security at the main prison in Abidjan, following the escape of 3,645 prisoners in November 2004, UNOCI has provided assistance for the rehabilitation of the prison's infrastructure through quick impact project funding.

### **Human rights**

42. The human rights situation throughout Côte d'Ivoire remains worrying. It has been exacerbated in the western part of the country by the continuing tensions created by the armed attack by a group of elements claiming to be members of the Mouvement Ivoirien pour la Libération de l'Ouest de la Côte d'Ivoire (MILOCI) against Forces nouvelles positions at Logoualé on 28 February and also the attacks around Duékoué.

43. Summary and extrajudiciary executions, rape, sexual violence and extortion continue throughout the country, involving elements of the Forces nouvelles and affiliated militias such as the Dozos, the Ivorian Defence and Security Forces, pro-Government militias and other armed groups.

44. Relations between indigenous Ivorian ethnic groups and immigrant communities in many areas remain tense, notably in Duékoué and Guiglo and in and

around the zone of confidence. The continuing confrontations between these communities have resulted in serious human rights violations. Robberies have also increased on main roads, while some elements of the Forces nouvelles and pro-Government militias have infiltrated the zone of confidence on several occasions.

46. The administration of justice continues to be an issue of deep concern. In the north, justice is often arbitrarily dispensed by a number of Forces nouvelles commanders. Following the attacks at Logoualé, the Forces nouvelles have held 39 elements of MILOCI in incommunicado detention in Korhogo. A further 43 prisoners have been held in incommunicado detention in Bouaké since 28 April. UNOCI has so far been denied access to the detainees.

47. UNOCI has continued to promote dialogue between the Ivorian authorities and Forces nouvelles representatives on human rights issues. In a positive development, the Government of National Reconciliation has resubmitted the law establishing the National Commission for Human Rights to the National Assembly for revision in order to bring it in line with the Paris Principles.

## **VIII. Promoting peace and peace combating media inciting hatred and violence**

48. During the reporting period, the Public Information and Outreach Section of UNOCI has strengthened its capacity to monitor the media, gather information and conduct public information campaigns in both the Government and Forces nouvelles-controlled areas of the country, including through deploying public information officers to Bouaké, Daloa and Man. In collaboration with the civilian police component, the Public Information and Outreach Section has also established a system of information gathering from the field in Korhogo, Bondoukou, San-Pédro, Yamoussoukro and Abengourou.

49. Media coverage of social and political events has continued to reflect broad divisions within Ivorian society. Some media have pursued a campaign against the continued presence of Licorne in the country that has often featured virulent anti-French attacks. A second group of media has advocated the continued presence of the French forces. A number of calls for a resumption of the armed conflict were also made through the media, especially following the Logoualé attack in February.

50. The signing of the Pretoria Agreement contributed to a lessening of inflammatory discourse in the media. However, the determination by President Mbeki that the candidates nominated by the parties signatory to the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement should participate in the presidential elections elicited a new wave of intolerant and divisive coverage by the Ivorian media. There were also incidents of biased and inflammatory reporting following the ethnic clashes in and around Duékoué.

51. The revision of the status of Ivorian Radio and Television referred to in paragraph 17 above has enabled UNOCI to develop closer ties with that organization and the Government's centre for information and communications, with a view to promoting professional ethics among journalists, who have a central role to play in the peace process. The Public Information and Outreach Section of UNOCI is planning training programmes for journalists during the electoral run-up

period with the aim of increasing their awareness of the importance of responsible and professional reporting in an electoral process that is likely to be fraught with tension. UNOCI has also sought to improve the technical capacity of some media that lack resources. In this regard, in April, a community radio station in Tiassale was provided with broadcasting equipment through quick impact project funding.

52. UNOCI FM radio can currently be heard in Abidjan, Bouaké, Daloa and Korhogo. Prior to the elections, the station will broadcast programmes on the electoral process to promote civic education and encourage voter participation.

53. Public information sections in UNOCI, UNMIL, UNAMSIL and the United Nations Office for West Africa are collaborating on issues of mutual concern in the subregion, in particular on cross-border issues related to the arms embargo and the recruitment of mercenaries and children formerly associated with fighting forces.

## **IX. Humanitarian challenges and economic and social perspectives**

### **Humanitarian situation**

54. The humanitarian situation in Côte d'Ivoire has continued to deteriorate, especially in the water, health and education sectors. In rural areas, only 40 per cent of the population has access to traditional wells, the main drinking water source, while most water pumps are in a state of disrepair. In the northern city of Korhogo, the supply reservoir is nearly dry, causing an acute water shortage. Some 30 per cent of the urban population do not have access to clean drinking water, while only 54 per cent have access to proper sewage systems. UNOCI has collaborated with United Nations agencies and ICRC on several projects to increase the number of functioning pumps, particularly in the north, and to establish water purification and distribution systems.

55. Limited access to water, sewage systems and medical services, particularly in the north and the west, has led to a continued rise in diseases and malnutrition. United Nations agencies and national and international partners are working to meet the most urgent health needs of the population. However, urgent steps need to be taken to rehabilitate the basic health infrastructure in order to prevent a further deterioration of the situation in the coming months.

56. In the education sector, the organization of final exams for the 2003/04 school year in the Forces nouvelles-controlled areas and the redeployment of the school administration are priority tasks. In the north, a lack of qualified teachers, school materials and administrative support is a major problem. In the north and west, the United Nations Children's Fund has distributed educational kits to 175,000 children and 3,500 teachers while the World Food Programme has distributed hot rations to 200,000 pupils. The ministries of human rights and education have produced a joint programme for the integration of human rights education into the school curriculum.

57. There are currently an estimated 500,000 internally displaced persons in Côte d'Ivoire. Most are living with host families, who are finding it increasingly difficult to cope with this additional burden. A number of humanitarian agencies, in collaboration with the Ivorian authorities, are developing a registration process for internally displaced persons to improve the system for responding to their assistance

and protection needs and prepare for their eventual return or resettlement. The UNOCI Human Rights Unit is also working with humanitarian organizations to establish a protection monitoring framework.

58. An Inter-Agency Standing Committee assessment mission visited Côte d'Ivoire from 2 to 7 April. The mission highlighted a number of issues requiring the urgent attention of the humanitarian community, including the need to improve the security and protection of populations living in the zone of confidence and to address the volatile situation in the west. In this regard, it noted the urgent need for the reinforcements of UNOCI outlined in my third and fourth reports on UNOCI. The mission also emphasized the need to develop a concerted strategy for restoring health and education services and improving access to water and electricity in the north.

### **Economic and social situation**

59. The gross domestic product of Côte d'Ivoire is officially estimated to have grown by 1.6 per cent in 2004, but due to the crisis of November 2004, economic growth is expected to be lower in 2005. The budget deficit for 2004 stood at an estimated \$295 million and the country's total outstanding external debt is estimated at \$846 million. The situation has been made worse by a decline in tax revenue of about \$67 million, resulting from the negative impact of the November crisis on private sector activity, and an increase in social and military expenditure of about \$61 million. Moreover, by the end of March 2005, Côte d'Ivoire had accumulated some \$135 million in arrears to the World Bank.

60. Meanwhile, some segments of the economy have registered gains. The production of cocoa, coffee, palm oil and oil and gas increased in 2004. However, if left unchecked, the smuggling of cocoa to neighbouring countries will have a negative effect on the performance of this sector.

61. The deteriorating macroeconomic environment, and the accompanying disruption of economic activity and social services, have led to increased poverty, particularly in the western part of the country. Some 44 per cent of the population now live below the poverty line, as opposed to 38 per cent at the end of 1999. This constitutes a major reversal of progress towards the achievement of the United Nations Millennium Development Goals.

62. The economic impact of the Ivorian crisis has had negative repercussions for the entire West African subregion. The overall economic performance of countries from the West African Monetary Union zone grew by only 2.8 per cent in 2004 against a projected growth rate of 4.1 per cent.

## **X. Gender**

63. During the reporting period, the UNOCI Gender Unit carried out induction training on gender issues for more than 100 military and civilian staff members. The Unit also established a gender sensitization campaign for UNOCI personnel. A gender task force has been formed to ensure gender mainstreaming in the mission's activities. The Unit is working with the National Commission for disarmament, demobilization and reintegration to address issues related to vulnerable groups affected by the conflict. It also liaises regularly with civil society representatives

and has participated in several meetings aimed at increasing women's participation as both candidates and voters in the upcoming elections.

## **XI. HIV/AIDS**

64. The UNOCI HIV/AIDS Unit has continued its awareness campaign for UNOCI personnel. The Unit trained 84 peer educators from UNOCI military contingents. Some UNOCI personnel have also taken advantage of the Unit's voluntary counselling and testing programme.

## **XII. Sexual exploitation and abuse**

65. UNOCI has sought to harmonize initiatives taken in compliance with the Secretary-General's bulletin on special measures for protection from sexual exploitation and abuse (ST/SGB/2003/13). A policy group on sexual exploitation and abuse has been established. It is developing and monitoring the mission's strategy to combat sexual exploitation and abuse, particularly in the area of prevention, and also acts as an advisory group to my Special Representative for Côte d'Ivoire. The visit of the Deputy Secretary-General to Côte d'Ivoire in March gave an important impetus to these efforts. During the period under review, one allegation was received but was found to be unsubstantiated following an investigation.

## **XIII. Staff security**

66. The security situation remains volatile and unpredictable. The involvement of UNOCI in the implementation of the Pretoria Agreement, in particular the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration and electoral processes, and also in the monitoring of the arms embargo, raises concerns regarding the security of UNOCI staff, particularly if disgruntled elements resort to violence to disrupt the peace process.

67. Criminal activities, particularly in Abidjan are a constant threat. Criminality is being fuelled by the circulation in the country of light arms and may have been exacerbated by the large-scale prison escape in Abidjan in November 2004. UNOCI personnel have been victims of armed robbery, burglary and carjackings in recent months. The continued presence of armed militias remains a potential threat to the security of UNOCI personnel and property.

68. UNOCI continues to improve its preparedness by incorporating in its security procedures lessons learned from the November 2004 crisis and from emergency drills and simulated evacuation exercises. The move of Abidjan-based staff into an integrated headquarters, currently scheduled for July, is expected to further contribute to enhancing their safety and security. UNOCI is also working with the United Nations country team to ensure effective operational coordination within the United Nations system in case of emergencies.

#### **XIV. Reinforcements required by the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire**

69. In the coming months, the maintenance of security nationwide will be essential in order for the implementation of the Pretoria Agreement to proceed smoothly. In addition to its ongoing security responsibilities, the demands on UNOCI are likely to increase significantly as the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process and the electoral preparations proceed. In addition to securing disarmament and demobilization sites, UNOCI and Licorne will also need to take all appropriate steps to ensure the integrity of the zone of confidence and prevent incidents that could jeopardize the disarmament and demobilization process. To this end, enhanced surveillance and reinforcement of the zone of confidence, as well as continued monitoring of the arms embargo, will be required.

70. As indicated above, political violence is expected to increase in the run-up to the elections, particularly as electoral campaigning intensifies across the country. The security situation in the western part of the country, in particular, remains volatile and requires close monitoring. High visibility and a robust approach by the UNOCI force will be critical to maintaining a climate conducive to the completion of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process and the holding of free and fair elections.

71. The crisis of November 2004 exposed some critical weaknesses in the mission's force structure and capacity. Therefore, in my third report on UNOCI (S/2004/962), I recommended that the Security Council approve additional military, civilian police and civilian resources, noting that these were indispensable for UNOCI to discharge effectively the multiple responsibilities assigned to it by the Council. I reiterated this recommendation in my fourth report on UNOCI (S/2005/186) since the reinforcements were still urgently required to provide adequate protection to United Nations personnel and facilities, especially in Abidjan, to increase the operational reserve of UNOCI and to restore its capacity in the zone of confidence.

72. In order for UNOCI to fully discharge its mandated responsibilities and to carry out the additional tasks envisaged under the Pretoria Agreement, the emergency reinforcements recommended in my third and fourth reports are still urgently needed. These comprise an additional 1,226 troops, including one infantry battalion (850 personnel), an aviation unit (270 personnel) with four attack and four surveillance helicopters, a riverine unit (30 personnel) and an additional 76 gendarmes for protection of the ministers of the Government of National Reconciliation.

73. In addition, UNOCI would require an additional infantry battalion of 850 military personnel dedicated to securing disarmament, demobilization and cantonment sites and reinforcing the zone of confidence during the disarmament and demobilization phases. Core tasks envisaged for this infantry battalion include the provision of security to groups moving towards disarmament, demobilization and cantonment zones; provision of security for disarmament and demobilization zones, including provision of armed escorts; assistance in the collection, storage and disposal of surrendered weapons, ammunition and explosives; and the conduct of mixed patrols with FANCI and the Forces nouvelles to promote mutual confidence and ensure the integrity of the zone of confidence.

74. Following the completion of the disarmament and demobilization process, these new troops would be redeployed throughout the country to provide support for the elections. Core tasks in this regard would include the provision of area security during all stages of the electoral process, including armed escorts for transportation of election staff and material to and from polling stations; mixed patrols with FANCI to ensure the maintenance of law and order; provision of close protection for candidates during the election campaign; and monitoring of border areas to minimize the scope for disruption of the electoral process by armed elements from across the borders.

75. The timely deployment of these reinforcements will be vital and several force generation options have been considered. One such option is the use of troops from UNAMSIL or UNMIL, in line with the proposals contained in my report on inter-mission cooperation and possible cross-border operations (S/2005/136). However, while I remain fully committed to the principle of greater cooperation among the three United Nations peacekeeping missions deployed in West Africa, the potential costs and benefits of such an approach must be carefully weighed in the light of the current subregional context. With elections in Liberia also scheduled to take place in October, it is my considered view that conditions for such a redeployment of troops from UNMIL do not exist at the present time. Furthermore, assuming that the requisite legal issues are addressed and the agreement of relevant troop-contributing countries is obtained, under the current plans for the drawdown of UNAMSIL, the deployment of a first battalion would not be possible before mid-September, which would not meet the requirements of UNOCI.

76. In line with Security Council resolution 1603 (2005) of 3 June 2005, initial contacts have been made with potential troop-contributing countries regarding the possible contribution of additional troops to UNOCI, pending authorization by the Security Council. It is expected that the first elements of the two additional battalions required could be deployed as early as a month after the adoption of an enabling resolution.

77. As indicated in paragraph 39 above, the UNOCI civilian police component has a crucial role to play in support of the Pretoria Agreement. In order to fulfil these and previously mandated tasks, the civilian police component needs to attain its authorized strength of 350 officers in July, as scheduled. In addition, three formed police units would be required, each composed of 125 officers. One would be deployed in Abidjan while the other two would be deployed in Bouaké and Daloa. The proposed units would be responsible for assisting in the protection of United Nations personnel and facilities; assisting in training and advising the 600 individuals from the Forces nouvelles as well as others from the Ivorian police and gendarmerie in the performance of their functions, particularly crowd control; assisting in the protection and security of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration sites in cases of civil disturbance; and participating in joint patrols with the Ivorian security services in Abidjan.

78. In line with Security Council resolution 1603 (2005) of 3 June 2005, potential police-contributing countries have been approached to ensure the timely provision of personnel, should the proposed reinforcement be authorized by the Council. In this connection, a first formed police unit could be deployed to Abidjan within one month of the adoption of the enabling resolution.

## **XV. Financial aspects**

79. The General Assembly, by its resolution 59/16 of 29 October 2004, appropriated \$378.5 million for the maintenance of UNOCI for the period from 1 July 2004 to 30 June 2005. Following its consideration of my proposed budget, the Assembly is expected to take action shortly on the appropriation of some \$367.5 million for the maintenance of the mission for the period from 1 July 2005 to 30 June 2006.

80. Should the Security Council approve my recommendations with respect to the reinforcement of UNOCI, the additional resources for the operation of the mission will be sought from the General Assembly during the main part of its sixtieth session. As indicated in the addendum to the present report, describing financial implications arising from the proposed reinforcement, it is my intention to cover the immediate costs of the reinforcement, should the Council approve it, from the initial appropriation to be provided by the General Assembly for the 2005/06 financial period.

81. As at 31 May 2005, unpaid assessed contributions to the special account for UNOCI amounted to \$95.8 million. The total outstanding assessed contributions for all peacekeeping operations at that date amounted to \$2,028.0 million.

## **XVI. Observations**

82. The signing of the Pretoria Agreement on 6 April opened a new opportunity for progress in the peace process in Côte d'Ivoire, in line with the Linas-Marcoussis and Accra III Agreements. I would like to reiterate my deep appreciation to the President of South Africa, Thabo Mbeki, in his capacity as the African Union mediator, for his personal commitment and untiring efforts towards resolving the crisis. Some progress has been made towards implementation of the Agreement. Notably, the resolution of the issue of eligibility to the presidency has removed a major obstacle to the holding of open and credible elections. The agreement reached by the parties on the timing and modalities of the national disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme, according to which the disarmament and demobilization phases are now scheduled to take place from 27 June to 10 August, and the planned restructuring of the armed forces, were also positive steps. In addition, the removal by FANCI and the Forces nouvelles of their heavy weapons from the zone of confidence and the approval and implementation of the provisions regarding the statute and management of Ivorian Radio and Television were also encouraging developments.

83. However, there have been protracted and dangerous delays in the implementation of other key provisions of the Pretoria Agreement. The full integrity of the Government of National Reconciliation has yet to be restored. Meanwhile, time is swiftly running out for the organization of the first round of the presidential elections, currently scheduled for 30 October. In this connection, the approval by the National Assembly of the revised law on the composition of the supervisory institution, the Independent Electoral Commission, and the establishment of the reconstituted Commission need in particular to be urgently completed. The holding of free and fair elections is vital to restoring democratic order in Côte d'Ivoire. As noted above, the United Nations will assist the process through the provision of



technical support. I also intend to appoint shortly a High Representative for the elections, who will play a key role in ensuring the credibility of the electoral process.

84. Meanwhile, the parties should take all necessary steps to ensure that the disarmament and demobilization process commences as scheduled. Progress in this area is essential and urgently needed in order to create an environment conducive for the elections and the restoration of State administration countrywide. I urge FANCI and the Forces nouvelles to provide a comprehensive list of their armaments to UNOCI without further delay for use in the disarmament process and in the monitoring of the arms embargo. Meanwhile, the continuing activities of militias pose a dangerous threat to security and their disarming and dismantling should proceed without delay. UNOCI will provide appropriate assistance to Prime Minister Diarra in undertaking the responsibilities entrusted to him for this process under the Pretoria Agreement.

85. The delays in implementation of the Agreement are contributing to a growing lack of public confidence in the peace process. Meanwhile, the security situation, particularly in the west, remains very difficult with the potential for the occurrence of increasingly virulent communal clashes in the future. The economy is suffering a downward spiral which fuels political tensions and deteriorating social conditions, leading to an increasingly worrying humanitarian situation. Meanwhile, widespread human rights abuses are continuing in the north and south of the country, with few steps being taken to combat the prevailing climate of impunity. The uncertainty regarding the peace process is having grave repercussions for stability and economic recovery in Côte d'Ivoire and also for the wider West Africa subregion.

86. The urgency of proceeding with the full and unconditional implementation of the Pretoria Agreement cannot be overemphasized. The Ivorian parties cannot afford to miss this window of opportunity for restoring peace. I would therefore urge President Gbagbo, the Forces nouvelles and the leaders of all Ivorian political movements to expeditiously fulfil their commitments and build on the progress that has been made so far. In the final analysis, the Ivorian leaders bear full, personal responsibility for making the sometimes difficult decisions and compromises needed to ensure the peaceful resolution of the crisis. Those who might choose to shirk this responsibility should expect the international community to take firm action and bring into force the individual measures envisaged in Security Council resolution 1572 (2004) of 15 November 2004, which remain an essential part of the international strategy to support the peace process. I urge the Council to assess regularly the effect of resolution 1572 (2004) on the ground.

87. Meanwhile, the full engagement of the international community in support of the implementation of the Pretoria Agreement and the mediation efforts of President Mbeki, in particular through the provision of necessary technical and financial assistance, will be critical. The United Nations, for its part, will continue to work closely with the African Union, ECOWAS and other key partners in support of the implementation of the key provisions of the Agreement. I would urge donor countries to give urgent consideration to the provision of much-needed resources, in particular technical and financial assistance for the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration and electoral processes and also for the restoration of State authority.

88. As indicated in paragraphs 69 to 78 above, UNOCI needs to be urgently reinforced so that it has the capacity to effectively carry out its mandated responsibilities, as well as those tasks envisaged for it under the Pretoria Agreement. The recent killings in the Duékoué area further underscore the need to reinforce UNOCI urgently so that it can effectively assist the Ivorian authorities in preventing a further deterioration of the situation in the west. I would therefore request that the Security Council authorize the deployment of an additional 2,076 troops and three formed police units comprising 375 officers to assist in the provision of security and the maintenance of law and order during the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration and electoral processes, along with a limited reinforcement in the civilian component of the mission.

89. Finally, it should be recalled that implementation of the Pretoria Agreement must go hand-in-hand with efforts to promote national reconciliation, address the prevailing culture of impunity, meet the social needs of the population and support the process of long-term economic recovery in Côte d'Ivoire. I therefore urge the international donor community to remain fully engaged and ensure that funds are also made available for these key areas.

90. In conclusion, I would like to commend my new Special Representative in Côte d'Ivoire, Pierre Schori, who began his assignment on 1 April 2005, and the civilian and military staff of UNOCI for their unsparing efforts in support of the search for lasting peace in Côte d'Ivoire. Similarly, I would like to express my gratitude to the United Nations country team, humanitarian and development organizations, bilateral donors and the countries that are contributing troops and police personnel to the mission, as well as to the African Union and ECOWAS, for their contributions to the peace process.

## Annex

### United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire: military and civilian police strength as of 13 June 2005

Country	Military component			Total	Civilian police
	Military observers	Staff officers	Troops		
Argentina					3
Bangladesh	10	8	2 823	2 841	1
Benin	8	4	305	317	16
Bolivia	3			3	
Brazil	4	3		7	
Burkina Faso		1		1	
Cameroon					48
Canada					10
Chad	3			3	3
China	7			7	
Congo	6			6	
Croatia	3			3	
Djibouti					24
Dominican Republic	4			4	
Ecuador	2			2	
El Salvador	3			3	
France	2	16	171	189	10
Gambia	5	1		6	
Ghana	6	5	396	407	1
Guatemala	5			5	
Guinea	3			3	
India	8			8	
Ireland	1			1	
Jordan	7	10		17	
Kenya	4	4		8	
Lebanon					2
Morocco	1	3	731	735	
Namibia	3			3	
Nepal	3			3	
Niger	6	3	366	375	23
Nigeria	5			5	3
Pakistan	10	9	364	383	
Paraguay	9	2		11	
Peru	3			3	
Philippines	4	1		5	

<i>Country</i>	<i>Military component</i>			<i>Total</i>	<i>Civilian police</i>
	<i>Military observers</i>	<i>Staff officers</i>	<i>Troops</i>		
Poland	2			2	
Portugal					2
Republic of Moldova	4			4	
Romania	6			6	
Russian Federation	11			11	
Senegal	8	11	314	333	50
Serbia and Montenegro	3			3	
Sri Lanka					1
Togo	6	4	292	302	1
Tunisia	3			3	
Turkey					9
Uganda	2	2		4	
Uruguay	2	1		3	11
Yemen	5			5	
Zambia	2			2	
<b>Total</b>	<b>192</b>	<b>88</b>	<b>5 762</b>	<b>6 042</b>	<b>218</b>

