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NOTE

Symbols of United Nations documents are composed of capital letters combined with figures. Mention of such a symbol indicates a reference to a United Nations document.

Documents of the Security Council (symbol S/ . . .) are normally published in quarterly *Supplements* of the *Official Records of the Security Council*. The date of the document indicates the supplement in which it appears or in which information about it is given.

The resolutions of the Security Council, numbered in accordance with a system adopted in 1964, are published in yearly volumes of *Resolutions and Decisions of the Security Council*. The new system, which has been applied retroactively to resolutions adopted before 1 January 1965, became fully operative on that date.

SEVENTEEN HUNDRED AND NINETY-SECOND MEETING

Held in New York on Wednesday, 14 August 1974, at 2 a.m.

President: Mr. Yakov A. MALIK
(Union of Soviet Socialist Republics).

Present: The representatives of the following States: Australia, Austria, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, China, Costa Rica, France, Indonesia, Iraq, Kenya, Mauritania, Peru, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Cameroon and United States of America.

Provisional agenda (S/Agenda/1792)

1. Adoption of the agenda
2. The situation in Cyprus:
 - (a) Letter dated 16 July 1974 from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council (S/11334);
 - (b) Letter dated 16 July 1974 from the Permanent Representative of Cyprus to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/11335);
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 - (f) Letter dated 13 August 1974 from the Permanent Representative of Greece to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/11445)

The meeting was called to order at 3.25 a.m.

Adoption of the agenda

The agenda was adopted.

The situation in Cyprus:

- (a) Letter dated 16 July 1974 from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council (S/11334);

- (b) Letter dated 16 July 1974 from the Permanent Representative of Cyprus to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/11335);
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- (f) Letter dated 13 August 1974 from the Permanent Representative of Greece to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/11445)

1. The PRESIDENT (*translation from Russian*): In accordance with decisions taken by the Council at previous meetings [1779th-1781st meetings], I intend, with the consent of the Council, to invite the representatives of Cyprus, Turkey, Greece, Yugoslavia, Romania, India and Mauritius to participate, without the right to vote, in the Council's consideration of the question of the situation in Cyprus.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Rossides (Cyprus), Mr. Olcay (Turkey) and Mr. Carayannis (Greece) took places at the Council table.

2. The PRESIDENT (*translation from Russian*): In view of the limited number of places available at the Council table, I propose to invite the representatives of Yugoslavia, Romania, India and Mauritius to take the places reserved for them at the side of the Council chamber, on the understanding that they will be invited to take a place at the Council table when it is their turn to make a statement.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Job (Yugoslavia) and Mr. Jaipal (India) took the places reserved for them at the side of the Council chamber.

3. The PRESIDENT (*translation from Russian*): As members of the Security Council have already been informed, this urgent meeting of the Council has been convened at such a late hour at the request

of the representatives of Cyprus, Greece and the United Kingdom in connexion with the recent events occurring in Cyprus.

4. I should like to draw the attention of the members to the following documents which have been circulated today: document S/11444, containing the text of a letter dated 13 August from the representative of Cyprus to the President of the Security Council; document S/11445, containing the text of a letter dated 13 August from the Permanent Representative of Greece to the President of the Security Council; document S/11446, containing the text of a draft resolution submitted by the United Kingdom. Before the convening of this meeting, during consultations with the Council members, a revised version of this draft resolution was agreed upon which has been circulated in document S/11446/Rev.1.

5. In view of the need for the prompt adoption of a draft resolution on this item as a result of the situation in Cyprus and in connexion with the events relating to the Cyprus question, I understand that the members of the Council are ready to vote on the English text of the draft resolution, without waiting for it to be translated into the other official working languages of the Council.

6. In accordance with the afore-mentioned understanding I intend, if there is no objection, to put draft resolution S/11446/Rev.1 to the vote now.

A vote was taken by show of hands.

The draft resolution was adopted unanimously.¹

7. The PRESIDENT (*translation from Russian*): The Security Council will now hear those representatives who have indicated a desire to speak after the vote.

8. Mr. RICHARD (United Kingdom): It is almost exactly two weeks since the Security Council last met on Cyprus [1789th meeting] and adopted resolution 355 (1974). I make no apology, Mr. President, for having been one of those instrumental in summoning the Security Council to a meeting, even though it is now 3.35 in the morning. I did so because it seemed to my delegation and my Government important that there should be a firm, a clear, unambiguous and a speedy resolution adopted by the Council expressing its view upon the events that have taken place in Cyprus and in Geneva in the last few days.

9. I do not want tonight to raise the temperature more than is perhaps necessary. I certainly do not wish to say anything which would exacerbate a situation which is already grave. But members of the Council will know that fighting has restarted in Cyprus

itself, and members will know that that fighting seems to be serve.

10. It will be recalled that resolution 355 (1974) requested the Secretary-General to take appropriate action in the light of his statement to the Council which, among other things, reported the Declaration by the Foreign Ministers of Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom at the conclusion of the first Geneva conference [see S/11398]. That Declaration envisaged a continuing role for the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP), taking account of the new situation which had then arisen. The Declaration was seen by my Government, and I think after analysis by the Council as a whole, as a first step towards the full implementation of Council resolution 353 (1974). And may I reiterate, if it needs reiteration, that the Government of the United Kingdom regards resolution 353 (1974) as the basis upon which any lasting settlement in Cyprus has to be seen.

11. Since the passage of resolution 355 (1974), the Secretary-General has reported developments to the Council at regular intervals, and in particular he submitted an interim report on 10 August [S/11433]. The work which was envisaged for UNFICYP by the Geneva Declaration under its paragraph 3 (a), namely, the establishment of a security zone at the limit of the areas occupied by the Turkish armed forces, got off to a slow start. The first task, as we saw it, was to try to establish a cease-fire line that would be accepted by all parties. The work was, if I use a neutral phrase, hampered by alterations in troop dispositions, even while the process of demarcation was continuing. However, by 8 August a *de facto* cease-fire line had been agreed, subject to a number of reservations, even though it could not be held in every respect to be the line obtaining at the time of the signature of the Geneva Declaration on 30 July.

12. One difficulty in securing acceptance of the cease-fire line was the contention that the recommendations in paragraph 3 of the Geneva Declaration should be implemented as a whole and that insufficient progress was being made on paragraph 3 (b), namely the evacuation of the Turkish enclaves by Greek or Greek Cypriot forces.

13. It was against this background and in this atmosphere that the Geneva conference resumed on 8 August. As a first step, the Foreign Ministers of Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom instructed officials to report on the problems of the exchange of prisoners, the demarcation of the cease-fire line and the evacuation of Turkish Cypriot villages. The Secretary-General's representative was invited to participate as an observer at that initial meeting and in subsequent plenary meetings.

14. There then followed a series of bilateral consultations, which included the representatives of

¹ See resolution 357 (1974).

Cyprus. It emerged from these consultations that Turkey was pressing for the principle that there should be two autonomous administrative regions in a united Cyprus. The United Kingdom representative made it clear that he would explain, but would not advocate, these ideas to Mr. Clerides, but only on the basis that the Turkish Government did not intend to expand the areas occupied by Turkish forces, and on the understanding that there would have to be a clear commitment on the withdrawal of Turkish troops. This proposal caused grave difficulties for the Greek Cypriot representatives. The Foreign Secretary of the United Kingdom made it clear in those exchanges that future constitutional questions of this nature were essentially for the Cypriot people themselves to decide.

15. On the evening of 10 August it was possible to hold a meeting with the representatives of Cyprus as well as the three Foreign Ministers. No decisions were reached, but it was agreed that Mr. Clerides and Mr. Denktas would continue the discussions between themselves.

16. The following day it was announced that the National Guard would evacuate a number of Turkish villages which were occupied or surrounded by it. The Greek Cypriot authorities also agreed to release a number of Turkish prisoners.

17. During the following two days, discussions continued on possible new constitutional arrangements, either of a cantonal nature or based on two autonomous areas under one unitary State. In the latter stages of the conference, however, the Turkish representative tabled proposals for a clearly defined Turkish Cypriot zone covering 34 per cent of the island, together with a demand for a constructive reply to these proposals within a short deadline. I regret to say that attempts to secure an extension of this deadline for consideration of this proposal and of counter-proposals submitted by Mr. Clerides met with no success at all. The Greek Cypriot counter-proposal conceded administrative autonomy and some grouping of Turkish villages but excluded the possibility of a geographical zone or of population movements. Against that background, the final meeting searching for a way out of the deadlock lasted for seven hours yesterday. This was unsuccessful, and the conference broke down at 2.15 a.m. Geneva time today, 14 August.

18. At the conclusion of the conference Mr. Clerides stressed that he did not reject the Turkish proposals and was prepared to consider them with an open mind if he were allowed 48 hours. The Turkish representatives were unable to agree to that request. The conference, therefore, dispersed, but the Greek, the Greek Cypriot and the United Kingdom delegations expressed their willingness to return tomorrow, Thursday, and the Turkish Cypriot representative expressed similar willingness if the Turkish Govern-

ment also agreed. It is a matter of profound regret to my delegation and to my country that a request for an adjournment of that nature could not in fact be conceded by the Turkish representatives at Geneva and that hostilities have now been recommenced.

19. In the afore-mentioned circumstances we thought that it was right to seek an urgent meeting of the Council and to put on record how the conference has failed. We wish to stress that diplomatic means of resolving this problem have not been exhausted, and for that reason I hope I have been studied in my approach this evening and moderate in my language. I also wish to express the hope that negotiations may be resumed at a very early date, if possible on Thursday. As I have already indicated, my Government, the Greek Government and the Greek Cypriot Government²—and, I understand, even the Turkish Cypriot community—would be prepared to accept this.

20. With that object in view, my delegation submitted the draft resolution that has now been adopted by all the members of the Council.

21. I would appeal to the Government of Turkey to stop the fighting in Cyprus. I would appeal to it to make a reality of resolution 353 (1974), which it has accepted. It is not possible for this Council or for any set of negotiators to solve the centuries-old enmity between Greece and Turkey and between Greek and Turk in a matter of days, but what we had hoped to achieve in Geneva and what we hoped the Security Council might help to achieve was that by resolving the problems of Cyprus we should find a way of at least lessening the enmity between those two nations.

22. Mr. MVOGO (United Republic of Cameroon) (*Interpretation from French*): My delegation voted in favour of the draft resolution that the Council has just adopted. This support means, first, that my delegation wishes to confirm the positive vote it cast at the time of the adoption of resolution 353 (1974). It means also that my Government firmly supports the principle of respect by all Member States for the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus. Finally, in voting for the draft resolution that the Council has just adopted my delegation expresses the hope that the Geneva negotiations on Cyprus will resume very shortly within the framework laid down by resolution 353 (1974), without overlooking the provisions of the present resolution.

23. The PRESIDENT (*translation from Russian*): I call on the representative of Greece.

² Subsequently, the United Kingdom delegation submitted a modification whereby the words "the Greek Cypriot Government" would be replaced by the words "the Greek Cypriots".

24. Mr. CARAYANNIS (Greece): As our last meeting on this item, we finished, I would not say on a tone of optimism as I am afraid that "optimism" is too big a word to apply to Cyprus, but anyway on a tone of hope. The Geneva Declaration was signed. Poor as it was in comparison with resolution 353 (1974), it nevertheless represented a first step towards the same goal and as such it was described around this table by most of the representatives. The Council had adopted a resolution giving a new mandate to the Secretary-General, enabling him to cope with the new situation and his new tasks.

25. At that meeting I expressed the hope that after those developments human lives would be spared in both camps. Since then, human lives have been lost in both camps, and more human lives are being lost at this very moment and will be lost in the days to come.

26. I see from the report of the Secretary-General [S/11353/Add.21] that among the casualties are five members of the Finnish contingent and four members of the British contingent, who have been wounded. I express the sympathy and gratitude of my Government to the representative of the United Kingdom and to the Government of Finland.

27. The prestige of the United Nations and the Security Council has suffered and will suffer.

28. I do not have to go into the details of the continuous Turkish violations and the step-by-step enlargement of the occupied territory. They are too many, and they have been fully reported by the world press. I feel I do not need to convince anybody. However, in spite of the tragedy of the moment, I must mention certain dates.

29. The invasion started in the early hours of 20 July, and, in the words of the representative of Turkey, it met with fierce resistance. Who offered the resistance? The National Guard, which is the name given to the army of Cyprus, helped by all Greek Cypriots who could carry arms and the 650 Greek officers who were there to train the National Guard. Those officers were incorporated in the National Guard. Everybody knew it. They had to fight alongside the Guard, and they did fight. And, by the way, I suppose that most of them have been killed.

30. There was a time when we had more troops in the island, always at the invitation of the Cyprus Government, and everybody will remember that, because of the continual Turkish threats, those troops were withdrawn after an arrangement with Turkey in 1967.

31. The fierce fighting, as my Turkish colleague called it, went on for two and a half days, and in

spite of the Security Council appeal for an immediate cease-fire on the first day of the invasion, a cease-fire was arranged after many delays and difficulties only on 22 July at 1400 hours Greenwich mean time. The Turkish Government accepted that cease-fire. In his letter to the Secretary-General of 22 July, the Prime Minister, Mr. Ecevit, wrote "Accordingly, necessary instructions are issued to the Turkish troops to cease fire effective as from 1400 hours GMT on 22 July." [See S/11356.] The Turkish Government deliberately did not implement the cease-fire, and the reason was that it wanted to occupy more territory.

32. A second cease-fire was signed in Geneva on 30 July, effective 2200 hours Geneva time. The fighting went on, as everybody in the world knows and as I myself informed the Council at its meeting of 31 July with respect to the Turkish attack against the villages of Lapithos and Karavas. Those villages have, of course, fallen since, and the Turkish forces are well west of them.

33. In any case, the overwhelming fact is that the territory held by Turkey at the date and time of the first cease-fire has tripled. I put that before the Council for its judgement, and I do not even have to prove it. Maps have been published not only in this country but all over the world, in all newspapers and in all magazines—maps in beautiful colours: different colours for the first cease-fire, different colours for the second cease-fire, different colours for today.

34. The expulsion of the Greek population from the occupied area went almost parallel with the expansion of the territory held by Turkey. Again, all this was fully reported all over the world, and I shall quote from the Secretary-General's report of 5 August:

"Most of the male population of the Greek Cypriot villages were taken prisoner and escorted by Turkish troops into the areas of Boghaz Geunyely and Orta Keuy. Some of the women and children of many villages were eventually told to leave their villages and to cross the lines into territory controlled by the National Guard. Others were transported, without their possessions, to Nicosia by bus and set free with instructions to cross the green line into the Greek Cypriot sector of the city." [S/11353/Add.15, para. 8 (b)]

If anybody had any doubt as to the Turkish intentions, I suppose he now has the proof. But even that proof is no longer needed. In Geneva, everything was said. There are no longer any doubts.

35. And so I come to the Geneva conference. My Government went to the first Geneva conference in conformity with resolution 353 (1974). It was the Security Council which sent my Government to Geneva. Its first preoccupation was to stop the fighting.

I do not think there is anything unusual in that. It has always been the practice, and especially so in the United Nations, first to stop fighting and then to start talking. We failed. From the very beginning, Turkey insisted on having all its demands accepted before it stopped fighting and occupying more territory. In any case, the result was the Geneva Declaration members have before them. Let us see what it says. In paragraph 1, it says that the parties

"recognized the importance of setting in train, as a matter of urgency, measures to adjust and to regularize within a reasonable period of time the situation in the Republic of Cyprus on a lasting basis, having regard to the international agreements signed at Nicosia on 16 August 1960 and to resolution 353 (1974) of the Security Council. They were, however, agreed on the need to decide first on certain immediate measures". [See S/11398.]

36. That means that the Declaration makes a clear distinction between measures which are urgent and measures which are immediate. The immediate measures on which there is a need to decide first—those are the actual words of the Declaration, and I emphasize the word "first"—are: first, the cease-fire; secondly, a security zone, the evacuation of Turkish enclaves, policing by UNFICYP of mixed villages and the exchange of prisoners and civilians. Then the Declaration deals with the urgent problem of finding a lasting solution acceptable to all parties.

37. What happened after the Declaration was signed is known by everybody, but I have some numbers members probably do not know. Thirty-five square kilometres inhabited by 11,000 people—mainly Greek Cypriots—were added to the territory occupied by the Turkish army on 30 July at 2200 hours.

38. I received a few hours ago an order of the Commander-in-Chief of the Turkish Army in Cyprus, dated 30 July, the day of the signing of the Declaration. This order had fallen into the hands of the Greek Cypriot army, and I shall read it out:

"28th Infantry Division Partisan Siklik, 3 July. Operation Order.

"1. Situation. Enemy position as discussed during briefing and indicated on the map.

"2. Mission: the 28th Division, having the objective of extending and ensuring the security of the area occupied, will attack on 30 July and occupy a line running from Hill 1023 west of Lapithos, Bassi, Sisklipos village."

39. It is a very long order and I am not going to read it all out. It says, "Necessary preparations will have to be made". All this was an order given to the Turkish soldiers on 30 July, the day the Geneva Declaration was signed.

40. My Government went to the second phase of the Geneva conference utterly shocked by such behaviour and only because it was determined not to leave unexplored the slightest hope of peace, no matter how small and doubtful it might be. The argument was advanced by the Turkish Government at the second Geneva conference that the package of the immediate measures to be taken must be implemented as a whole, and therefore the Turkish Army had to continue fighting and occupying territory because the National Guard of Cyprus had not evacuated the Turkish enclaves. The Cypriot Government had made it clear from the very beginning that it was ready to evacuate the enclaves and hand over the responsibility in an orderly way to UNFICYP. It was not expanding its holdings nor killing people. But you have to admit, Mr. President, that one has to stop doing something in order to start doing something else. The fighting had never stopped. When it did stop, at the beginning of the second Geneva conference, and a cease-fire line was finally drawn after interminable efforts by the Greek and United Kingdom delegations, the evacuation of the enclaves immediately started.

41. I read from paragraph 3 of the Secretary-General's report of 12 August:

"In the evening of 11 August, UNFICYP headquarters was informed by the National Guard that they were prepared to begin withdrawal from Turkish enclaves which had been occupied by 'Greek or Greek Cypriot forces'. The following Turkish Cypriot villages were evacuated Sunday evening: Alekhtora, Evdhimou, Ayios Thomas, and Plataniskia, all in Limassol district, and Mandria and Kouklia in Paphos district. On 12 August, the National Guard evacuated the Turkish sectors of Larnaca/Scala and Paphos/Ktima. In accordance with the role of UNFICYP pursuant to Security Council resolution 355 (1974), UNFICYP has assumed responsibility for the protection of those areas." [S/11353/Add.20.]

And all this before any arrangements were made on the security zone, even before any decisions were taken on how the supervision of this buffer zone would operate—the arrangements and decisions envisaged in subparagraph 3 (a) of the Geneva Declaration as immediate measures.

42. Another reason which made by Foreign Minister decide to attend the second Geneva conference in spite of the Turkish bad faith was his belief that it was urgent to take measures for the exchange of prisoners, military and civilian, and of the numerous Greek Cypriots in the Turkish occupation zone. It is astonishing, and characteristic of the Turkish methods and intentions, that, after imposing all possible measures of protection for the Turks in the non-occupied parts of the island, including the keeping of order by Turkish Cypriot police, Turkey

still refuses to allow any activity other than relief to the UNFICYP troops in the occupied territory.

43. Allow me to refer to the interim report of the Secretary-General of 10 August. It deals almost exclusively with the UNFICYP activities in the non-occupied part of the island; there is only one paragraph for the Turkish-controlled area, namely, paragraph 17, which reads as follows:

“Within the Turkish-controlled area, UNFICYP activities are centred on humanitarian and relief measures in Kyrenia and certain surrounding villages, especially Bellapais. These activities include the delivery of food to a considerable number of small isolated groups.” [S/11433.]

44. This situation is unbelievable, and it is unacceptable to my Government. The Turkish authorities have even refused to allow 500 women, children and old men to return to their homes in the occupied zone.

45. I now come to the search for a lasting settlement in the island. This is the most interesting, the most unbelievable and the most shocking part of the conference. It started when the three participants became five with the addition of representatives of the Cypriot Government and of the Turkish Cypriots. The Turkish Foreign Minister proposed the division of the island into separate geographical zones and demanded that a decision be taken for any constitutional negotiations to be based on this principle. The Acting President of Cyprus and the Greek Foreign Minister remarked that Cyprus was an independent and sovereign country, a Member of the United Nations, and that it was not up to the Geneva conference to dictate its constitution to Cyprus. The United Kingdom Foreign Minister declared that the United Kingdom did not feel that it had any right to interfere in the constitutional problem of Cyprus. We tried to suggest that if Turkey invaded Cyprus to protect its Constitution, as the Turkish Government contends, it did, it would then be only reasonable to take the Constitution as it is, the Constitution based on the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee³ referred to in the Geneva Declaration, eventually accept whatever modifications had been accepted up to this time by both parties, and try to agree on other modifications that would make it more practical under the present circumstances. That was flatly rejected.

46. Now I would like to make a point here. We have never accepted that the Treaty of Guarantee gives Turkey the right to invade Cyprus for whatever reason, and I do not think that there are many in the United Nations who accept this predominance of a treaty over the Charter. But if we were to accept for a moment this un-United Nations—if

I may call it that—mentality, I think it should be obvious that the right of invasion is granted in order to bring things back to constitutional legality. If the intention is to change the Constitution and divide the island and move masses of the population, then I would humbly submit that the Turkish Army is not legally on the island, not even on the basis of the Turkish interpretation of the Treaty of Guarantee. It is occupying the territory of a State Member of the United Nations illegally, even by Turkish standards, because by our standards the action is illegal anyway.

47. In spite of all this, the Geneva conference started yesterday examining constitutional proposals under the Turkish threat that if the Turkish conception of geographical partition was not accepted military operations would resume in the island. This is the precise reason why the buffer zone has not been accepted until this moment in spite of the fact that, in accordance with the Geneva Declaration, it was one of the immediate measures to be taken, right after the cease-fire, because the road to further advance should remain open to the Turkish Army.

48. Let us have a look at the different proposals. I quote from the Turkish Cypriot proposal:

“The Republic of Cyprus shall be an independent binational State. The Republic shall be composed of two federated States with full control and autonomy within their respective geographical boundaries. The area of the Turkish Cypriot State shall cover 34 per cent of the territory of the Republic falling north of the general line starting from Lefka and going through Nicosia to Famagusta.”

This was, of course, rejected.

49. You may ask why 34 per cent of the territory? The Turks are only 18 per cent of the population. I have the answer. Because the Turkish army is there.

50. Mr. Clerides was drafting his counter-proposal when the Turkish Foreign Minister came out with a proposal of his own, not from Cyprus but from the mother country. This is the Turkish proposal:

“The Republic shall comprise two autonomous zones, one Turkish and the other Greek. The Greek Cypriot zone shall be composed of two districts. The area of the autonomous Turkish Cypriot zone will be equivalent to approximately 34 per cent of the territory of the Republic.”
—The word “approximately” is here—“The Administration of each of the autonomous zones shall have complete control over its geographical area.”⁴

This was on the basis of take it or leave it, until midnight. Some more time was finally, and with

³ United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 382, p. 3.

⁴ Quoted in French by the speaker.

much difficulty, arranged and the latest proposals came out. I am quoting from Clerides' proposal:

"The constitutional order of Cyprus shall retain its bi-communal character based on the coexistence of the Greek and Turkish communities within the framework of a sovereign, independent and integral republic. The coexistence of the two communities shall be achieved in the context of institutional arrangements regarding an agreed allocation of powers and functions between the central government having competence over State affairs and the respective autonomous communal administrations exercising their powers on all other matters within areas to be established as in paragraph 5 herein-below. The Greek and Turkish communal administrations shall exercise their powers and functions in areas consisting respectively of the purely Greek and Turkish villages and municipalities. For the purpose of communal administration, such villages and municipalities may be grouped together by the respective communal authorities. For the same purpose, mixed villages shall come under the communal authority of the community to which the majority of their inhabitants belong. Legislative authority over the respective communal administrations shall be exercised by the Greek and Turkish members of the House of Representatives constituted in separate councils for this purpose."

It will up to the Council to decide which of the three projects is closest to resolution 353 (1974). It may possibly find even Mr. Clerides' project far away from it.

51. The Government of Cyprus was not able to accept the Turkish constitutional proposals in Geneva. The Government of Greece takes the attitude that no sovereign, independent State could accept such proposals at gun point from an outside country. It will be up to each Member of the United Nations to take a position on this issue. The situation is extremely serious. For Cyprus itself it is dramatic. For the United Nations it calls for a reappraisal of its fundamental purposes.

52. The Group of Non-Aligned Countries at the United Nations issued a declaration the other day. I quote from that declaration:

"The tragic situation of Cyprus is a grave warning to all non-aligned countries and calls for their united action. The threat to the independence and security of one non-aligned country is a threat to the security of all of them."

I, for my part, would agree.

53. As Greece and Turkey are the two countries most closely connected with Cyprus I should like to close by referring to clear written indications of the

positions of the two respective Governments. I quote from the declaration of the Greek Government of 6 August:

"Greece is in favour of the maintenance of the independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and unity of Cyprus. The above-mentioned elements would allow the Cyprus State to continue its non-aligned policies. Furthermore, the Greek Government is in favour of the demilitarization of the Republic of Cyprus inasmuch as the concentration and accumulation of armed forces in the island will result in the annihilation of the international entity of Cyprus. Greece feels that the first urgent step to be taken to this effect is the withdrawal of the Turkish forces which invaded Cyprus. This will enable Greece to withdraw all Greece officers and other military personnel presently in the island in conformity with Security Council resolution 353 (1974). It is Greece's position that resolution 353 (1974) must be implemented in all its provisions and as soon as possible."

And I repeat, that we are ready to take out of Cyprus the Greek officers and any other military personnel in the island any time, together with the Turkish army.

54. I now quote from *The Washington Post* of 11 August. It is a telegram from Ankara:

"In Ankara a high Government official said that Turkey is determined to press for acceptance of its plan for a Cyprus solution even at the cost of renewed fighting on the island. 'There will not be a third round of Geneva talks', said the official. 'We will get peace, either in Geneva talking, or in Cyprus fighting'."

55. We all know a bit of history, and we all know what is meant by gunpoint diplomacy. Those of us who are old enough can remember Hitler and Munich. We had hoped they were past experiences. I will not go into the final hours of the Geneva conference, as I think they were very plainly explained by the representative of the United Kingdom. As a matter of fact, what Mr. Clerides said was: "Give me time to consider your proposal". But it was not possible; time was not given; and fighting is going on.

56. Mr. LECOMPT (France) (*Interpretation from French*): The failure, which we hope is only temporary, of the negotiations in Geneva has led the delegations of Greece, Cyprus and the United Kingdom to request the urgent meeting of the Council.

57. Even before we had enough time to meet, the Turkish Air Force had bombed certain targets, particularly Nicosia, causing many casualties and wounding nine soldiers of the United Nations Force. This was reported to us two hours ago in a report of

the Secretary-General, which emphasized once again, if that were necessary, the seriousness of the situation which is threatening peace and security in the eastern Mediterranean.

58. By this time tomorrow—now, even at this very moment—the war could spread over Cyprus and once again affect populations which have already been seriously harmed. Aware of the dramatic nature of this situation, the nine countries of the European Economic Community met yesterday evening while negotiations were still continuing; they decided to make a new and pressing approach the Governments of Ankara and Athens.

59. As I speak, I do not know whether that approach was made in both capitals. It was essentially a solemn appeal to the two parties to pursue the course of negotiation, to the exclusion of any other means. The nine countries, the text adds, feel that they must give both parties a most solemn warning of the responsibilities that would be incurred in the eyes of the European Community by the one that resorted to military action at the risk of starting a conflict, with incalculable consequences.

60. Speaking now on behalf of my Government, I would say that we sincerely deplore the excessive haste with which the Turkish Government interrupted last evening's negotiations, and particularly the military action which the Turkish forces have just begun. War is not the way to solve the difficult problems separating the two communities on Cyprus. On the contrary, it can only complicate and delay a solution, without any of the parties concerned finally being able to gain the least benefit.

61. Here I must recall the rule that as long as negotiations are acceptable to one of the partners—and the request for a 36-hour postponement was not a refusal to negotiate—the other should abstain from making it impossible to carry on the negotiations. Also I must concur with the urgent appeal which our colleague from the United Kingdom addressed a few moments ago to the Turkish Government.

62. However for the time being, the Council, which has the major responsibility for peace, the maintenance of world had to act. I had at least to require full implementation of resolutions 353 (1974) and 354 (1974) and, particularly, respect of the cease-fire throughout the island—in other words, an end to the fighting which is how going on. It had also urgently to appeal to the parties to resume negotiations without delay; and, in conclusion, it had to state that it would remain seized of the situation. This has been done, and I hope its appeal will be heeded.

63. Mr. SCALI (United States of America): My delegation deeply regrets that almost a month after the adoption of resolution 353 (1974) we have found it necessary to meet once again in this hall to consider

new steps to end the violence on the island of Cyprus. We regret this all the more because this return of violence was so unnecessary. Promising negotiations had been going forward in Geneva pursuant to resolution 353 (1974) and in keeping with the Charter of the United Nations and the Treaty of Guarantee establishing the State of Cyprus. But, unhappily, in the absence of a conciliatory spirit at the conference table, those negotiations have been interrupted and the guns of war are speaking again.

64. The United States is convinced that only through such negotiations can a settlement emerge which will restore constitutional government to Cyprus and peace and stability in the eastern Mediterranean.

65. As the Council is aware, the United States has lent its total support to this process. My Government did this because of its close relations with its allies, Greece and Turkey, because of its commitment to the independence and territorial integrity of Cyprus, because of its concern for the welfare of the Cypriot people of both communities and, also, but not least, because of its overriding concern for peace in the area.

66. We have given our full support to the valiant and tireless efforts of the United Kingdom, a guarantor Power under the London-Zurich agreements, to bring about a measure of common understanding at Geneva which would point the way towards a new constitutional arrangement in Cyprus which takes into account the new realities. In this role we have been in constant touch with all of the parties so as to do whatever we could to encourage the negotiating process.

67. The United States has taken heart from the restoration of constitutional government in Greece, so ably led by Prime Minister Caramanlis. The Greek Government has pursued with diligence the search for arrangements to restore constitutional government in Cyprus. As a guarantor Power, Greece has legitimate interests which must be fully recognized.

68. We also pay a tribute to the people of Cyprus, of both communities, who have endured many hardships in the past month.

69. The Acting President of Cyprus, Mr. Clerides, and the Turkish Vice-President, Mr. Denktas, have both made major contributions in this complicated process of negotiation.

70. Turkey also has legitimate interests which must be fully recognized. My Government made clear yesterday in a public statement its view that the position of the Turkish community on Cyprus requires considerable improvement and protection, as well as a greater degree of autonomy.

71. My Government considers that it is the duty of the Council to do everything in keeping with resolu-

tion 353 (1974) to aid in bringing the parties back to the negotiating table. It is only at that table that a consensus can emerge leading to a settlement which will be satisfactory to all the parties and which will bring peace and stability once again to that area.

72. The duty of the Council is simply this: we must call for an immediate end to the fighting and we must call for the earliest resumption of negotiations. My Government pledges that it will continue its own efforts towards the end that the voice of reason will again be heard and the voice of the cannons will once more be stilled.

73. The PRESIDENT (*translation from Russian*): I call on the representative of Cyprus.

74. Mr. ROSSIDES (Cyprus): The situation in Cyprus—and it is Cyprus which is really the suffering party—is very critical. It is a situation that goes beyond mere words. The salient fact—apart from all the other aspects—is that we have in Cyprus at the present moment a Power with a military force of some 40,000 men, a Power which by reason of its membership of a strong military alliance possesses the means to attack a small, undefended, unassisted country, a country that is independent, a country that is a Member of the United Nations, a country that is entitled to all the rights of independence, freedom and territorial integrity, a country that has the right of protection under the Charter, which provides that force shall not be used by one State against another.

75. If we examine all the circumstances, we see that the situation in Cyprus today is not merely comparable but almost identical to the situation before the Second World War of a small country that was attacked on exactly the same grounds: the protection of a minority. Everyone knows that those grounds were merely a pretext for destroying that country and its independence. Any encyclopedia—again I must turn to an encyclopedia—will show the real purposes that Hitlerite Germany had in mind when it purported to be protecting the rights of the German minority in Czechoslovakia. At that time the big Powers found it more convenient not to oppose the aggressor—despite the fact that under the Covenant of the League of Nations it was their obligation to protect that small country. But they preferred to trifle with the rights of a small country in order to appease the aggressor. For many reasons they found it more convenient to side with the aggressor than with the victim.

76. But there is in the very structure of the cosmos a power that is called the moral power: crime and retribution. In the case of the abandonment of the small country to which I have just referred, the retribution did come—but it fell on all mankind, through the Second World War.

77. The situation in Cyprus today is a symbol. However small Cyprus is, it is the symbol of the breakdown of whatever international legal order and security exist. Otherwise, it could not have been accepted that this country could be pounded from the air in a war that has now lasted for over two weeks.

78. Every cruel means of war has been used, including napalm bombs. Turkey has been in command of the air. There has been no other Power disputing Turkey's domination of the air and the seas. Cyprus has no fleet, no air force, and no anti-aircraft guns. Would anyone have thought it possible that the international community would stand and watch this crime being committed, without turning a hair? That would have seemed unimaginable, particularly in the present age, the age of the United Nations, the age of the Charter. It is true that the League of Nations had a Covenant, but that Covenant contained no principles; it was merely an arrangement for keeping the peace. At that time war had not been prohibited; war was still considered a normal process. The Charter brought the change that war was to be treated as a crime and that force was not to be used by one country against another except in the exercise of self-defence. Therefore, under the Charter Turkey is committing a crime, because it is not acting in self-defence but in naked aggression.

79. We have been striving for so many years to find a definition of aggression. Well, here it is; this is the picture of aggression. Could this be described as anything else but direct aggression?

80. Under paragraph 5 of resolution 353 (1974), a conference was to be held, and indeed it was held. But there are four paragraphs that precede paragraph 5 of that resolution, namely the paragraph that called on Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom to enter into negotiations for the restoration of peace in the area and constitutional government in Cyprus. What did those four other paragraphs provide for? First, there is the paragraph calling upon all States to respect the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Cyprus. Turkey is supposedly one of the countries which is to enter into negotiations for the restoration of peace in the area and was one of the guarantors—the irony of the situation—of the independence, territorial integrity and security of Cyprus. Now that country is called upon, as is every other State, to respect the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Cyprus.

81. We do not have to go very far to see what the degree of respect Turkey has for the independence and territorial integrity of Cyprus—no farther than what is happening tonight, even if we forget everything else.

82. What is happening tonight? I have here before me a cable that reached me just a little while ago from

the Acting President of Cyprus, Glafcos Clerides, which states:

"Since 4.45 this morning, 14 August, Cyprus, of half a million population, is suffering without any provocation on its part, without any notice whatsoever, the cowardly attack by Turkey, a country of 36 million, by air, by sea and by land. You are requested to communicate to other Ambassadors and Governments and the United Nations and express the indignation of all the people and Government of Cyprus at this situation and ask for the assistance of all peace-loving countries."

83. What is the situation that unfolds before the Security Council out of this picture? Where are we? Are we in the days before the Second World War? Is there no Charter? What is the meaning of signing the Charter? What is the meaning of having a Charter? What is the meaning of having the United Nations and the Security Council if we have no respect for the principles of the Charter and if we have no human feeling when such a crime is committed in cold blood? I have no doubt that our very affable and smiling colleague, the representative of Turkey, will find many excuses for it. Surely he will have many excuses and many unproven stories. I can assure members that the Turkish Cypriots in Cyprus have had more rights than the Greek Cypriots have had. They have had freedom of movement all over the island when the Greek Cypriots were prevented by force by the Turkish Cypriots in the exercise of that right on over 100 public roads, including main communication roads. It is a strange thing that the 18 per cent minority has had such force as to prevent the majority from moving in the island, yet that is a fact. It has been commented on repeatedly by the Secretary-General in a number of his reports that the Turkish Cypriots could move everywhere—and I could easily quote the documents. Yet, in order not to create trouble and in order not to use force, there was no effort by the Government to free those public roads.

84. Were the Germans in Czechoslovakia suffering? Let us see what the encyclopaedia says about that: "They were by no means an oppressed minority, but Hitler, conforming to Nazi grand strategy, through Henlein, insisted they were". He actually and officially asked for autonomy for the Sudetens. It is the same thing. In Cyprus the Turkish Cypriot leadership is prompted by Turkey in the same way as Henlein was prompted by Hitler, seeking under the guise of autonomy to destroy the independence of Czechoslovakia. In this case it is for the destruction of the independence of Cyprus and for no other reason.

85. Turkey is not concerned with the welfare of the Turkish Cypriots. I can assure members it is not. It is only concerned with grabbing a part of Cyprus. That is the clear situation that we have to face. And it wants to grab it how? By partitioning it, and then

eventually annexing it. That is the programme that has existed and exists.

86. What we see today, therefore, is nothing less and nothing more than the continuation of that policy now having run amuck. As I said before, this is really bankruptcy with regard to the whole world—the bankruptcy of international legal order and security, but in this particular case it is also the bankruptcy of the so-called Treaty of Guarantee, because it is exposed by its reality, the bankruptcy of any idea that a guarantor is anything other than, as in the case of Turkey, an aggressor under the guise of a guarantor.

87. What is the Treaty of Guarantee? What does it say and how can this Treaty of Guarantee remain valid, with Turkey as a member when Turkey behaves in this way? The two other members may remain guarantors, but not Turkey. The Treaty of Guarantee clearly provides for the independence, territorial integrity and security of the Republic of Cyprus; it also provides that there should be no annexation or union with either Greece or Turkey or any other country, and no partition.

88. In the event of a breach of the provisions of that Treaty, the three guarantor countries undertake to consult together with respect to the representations or measures necessary to ensure observance of those provisions. We have not heard any invitation by Turkey to Greece and the United Kingdom to consider serious representations or measures to ensure observance of those provisions. Article IV of the Treaty says:

"In so far as common or concerted action may not prove possible, each of the three guaranteeing Powers reserves the right to take action, with the sole aim of re-establishing the state of affairs created by the present Treaty."

It speaks here of concerted action, and concerted action is explained in the same article as "measures necessary to ensure observance". If that concerted action may not prove possible—which means peaceful representation measures—then separate action is possible, but not violation of the Charter and such violations and aggression as would create the present situation. Therefore I submit that this Treaty of Guarantee has been torn to pieces by Turkey. Now, whether the other guarantors would like to take that torn Treaty of Guarantee and put the pieces together is another question, but Turkey has been not only the aggressor against Cyprus but also the aggressor against the Treaty of Guarantee. If the Treaty of Guarantee had been respected, we should not have seen the situation existing today—if it had been interpreted in its real sense of representations or other peaceful measures for re-establishing the situation, and not by the use of force and aggression in violation of the Charter.

89. At the present moment we have the resolution which was adopted today. The resolution, fortunately, in this case, provides what should have been provided in the previous cease-fire. In this resolution the Security Council not only reaffirms resolution 353 (1974) in all its provisions and demands that the parties to the present fighting cease all firing and military action forthwith, but also decides to remain seized of the situation and on instant call to meet as necessary to consider what more effective measures may be required if the cease-fire is not respected. That is what presents a hopeful situation. By that provision something practical must be done to enforce the cease-fire, because if it is not enforced the situation will be further aggravated—and will be perilous not only for Cyprus but for the whole world, for I am perfectly certain that in a world which accepts this situation there is very slender hope for peace or survival.

90. I want to say only a few words with regard to resolution 353 (1974), which is reaffirmed. Apart from the call for respect for the sovereignty of Cyprus, it calls for a cease-fire—a call which has not been respected—it demands an immediate end to foreign military intervention and it requests the withdrawal without delay of foreign military forces in Cyprus. Those four conditions should have been implemented wholly—or in part at least with regard to withdrawal—before the negotiations started. The parties should have gone to the negotiations with a cease-fire operating and with immediate cessation of intervention and then discussed the situation. But what happened? This is the other salient point in this situation. We have an enormous country destroying open cities in violation of all international legal order and The Hague Convention of 1907—bombing open towns and civilian populations. Not only that but we have had the other characteristic, again regrettably reminding us of Hitler and his tactics, of negotiating at gunpoint. It demands at gunpoint that its terms be accepted. What are the terms? To make a State within a State in Cyprus: something wholly unworkable and unacceptable; that State, the Turkish State, is to be 34 per cent of the total area, whereas the Turkish population is only 18 per cent. So that is another characteristic of the arrogant attitude of Turkey. It has insisted on both occasions to have negotiations at gunpoint, saying: "I will continue and intensify my aggression against Cyprus unless you accept my terms within so many hours"—24 or 36.

91. That is the situation that the Security Council has to meet effectively in the event that Turkey again does not comply.

92. The PRESIDENT (*translation from Russian*): I call on the representative of Turkey.

93. Mr. OLCAY (Turkey) (*interpretation from French*): I do not wish to deny the seriousness of the circumstances which have led the Security Council

to meet at such a late hour. It was with great reluctance that the representative of Turkey felt it necessary to halt the meetings in Geneva—and I use that word deliberately—talks not negotiations.

94. From the very beginning of the second stage it became apparent that the substantive problems which seemed to have been defined when the Declaration was adopted were interpreted in a way which was totally different by the signatories and later by those who had been invited to join in the negotiations. The autonomy which seemed to have been accepted even at that time—according to the description of the representative of the United Kingdom of his views of what occurred last week—apparently was not as clearly accepted as it had seemed from a perusal of the document which had been signed in Geneva. Who to believe and what to believe?

95. Reference has been made to the fact that all the diplomatic resources had not been exhausted. It seems that when one is at the end of a table where one is supposed to be sitting as a judge and one can resort to the subterfuge of last-minute delays it is easy to say that all diplomatic resources have not been exhausted. It is not the same when these negotiations have been going on, these diplomatic means being used for over a decade while the international community turned a deaf ear to the appeals of the community which was driven to despair in Cyprus—and I am speaking of the Turkish Cypriot community, no matter what was said by Mr. Rossides, who seems to have a much more optimistic view of the conditions in which that community was attempting to live.

96. One of the things that was already revealing in Geneva, and which remains so today, is the fact that, for example, the representative of the United Kingdom spoke—and I shall quote his words in his own language—of the "Greek Cypriot Government" and the "Turkish Cypriot community". If that is not a lapsus, it would seem to indicate a mentality that would explain, at least partially, the failure of the meetings in Geneva. And the fact that that was deliberately repeated by the representative of Greece confirms any doubts I might still have on that point.

97. The representative of Greece spoke of the Cypriot army. I should like to ask him some questions, but let me say I am not expecting an answer at this very late hour. What is the Cypriot army? On what basis was it established? In the breach of what agreements solemnly agreed to? In the violation of what Constitution that had already been cast to the ground and trampled upon? Was it the same Cypriot army of a country which is supposedly non-aligned of which a new Greek general from Athens has just been appointed commander by decree? I am saying all this to show you that the

problems of Cyprus were not discussed in Geneva. The problems of Cyprus are so deep! They sometimes stem from a philosophical approach to problem solving, and sometimes from a lack of political realism, but, also unfortunately, only too often, from a lack of good faith. I shall quote some examples.

98. The representative of Greece spoke of Greek villages in the Turkish occupied zone. The representative of Greece spoke of an occupied zone, of Turkish occupation, which, he said, had grown by leaps and bounds. I should like to ask him, whether the Turkish villages that were subjugated, destroyed and made uninhabitable do not take up any space in the Cypriot territory? Is the occupation of those villages not occupation because it is a Greek island at least in the eyes of the Greeks in Athens and in Cyprus? How many times, has the territory subjugated by the Greeks been expanded? Does geometry apply only when it is a question of Greeks and not when it is a question of Turks in Cyprus?

99. All this may explain why the Turkish negotiators in Geneva did not consider that all the shilly shallying and refusals to comply with the demands stipulated in the text accepted in Geneva—which I think all came from Greece of the Greeks in Cyprus—were unimportant and could be disregarded. They did not consider that the essence was the cease-fire, with which Turkey should comply—while the rest, of course, could wait. However that might be, the same Geneva Declaration referred—and this is what I have been leading up to—to the basic problem, which should be paramount because it is only on the basis of security that the settlement of the substantive issues might convince the Turks that it would really be possible to build a lasting peace in Cyprus and also to apply all the other provisions of the Geneva Declaration.

100. And now to return to what occurred in Geneva last week, this time I think the game was, on the one hand, non-application of the Geneva Declaration as a whole, and, on the other, refusal to discuss the substance. Mr. Clerides began by refusing to hold talks with the guarantor Powers as such, because his personal interpretation of the Declaration enabled him to adopt this deviant approach. And yet if Mr. Clerides was there, it was at the invitation of those Powers, it seems to me.

101. Mr. Clerides—unless it was the representative of Greece—requested a return to the 1960 agreement, which by the way implies that he had violated that agreement. But the Constitution can take it; whenever the violators of the Constitution find it to their advantage to do so, they revive it and it ceases to be a dead letter. However, in 1960 the Constitution included a number of provisions which, had they been applied—and I am only too willing to believe Mr. Rossides when he says the intention was to apply them in good faith—would have meant we

should not be in the situation in which we find ourselves today.

102. For 10 years, the Turkish representatives here tried to revive a system as similar as possible to that of 1960. Having failed on several occasions, and having reached the point of no return several times, those same representatives here and in Cyprus raised the question of a federal State, a State which would enable Cyprus to remain what the Turks always wanted it to remain, namely, a truly independent State, as opposed to a temporary solution pending union with the mother country or some veiled form of enosis—in other words, a second Greek State giving Greece two votes in the United Nations or enabling it to play the dual role of a State which is part of an alliance when it is a question of Greece or part of the non-aligned world when it was a question of the Cypriot Republic, but, in any case, receiving instructions, or inspiration if the word "instructions" is not appropriate, from the same source—namely, from Athens.

103. I would have preferred my Greek colleague to make no mention of the Greek refugees in an island where the Turks, in the world's eyes, were living as refugees but did not attract much attention at a time when the situation on the island was no threat to world peace and tranquillity. As far as the peace and tranquillity of the Turks was concerned, there was always some way to settle the problem. It was only when they decided that the Turks should no longer live as refugees in their own country that the problem reached its present state of acuteness.

104. The representative of Greece here said that the Turks were overreaching themselves in claiming 34 per cent of the territory as the basis for establishing an autonomous administration to be set up as the basis of a viable constitution for Cyprus. I believe I can explain this figure, which may seem strange to those who are unfamiliar with the Cypriot problem—and God knows there are many who do not understand the problem of Cyprus in general or in detail. Before they were dispossessed of their land in Cyprus during the last 10 years, and before they were forced to take refuge in the enclaves, the Turks owned 34 per cent, at least 34 per cent, of the land and of the villages where they made a living by practising agriculture. The land registries of the municipalities, if they have not been changed or falsified in recent years, are evidence of this. But this certainly is not the reason for the failure of the negotiations. The failure was due to the basic philosophical concept, the refusal to recognize that the Turkish Cypriots have been and should remain masters of their island to the same degree as the Greeks.

105. I will not go into the details of the negotiations, because I do not feel that we are competent to do so. I must, however, emphasize that if during

10 days in Geneva we have only begun to consider a constitution for Cyprus, this is hardly an accident. The representative in Geneva of the Greek community of Cyprus played a double role which is quite familiar to us. Whenever attempts were made to reach a solution to the problem of Cyprus, we were faced with a strange situation. Whenever the Greeks from Greece seemed to be entertaining the idea of a constitution that appeared suitable to us, they would state that unfortunately, the Greek Cypriots refused to heed the advice given them by the Greeks from Greece—who are represented by 650 officers in Cyprus; sometimes there are more, but at the present time there are 650 of them, and sometimes they have the nerve to go in for coups d'état. At other times when there was hope for some agreement between the representatives of the Greek Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriots, Athens would find that the Turks were going too far and what was being asked of the Greek Cypriots was not acceptable, and they would agree. This seems to be the kind of game that was being played in Geneva. It went on for 10 days. Proposals were made, and the Greek representatives said they wanted 36 hours to study them before submitting a reply, and my Government refused, and so the negotiations were suspended. Do you know what happened there? Well, what happened was that the Greek Foreign Minister made a statement to the press immediately afterwards, saying that the Turkish proposal was inadmissible because it was contrary to the spirit and the letter of the 1960 agreements. I wonder whether he had to wait 36 hours to issue that reply, which was immediately forthcoming from the Greek representative as soon as the negotiations were suspended. This is of course just an indication, an indication we think important for the future of the negotiations, which we hope will continue.

106. Much has been made of the non-alignment of Cyprus, to which my Greek colleague seems very much attached. That non-alignment is hardly compatible with two basic positions taken by the Greeks from Greece and the Greeks in Cyprus. First of all, in order for the Greek Cypriots and Cyprus as a whole are to become a truly non-aligned State, the army of that island should no longer be under the command of a Power which is, juridically speaking, foreign to that island. As regards the withdrawal of forces, the representative of Greece used the words "together with the Turkish army. After a presence of 15 years, I thank the representative of Greece for his generosity. However, I notice incidentally that nothing is said about the tremendous fighting potential that has been created in Cyprus by Greece, by all the Greeks, in violation of all legality.

107. As regards the future status of Cyprus, despite the fact that certain circumstances have compelled us to place troops on the island, I once again solemnly state my country's firm attachment to the

independence, the sovereignty and the territorial integrity of Cyprus, as well as to its freely-chosen status, the status of a non-aligned country. The Turkish presence—and I have repeated this many times here—has been and remains today the only guarantee of that status, or of any other status—why not a neutral status on the Austrian model? Anything is possible in Cyprus—anything—but with one proviso: that the Turkish Cypriots must participate in any status under conditions of equality and security. Only such conditions can ensure them, after 15 years of experience—rather regrettable experience—a truly federal system.

108. In reply to Mr. Rossides I must tell him once again that, personally, I do not recognize his right to speak on behalf of the Turkish community. That community has never been represented in the United Nations.

109. This is all that I would have to say if he had not made certain comments which require a very brief reply. I can make this reply in five minutes.

110. First of all, I should like to mention his insistence—contrary to all logic and to all historical and political reality—on speaking of a "minority" while referring to the profound nature of a conflict and the difficulties we Turks are having in finding a solution. I should have been very pleased to discover so late in history and so early this morning that Mr. Rossides and his administration finally believe that the principle of *pacta sunt servanda* is sacrosanct, because they stated that we had violated certain arrangements or certain treaties, certain constitutional provisions, which apparently had been unilaterally denounced and considered as so many scraps of paper—following Hitler's example, which he has referred to so often today—by Archbishop Makarios.

111. In conclusion, allow me to reiterate that if the appeals contained in paragraph 3 of the resolution just adopted by the Council are really considered by Greece and by the representative of the Greek community in Cyprus with all the seriousness called for by negotiations—I emphasize the word "negotiations"—rather than as delaying tactics or a refusal to deal with the basic problems—then my Government will be very happy to comply with this resolution.

112. The PRESIDENT (*translation from Russian*): Since there are no further names on the list of speakers, I should like to speak in my capacity as representative of the UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS.

113. The Council has met urgently at this late hour in order to consider again the very dangerous situation which has arisen in Cyprus. The Geneva negotiations have failed. Military operations have resumed on the island, and they have claimed further victims

and caused further suffering to the Cypriot people and further destruction of property. The extremely dangerous development of events both for the fate of the Cypriot people and for the cause of peace has demonstrated the complete failure of the efforts of those who have striven to demobilize the Council and to condemn it to inactivity on the pretext that on Cyprus all is peaceful, the situation is normal, the cease-fire is generally being observed and even that progress has been made towards the establishment of peace.

114. Despite the three resolutions adopted by the Council on Cyprus, the situation in Cyprus has in no way improved, but, rather, has become even more complex. As the Soviet delegation has already pointed out at previous meetings of the Security Council, the Council, as a result of the actions of certain circles, has not only been unable thus far to ensure implementation of resolution 353 (1974), adopted 24 days ago, but is now facing a situation which requires the adoption of more resolute, more urgent and more effective measures for the immediate implementation of all the provisions of that resolution, which is the basis both for putting an end to foreign military intervention in Cyprus and for a political settlement. Not a single one of the basic provisions of that resolution is being implemented; the fighting has not only not ceased, it has resumed on an even broader scale. Foreign military intervention against a sovereign State, the Republic of Cyprus, which is a Member of the United Nations and a non-aligned country, is continuing and expanding. Not only have foreign forces not been withdrawn from the island, but their numbers are increasing. The military occupation of the territory of Cyprus is expanding.

115. The lawful Government of the Republic of Cyprus, headed by President Makarios, and all its institutions continue to be unable to function or to exercise full authority throughout the island. As has already been observed, the burning question continues to be whether or not the Republic of Cyprus, a Member of the United Nations, is an independent sovereign State.

116. Events confirm the correctness of the evaluation made in the statement of the Soviet Government to the effect that certain NATO circles are trying to put an end to the existence of an independent Cyprus by means of direct military intervention. These circles are making the independent statehood and territorial integrity of Cyprus an object of cynical bargaining for the purpose of strengthening their military and strategic positions in the eastern Mediterranean. Events have shown that they are trying to present the world with a fait accompli in the partitioning of Cyprus.

117. The States which are perpetrating military intervention against the sovereign Republic of Cyprus have not only failed to heed the appeals of the

Security Council to halt the intervention and immediately withdraw their forces and all military personnel from the territory of Cyprus, but, on the contrary, are continuing to expand the intervention with the clear aim of keeping their forces on the island for an indefinite period. Steps are being taken to partition the Republic of Cyprus on the pretext of establishing a so-called security zone and setting up two administrations in Cyprus. All this is being done with the knowledge of the principal NATO countries. Whereas in the formal meetings of the Council they make a show of speaking against and voting against aggression and in favour of the independence of Cyprus and the restoration of constitutional government, outside the formal meetings of the Council they object to proposals for the Council to take truly effective measures to defend the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Cyprus. This places a serious international responsibility upon them towards the United Nations and the entire world.

118. As it once again considers the Cyprus question as an urgent matter and under conditions in which hostilities have been resumed, the Council must also take into account the demands of the non-aligned States Members of the United Nations. They constitute the overwhelming majority of the membership of the Organization. In the declaration adopted by those countries on 6 August, they appealed for the immediate and full implementation of resolution 353 (1974) and emphasized that

"delay in the withdrawal from the Republic of Cyprus of all foreign military personnel poses a direct threat to international peace and security and to the stability of the eastern Mediterranean region".

119. Consequently, the withdrawal of foreign forces and military personnel from the territory of the Republic of Cyprus is the key to the solution of the problem because the implementation of this requirement can ensure peace, security and territorial integrity for Cyprus. This alone will ensure the maintenance of that country's sovereignty, and the countries of the eastern Mediterranean region and all those who cherish the cause of Cyprus and the cause of peace will then be able to live in peace without anxiety over the possibility of the outbreak of a new military conflict, the emergence of a new hotbed of war which might easily spread far beyond the borders of that small island.

120. The Security Council must urgently put an end to all outside interference in the internal affairs of Cyprus and ensure the immediate withdrawal of all foreign forces from the island.

121. Today in the Security Council we are all witnesses to the failure of the two Geneva conferences concerning Cyprus. No matter how many attempts are

made to convince us by those who declaimed at this table about the inactivity of the Council and its refusal to take effective measures to implement resolution 353 (1974) on the pretext that success had been achieved in Geneva, we again emphasize the argument advanced by the Soviet Government on 28 July on the subject of the Geneva negotiations. The statement of the Soviet Government noted:

"Any decision which was not in conformity with the interests of the Cypriot people could only lead to further aggravation of the situation and to fresh conflicts." [S/11390.]

122. I do not think that anyone here today would dare to dispute this statement. The collapse of the Geneva negotiations is the direct result of attempts to solve the Cyprus question within the narrow circle of NATO. That approach proved to be completely ill-founded. It is contrary to the interests of the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Cyprus.

123. The second reason for the failure of the Geneva negotiations is the disregard for the demands of all peace-loving States that all measures be taken immediately for the implementation of resolution 353 (1974) in its entirety. Now we have to observe once again that, not only has time been lost, but it has also become necessary to enlist the assistance of the Security Council, which should actively intervene in the prevailing situation and attempt finally to achieve immediate implementation of resolution 353 (1974).

124. We note with great satisfaction that today's resolution, while not sufficiently strong, was adopted by all 15 members of the Council. This calls for a greater role for the Council in settling the Cyprus question. The Council should take the settlement of this question into its own hands. Attempts to deal with this matter within the narrow circle of NATO countries have been a complete failure. In this connexion, among other measures, it is urgently necessary and advisable to dispatch to Cyprus a mission composed of members of the Council: the Soviet Union continues to insist on this. More effective action on the part of the Council is also being demanded by the overwhelming majority of States Members of the United Nations—the powerful group of non-aligned countries. The declaration of those countries, to which I have already referred, states:

"The tragic situation of Cyprus is a grave warning to all non-aligned countries and calls for their united action. The threat to the independence and security of one non-aligned country is a threat to the security of all of them."

This is absolutely true. However, this could have been avoided through the timely adoption of the measures proposed by those countries, including the measures

which the Soviet Union proposed for adoption in the Council. We sincerely hope that the representatives of the non-permanent members of the Council will fight more actively for implementation of the provisions of the declaration adopted by the group of non-aligned countries.

125. In supporting the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Cyprus and the status of the Republic as a non-aligned State, the Soviet Union is guided by considerations of principle. These derive from the very essence of Soviet foreign policy—a policy of repulsing aggression and protecting the lawful rights of all peoples, both great and small, a policy of peace and international détente. Those who are striving to maintain an independent Cyprus and to guarantee peace and security in that region can count on the understanding and co-operation of the Soviet Union.

126. The proposal by the Soviet Union—contained, as you will recall, in its draft resolution [S/11391]—is still before the members of the Council. As proposed by the delegation of the Soviet Union, the Council should again consider the adoption of effective measures to guarantee the independence of Cyprus and the immediate withdrawal of all foreign forces and military personnel present in Cyprus in violation of its sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity.

127. Although it voted for the resolution just adopted by the Council, because of the obvious need for its speedy adoption, the Soviet delegation wishes to state that it would have preferred a stronger resolution providing for more effective measures. The Soviet delegation said this also at today's informal meeting of members of the Council. The Soviet Union firmly advocates complete implementation of resolution 353 (1974); it favours immediate and complete implementation of all parts and provisions of that resolution. As has already been stated and agreed, we reserve the right to submit proposals along these lines at a later stage.

128. And now, as PRESIDENT, I call on the representative of Cyprus.

129. Mr. ROSSIDES (Cyprus): I shall try not to take up too much of the Council's time, but I must reply to certain statements made by the representative of Turkey.

130. When Turkey invaded Cyprus on 20 July, its Prime Minister issued a statement to the effect that its purpose was completely peaceful, that everyone should keep quite calm because its only aim was to re-establish the constitutionality of Cyprus. Of course, I am not saying that we believed that statement for a moment. But let us see what was the degree of good faith of our neighbour Turkey in issuing that statement. It insisted that its concern was above

all the return of constitutionality, in respect of the coup and Archbishop Makarios, but that it was acting also out of its concern that the situation that had caused the withdrawal of the Turkish Cypriots from the Government and the Council of Ministers should be returned to normal.

131. Yet, at the meeting of 10 August in Geneva, when the Greek Cypriots proposed that there should be a bicomunal Council of Ministers with proportionate representation for the Turkish minority, the Turkish side rejected that proposal. They rejected the proposal because they wanted a geographical division of the territory as a means towards partition, with all the disastrous consequences that that would entail for the people of Cyprus. That shows the remarkably bad faith of Turkey. In fact, it did not accept a return to constitutionality. In fact, it did not invade Cyprus with peaceful aims. On the contrary, its aim was the destruction of the independence of Cyprus, the destruction of the Treaty of Guarantee, the destruction of every treaty and every agreement entered into by Turkey in respect of Cyprus. It refused to comply with the first cease-fire and the second cease-fire, both of which it had accepted. Instead of beginning to withdraw its forces, it brought in even larger forces, until it now has about 40,000 men on that little island; and it is constantly bringing in arms, tanks, and so on, for the purpose of carrying on a war against the people of Cyprus. And when I say "the people of Cyprus", I mean all the people of Cyprus, for the Turkish Cypriots are also suffering from this war.

132. The real purpose of the war is the aggrandizement of Turkey through a colonialist, imperialist policy in respect of Cyprus. That is the reality.

133. The representative of Turkey, in saying that Cyprus is not non-aligned, is entirely wrong. It is not for him to decide whether or not Cyprus is non-aligned. It is non-aligned in its policy and it has been so all along in the United Nations. It is not the few officers from Greece in the National Guard that determine anything because the National Guard does not formulate the policy of Cyprus.

134. I believe we have had a discussion of the whole problem here, whereas what is needed is to stop the fighting in Cyprus so that there can be cool discussion. It seems to me that cool and effective discussion is not possible in the Geneva conference of the guarantors for obvious reasons which have been demonstrated here and in Cyprus. Therefore, we wish to have the United Nations more involved in this problem and in its solution. Consequently, we would gladly see a mission from the United Nations go to Cyprus, examine the situation and take a greater interest in the solution of the problem. Indeed, Cyprus is a Member of the United Nations and its guarantee and protection is the United Nations itself—the Security Council and the United Nations

as a whole. We come here to seek protection. No other protection has come to Cyprus during these two weeks, because Cyprus does not belong to any military alliance. That is the proof of its non-alignment. The non-aligned countries do not have an army, nor do they have military pacts that would enable them to come to the rescue of Cyprus by force. Is that why Cyprus is being torn to pieces and, at the same time, being told that it is not non-aligned? That is adding insult to injury.

135. Cyprus has followed a policy consistent with its principles, which are the principles of the Charter. It has followed a policy which has always been constructive towards peace, towards world understanding and towards the progress of humanity in the right direction, which is not war and which is not the use of force, but the very opposite of that—in other words, everything that is entailed in the concept of non-alignment.

136. The PRESIDENT (*translation from Russian*): I call on the representative of Greece.

137. Mr. CARAYANNIS (Greece): I am not going to take much of the Council's time at this late hour. My Turkish colleague made several references to my statement. I do not really think there is any need to answer him. His statements differ from mine because he has different policies from mine, and his position is well known to all members of the Council, just as my position is well known.

138. I shall confine myself to replying to what he said about the Geneva conference by quoting the following from a dispatch of Agence France Presse dated today:

"In Geneva it looked as though Turkey had decided to use military methods in the diplomatic field".⁴

139. I should like to refer to only one point in the statement of the representative of Turkey. In my statement I referred only incidentally to the 34 per cent of the territory of Cyprus which Turkey is demanding for the autonomous part of Cyprus. In thinking of Cyprus, we do not think in terms of percentages. Turkey of course does. But I did not quite understand the point he was making when he said that he is interested in the Turkish population of the island. Is he interested in terms of human beings or in terms of real estate?

140. The PRESIDENT (*translation from Russian*): I call on the representative of Turkey.

141. Mr. OLCAY (Turkey): I shall be very brief. In answer to the question put by my colleague from Greece, I would say: both.

142. In answer to Mr. Rossides, I would again request him to refrain, if possible, from speaking on behalf

of the Turkish Cypriots. Secondly, I would say that past history, as well as the history of the last month, has been distorted by him this morning. I would therefore invite all members to check his statements against more trustworthy sources.

143. The PRESIDENT (*translation from Russian*): I call on the representative of Cyprus.

144. Mr. ROSSIDES (Cyprus): With respect to the statement made by the representative of Turkey that he does not permit me to speak on behalf of the Turkish Cypriots, I think he is not entitled to dictate who represents the Turkish Cypriots, unless he claims that he represents them. The Turkish Cypriots are part of the island of Cyprus and I can speak on behalf of the bulk of the Turkish Cypriots but not on behalf of the agents of Turkey. I know that the bulk of the Turkish Cypriots have also suffered from these actions of Turkey, though obviously not to the same extent.

145. I should like to point out also that the representative of Turkey seems to dispute the accuracy of my statement. Does he dispute the bad faith of Turkey in speaking about constitutionality, pretending to support constitutionality, but rejecting anything that

is constitutional, bringing catastrophe and upheaval and havoc to the island? Does he dispute the bad faith of Turkey in agreeing to the cease-fire and then refusing to comply with the cease-fire in spite of an express agreement? Does he deny the bad faith of Turkey in accepting the cease-fire of the United Nations and in violating it at the same time? Does he deny the fact that Turkey was trying to negotiate under the threat and use of military force—unprecedented conduct since the time of Hitler? Does he deny these facts? Does he deny that Turkey brought about the breakdown of the negotiations by that threat of the use of force, and precisely by that threat—"Unless you give me a reply within so many hours I am going to attack the island with my superior force"? Does he deny the inhumanity of this conduct? Does he deny the violation of the Charter in its every aspect by that conduct? If he denies these things, then of course we know where Turkey stands.

146. The PRESIDENT (*translation from Russian*): I call on the representative of Turkey.

147. Mr. OLCAY (Turkey): I do.

The meeting rose at 6 a.m.