

UNITED NATIONS



SECURITY COUNCIL
OFFICIAL RECORDS

UN LIBRARY

OCT 13 1983

THIRTIETH YEAR

UN/SA COLLECTION

1817th MEETING: 27 FEBRUARY 1975

NEW YORK

CONTENTS

	<i>Page</i>
Provisional agenda (S/Agenda/1817)	1
Adoption of the agenda	1
The situation in Cyprus: Letter dated 17 February 1975 from the Permanent Representative of Cyprus to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/11625)	1

NOTE

Symbols of United Nations documents are composed of capital letters combined with figures. Mention of such a symbol indicates a reference to a United Nations document.

Documents of the Security Council (symbol **S/ . . .**) are normally published in **quarterly Supplements** of the *Official Records of the Security Council*. The date of the document indicates the supplement in which it appears or in which information about it is given.

The resolutions of the Security Council, numbered in accordance with a system adopted in 1964, are published in yearly volumes of *Resolutions and Decisions of the Security Council*. The new system, which has been applied retroactively to resolutions adopted before 1 January 1965, became fully operative on that date.

1817th MEETING

Held in New York OR Thursday, 27 February 1975, at 3 p.m.

President: Mr. HUANG Hua (China).

Present: The representatives of the following States: Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, China, Costa Rica, France, Guyana, Iraq, Italy, Japan, Mauritania, Sweden, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Cameroon, United Republic of Tanzania and United States of America.

Provisional agenda (S/Agenda/1817)

1. Adoption of the agenda
2. The situation in Cyprus:
Letter dated 17 February 1975 from the Permanent Representative of Cyprus to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/i 1625)

The meeting was called to order at 3.45 p.m.

Adoption of the agenda

The agenda was adopted.

The situation in Cyprus:

Letter dated 17 February 1975 from the Permanent Representative of Cyprus to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/i 1625)

1. The PRESIDENT (*translation from Chinese*): In accordance with the decision taken at the 1813th meeting, I propose, with the consent of the Council, to invite the representatives of Cyprus, Turkey and Greece to participate in the debate without the right to vote.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Clerides (Cyprus), Mr. Olcay (Turkey) and Mr. Carayannis (Greece) took places at the Council table.

2. The PRESIDENT (*translation from Chinese*): In accordance with the decisions taken at the 1815th and 1816th meetings, and with the consent of the Council, I invite the representatives of Bulgaria and Saudi Arabia to take the places reserved for them at the side of the Council chamber in order to participate in the discussion without the right to vote.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Grozev (Bulgaria) and Mr. Baroody (Saudi Arabia) took the places reserved for them at the side of the Council chamber.

3. The PRESIDENT (*translation from Chinese*): I have received a letter from the representative of Romania requesting to be invited under the relevant provisions of the Charter to participate in the discussion without the right to vote. In accordance with rule 37 of the provisional rules of procedure and the established practice of the Security Council, I propose to invite the representative of Romania to participate in the discussion without the right to vote.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Datcu (Romania) took the place reserved for him at the side of the Council chamber.

4. Mr. SALIM (United Republic of Tanzania): Speaking in a formal meeting of the Security Council for the first time since the United Republic of Tanzania became a non-permanent member of the Council, I wish to take this opportunity first to express my delegation's pleasure at the happy coincidence of seeing you, Mr. President, preside over the first formal meetings of the Council my delegation is attending as a member. Since you are a long-time colleague and a representative of a country with which my own country enjoys very close and warm relations, a country in which I had the honour and privilege of working as a representative of my country, your presidency can only draw the greatest co-operation from my delegation. Your outstanding diplomatic accomplishments and personal stature at the United Nations are for all of us a source of great confidence in your presidency.

5. I also wish to express our appreciation to Mr. Tchemouchtchenko of the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic for his leadership of the Council during the month of January.

6. Our gratitude also goes to the other members of the Council for the warm welcome they have extended to our delegation, and especially to the representative of the Soviet Union, Mr. Malik, for the very kind words he addressed to me personally and to my country. We pledge our greatest co-operation in the work of the Council.

7. In the Council and in other forums, the achievements of the United Nations in the field of **decolonization** have been hailed, not without justification, over and over again. Many of us who gained our independence after the foundation of the United Nations cannot but be conscious of the invaluable contribution of the Organization to the struggle for our independence, for it was and still is our hope that as independent States we can determine our own future and work for our economic advancement in co-operation with other States. In joining the United Nations we nursed the hope and confidence that **the** Organization as a whole, and its Members in particular, would work for the preservation of peace and security so that our independence could have substantial meaning to our people. For without peace and security: independence is jeopardized and development and progress are hindered, if not made impossible.

8. It was in pursuit of that peace and security as well as for the strengthening of the freedom and independence of **all** nations that the Organization in 1970 enunciated the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, the very first provision of which condemns threats and the use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State as **violations** of international law and the Charter of the United Nations.

9. The Republic of Cyprus attained its **independence** from the United Kingdom almost 14 years ago, and, like all of us, that young Republic hoped that, with the attainment of independence and as a Member of the United Nations, it would embark upon the struggle of national reconstruction for the betterment of the economic lot of its people. The young Republic hoped that the Organization and its Members would see to it that it would be allowed to do so in peace and security. Yet, ever since its independence, Cyprus has never enjoyed the peace and security. Its independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity and its policy of nonalignment have been respected more by lip-service than in reality. There is probably no other country among our United Nations membership whose territory has been so continuously threatened with partition since it attained independence. There is probably no other country whose independence has been so precarious as a result of its constantly being a victim of interference by external forces. Indeed, ever since independence, the unity of the country has been disrupted by foreign interference, both direct and indirect.

10. My country enjoys a long-standing friendship with the Republic of Cyprus and has co-operated with it in many areas, including the endeavours in the non-aligned movement. The Government and people of Tanzania still cherish memories of the State visit made to our country by the President of Cyprus, Archbishop Makarios. That visit served

further to strengthen the ties of friendship and co-operation between our two non-aligned countries. It is only understandable, therefore, that we have **followed** with deep sympathy and disappointment the ever-deteriorating situation in which the people of Cyprus find themselves.

11. We view with concern the failure of the United Nations, and especially of the Security Council, to put an end to the misery and agony which grips the young Republic and its people, although the question has been before **the** Council for the last 11 years. We firmly believe that the United Nations can and should shoulder its responsibilities in this matter, and we strongly share the concern expressed by the Secretary-General, Mr. Waldheim, in his statement to the Council of 21 February 1975 [**1814th meeting**]. Indeed, for **all** years the Cypriot people have vested their last hopes in the Organization. Failure to meet those expectations in time may result in the total disillusionment of the world with the Organization and the breakdown of the foundations of peace and security. For, as has correctly been pointed out, the Cyprus problem presents a crucial test of the effectiveness and credibility of the **Organization**, and whatever happens to Cyprus is an **indication** of what may happen to any other small independent State.

12. It is therefore only logical that Tanzania considers the question of Cyprus to be a matter of immediate and particular concern to the less powerful Member States. To put it differently: we are of the view **that** the threat to the sovereignty, territorial integrity, independence and non-alignment of Cyprus is not only a great challenge to the Organization but has serious, even ominous, implications for the peace and security of many Members of the Organization. We, the non-aligned countries, in **particular**, can ignore it only at our collective peril.

13. But while we lament the ineffectiveness of the United Nations in this case, we fully **recognize** the complexity of the problem and, above all, the responsibility of all the parties concerned to extend their co-operation in efforts to find a solution. Judging by the rather sad history of intercommunal conflict on the island, it becomes crystal clear that such co-operation is indispensable if the Organization is to play an effective role.

14. We wish to reiterate what **has** already been eloquently stated **by** many of my colleagues **who** have preceded me in the deliberations of the Council; namely, that the solution to the question of Cyprus hinges on the willingness of the parties concerned to respect and **scrupulously** implement General Assembly resolution 3212 (XXIX), which was endorsed by Security Council resolution 365 (1974). The resolution of the Assembly, which was adopted with the unanimous consent of all the parties concerned, among other things calls upon all States to respect the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity

and non-alignment of the **Republic of Cyprus** and to refrain from all acts and interventions directed against it. The resolution calls for the speedy withdrawal of all foreign armed forces and foreign military presence and personnel from Cyprus and the cessation of all foreign interference in its affairs, and considers that all the refugees should return to their homes 'in safety.

15. My delegation therefore wishes to add its voice in calling emphatically for the immediate withdrawal from Cyprus of all foreign armed troops and foreign military presence and personnel. For humanitarian **considerations**, as well as in the interests of a peaceful resolution of the problem, it is imperative that the refugees be allowed to return to their homes without delay. Of equal importance and urgency is the necessity for the resumption of intercommunal talks. We are, however, well aware of the present deadlock on this matter and we share the view that the necessary atmosphere must be created to facilitate the resumption of those talks.

16. In **that** respect Tanzania has no strong views about one procedure or another concerning the methodology of resuming the talks. What is important is that new initiatives are needed. And of equal importance is the fact that for such talks to be meaningful and productive they must be held without duress or **faits accomplis**. It goes without saying that unilateral acts like the one engaged in by the Turkish Cypriots in declaring a 'Turkish Cypriot State only complicate the situation and make the negotiations more difficult. As is stated in paragraphs 'of General Assembly resolution 3212 (XXIX), the constitutional system of the Republic of Cyprus concerns the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities. But paragraph 4 provides for a freely negotiated mutually acceptable political settlement. On the basis of the acceptance by the parties concerned of resolution 3212 (XXIX), it is the belief of my delegation that, with their good will and the assistance of the **Secretary-General** and the Security Council, a workable procedure can be found for the implementation of these goals.

17. My delegation considers that with the acceptance of resolution 3212 (XXIX) by all the parties concerned, the necessary framework has been created for the negotiations. It remains for them to seize this chance and work for a peaceful settlement. In particular, it is incumbent on the two Cypriot communities to make a fresh decision and act accordingly for the peace, mutual understanding and unity of their country.

18. Before I conclude I wish to place on record our high and sincere tribute to the Secretary-General for the commendable and selfless efforts he has been exerting in search of peace and understanding in Cyprus. His persistent endeavours, **characterized** by the utmost devotion and patience in a **difficult**

situation, are an invaluable contribution to the Organization's efforts to find a solution to the problem. We wish to pay a tribute also to his Special Representative, Mr. **Weckmann-Muñoz**, for the important role he has been playing in facilitating the contacts for intercommunal talks.

19. The least that the Security Council should do is give the Secretary-General all the encouragement and support he needs. At the same time, the Tanzania & delegation believes that the Council should strive also to ensure that its resolutions, especially those that have been adopted unanimously, are implemented. In that regard therefore we, like the delegation of Guyana, would be inclined to support the setting of a **time-limit** within which the provisions of resolution 3212 (XXIX) should be speedily implemented. That will not only inspire hope and demonstrate to the world the seriousness of our purpose but will also mean a significant step forward towards the attainment of the objective in our efforts to meet the legitimate aspirations of the people of Cyprus.

20. The **PRESIDENT** (*translation from Chinese*): I should now like to make a statement as the representative of CHINA.

21. The Chinese delegation is seriously concerned over the situation in Cyprus. We have pointed out on many occasions that, fundamentally speaking, the Cyprus question is a legacy of imperialist colonial **rule** and the result of the imperialist policy of exploiting contradictions and playing off one party against the other. The internal cause of the renewed eruption in Cyprus since last year is the lack of a satisfactory solution to the dispute between the two communities on the island, and its external cause is the attempt of each of the two super-Powers to put this island of great strategic importance under its own influence and control in contention for hegemony in the Eastern Mediterranean. They bear the unshirkable responsibility for the development of the Cyprus question to the present stage and for the sufferings now being experienced by the two Cypriot communities. Where there is contention between the two super-Powers there are untold sufferings for the countries and people in the region. The development of the situation in Cyprus has once again proved this to be true.

22. One super-Power has stirred up trouble by pulling the wires behind the scenes. The other super-Power has long harboured covetous designs upon Cyprus. Its ugly and most revealing performances on the Cyprus question since last July have gradually and for a long time been seen through by the people. But it has not given up its **designs**. After the adoption of resolution 3212 (XXIX) on the question of Cyprus last year, it again tried hard to meddle from behind the scenes and sabotage the intercommunal talks in an attempt to create contradictions and exacerbate the situation so as to gain profit therefrom.

Recently, taking advantage of the difficulties in the intercommunal talks and the new developments, it once again hastily issued statements, actively working in various places to peddle its worn-out proposal for convening an “international conference” in an attempt to internationalize the question of Cyprus. Obviously, its advertised plan of **internationalization** is designed in effect to give the green light to its interference. The various proposals put forward by the super-Powers are not intended to serve the interests of the Cypriot people but are meant entirely to serve the needs of their expansion in the Mediterranean. There must be sufficient **vigilance** against it.

23. We hold that the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Cyprus must be respected. We are not willing to see the further complication and exacerbation of the situation, which would provide opportunities to be exploited by the **super-Powers**, particularly that super-Power which styles itself the “friend”* of the Cypriot people. In the final analysis, the settlement of the **Cyprus** question depends only on the Cypriot people themselves. It was on the basis of this position that we voted in favour of General Assembly resolution 3212 (XXIX) and Security Council resolution **365** (1974). In order to settle the Cyprus question in the spirit of the above-mentioned resolutions, it is essential, first of all, resolutely to do away with meddling and intervention by the super-Powers.

24. Cyprus, Turkey and Greece are all friends of China. We feel deep sympathy for the sufferings of the two Cypriot communities. We have been following closely and have placed hopes in the intercommunal talks in Cyprus, and we are gratified at certain progress made through the talks at the initial stage. Despite the temporary difficulties that have now emerged, we believe that so long as the two Cypriot communities and the parties concerned do away with super-Power interference, take the over-all interests of the island to heart, conduct peaceful and patient negotiations on an equal footing and in a spirit of mutual understanding and mutual accommodation and adopt a positive approach to eliminate, and not widen, their differences, it will **finally** be possible to achieve a reasonable settlement of the Cyprus question.

25. Mr. SCALI (United States of America): The Security Council meets today to consider how to revive **and** encourage movement towards peace in **Cyprus**. To date, progress towards this goal has not met the hopes or the expectations of the Council when it endorsed the talks between the two communities in the island two months ago.

26. The efforts in Cyprus to achieve a mutually acceptable settlement are essentially the responsibility of the parties themselves; nevertheless, the Security Council has an important interest in encouraging them. Thus, in July 1974, following the

outbreak of fighting on the island, the Council achieved a cease-fire, created a framework for negotiations in Geneva and established principles to guide those talks [resolution 353 (**1974**)]. In August, following the breakdown of the negotiations, the Council endorsed contacts between representatives of the two communities under the auspices of the Secretary-General and his Special Representative [**resolutions** 360 (1974) **and** 361 (**1974**)]. We urged that those negotiations deal not only with immediate humanitarian issues but with political problems as well.

27. In November, the General Assembly in its resolution 3212 (XXIX) commended the discussions between the representatives of the two communities and called for their continuation with a view to reaching freely a mutually acceptable political settlement. The Assembly emphasized that the future constitutional system of **Cyprus** is the concern of the two communities. The Security Council endorsed that General Assembly resolution in December in its resolution **365** (1974). Finally, throughout the period in which these talks have been conducted, the Secretary-General has, through his able Special Representative in Nicosia, Mr. **Weckmann-Muñoz**, provided every encouragement for their success.

28. These actions provide the basis for our consideration of the present situation in Cyprus. Having seen established a framework in which a negotiated settlement is possible, we regret any unilateral action such as the announcement of a Turkish Federated State of the Republic of Cyprus, which complicates the search for a solution.

29. Thus, my Government stated on 13 February that the United States “... regrets the action that has been **announced** today. We support the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus, and have sought to discourage unilateral actions by either side that would complicate the efforts to achieve a peaceful settlement. We believe that any eventual solution to the Cyprus problem must be found through a process of negotiation, a process which has been under way”. Secretary of State Kissinger added on the same day:

“The United States continues to **recognize** the Government of Cyprus as the legitimate **Government** of Cyprus” and that “the United States will make every effort to encourage a peaceful solution.”

30. We believe that the Secretary-General and his Special Representative in Cyprus have played and continue to play a significant role in facilitating the efforts of those directly concerned to achieve a peaceful settlement. We are especially encouraged to note from the Secretary-General’s statement to the Council at 21 February [**1814th meeting**] that he is prepared to facilitate the continuation of talks under

new conditions and procedures. This provides legitimate hope for further progress. We urge the Governments of Greece and Turkey—two allies we value—and the Republic of Cyprus—with which we have had a long and friendly relationship—to respond positively to the timely initiative of the **Secretary-General**.

31. In our deliberations thus far, we have been impressed with the serious character of the debate, which reflects a sober understanding of the complexity and delicacy of the problems confronting the parties and the Council. The discussion in this chamber has gone forward in an atmosphere which demonstrates recognition of the vital fact that there is no substitute for a realistic dialogue when the Security Council deals with the critical problems of international peace and security.

32. Informal consultations are now actively being pursued in the search for a resolution which will encourage and further the settlement process. The members of the Council can be assured that the United States is prepared to co-operate constructively in the efforts to negotiate and formulate a resolution acceptable both to members of the Council and to the parties concerned.

33. I wish to reaffirm emphatically that the interest of the United States is in a peaceful, negotiated solution, guided by the principles enunciated in the Security Council and in the General Assembly and based on justice, dignity and self-respect. We believe that such a solution can only be achieved by free negotiations between the parties, not by dictation from the outside. We call on all concerned to reaffirm their commitment to this approach and to rededicate themselves to such a solution.

34. The **PRESIDENT** (*translation from Chinese*): I call on the representative of Turkey.

35. Mr. **OLCAY** (Turkey): Except for the regular bi-yearly meetings to extend the mandate of the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP), this is one of the rare meetings or probably the **first** meeting of the Security Council held to consider the question of Cyprus without an emergency situation, without a crisis and, in short, without, as far as we are concerned a sound and solid reason.

36. We are here as a result of an attempt on the part of those who see fit, in spite of clearly serious consequences, to create confusion and crisis. In December **1963** a *coup* took place in Cyprus. Its initiators were the then Kingdom of Greece and the Greek Cypriot faction of the island of Cyprus. Its aim was the elimination of a compromise, worked out in international agreements, that gave birth to the bicomunal independent Republic of Cyprus. The chain of events that is sometimes most naively

oversimplified, and called deplorable intercommunal violence, repeated itself in 1964 and in 1967, at that time turning 25,000 Turkish Cypriots into refugees and degrading them to the rank of second-class citizens in their own country.

37. From the bloody evening of Christmas 1963 to the bloody morning of 15 July 1974, the **Turkish** community of Cyprus, and Turkey as a guarantor **Power**, went through tremendous moral and material sacrifice just to find a peaceful way to solve the problem. For 11 hard years, 11 long years, we really tried. We tried without the suggestion of an international conference; we tried without a suggestion of a fact-finding mission. Despite frequent displays of sympathy, we were alone.

38. Leaving everything else aside, we have accomplished one thing. We kept Cyprus independent. No less a man than the great Greek statesman Mr. **Averoff**, the present Minister of Defence of Greece, stated this fact when, on 4 May 1966, he said in an interview with the Athens daily *Kathemerine*:

“We want *enosis*. Demand for *enosis* constitutes a moral, rational and useful aim in every respect. Who is trying to avoid *enosis*? It is Turkey’s stubborn resistance to *enosis*. How we shall cope with this attitude of Turkey, that is the most important question.”

39. Starting from 1968, talks between the Turkish and Greek Cypriots took place in Cyprus. For six years the weakness of the Turkish community on the island and the evidently misinterpreted patience of Turkey caused the Greek Cypriot side to be especially **difficult**. Whether this was due to the intransigence of the negotiator or his leader in Lefkose (Nicosia), or of their master in Athens, is a question of no concern to Turkey. For those six years the Turkish community expected considerably less than what Mr. Clerides proposed to give to Mr. **Denktas** when he visited the latter in his capacity as the President *en ville* of Cyprus. Mr. Clerides was too late, some 11 years too late.

40. The Sampson *coup* was the last of Greece’s mistakes, but a very decisive one. All those who had seen Turkey’s patience as an inability to act understood that they were seriously wrong. I do not want to go into the hows and whys of Turkish intervention. But since we are on the subject, let me once again and in most clear terms reiterate that my Government has no doubts over the legitimacy of its action. In the days which followed the Sampson *coup*, during and after the Geneva conferences, the Greek side, which for six years in the intercommunal talks had exploited the Turkish community’s weakness and Turkey’s patience, now attempted to make use adversely of the strength of the Turkish side in the field. They had only one rule: those who have the upper hand in the field do not have the right to feel

strongly on any subject, because this would mean gunboat diplomacy and an attempt to humiliate the opposing party.

41. Now, Archbishop Makarios, on 4 May 1974—that is to say, only a few months before he was **deposed**—said, in an interview with the German newspaper, *the Frankfurter Rundschau*: “If I had a free choice between *enosis* and independence, **I** would support *enosis* .” I wonder if he was implicitly complaining again of Turkey’s gunboat diplomacy when he said such words. Those who can appreciate the facts know otherwise.

42. Now I have, and it is known that I have, great respect for the feelings of the Greek people. Those feelings are evidently hurt. But is ‘Turkey to be blamed for it? Or should the Greeks blame their own leaders who for years stimulated their imagination and exploited national feelings with **false** hopes and impossible dreams?

43. For a while, after the Geneva talks and after the **final** cease-fire was accepted, we sat idly in Ankara and in Cyprus and wondered what **the** Greek leaders meant when one of them, claiming to be the President of the Republic while in exile—I am speaking of the Greeks of Cyprus of **course—refused** any possibility of a federal solution, **while** the other, acting as President, was publicly speaking about the injustices done to the Turkish Cypriots in the past and stating his readiness to accept a biregional federation.

44. After some time, a **possibility** of talks on the substance of the Cyprus problem appeared. But this time the Greek Cypriot negotiator was desperately complaining about his lack of mandate and most candidly said **that** what he would promise to give could be taken **back by** others. So they all went to Athens. They consulted the Greek Government and came **back** to the **island—all** this in the framework of independence and non-alignment.

45. The Greek Cypriot negotiator still did not have a mandate to negotiate. If I am not mistaken, it took him slightly more than a week to get the green light from his leader; and this same person, this same honourable gentleman is here today trying to arouse international reaction, alleging that no progress was achieved in talks in less than four weeks. We learned about his mandate when he told Mr. **Denktas** that he had to take any solution they might reach to the Archbishop for ratification. In short, somebody could take back again what had already been promised. If you ask them, all this time it was **Turkey** which was dragging its feet.

46. At the first meeting that took place the Greek side made its major point: the existing guarantees were going to be abolished or, at best, replaced. This was unthinkable as far as the Turkish side was concerned and, for the information of all **those** who

are seeking a peaceful solution to the Cyprus problem, it still remains unthinkable.

47. So there was a pause in the talks. As a result of the valuable efforts of some sincere friends we have in common, the Turkish side reserved its position on this subject and the matter was shelved for the time being just to get the talks going. If you ask the Greek side, the Turks were again dragging their feet. But for some others, the Turkish decision to suspend the discussion of this very vital element may **be** considered as a gesture of good will to facilitate the talks and break down the barriers, thus promoting mutual trust. The members of the Council are free to draw their own conclusions.

48. The talks on the substance of the Cyprus problem began on- 14 January 1975. Since then the negotiators have been meeting twice a week and have held a total of eight meetings. One of these meetings was used up without any substantial discussion because the negotiators made a trip to the Turkish-controlled zone to see if a certain report that had reached Mr. Clerides about 200 missing persons was accurate. The information proved to be false.

49. Because both sides needed constitutional experts to consult with during the negotiations, the discussions on the constitutional aspects of the agenda were suspended by mutual consent until such experts arrived. So, during the talks the only issue that was discussed was the question of the reopening of the Lefkose (Nicosia) airport. Many direct accusations against Turkey concerning this **subject** have been made by the Greek side. The main point of these accusations was that Turkey—more specifically, Foreign Minister Esenbel—had ruined the agreement that had already been reached. That **is** a lie. No agreement was ever reached, and this is known and has been stated to our side by impartial insiders to the talks.

50. At a recent meeting of the Council we had a rather amusing account of the discussions on the airport. I must assure the Council members that Turkey, if it intended to obstruct a certain subject in the discussions, is sophisticated enough to do so without resorting to clownishness. But Mr. **Çelik**, the representative of the Turkish Federated State of the Republic of Cyprus, has given enough details on the subject to make it unnecessary for me to dwell at length on it. The same also applies to the many concrete proposals presented by the Turkish side concerning the reopening of the airport and the Magosa (Famagusta) harbour, as well as the return of a number of Greeks to the zone controlled by the Turkish Cypriots.

51. I might add, in order to **finish** with this aspect of the problem, that the Turkish forces on the island during that period **were** also reduced by a brigade. All this, unfortunately, aroused no interest at all on the part of the Greeks.

52. The same period is quite informative as far as Greek intentions are concerned, I am going to give the Council, in chronological order, the **events** that took place during this span of time. I shall start with 27 January, less **than** a month ago. The Archbishop on that day, after only four meetings, proclaims that the talks are going nowhere.

53. On 29 January, the Athens news agency reports that February and March will be crucial as far as the question of Cyprus is concerned because there is the possibility of a Turkish reaction to some measures that were envisaged by the Greek side—a cryptic statement.

54. On 31 January, the National **Council—“National”**, of course, in **Cyprus** means only **“Greek”**—meets under Archbishop Makarios. In the official statement released after the meeting it was announced that **“the** situation was reviewed and in view of the lack of any progress in the local **talks** certain **conclusions** were reached about the further handling of the matter.*” It is also reported in the Greek Cypriot press that the Government will abandon its passive attitude and embark on an international **offensive—of** which this meeting, I suppose, is a part.

55. On the same day there was a major cease-fire violation by the Greek forces, who fired with heavy weapons on the civilians of **Çamliköy** in the **Lefka** area. The local UNFICYP authorities confirmed the violation, but I am sorry to say that this incident did not find its way into the Secretary-General’s latest report [S/11624]. On this occasion, I would express the hope that the Secretariat will see to it that a greater degree of co-ordination is maintained between UNFICYP and New York in the matter of reporting.

56. On 1 February there was a major cease-fire violation by the Greek Cypriots near the Lefkose (Nicosia) airport. UNFICYP **confirmed** this but stated **that** owing to unfavourable weather conditions it was unable to determine the initiator.

57. On 3 February, the Archbishop held a **press conference** and gave four weeks’ time for the talks to produce results or else, he said, he would resort to every available channel, including the United Nations.

58. On 5 February, **strangely** enough after all these cease-fire violations, all these statements as to the non-progress in Cyprus, the United States, certainly prodded by what is colloquially called the Greek lobby, cut off military aid to Turkey.

59. On 7 February, after renewed talks, Mr. Clerides informed Mr. **Denktas** that he would bring his side’s proposal on constitutional **matters** to the next meeting. **Between** 7 and 9 February, an artificial atmosphere of crisis was created in the Greek sector of **Lefkose**

(Nicosia) by certain circles. UNFICYP was put on alert. But all proved to be false.

60. On 10 **February**, the meeting between Mr. **Clerides** and Mr. **Denktas** was postponed at the request of Mr. Denktas so that he also could prepare counter-proposals for the Turkish side.

61. Mr. Clerides forwarded his proposals in a letter. On the same day Prime Minister Karamanlis of Greece addressed the Greek Parliament and said that if Turkey did not accept the plan as a basis for talks, another process would be sought in consultation between Athens and Nicosia—the non-aligned Government in Nicosia.

62. Between 19 January and 1 February there were 14 cases of cease-fire violations on the part of the Greeks and the Greek Cypriot forces.

63. These are only a few of the relevant facts. The intention was very clear. The Greek side first hoped to get something out of the cut in military aid to Turkey by the United States. As one independent observer said, the Greek Cypriots would not at **that stage** accept it if the whole of Cyprus was presented to them on a silver plate. When that hope became exhausted, they turned to **other** means, and among them they resorted to the United Nations, trying to gain some political advantage.

64. Had it not been for the present timing, we all know that the Security Council meeting was in the **offing** when Archbishop Makarios, on the 3rd of this month, as I mentioned earlier, most generously gave the Turkish and Greek negotiators—I have to be fair, to both of them in Cyprus—four **weeks** in which to solve the whole complex problem of Cyprus: or else, he said, he would resort to every channel available, including the internationalization of the problem by going to the Security Council. When doing so, he probably forgot that it took him slightly more than four weeks to arrange for his return to his own people.

65. Immediately after that, through his negotiator, he gave the formula to solve the problem, and the formula was the following. He simply ordered the Turkish Cypriot community back to their enclaves, but this time he called them “cantons”, as part of one of his great concessions. He also reaffirmed his intention to abolish the existing guarantees—ail in four weeks.

66. I must say, his proposals were far from being an offer which the Turkish Cypriots could accept. It was clear even to the Greeks that those proposals were an attempt to break off **the** intercommunal talks, thus giving the Greek side the long-sought excuse to pay a visit to New York. This almost perfect plan was probably a part of the common line which was said to have been decided upon in Athens a few months ago, when Archbishop Makarios, as the

head of his non-aligned State, visited his aligned master to get a visa for entry into Cyprus, and when something came up that spoiled this master plan, the non-aligned leaders of the non-aligned Cyprus were summoned by their aligned masters in Athens and received their new instructions, and here we are.

67. We can hardly consider this as a true spirit of negotiation. This, in our view, can only further the suffering of the population in Cyprus. Now what the Greeks do with the interests of their own people is their business, but surely nobody would expect the Turkish side to idle around in this confusion created by the Greeks. Therefore, the Turkish Cypriot administration took the step which had become inevitable in the circumstances, and turned its attention to the needs of its own people. Thus came the rearrangement in the Turkish Cypriot administration and the proclamation of the Turkish Federated State of the Republic of Cyprus.

68. If something has to be deplored, it should not be the entirely internal matter of the Turkish community, but the irresponsible Greek actions which made such a move inevitable. The decision of the Turkish Cypriots to form their federated State is not a unilateral declaration of independence. It does not envisage any kind of international recognition. In fact, the international community **recognizes** the presence of a Turkish community in Cyprus with equal rights. That is enough. How they administer themselves is their internal business and does not need any **comment** from anybody, including the Greek Cypriot side.

69. There have been attempts to present the Turkish Cypriot decision as a **coup**, as if everything were normal in Cyprus. A **coup can** only occur when it takes place against some constitutional set-up. How long has it been since there has been any constitutionality in Cyprus?

70. The organizer of one of the last **coups** against what the Greek side considered their Constitution, a man of international criminal fame, is still at large and in good health, making speeches, publishing his memoirs and praising the heroes of EOKA and **enosis**. Was there constitutionality in Cyprus as a whole before the Sampson **coup**? The answer is again no. The symbol of this lack of constitutionality is the Cypriot delegation itself. I should like to know under which constitution the Government they purport to represent has been constituted--constituted for more than a decade.

71. The Archbishop, on 14 January last, appointed a Council of Ministers, one more in the long list of councils he has created since 1963, excluding again, as a matter of fact, the Turks.

72. Now this Constitution, which they sometimes **recognize** as still valid, reserves 30 per cent of the

seats in the Cabinet for the Turkish Cypriots. How many Turkish Cypriot representatives now occupy their seats in the so-called Parliament of Cyprus? Since when have they ever been present either in the Parliament or in the cabinets or in the diplomatic missions of Cyprus? What happened to the Supreme Constitutional Court which, according to the Constitution, was going to be headed by a neutral jurist? How is it that the army of Cyprus which, according to the Constitution, was meant to be a symbolic force of 2,000 men, suddenly became an all-Greek army of tens of thousands, and assumed the name of "National Guard"? What nation and what guard? What about the police force? What about the veto rights of the Turkish Vice-President? Was he ever consulted in a decade? What did he have to say before the "Government" decided to call the present meeting of the Security Council?

73. The answers to those questions would demonstrate the degree **of** constitutionality which has existed in Cyprus for the past 10 years and which exists now. A **coup** indeed took place in Cyprus, but it was not on 13 February 1975, not on 20 July 1974, and not even on 15 July 1974. It took place way back, at Christmas 1963.

74. The constitutionality of Cyprus was destroyed by the very same gentlemen **who** have suddenly become the flag-bearers of the Constitution here. And despite those circumstances, for more than a decade we came here to the Security Council and listened to the Greeks of Cyprus and the Greeks of the mainland complaining about everything on earth, including the fact that the Turkish Cypriots were not paying their electric bills. What an absurdity!

75. For more than a decade, the island of Cyprus was a land of illegality, unconstitutionality, harassment and injustice, and the last thing that can be considered illegal and unconstitutional in Cyprus is the newly formed Turkish Federated State, which aims to unite with its Greek neighbours to form the future bi-regional Federation of Cyprus, which I hope will be constitutional and respected.

76. The proclamation of the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus contains nothing that goes against the principles set out in the resolutions of the United Nations.

77. Now may I comment briefly on some of the proposals of the Greek Cypriots contained in the last document they presented to Mr. Denktag [see S/11624, annex I], because they seem illustrative of the thinking of their ruling circles. In paragraphs 3 and 4 Mr. Clerides speaks of a fictitious Turkish zone in the north extending to both sides of the Nicosia-Kyrenia (Lefkose-Gime) axis up to the sea and an undefined number of Turkish areas principally located where the Turkish Cypriot villages are concentrated. **According** to the Greek press, the number of these zones would

be between 9 and 12. Now, if we had not known their Byzantine heritage we would have thought these proposals, which envisage the creation of bantustans in the middle of the Mediterranean, had been formulated by some racist and Fascist leaders of South Africa or Southern Rhodesia. These dispersed Turkish cantons under a strong central Government-controlled, of course, by the Greeks-would be ready in a short time to be consumed by the Archbishop for the realization of his ultimate aim for the greater glory of Hellenism as soon as the Turkish troops left the island and the existing guarantees were abolished.

78. For the Turkish side, and by that I mean Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots, there are two principles on which a compromise is out of the question. Those two principles are, first, that Cyprus should be a biregional and bicomunal federation, and, secondly, that the existing guarantees, as set forth by the international agreements, should prevail. The rest are matters which are negotiable, and once the Greek side sees the facts and starts serious negotiations they will realize that the Turkish Cypriots are capable of putting the general interests of Cyprus as a whole before any other considerations.

79. Now, the statements of some of the members of the Security Council gave me the impression that, since the declaration of 13 February, they are worried about increased chances of the partition of the island. I would assure them that their anxieties are not well-founded. Turkey and the Turkish Cypriot community have time and again made crystal clear their attitude towards partition and *enosis*, but if it is going to help in any way I am more than willing to confirm our attitude once more. I also hope that what I will now say on this subject will satisfy the specific requests of the Soviet Union as expressed by its representative in the Security Council, Mr. Malik. First of all I wish to reiterate what the then Foreign Minister of Turkey said in the General Assembly. He said: "On behalf of the Turkish Government, I condemn any idea of partition, whether in the past or in the future." Now, upon instructions, I wish to put on record once more that the Government of Turkey has no intention whatsoever of resorting to the partitioning of Cyprus. In fact, as a guarantor of the independence of the Republic of Cyprus, it will strongly resist any efforts that may be made by others to partition or annex the island. Furthermore, the Government of Turkey wishes to reiterate its adherence to General Assembly resolution 3212 (XXIX), with the same understanding as that expressed by the then Foreign Minister of Turkey during the voting on that resolution. Turkey is convinced that the resumption on an equal footing of the talks between the representatives of the two communities of Cyprus and the progress that **would** be achieved therein would greatly contribute to bringing about an atmosphere that would lead to the full implementation of the said resolution.

80. I intended to **treat** the whole issue before the Council in a most dispassionate manner. I did not fully **realize** the many pitfalls that the mass media in this city can dig under one's feet. The contributions of the many shipping magnates, business tycoons, rich professionals and the many millions of Greek Americans to the cause of lessening the tension in the Mediterranean have been numerous since last summer. I would draw the attention of all my colleagues around this table to today's issue of *The New York Times*. I would indeed urge them to read it. It does more for the comprehension of the Cyprus issue-indeed, of all the many problems besetting Turko-Greek relations-than many an expose here. The vitriolic expressions of hatred even in the choice of words and adjectives, the distortions and the over-simplifications are appalling, and it is only one of the hundreds of publications sully the press daily all over this country and every other country where there is a sizable Greek minority and they can afford it, which they usually can. This constant hatred permeates the literature and the teaching from their pulpits and chairs. It is sad; it is discouraging; it is shameful from the point of view of humanity. But to us Turks it must be, and is, a warning.

81. Now I am sure that Mr. Malik, in his long and distinguished career, may have run into a handful of diehard emigres who have insisted upon misnaming the beautiful city of Leningrad "St. Petersburg*" or "Petrograd". The number of such people may allow one to consider them to be a bunch of eccentrics. Greek lips, after more than **500** years, are pained to pronounce, and their ink runs dry when they try to write, the name "Istanbul". Witness what is published today in *The New York Times*. Now, that is the mentality whose manifestations I have sadly witnessed on occasion even in this chamber during some Greek Cypriot outbursts.

82. That is the mentality which we have to take into account in understanding the reactions of the Turkish Cypriots, who for so long had to submit to its whims. That is why there can be and there will be no return to the status quo ante in Cyprus. That is why Cyprus will have to be a bizonal State and a federative one; physical separation of the Turks and Greeks in their daily life within their own community is essential for the safety of the Turks. That is why a Greek Government headed by the Ethnarch cannot be and will not be considered by the Turkish Cypriots to represent the whole of Cyprus. The sooner that is realized, in a new, constructive, realistic spirit, the sooner Cyprus-this creation of the hopes, good will, realism and statesmanship of many Turks and Greeks alike-will start, at long last, to live up to the promise of its birth, a truly independent and non-aligned State, genuinely dedicated to the welfare of both its communities, which will share equally in all aspects of its life. All the rest, I submit, is bound to remain idle talk.

83. At this stage of my statement I wish to refer to some of the statements made by my Greek colleague, Mr. Carayannis, at the first of this series of Security Council meetings [*1813th meeting*].

84. Now, in every forum of the United Nations where the Cyprus problem is discussed, the Greeks go through an act of contrition, **recognizing** Greece's past mistakes over Cyprus. Mr. Carayannis goes so far as to state that his Government is ready to pay a price, if it is not unreasonable. I understand him. But I assure him that Turkey does not intend to make Greece pay anything. Greece's mistakes during the past 11 years have been paid for by the Turkish Cypriots. That is settled. But we want to make absolutely sure that Greece makes no more mistakes. We want to be sure that even if it wants to make some mistakes it will not have the opportunity to do so.

85. We have our reasons for feeling that way. For, I regret to say—and I intend nothing derogatory in **this—Greece** is prone to making mistakes. It committed errors of judgement from 1919 to **1922—and** then atoned for them. It made mistakes in 1964 in Cyprus, repeated them in **1967**, re-repeated them in **1974—and** then apologized for **them**. We are full of forgiveness, but we should not be forgetful.

86. Let us look at what Mr. **Karamanlis, the Prime Minister of Greece**, said as recently as 24 August 1974, in a television broadcast which was relayed also by Athens Radio and the BBC on 25 August: "Cypriots, one thought, one word will change your spirit and renew your strength. This very word is **enosis**. You must have no **other** thought, for **Hellenism** must live."

That was said in August 1974. Since then, the Foreign Minister of Greece and Mr. Carayannis have condemned **enosis** here at the United Nations, and we welcome that. But, as I have said, **while** we must be forgiving we must not be forgetful, and we therefore have to remain most careful.

87. I shall make clear what I mean by quoting again from Mr. Karamanlis—this time from the statement he made right after the Turkish Cypriot declaration of 13 February. He said: "The Greek Government, which since it took over has shown full respect for international law and a readiness for entente, internationally denounces the Turkish **coup** and reserves its right to defend the inviolable rights of Hellenism, under attack.*"

Now, if the Hellenism Mr. Karamanlis was speaking about after the declaration of 13 February is the same Hellenism he was speaking about in August last, we may be in **serious** trouble.

88. The representative of Greece alleged that Turkey had always sought a solution to the Cyprus problem

behind the backs of the Cypriots by making advances to Greece. It is not my intention either to embarrass anyone who is living or to mar the memory of the dead by giving names. I beg my Greek colleagues not to force me to do so. But I feel bound to say, on the basis of personal experience, that many such approaches have been made by Greek diplomats and statesmen to their Turkish counterparts. I happen to know also of many other attempts—certainly beyond Turkey's means and aims—to create situations in Cyprus which, to be charitable, I shall describe only as unlawful. I have served my country in the field of foreign affairs in various capacities. My own recollections of some of these incidents go back to each one of those capacities. So, please, no more of these allegations.

89. **My** Greek colleague, who claims to be so much against diplomatic blackmail—and I am sure that he is sincere in that claim—actually took the liberty of issuing a warning to the members of this Council in his statement, implying that the attitude they will adopt will be closely watched in Athens and necessary adjustments made accordingly. If I were ever to follow suit, the members of the Council would indeed have a rather **difficult** choice to make. These are **not** what I would regard as reputable tactics.

90. One final word regarding the statements made by Mr. Carayannis. My Greek colleague mentioned in his statement the name of Mr. Galo Plaza. It seems that they are running out of arguments if they have to dwell on Mr. Galo Plaza. I have on various occasions in the past dealt with Mr. Galo Plaza's report [*S/6253*]. Those who wish to know the Turkish views on the subject can refer to past records of the Council. But I shall take the opportunity to say that the Turkish Cypriots and Turkey did not lose anything by Mr. Galo Plaza's report. I fail to see what it brought to the Greek side, except a rich source to quote from, but with little effect. Mr. Plaza, I submit, affected only one thing: the United Nations. I wonder how many Galo Plasas the Organization can have and still survive.

91. There have been several statements indicating the preference that the speakers' countries had with regard to which is the legitimate Government in Cyprus now; sometimes they went so far as to name its head. My country's description of interference in the internal affairs of others would cover such statements. We consider that it is not for anyone except those who live in the country to decide **which** is the Government of that country, and that is especially true when it comes to naming names. But everyone has the liberty of deciding on his own action and his own conception of what is or is not intervention in the internal affairs of others.

92. Now a final word—and I apologize for having been so lengthy. The Security Council's present deliberations will surely be followed by a resolution.

In fact, I know that extensive **consultations** are going on, and I shall not be revealing, **any** secret if I say that those who think they are in a position to submit a resolution have been kind enough to **consult** interested parties, although we are not members of the Council and have no voice. in the final adoption of any resolution. I shall be **very** frank and straightforward in addressing myself to this aspect of the question.

93. When it was decided that the Council should meet, the members of the Council may have had two things in mind. They could have felt that the declaration of 13 February should be regretted or deplored. If that was the intention, then it would be the privilege of the members of the Council to do that; and I, as a non-member, most respectfully stepping aside, would be, as I could only be, a spectator of that action. On the other hand, the members of the Council may have felt it their duty to try to create an atmosphere that would bring about the resumption of the talks between the two communities in Cyprus. If that is the case-and I hope it is-all the members no doubt **recognize** that there are at least two parties to the negotiations and that, consequently, the adoption of the views of only one side cannot bring about the conditions for meaningful negotiations.

94. Each member of the Council may have adopted a political attitude on the question of Cyprus which suits his own views, his own intellectual approach to the problem or his own interests, and that may not always be in accord with the views of at least one of the parties. Now, the enforcement of these points of disagreement in resolutions will not yield any positive results. On the other hand, the sorting out of common denominators of the views of the parties should be conducive to achieving the results which we all hope to obtain. This is, in my view, the heaviest responsibility that now rests on the shoulders of the Security Council. Any decision--any judgement on this subject-is, of course, the **Council's**.

95. Mr. KANE (Mauritania) (*interpretation from French*): Mr. President, I should **first** of all like to convey to you, on behalf of my delegation, my warm and **sincere congratulations** on your assumption of the presidency of the Council for this month. These congratulations are all the warmer because of the cordial relations between our two Missions, which reflect the friendly relations and fruitful co-operation between your great country, the People's Republic of China, and my own country, the Islamic Republic of Mauritania. Your great experience of international affairs and your statesmanlike talents, acquired in the cause of the liberation struggle of the countries and peoples of the Third World, are a guarantee of the success of the work of the Council this month.

96. I- should also like to pay a well-deserved tribute to the representative of the **Byelorussian** SSR who last month presided over the Council with a skill

which does credit to his country and the great people he represents here.

97. I **should** also like to take this opportunity-since this is the first time I have spoken in the course of an **official** meeting of the Council since the beginning of the year-to congratulate the representatives of Italy, Sweden, Guyana, Japan and the United Republic of Tanzania on the election of their countries to the Security Council. I would like them to convey to their respective Governments the compliments of the Mauritanian Government for the confidence which the General Assembly has placed in them in entrusting to them such a delicate and difficult task. I am convinced that their long and rich experience in the United Nations will contribute to the success of the work of the Council.

98. I should like now to turn to the problem which continues to be of concern to us: the situation in Cyprus. Previous speakers have stressed in their statements the gravity of this situation, which may at any time degenerate into a conflict with incalculable consequences.

99. The Secretary-General-to whom I should like here. to pay a well-deserved tribute for the objective report he has submitted to us-has, of course, drawn the Council's attention to the urgent and effective measures that **should** be taken to prevent the Republic of Cyprus from becoming once again the scene of a conflict which can only cause the Cypriot population indescribable suffering and loss of human life.

100. My delegation, therefore, cannot but be seriously concerned by the continuation of the Cyprus crisis, a crisis which every day increasingly threatens the unity, independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of that non-aligned country and full-fledged Member of the United Nations.

101. General Assembly resolution 3212 (XXIX) and Security Council resolution 365 (1974), supported by my delegation, already provided an appropriate framework for the resumption of negotiations between the parties directly concerned. While regretting the fact that they have not been implemented, my delegation believes that those resolutions still constitute today an acceptable framework for the resumption of negotiations between the two communities.

102. However that may be, it is essential to leave it to the Cypriots to resolve the differences between them. Any external intervention not arising from a mutually accepted agreement by the two parties in question would only serve to delay a solution of the crisis.

103. My delegation, devoted to the ideals of independence, respect for sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-intervention in the internal affairs of other States, can only deplore the interference of foreign

Powers in the internal **affairs** of Cyprus. It is time that these Powers understand that **the** interests of the Republic of Cyprus and their own interests lie in scrupulous respect for the independence of this Republic.

104. It goes without saying that the future of the Republic of Cyprus lies in its unity, and the higher interest of the two communities is to seek ways and means of achieving that objective.

105. I should like to pay a well-deserved tribute to the far-sightedness of the representatives of the Republic of Cyprus and to their constructive participation in the Council's debate. I am convinced that common sense and reason will finally prevail and that the Republic of Cyprus will continue to bring to us, within the framework of the United Nations, its valuable experience, deriving as it does from a centuries-old history and a **civilization** which has for so long done so much to bring together men, **civilizations** and cultures.

106. The PRESIDENT (*translation from Chinese*): The next speaker is the representative of Romania. I now invite him to take a place at **the** Council table and to make his statement.

107. Mr. DATCU (Romania) (*interpretation from French*): Mr. President, I should like to start by expressing our thanks to you and to the members of the Security Council for having allowed me to address this important forum of the United Nations and expound here the position of the Government of the Socialist Republic of Romania concerning the situation in Cyprus, which is the subject matter of the present debates.

108. We have asked to be allowed to participate in these debates since we are convinced that Member States of the Organization bear the responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security and that each one of them is duty bound to make his contribution to the solution of the problems examined by the United Nations. With respect to the evolution of the situation in Cyprus, the constant concern of Romania is all the easier to understand since that country is one which is situated in a geographical area close to Romania and one with which we maintain relations of friendship and co-operation.

109. As is known, ever since the conflict in **Cyprus** broke out, the Socialist Republic of Romania has consistently spoken out firmly in **support** of respect for the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus. The **Romanian** Government considered and still considers that the problem of **Cyprus** should be settled only by political means. Accordingly, we have spoken out in favour of the cessation of all military actions and actions of intervention on the territory of the Republic of Cyprus and for the withdrawal, without delay, of all foreign

troops from the island. In that way the necessary conditions would be created for the peaceful coexistence of the two communities and for their free development towards progress and prosperity, free from all foreign intervention, on the basis of full equality before the law.

110. Recently, at the Eleventh Congress of the **Romanian** Communist Party, our President, **Nicolae Ceaușescu**, reaffirming the position of my country on the problem of Cyprus, stated:

“We are profoundly concerned about the situation that has been created in Cyprus. We speak out firmly in favour of a political solution to this situation, the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Cyprus, and we favour peaceful co-operation between the two communities. This would be in accordance with the interest of all the Cypriot workers and the people as a whole. It would promote the cause of co-operation and peace in the Balkans, in the Mediterranean, in Europe and throughout the world.”

111. The **Romanian** Government has followed very closely, with approval, the activities undertaken by the United Nations, the tireless efforts of the Secretary-General, Mr. Kurt Waldheim, and those of his Special Representative, which are designed to promote a peaceful conclusion to the problem of Cyprus.

112. In this connection I should like to associate myself with previous speakers who have expressed warm appreciation for the efforts of the Secretary-General and have encouraged him to pursue these actions designed to give effect to the decisions and recommendations of the United Nations concerning Cyprus. Last year we participated, here in the Security Council and in the General Assembly, in the debates on this question and we lent our support to the resolutions that were adopted.

113. Romania has considered and still considers that resolution 3212 (XXIX), which was unanimously adopted by the General Assembly on 1 November 1974, is an important contribution to the creation of the necessary conditions for a settlement of the Cypriot crisis. The international community was well justified in hoping that the provisions of that resolution, which was endorsed unanimously by the Security Council, would be observed and applied by all of the parties concerned. My country continues to feel that resolution 3212 (XXIX) contains the elements necessary for a solution to the problem of Cyprus. That resolution establishes the procedure for the settlement of the Cypriot problem, namely, negotiation on a footing of equality between the representatives of the two communities. The purpose of these negotiations should be the elaboration of **the constitutional régime** of the Republic of Cyprus, based on the fundamental and legitimate rights of the two communities, and also on respect for the sovereignty,

independence and territorial integrity and the non-alignment of that country.

114. In order that the intercommunal negotiations may be carried out in **all** freedom and equality, that same resolution called for the speedy withdrawal from the Republic of Cyprus of all foreign armed forces and the cessation of all foreign intervention in its affairs. In accordance with the provisions of that United Nations resolution, all the refugees were supposed to be allowed to return to their homes safe and sound, and the parties concerned were called upon to take measures to achieve this end.

115. Today, four months later, we note with regret that resolution 3212 (XXIX) has not been respected or applied. What is worse, the leaders of the Turkish Cypriot community have decided to proclaim the northern part of the island an autonomous and federated State, a measure which is in contradiction with the resolutions of the General Assembly and of the Security Council. This decision has complicated the situation in Cyprus even further. Accordingly, new obstacles have been raised in the way of the intercommunal talks which were supposed to be carried out in all freedom and protected from any type of pressure or unilateral action.

116. The Government of the Socialist Republic of Romania has undertaken certain diplomatic approaches to the Governments of Greece, Turkey and Cyprus, and also to the Secretary-General, in which we have expressed our concern about the consequences of the most recent developments in the situation in Cyprus, which have led to a further intensification of tension in the area of the Mediterranean and the Balkans.

117. For its part, Romania maintains normal relations of friendship and co-operation with the Republic of Cyprus. It **recognizes** only its legally constituted Government, which is headed by President Makarios .

118. The **Romanian** Government has repeatedly **emphasized** that an essential prerequisite for avoiding an escalation of the conflict was to refrain from any act of force or any unilateral measures.

119. The United Nations is duty bound to take all necessary measures to apply these resolutions. To this end it would appear necessary for the Security Council, following upon the present debates, to adopt measures to encourage a continuation of the efforts in order to reach a solution to the dispute within the framework of a constructive political dialogue, and also for the resumption of direct negotiations between the two Cypriot communities in order to work out a State structure for the Republic of Cyprus which would reflect the aspirations and the fundamental interests of all the Cypriots. It is possible that the two parties may chose the form

of a federal State. That solution should, however, be the result of their free agreement and not the outcome of **unilateral** measures.

120. At the same time, we are of the opinion that it is necessary that new means and possibilities should be examined by which the United Nations and the international community could make their contribution to the success of the negotiations between the parties concerned and to a solution of the Cyprus problem.

121. In this connection I should like to draw attention to the fact that during the past 15 years we have tried to resolve the Cyprus problem within a limited framework, with the results that are well known. We believe that the time has come to **recognize** that a lasting and **equitable** solution to international problems can be achieved only with the participation and the active contribution of all the States concerned. That is why the **Romanian** Government considers that the countries of the Balkans and the Mediterranean basin which are deeply concerned with an urgent and equitable solution to the Cyprus conflict, should participate directly in the solution of the problem. In that way those States could provide an effective contribution to the elimination of this hotbed of tension in that part of the world and to the creation of the necessary conditions to ensure that Cyprus, a Member of the United Nations can develop as an independent and sovereign State.

122. The requirements of peace and international understanding call for concerted efforts by all the States concerned to encourage a relaxation of tension in that part of the world, in order to succeed, by negotiation, in reaching a lasting settlement of the problem of Cyprus. It goes without saying that such a settlement of the problem would have a beneficial influence on relations among the Balkan States and those of the Mediterranean basin and contribute to the transformation of this part of the world into a region of good-neighbourliness and peaceful coexistence.

123. In conclusion, I should like to express the **firm** conviction of the **Romanian** Government that the United Nations and the Security Council will spare no effort and will act with all necessary energy in order to succeed as quickly as possible, with the participation and direct contribution of **all** the countries concerned, in reaching a political solution to the problem of Cyprus.

124. For its part the **Romanian** Government will do its best to contribute, together with the other countries concerned, to a lasting solution of this problem in the spirit of the Charter of the United Nations and in accordance with the interests and legitimate aspirations of the Cypriot people as a whole and the imperious need for a lasting peace in the region, in Europe and throughout the world.

125. The **PRESIDENT** (*translation from Chinese*): There are three representatives who have expressed the wish to speak in exercise of the right of reply. The first is the representative of the Soviet Union, on whom I now call.

126. Mr. **MALIK** (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*translation from Russian*): When, before the October Revolution the **Tsarist** Government of pre-revolutionary Russia committed outrages in politics, Leo Tolstoy, the well-known classic writer of Russian literature, said: "I cannot remain silent." When the Chinese representative, occupying the chair of President of the Security Council, speaks outrages; I as representative of the Soviet Union cannot remain silent.

127. In my welcome to the Chinese representative upon his assumption of the presidency of the Security Council I said:

"We should also like to congratulate you, Mr. President, on your assumption of the presidency and wish you success in your work and, in particular, success in the adoption by the Council under your presidency of positive decisions for the settlement of the Cyprus question." [1813th meeting, para. 176.]

128. Having heard the statement of the Chinese representative on Cyprus, I **have** come to the conclusion that this was a vain **hope**. **We shall** wait and hope that your successor, the representative of Costa Rica, in the post of President of the Security Council, will adopt a more constructive approach as regards the achievement of positive results **by the** Security Council in the matter under discussion.

129. Of course, the natural question arises of **how** long you and your colleagues, in all organs of the United Nations, will continue to speculate in worn-out formulas about the "two super-Powers"* in order to cover up a pathological **anti-Sovietism**—on your part personally and on that of your leadership. According to reliable data available **to me**, **this** is already beginning to bore the States Members of the United Nations and their representatives in United Nations bodies. Nothing constructive, nothing positive is suggested; everything is rejected; everything is **criticized** by the Chinese representatives in the United Nations; and it is all covered up by pathological anti-Sovietism and **slander** against the policy of the Soviet Union. But we have an apt Russian proverb **which says**: "Slander does not stick" Our policy is correct and we are proud of it. It wins support throughout the world. It is precisely by the efforts of the Soviet Union and of its friends; the socialist countries, that we have been able **to** convince the people who live on the same continent as ours that they should take measures to convert Europe into a continent of peace and security. You do not like that either. You are against **peace** and security in Europe.

You provoke Western Europe against the Soviet **Union**. But you will not be successful in this. You already have a well-established habit. You mention the two "super-Powers"; you say a couple of words about one of them, as you did today, for instance. You said that one of them was pulling "strings" in the Cyprus question. They were very solid strings, but you were silent about that. However, you heaped slander upon the Soviet Union and monstrously distorted its **policy**.

130. Anyone who was not familiar with the substance of the Cyprus question and who heard your statement today might get the impression that the responsibility for the events in Cyprus does not lie with those who **organized** and provoked the military coup in Cyprus and those who for seven years supported and equipped all those who carried out the **coup**. The responsibility, it would appear, likewise does not tie with those who intervened in the internal affairs of Cyprus, who put their troops on the island and who keep them there in spite of the decisions of the Security Council and of the resolution of the General Assembly, which you, as you said in your statement, supported and which you apparently voted for.

131. According to your version, the responsibility should not lie with those who maintain military bases on Cyprus nor with those who at one time imposed guarantees on **Cyprus** which were used not for the purpose of ensuring the independence, freedom and territorial integrity of Cyprus but for directly contrary purposes. These countries, **according** to your purely Chinese version, seem almost like the guardian angels of Cyprus. As you see it, the responsibility for all this lies principally with one major super-Power. Obviously, as everyone can see, you have in mind the Soviet Union.

132. But what has the Soviet Union to do with all this? The history of the origin and continuation of the tragedy of the Cypriot people and the identity of those who have been responsible for this is quite obvious to everyone. You are attempting to mislead the Council, the United Nations, the representatives, the missions to the United Nations and the whole of world public opinion in a matter which is patently clear.

133. The Soviet Union, as I have already pointed out, has adopted a correct and a just position on the question of Cyprus. From the very outset of the Cyprus crisis, it has resolutely and consistently advocated the immediate restoration of the independence, the territorial integrity and the sovereignty of Cyprus, its non-alignment, the active participation of the United Nations in the solution of the Cyprus question, the convening of a broad international conference to bring about a just political settlement and the granting of genuinely effective guarantees to Cyprus. This is our position and our policy, and we are proud of it.

134. And what do you propose? Nothing. You are helping those who want to **partition** Cyprus, those who want to turn it into a strategic **base**. No comment is needed.

135. If we gathered together a hundred men, including Chinese wise men, and **asked them** to come up with the most fantastic and improbable version of responsibility for the events in Cyprus, I do **not believe** that any of them would be able to devise anything more absurd than what has been concocted by the Chinese delegation.

136. What is the need for all this slander against the Soviet Union, both in this matter and in many others? This is not all hard to understand. It is needed to cover up the real position of China in the matter of Cyprus. China does not want to raise one finger to promote a settlement of the Cyprus question. On the contrary, China is pleased at the exacerbation of the situation. This is quite obvious. It is pursuing a policy according to which "two super-Powers" are in **conflict** at every point on the globe. Read the recent statement made by Mr. Chou **En-lai** at the Chinese Congress of National Representatives in Peking. He predicts "war between America and Russia", between the United States of America and the Soviet Union. In doing this, he has revealed his own secret dream and the dream of his leader, Mao Tse-tung. The dream of the Chinese leaders is to pit the United States and the Soviet Union against each other in a thermonuclear conflict. But this is not an original thought, and it is not a new one.

137. In May of this year we shall be celebrating a great historical event-which I have already mentioned in my statement on Cyprus in the Security Council-namely, the thirtieth anniversary of the victory of the Soviet Union over fascism in the Patriotic War of 1941-1945. But there were those who wanted Germany to destroy Russia, and Russia to destroy Germany. One United States senator, speaking at that time-a time which for us marked the very height of the heaviest and most intense fighting, a time **when** the fate of our country was hanging in the balance-made this statement: "Let the Russians **kill** as many Germans as possible, and the Germans as many Russians as possible. When they have worn each other down, we can come and dictate our own conditions." A member of the British House of Lords made a statement along similar lines. But, for them, that day did not come; neither of them is alive today. And what they dreamed of did not happen.

138. Through the concerted efforts of the States and nations of the anti-Hitler coalition, the efforts of the nations that abhorred fascism and, **first** and foremost, the efforts of the peoples of the USSR, fascism was defeated, and we shall be celebrating the **thirtieth** anniversary of that defeat.

139. I am firmly convinced-and you can convey this to your leadership-that neither will they live to see

the day when America clashes with Russia in a thermonuclear catastrophe because your dream will not come true.

140. The Chinese representative has said that China is the friend of all three of the interested parties that are involved in the Cyprus problem, that **is**, the Republic of Cyprus, Turkey and Greece. But, to judge from press reports, the Chinese Ambassador in Ankara spoke of Chinese support for only one side. Thus, one thing is said in one place, and another somewhere else.

141. Four permanent members of the Security Council, as I pointed out in my statement in the Security Council on the Cyprus question, have stated in their joint communiques that they **recognize** the lawful Government of the Republic of Cyprus, headed by President Makarios. China, in the person of its representative here in the Security Council, has not said a word in this regard. This is apparent to **all**. It is a vulnerable position. How must this be covered up, how must attention be diverted from this position? By anti-Sovietism. It is very simple and, I might say, very petty and unconvincing.

142. All members of the Security Council-the majority of those who have thus far spoken on the question under discussion-have supported strict compliance with the resolutions of the **Security Council** and the General Assembly, including the withdrawal of foreign troops from the territory of Cyprus. The Chinese representative has not said a word about the withdrawal of foreign troops.

143. The Chinese representative had the audacity-to put it mildly-to assert that the Soviet Union was trying to establish a base on Cyprus. I say to you, the Chinese representative, wake up and rub your eyes; the Soviet Union has never had, could not have and never will have any **such intention**.

144. We are proud of the fact that the Soviet **Government** was the **first** one, after the founding of the United Nations and after the end of the Second World War, to introduce a proposal in the United Nations for the elimination of all foreign military bases on the territories of other countries, and we firmly stand by this position up to this very day.

145. You were aware, as everyone is aware, that we have repeatedly proposed the elimination of all military blocs and **all** military alliances. We have proposed to the States Members of the North Atlantic Treaty **Organization** (NATO) the liquidation of NATO and the Warsaw Pact. We regret that NATO is still **just** studying this problem. But it is my belief that they will complete their study of it and that we shall come to an agreement on the liquidation of those bodies. I am optimistic about this.

146. Why would we want a base on Cyprus? Our only wish is to see the Republic of Cyprus

free, independent, nonaligned and flourishing, and with its territorial integrity intact. And we sincerely regret the absence of peace and friendship between the two Cypriot communities. We counsel them to profit from our experience in how to ensure friendship between peoples. We have 15 Union republics, and we live together as brothers. **I**, a Ukrainian, represent the Soviet Union, while the leading republic in the Soviet Union is the Russian Republic. It would seem that there should be a Russian here at this place, but we practise the equality of **all** nations. When I came here in 1968 as representative of the USSR, **I** sat here at the Council table as a Ukrainian, and behind me sat a Jew, one of my deputies, and an Armenian, my other deputy. That is a perfect example of **equality** and of the absence of hostility or hatred between peoples in our country. With ail our heart, we sincerely wish that in Cyprus the Turks and Greeks could **live** together as brothers in the same way. That is our only **goal**, the objective of USSR policy on- the Cyprus question. Yet the Chinese representative is making fantastic **allegations** against us. People laugh at you when you make such statements, but I **shall** say something about that later.

147. As I **said earlier**, the vulnerability **of the** Chinese **position** and of Chinese policy on Cyprus, the **Middle East**, the strengthening **of** international security, the definition of aggression and disarmament forces Chinese representatives to the United Nations to cover up and **to divert** attention from their weak position by slandering the Soviet Union.

148. We are very satisfied that in **all** these matters we have the active support of the overwhelming majority of States Members of the United Nations, including Third World countries. We had unprecedented success with our latest proposal at the **twenty-ninth** session of the General Assembly. Our proposal concerning the prohibition of action to **influence** the environment and **climate** for military or other hostile purposes was supported by the overwhelming majority of States Members. Our draft **resolution**, as amended by other delegations, received 126 affirmative votes [**General Assembly resolution 3264 (XXIX)**]. That is the best answer to Chinese slander against the Soviet Union and to Chinese anti-Sovietism.

149. Let us consider the Soviet Union's proposals on Cyprus. Yes, we proposed that an expanded representative conference on the Cyprus question should be convened by, or under the auspices of, the United Nations. Yes, we proposed that the 15 members of the Security **Council** and some other States from the group of non-aligned countries in the United Nations should participate in that conference. What prevented the adoption of that proposal? China and the Chinese representative. Who was the first to speak against that proposal? The Chinese representative. Whom did he help? He helped those who wish to resolve the Cyprus problem within a narrow

circle without the participation of the United Nations. Thus, China is guilty of prolonging the tragedy in Cyprus **along** with those who initiated it and are continuing it. And in order to cover up that position, which is vulnerable and difficult to defend, China needs to resort to anti-Sovietism.

150. Yes, we proposed sending a Security Council mission to Cyprus immediately after the trouble started. We are still thoroughly convinced that the adoption by the Council at that time of the two proposals made by the Soviet Union would have played a very positive role in expediting a just settlement of the Cyprus problem. Who thwarted that possibility? China, together with those who did not like it because of strategic considerations. These are the facts, and they are clear to everyone. Why does the Chinese representative have to distort the facts? Why does, the Chinese representative resort to the monstrous fabrication that the Soviet Union proposed the conference for the sole purpose of establishing a military base for itself on Cyprus? As the English and the Americans say, that is incredible, a most unlikely story. It would be difficult to think up anything more fantastic. And here I would like to point out that after four years' participation by Chinese representatives in the work of United Nations bodies and Chinese participation in the United Nations as a whole, many representatives have said to us that China's reaction to Soviet proposals in the United Nations is **like** the reaction of a bull to a red **flag**. That is true; it is a fact. Everyone knows this. And everyone is laughing about it. But is this case even more is involved; the causes lie much deeper. China is pleased that the situation in the eastern Mediterranean has become more tense. China is glad that the situation in the Middle East has become more tense. Why? For those very reasons which I have already mentioned. China wants America and Russia to clash, the Soviet Union and Western Europe to disagree. That is the **idée fixe** of China and the Chinese leadership. Why? So that the two great Powers, to which China has attached the label "super-Powers", will clash in a thermonuclear **conflict** and destroy each other--and there could be no other outcome of such a conflict--and so that the Soviet Union and Western Europe will clash and destroy each other, and China would emerge as the only **super-Power**, the mono-super-Power. That is the secret dream of the Chinese leadership. And that is why China, **as** I said, **will** not lift **a** finger to help strengthen peace and security in the world or to promote a just and speedy settlement of the Cyprus question or a speedy settlement of the Middle East **conflict**. On the contrary, it is **glad** when the situation deteriorates. That is in accord with its far-reaching strategic aim, which is fundamentally hegemonism and becoming a hegemonic Power. In order to do so, it is trying to use every opportunity and it is **also** trying to use the Third World. But these are just **wild** hopes and dreams. They **will** not come to pass.

151. Let us suppose for a moment that the Soviet Union-as the Chinese representative said-proposed the convening of an expanded conference on Cyprus within the United Nations framework in order to establish a base in Cyprus. That is the Chinese theory! But the **Romanian** representative who spoke just before me made the point-if I understood the interpretation correctly-that we should perhaps convene an expanded conference on the question of Cyprus in which States in the eastern Mediterranean region would participate. Does this mean that you, the Chinese representative, will accuse Romania of trying to establish a base in Cyprus through such a conference? That would be very strange and quite preposterous. Try to realize what you are saying. After all, the people sitting here are literate and experienced; they are not pre-school children. What you are telling us is fairy tales for young children and **old** fools. But by now the fools have disappeared, or at least there are far fewer of them.

152. In conclusion, I should like to point out one more thing. All the members of the Security Council know that a draft resolution on Cyprus is being prepared in the corridors. Apparently every version of the draft resolution includes the idea that the Security Council must participate in some way in talks between the two communities in Cyprus if talks are to be resumed. But the fact is that the long drawn-out talks, from which many members of the Council-the North Americans, the British, the French and a number of others-expected so much, have not led to positive results. On the contrary, the separate action of the Turkish Cypriot community has confused the issue and created a deadlock in the talks. What is the solution? We are told that the representatives of Turkey and Greece should participate in the next talks. That is a new idea but one that **will** probably lead nowhere. The Greeks would defend their position, and the Turks theirs. Before, there were two representatives, one from each community, holding talks in the same room, and now, with the addition of the representatives of Greece and Turkey, there would be four, but the situation would be unchanged.

153. So let us just face the facts. Many members of the Security Council, quite **naturally** and rightly, have the idea that perhaps a new spirit really **could** be brought into the talks by sending a small group of two or three members of the Council to take part in them. I would point out for the benefit of the Chinese representative that this would not include representatives of the Soviet Union, for the Soviet Union makes no claim to participate in this group. But there are others, for example, the representatives of the non-aligned countries included in it. That would really be of help to the Security Council, to the Secretary-General and to both parties to the conflict in their search for a settlement. And so, if the idea is implemented, we shall see how the Chinese representative will react to it and whether he will

suspect the Soviet Union of plots and intrigue, and of trying to make Cyprus a Soviet strategic base.

154. With this I shall conclude-and without expressing my thanks to you.

155. The PRESIDENT (translation *from* Chinese): I now call on the representative of Greece to speak in exercise of his right of reply.

156. Mr. CARAYANNIS (Greece): I shall refer first to the beginning of the statement made today by the representative of Turkey.

157. I was amazed by the number of Greek Cypriot violations enumerated to the Council by Mr. Olcay. None of them is mentioned in the **Secretary-General's** report; it speaks only of Turkish violations. Perhaps those details throw some light on the other events recounted to us by Mr. Olcay. Most of them relate to the negotiations in Cyprus before the invasion and after the invasion. The representative of Cyprus, Mr. Clerides, **who** was the negotiator, is here and he is more competent than I to reply to Mr. Olcay in that connection; I am sure he **will** do so at the proper time. He will of course have to study very carefully the statements made about all these events.

158. Among other things, the representative of Turkey referred to a statement made by my Prime Minister in August last. He said that after Mr. **Karamanlis** had arrived in Greece he had called for the union of Cyprus with Greece. Let us be realistic. We all remember that when my Prime Minister returned to his country after a long exile he told the Greek people that he was not going to wage war against Turkey. Did he have in mind achieving the union of Cyprus with Greece without war? This reference to Mr. Karamanlis by Mr. Olcay relates **to** my country; all the other events to which he referred relate to Cyprus, and Mr. Clerides will reply to him about them. But I do not hold Mr. Olcay responsible for the version he gave of Mr. Karamanlis's statement. I know him personally and I know that he would not **tell** such a **lie** deliberately. I think he was misled. I have before me the text of what my Prime Minister really said in August last. 'Addressing the people of Cyprus, who were facing invasion at that time, he asked them to be united. Now, "union" and "united" may have a **similar** meaning in English. The same is true of the corresponding Greek words. Most probably my Turkish colleague has been the victim of some advisers who do not know Greek. But I have the correct text of Mr. Karamanlis's statement, and it is available to Mr. Olcay.

159. Again in the beginning of his speech, Mr. Olcay said that he did not understand why the Cypriot Government had asked for a meeting of the Council. According to him nothing had happened-absolutely nothing-that could be regarded as a serious or valid reason for convening the Council. But let us not

exaggerate. After **all**, there was a proclamation of a Turkish Cypriot State. Ambassador Olcay tries to make us believe that this is an internal **affair**. But they sent notes **verbales** to **all** the embassies in Nicosia, announcing this proclamation and announcing that from then **on a** Turkish Cypriot State was established and that foreign Powers would have to take it into account. Is that an **internal** affair? They announced their intention of opening a consulate. Does anyone know of any internal administration with consulates in foreign countries?

160. But let us leave aside this question of whether it is an internal or an external matter. Is there anyone round this table who **will** deny that Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots decided by a unilateral act on one of the problems on which they were negotiating? Do they deny that?

161. Mr. Olcay spoke of another problem which is not **negotiable**. I **shall** revert to that, but now I would **only** ask: can that **be called** decent negotiations? That is the reason why the Government of **Cyprus** came here and **called** for a meeting of the Security Council. I **would** suggest to the Council that this fact cannot be ignored in whatever resolution it may choose to adopt. The reason we are here is the **unilateral** act by the Turkish Cypriot -side, **while** negotiations were going on, in respect of one of the items on which they were supposed to be negotiating in good faith.

162. It is not **only** Cyprus that is on the Security Council's agenda. There is a principle on the Security Council's agenda. It is a principle very dear to **all small** countries. My country is a **small** country. We do not care about Cyprus alone; we care also about principles. The United Nations-I admit it-may not be able to save Cyprus.. But in our view the United Nations has the duty to serve a principle, a principle that is very fundamental for **all small** countries in the world: the principle that they cannot be invaded and that they **will be able**, when they have to negotiate, to count on decent negotiations.

163. We have not asked any of the countries round this table to send soldiers to Cyprus to save it. We know you cannot do it. Why should you do it? We would not like any of your soldiers to be killed in Cyprus. We are **only** too sorry that some of the soldiers of countries participating in **UNFICYP** have been killed there. But there is a principle which **will** have to be served, and **by** serving that principle we **shall only** be serving the United Nations-the United Nations of today and as we **all** hope it **will** become some day in the future.

164. Mr. Olcay told us that in future negotiations, biregional or **multiregional**, neither the question of a biregional or a **multiregional** solution, nor the problem of **guarantees**, is **negotiable**.

165. **Well**, I have spent **all** those days with **all** of you trying to find the right solution-and probably Mr. **Olcay** has done the same-and I know that many of you in your turn were hoping that the two plans submitted during the negotiations-the Cierides **plan** and the **Denktas** plan-were after **all** forming two points which, if taken as a basis for negotiation, could probably help us to arrive at a solution. Gentlemen, you have the answer. no, there is no such hope; That is, about **Cyprus**.

166. I turn now to the part of the Turkish statement concerning relations with Greece. The Turkish representative said that in my initial statement I said that my Government would be obliged to take into consideration the position taken by its friends on the issue of Cyprus. The representative of Turkey **called** this pressure exerted by me on you. Then he continued by saying that either the Security Council would have to adopt a resolution accepted by **both** parties-that means by Turkey as **well-or** else he would leave this room and he would leave us **alone** here to do whatever we wished, but without him; he would **walk** out. I have a name for that, but I **will** leave you to **find** the name.

167. And now I come to my **final** remark. He spoke about Greek hatred of Turks. I **will** not embark upon a lengthy statement. I have not accustomed you to long speeches and I am not going to be long. this time, but I can give you some facts.

168. There were about 100,000 Turks in **Thrace**, Greece. There are now a few more. Do you **know** why? Because they are probably happy and they are having children. In 1960 there were 100,000 Greeks in Istanbul--and I **only** hope that my Turkish **colleague** has not perceived that my lips have any **difficulty** in pronouncing "**Istanbul**"--**but** now there are 10,000, no more, probably less. There is one **island** in the Aegean Sea close to the Straits that was given to Turkey because of its closeness to the Straits; the name is Imbros. It was inhabited entirely by Greeks. Now there are no Greeks there any more. I have one of them here in my Permanent Mission. Mr. Olcay has met him because he has been invited to my Permanent Mission. He is my doormati; he is not a young man, he is more **than** 50 years **old**; he does not know a word of English. He could not **do** anything else here but be my doorman and I have him there out of pity. He cannot do anything else.

169. On the subject of hatred, Mr. Olcay talked about publications; I am talking about factual hatred.

170. The PRESIDENT (*translation from Chinese*): I **call** on the representative of Cyprus in exercise of the right of reply.

171. Mr. CLERIDES (Cyprus): I will of necessity reply to Mr. Olcay who, on the one hand, chooses to accuse me of having **lied** and at the same time

chooses to ignore me by saying that I represent nothing. I am not going to follow his example, because I am not afraid of open discussions, nor do I have a guilt complex. Perhaps I **should** have ignored the fact that he is speaking-as- he is for that Power which today has on my country's soil 40,000 Turkish troops **occupying** 40 per cent of the territory of my country, while he represents himself as the defender of the freedom of Cyprus, of its non-alignment and of its very existence.

172. I will ignore the fact that the representative of Turkey ignores my existence, for my existence here will prove what the real issue is and what methods have been used by him to deflect the discussion from the real issue.

173. In his masterly speech-and I give credit where credit is due-he has chosen the tactic of first trying to explain to all of us here that there is no reason for us to be here-in fact, I am wasting your time and you are wasting your time-considering the Cyprus problem. Why? Because all this is a Greek machination, a Greek fabrication, to bring representatives here to this august body and play a trick on them.

174. And why? Because everything was rosy in Cyprus, because there was a pot of honey in front of us and because we should leave everything to the Turkish forces to settle in the island.

175. But let me answer him-not in my own words, for I am an unreliable Greek-let me answer him in the words of the Secretary-General. -Do we face a grave situation in Cyprus? Do we face that grave situation because there has been no compliance with or implementation of the resolutions of the United Nations? The reply to that has been given clearly by the Secretary-General in addressing this Council:

“In the first place I wish to emphasize the great seriousness of the risk to peace and security in the **eastern** Mediterranean which the Cyprus situation represents as long as no progress is made in resolving it along the lines laid down in the relevant United Nations resolutions, especially General Assembly resolution 3212 (XXIX)” [*1814th meeting, para. 7*].

What was it that I said in my first address to the Security Council? I said that there was a grave situation in Cyprus. I said that the resolutions of the Council had not been implemented. I said that because of the non-implementation of those resolutions, no progress had been made or could be made, and that the result of the stalemate was dangerous for peace, for all of us. I went on to add that unless the Council took the relevant measures, the necessary measures, to save the situation, then the independence of the Republic of Cyprus would cease to exist.

176. And here we have the representative of Turkey addressing the Security Council, after the words of the Secretary-General which established beyond reasonable doubt that there is a serious situation in Cyprus, resulting from non-compliance with the resolutions of the Council, telling us that all that we have done was to play a trick, a Greek trick, to **draw** attention to what they want to hide; the fact that there has not been any implementation of the resolutions of the Council.

177. Then I have been called a liar. Well, I am 55 years old and being in politics, I have been called many names. But up to this day, neither a Greek in my country nor a Turkish Cypriot-and I am very proud of that fact-has called Clerides a liar. And why am I a liar? Because I distorted the picture by saying that the negotiations that were going on in Cyprus had made no progress at all.

178. The representative of Turkey admits that there has been no progress. So on that we are agreed. What do we differ on? Whether there has been any progress on the implementation of resolution 3212 (XXIX)? On that, again, he does not claim that he has moved towards implementation of the resolution. On the contrary, he has avoided answering any questions which I have pertinently put to him with regard to the resolution.

179. I have put to the representative of Turkey the question whether any Turkish forces have been withdrawn pursuant to resolution 3212 (XXIX)? There has been no reply. I have asked him a very pertinent and humane question. Have any refugees returned to their homes in pursuance of the provisions of resolution 3212 (XXIX)? Has he taken any urgent measures for these refugees to go back? And I met with silence, because he could not say that any progress has been made.

180. Then he had the effrontery to say that I caused delays in the talks because I raised the question of guarantees prematurely. Even on that fact I would not say that an eminent and distinguished representative of Turkey has lied. I would say that he has been terribly misinformed.

181. In order to set the record straight, let me read to the Council the minutes of that meeting-I will not only read them, I am prepared to put them before the Council. Each page of those minutes bears the signature of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Mr. **Weckmann-Muñoz**, and no one can say—I shall take the precaution to stress it now-that I have doctored them. I da this because I do not want to be called a liar again. Let us have this before us and let us see precisely what the issue was and on what date it took place. On 30 December 1974, a letter was addressed to me by the Special Representative, which said, among other things: “I am enclosing a copy of the minutes of conversations

between yourself and Mr. **Denktaş** held on Saturday, 14 December 1974." The same letter was addressed to Mr. Denktaş. The same endorsed minutes were given to both of us.

182. Mr. **Denktaş** asked me, at first, whether I would accept the existence of the same treaties of guarantee and that everything we have agreed on should be put before the guarantor Powers for approval. Here then is my reply: "It is premature to examine the question of guarantees." So how could I raise the question of guarantees when I said that the whole matter was premature? I go on to say: "**I** accept that it will be necessary to have outside guarantees, but this does not depend on us. This must be examined at a different level." I could not commit any Government **to act** as a guarantor without its consent. I was conducting inter-communal talks on the question of the Cyprus Constitution. So why-I **emphasize**, why-ask me at that stage to commit myself as to what guarantees I would accept or would not accept, and whether I would accept that anything agreed upon between us would be subject to the guarantors? Then Mr. **Denktaş** proceeded: "At what level?" I answered: "**I** cannot **define** the level. I can say, however, that there will be no objection by my side that at this level Greece and Turkey, if they wish, including others, may participate in the guarantees."

183. Was I obstructive, or was I trying to tell Mr. **Denktaş**: "We are here to discuss the Cyprus Constitution. It is premature to rely on guarantees, to talk about guarantees. But I give you notice now: if what you are **afraid** of is that Turkey and Greece will be excluded, this can be done at a different level"?

184. Then again the representative of Turkey was grossly misinformed on a number of issues. He says that we called a National Council- and I have already explained that it is a Council in which **all** political leaders participate-to determine what course of action we would take. **Of** course we did. Having noted that there was no progress in the talks, we decided what we should do to make the talks progress, and that we did.

185. We decided to give written proposals to Mr. **Denktaş** and we made a public statement after the meeting that the measure we had decided to take was to give written proposals to the Turkish side.

186. Having finished with his pretence that there was nothing serious and that there was no reason for calling this Council, he then followed with the second part of his statement-his tactical attack-to try to destroy the integrity of the Greek Cypriots by accusing their leadership of various evil deeds from 1960 onwards. In my opening statement I said that I would not go into the past, that the past had been repeatedly discussed both in the Security Council and in the General Assembly and, knowing that this tactic was to

come, that I would not be drawn into this kind of war of attrition, that I would not be sidetracked from the main issue and that the main issue was whether there had been compliance with resolution 32 12 (XXIX) and whether new procedures were needed.

187. I did, however, promise the representative of Turkey that I was not short of proved facts nor did I lack conclusive arguments. As to the facts, I could bore the Council by reading out, in context or out of context, statement after statement made from before 1960 to the present day by Turkish leaders-both in Cyprus and in Turkey-showing that the aim of Turkish policy on Cyprus was the partition of the island and not independence. At the next meeting of the Council-not tonight because I do not have the tiles with me-I shall give the representative of Turkey a taste of what he has attempted to **start**.

188. The representative of Turkey made a very definite statement which really explains the whole situation. Having made an analysis of the proposals I gave to Mr. **Denktaş**, which I shall not discuss here or anywhere else because under the relevant resolutions the constitutional issue is between the two communities, he concluded by stating--and this was heard by all of us-that Turkey will not accept a **multizonal** solution and that it insists on a bi-zonal solution. This is a statement that really should leave us in no doubt.

189. This is exactly what I have been complaining about, that the Security Council provided a forum to negotiate the constitutional issue. What was that forum? That forum was the talks which I was holding with Mr. **Denktaş**. What was the object of those talks? It was to **find** out whether the solution would be **multi-zonal** or bi-zonal. What did the representative of Turkey tell us? He told us: "There is only one solution we shall accept, and therefore there is only one solution that you can discuss." And that solution is the bi-zonal solution.

190. It is difficult to understand why the representative of Turkey does not want implementation of General Assembly resolution 3212 (XXIX)? It is because if the Turkish forces are moved out of Cyprus in accordance with that resolution he will not be able to say at gun-point: "There is only one solution to the Cyprus problem, and I courteously invite you to discuss it." If that is done there will be negotiations as envisaged by resolution 3212 (XXIX), freely conducted and on an equal footing.

191. There are mistakes which have been committed by my side, and there are mistakes which have been committed by the Turkish side. That is why we are here. But at least I, the "liar", from the beginning admitted frankly and truly that there have been mistakes on my side. Perhaps I believe that confession is good for the soul. However, the representative of Turkey

tells us here that all the mistakes have been made by us, that there have been no mistakes by Turkey, that all the mistakes were committed by Greece and that Greece has committed many, but that Turkey has not committed any mistakes, including the mistake it has not committed of complying with resolutions of the Security Council and the General Assembly.

192. It is not my intention, as time is moving on, to tire the Council on this particular issue. However, on this very particular issue I reserve my position, and should the representative of Turkey not wish to discuss with me the question of whether the resolutions of the Council have been implemented or not, I shall also continue along this line. But I **shall** take issue on what were the mistakes of Turkish policy and what were the mistakes of Greek policy. If, however, the Council **believes—and** I am sure it does believe—that this is not the right forum for such an examination, then I again publicly state what the Turkish side loathes to hear: I officially and solemnly invite a fact-finding mission on these issues to establish what were the mistakes, who made them and why Cyprus is in the position it is in today. I should like to hear the representative of Turkey join me on this and not tell me that this is again a Greek trick to deceive the world. No, it is not a Greek trick. It is a search to establish the truth, and if we establish the truth, then perhaps we shall not hide behind bushes when we have not implemented the resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Council.

193. The PRESIDENT (*translation* from Chinese): I call on the representative of Turkey, who has asked to speak in exercise of his right of reply.

194. Mr. OLCAY (Turkey): I should like to make some brief comments in reply to the many statements that have been made, and I do so with the usual reservation on my part with respect to the official status of Mr. Clerides, for whom personally I have only respect. In view of my attachment and my country's attachment to a system of law, it is not possible for me to refer to him as the representative of Cyprus. Aside from this, I am ready to address him as a most **honourable** gentleman from the Greek Cypriot side who happens to sit at the Council table behind the nameplate of Cyprus.

195. Most of what Mr. Clerides has just said relates to questions which I believe have been answered or will be answered by the representative of the Turkish Cypriots, who, I am sure, will be ready when the time comes to put the record straight. In this respect I have to be very honest. **One** of the reasons I cannot answer them is that I have not been a party to the negotiations. I do not know exactly who said what and when. I rely on the records. I am sure that Mr. **Çelik**, who was much closer to the Sources of information, will be more helpful in giving

the Security Council, if it considers it necessary, the details concerning some of the questions raised by Mr. Clerides.

196. I should like to make one thing clear. I would certainly not call Mr. Clerides a liar. I would not call any distinguished person sitting at this table a liar. What I did say—and I hope that the verbatim record will show this—was the word “lie”. I used the word “lie” to describe an action which was said to have been taken by my Foreign Minister and which resulted in certain consequences for the negotiations in Cyprus. I deny that that took place in the way in which it was presented. I therefore hope that my explanation will satisfy Mr. Clerides as regards my feelings and my respect for him personally.

197. In his remarks he put many words into my mouth which I do not remember having uttered today. I have jotted down some notes, but I do not remember exactly which words he put into my mouth that I did not pronounce. However, it will be easy for those who are willing to read the verbatim record of today's meeting to find them. With regard to the quotations of who said what and when—the Greek side, the Turkish side, the Greek Cypriot side, the Turkish Cypriot side—regarding Cyprus, I must say that however great the amount of documentation on which Mr. Clerides bases his argument—and I say this respectfully as a challenge—there is nothing to equal the record of statements made by Archbishop **Makarios**, the so-called head of the independent, non-aligned State of Cyprus, regarding his ultimate aim of putting an end to the independence of that State through **enosis**. I believe that on that point I am in rather a strong position. But again I shall leave that to Mr. **Çelik**, who, when he speaks again, with the indulgence of the Council, will be able to show that examples of this can be multiplied *ad nauseam*.

198. There has been mention of outside interference in the negotiations in Cyprus. Mr. Clerides said that the negotiations were only between the two parties, and that nobody, certainly not I or Turkey, has anything to say about them—or words to that effect. I fully agree with him. But **now** I should like to quote from the last paragraph of the statement made by the representative of Greece—and this **will** also constitute a reply to another aspect of what Mr. Clerides said. The representative of Greece said:

“... I have, however, to inform the Council, in view of the blackmail procedure we have been faced with, that my Government”—that is to say, the Government of Greece—“would not be prepared to accept a solution, even one accepted by the Greek Cypriots, if we were not convinced”—that is to say, the Greek Government—“that it had been ‘accepted of their own free will.’ [1813th meeting, para. 84.]

199. The representative of Greece, I think, did not **exactly** follow what I meant—I was not speaking of

Turkish or Greek relations-when I said that some form of the blackmail procedure that he says he dislikes so much-and I am sure he does dislike it-had been used. But he stated in his remarks-and that is what I was quoting from in my statement-that:

“... We have friendly relations with each one of the Council’s members and we need and we are determined and we have to evaluate and adjust our position in accordance with theirs.” [Ibid., *para. 83.*] Regarding the attitude they are going to adopt. . .

That is what I considered to be a type of pressure put on the members of the Council, and I added in my statement **that** if I were to say the same thing, it would be a rather sorry situation. We all **know** that countries also have bilateral relations with the parties to a dispute, but it is usually not said in so blatant a manner. That was the point I was trying to draw attention to.

200. At this stage I do not recall exactly whether it was the representative of Greece or Mr. Clerides who referred to the invasion of Cyprus by Turkish forces. I have had to deal with this whole question of invasion in the Security Council for a long time and my predecessor had to deal with it also. The history of Cyprus is a strange one and it has always **been** connected with the word “invasion”. But the word is only used when the invaders at the time happen to be Turkish forces. As I have said many **times**—and I believe the records of past meetings of the Council over the years will prove this—there has been a permanent state of invasion of Cyprus by the Greeks of the mainland, by Greek troops. It was never called an invasion; in fact, the President of that non-aligned independent State, having through the miscalculation of the then invaders been thrown out of **office**, when he came here, stated publicly—and it is on record—that he had in fact invited Greek troops into his country but they had misbehaved. It backfired. They followed certain other orders, not the ones he thought they would follow.

201. Thus the situation of permanent invasion in Cyprus was in fact balanced when Turkish troops went there in order, first, to prevent the invasion by Greece from transforming Cyprus into a province of Greece, and, secondly, to see to it that the Turkish community would not be the ultimate victim in the final settlement of the Turkish problem as far as the Cypriot leadership was concerned. There again, I could make many quotations but I shall not do so now because I do not have my files with me all the time either. But it is a dangerous area to dwell in. . .

202. There have been mistakes in Cyprus, I agree. Certainly, we were not the first to make mistakes in **Cyprus**. In fact, one of the gravest mistakes—the one **recognized** by the Security Council—took place in 1967. That was the whole Grivas episode and the formal withdrawal of Greek forces from Cyprus. But

at that time, of course, no dramatic situation was created because all that was happening was that Turks were suffering at the hands of Greeks.

203. That brings me to the question of the word “hatred”. One **thing** I can say, I hope, is that I consider the representative of Greece, Mr. Carayannis, to be well above this kind of sentiment. My respect for him **and** for my many Greek friends does not permit me to say that all Greeks hate Turks. It would be a sin to say such a thing. But, mind you, there is a problem with regard to the sentiments of Greeks in general concerning Turks, which is perhaps more visible because of the presence of Greeks in many parts of the world, while there are not so many Turks.

204. During the whole summer in which the Cyprus question was being debated here, it was a problem—**one** that was usually solved through the energy, understanding and help of the host country’s delegation—to bring me down here from my office there. The people who were chanting hate-filled songs and slogans against Turkey were not Greeks **living** in Cyprus, nor Greeks living in Greece. They were, some of them, Greeks who had lived for many generations in this country.

205. The other day I read in *the Herald Tribune* an article about Greeks from -somewhere in Cyprus who have been in the United States for the past 30 or 40 years and therefore have nothing **to** do with events in Cyprus. They were in the United States long before Cyprus acquired independence. They were bombarding the Government of the United States, their Senators and Congressmen with letters concerning their feelings about Turks in general and Turks in Cyprus in particular, and those letters were not all full of love.

206. These are facts. I have mentioned the page in *The New York Times* of today. I must say that I thank Mr. Carayannis for having so easily and with such good pronunciation used the word “**Istanbul**”, but I am obliged to observe that the declaration of Greek elements in this country—and it is, as I have said, one of many, one of hundreds and thousands—does not use the word “Istanbul”. It refers to “Constantinople” and “Asia Minor” and is full of stories concerning misdeeds and massacres by Turks in “Asia Minor” and in “Constantinople”. One question that immediately comes to mind is what were the Greeks doing in Asia Minor?

207. I am grateful to the representative of Saudi Arabia for having given a more objective version of certain incidents in his speech of yesterday on this subject [*see 1816th meeting*].

208. As proof of how much the Greeks love the Turks, the representative of Greece has told me there are now more Turks than there used to be **some**

time ago in northern Greece. Those Turks are in a minority and the problem of minorities is one of the problems between Greece and Turkey, a sorry problem; it is one of the areas in which our respective Governments have perhaps both in the past and in the present committed errors. But this is a very, very sorry situation when it comes to the status of the Turkish minority in northern Greece. Their number does not decrease. I suppose that is because these people are bound to the soil; they are peasants mostly, in contrast to the much more mobile Greek elements, who are usually people whose assets can be transferred **from** one country to another very easily.

209. I do not want to prolong the futile exercise of bickering on this question. The main problem of Cyprus is a more serious matter than that.

210. On one point, there has been mention of the consular offices, as they are called, that have been established in various places. Now my information is that they have always existed in various places—in London, for instance, and in Germany, I believe, and in other places; certainly one is needed in the United States—where there is a great concentration of Turkish Cypriots who have always over the years had the greatest difficulty in obtaining passports, documents and birth certificates. The question of birth certificates has always been a problem for the Turks, even in Cyprus itself. It is part of a campaign of harassment against them.

211. I have had occasion to explain how a Turk could obtain a passport in Cyprus. Only if it was certain that he would never come back to Cyprus was a passport granted to him. I suppose that these consular **offices** to which reference has been made will help to overcome that kind of problem. But these are certainly not consulates in the sense that word has in international law. And need I repeat that we have never asked, and I do not think the Turkish Cypriots have ever asked, that the Federal State that has been established should be **recognized**.

212. I shall confine myself to those observations this evening. I hope that I shall not have to revert to this kind of issue. All of us who have spoken this afternoon in exercise of the right of reply will, unfortunately, have many other occasions to say many things round this table. But, Mr. President, I crave your indulgence, as I have done before, to give an opportunity, when the time comes, to the one Turk here who knows the real situation much better than anyone else—that is, the representative of the Turkish Cypriots—to answer some of **the** questions raised during the debate today.

213. The PRESIDENT (*translation from Chinese*): I now call on the representative of Greece to speak in exercise of his right of reply.

214. Mr. CARAYANNIS (Greece): I appreciate Mr. Olcay's sentiments about me personally, and I

can assure him that I have exactly the same sentiments about him.

215. Having said that, I should like to make the following observation. We are faced with an avalanche of arguments. I of course have the same difficulty **as** the representative of Turkey in taking notes on **all** these arguments. I shall therefore have to reserve **my right** to reply, if necessary, at a later stage to each one of Mr. Olcay's arguments. There are, however, some points to which I must reply now, but I shall not take up much of the Council's time.

216. So far as invasion is concerned, would **Mr.** Olcay be satisfied if we said that we had also invaded Cyprus, but without killing people or raping girls?

217. In the course of his statement Mr. Olcay asked: what were the Greeks doing in Asia Minor? Well, I might ask: what were the Turks doing in Greece for five centuries?

218. Mr. Olcay said, too, that minorities present problems. Minorities present problems everywhere; that *is* true. The difficulty is that Turkey has in mind a very simplistic solution to the problem of minorities: eliminate them. That is Turkey's solution. That is exactly the point I was making.

219. So far as hatred is concerned, I still insist that all the evidence the representative of Turkey gave us with regard to Greek hatred was verbal evidence, and all the evidence I gave on this subject was factual evidence.

220. The PRESIDENT (*translation from Chinese*): Now, having heard the lengthy so-called reply by Mr. Malik, I consider it necessary to say a few brief words in the name of the delegation of CHINA.

221. Mr. Malik's reply just now is a distortion of and a slanderous attack on the stand of the Chinese delegation. He has even attempted to sow discord in the relations between the Chinese and the Cypriot peoples. This is utterly futile. China is not, and will never be, a super-Power which subjects other countries to aggression, intervention and control. China's stand on the Cyprus question, as on all other major **international** issues, has been consistent and open and above-board. We seek **no** selfish interests whatsoever. In the interests of the Cypriot people, we have always held that the question of Cyprus should be settled by the Cypriot people themselves through peaceful negotiations free from outside interference, particularly from super-Power meddling. For only thus 'will it be possible to achieve a truly reasonable solution. As in the case of all other regions in the world where are super-Power intervention and **contention**, there is turbulence, the issues there can only **become** more complicated, the situation more tense **and** the efforts for a reasonable solution more

difficult. This has become a law which people have derived from their own experience.

222. It is an objective fact that the two super-Powers, the Soviet Union and the United States, are engaged in fierce contention throughout the world. This is not anybody's invention. The record of expansion and aggression committed by the Soviet Government in recent years in all parts of the world cannot be obliterated. It is crystal clear for the people of the world to see.

223. As for the Soviet Government's performance on the **Cyprus** question, it is all too evident as well. You have tried by every possible means to exploit the contradictions and exacerbate the dispute for fear of an early agreement between the two communities, which would deprive you of an opportunity for meddling and intervention. Your advertised proposal for a so-called international conference with the participation of the five permanent members of the Council is aimed at enabling you to poke your nose in for direct intervention. The facts are very clear. No amount of flowery words can cover up your real motive, which is further to complicate and exacerbate the situation, so that you can fish in troubled waters, contend with the other super-Power for hegemony over the Mediterranean and thus realize the old

Tsar's dream of controlling this area and then attaining world hegemony. The more you resort to sophistry, the more clearly you reveal yourselves. In face of the daily awakening people of the world, these tactics on your part are of no avail and will not succeed.

224. Speaking as PRESIDENT, I now call on the representative of the Soviet Union.

225. Mr. MALIK (**Union of Soviet Socialist Republics**) (*translation from Russian*): The Chinese representative has added nothing new to his earlier anti-Soviet fabrications and slander. But I have already responded to **all** that, and I do not consider it necessary to repeat myself and prolong the meeting of the Security Council.

226. In response to his further fabrications, I would only say that the Soviet Union **sacrificed** 20 million lives and saved the world, mankind and China from the domination of fascism and militarism.

The meeting rose at 7.15 p.m.

Notes

¹ See **Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-ninth Session, Plenary Meetings, 224 1 st meeting.**

كيفية الحصول على منشورات الأمم المتحدة

يمكن الحصول على منشورات الأمم المتحدة من المكتبات ودور التوزيع في جميع أنحاء العالم - استلم منها من المكتبة التي تتعامل معها أو اكتب إلى : الأمم المتحدة ، قسم البيع في نيويورك أو في جنيف .

如何购取联合国出版物

联合国出版物在全世界各地的书店和经售处均有发售。请向书店询问或写信到纽约或日内瓦的联合国销售组。

HOW TO OBTAIN UNITED NATIONS PUBLICATIONS

United Nations publications may be obtained from bookstores and distributors throughout the world. Consult your bookstore or write to: United Nations, Sales Section, New York or Geneva.

COMMENT SE PROCURER LES PUBLICATIONS DES NATIONS UNIES

Les publications des Nations Unies sont en vente dans les librairies et les agences dépositaires du monde entier. Informez-vous auprès de votre libraire ou adressez-vous à : Nations Unies, Section des ventes, New York ou Genève.

КАК ПОЛУЧИТЬ ИЗДАНИЯ ОРГАНИЗАЦИИ ОБЪЕДИНЕННЫХ НАЦИЙ

Издания Организации Объединенных Наций можно купить в книжных магазинах и агентствах во всех районах мира. Наводите справки об изданиях в вашем книжном магазине или пишите по адресу: Организация Объединенных Наций, Секция по продаже изданий, Нью-Йорк или Женева.

COMO CONSEGUIR PUBLICACIONES DE LAS NACIONES UNIDAS

Las publicaciones de las Naciones Unidas están en venta en librerías y casas distribuidoras en todas partes del mundo. Consulte a su librero o diríjase a: Naciones Unidas, Sección de Ventas, Nueva York o Ginebra.
