

UNITED NATIONS



SECURITY COUNCIL OFFICIAL RECORDS

THIRTY-FIFTH YEAR

2191st MEETING: 11 AND 13 JANUARY 1980

NEW YORK

CONTENTS

	<i>Page</i>
Provisional agenda (S/Agenda/2191)	1
Adoption of the agenda	1
Letter dated 22 December 1979 from the Permanent Representative of the United States of America to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/13705)	1

UN LIBRARY
MAY 27 1986
UN/SA COLLECTION

NOTE

Symbols of United Nations documents are composed of capital letters combined with figures. Mention of such a symbol indicates a reference to a United Nations document.

Documents of the Security Council (symbol S/ . . .) are normally published in quarterly *Supplements* of the *Official Records of the Security Council*. The date of the document indicates the supplement in which it appears or in which information about it is given.

The resolutions of the Security Council, numbered in accordance with a system adopted in 1964, are published in yearly volumes of *Resolutions and Decisions of the Security Council*. The new system, which has been applied retroactively to resolutions adopted before 1 January 1965, became fully operative on that date.

1965/10/10
10/10/65
10/10/65

2191st MEETING

Held in New York on Friday, 11 January 1980,
at 9 p.m. and on Sunday, 13 January 1980, at 8 p.m.

President: Mr. Jacques LEPRETTE (France).

Present: The representatives of the following States: Bangladesh, China, France, German Democratic Republic, Jamaica, Mexico, Niger, Norway, Philippines, Portugal, Tunisia, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Zambia.

Provisional agenda (S/Agenda/2191)

1. Adoption of the agenda
2. Letter dated 22 December 1979 from the Permanent Representative of the United States of America to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/13705)

The meeting was called to order at 9.15 p.m.

Adoption of the agenda

The agenda was adopted.

Letter dated 22 December 1979 from the Permanent Representative of the United States of America to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/13705)

1. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): Members of the Security Council have before them document S/13735, which contains the text of the draft resolution presented by the United States. I should also like to draw the attention of members of the Council to document S/13730, which contains the text of the report of the Secretary-General, submitted in pursuance of Security Council resolutions 457 (1979) and 461 (1979).

2. During the consultations which took place this evening, a proposal was made that the meeting should be suspended, in the light of a new fact that the Council may wish to examine.

3. The representative of the United States has asked to be allowed to speak. I now call on him.

4. Mr. McHENRY (United States of America): We have come a long and agonizing way, all of us, in our consideration of the perplexing problem of the release of the American hostages and personnel at Teheran.

My President and the American people have sought every possible means to resolve this problem peacefully.

5. As I have made clear to you, Mr. President, and to all the members of the Council, we strongly feel that the time has come for the Council to take the action which it is capable of taking and which it ought to take under the Charter. In fact, none of us, not even the Secretary-General, with the extraordinary effort which he has made personally throughout this tense period, has found a key to the obdurate and unconstructive response of those in Iran who claim to stand in some authority over decisions regarding the American personnel. We insist, and we shall continue to insist, on the unconditional release of the hostages, who have already suffered too much for too long.

6. I wish to inform you, Mr. President, and the other members of the Council, that very late today certain suggestions were put forward from a number of quarters, and that those suggestions are now under consideration. The ideas in question are as yet unformed and are of uncertain authority. On the basis of the past, the United States remains highly sceptical that these suggestions have any more validity than all of the others in which we have invested hope through the last weeks. We have too often been led to pray for a breakthrough in the frustration, only to be let down time and time again by the failure of the other side—of the Iranians—to show concrete willingness to work with us, with the United Nations, with anyone for the release of the American personnel.

7. I am authorized by my Government to support a suspension of the meeting of the Council this evening, without a vote on our proposal, until tomorrow afternoon. I hope that you, Mr. President, will set a specific time for the resumption of the meeting, so that we can decide about action to be taken tomorrow.

8. Despite our serious doubt that anything dependable will emerge from this further period of consultation, we remain, as we have always been, eager to explore every avenue for a peaceful solution. We continue to ask for, and expect the support and assistance of all of the members of the Security Council since, as I have said repeatedly, this is not a conflict, or a difference between the United States and Iran. It is a difference between Iran and the international community.

9. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): If there is no objection, I shall suspend the meeting immediately.

The meeting was suspended at 9.20 p.m. on Friday, 11 January 1980, and resumed at 8.40 p.m. on Sunday, 13 January 1980.

10. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): I call on the Secretary-General.

11. The SECRETARY-GENERAL: Members of the Security Council will recall that on 6 January 1980, after my return from Iran, I submitted a report to the Council on that visit [S/13730]. In the report, I gave the Council an account and an assessment of my conversations at Teheran with the Foreign Minister and with the Revolutionary Council. I concluded that, while my report in no way contained a solution to this most delicate and complex problem, it did contain a number of elements and ideas which might provide a basis for the further consideration of the existing crisis by the Security Council.

12. It may be useful to members of the Council if I now make a brief report on developments since that time.

13. I maintained close contact with the President and members of the Security Council from the time of my return to New York, and, during informal consultations of the Council, I gave the members a full account of my visit to Iran. I also went to Washington to discuss my visit to Teheran, with President Carter and the Secretary of State of the United States, since I felt it necessary to make a direct contact with the other party principally involved in this crisis. In all these talks I emphasized my earnest hope that it would be possible to use my contacts at Teheran as a basis for making progress towards a solution of this very serious international problem.

14. Later during the week, in conversations with the Permanent Representative of Iran to the United Nations, Mr. Farhang, we tried to clarify certain aspects of the talks I had had at Teheran with a view to developing common ground on an approach to the problem. Mr. Farhang gave some clarifications, which I conveyed to the members of the Security Council, including, of course, the United States, as the other party involved. It was in the light of these exchanges that members of the Council expressed the need to seek further clarifications from the Iranian authorities. The object was to determine whether it was possible to agree upon the elements of a package which would be acceptable to the parties and would lead to a satisfactory resolution of the two main elements of the problem—namely, the release of the hostages and a means of meeting the grievances of the Iranian Government.

15. These clarifications were sought in an exchange of communications with the Foreign Minister of Iran,

Mr. Sadegh Ghotbzadeh. This afternoon I personally discussed the issues involved with the Foreign Minister of Iran by telephone. In the course of that exchange of views, it turned out that the fundamental problem remains the same—namely, the timing of the release of the hostages and the procedure to be followed to meet the grievances of the Iranian Government. To my regret, despite all our efforts, a mutually satisfactory solution to this problem has not yet been found.

16. Before leaving for Iran, I made it very clear that I did not expect my visit there to lead to an immediate solution of this most complex and difficult problem. I did, however, express the hope that it might pave the way to a negotiated settlement.

17. Despite all the difficulties, I consider it my duty to pursue this course and I shall continue to make every effort to contribute to a peaceful solution of this serious crisis.

18. Mr. McHENRY (United States of America): For the third time in the last six weeks, the Security Council meets to consider a dangerous violation of the principle of diplomatic inviolability—one that, in the words of the Secretary-General, poses a serious threat to international peace and security.

19. After 70 days, the 50 personnel at the United States Embassy at Teheran taken hostage by a lawless mob are still prisoners. We have yet to have a statement of opposition to their imprisonment from the Iranian authorities.

20. Those few outsiders who have seen the hostages briefly, during carefully orchestrated visits, report that the hostages are isolated, psychologically abused, and afforded an inadequate diet—despite assurances to the contrary. Some have suffered the humiliation of forced participation in propaganda broadcasts. Neutral observers are not permitted to visit them regularly, to assess their condition, or to minister to their needs. Even the Secretary-General of the United Nations, the emissary of the world community, was barred from seeing the hostages.

21. The past two months have been marked by repeated calls for the release of the hostages from nearly every member of the international community. The Secretary-General and many Members of the United Nations have devoted tireless efforts to promote a peaceful resolution of the present crisis. The broad international support we have received in our efforts to secure the release of the hostages has given encouragement to the American people in this difficult and trying period. On their behalf, I thank all of you here who have worked so hard to help us in our efforts.

22. It might be useful to recall the measured steps which have brought us to the current situation.

23. On two separate occasions during November [S/13616 and S/13625 of 9 and 27 November 1979], the President of the Security Council, expressing the will of the members of the Council, appealed to Iran to release the hostages. But the hostages were not freed.

24. On 4 December, the Council, by unanimous vote [resolution 457 (1979)], urgently called on the Government of Iran to release immediately the personnel of the United States Embassy who were being held at Teheran, to provide them with protection and to allow them to leave Iran. Still the hostages were not freed.

25. On 15 December, the International Court of Justice gave the authority of the world's highest tribunal on international legal matters to the position set forth in the Council's resolution. The Court noted that

"... there is no more fundamental prerequisite for the conduct of relations between States than the inviolability of diplomatic envoys and embassies".¹

The Court ordered the Government of Iran to release the hostages immediately and to restore possession of the United States Embassy at Teheran to American authorities. But still the hostages were not freed.

26. On 31 December, the Security Council, without dissent, adopted resolution 461 (1979), in which it deplored the continued detention of the hostages as contrary to the Order of the International Court of Justice and the prior resolution of the Council, and urgently called once again on the Government of Iran to release immediately all persons of United States nationality being held as hostages. In that resolution, the Council decided that it would adopt effective measures under Articles 39 and 41 of the Charter of the United Nations in the event that Iran did not comply with its mandate. And still the hostages have not been freed.

27. Five times the world community, acting through the duly constituted organs of the United Nations, has pleaded with the Government and people of Iran to conform to the precepts of international law and release the hostages. Five times our collective plea has fallen on deaf ears. The International Court of Justice and the court of world opinion have demanded that Iran release the hostages in accordance with both the accepted norms of international behaviour and its treaty obligations. Yet Iran continues to imprison diplomatic personnel as part of a campaign of terrorism and political blackmail by elements in Iran who have the support of Iranian authorities.

28. Resolution 461 (1979) is a decision of the Security Council adopted under Chapter VII of the Charter. The operative language of that resolution, including the Council's decision to adopt effective measures under articles 39 and 41 of the Charter in the event of non-

compliance with the resolution, continues in full force, and, under Article 25 and Article 2, paragraph 2, of the Charter, all Members of the United Nations are obliged to accept that decision and to carry out its mandate.

29. Clearly, Iran has not complied with the resolution and freed the hostages. The time therefore has come for the Security Council to adopt the effective measures against Iran under Articles 39 and 41 of the Charter that are required by paragraph 6 of resolution 461 (1979).

30. The members of the Council have before them the measures that my Government proposes. Admittedly, those measures should not be taken lightly. But, after two months of restraint by the American people and the world community, during which we have explored every possible avenue for a solution, we have failed to secure the release of the hostages and to restore the rule of international law.

31. Our deliberations this weekend exemplify the patience and good faith with which we have sought to resolve this crisis. The Council was originally scheduled to vote on these measures last Friday, 11 January. In the hours before that meeting, various suggestions and reports from voices purporting to speak for Iran led some to believe that progress towards release of the hostages was possible. They believed that further clarification of Iran's position was necessary before proceeding to vote on sanctions.

32. Reluctantly, the United States agreed to delay the vote—not because we saw any evidence of movement towards a solution, but because we were, and are, prepared to explore every proposal that holds any realistic prospect of securing the release of the hostages. The Secretary-General then sent an urgent message to Teheran, seeking clarification of the unwritten proposal which some thought that they had heard on Friday afternoon.

33. Last night the Secretary-General received a letter. But the letter did not respond to the Secretary-General's message. The letter does not mention the existence of the hostages or acknowledge the world's concern and responsibility for them. Even the most dextrous among us have had difficulty finding a clue in the letter that could encourage responsible Governments to delay the vote on sanctions any longer.

34. The most that can be said for that letter is that for the first time since last November, when Mr. Bani-Sadr resigned as Foreign Minister, Iran has sent a written message to the United Nations. Even so, Iran has now explicitly refused to abide by any pronouncements from the United Nations with which it does not agree—including, obviously, the demand for the immediate release of the hostages.

35. We agreed to the delay of the vote on Friday in order to explore any possible hope represented by

Friday's suggestions and by the letter from the Foreign Minister. To have gone ahead without doing so would have been irresponsible. But our efforts at clarification have come to a frustrating end. In the current circumstances it would be even more irresponsible for us to delay any longer in discharging our obligations under resolution 461 (1979) and the Charter. Clearly, the time has come to act.

36. When Secretary of State Vance addressed the Council on 29 December, he said that

"As long as Iran remains indifferent to the voices of reason and mercy that have been raised from every corner of the world, as long as it refuses to recognize the common rules of international behaviour, it must accept the consequences of its deliberate actions." [2182nd meeting, para. 17.]

The sanctions we propose today will serve to demonstrate that Iran's continued defiance of international law will result in its increased isolation from the international community.

37. While the proposed sanctions constitute a meaningful and significant expression of the world's condemnation, they are yet a temperate measure taken in response to Iranian intemperance. To adopt measures less stringent than those proposed in the draft resolution before the Council would be tantamount to adopting no measures at all. And to adopt no measures at all would both violate the binding mandate of paragraph 6 of resolution 461 (1979) and constitute an abdication of our obligation to search for a peaceful resolution to international disputes and to uphold the fundamental principles of international law.

38. Now, some among us have urged that we not pursue sanctions because they may not result in the immediate release of the hostages and may even harden Iranian intransigence. We hope that sanctions will strengthen the voices of those in Iran who argue that the holding of diplomatic hostages is wrong, and will result in Iran's increased isolation from the international community, thus proving the predictions of those who have sought to take a different course. The failure of the Council to act, in my judgement, would confirm the belief of those in Iran who feel that they can act with impunity.

39. Others on the Council have urged that the Council set aside the question of sanctions in order to focus the world's attention on Soviet aggression in Afghanistan. But Soviet aggression does not reduce our concern for the situation in Iran. On the contrary, it ought to heighten Iran's concern for its future as an independent nation. It should bring Iranians to a realization that they must rebuild their country quickly and prepare to defend themselves. It should make Iran aware of the danger imposed by its isolation from the rest of the international community.

40. Once sanctions have been imposed, the key to ending this crisis and restoring its status as a full participating member of the international community will lie only with Iran. It has only to free the hostages and to provide them with safe conduct until they can leave for home, and the sanctions will automatically expire. Iran can even avoid the imposition of sanctions altogether by releasing the hostages before the Members of the United Nations complete the process of taking the necessary steps under their Constitutions and laws to implement the sanctions. And nothing in this measure will prejudice Iran's right to seek redress of its grievances, whether against the United States or against its own former rulers, in an appropriate international forum.

41. I should like to close by reminding the Council of something I have said on a number of occasions: this is not a quarrel between the United States and Iran. In my judgement, it is a dispute between Iran and the international community. The continued viability of cherished and heretofore universally observed principles of international law is at stake. As the representative of Nigeria, who served so ably on the Council during our prior debates, said last month, diplomatic immunities and inviolability are so much a part of international law and custom that all nations that rely on and respect law have an obligation to defend them.

42. Members of the Council must now do what we can to, in the words of Secretary of State Vance, "demonstrate that the rule of law has meaning and that our machinery of peace has practical relevance" [*ibid.*, para. 28].

43. We must do what we can under the Charter to defuse this most serious threat to the peace and world order. That is the object and purpose of our collective security system. We must demonstrate to Iran that the world is determined to see the hostages freed.

44. Mr. TROYANOVSKY (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*interpretation from Russian*): Throughout the period of the Security Council's consideration of the Iranian-American conflict, the Soviet Union has taken a consistent position of principle: the Soviet Union recognizes the existence of a problem created by the holding of personnel of the United States Embassy at Teheran as hostages. We have repeatedly stressed that the violation of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of 1961² by anyone whatsoever constitutes an act which is in contradiction with international law, and we have expressed the hope that the conflict which has arisen between the United States and Iran will be settled to the mutual satisfaction of both parties, on the basis of respect for that Convention.

45. The Soviet delegation supported the statements of the President of the Security Council with regard to the need for observance of the principle of the inviola-

bility of diplomatic personnel and premises and for the immediate release of the United States diplomatic personnel held in Iran.

46. The Soviet delegation also supported Security Council resolution 457 (1979), which, while making an appeal to the Government of Iran to release immediately the personnel held in the United States Embassy at Teheran, called upon the Governments of Iran and of the United States to take steps to resolve peacefully the remaining issues between them to their mutual satisfaction, in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations, and to exercise the utmost restraint in the prevailing situation. The resolution also drew attention to the obligation of States to settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner as not to endanger international peace and security, and justice.

47. Today, the Soviet delegation believes it necessary to stress once again that, on the question of holding hostage the diplomatic staff of the United States Embassy at Teheran, the Soviet Union continues to believe it necessary to respect international treaties and agreements, and this includes the relevant international Convention on diplomatic immunities.

48. At the same time, the Soviet delegation has said on every occasion that it was wrong to allege that, as a result of the actions of Iran, a threat had been created to international peace and security. Attempts to represent matters in this light distort the actual state of affairs. What is happening between the United States and Iran is a bilateral dispute that does not fall within the purview of Chapter VII of the Charter. Attaching to this dispute the question of any kind of sanctions is unjustified. To apply sanctions or to take any kind of physical action against Iran could only serve to exacerbate the situation and create a threat to peace.

49. The Soviet Union is firmly in favour of the settlement of the dispute between the United States and Iran on a basis that is mutually acceptable to both parties. What we need here is the exercise of restraint and cool-headedness. We are convinced not only that it is necessary to solve this problem by peaceful means, but that there exists a possibility of doing so. Therefore the existing means for the peaceful settlement of bilateral disputes, including the means available to the United Nations, should continue to be used.

50. Security Council resolution 461 (1979), as is well known, reiterated the request to the Secretary-General to continue to lend his good offices in order to bring about a settlement of the conflict. In his report of 6 January 1980 [S/13730] the Secretary-General mentions a number of elements and ideas that, in his view, could ensure a basis for further consideration of the crisis by the Security Council.

51. The Soviet delegation is of the firm belief that only by peaceful means does there exist a real possibility of promoting a settlement of the Iranian-American dispute. However, from the very beginning of the question of the holding of staff members of the United States Embassy at Teheran, the United States has embarked on a course of crude political and economic pressure on Iran. It has been resorting to the threat of the use of force and to direct military preparations in close proximity to Iranian frontiers. At the same time the United States has rejected, and continues to reject, efforts aimed at bringing about a mutually acceptable solution to the Iranian-American conflict and considers possible proposals from the Iranian side to be inadmissible in advance.

52. Now the United States has submitted for the consideration of the Security Council a draft resolution [S/13735] the purpose of which is to involve the United Nations in the American policy of pressure and threats against Iran. It is clear that the proposal, which provides for the application of coercive measures against Iran in accordance with Chapter VII of the Charter, is entirely inadmissible. It contradicts the Charter, and it can only serve to make more difficult the attainment of the goal of the peaceful settlement of the Iranian-American conflict.

53. The Soviet Union has consistently opposed, and continues to oppose, any steps by the United States aimed at exerting pressure on Iran. Iran has done nothing that constitutes a threat to international peace and security, as do the actions that have been undertaken by the United States in pursuing its policy of threats against Iran and in concentrating its naval forces off the coast of Iran and threatening that country with a blockade and the use of force against it.

54. In attempting to force through the Security Council a draft resolution on sanctions against Iran, the United States has deliberately been acting in such a way as not only to exacerbate the American-Iranian conflict, which has far deeper roots than the question of the United States Embassy staff held at Teheran, but also to increase tension further in the area of the eastern Mediterranean and not only there.

55. The actions that have been undertaken by the United States in the international arena and the statements of its officials, including officials of the highest rank, demonstrate that the policy of the United States as a whole is taking a turn that is increasingly inimical to the interests of universal peace, détente and equal co-operation of States. Today that policy of intervention in internal affairs and the trampling under foot of the rights of peoples is being manifested with regard to Iran; tomorrow it will be other sovereign States. All those who cherish the interests of peace and détente, all those who are loyal to the letter and spirit of the Charter of the United Nations, must recognize the danger of that policy and take vigorous action to oppose its gaining ground in international relations.

56. The position that I have outlined will guide the Soviet delegation in its conduct when the draft resolution proposed by the United States is put to the vote.

57. Mr. MUÑOZ LEDO (Mexico) (*interpretation from Spanish*): Ever since it became known that hostages had been seized and United States diplomatic premises had been violated at Teheran, the Government of Mexico has been condemning that action. We consider that those acts constitute serious violations of fundamental rules of international law that make possible the very existence of relations between States. We believe that not only the United States has been harmed but also the international community, and that the United Nations should intervene effectively to re-establish the law that has been violated and to ensure the release of the hostages.

58. Thus far we have limited ourselves to condemning what has occurred. More effective action must be taken. However, we consider that, in order to guide our conduct, it is necessary to weigh various questions related both to the effectiveness of possible sanctions and to their legal validity.

59. Above all, one must consider the timeliness of the measures that are being proposed. Apparently, in view of the situation prevailing in Iran, the adoption of economic sanctions by the United Nations might, instead of having the desired effect, be counter-productive; that is, they might strengthen the position of the intransigents, weaken the authority of those who seek a dialogue and compel the authorities not to release the hostages.

60. Certainly the effect of economic sanctions would be felt over a longer period. Perhaps we would have to wait several months to know their real effect. However, the political and psychological effects of punishing an entire people by means of punitive international action might have an immediate impact of a kind directly opposite to our aims.

61. Moreover, it is well known that economic sanctions have generally been ineffective. In the cases of Cuba and Rhodesia, and of Abyssinia in the time of the League of Nations, it was demonstrated that, whether justified or not, economic sanctions solve nothing. Furthermore, it seems unfair to us that a developing country should suffer serious harm as a result of a decision that was probably adopted by a group or faction of whose representativeness we are unsure, even though for various reasons the authorities have so far supported it.

62. Moreover, we consider that there is a contradiction between the fourth preambular paragraph of the draft resolution and its operative clauses. On the one hand, we would be taking into account the fact that the International Court of Justice calls on the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran "to ensure that

no action will be taken by them which will aggravate the tension between the two countries", while, on the other hand, we should be adopting a draft resolution which most probably would have precisely that effect.

63. Legal considerations are also relevant, because if we wish to restore legality, we must strictly abide by the law. The sanctions that are proposed are supposedly based on Article 39 of the Charter. It is claimed that a real threat to peace has arisen and that this situation justifies the adoption of such measures. That judgement is debatable; the taking and holding of hostages does not in itself constitute a threat to peace. There may be factors which, if they were combined with others that worsen the problem, might lead to such a threat. We therefore believe that the current situation does not justify the use of coercive measures, that is to say, sanctions under Chapter VII of the Charter.

64. Furthermore, such a draft resolution might establish a delicate precedent for many States, particularly the developing ones. It is inherent in the very nature of violent social changes that power temporarily disintegrates and that it is partially exercised by various groups, entities or factions. Frequently, some of those sectors take actions which impair or cause serious or unjust harm to the person, the freedom or the property of foreigners. If those facts, however serious they may be, were to be characterized as a threat to peace, and if sanctions were to be adopted by the international community against insurgent peoples simply because they had caused unfair harm to foreigners and had violated respected international rules, what might occur would be interference in the development of the process of political change which in the final analysis, must remain within the purview of the self-determination of peoples, as stipulated in the Charter.

65. In a few days there may be an important change in the Iranian political process. On 25 January elections will be held, and, while it is not certain that this simple fact will mean that there will be considerable changes in the correlation of internal forces, we can expect the beginning of institutional normalization and the presence of a constituted government with a president and a parliament bearing legal responsibility for its acts.

66. The developing countries that are non-permanent members of the Security Council have been holding continuous consultations and making efforts, including contacting representatives of the Government of Iran, in order to urge them to take a step forward so that the Security Council can be certain that they are willing for there to be negotiations which could lead to the release of the hostages. The responses that we have received seem to be weak and insufficient, but we consider that dialogue has not been foreclosed.

67. In the view of our delegation, the trip made to Teheran by the Secretary-General, when he exercised all his personal courage and sense of duty, must be considered as the beginning of a conciliatory solution and not as its end. The representatives of the third world countries on the Council have been exploring various options which, in a second stage, might complement the action undertaken by the Secretary-General. They include the establishing of new contacts with the Iranian authorities so as to lay the bases for fruitful negotiations.

68. For all those reasons, we have suggested to the United States delegation in a friendly way that it agree to postpone the vote on this draft resolution and, in any case, to revise its scope and content. We fear that to adopt the draft would be to confine ourselves to a course of action which would subsequently be very difficult for us to abandon and which would take us too far.

69. While the violation that has been committed is a serious one, the draft resolution that will be put to the vote contains sanctions that do not in law correspond to the situation we are facing. Moreover, all hopes of dialogue are not completely over. The domestic situation in Iran is not static either, but, on the contrary, is changing.

70. The United States of America must be convinced that the aim of the international community is none other than to find the most suitable ways of freeing the unjustly held hostages. It must be convinced that we all want a satisfactory solution of the conflict, so as to preserve peace and normality in international relations.

71. The vote of each of us should in no way be regarded as an unfriendly gesture against any country. On the contrary, as a gesture of co-operation to show its good faith in seeking a way out of the crisis, Mexico, through its Secretary for Foreign Affairs, has placed on record the fact that our country is always ready to defend just causes and to propose constructive solutions.

72. That is what underlies the decision that the Government of Mexico has adopted to abstain from the vote and to offer its full co-operation, as it has to date, in seeking, with the aid of the parties directly involved and the international community, formulas that would permit the restoration of concord and compliance with the law.

73. Mr. FLORIN (German Democratic Republic) (*interpretation from Russian*): The German Democratic Republic has been following with concern the aggravation of the problems in the relations between the United States of America and the Islamic Republic of Iran. In that connection, the release of the United States Embassy staff being held at Teheran is only one aspect, albeit a very essential one, of this series

of problems. In resolution 457 (1979) adopted unanimously by the Security Council, the Council quite rightly dealt with the whole series of problems involved and called for their peaceful solution.

74. The German Democratic Republic supports that resolution of the Council, demanding the release of the personnel of the Embassy of the United States of America being held at Teheran. The German Democratic Republic believes that it is the inalienable right of each and every people to define for themselves their own path of development and to solve independently the problem of the use of their natural resources. The German Democratic Republic has maintained active solidarity with the struggle of peoples for freedom, national independence and social progress—with the just struggle of the peoples of the Arab region or in support of the peoples struggling in southern Africa, to give just a few examples.

75. At the same time, the German Democratic Republic is in favour of the consistent observance of and respect for the protection guaranteed by international law to diplomatic representatives, as unambiguously set forth in the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of 18 April 1961.² That is an essential prerequisite for the normal functioning of relations among States. In that connection, the delegation of the German Democratic Republic is in favour of maintaining and strengthening peace by solving existing disputes among States by peaceful means in accordance with the principles and generally recognized norms of international law, including the Vienna Convention.

76. We believe that the solution of the conflict between the United States and Iran by peaceful means is most essential and that it is still possible. Both sides have repeatedly reasserted their readiness to achieve a peaceful settlement, and the means to that end have not yet been exhausted. In that regard, we hope that both sides will show exceptional restraint and will not do anything which might lead to the further worsening of the situation. The peaceful settlement of conflicts is in the interests of all peoples.

77. The delegation of the German Democratic Republic has carefully studied the report of the Secretary-General on his trip to Teheran [S/13730], and our delegation believes that the Secretary-General is deserving of our deepest gratitude for his efforts to obtain a peaceful settlement of the conflict between the United States and Iran. Unfortunately, the Secretary-General could speak of only limited results from his trip, but he did come to the conclusion that it had been a useful mission that had helped him to obtain a better understanding of the many facets of the existing crisis. We should like especially to highlight the fact that it was possible for him to have an initial discussion of problems with the Revolutionary Council at Teheran.

78. The delegation of the German Democratic Republic believes that every aggravation, every exacerbation of the problem in the relations between the United States and Iran is extremely dangerous, and we advise caution with regard to any foolhardy measures which might only worsen the situation.

79. The detention of United States Embassy personnel at Teheran is undoubtedly a distressing fact, but it cannot be regarded as a direct threat to international peace and security. We must do our utmost to ensure that this situation does not in fact give rise to a threat to international peace and security. The sharp increase in the United States military presence in that area has led to an increased danger of the creation of a new and threatening source of international conflicts. As was already pointed out in an earlier meeting of the Security Council, reference to Chapter VII of the Charter is more of a threat to stability in the region than a step towards finding a solution to the conflict. Sanctions would only further worsen a complex situation and would make more difficult a peaceful solution, which requires the co-operation of both sides in the conflict.

80. The Charter of the United Nations entrusts the Security Council with special responsibility in the safeguarding of international peace and security and it gives to the Security Council appropriate special powers. That makes it incumbent upon us to approach this task with a full awareness of our responsibilities. Economic sanctions, in accordance with Chapter VII of the Charter, have thus far been used only in exceptional instances, against régimes the existence or activities of which were a direct threat to international peace and security. Even in situations of a serious threat to international peace and security, arising out of the occupation and abuse of a territory, such as, for example, Namibia, for which the United Nations bears responsibility, or even in cases of repeated acts of large-scale acts of aggression against sovereign African States, certain permanent members of the Council have unabashedly used their veto to thwart the imposition of such sanctions.

81. The German Democratic Republic will welcome and support all efforts to find a peaceful solution to the dispute between the United States and Iran. Further careful study is required of the extent to which the elements and ideas to be found in the report of the Secretary-General might be used for a peaceful settlement of the dispute and the extent to which further information might help.

82. Mr. MILLS (Jamaica): Once again the Security Council meets to consider the issue of the relations between Iran and the United States of America. The Council has taken a series of steps over the period of nearly 10 weeks that has elapsed since this crisis started. While it was the hope of all of us—and of the international community, in general—that the very serious issue of the holding of United States Embassy

personnel as hostages would have come to a satisfactory conclusion weeks ago, we were aware of the need to contemplate and to put into effect, in stages, a series of steps carefully but purposefully framed and executed in order to bring the matter to an end.

83. Thus it was essential, in the view of my delegation, that the draft resolution put before the Council and approved on 4 December 1979 as resolution 457 (1979) should contain, among other things, a mandate for further action, in particular by the Secretary-General, who had established and maintained very vital contact with the authorities at Teheran. It was on the basis of that mandate, expressed in paragraph 4 of that resolution, and in the light of the growing feeling on the part of many countries, as well as his own conviction, as to the need for it, that the Secretary-General took the significant step of going to Iran. In his report [*ibid.*], which was presented to the Council, he states how he outlined clearly to the Iranian authorities the grave nature of the action of taking over the United States Embassy and holding its staff as hostages and the strong feelings of the Security Council and the international community on this matter. At the same time, he indicated the willingness of the international community to find adequate means of addressing the grievances of Iran. In particular, he explored the idea of establishing an international committee of inquiry for this purpose. He stated that his report in no way contained a solution of this most delicate and complex problem. He concluded, however, that "it contains a number of elements and ideas which may provide a basis for the further consideration of the existing crisis by the Security Council". [*ibid.*, para. 14.]

84. My delegation wishes once more to place on record its appreciation of the efforts of the Secretary-General and his staff and to express its understanding of the difficulties that they encountered in this situation.

85. At its meeting on 31 December 1979 [2184th meeting], the Council arrived at two main conclusions. First, and in further support of the Secretary-General's efforts, the idea of a visit by him to Iran was envisaged. Secondly, it was proposed that in the event of Iran's not complying with the urgings of the Council or of the Secretary-General during his visit with regard to the matter of the release of the hostages, the Council would proceed to the adoption of effective measures under Articles 38 and 41 of the Charter of the United Nations. The Council is now meeting to consider this particular proposal, specifically the imposition of sanctions against Iran, a proposal initiated by the United States.

86. From the outset, Jamaica, along with other members of the Council, has given full support to the search for adequate and effective means of dealing with this crisis and achieving the release of the United States personnel. We have remained fully aware of the

complexity and sensitivity of the situation and of the need to strike a judicious balance between a determined and responsible approach on the part of the Council and a delicate appreciation of the need for caution, in the light of the high level of emotions and strong feelings involved, especially in Iran and in the United States.

87. Every possible approach and each initiative have been the subject of close analysis in the discussions in which my delegation has participated and on the part of my Government. Our efforts and those of others have been rooted in our conviction that the action with regard to the Embassy and its staff was unacceptable, that Iran must comply with the call by the Council and the international community for the release of the hostages and that means must be found to address the grievances and complaints about which the Iranians feel so strongly. We are deeply aware of the need for positive and continuing efforts by the United Nations through the Council in these matters.

88. The Council has moved from its early strong calls for the release of the hostages to an explicit endorsement of the Secretary-General's good offices and of his visit to Iran and, finally, to the consideration of the imposition of sanctions. Parallel to all this has been a readiness to search for machinery for dealing with the concerns expressed by Iran.

89. In recent days a new dimension has been added to this ever-changing crisis. It emerged that there was at last some possibility of eliciting a positive response from the Iranian authorities that might permit a peaceful settlement of the issues. The Council, with considerable assistance from a number of interested parties and with the continued and commendable efforts of the Secretary-General, agreed to pursue this initiative. But, whether because of the constraints of time or the unique configuration of power and authority in Iran, it now appears that this response, received today, does not go sufficiently far in providing the basis for a new approach of a kind that my delegation and others see as very desirable.

90. While my delegation has seen the imposition of sanctions as a possible option in the event of the failure of all other approaches, we had sincerely hoped that it would not be necessary to contemplate such a step. That feeling on our part was based on a number of considerations. First, we continued to hope that in our deliberations other measures would emerge that would be judged by members of the Security Council to be more effective in achieving the results we all seek. Secondly, we hoped that Iran would respond positively to such approaches. Thirdly, we have no wish to impose hardships on the people of Iran, who have had more than their fair share of suffering in the past and now appear to be going through major and fundamental social changes. Fourthly, we are aware of the sensitivity of a large number of countries on the matter of sanctions, a

sensitivity related, for instance, to the failure to achieve the imposition of sanctions against South Africa, where so many black Africans have suffered humiliation and even death under the harsh racist régime. Fifthly, we know of the serious and genuine misgivings on the part of a wide range of countries on the question of the imposition of sanctions in the present circumstances. Sixthly, we feel that any action by the Council, whether by way of the imposition of sanctions or by other means, must have the full weight of the international community behind it, since the main force of such action is by way of its political, moral and psychological impact.

91. But we cannot evade the simple fact that a great deal of time has passed without any significant sign of a break in the situation. My delegation recognizes that the Council must act and be seen to act positively. In the circumstances, my delegation will respond positively to the call for sanctions.

92. The imposition of sanctions would presumably seek to focus on the primary issue that has been the concern of the international community and the Council, namely, the release of the hostages, and would be an expression of the determination of the Council to move forward progressively in the exercise of its authority and an expression of its demand for respect for its rulings. My delegation hopes that this would not be lost on the Iranian authorities. But we continue to believe that parallel initiatives must be pursued, in particular, in the direction of finding means of dealing with the concerns of Iran and laying the foundations for harmonious relations, especially between the two countries directly involved in this issue.

93. There will be difficulties in the way of finding acceptable approaches and machinery for all this. But the search must proceed now. Without this there is little prospect for an early and final resolution of the issues in this situation.

94. Mr. OUMAROU (Niger) (*interpretation from French*): The matter of the hostages being held at Teheran is now at a critical stage; it concerns the world as a whole. Because of that, the Iranian-American crisis has assumed the aspect of a world crisis, and it is hard to say today what turn it will take. My country is therefore very seriously concerned about it. For that reason, Mr. President, we wish to tell you once again how very satisfied we are with the remarkable way in which you have been leading our discussions aimed at a peaceful settlement of this extremely complex issue. We address our compliments also to Secretary-General, who has just demonstrated to the world that he is devoted to his duty to the point of abnegation. His courteous availability in the service of the Security Council deserves all our praise.

95. The Niger has already vigorously condemned the taking of the hostages. In our opinion, the taking of

the hostages is a serious precedent, because it paves the way to the dangerous law of the jungle in international relations. Indeed, in relations between States, it is dangerous to try to take justice into one's own hands, especially when the means used trample under foot the established rules and flout conventions or traditions on which the international community bases its balance and its harmony.

96. Thus, today we state once again that while we understand and respect the motives and aims of the Iranian revolution, we do not condone its precedents, and, still less, its excesses. Iran must immediately free the hostages. It must unconditionally obey the appeals of the international community, and, above all, the verdict of the International Court of Justice and the resolutions of the Security Council. Furthermore, Iran must restrain its passions so that free rein may be given to the wisdom of the nations, in order that its demands and grievances may be brought to justice.

97. My country regrets that it must seem so firm in a matter where responsibilities are still so diffused and imprecise; in a matter which places in the balance rules that we must protect and demands that we must not disregard; in a matter, finally, which the Iranian people itself perhaps condones, when all is said and done, only because it is still under the shock of the collective delirium resulting from the spectre of a too recent past, and following a deliverance that was somewhat hallucinatory because it had been despaired of for too long. None the less, international peace requires such firmness from time to time, and the excuse for it in this case is our repeatedly demonstrated friendship for the people of Iran, with which we have very close ties.

98. As the Council knows, the Niger has always shown itself to be in favour of dialogue between nations. It has always preferred the peaceful method of discussion to the power of force and threats of sanctions. That is why the Niger's entire inter-African life has been marked by attempts—often successful attempts—at mediation. That is why in the consultations that have been taking place in the past few days in the Security Council, we favoured from the very outset a search for alternatives that could prevent, or at least postpone, international sanctions against the Iranian people, a people that has already suffered so much because of its own internal convulsions and that, more than ever, deserves our active compassion instead of our collective punishment.

99. Unfortunately, the inertia of the Teheran authorities—an inertia that has, frankly, been a cause of anguish—and the fanatical intransigence of the Islamic students, as well as the regrettable development of an internal situation in which the decision-making centres are becoming increasingly dispersed, do not even encourage further initiatives and, at the same time, dangerously increase the impatience of the

American people, whose honour is still being flouted, whose nerves have been put to severe tests for more than two months now, and whose representatives vested with internationally recognized duties are still unjustly suffering both physically and mentally, despite the sharp disapproval of the international community.

100. Hence, my country, which, we must confess, has no enthusiasm for the sanctions that are today proposed to us against the Iranian challenge, will vote in favour of these sanctions, leaving aside the natural solidarity that must unite it to Iran on such an occasion. It will vote in favour so that law, morality, justice and the spirit of peace and harmony among peoples may prevail. It will vote in favour so that the credibility of the United Nations and its ability to do its work with respect for its Charter may not be further altered in the slightest.

101. This Iranian crisis in fact reveals the need for the United Nations and the Security Council to regain their prestige and to guard their credibility. The kind of welcome inflicted on the Secretary-General at Teheran must never be repeated. But to succeed in regaining this confidence and in rehabilitating itself—something so necessary for its health—the United Nations must ensure that neither its mission nor its cohesion nor its objectivity is challenged and contested. The United Nations must in all circumstances remain firmly above the fray, and outside the struggles between blocs or regions. It must always reflect and apply its Charter; it must constantly ensure that the Charter is seen as a more reliable refuge than the power of arms, than economic vanity, than warlike alliances.

102. Now, we, the small countries, have the unpleasant feeling that the United Nations is daily becoming a stake in a game and is even slowly becoming bipolarized—to the point, it seems, that the mood in the halls is active, hesitant or completely passive depending on whether the crisis concerns one or another country, one or another region, one or another Power. For example, for a long time now Africa, its peoples and its leaders, have been asking for sanctions against South Africa because of its obstinate refusal—repeatedly proclaimed—to obey the verdict of the nations in regard to its illegal occupation of Namibia; equally, for a long time now the Arab world, Africa and the entire third world have been calling for sanctions against Israel because of its armed occupation of territories that do not belong to it, an occupation that continues despite the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Council.

103. There is a French proverb that says that if everyone does his job, the cows will be guarded. It is for the United Nations to maintain and strengthen peace in the world. May it be able to do that successfully and prevent this Iranian crisis from degenerating into a catastrophe.

104. Mr. ESSAAFI (Tunisia) (*interpretation from French*): The Government and people of Tunisia are

deeply concerned about the situation in Iran that has resulted from the taking of hostages in the United States Embassy at Teheran. This situation gives us even more cause for concern because it is the result of action taken by a Moslem, non-aligned country with which we have traditional bonds of friendship and brotherhood.

105. We welcomed the Iranian revolution as a manifestation of the will of the Iranian people to regain its dignity and to bring about in its country a new era of social justice and freedom. But our initial faith in that revolution has been seriously shaken by an act which does the revolution a disservice because it is a serious transgression of international conventions. Whatever grievances the Iranians may have against the former Shah or against the United States of America, and without in any way prejudging whether those grievances are well-founded, we do not feel that they can legitimize a distortion of international legality. Respect for international rules, and especially those governing diplomatic relations between States, in conformity with the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations,² must be observed by all States without exception. Otherwise, there would be a return to the law of the jungle, and it would be the small countries that would suffer the most.

106. I should like to recall that, among other teachings of Islam, Moslems are taught the obligation to ensure the security of guests in their homes, even if they are enemies. The history of Islam is replete with examples of Moslems who have risked their own lives to defend those who had sought refuge under their roofs.

107. Thus we see that Islamic ethics and international law join in calling for the protection of embassy personnel in a Moslem country. The honour of the host country is in consonance with its obligations under the international conventions to which it has freely subscribed.

108. The President of the Republic of Tunisia, Mr. Habib Bourguiba, on 8 January 1980 made a statement on these events as follows:

“With regard to Iran, however deep our feelings of solidarity may be, our duty as brothers in Islam commands us to speak out and express our concern regarding actions that no one can be sure are serving the cause of the Iranian revolution *vis-à-vis* world public opinion.

“However great, however exalted our pride in the Iranian revolution because of its struggle for the dignity of the Iranian people, which had long been deprived of its rights by internal and external forces of oppression, we must nevertheless accept that dignity—which springs first of all from the heart—must in the final analysis be won by patience and careful thought, order and reason. Meanwhile, the course of events in Iran will certainly—God forbid—

lead to chaos if this problem of the holding of hostages is not settled, even though we do not know whether it comes under the jurisdiction of the Revolutionary Council or is subject to the authority of the students who have for many weeks been holding the hostages in the United States Embassy, thereby flouting international conventions and diplomatic practice.”

109. For all those reasons, and placing at the forefront of its concerns respect for international law, of which the United Nations is the guarantor, Tunisia has decided to vote in favour of draft resolution S/13735.

110. Mr. MUTUKWA (Zambia): It is saddening that United States diplomatic personnel continue to be held as hostages in Iran. This is in spite of the repeated appeals by the international community to the Iranian authorities to release the hostages. Zambia is totally and unequivocally opposed to the holding of the hostages. We have stated, and we repeat here, that the holding of diplomats as hostages is a gross violation and flagrant breach of international law and international conventions. This we have reiterated in all our statements before the Security Council and elsewhere. In Zambia's view, Iran's behaviour in this case is unacceptable. This action by a State Member of the United Nations could render the practice of diplomacy in future extremely precarious.

111. In our condemnation of Iran's action of holding hostages, I should stress that the people of Zambia fully sympathize with the personal plight of the hostages themselves, who are being held under difficult and trying conditions. On behalf of Zambia, I wish therefore to express our grief both to the hostages and to their families back in the United States. We shall continue to be by their side in their wish to see their loved ones released peacefully and promptly. It is on the basis of these humanitarian grounds that we appeal once again to the Iranian authorities to release the American diplomatic personnel being held hostage in Iran.

112. Since the seizure of the United States Embassy and American personnel on 4 November 1979, Zambia has individually and together with the other Council members worked scrupulously for the peaceful release of the hostages. A message to this effect was sent by President Kaunda of Zambia to Ayatollah Khomeini of Iran.

113. We have made our view known directly to Iranian authorities that we do not condone their actions. We have told them frankly that Iran's holding of the hostages is wrong, and that it contravenes the basic norms of international law and practice. We appeal to the Iranians as a religious people to let the hostages go free. We have stated further that their grievances have already been heard and that they should not use the seizure of diplomats as a ploy in these matters because it is counter-productive to do so.

114. Zambia has emphatically stated that we expect Iran to respect the authority and decisions of the United Nations. This has been our position even long before we became a member of the Security Council. Our appeal has equally been made to all countries without exception to respect the decisions of the United Nations. It is on the basis of these basic principles that we have always condemned the intransigence of the *apartheid* régime in South Africa, which also occupies Namibia illegally, as well as Israel, for their total disregard of United Nations resolutions. We shall continue to stress this position because the future and salvation of the international community in our contemporary world lie in the United Nations.

115. That aside, the matter before the Council this evening is one on which Zambia urges the Council members to reflect seriously. Zambia still believes that there is one prime objective on which all of us share the same views, and that is a substantive issue: the need to secure the safe release of the hostages. It is regrettable that there are differences of approach on the means or tactics by which the safe release of the hostages could be achieved.

116. In Zambia's view, the mission of the Secretary-General to Iran was a part of the peaceful approach to the resolution of the current crisis. I wish, on behalf of my country, to express our most sincere gratitude to the Secretary-General for having undertaken a mission of peace to Iran and for his report on this mission, dated 6 January 1980 [S/13730]. Members of the Council have, I am sure, benefited greatly from the report. There are indeed positive elements in the Secretary-General's report on the results of his mission to Iran. It is the view of my delegation that the Council could have continued to explore these positive elements in the search for peaceful negotiations. My delegation is of the view that all peaceful political options with regard to this problem have not yet been exhausted. It is also the view of Zambia that among the means that could have been explored fully to secure the release of the hostages are those which are contained in the Secretary-General's report.

117. In conclusion, I should like to repeat that the issue at stake is how to secure the safe release of the hostages. As a non-aligned country and member of the Council, we believe that our role is that of a broker, a mediator and a peacemaker. We want peace and we are for peace. We want a peaceful resolution of the conflict in the spirit of conciliation.

118. Sir Anthony PARSONS (United Kingdom): The position of my Government as regards the detention of the American diplomatic hostages at Teheran is absolutely clear. Statements in the last two months by my Prime Minister, by other British Ministers and by myself in the Security Council, on 1 and 29 December 1979 [2175th and 2182nd meetings], can leave no doubt about our conviction of the illegality of the Iranian authorities' action in terms of international

law and in terms of long hallowed practice between States. At the same time, no one can be in any doubt of the sympathy of the British Government and of the British people for the American hostages, for the American people as a whole and for the United States Government which, in our view, has exercised admirable patience and restraint in this unique and truly terrible situation.

119. But, sadly, successive appeals and resolutions from the Council have been ignored. The conclusion in the Secretary-General's most recent written report [S/13730] plainly indicates that the Iranian leaders are not prepared to respond to the call of the international community for the immediate release of the hostages.

120. What has since emerged, as stated this evening by the Secretary-General, makes it equally plain that we have reached the end of the road which we have been travelling along over the past two or three weeks without our destination even coming into view.

121. In these circumstances, this body has no alternative but to follow up the decision it took on 31 December and resort to the further measures available to it under the Charter. For this reason, my delegation will vote in favour of draft resolution S/13735 which is before us.

122. I take no pleasure in casting this vote, and it is my sincere hope that wiser counsels will quickly prevail within Iran. As I have said before, Britain entertains no animosity towards the people of Iran. On the contrary, the sooner the action which has caused the imposition of these measures is reversed, the sooner we and the rest of the international community can resume the normal relations with the Iranian Government and people which we all so earnestly desire.

123. Mr. AASEN (Norway): Norway has on previous occasions in the Security Council stated its position on the question before us. Thus, in this statement I shall limit myself to a few brief remarks.

124. My delegation deeply appreciates the untiring efforts made by the Secretary-General in this case. I want to assure him of our continued support.

125. It is a matter of deep regret that Iran has refused to co-operate with the United Nations by not heeding the repeated appeals for the immediate and unconditional release of the hostages, although Iran has been assured that such a step on its part would open to the Iranians ways in which they could air their grievances. The lack of any positive response by Iran to the appeals unanimously adopted by the Council has left us with no alternative but to take such specific actions as are envisaged in draft resolution S/13735 which is before us. Thus, we shall vote in favour of it.

126. We do hope that Iran will realize that its interests are best served by complying with the appeals for the release of the hostages. None of its concerns can be met as long as Iran chooses to remain in open defiance of the entire world community. It is still the hope of the Norwegian Government that reason will prevail, that the hostages will be released so that the steps that we find ourselves forced to take tonight can be reversed at a very early time.

127. Mr. FUTSCHER PEREIRA (Portugal): The Portuguese delegation has already made clear on several occasions its position regarding the unacceptability of the taking of American diplomatic hostages in Iran and their continued detention. The position taken by the Iranian authorities shows an intolerable contempt for the community of nations in the violation of an essential principle of international law, the very one that allows for relations between States.

128. Not only the United States, but also the international community represented in the terms of the Charter by the Security Council, has shown during these last two months enough proof of its patience, its restraint and its good faith. But all our appeals, all our decisions and endeavours, including those carried out with total dedication by the Secretary-General, have been ignored so far. In these circumstances, the Council cannot but assume its responsibilities. The Portuguese delegation will therefore support the sanctions proposed in this draft resolution out of respect for international law and for the provisions of the Charter which, in our opinion, are applicable in the present circumstances, as we have had the opportunity to explain on previous occasions. We also do so in the belief that the Iranian Government will thus understand how deeply the international community condemns its attitude.

129. Our support for the application of sanctions does not mean that we want to impose a burden on the Iranian people. But we believe that the attitude of the Iranian Government has given us no alternative but to vote in favour of draft resolution S/13735 which is before the Council.

130. We hope that the Iranian authorities will heed the feelings of the community of nations expressed in this way and will now decide to release the hostages immediately, thus averting the need for the implementation of the measures implied in the draft resolution on which we are about to vote.

131. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): I should like now to say a few words as the representative of FRANCE.

132. I intend, on behalf of my delegation, to vote in favour of draft resolution S/13735 which is before us, and I shall state why.

133. France, like all the other members of the Security Council has condemned the detention in Iran of American nationals and diplomats, in violation of the principles, conventions and practices most universally recognized by the international community. The highest authorities in my country have on several occasions spoken on this subject. I should like once again to express all the sympathy for the hostages unjustifiably detained in inadmissible circumstances. The constant appeals of the President of the Security Council [*S/13616 and S/13652 of 9 and 27 November 1979*] have gone unheeded, and my delegation on 31 December last voted in favour of resolution 461 (1979), which provided for the implementation by the Council of measures under Articles 39 and 41 of the Charter if the hostages were not released.

134. France pays a tribute to the tireless efforts of the Secretary-General and of certain members of the Council to establish with the Iranian authorities a dialogue that might lead to a successful resolution of the crisis, which affects the entire international community. We deeply regret that those efforts have thus far not been successful.

135. By the vote we are about to cast in favour of a draft resolution dealing with an unprecedented situation, my delegation does not at all wish to accuse the Iranian people—a people with which the French people has long-standing bonds of friendship. Nor do we wish at all to change the course of the revolution; the Iranians alone can and must, as we have stated on many occasions, decide their own destiny.

136. We hope that the economic sanctions which might be adopted by the Security Council this evening, and which arise solely from the violation of international law in the taking of hostages, will very soon be rendered unnecessary when the reasons for which they are advocated no longer exist.

137. I now resume my capacity as PRESIDENT.

138. I take it that the Security Council is now ready to proceed to the vote on draft resolution S/13735 submitted by the United States.

139. I call now on the representative of Bangladesh, who wishes to make a statement before the vote.

140. Mr. KAISER (Bangladesh): At the very outset, Bangladesh would like to place on record its sincere appreciation for the mission recently undertaken by the Secretary-General to Iran. Bangladesh shares the world-wide concern over the Iran-United States crisis. We have given our most careful consideration to the perceptive report of the Secretary-General [*S/13730*] and to the statements of our esteemed colleagues.

141. Bangladesh has unequivocally supported, and continues to support, the call of the international community for the immediate release of the hostages,

in conformity with international law and for humanitarian reasons, on the basis of our belief in peace, compassion, tolerance and justice.

142. Bangladesh has also stressed that the legitimate grievances of the people of Iran over the violation of human rights in the past deserve due consideration by the international community. The human dimensions involved in the situation constitute a painful reality evoking our deepest and heartfelt sympathy, on the one hand, for those anxious parents and relations in the United States awaiting the safe return of the detainees and, on the other, for those in Iran who have been the victims of oppression and have suffered bereavement during the previous régime.

143. We have stated earlier, and we strongly reiterate, that we are dealing with a difficult, complex and human situation charged with great emotion. It is imperative for the members of the Security Council, acting jointly and individually, to do everything in their power to defuse and contain the tense situation and to work with caution and restraint in the search for a peaceful, negotiated and honourable settlement of this problem, in conformity with justice and international law.

144. Viewed objectively, the realities of the situation do not appear to have a parallel. It has been repeatedly underscored by the Secretary-General, and also others, including sincere sympathizers both of Iran and of the United States, that the situation obtaining in Iran today is "unusual and highly exceptional" in the context of the circumstances of Iran's revolution and the particular power structure that has emerged.

145. The Secretary-General in his latest report has held out the hope that there are ideas and elements in the report which might provide a basis for further consideration of the existing crisis by the Council. Given the choice of action between the sanctions that are currently proposed, with little likelihood of success, and the renewed peaceful initiative, Bangladesh believes that the latter remains the better alternative for accomplishing the objectives that we all share.

146. In the circumstances, particularly in view of the Secretary-General's report, we feel that the complex, unprecedented and unusual nature of the problem renders it necessary that we exercise the maximum degree of restraint and caution and continue our efforts to defuse and contain the tension in the region and to find a peaceful solution. The need for the utmost caution and restraint has been made all the more imperative by the recent developments in Afghanistan, placing in jeopardy the peace and security of the entire region.

147. In consideration of these harsh realities, Bangladesh would once again plead for more time for passions to cool and for the intensification of bilateral, individual and international approaches to intensify and for such approaches to be allowed a chance to

succeed. It now seems to be more widely felt than ever before that the alternative course—namely, the imposition of economic sanctions—will not be effective in achieving its objectives but may aggravate the situation and unleash a chain of events with far-reaching implications for the security of the region. It has to be borne clearly in mind that an altogether new dimension has been added to the situation by the recent developments in Afghanistan, which cannot be overlooked except at great peril.

148. It is for these reasons that Bangladesh proposes to abstain in the voting on draft resolution S/13735 which is before us.

149. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): I shall now put draft resolution S/13735 to the vote.

A vote was taken by show of hands.

In favour: France, Jamaica, Niger, Norway, Philippines, Portugal, Tunisia, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Zambia

Against: German Democratic Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

Abstaining: Bangladesh, Mexico

The result of the vote was 10 in favour, 2 against and 2 abstentions. The draft resolution was not adopted, one of the negatives votes being that of a permanent member of the Council.

One member (China) did not participate in the voting.

150. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): I now call on those representatives who wish to make statements after the vote.

151. Mr. CHEN Chu (China) (*translation from Chinese*): With regard to the events which have occurred between Iran and the United States, the Chinese delegation has already expounded its position in its statements at the Security Council meetings held on 1 and 31 December 1979 [2175th and 2184th meetings]. We fully understand and sympathize with the American people's serious concern over the fate of the American hostages. In this connection we have always maintained that the accepted norms of international relations and diplomatic immunity should be universally respected. We stand for the implementation of the provisions of Security Council resolutions 457 (1979) and 461 (1979), calling on Iran to release immediately the Americans being held as hostages in Iran. But those resolutions have not been implemented thus far. The Chinese delegation cannot but express regret over this.

152. The Secretary-General and the non-aligned members of the Council have made great efforts to

seek a solution to this question. We appreciate their efforts and support them in making continued contributions to the search for an appropriate solution to the question.

153. When resolution 461 (1979) was adopted by the Council, the Chinese delegation stated:

“... should it be necessary for the Security Council to review the situation and adopt measures in accordance with [*operative paragraph 6 of the said draft resolution*], it should take a prudent attitude. The decision which the Council might take should really be conducive to the relaxation of the prevailing tension and the release of the hostages.”
[2184th meeting, para. 25.]

154. At present, the application of economic sanctions against Iran may not necessarily lead to the relaxation of tension and the release of hostages. It can also be seen from the developments over the past few days that the possibility still exists for a solution to be found through patient consultations and negotiations and that this possibility deserves further exploration. Therefore, we appeal to the parties concerned to exercise restraint, avoid taking any action that would aggravate the existing contradictions and refrain from blocking any channels that might lead to the release of hostages through consultation and mediation.

155. On the basis of the position outlined above, the Chinese delegation did not participate in the voting on the draft resolution contained in document S/13735.

156. At this juncture, we cannot but point out that the Soviet Union is now carrying out a large-scale armed aggression against Afghanistan, posing a grave threat to the independence and security of Iran. In these circumstances, the performance of the Soviet Union on the question now under consideration shows that it intends to take advantage of the crisis in United States-Iranian relations to disguise itself as the “guardian” of Iran and a “natural ally” of the Islamic countries, so as to make cheap political capital out of it. We believe that the peoples of Iran and the Islamic world will certainly see through the intrigues of the Soviet Union and not allow it to succeed in its plot to sow discord and to fish in muddied waters.

157. Mr. McHENRY (United States of America): The Security Council has now completed its efforts, albeit unsuccessfully, to discharge what we consider to be the legally binding obligation imposed upon it by the passage of resolution 461 (1979) to adopt effective measures against Iran under Articles 39 and 41 of the Charter of the United Nations. It has been prevented from doing so by the negative vote of the Soviet Union.

158. The statement made on behalf of the Soviet Union, and, I would add, the statement by the representative of the German Democratic Republic, could

have been written by Lewis Carroll as pages of *Alice in Wonderland*. The light becomes darkness, the victim becomes the criminal, commitment to international law becomes the defence of anarchy. How extraordinary to hear from a nation that has just sent its armies and gauleiters into Afghanistan describing our efforts to seek the freedom of 50 of our citizens held hostage by armed terrorists as interference in the internal affairs of Iran.

159. The Soviet Union's vote, in its effect of preventing the Council from acting, is a cynical and irresponsible exercise of its veto power. The motive behind it is transparent. The Soviet Union hopes that by blocking sanctions it can divert attention from its subjugation of Afghanistan and curry favour with the Government and people of Iran, who are among those directly affected by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. But I would suggest that the Soviet hope is in vain. The nations of the world, viewing this veto in tandem with the invasion of Afghanistan, cannot fail to note that Soviet tributes to the supremacy of international law are purely rhetorical and that Soviet policy conforms to international norms only on a selective and self-serving basis. And in Iran, even though chaos seems to reign, it should be apparent that the vote of the Soviet Union is an act of political expediency designed to buy Iranian silence on Afghanistan and Soviet advantage in the area.

160. Now, under resolution 461 (1979), the Council undertook a binding obligation to adopt effective measures and under Article 25 of the Charter, all Member States are obliged to respect the provisions of resolution 461 (1979). The Soviet veto now attempts to block the membership from fulfilling that obligation. The question then arises what a member bound by resolution 461 (1979), and acting in good faith pursuant to its obligations under Article 2, paragraph 2, of the Charter should do to implement that resolution.

161. Most obviously, Iran remains bound immediately to release the hostages pursuant to that resolution. But, in addition to that paramount obligation, the membership of the United Nations at large remains obliged to review the situation and the event of Iran's non-compliance with it, an event that has come to pass, and to take effective measures consistent with the Charter to implement that resolution.

162. My own Government has already instituted measures designed to exert economic pressure on Iran, as envisaged in the draft resolution which the Council has just been prevented from adopting. Those measures will be applied firmly and vigorously until the hostages have been released. We urge all Members of the United Nations to join with us in the application of meaningful measures against the continued holding of the hostages in defiance of international law. Only thus shall we demonstrate to Iran that its lawless actions are viewed with disfavour by all nations.

163. The United States will of course welcome and co-operate with the continued good offices of the Secretary-General and will co-operate with all members of the international community in seeking a solution to the present crisis. We sincerely hope that, despite the Soviet veto, our efforts will lead to the return of the hostages and to the return of the rule of law in international affairs.

164. Mr. TROYANOVSKY (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*interpretation from Russian*): The Soviet delegation was not at all surprised by the attacks of the representatives of the United States of America and of China on the Soviet Union, because it prevented the adoption of the United States proposal on economic and diplomatic sanctions against Iran. Those reactions are understandable, since the Soviet Union has undermined the attempt by the United States to use the United Nations for covert plans to intervene flagrantly in Iran and to undertake hostile activities.

165. The Soviet Union is not afraid of references to the fact that it is using its right of veto in the Security Council, because it has made repeated use of that right in order to defend the legitimate interests of the socialist and non-aligned States and in order to defend the national liberation movements and the peoples struggling for the observance of their inalienable rights.

166. A few days ago, the Soviet Union prevented the attempt undertaken in the Security Council to cast doubt on the right of Afghanistan to use the help of a friendly State to defend it against imperialist interference. Half a year ago, the prospect of the use of its veto by the Soviet Union played a decisive role in plans to involve the United Nations in the conclusion of a separate Egyptian-Israeli treaty against the vital interests of the Arab peoples. Today the Soviet Union has used its right of veto to defend the interests of the Iranian people from foreign interference.

167. Therefore we expected the attacks on the Soviet Union by the representative of the United States which is carrying out a policy of interference in the internal affairs of Iran and attempting to draw Iran back into the orbit of American political, economic and military

domination. That, of course, is natural. But what gives rise to some surprise is the position of some non-aligned developing countries in supporting the policy of the United States against the interests of peoples struggling for their freedom and independence. But time will pass and truth will triumph. It suffices merely to recall that about eight years ago, in this hall, the veto of the Soviet Union prevented the adoption of a decision which was directed against the interests of the people of Bangladesh; and now today that State is a member of the Security Council. And even if there is anyone who still does not understand or wishes deliberately to close his eyes to the truth behind the events in Iran, Afghanistan or Kampuchea, with the passage of time, historical justice will triumph.

168. We cannot pass over in silence the fact that the United States intends to apply sanctions against Iran, as if they had been approved by the Security Council. It would be inadmissible for some Powers to try to take upon themselves the rights which come exclusively within the purview of the Council and, as they see fit, to decide when to end sanctions established by the Council, as was done by Britain, the United States and a number of other Western countries in the case of sanctions against the racist régime in Southern Rhodesia, and when to impose sanctions which the Council has not decreed. This is a clear lack of respect for the Charter of the United Nations and an attempt to take the law into one's own hands, and it should be resolutely condemned by all Member States.

169. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): The Security Council has concluded this stage of its consideration of the question inscribed on its agenda.

The meeting rose at 10.45 p.m.

NOTES

¹ *United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Teheran, Provisional Measures, Order of 15 December 1979, I.C.J. Reports, p. 7, para. 38.*

² *United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 500, p. 95.*



كيفية الحصول على منشورات الأمم المتحدة

يمكن الحصول على منشورات الأمم المتحدة من المكتبات ودور التوزيع في جميع أنحاء العالم . استعلم منها من المكتبة التي تتعامل معها أو اكتب إلى : الأمم المتحدة ، قسم البيع في نيويورك أو في جنيف .

如何获取联合国出版物

联合国出版物在全世界各地的书店和经销处均有发售。请向书店函购或写信到纽约或日内瓦的联合国销售组。

HOW TO OBTAIN UNITED NATIONS PUBLICATIONS

United Nations publications may be obtained from bookstores and distributors throughout the world. Consult your bookstore or write to: United Nations, Sales Section, New York or Geneva.

COMMENT SE PROCURER LES PUBLICATIONS DES NATIONS UNIES

Les publications des Nations Unies sont en vente dans les librairies et les agences dépositaires du monde entier. Informez-vous auprès de votre libraire ou adressez-vous à : Nations Unies, Section des ventes, New York ou Genève.

КАК ПОЛУЧИТЬ ИЗДАНИЯ ОРГАНИЗАЦИИ ОБЪЕДИНЕННЫХ НАЦИЙ

Издания Организации Объединенных Наций можно купить в книжных магазинах и агентствах во всех районах мира. Наводите справки об изданиях в вашем книжном магазине или пишите по адресу: Организация Объединенных Наций, Секция по продаже изданий, Нью-Йорк или Женева.

COMO CONSEGUIR PUBLICACIONES DE LAS NACIONES UNIDAS

Las publicaciones de las Naciones Unidas están en venta en librerías y casas distribuidoras en todas partes del mundo. Consulte a su librero o diríjase a: Naciones Unidas, Sección de Ventas, Nueva York o Ginebra.
