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The **resolutions** of the Security Council, numbered in accordance with a system adopted in **1964**, are published in yearly volumes of *Resolutions and Decisions of the Security Council*. The new system, which has been applied retroactively to resolutions adopted before **1 January 1965**, became fully **operative** on that date.

1819th MEETING

Held in New York on Wednesday, 5 March 1975, at 3 p.m.

President: Mr. Gonzalo J. FACIO (Costa Rica).

Present: The representatives of the following States: Byelorussian Soviet **Socialist** Republic, China, Costa Rica, France, Guyana, Iraq, Italy, Japan, Mauritania, Sweden, Union of Soviet **Socialist** Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Cameroon, United Republic of Tanzania and United States of America.

Provisional agenda (S/Agenda/1819)

1. Adoption of the agenda
2. **The situation in Cyprus:**
Letter dated 17 February 1975 from the Permanent Representative of Cyprus to **the** United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/11625)

The meeting was called to order at 4 p.m.

Adoption of the agenda

The agenda was adopted.

The situation in Cyprus:
Letter dated 17 February 1975 from the Permanent Representative of Cyprus to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/11625)

1. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Spanish*): In accordance **with** the decision taken at the 1813th meeting, I propose, with the consent of the Council, to invite the representatives of Cyprus, Turkey and Greece to participate in the debate without the right to vote.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Clerides (Cyprus), Mr. Olcay (Turkey) and Mr. Carayannis (Greece) took places at the Council table.

2. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Spanish*): In accordance with **the** decisions taken at the 1815th to 1817th meetings, and with **the** consent of the Council, I invite the representatives of Bulgaria, Saudi Arabia and Romania to take the places reserved for them at the side of the Council chamber in order to participate in the discussion without the right to vote.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Grozev (Bulgaria), Mr. Baroody (Saudi Arabia) and Mr. Dacu (Romania) took the places reserved for them at the side of the Council chamber.

3. Mr. ZAHAWIE (Iraq): Mr. President, may I first, on behalf of my delegation, welcome you back to the United Nations to preside once more over the deliberations of the Security Council. We still remember the excellent manner in which you presided over the first **meeting** of the Council in 1974, when both our delegations had **just been** elected to the membership of the Council **along** with the **other** new non-permanent **members**. We wish **you** success in your present task and promise you our full co-operation.

4. **We** should like also to express our congratulations and appreciation to Mr. Huang Hua of China for his outstanding **contribution** to **the** work of the Council in his capacity as **President** during the month of February.

5. As this is the **first** occasion this year on which my delegation has spoken, I should like **to** extend a brief but warm welcome to the new non-permanent members of the Council. The representatives of Italy, Japan and Sweden return to the **Council** with the vast experience and the tremendous achievements of their countries. The representatives of Guyana and the United Republic of Tanzania bring to the Council the vigour and the vision of young nations which have already accomplished much in shaping the non-aligned movement, and hence the outlines of a new world order for future generations.

6. Our best wishes accompany the outgoing members of the Council, the representatives of Austria, Australia, Indonesia, Kenya and Peru, each of whom has, in his own distinctive way, made valuable contributions to the work of the Council. It was a pleasure and a privilege to serve with them here.

7. It may well be said that it is a matter of regret whenever the Security Council meets to examine a particular crisis, inasmuch as the occurrence of the crisis itself **is** regrettable. **My** delegation **specially** regrets the fact that the Council has had to convene now **to** consider yet again the situation in Cyprus, since this made it necessary for the Secretary-General to cut short his visit to our part of the world. He thus spent only one night in Baghdad instead of the two

nights originally scheduled. Be that as it may, we hope that we shall have another opportunity to welcome Mr. Waldheim as an honoured guest in our capital and without the pressures of crises looming on the horizon.

8. We would like here to commend the most valuable efforts of the **Secretary-General** in dealing with the Cyprus problem, as well as the efforts of his Special Representative, Mr. **Weckmann-Muñoz**, whose outstanding qualities and dedication we came to appreciate from direct experience through his involvement in one of Iraq's own problems.

9. The situation in Cyprus is, as it has already been pointed out, chronic, complex and, I might well add, plagued with confusion. As the debate now draws to an end, and having listened very carefully to all the statements already made, one wonders what is left to be said about the dilemma that is Cyprus without provoking further recriminations or taking the risk of plunging the Council into the endless speeches and futile debates that are the bane of the United Nations.

10. My delegation takes its lead from the wisdom displayed by the representative of Cyprus, Mr **Clerides**, in his opening statement [*1813th meeting*], when he said that he would not reopen old wounds nor attempt to apportion blame, in a sincere desire to be constructive and not obstructive. Nevertheless, and perhaps unavoidably, the wounds have been reopened, and it is not my intention to add to the pain; there is enough suffering in Cyprus as it is.

11. The one glimmer of hope in all the gloom into which Cyprus has been thrust is the almost unanimous agreement on the necessity for the resumption of the negotiations between the representatives of the Greek and Turkish communities in Cyprus. In the circumstances, it is imperative to look for the points of agreement between the parties concerned rather than to emphasize the differences between them. The unilateral declaration of 13 February has undoubtedly aroused deep concern about the future of the island. I would like to state here again that Iraq firmly supports the independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and the non-aligned status of the Republic of Cyprus.

12. My delegation finds deep satisfaction in the fact that all the parties concerned have reaffirmed their adherence to these basic principles. We take note of the fact that in the declaration he made on 13 February, Mr. **Denktaş** stated his determination: "to oppose resolutely all attempts against the independence of Cyprus, and its partition or union with any other State" [S/11624, annex *II*]. We also wish to recall on this occasion that during the debate on Cyprus at the twenty-ninth session of the General Assembly, the Foreign Ministers of both Greece and Turkey condemned any attempt at *enosis* or partition

of the island. My delegation welcomes the renewed assurances given by Mr. Olcay of Turkey that the Government of Turkey has no intention whatsoever of resorting to the partition of Cyprus and, in fact, as a guarantor of the independence of the Republic of Cyprus, will strongly resist any efforts that may be made by other parties to partition or annex the island.

13. The representative of the Turkish community in Cyprus, Mr. **Çelik**, on the other hand, stated that nothing in their proposal should be interpreted as the last word; and I believe that Mr. **Denktaş** himself has also stated that his declaration does not prejudice the final political settlement of the problem of Cyprus.

14. It would appear that there are good reasons to believe that both sides want Cyprus to remain an independent, sovereign and non-aligned State. Both sides appear to accept the necessity of establishing separate communities in the island. Both appear willing to discuss the structure of the State and the boundaries of the communal regions.

15. Now there have been many calls made upon the parties concerned to create the right climate for the resumption of the negotiations. The Security Council, in trying to act constructively in the present situation, can do no less than attempt, itself, to create the appropriate atmosphere for the speedy resumption of the negotiations by calling upon the parties to start genuine moves towards the implementation of resolution 3212 (XXIX), by placing the Secretary-General at the disposal of the parties, by calling upon them to co-operate fully with the Secretary-General and with the Council in order to achieve a just and durable settlement of the problem.

16. We sincerely hope that the Council will succeed in its endeavours and will not appear to have indulged in yet another profitless debate.

17. The **PRESIDENT** (*interpretation from Spanish*): Since all the members of the Council have already spoken in this debate, I should now like to make a statement on behalf of COSTA RICA.

18. The Government of Costa Rica attaches the utmost importance to the post of President of the Security Council. As proof of this, it decided that its Minister for External Relations should discharge that function when it was the turn of our country to assume the presidency of the Council. It is for this reason that I had the honour to preside over the Security Council during the month of January 1974, and that is why I am here today in the President's chair.

19. I appreciate the welcome given me by the members of the Council who participated in the debate at yesterday's meeting and today. I also appreciate the attention paid me by all the members

whom I have consulted. Their advice has been most valuable to me in my endeavour to fulfil adequately my exalted task.

20. I should like to avail myself of this opportunity to congratulate and offer my co-operation to the new members of the Council, the representatives of Guyana, Italy, Japan, Sweden and the United Republic of Tanzania.

21. We are meeting here at the request of the representative of the Government of the Republic of Cyprus. We were convened to consider an urgent problem which, if not quickly resolved, could endanger the peace and security of the world. Accordingly, I believe that the Council would be failing in its duty if, after having listened to the statements of the parties concerned, it were not promptly to decide on a viable solution which would make it unmistakably clear that it intended to assist in a satisfactory resolution of the Cyprus conflict.

22. This debate, which started on 20 February 1975, has been a lengthy but a useful one. It has enabled us to hear lucid arguments from the parties to the conflict. We have been informed of the historical background and present causes' of the conflict. It has allowed us to hear significant appeals for harmony from all members of the Council. But we cannot prolong this debate any longer because, while we are meeting here, the two Cypriot communities are drawing farther and farther apart; their positions are hardening; their rancour is being exacerbated; the sufferings of thousands of displaced persons are increasing and Cyprus is more and more the victim of a terrible economic depression.

23. We must now reach a conclusion. In accordance with what has been stated here, that conclusion can be none other than the achievement of the practical implementation of the principles contained in General Assembly resolution 3212 (XXIX), which the Council endorsed, thus making it binding, in its resolution 365 (1974), which was unanimously adopted on 13 December 1974. The principles contained in those resolutions can be summarized as follows: first, respect for the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus; secondly, non-intervention by any foreign Powers in the internal affairs of Cyprus; thirdly, the withdrawal of all foreign armed forces and foreign military personnel at present stationed in the island; fourthly, the return of the refugees to their homes; **fifthly**, a solution of the problems existing between the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities through negotiations carried out on a basis of equality, so as to arrive freely at an agreement that is mutually acceptable.

24. The order in which these principles have been stated does not necessarily imply the chronological priority for their implementation. At any rate, since the reason for the convening of the present meetings

was the breaking off of negotiations owing to the unilateral action taken by one of the parties, our immediate and principal concern must be to ensure that the parties return to the negotiating table as soon as possible, in a place and with a procedure that are more suitable than those of the previous talks.

25. We have no doubt that it is up to the Cypriots themselves to find a definitive solution for their political problems by means of negotiation. But the task of the Council cannot end with the resumption of talks. Bearing in mind the danger for the peace of the island, the eastern Mediterranean region and the entire world which would be created by the failure or the breakdown of the negotiations, there is a consensus that the Security Council has the duty to superintend their progress and in so far as possible ensure that the parties will **find** new ways to reach a peaceful settlement.

26. One of the best means of helping to bring about the success of the new dialogue is the active participation of the Secretary-General. The prudence and the skill which he has demonstrated in the exercise of his duties in general, and in particular in his peace negotiations on Cyprus, bring him to the forefront as the most able official to act as a moderator and a promoter of these negotiations, which we hope will be successful.

27. One by one the members of the Council during this debate have expressed their faith in the participation of the Secretary-General in the dialogue to be held between the representatives of the parties concerned, a faith which extends to his Special Representative, Mr. **Weckmann-Muñoz**. I have no doubt that there is this consensus-shared by the parties concerned themselves to the effect that the Secretary-General should be invited to make himself personally available to the negotiators in order to secure a better **result** for their efforts.

28. The debate has also shown, in my opinion, the consensus of the members of the Council on other important matters; this will be reflected in the resolution which, I hope, we shall adopt before the end of this week.

29. In the first place, it has been recognized that the Government under the presidency of Archbishop Makarios is the only legitimate Government of Cyprus. Whatever arguments may be advanced for a constitutional restructuring of the island, the fact is that as long as there is no constitutional change, and as long as there is no election, in accordance with new rules, of another head of State and a corresponding Cabinet, the present Government of Cyprus, which has been recognized by the **quasi**-totality of the Members of the United Nations, will continue legally to represent its people, and the persons designated by that Government will be the only legitimate representatives of Cyprus to the **Organi**-zation .

30. Secondly, it has been made crystal clear that there is a consensus among **the members of the Council** on maintaining the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Cyprus. It is therefore obvious that all members -of the Council reject any attempt at the partition of Cyprus, or *enosis* or what has been called double *enosis*.

31. There is a consensus too as to the undesirability of the unilateral declaration which proclaimed the existence of an autonomous Turkish Federated, State of Cyprus. This decision, which was taken when negotiations were about to start **on the** future constitutional status of Cyprus, had to be unacceptable to the Greek Cypriot side. The result was the immediate suspension of the talks, which we are now endeavouring to have resumed.

32. Although we continue to regret the declaration of 13 February 1975 [ibid.], it is fair to point out that both the ad *hoc* representative of the Turkish Cypriot community, Mr. **Çelik**, and his leader, Mr. Denktaş, have reiterated that this action is not intended to jeopardize the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Cyprus; or to prejudge the final result of the negotiations to be **held** with the Greek Cypriot side on the future constitutional organization of the Republic of Cyprus. We must also note that such statements are in complete accord with the **actual** text of that declaration, which reaffirms the determined Turkish Cypriot objection to any act which would jeopardize the independence of Cyprus or lead to its partition or its union with any other foreign State. The declaration also reaffirms that the final objective of the Turkish Cypriots is to be united with the Greek Cypriot community within the framework of a **bi-regional** federation.

33. It is to be hoped that, if these are the purposes of the Turkish Cypriots, they will in future refrain from adopting new unilateral decisions which, like that of 13 February, would constitute an obstacle to what they maintain is their final objective.

34. On the basis of the points on which the **debate** showed that there was a consensus, two working documents were prepared which contain valuable elements for a possible draft resolution. One was prepared by the representatives of France, Italy and the United Kingdom; the other was prepared by the representatives of Guyana, Iraq, Mauritania, the United Republic of Cameroon and the United Republic of Tanzania. On the basis of their praiseworthy **efforts**, I had the honour of holding intense **consultations** from the very moment I took over the presidency on 1 March. For their part, the members of the group of **three** Western European Powers, as well as the members of the non-aligned nations, in turn held consultations among their groups, with other members of the Council and with **the** parties concerned. The result of this **effort**, for which **we** must all be

grateful, could be a single draft resolution which would consolidate the two documents I have mentioned.

35. Because of the unflagging labour of such active **members of the Security Council**, I think that we shall soon be **able** to end this debate by adopting **unanimously**. I hope a resolution intended to promote the immediate start of new negotiations between the experienced representatives of the Cypriot communities, Mr. Clerides and Mr. Denktaş.

36. I should like to express to these negotiators my confidence that their proven skill, moderation, experience and love for their people will lead them to find terms of understanding which, in time, will be the foundation for peaceful coexistence and active co-operation between the two Cypriot communities. It is **true** that at times the task seems impossible. But history teaches us that differences between other communities which **appeared irreconcilable** have been overcome in the course of time. A good point of departure is all that is needed.

37. If we read carefully the proposals on the **organization of the Constitution** which Mr. **Clerides** and Mr. **Denktaş** exchanged through the intermediary of the Representative of the Secretary-General, Mr. **Weckmann-Muñoz**, before the interruption of the negotiations that were being held in Nicosia, we shall find that they reveal much common ground.

38. Of course there are differences in emphasis which at times make them seem incompatible. But, in fact; some progress had been made. It had been agreed that the new State of Cyprus should be a bicomunal federation. Although Mr. **Denktaş** had proposed a biregional federation and Mr. Clerides a multiregional federation, the latter came close to the approach of the former when he agreed that there should be a substantial area in the north under Turkish Cypriot control. For his part Mr. **Çelik**, speaking in this Council as the representative of the Turkish Cypriot community, clearly stated that the proposals of Mr. **Denktaş** were not final, since in a **process** of negotiation there must logically be **proposals** and counter-proposals until a mutually acceptable compromise is reached.

39. I am pointing out the areas of agreement without the least desire to give an opinion as to how the basic problem is to be resolved, **because**, I repeat, the **building** of a new **Cyprus** and the solution of the problems related to it are tasks incumbent on the Cypriots alone. But I cannot refrain from expressing the **hope** that if negotiations are undertaken in a new spirit, looking to the future, without looking **back** on the errors of the past, peace will once again reign in **Cyprus**, and I also hope that with the passing -of time a Cypriot nation will emerge free from the rancour and bloody battles which have been the century-old tradition of the two communities inhabiting the island today.

40. The next speaker is the representative of Saudi Arabia, and speaking in my capacity as PRESIDENT I now invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

41. Mr. BAROODY (Saudi Arabia): Mr. President, before I embark on my statement, allow me to express to-you my appreciation of the fact that you have come from your country specially to preside over the deliberations of the Security Council on a problem that indeed is taking more time to solve than many of us had expected. I say this because, as the Minister for External Relations of Costa Rica, you no doubt have many duties at home. However; the sense of responsibility of a leader who feels that he should do his bit in trying to find ways and means to resolve this problem is laudable, and all the more so because your country is a small one, and we are heartened by the fact that the representatives of small countries are involving themselves in -such matters more than they did in. the past. I hope the message will not be lost on the major Powers when they see many of us small countries taking an interest in the **affairs** of the United Nations.

42. I am heartened by the fact that throughout the debate I have, on the whole, seen a -genuine rapport between our Greek and Turkish colleagues, on the one hand, and between the representatives of the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities, on the other. In spite of the minor accusations and recriminations to which we have listened, I believe that all the parties concerned are well disposed to one another. I would not say that if I did not feel it. There is no deep bitterness, or even the shadow of hatred, although blood has been spilled and the common people of Cyprus-I do not use the word "common" in a derogatory sense-the people of Cyprus have indeed paid a heavy price, whether they are from the Greek or the Turkish communities.-

43. I have already spoken on this matter in the Security Council Why is it that I have asked 'to speak again? I mentioned that Cyprus happens to be in **our** region. I was glad that my brother and colleague from Iraq spoke today, because Cyprus is part of the Middle East. We are concerned. All those countries in the Middle East are concerned about what is happening in Cyprus, because Cyprus is the microcosm of invisible forces and, if I may use the term, of a tug-of-war that may be taking place without our knowledge. But we feel it. I do not **want** to adduce facts and embarrass some of my colleagues. I can adduce facts, but if I do so I may elicit rights of reply, and then I shall have to- reply and accuse. What would be the result? That would- not get us anywhere. It would lead to increased bitterness. I have learned that the hard way; I **have been** here many years. So is Baroody trying, now that the Arab States have a little extra oil, to pour 'oil on troubled waters? No, because somebody might put a match to that oil and then we would get nowhere.

We would **all** get burned. But the simile holds good in some respects.

44. Why am I speaking again? At the last meeting I signalled to my good brother and colleague from India, a member of the Secretariat sitting behind Mr. Shevchenko, the Under-Secretary-General for Political and Security Council Affairs, that I wanted to speak. He took my signal to mean that I wanted **to see** him personallyj so I missed the occasion to speak then after I -had heard. the speakers, who, with all due respect to their honesty, perspicacity and lucidity of thought, found themselves going in **circles** with no working paper.. At least, if there is a working paper -either they do not trust me enough to show me its contents, or, it seems, they have not come to an agreement.

45. I felt saddened-not so much for the gentlemen sitting here, around this table, but for 'the Cypriot people who are suffering, regardless of their **so-to-speak** religious or national origin. They are Cypriots; we decided that a **long** time ago: no **enosis**, and no partition. That was the **raison d'être** for Cyprus being declared an independent Member State of the United Nations.

46. What has happened? Well, I did some research about this fellow called Sampson, and I was told he was not an Anglo-Saxon. I said, "For heaven's sake", because I always have some suspicion about our English friends, and I thought that since the Labour Party took power they were not doing so many things as they did in colonial days, starting with **Ramsay** MacDonald, when things took a turn for the better in 1924. You remember that year?

47. I heard that Sampson was a madcap, an adventurer. I am not asking Mr. **Clerides** if that is true; because that **may be** embarrassing, nor am I asking my good friend Mr. Olcay. You know what Sampson did? He cut off the heads of British soldiers -not Greek or Turkish soldiers- during the struggle for the emancipation of Cyprus.

48. I really envy the stoicism and the reticence of **our** English friends, who never complained **even** when he **decapitaed** their own compatriots on the island. They did not even complain very much when British tommies were hanged from the branches of olive trees in Palestine in the 1920s and **1930s**. That is to their credit. But nobody can be as unemotional as the British Government. We happen to be Mediterranean people, and it is a wonder how my good brother. to my right and my good -brother facing me **have** acted more or. less like the Anglo-Saxon& with **sang-froid**. That is heartening because I see hope in the new attitudes. of Mediterranean people in approaching a question unemotionally, although emotions may run very high among the peoples of Turkey and Greece and the people of the Cypriot communities-because they are people. How do I

know? I am an Arab. Once, in Paris in the **1930s**, I was sucked into a crowd as I went to the Place de la Concorde one day, not knowing what the demonstration was about. I was shouting my head off, not knowing what I was shouting about, until **machine-guns** were fired. I do not want to go into that event in detail, but it was the Stavisky case, which members will remember. That was in the **1930s**. I apostrophized myself in Arabic: "**Jamil**, what are you doing here! Get out of here"-in order not to be sucked in by the Nazis. I told a Frenchman at one time what had happened to me. He said, "Ah, il faut lire *La Psychologie des Foules* de Gustave **LeBon**". It became a classic.

49. So what should we expect of the Cypriots, be they of Turkish or of Greek origin--and, please let me add, "of other origins", because not all Cypriots are Greek or Turkish. Some are from the Arab world. They got to be Cypriots. They identified their interests with Cyprus. Some of them, as I mentioned the other day, are Maronites from Lebanon. Others are Christians or Moslems from Syria. Ask me about Cyprus. It is in my region.

50. But people are people, and I do not like to **categorize** them. A people is a people because of its way of life and its common interest--we settled that point the other day--not necessarily because of its religion. For if it were a matter of religion we should not have had the European Christians engaging in two world wars--praying on Sunday in the name of Jesus, the Prince of Peace, and the next day cutting each others' throats; So religion is not involved. Some may have religion at the back of their minds. Take my family, the **Baroodys**. It is a very ancient family. It is no honour to be ancient; you must always be kept shining; you rust when you are too old. Half of it is Christian and half is Moslem. We do not say "You are a Moslem" and "You are a Chris&n".

51. So this is my counsel, my advice to my colleagues from Cyprus: please do not make religion the pivot of your **differences** from which all trouble may emanate and by which it could even be intensified. Look across that little strip of Mediterranean to Lebanon. Lebanon has Moslems and Christians of all denominations; it has Jews that live in peace regardless of **all** the propaganda you read here in this country about the maltreatment of Jews. They are full-fledged citizens, and the people are thriving because each one worships the way he wants without making an issue of religion. I am not saying that the situation is the same **as it** is in Lebanon, but it is a parallel.

52. Who am I to come here and preach? And where would it get us if I were to tell you what should be done? After all, who is Baroody; why should he? Let him mind his own business. The Arabs have enough trouble; let them solve their own problems before they come and give advice to others.

53. But after all, I am a Member of the United Nations; I identify myself with the **Organization**. I have done so for 30 years; and I believe it the right of everyone. That is why I applauded our President for involving himself--a Costa Rican, from perhaps 7,000 or 8,000 miles away from the focus of the trouble--in this question, hoping that it could be resolved.

54. Now, what is the solution? What approach or approaches should we try--if they have not already been tried? And, no doubt, some have been tried without the knowledge of many of us, including myself. Let me be frank; I do not mince my words. I am not going to embarrass anybody, so please do not get uncomfortable, some of you--although if you feel that certain remarks apply to you it is not my fault. There is an Arabic proverb which says: "If you put a saddle needle in your inside pocket, it will prick you in the armpit". Well, we do not know who has the needle in his inside pocket. Once, years ago, I mentioned this to a Foreign Minister; he asked me whom I meant by the "perverted democracies" and whether his country was included. I mentioned this proverb--"you put a saddle needle in your inside pocket, it will prick you in armpit*"--so he put his hand inside his jacket and said: "I do not have any saddle needle". To which I replied: "Search in the other pocket: maybe you will find it." That was as far back as 1947, at Lake Success.

55. Many of us have such needles which we hide. But we cannot take such an approach to a problem like this. I will start with Greece and Turkey, Mediterranean peoples. The Mediterranean is the cradle of Western civilization and, by extension of the civilization of the New World, so I think we should appeal to those peoples with glorious histories.

56. The other day I mentioned **how** tolerant the Turks were, having myself been born an Ottoman subject. Who can deny the contribution of Greece to world civilization? We were proud that the Arabs were the transmitters of much Greek culture and thought. Indeed, had it not been for the Arabs, no one would have heard of Aristotle or Plato. We should consider ourselves a Mediterranean community with common interests. No religion or political faction should split us asunder.

57. But I go further than that: we should be considered a world community. True, that is utopian: we have not arrived at that stage in society. Therefore, scratching my bald head, I was thinking of how to deal with this question as someone who hails from the region, and I thought of several options, some of which perhaps merit more attention and scrutiny than others.

58. I will start with the Greeks and the Turks. Mind you, if I say "the Greeks and the Turks", and not "the Turks and the Greeks", it is that I am

going by alphabetical order. Let us forget for a **moment** the historical background I gave you last time, because I would just be repeating myself. Many Greeks distinguished themselves in the Ottoman Empire, and while the Turks ruled the *Greeks* until the independence of Greece in 1824 or thereabouts-the British sent Lord Byron, you remember, to incite the Greeks-the Greeks did not suffer on religious grounds, because of the tolerance of the Turks. Why? Because the Turks were devout; they were good Moslems. Both the Christians and the Jews were the people of the Book, and the people of Anatolia today are perhaps, I would say, as Moslem as the people of Saudi Arabia-most of them-and they do not hate the Christians, unless they are incited for political reasons. Likewise, many Greeks are true Christians. I know: they practise their religion more than do their Western co-religionists, who, as I said, went at each other's throats in two world wars in the name of religion.

59. Now, the one who is having a good time is our friend Mr. Malik, because they have no religious complexes any more: they are atheists. We accept your atheism, in the sense that in the Koran it says: "There is no compulsion in religion.* We cannot compel you to be a good Christian or a good Moslem, so be what you are. They have no complexes about religion-with the exception of some people who are using religion for political motives. You know who they are; there is no need to mention them.

60. Therefore, the first axiom, if I may say so, is not to fan the flames of religious animosity, in Cyprus or elsewhere. We cannot afford it in our part of the world. We have solved this problem in Lebanon, in Syria and in Iraq, regardless of what they say about our Iraqi friends in the mass media, which are controlled by certain factions which I do not have to mention. That is the first axiom. Try to calm down the Greek and Turkish communities and tell them that what has happened is very grievous and very sad and that it should not happen again on the grounds of religious intolerance.

61. Now, having prepared the ground, we come to the first option. It may not be practical because of the special interests of certain States-and I do not need to name them. I address myself here to our Greek and Turkish brothers. Their countries are both members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (*NATO*), are they not? Has anybody pulled out of NATO yet? Of course, someone might; I do not know. What kind of alliance is this when any suggestion of arbitration between two parties evokes the fear that one party or the other might be antagonized? This is a very weak alliance, let me tell you; it will not work.

62. I do not believe in military alliances myself. I hope that we Arabs will not be forced into one in the

future. But the members *of NATO should quietly and silently try to compose the differences between the Greeks and the Turks. After all, there is the sagacity of our English friends, the lucidity and logic of our French friends and the Mediterranean sentiment of our Italian friends. The Italians are exuberant people; they are affectionate and sentimental. Someone once said to me, "The Italians are not good soldiers. Look at them". I answered, "That is because they are more civiized than you are. They prefer song and the opera". After all, the Renaissance started in Italy, and that is to their credit. People are still barbarians. They think that brute force, killing one another, is a virtue-in war or peace.

63. I have mentioned three members of NATO. There are others. I do not want to rule out the Germans-East and West. And is it not terrible that they divided Germany into two parts? Of course, that is not my business.

64. As I have said, the first option is for the members of NATO quietly and silently to try to compose the differences between the Greeks and the Turks. Unfortunately, events are following the same old pattern: our Greek friends support the Greek faction and our Turkish friends support the Turkish faction in Cyprus. That is wrong. That is why I stated the first axiom-that is, that there is religious tolerance on the part of the rulers of Greece and the rulers of Turkey. We see proof of that in this chamber.

65. Of course, the members of NATO may fail in that attempt. If they do, we have to provide another option or choice or alternative-whatever one wants to call it.

66. It so happens that Cyprus is regarded as a member of the so-called third world, or non-aligned world. I **say** "*so-called" because I do not believe in these nomenclatures that are without substance. These are cliches. Saudi Arabia is also regarded as belonging to the third world, the non-aligned world. What is the **first** world or the second world? We are one world, and the catalyst is the Organization, the United Nations. With all due respect to the aims of the members of the third world, including my country, I would ask: Is there any homogeneity among the countries of the third world? There are all kinds of special interests served by the politicians of each national State. And there are national interests within NATO too. If there were not, NATO would be a solid bloc. We have found that it is not, that it is very weak. I do not know about the Warsaw Pact; I hope it is not very solid because if it is there will always be a NATO.

67. The proper way to proceed is to discuss the question, to go to the roots of the matter, to talk man to man, and not merely read out statements. All these-words we hear are spoken with good diction, but if we really try to find out what they mean we

see that these are platitudes-beautiful platitudes, but still platitudes. I sometimes wish that there was a tax on words and prizes for deeds, There is an Arab proverb which says: "Let him talk; he is not paying any tax on what he says". Because of semantics and double meanings and **rationalizations**, most of us, sometimes say things we **do** not mean and mean things we do not say. I have said time and again that I wish we communicated like birds, by chirping and twittering, instead of putting various meanings on words. As an example of what I am saying I would refer to the famous resolution 242 (1967). I told the Council at the time that this resolution would backfire. The word "the" was not put in before the words "territories occupied in the recent conflict", and so everyone puts a different interpretation on the phrase. Words, words, words-as Hamlet said to Poionius. If Polonius were alive today, he would still be mystified. Why should we live by the words or the resolutions or the **working** papers?

68. If the members of the third world and/or the members of NATO would get together quietly and have what the French call **pourparlers**, exchange thoughts, perhaps the fears could be allayed and something could be **accomplished**. I **do not** know. These are options. We are exploring the various ways and means;

69. 'And we should not rule out the idea put forward by our **good** friend Mr. Malik. He has a right to his **views**. He said, "Why not have the five members of the Council meet together?*" He was referring, of course, to the major Powers, the permanent members of the Council-I shall not use the -word "**super-Powers**" because I do not want to hurt you, Mr. Malik; I do not want to go into your squabbles with **you-know-whom**. Why not explore the possibility of meeting together, perhaps also with a selected number of other members-three or four-in **order** to find a **way** to compose the differences, on the basis always of "**no enosis**, no partition*.". Do you hear that, Mr. Rossides? You are **the** one who, in 1958, started me on this theme of "**no enosis**, no partition".

70. I do not want that gentleman, the **Secretary-General**, to shoulder the burden **all** by himself, but we must always keep in mind that if his services are needed he can be a sort of catalytic agent between the parties concerned-and not only the parties directly concerned but also those who are dealing with the situation.

71. Now do not think that I have not jotted down other- choices. But the Council has been meeting day after day and no text has emerged, and you are going in circles-with all due respect to you as very capable representatives of your respective countries. I am not a member of the Council and I thank you for allowing me to express my views. I cast no vote; thank God I do not have to cast any vote, not being 'a member of the Council. But that does not

preclude -non-members of the Council who are involved in the United Nations and who think that there is no alternative to this Organization expressing their humble opinions about how to find a way out of this impasse.

72. Before I **conclude**, I wish to **say** something about my knowledge of economics and finance that I learned when young in the Western world-not from books in the East-in the City of London and in Paris. I have **no crystal ball**, unlike the economists who -do not see anything in their respective crystal bails but imagine that they see things.

73. **Incidentally**, we are going to have a new socio-economic -order--not communist, not socialist, not capitalist. It is 'a hybrid, neither **fish** nor fowl. We do not know whether in the future we shall be able to identify the "animal"; we do not know into what economicstraits we are heading.

74. If the major Powers are becoming insolvent-and I mean insolvent-having spent their substance in two world wars and in subsequent wars, if their currencies are dwindling to nothing, erasing the middle class and, one day, the -technocrats too if the rouble goes down, why should we expect that the peoples of 'Cyprus, Greece and Turkey will not suffer economically if there is a drain on their economies **and** finances? You may now be semi-bankrupt. I do not want to name those who are bankrupt. They are all becoming bankrupt now-Saudi Arabia, too, with all its surplus, because when we sell our oil we sell it for **fiat** money that is worth nothing, that is dwindling.

75. Of what benefit will it be to Cyprus, -Greece or 'Turkey to be made more impoverished by maintaining this conflict? Who will benefit? Of course your rulers will-rulers always find a way' to eat and get themselves jobs. But what about the people? Do you want them to rebel against you; against your rulers?.

76. 'Let me tell you, there is an awareness 'among people all over the world, including those of the host country.' **Only** yesterday we read that there are 2 million weapons in the hands of the citizens of New York. If there is a crisis here and the **Government** does not have a firm hand, do you think the people are going to take their soup bowls to Times Square as they did in the 1930s and sell apples on the streets? -They will rebel. So **if in** this great country, full of resources, people are restive because of the economic situation, who do you-Greece, Turkey and Cyprus-think you are? You would be rendered insolvent. The people will rise against you. They want to eat. Spending your substance on what-on dissension, war and conflict? The' people will **not** let you do it. If I were one of the people-and if I see an ant I do not tread on it-I would rebel. They will

rebel against you all, regardless of your religious affiliations, national origins or respective Governments.

77. So this is my last word to you: the unsatisfactory economic and financial situation that prevails in the **world,—do** you think it will be to anyone's profit? I am sure that if our Russian and Chinese friends—I am talking as a Communist—saw misery they would not have a feast, because they are humans. After all, humanism transcends ideology. We **are** all brothers under the skin, and people in want should be objects of sympathy for us all, regardless of our political persuasions. Or, **are** we hypocrites here talking about "human rights" year after year yet seeing people suffer—I am not talking about war; war is **madness—**owing to a lack of foodstuffs or a lack of the substance with which to buy those foodstuffs so essential for the sustenance of every human 'being? Do not let your people rebel against you because of want.

78. I shall therefore go back to the theme of my last statement. I beseech you, both sides, not to be rigid in searching for a solution. Do not go by terms such as "federation*", "confederation", "autonomy" and "canton"*. Grapple with the question. Forget any shadow of religious intolerance and think of humanism. That is the persuasion that should take a hold of each one of us, including us Arabs. Do not think I am preaching this to you only; I preach it to my own people as well.

79. With the permission of the members of the Council and while impatiently awaiting the emergence of something from your deliberations which I will take to heart and **scrutinize** in the hope that it will yield results, I do ask you to be tolerant with me and indulgent and, depending on what emerges from any deliberations, overt or covert, allow me to address the Council again.

80. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Spanish*): I should like to inform the Council that Mr. **Çelik** has asked to be allowed to make a further statement. In conformity with the decision taken by the Council at the 1813th meeting to extend an invitation under rule 39 of the provisional **rules** of procedure to Mr. **Çelik**, I now invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

81. Mr. **ÇELIK**: Mr. President, may I thank you and, through you, each and every member of the Council for giving me **the** floor. I have found it necessary to ask to be allowed to speak for a third time in order to comment on some of the points raised by Mr. Clerides in his statement before the Security Council yesterday. It is not my intention to enter into an unproductive dialogue with Mr. **Clerides**, but I thought it necessary to elaborate on some issues of substance in order to clarify the Turkish Cypriot position.

82. In his statement yesterday [*1818th meeting*], Mr. **Clerides** started by blaming Turkey for not having implemented General Assembly resolution 3212 (XXIX) by withdrawing its troops from the island, and implied that that was why the Greek Cypriot side had again brought the Cyprus question before the Security Council. In this connection, Mr. Clerides, yesterday and during his previous --statements, has addressed to me and to Mr. Olcay of Turkey many specific questions regarding the implementation of resolution 3212 (XXIX). Those questions sometimes took the form of challenges.

83. I hope that the Greek Cypriot side appreciates that the utilization of New York in general and this chamber in particular as a sounding-box for propaganda effects is not the right way to obtain correct answers to these questions. The answers to all of these questions can and shall be given at the negotiating table. Had the Greek side preferred the continuation **of the** talks to coming to New York for political reasons, some of the questions raised would probably have been answered by now. I again **sincerely** urge Mr. Clerides to return to the negotiation table and resume negotiations with Mr. **Denktaş** as early as possible.

84. I should like to repeat here what is already on record: that the implementation of resolution 3212 (XXIX) does not only mean the withdrawal of the Turkish troops from the island. It has to be taken up and implemented **in toto**. The Turkish side has on various occasions in the past, both in the General Assembly and in the Security Council, made it clear, and placed on record, in what conditions the Turkish troops would be withdrawn from the island. We stated that in view of the security risk involved for the Turkish- Cypriot community—which, being numerically the smaller and militarily by far the weaker, had always been the losing party in **Cyprus** for the last 12 years—both the question of the withdrawal of troops and **the** question of refugees were political problems which should and must be taken up only within the framework of a final political settlement.

85. There must **first** be an agreement on the constitutional problem, as a result of which the security problem will be solved, all Greek Cypriot armies and armed elements will be dissolved and disbanded, and the way- paved for full **normalization**, including the withdrawal of **forces**. Only then will the full implementation of resolution **3212** (XXIX) be possible, 'and the sooner all concerned **realize** this, and the sooner we go back to the negotiating table and resume talks with a view to solving the political problem, the sooner the implementation of **resolu-**tion 3212 (XXIX) will be possible.

86. Mr. Clerides complains to the Security Council that the Turkish army invaded "**his** country" and occupied 40 per cent of "their land*"—meaning, of

course, the Greek Cypriots* land, as he **can** only speak, as he actually does, for the Greek Cypriot side. But Cyprus is our country; it is the country of the Turkish Cypriots, who actually own more than 30 per cent of the land of the island, as much as it is the country of the Greek Cypriots. It is this land that has been invaded in order to prevent or to put an end to a de facto **enosis** which had been completed with the coup of **15 July**, and save the islands independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-alignment. It was invaded in order to save the Turkish Cypriot community from political, administrative, social and economic discrimination, usurpation, harassment, expulsion and/or annihilation in their own land.

87. It is this anomaly that has to be corrected. It is the recurrence of these actions and unfair treatment that **first** has to be prevented. It is the **enosis** movement and struggle that first has to be forgotten. When that is done, Mr. Clerides may rest assured that the Turkish troops for their part will leave the island.

88. As regards bi-regionality, which is really the de facto regrouping of the Turkish Cypriots for obvious security reasons, as I have already said in my previous statements before the Council, it has been forced upon us by the Greek Cypriot administration, which has no one to blame but itself.

89. Mr. Clerides stated that the Turkish policy on Cyprus was based on partition and not independence, which is wrong. Partition was never considered by the Turkish side as an alternative to independence. It has always been considered as an antidote to **enosis**; in fact partition is double **enosis**.

90. For years the Greek side tried to achieve **enosis** through self-determination. There being no Cypriot nation, as there are two national communities in Cyprus, in our struggle for equal rights, which is still continuing, we always demanded that if the right of self-determination was to be applied it should be applied equally to both communities-which would mean in a way both communities opting for the union of Cyprus with the two respective motherlands, Turkey and Greece, and therefore double **enosis**. It is only when **enosis** agitation was high, or it looked imminent, that partition was thought of by the Turkish side. It came up not as an alternative to independence, but as an antidote to **enosis**.

91. In an effort to accuse the Turkish side of having pursued a policy of partition, Mr. Clerides, in his statement before the Council yesterday, read an extract from a recent edition of the Turkish Cypriot daily newspaper **Halkin Sesi**. If we were to quote the Greek Cypriot press on **enosis** it would take us whole months, if not years, to complete. But why quote from the press? Why not quote official statements made by men in office, by persons of

responsibility? But this is Mr. Clerides' **heel of Achilles**. This is his weak point; there are not many statements he can quote from. On the other hand, what is the position of the Greek Cypriot side regarding **enosis**? We have a Greek Cypriot community which, with its President, leaders, institutions and people, thought **enosis**, wanted **enosis**, spoke and wrote **enosis**, and fought not only us, the Turkish Cypriots, but also each other for **enosis**.

92. I do not believe in the usefulness of quoting **in extenso** statements made by Greek Cypriot leaders on **enosis**, and it is definitely not my intention to take much of the Council's time over this matter. I shall therefore let it **suffice** to give only one or two quotations from Archbishop Makarios, from each member of the Greek Cypriot delegation here, and from other political leaders.

93. Fit, a statement issued by Makarios on 29 October 1971:

"I can now disclose that I have stated clearly and categorically to Greek Governments from time to time that I would unhesitatingly proclaim **enosis** if I had the consent to this end, that is, if Greece were prepared to accept **enosis** and share the responsibilities for the repercussions from such a venture.*"

94. A second statement by Makarios, addressing members of the Greek Army contingent in Cyprus on 29 April 1973, on the occasion of the Easter celebrations:

"We, the Greek Cypriots, see in your persons the presence of Greece. We, the Greek Cypriots, are still living the sorrow of the 'Great Friday' of the Easter Week. But our unshakable convictions is that national resurrection will follow our **crucifixion**. Our hard national path is lit by the light issuing from the Holy Sepulchre. We shall march on like Hellenes. The needle of our compass shall always point towards immortal Greece-our immortal motherland. At the end of our road is Acropolis. Acropolis is the symbol of our aspirations and dreams.**"

95. Another statement by Makarios, made on 21 February 1974 in an interview on Netherlands and Belgian television:

"**Enosis** is my as well as all Greek Cypriots* national aspiration. This aspiration shall never die. The fact that this aspiration cannot be **realized** now because of certain difficulties beyond our control is another matter."

%. A statement made on 16 July 1966 at Ayia Phylaxis village by Mr. Kyprianou, former Foreign Minister of the Greek Cypriot administration:

“The national leadership, which voices the wish of all the people, is not **prepared** to accept any compromise solution adulterating the people’s national restoration. The Cypriot people want union of the whole of Cyprus with Greece... The Greek Cypriot people will continue to struggle, having as their standard the Greek flag, the Greek virtue and the Greek ideals.*”

97. In an interview with the editor of the *Daily Star* of Beirut on 19 April 1967, Mr. Kyprianou made the following statements:

“*Editor:* There have been reports that your Government is willing to accept a NATO base on the island in return for *enosis*. Is this true?”

“*Kyprianou:* Greece is a member of NATO. In case of *enosis*, *Cyprus* would normally be part of Greece in the same way, vis-bvis NATO, as any other part of Greece. The question of a NATO base, therefore, should be viewed in the light of this reality.

“*Editor:* There are suggestions that your Government is not actively in support of *enosis* at this present stage. Is this true? Is your Government still committed to union with Greece?”

“*Kyprianou:* The Cyprus Government has always been committed to a solution of the problem in accordance with the wishes of the majority of the people of Cyprus in the exercise of their right to self-determination. The vast majority of the people of Cyprus desire union of Cyprus with Greece, as is well known.”

98. The statements I have just quoted were made by the President and the Foreign Minister, **respectively**, of an administration which professed devotion and still pretends to pay allegiance to the policy of non-alignment.

99. The following is a statement by Mr. Tassos Papadopoulos, former Minister of Labour and at present a member of the Greek Cypriot delegation, at the thirtieth session of the General Assembly:

“Our national tradition and ancestral endowment have pre-charted the course of our evolution in history, and no power, no pressure, no threat, no intervention, no sacrifice, no time consideration can **divert** the course of history from its natural evolution, which leads to freedom and to union with Greece... It is high time Cypriots and others made it their conviction that union of Cyprus with Greece is a historical necessity... There can be no freedom for Cyprus outside the boundaries of Greece.*”

100. A statement by Dr. Lyssarides, leader of the Greek Cypriot EDEK Party, made on 27 March 1972 in Kypros:

“EDEK believes that no solution to the Cyprus problem can be everlasting if it is not based on the inalienable right of the people of Cyprus to self-determination. The use of the right to **self-determination** in Cyprus will result in the union of Cyprus as a whole with Greece.”

101. A second statement by Dr. Lyssarides, made on 23 April 1973:

“The real cause of the crisis is that the people of Cyprus have not been allowed to exercise their right to self-determination. For this reason, various groups have turned to different goals and thus a crisis has arisen. Some people *speak* of ‘**enotists**’ and ‘**anti-enotists**’. This is not at all correct. All *the* Greek Cypriots are ‘**enotists**’ and they are prepared to make every sacrifice and to fight for *enosis*, provided that suitable conditions are created for its achievement.”

102. The following is a statement made on 24 April 1973 by Mr. Ezekias Papaionnou, Secretary-General of the AKEL Party:

“Allegations that AKEL opposes *enosis* are contrary to realities. AKEL supports genuine *enosis* without conditions, strings or exchanges as the ultimate goal...”

103. A statement made on 4 February 1973 at Dhali village by Mr. Clerides:

“The national duty makes it incumbent on us to work positively to preserve the national character of the island’s Hellenism, to strengthen the national spirit of our people and to cultivate their faith in the supreme values of Greek Christian **civilization**. Our eyes must always be turned towards eternal Greece, which is a symbol and a source of the loftiest ideal of humanity.”

104. A second statement by Mr. Clerides, made on 10 February 1974:

“The **Cyprus problem** is a national problem and, consequently, the Government of our motherland should have a decisive opinion on the ways of handling it and to the point up to which we are entitled to proceed at the present stage.”

105. But why quote individuals? The Greek Cypriots House of Representatives, of which Mr. Clerides was and still is President, on 26 June 1967 adopted the following resolution unanimously:

“Interpreting the age-long aspirations of the Greeks of Cyprus, the House declares that despite any adverse circumstances it would not suspend the struggle being conducted with the support of **all** Greeks until this struggle ends in success through the union of the whole and undivided Cyprus with the motherland, without any intermediary stage.”

106. This resolution of the Greek Cypriot House of Representatives is still valid, and the events that have taken place since 1967 confirm that the Greek Cypriots-President, leadership and people-have not abandoned their policy of uniting the island "whole and undivided" to Greece.

107. The Greek members of the House of Representatives who took an oath to implement this resolution are **the same** members who paid allegiance to and supported Sampson, who carried out the *coup* of 15 July 1974 for the realization of the union of Cyprus with Greece.

108. Now these very gentlemen are here today, pretending to be the ardent supporters of independence and non-alignment. They accuse us of having followed a partitionist policy **and** of having dismembered Cyprus.

109. The Turkish policy, on Cyprus is very clear. We are against *enosis* and we are against partition.

110. As regards bi-regionality, which the Greek Cypriot side considers "dismemberment of the island", this is the only real physical guarantee both for the independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and nonalignment of the **island** and for the security and survival of the Turkish Cypriot community.

111. **The Greek side** is against biregional **federation** not because it will destroy the independence of the island, but because, as can be seen from the various quotations just cited, Cyprus **cannot** any longer be united to Greece "whole and undivided". In fact, not even a part of it can be annexed by Greece. This must be the **main** source of uneasiness for them.

112. Mr. Clerides **again repeated** the **allegation** that the Vice-President, **the Turkish ministers** and the Turkish members of the House of Representatives had left the Government and the House respectively of their own accord, and went as far **as** to say that the Turkish seats in the House of Representatives are still kept vacant for the Turkish members.

113. May I ask one question of Mr. Clerides: Why has **Cyprus** not participated in the deliberations of the Parliament of the Council of Europe since 1964? Cyprus until December 1963 participated in the deliberations of the Parliament of the Council of Europe through a joint parliamentary committee consisting of Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot representatives, as our Constitution demanded.

114. In 1964, **Mr.** Clerides attempted to participate in the deliberations of the said Council without Turkish Cypriot members, and when he was told by that Council that the Cypriot Parliamentary Committee had to consist of representatives of both **communites**, and despite the expressed readiness by the Turkish

side to conform to this, rather than take the Turkish members with him, he preferred not to participate in the deliberations of that Council at **all**. Cyprus today is still not represented in the Parliament of the Council of Europe. This, I think, will suffice to disprove what Mr. Clerides has said.

115. **As** regards the contention that shortly after 1964 the Turkish Cypriots enjoyed full freedom of movement throughout the territory of the Republic under the control of the so-called Government, I can only say that the statement does not reflect the truth. If the Turkish Cypriots enjoyed full freedom of movement, why is it that thousands of Turkish Cypriots, 6,000 of them, were not **allowed** to return to their own homes in **Küçük Kaimakli** (Omorphita), on the outskirts Of Nicosia? Why is it that tens of thousands of other Turkish Cypriot refugees were not allowed to return to their villages, like Ayios Theodoros, **Mansura**, Vroisha to name only three of scores of others? Why was it that those unfortunate Turkish Cypriot refugees were not allowed even to visit their villages for agricultural purposes? What kind of freedom of movement was it when hundreds of Turkish Cypriots who ventured to leave the Turkish enclaves disappeared, never to return?

116. **Greek** Cypriots were allowed access to Turkish controlled areas for legitimate business, and no one can cite a single instance of any Greek Cypriot being hurt or harmed while in a Turkish Cypriot controlled area.

117. **It is** true that we had to take some security precautions against surprise attacks and Greek military infiltrations. The Turkish enclaves, as the name clearly indicates, were our last defence positions, and we could not unconditionally open them to the Greeks, who were all out to break up the enclaves by armed force. We even agreed to open the famous Kyrenia road to Greek Cypriot **traffic**, on condition that the users of the road **accepted** Turkish Cypriot authority, as we did when we entered Greek Cypriot controlled areas, but they refused. Mr. Clerides, as the Greek Cypriot negotiator, insisted that we should both open the road to Greek Cypriot **traffic** and accept Greek Cypriot authority at the same time, which would have meant political surrender.

118. Mr. Clerides took **pains** to accuse the Turkish Cypriot side of creating **faits accomplis** by **declaring** the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus and of thus having caused the suspension of the intercommunal talks.

119. The **problem** of Cyprus; **and** therefore the negotiations, started as a result of **faits accomplis**, negotiations continued despite **faits accomplis**—**faits accomplis** by the **Greek** side, **faits accomplis** to violate the Constitution, **faits accomplis** to establish secret armies, **faits accomplis** to invite to Cyprus whole armies from Greece with a view to destroying the

very independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-alignment of Cyprus and to uniting it to Greece. There have been numerous other faits accomplis that I do not intend to **enumerate** here.

120. But despite all these faits accomplis we continued to negotiate and never ran to New York to call for an urgent meeting of the Security Council. We continued to negotiate despite statements by Makarios that he would not accept federation, that he would not accept **multicantonal** solutions, that he would not grant us even **local** autonomy. He offered us only a degree of self-government. Here is what Archbishop Makarios had to say in the **Cyprus Mail** on 3 June 1974:

“We do not accept federation or cantons or local self-government. If the Turks insist on their imprudent demands, then the talks **will** be a waste of time, and their failure will be their end.

“If the **talks** fail, the Turks should know that we **will** withdraw **all** our offers so far made to them, which constitute serious concessions. Greek **Hellenism** is ready **to face** all the consequences.”

121. We did not **run** away from the negotiating table, despite the fact that even Mr. Clerides, as negotiator for the Greek Cypriot side, made provocative statements, such as this one:

“Common sense ought to have led the General **[Grivas]** to the conclusion that the carrying out of talks for five years without arriving at a solution meant that the Greek Cypriot side did not attend them in order to arrive at ‘any solution’, or to make inadmissible concessions for an ‘un-national’ solution and that their bargaining at the talks was aimed at safeguarding the national interest in its **true** sense.”

122. This quotation from Mr. Clerides is also an answer to his question: “Why had there been no progress in the talks?”. The reason is obvious. Everyone wanted a **national** solution-and we **know** what a national solution for **the** Greeks is-but pretended to be negotiating independence with us: Any solution which effectively closed the door to **enosis** could not therefore be accepted by the Greek side.

123. In the same way, it appears now that the Greek side will not accept a solution which grants the Turkish community an equal status and does not reduce us to a simple minority on the island.

124. Mr. **Clerides** accuses the Turkish side of objecting to expressions condemning, deploring or even regretting the unilateral declaration of the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus. We are of the opinion that any expression of regret should apply

equally to **all** unilateral actions by all sides that contributed to the present impasse.

125. Mr. Clerides persistently demands the appointment of a fact-finding mission to visit Cyprus and to establish who is responsible for the Cyprus situation. But the whole world knows by now who is responsible for the-Cyprus crisis. The **Cyprus** problem started with the inhuman onslaught on the Turkish Cypriot community in **1963** aimed at uniting the island with Greece. The so-called Government violated **all** Turkish rights in the Constitution. The Turkish community was denied not only political rights but also economic, administrative and even human rights. We were denied drinking water; we were denied electricity; we were denied birth certificates; we were denied passports; we were denied the right to live, to exist.

126. To cite only one example, men like Mr. Modinos of Greece, who had no connection whatsoever with Cyprus, were granted Cypriot citizenship and Cypriot passports and were employed by the so-called, Government of Cyprus, but a **few** young Turkish **Cypriots** born and raised in Cyprus, who during the crisis of **1964-1967** were stranded in Turkey without passports, were denied travel documents to **return** to the island for **10** years-solid years. “

127. I remember drafting letters to Mr. Clerides on ‘behalf of Mr. Denktag at least six times on this matter, with no positive results.

128. The so-called Government used its so-called police not to protect but to subjugate and to exterminate the Turkish Cypriots. Tens of thousands of Turkish Cypriot refugees’ who had been forced to abandon their homes were not allowed to return **to** their villages until July 1974.

129. The **coup** of 15 July 1974 was the last of the chain of events that threw Cyprus into the lap **of** Greece. Even Turkish **military** intervention **did** not prevent the massacre of whole Turkish Cypriot village populations. **Atlılar** (Aloa), **Muratağa** (**Maratha**) and Sandallar (**Sandallarıs**), where scores of bodies were unearthed in the presence of the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus (**UNFICYP**) and foreign correspondents, are only three examples; not to mention **Taskent** (**Tokhni**), where the graves have not yet been unearthed.

130. The whole world knows this. The United Nations records cry aloud in support of our arguments. Furthermore, UNFICYP and the Red Cross are actively in operation in Cyprus. So why the need for a fact-finding mission, which the Greek Cypriot side wants for political reasons **and** is meant to be a first step towards internationalizing the Cyprus problem?

131. That is why we are opposed to missions-not because we have anything to hide from anyone, but

because the whole matter would be exploited by the Greek Cypriot side for political purposes.

132. Having said all that-and I should like to assure the members of the Council that I do not enjoy making these statements-I should like to put on record once more that the Turkish Cypriot side is in favour of negotiations. We believe that the intercommunal talks are the best and only way to a peaceful settlement of the Cyprus problem. May I therefore once more extend my hand in friendship to Mr. Clerides and assure him of the willingness and readiness of the Turkish side to co-operate with the Greek Cypriot community to build a new, happy and prosperous Cyprus.

133. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Spanish*): I call on the representative of Cyprus.

134. Mr. CLERIDES (Cyprus): Let it not be imagined for a single moment that I enjoy exchanging **recriminations** with Mr. Celik of the Turkish Cypriots. What hurts me most is not recrimination but the actual facts, and what hurts even more than the facts is when they are distorted or slanted to produce the picture his side wants. That is why I have **asked** for a commission of inquiry to visit Cyprus and to establish the real facts.

135. I should like to say that had I known there were Turkish Cypriots in Cyprus who considered me their nemesis, I might have found great use for them, because one of the problems I faced in the last election was the accusation that I was for independence and against **enosis**. I have been repeatedly **criticized** by the extreme right of the Cypriot press, which represents only 5 per cent of the population, and the only thing for which they can **criticize** me is my commitment to the independence and territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus, and its non-alignment.

136. It is futile to repeat out of context statements made from time to time by various Greek Cypriot or Turkish Cypriot leaders trying to establish that either the Greek Cypriots or even the Turkish Cypriots are opposed to independence. It is a fact that independence came to Cyprus and that both the Greek Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriots were very reluctant to accept it. Cyprus has been called "the reluctant Republic", because both communities tried to unite the island with their respective motherlands. That is the reality, and that reality cannot be changed by quoting statements, by bandying accusations and counter-accusations. What is important in this debate is to record the statement of Mr. Celik. I noted the exact time he started his statement. It was precisely 5.40 p.m. And the statement is a real eye-opener for the Security Council. It is the interpretation by Mr. Celik of General Assembly resolution 3212 (XXIX) which should be the disturbing fact and **the** fact which the Security Council is bound to examine and to answer.

137. When I made my statement yesterday, I thought I understood the Turkish position with regard to the implementation of resolution 3212 (XXIX). I said that Turkey **alleged** that **the** implementation of that resolution, and particularly of the parts of its operative paragraphs that call upon Turkey to proceed to a speedy withdrawal of its forces from the Republic of Cyprus and to permit the return of 200,000 Greek Cypriot refugees to their homes, was something that was to be carried out in parallel with the finding of a solution or in the context of that solution. I thought that that was the Turkish position.

138. I heard today with amazement Mr. Celik state clearly that even that is not the correct Turkish interpretation of the resolution. The Turkish side contends not only that a solution of the Cyprus problem must be found but that it must be signed and sealed before the Turkish forces leave Cyprus or the refugees return to their homes.

139. But he went further, to the position which the Turkish Foreign Minister had stated, clearly and unambiguously at the second Geneva conference, that the Turkish forces will leave Cyprus only if and when Turkey is satisfied that, beyond finding a solution, conditions have been created that make it possible for the Turkish forces to leave.

140. And we have here this position: Turkey is the sole arbiter of when it will withdraw its forces from the Republic of Cyprus. I am amazed that such a statement has been made before the Security Council. I have always believed that ordinary words, in any language-in **English**, for example, as the resolution is in the English language-have an ordinary meaning. And I have always believed that the words "speedy withdrawal" meant a withdrawal within a reasonable time: perhaps weeks, perhaps a couple of months. But I am told now that the resolution which spoke of a "speedy withdrawal" of Turkish forces from the "territory of the Republic-the resolution which spoke about "urgent measures" for the return of the 200,000 Greek Cypriot refugees-is to be interpreted to mean that none of these events will take place until there is a solution of the Cyprus problem and, even beyond that, until Turkey feels that the conditions are right for the evacuation of its forces from Cyprus.

141. I should like this important fact to be noted, to be understood, by the members of the Council, because it is very pertinent, in preparing a resolution, to bear it in mind.

142. Mr. Celik said that in the course of my addresses to the Security Council I had asked certain pertinent questions. It is a fact that I have, and the most pertinent question I asked was: When will the Turkish side **begin withdrawing** the Turkish forces of occupation from Cyprus? At least now I have **had** an answer to that. And there can be no covering up

of the fact any longer that Turkey does not-intend to comply with General Assembly resolution 3212 (XXIX).

143. Mr. Celik invites me to go back to Cyprus and resume talks. It is an attractive invitation; it is an invitation which my heart and my spirit would want me to accept. But for -what purpose? To return to the negotiating table in order to accept the fait accompli which the Turkish side has created during the process of negotiation? What is the purpose of this negotiation? Is the purpose to accept the Turkish position so clearly and eloquently stated by both Mr. Celik and the representative of Turkey-which is that two things are not negotiable: any solution which is not bi-zonal; and any solution which is not multi-regional. These are not to be debated.

144. Is that the process of entering into negotiations-the dictation of terms by one of the two sides? Mr. Celik says-and Mr. **Olcay**, the representative of Turkey, has stated: "We **will** not accept any other guarantee; we will not accept any other solution but a bi-regional one. Welcome, Mr. **Clerides**, to the negotiating table. Accept these conditions and the negotiation is completed."

145. Was that the spirit of resolution 3212 (XXIX) when it called for free negotiations in order to arrive at a mutually agreed solution? Supposing I were to say to Mr. Celik: "Come and negotiate on a **multi-regional** basis"; and supposing I, because I had 40,000 troops in Cyprus, imposed a multi-regional federation in Cyprus, would he have accepted my invitation? Would he have sent me flowers for inviting him to such a conference?

146. I am prepared to go back to the negotiations this very moment; but let Mr. Celik, let the representative of Turkey, state that they will undo that which they have done. Let them say openly that any negotiation, any solution, is on the agenda-that any negotiation could be for a solution of **the** Cyprus problem based not on any preconditions which force of arms made it possible for them to dictate, but on free argument, negotiation, exchange of views and reasonable attitudes. I would then gladly join him in the intercommunal **talks**, and he would then find me very constructive.

147. Now, Mr. **Celik** says that on one occasion I stated, in answering General Grivas-the dear old gentleman died some time ago-that in the Cyprus talks I had made no concessions which were contrary to the national interests of the Greek Cypriots. Yes, indeed, I made such a statement. I had even been publicly accused by the deceased old General, who said that by my support and by my conduct in the talks I was destroying the national interests of the Greek Cypriots. To which I retorted: "No, I have not done that. I am looking for a solution based on an independent State of Cyprus; I am looking for a solution

whereby the Greeks will have the right to remain Greeks, and the Turks to remain Turks. But **they** will live and coexist in the same island, administering it for the benefit and in the interests of the people of Cyprus." And in defence of my position I added: "This is the true national Greek interest in Cyprus."

148. Yet Mr. Celik takes that statement, manhandles it a bit, and tries to accuse me of not having performed my duty as a negotiator in the talks because of my inhibitions as a Greek. It is an established fact, a fact that can be proved by the records of the negotiations which were conducted, that the negotiations were proceeding very well, and that we had almost reached the point of agreement, when, for the first time, they were interrupted when the Prime Minister of Turkey Mr. Ecevit-while the talks were proceeding, and proceeding on the basis of an independent State of Cyprus with a large degree of autonomy for the two communities-made certain public statements, **first** in the party memorandum for his election campaign, and second before the Turkish National Assembly as soon as he was elected and assumed his duties. He said that he would not accept any solution of the Cyprus problem other than a federation-and this despite the fact that talks had **been** conducted in Cyprus since **1968** and were proceeding and developing towards a successful culmination when he, Mr. Ecevit, decided to change the course of action that was being followed at the talks.

149. Now, it is late; we have all heard long speeches; and I say again that I will not follow the unproductive path of regrettable, lamentable accusations and counter-accusations. If Mr. Celik believes that we are in the wrong, then let him accept a commission of inquiry to establish beyond reasonable doubt who is at fault. Such a commission will probably find that both sides were at fault, and it might even go as far as to apportion blame.

150. But we are not here today to apportion blame for the past mistakes of the two communities. We are here today to examine the question as to whether a resolution adopted by the General Assembly and endorsed by the Security **Council** has been **implemented** or not, whether there is any intention of implementing it or not, and whether by a unilateral fait accompli the Turkish side has destroyed the process of negotiation. Those are the pertinent questions, and to each one the answer given by the representative of Turkey or by Mr. Celik has been a negative one: resolution 3212 (XXIX) will not be implemented, not even after a solution has been arrived at and signed. And so far as the process of negotiation is concerned, there is not even a word of regret or remorse about unilateral action taken arbitrarily by the Turkish side at the very moment when proposals were being exchanged that would have led to progress in the negotiations.

151. Mr. **Çelik** has suggested that I sought the limelight of the Security Council in order to air **my** views. Mr. **Çelik** has forgotten that from 1964 until this time I had never attended a meeting of the Council and that since 1968 I have been patiently negotiating with Mr. **Denktaş**, seeking neither the limelight of the Council nor any other limelight but merely making a sincere attempt to find *a* solution to the Cyprus problem, a solution not for the benefit of the Greeks or for the benefit of the Turks but for the benefit of the people of Cyprus as a whole.

152. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Spanish*): I call on the representative of Turkey.

153. Mr. OLCAY (Turkey): I think that at this late hour I owe a very brief explanation to the Security Council, especially in view of the statement which the President has made that there **is now** a well-defined movement towards the adoption of a resolution by the end of this week.

154. I believe that the Security Council should refrain from tampering with General Assembly resolution 3212 (XXIX), which was arrived at so painstakingly. I know **that** the authors of that resolution and I am referring especially **to** the five dedicated members of the non-aligned group of countries, of which only one is represented in the Council are aware of the meaning of the resolution. They are aware also of the motivations for Turkey's acceptance of it, as well as of the conditions on the basis of which it was accepted by my Government.

155. The main issue the United Nations was facing when the resolution was adopted was the necessity of finding a solution to the Cyprus problem. The situation has not changed since then. In its wisdom, the General **Assembly** decided that negotiations should take place to that end. The negotiators in Cyprus and those familiar with the problem know that all negotiations in Cyprus during its lamentable history since independence have always taken place in very special circumstances involving the presence of forces outside the island. They know that statements were made indicating no possibility of compromise on certain basic positions. And yet negotiations were pursued. Now the negotiations are regarded as imperilled because for the **first** time in history the Turks in Cyprus have ceased to negotiate from a position of physical weakness.

156. I appeal to the members of the Council, as they deliberate on the kind of resolution they think can emerge from the two long and arduous weeks of negotiations and debate here, not to create **conditions** that would take us far from the only text on which there is agreement—that is, General Assembly resolution 3212 (XXIX). That resolution indicates what the issue is: finding a solution through negotiations, with the negotiations taking place between the only two parties involved: that is, the Turkish Cypriots

and the Greek Cypriots. Any attempt to boost the ego of one of the parties, which finds itself in a **difficult** position because of certain internal political situations, would only at this stage render more difficult the smooth process of reactivating the negotiations.

157. That is the appeal I make to the members of the Security Council, through you, Mr. President.

158. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Spanish*): I call on the representative of Greece.

159. Mr. CARAYANNIS (Greece): I am amazed at what the representative of Turkey said about General Assembly resolution 3212 (XXIX). He tried to make us believe that that is a very fragile resolution, that it had been arrived at during the last General Assembly session only through painstaking efforts and that it would be wise for the Security Council not to touch it.

160. Well, I personally worked on that resolution, and Mr. Olcay worked on it too. At that time I asked him a question, and I shall ask him the same question today: Why did Turkey insist on voting for this resolution? I know that Mr. Olcay will not be able to answer that question today, any more than he was able to answer it then.

161. General Assembly resolution 3212 (XXIX) is drafted in good English. It is very clear. We all **know** that Mr. Olcay has a very good knowledge of English.

162. Now, Mr. Olcay said also that this resolution was adopted only for the purpose of solving the Cyprus problem. I very much agree with him. It was adopted for the purpose of solving the Cyprus **problem—but** solving it on the lines of the **resolution**, not on any other lines. And the lines of the resolution are very clear. The resolution is drafted in very good English, Mr. Olcay understands English. He understood English when he voted in favour of the resolution.

163. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Spanish*): I call on the representative of Cyprus.

164. Mr. CLERIDES (Cyprus): I listened very carefully to the appeal of the representative of Turkey and, if I understood it correctly, his theme was that the Turkish Cypriot side is now in a position of strength, by virtue of the fact that it has a substantial military force in Cyprus and that it occupies 40 per cent of the territory of the Republic. He alleges that in the past the Greek side was in a stronger position than the Turkish side and that as a result of this no solution was possible. If I were to accept his logic, **then** surely the same thing might **happen again—unless** Turkey intends to force a solution. It is now in the stronger position in Cyprus and, therefore, we shall

have the **same** problem again. Surely, the logical conclusion **from** what he has- **said** would have been: let **all** Greek forces and all Turkish forces stand down; let the security of the island's Greeks and Turks be entrusted to a strengthened peace-keeping force; and let free negotiations continue for the solution of the Cyprus problem.

165. Why does the representative of Turkey want to continue to have talks on the Cyprus problem from an advantageous position of strength? Does he intend to impose a solution in Cyprus? If he does, what is the purpose of negotiating? Surely, the very words he has **uttered** prove the absolute necessity for the withdrawal of **all** forces, as provided in resolution 3212 (XXIX), for a speedy and immediate withdrawal and for the resumption of free negotiation for the purpose of finding a solution to the Cyprus problem.

166. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Spanish*): I call on the representative of Turkey.

167. Mr. OLCAY (Turkey): In reply to the representative of Greece, who has asked me now, as he said he did during the General Assembly-and I **am** sure he did-why we wanted to accept the terms of the resolution, let me say it was because in all good faith we believe **in** all the contents of that resolution. What we do not believe is that there is an order of priority in the resolution-and those who have negotiated the resolution with us know that too.

168. That particular resolution came after **15** years of a very, very **difficult** situation in Cyprus. Those **15** years ended with a Turkish intervention in Cyprus which followed a Greek intervention in Cyprus. There was at that time and there still continues to be a tense situation in Cyprus. The tenseness of that situation is not due merely to the presence of armed forces. It is due to the factors that brought the forces to the island. The island has now reached a point where the ultimate settlement which may still save its independence has naturally evolved towards a certain position. We may not like it-the Greek side may not like it-but this is the result of **15** years of continuous bickering and warring. And, as a result of this situation, we now find ourselves in a de **facto** position where we cannot-d I say it very clearly and very candidly-be expected to return to the situation of 14 July 1974 for the greater glory of the Archbishop. It is not possible to revert to that situation. **We** have to take **the** situation from where we are.

169. I **can** solemnly state, on behalf of my Government, that **Turkey** has no intention at all of keeping its forces there. Turkey **has** no intention at all of partitioning the island. We do not intend to impose a "Turkish" solution on the island. What we want is for the Turks of the island to feel **free** from all the threats under which they have lived for so long. We want to rest assured that the island will become

what it has never been-a truly independent island, a 'truly non-aligned island. And I address myself to the non-aligned world, to which so far only the Greek side-which calls itself the "Greek Government"-**has** been able to appeal, to tell it that we intend that the island should be a non-aligned island **and** not what it is at present. All this is a process which is going to take place through negotiations; there is no other way. But we cannot accept that, for the negotiations to start, we should return to the situation of 14 July 1974, when there was no possibility for negotiation anyway. We were under a threat from the Archbishop either to accept something or leave the table. That was the position always taken by the Greek side.

170. I am being very candid. **One** has to **realize** that there are irreversible situations in a political world. We are not living in a laboratory. Things have happened in Cyprus that I wish had **not** happened; but, unfortunately, they have happened. It is not through us that they have happened.

171. Sampson-to whose intervention Mr. **Baroody** has given so much importance today, indicating even its origin-was not a creation of the Turkish **mind**. The **coup** of the colonels was not a Turkish invention.

172. We always come back to **the** position of regretting that things have happened which should not have happened. Those are mistakes, **maxima culpa**; therefore, they have to be **forgiven** and we have to start all over again. "All over again" is, I submit, a situation in which Turkey always finds itself the underdog. It is a situation which we will not tolerate; we cannot tolerate that situation.

173. There is a **political problem affecting** all of **us** around this table **which has** to be solved. **I wish** that it may be solved. My Government's only hope is that it will be solved, but that will be through negotiations and not by a return to a situation in which the other side need not negotiate, as it has not negotiated for the past **10** years. If this was, unfortunately, the only way we found to bring them to the negotiating table, too bad.

174. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Spanish*): I call on the representative of Greece.

175. Mr: CARAYANNIS, (Greece): I shall not take up the Council's time in **this** exchange of views, but the representative of Turkey, at the very beginning of his statement, said something about "priorities in resolution 3212 (XXIX)": I would only like to recall the facts to the members of the Council and to refer them to the verbatim records of the General Assembly according to which the representative of Algeria, one of the sponsors of the draft resolution, indicated the priorities of that resolution before the vote was taken.'

176. With regard to what Mr. Olcay told us—that we cannot return to the situation of 14 July—nobody is asking Mr. Olcay to return to the situation of 14 July. The only thing we ask of him is to return to a decent situation.

177. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Spanish*): I **call** on the representative of Cyprus.

178. Mr. CLERIDES (Cyprus): I have listened again to the representative of Turkey giving assurances that it is not the intention of the Turkish Government to keep its forces in Cyprus. The representative was trying to be very convincing on that issue. But I noted with regret that he never stated when it is the intention of the Turkish Government to withdraw its forces. Is it the intention of the Turkish Government to proceed in the next two months speedily to withdraw them? Is it the intention of the Turkish Government to maintain them there until a solution is found; or, as Mr- **Çelik** said, even after a solution is found, until Turkey is satisfied that **all** is well with Cyprus? An answer to that would have been much more convincing. I regret that he has failed to be convincing as far as I am concerned, because he has not given a date when this auspicious event, the withdrawal of Turkish forces from the Republic, will occur.

179. Mr. PLAJA (**Italy**) (*interpretation from French*): I **recognize** that Mr. Baroody had no intention of being discourteous to anyone whatsoever in his remarks, and I have known him well and for a long time. I think, however, that he would not be surprised to hear me say that some of his remarks seemed to me out of order, and **I** would prefer to disregard them.

180. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Spanish*): I have a request to speak from the representative of Saudi Arabia. I invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

181. Mr. BAROODY (Saudi Arabia): I have no choice but to reply to my good friend, the representative of Italy, and I mean good friend because we are friends, at least outside this chamber. But how can he say that what I said was *out* of order? I thought that the essence of the United Nations was free speech and free thought, and for one thing I must say that the approach to dealing with any question should be individual and not, as I have said time and again, platitudinous. My good friend should have been briefed if he had not perhaps paid much attention to my speeches since he was appointed Ambassador of Italy, which is a country very dear to our hearts. When I say dear to our hearts, it is not to my heart only but to the hearts of the Arabs.

182. In that regard I want to mention something. We are honoured that the President of Italy is, I think today, visiting Saudi Arabia. How could I be so

careless as to wound, even unwittingly, my brother and good friend, except that I would like to draw his attention to the fact that I deal with subjects in the United Nations, not in **clichés** and rubrics, but in an unorthodox, personal, individualistic manner.

183. I know why he is smarting about certain remarks. I said that I for one, and I repeat it, glory in the fact that there is a Mediterranean country—I am paraphrasing what I have said, not today but on many occasions, before my good friend Mr. **Plaja spoke**—whose people do not have the heart to fight and **kill**, and I respect them.

184. Our actions are predicated on peace in the United Nations. We have not reached utopia yet. But perhaps I said that, because the Italians are so civilized, I do not think they made good **soliders**. There is nothing wrong with that. We Arabs sometimes are very bad soldiers in many respects. So he should think that it is a **wonderful** thing that they consider the sanctity of life more important than going and murdering somebody whom they do not know because they have been indoctrinated by their Governments, which say “go and kill the enemy”.

185. That is brutality. And I mentioned in this context that you are more civilized than are people who have lived in the north, because you civilized Europe, you, Italy. The Renaissance started in Europe. The British were barbarians before the **Nromans** came and slew Harold in 1066. But then the **Normans** had taken a lot from Rome. And where was Rome? In Italy. See? And the Renaissance, where did it start? In England or in **Germany**? The Germans were the **Huns—Attila** and all that. I am talking of history. So why are you so sensitive? If you want to **be a** soldier, go and get into the army. But you are a diplomat and we are dedicated here to peace.

186. The country of this gentleman, the **Secretary-General**, had an empire and it was a sort of commonwealth. They did not become less civilized when they lost their power. They became perhaps more civilized. The Austrians were always civilized. I have known them for 50 years. He does not take exception to the fact that they are a small Power and that they do not wield power. Power means war. We abuse power, as individuals and as nations. That is why we are in trouble.

187. Who am I to say when we abuse power and when we do not abuse power? I am a human being entitled to my thoughts. And you want me to wear the **straitjacket** of courtesy and the gloves. That is **all** right when you are accredited to a country as Ambassador and there is decorum and there are the cocktail parties, and **you** have to know what to say and what **not** to say. But here it is a free forum, for heaven's sake, my good friend. If I hurt you, I did not mean to. If you want an apology from me I say it in public. There is no apology; there is no-difference

between you and me. Therefore, I was **not** out of order. I think you were a **little** over-sensitive, my good friend.

188. Mr. **PLAJA** (Italy) (*interpretation from* French): Not only did I not wish, but I would not have dared, to say that Mr. Baroody was out of order. I do not know whether *hors de propos* is the same as "out of order"? But I should like to end this exchange with the same expressions of friendship as those of Mr. Baroody, particularly on the occasion which he just mentioned, the visit of my President to his country, to His Majesty the King.

189. Mr. **MURRAY** (United Kingdom): This is simply to announce that I am not going to exercise my undoubted right of reply.

190. The **PRESIDENT** (*interpretation from Spanish*): During the weeks which have elapsed since this debate began, the parties have had ample opportunity

to make their arguments public and they have done so. Furthermore, all members of the Council- have stated their points of view, and other Members of the United Nations have participated in the debate.

191. I believe that it is our duty not unnecessarily to postpone a decision which we hope might lead to fruitful negotiations on the solution of the serious problems confronting Cyprus, negotiations between the representatives of the two Cypriot communities, with the active personal participation of the **Secretary-General**, if that were to be decided. In that way we would promptly contribute to alleviating the tragedy which the people of Cyprus are suffering.

The meeting rose at 6.45 p.m.

Notes

¹ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-ninth Session, Plenary Meetings, 2275th meeting.*

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