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TWENTY-NINTH YEAR

1772nd

MEETING: 29 MAY 1974

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16 p.

NOTE

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1772nd MEETING

Held in New York on Wednesday, 29 May 1974, at 3.30 p.m.

President: Mr. Charles Gatere MAINA (Kenya).

Present: The representatives of the following States: Australia, Austria, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, China, Costa Rica, France, Indonesia, Iraq, Kenya, Mauritania, Peru, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Cameroon and United States of America.

Provisional agenda (S/Agenda/1772)

1. Adoption of the agenda
2. Letter dated 26 December 1963 from the Permanent Representative of Cyprus to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/5488):
Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations operation in Cyprus (S/11294)

The meeting was called to order at 3.55 p.m.

Adoption of the agenda

The agenda was adopted.

Letter dated 26 December 1963 from the Permanent Representative of Cyprus to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/5488):
Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations operation in Cyprus (S/11294)

1. The PRESIDENT: In accordance with the decision taken by the Council at the preceding meeting, I now invite the representatives of Cyprus, Turkey and Greece to take places at the Council table in order to participate in the discussion without the right to vote.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Rossides (Cyprus), Mr. Olcay (Turkey) and Mr. Megalokonomos (Greece) took places at the Council table.

2. Sir Laurence McINTYRE (Australia): In voting for the draft resolution which the Council adopted this morning, at the 1771st meeting¹ my delegation has indicated its support for the Secretary-General's view that the current situation in Cyprus necessitates the presence of the United Nations Peace-keeping Force for a further period of six months. It follows that the Australian Government will maintain its civilian police contingent in Cyprus for the period of the

¹ See resolution 349 (1974).

extended mandate and that we shall again be making a voluntary contribution towards the financing of the Force.

3. Before commenting on some of the issues that have been raised in the Secretary-General's report [S/11294], as usual a most comprehensive and lucid document, even if not exactly heartening, I should like to pay a tribute to all those associated with the United Nations efforts in Cyprus. The Secretary-General and his staff, the Force Commander, Major-General Prem Chand, and the troops and police under his command, all deserve our fullest and highest commendation. It is always difficult to single out any one individual in a co-operative effort such as the one associated with the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP), but I should like, on the eve of his retirement, to pay a special tribute to my old friend and colleague, the Secretary-General's Special Representative in Cyprus, Mr. Osorio-Tafall. His 25 years of distinguished service for the United Nations, including seven and a half years of devoted duty in Cyprus, is a record of dedication and skill, I believe, second to none. The patience and the understanding that he has shown have contributed immeasurably to keeping the parties in Cyprus in contact and our hopes for an eventful settlement alive. All of us indeed owe him our gratitude and wish him well in whatever future role he assumes for himself. To his successor, Ambassador Weckmann-Muñoz, we extend our full support and good wishes as he assumes his new post.

4. It was naturally with some concern that we learnt of the interruption of the intercommunal talks in Cyprus in early April. It is our view, as it is the Secretary-General's view, that those talks are the best vehicle for the attainment ultimately of a solution acceptable to both communities on the island, and their suspension appeared to us as a severe setback to the search for that solution.

5. Needless to say, we have been glad to learn that an agreement has now been reached that will enable the talks to be resumed in early June, and we can only urge all the parties concerned to exercise the patience, restraint and mutual accommodation that will be necessary if there is to be genuine progress.

6. As the Secretary-General notes in paragraph 60 of his report, it had appeared, after meetings between the constitutional experts in the first quarter of 1974, that a measure of agreement was being reached on a "package deal", shall I say, concerning the structure of the State, and the division of powers and the degree of local authority to be granted to the two communities. It is to be hoped that when the talks are

resumed the two sides can build on the progress that had been made prior to their suspension.

7. At the 1759th meeting, on 14 December 1973, when the Council met to consider the renewal of the UNFICYP mandate, I indicated our support for the Secretary-General's proposed second phase reductions in the level of the Force. We are accordingly pleased to note in the Secretary-General's report that, as a result of further consultations following that meeting, the Secretary-General felt himself able to proceed with those reductions during the course of the contingent rotation that took place during the period from March to May 1974. We also note the careful manner in which the restructuring of the Force, made necessary by its reduced numbers, has been accomplished, and we are glad to see, although it is perhaps too early to make any firm assessment, that thus far the reductions do not appear to have materially affected the operation of the Force itself or to have led to renewed outbreaks of fighting or instability, even though I understand that there has been some increase recently in minor incidents.

8. Although the grounds for a further reduction in the Force may be established in due course, we would agree with the Secretary-General that perhaps for the time being a further reduction, however welcome it would be, would be somewhat premature in a situation that remains, in the Secretary-General's own words, "tense and potentially dangerous".

9. As I had occasion to note last December, and as the Secretary-General's report again reveals, there has evidently been little progress in a number of important areas, military, economic and social, where greater co-operation and understanding would enhance the prospects for a return to normal conditions or something like normal conditions. We note with regret that there has been little progress towards military deconfrontation and that there have been disturbing reports of an increase in the importation of arms, by both sides, for their use. The trend towards separate economic development has apparently increased and we have observed the Secretary-General's comment that only slight progress had been made towards the extension of public services to all areas that are in need of them.

10. As we read the Secretary-General's report, and particularly section III on the subject of "Activities towards a return to normal conditions", we see clear evidence of the extent to which mutual fear and distress is a major obstacle to better relations between the communities in almost all fields. We can thus all the more appreciate and encourage the activities of UNFICYP in its patient efforts not only to keep the peace but also, through the exercise of its good offices in the implementation of social projects, to foster greater co-operation between the two communities, and to help to lower the barriers raised by this same fear and suspicion.

11. Finally, although I do not think I can make much useful contribution by way of comment on the financial situation of UNFICYP at this stage, I do note that the situation in which UNFICYP finds itself has shown some welcome, albeit temporary, improvement. However, I understand also that as UNFICYP enters the period of the

new mandate, its hard-core deficit will amount to some \$16.5 million and that each six-monthly extension of the mandate is likely to add to that deficit something of the order of \$1 million. We can only regret that the response to the Secretary-General's appeal for further additional funds has not yielded so far the contributions necessary to reduce appreciably the debt that UNFICYP has built up over the years, and we can only encourage the Secretary-General to continue his efforts to seek further assistance and at the same time to look for all possible economies in the administration of the Force.

12. Mr. LECOMPT (France) (*interpretation from French*): Once again called upon to extend the mandate of the United Nations Force in Cyprus, my delegation, as it has always done, voted in favour of the traditional draft resolution submitted to us.

13. But this vote, even if it has all the appearances of a formality which we engage in every six months, does involve certain concerns to which I should like to draw the Council's attention briefly.

14. The maintenance of order in Cyprus, the preservation of the security of the two communities, without any doubt is an objective which, of course, the Council must subscribe to; that is its mission. The dispatch of a peace-keeping force constitutes one of the means by which the Council can discharge its duty. But this is an extreme measure, in a way, to which it has recourse in exceptional circumstances, on a temporary basis, when the Force, as in the present case, is stationed on the territory of a single State in order to prevent a confrontation between antagonistic elements within the population: the presence of a Force must in fact make it possible to ensure the necessary conditions for the search for and the establishment of a normal situation in which order and security are guaranteed by the functioning of those institutions which are proper to all sovereign States. However, after more than 10 years, the same circumstances which were invoked at the time the Force was established are being put forth to justify its maintenance. Even if several attempts have been made by the parties and are still going on, in order to normalize the situation, they have not yet proved successful. We may then wonder if the Council, while taking note of the fact that the Force has acquitted itself impeccably, as is shown by the expressions of satisfaction addressed to it by the interested parties themselves, has not the duty to question this operation. In providing the tranquilizer, have we not encouraged a certain resistance to the true treatment, sometimes uncomfortable, and always demanding?

15. Have we not also, over the long term, neglected to draw the conclusions from a situation which is, most happily, no longer marked by the open confrontations or tensions of a few years ago? The Secretary-General prompted this thought himself when he undertook a reduction of the Force, a reduction which is now to be accompanied by a certain change in methods. My delegation, while taking note of the comments contained in paragraph 79 of the report, considers that this effort, linked to a new evaluation of the real needs in the light of the mission of the Force, should be continued.

16. The Secretary-General, like his predecessor, has also provided his assistance to the parties in their attempt to formulate a diagnosis of the problems dividing them and to seek ways and means of establishing between them balanced and harmonious relations. We are being kept informed on this subject. However, it is obvious that the responsibility assumed by the Council with regard to peace and security in Cyprus makes it natural that it should concern itself with the efforts undertaken by the parties.

17. It is not without concern, therefore, that we have learnt of the suspension of the intercommunal talks. Without going into the reasons alleged on either side for this suspension, reasons which are very usefully set forth in section IV of the Secretary-General's report, we have to note that these negotiations, which were resumed two years ago, are now at a standstill. Most fortunately, on 4 June next the participants will be meeting again; we hope that because the stake is so important—it is a matter of safeguarding and protecting the identity of each of the communities within the framework of a sovereign State endowed with viable and effective institutions—the parties will not take refuge in the *status quo*, which, as we note here every six months, is accompanied by a deepening polarization of the intercommunal life of Cyprus, and, undoubtedly, by a similar polarization in attitudes. The effects of the frequent instances of procrastination are obvious. Who of us could accept that such a second-best solution should be the only result of the efforts which have gone on for so many years and which the Council has ceaselessly followed with such vigilance?

18. Our constant objective is to make possible the establishment of harmonious coexistence between the two communities for their own benefit, for that of the Cypriot State and for the benefit of peace in that part of the Mediterranean. This remains our objective as today we renew the mandate of the Force. But my delegation has deemed it necessary to make clear the spirit in which we have agreed to this renewal.

19. Finally, I should like to associate myself with the expressions of gratitude proffered by previous speakers to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Mr. Osorio-Tafall, who has acquitted himself with such distinction and talent in carrying out the delicate task which had been entrusted to him. The tribute paid to him by the representatives of the parties is the most obvious evidence of this. My delegation takes pleasure in greeting his successor-designate, Mr. Weckmann-Muñoz. We have been able to appreciate his eminent qualities in his recent mission of inquiry in Iraq and Iran.

20. Mr. SCHAUFLE (United States of America): The United States supports the extension of the mandate of UNFICYP for an additional six months. I would like to express our gratitude and admiration to Major-General Prem Chand and the officers and men of UNFICYP for the high standard of performance we have come to expect from them.

21. In addition, I want to extend our special appreciation to Mr. Osorio-Tafall, who, after seven and a half years of imaginative, understanding and patient leadership as the Secretary-General's Special Representative in Cyprus, will

soon be retiring. You leave, Sir, not only with our best wishes but also with our profound gratitude for your heroic efforts in Cyprus and elsewhere to realize the aims of the United Nations and its Charter. Your contribution will not be forgotten.

22. At the same time we welcome the appointment of Ambassador Weckmann-Muñoz as the new Special Representative. Ambassador Weckmann-Muñoz's skilful diplomacy as the Secretary-General's Special Representative in the Iran-Iraq dispute is only the latest example of the statesmanlike qualities which he brings to his new duties.

23. Once again we commend the Secretary-General for another incisive and important report on the current situation in Cyprus. We had hoped that the last six months would have been marked by more progress towards a just and peaceful settlement through the intercommunal talks. Admittedly, the suspension of those talks was a temporary setback, but we are gratified that the concerned parties have demonstrated their willingness to resume the negotiations shortly and to continue the search for a peaceful, mutually acceptable solution. In this regard, my delegation would like to reaffirm the support of the United States for the intercommunal talks as the best available means of achieving a just solution based on the concept of a single, sovereign and independent Cyprus, with appropriate guarantees for the safety and well-being of all its people.

24. We had hoped—indeed, we expected—that the reductions in the UNFICYP force level would be carried forward in accordance with the Secretary-General's plans, unmarred by incidents, and leaving the beginnings of a more streamlined, more efficient UNFICYP. Here, our expectations were commendably fulfilled.

25. We are extremely pleased that the Secretary-General has been able to report completion on schedule of the second phase reductions in the UNFICYP force levels. My Government strongly supported the 25 per cent cutbacks which the Secretary-General implemented during the past year. The support of the United States delegation for still further force reductions is undoubtedly well known by now to the members of the Council and to other interested parties.

26. At the 1759th meeting of the Council, on 14 December 1973, the mandate of UNFICYP was last extended. I expressed our delegation's view that UNFICYP could most efficiently execute its mandate essentially as a mediator/observer Force with substantially fewer personnel. Events of the last six months have not altered our view.

27. In addition to the matter of efficient operation, the financial difficulties confronting the Force have still not been resolved. We find it increasingly difficult to justify the mounting debts of UNFICYP. We believe that all of us—members of the Council, as well as troop and cash contributors—must give serious consideration separately and collectively to how the cost of maintaining the Force can be reduced. Expenses, including the payment of the debts of UNFICYP, must somehow be covered by contributions, and very soon.

28. Although we do not fully share their concerns, my delegation understands the reluctance of some troop contributors and others to support further reductions in UNFICYP forces at this time. We trust that, as the inter-communal talks resume their course, the necessity for and desirability of further cuts will be accorded prompt and serious consideration. The Secretary-General, in his report, has left the door open to further reductions and restructuring, which we believe are financially necessary, operationally feasible and fully within the scope of the Force's present mandate.

29. Resolution 186 (1964), which established UNFICYP, spelled out rather clearly that the primary responsibility for maintaining peace and internal order rested with the parties; UNFICYP was given an important, but essentially supporting, role. We envisage a streamlined observer/mediator UNFICYP which would still "use its best efforts to prevent a recurrence of fighting" and would continue to "contribute to the maintenance and restoration of law and order and a return to normal conditions".

30. Mr. BOOH BOOH (United Republic of Cameroon) (*Interpretation from French*): On behalf of my delegation, I should like first of all to express our appreciation to the Secretary-General for the outstanding report he submitted to the Council on the United Nations operation in Cyprus for the last six months. This clear, lucid and complete report has been very carefully studied by my delegation, which approves of the motives which underlie the Secretary-General's recommendation to extend the existence of the Force for a further six months. That is in explanation of the vote we cast on the draft resolution in document S/11301, which the Council adopted this morning.

31. If there is reason to be gratified over the fact that the general situation in the island has remained relatively calm over the last six months, as we gather from paragraph 26 of the Secretary-General's report, my delegation nevertheless regrets the fact that no effort has been made to achieve a significant relaxation of the military and political situation. A military confrontation is still possible since the two communities are still maintaining and reinforcing their military equipment and living in an atmosphere of mutual fear and suspicion.

32. The Secretary-General, in paragraph 44 of his report, in fact notes that for six months little progress has been achieved towards a return to normal conditions, and that the "trend towards the separate development of each community has continued unabated". My delegation is concerned over this situation since it might be prolonged indefinitely and, as a consequence, might require the continued presence of the United Nations Force in the island, with all the financial implications which that would involve.

33. My delegation is still concerned over the persistent obstacles standing in the way of a so eagerly desired return to a normal situation. It is true that these are obstacles difficult to overcome, but my delegation sincerely trusts that the parties directly concerned will be able to make additional efforts to arrive at a common agreement on a definitive constitutional structure for the State that will be acceptable to all the component parts of the population with

full respect for the integrity and sovereignty of Cyprus. It is in that spirit that my delegation expresses its hopes for the success of the intercommunal talks in Cyprus, which will be resumed on 4 June.

34. In this connexion I should like to congratulate Ambassador Weckmann-Muñoz on his recent nomination to the post of Special Representative of the Secretary-General in Cyprus and to assure him of the support of my delegation in the fulfilment of his delicate mission.

35. I should also like to pay a particular tribute to Mr. Osorio-Tafall, who for approximately eight years served with the United Nations Force in Cyprus with great dedication. My delegation wishes him a well-earned rest after almost a quarter of a century of service in our Organization.

36. As members of the Council are aware, the United Republic of Cameroon was not on the Council when the first decisions to ensure the stationing in Cyprus of a United Nations Force were taken. However, my Government has unhesitatingly given its constant support to all the United Nations efforts to maintain peace in the island and to create an atmosphere conducive to understanding between the two communities. We shall continue along that constructive line, and it is for this reason that, despite our limited financial means and the many difficulties inherent in our social and economic development, my Government has just decided to make a voluntary contribution of 500,000 francs CFA to the UNFICYP Special Account.

37. Mr. EL HASSEN (Mauritania) (*Interpretation from French*): The very comprehensive report of the Secretary-General which was submitted to the Council on 22 May 1974 has given us a very clear picture of the situation in Cyprus. Tension and mistrust between the two communities unfortunately seem to be the main characteristics of that situation. Had it not been for the presence of the United Nations Force in Cyprus, this situation, in which many divergent if not contradictory interests are at play, could have degenerated into an armed conflict which by developing further might have threatened peace in the entire region. But if calm is being maintained in Cyprus thanks to the United Nations Force, and also to the moderation exercised by the parties concerned, no significant progress has yet been made towards a final solution to this painful situation.

38. From the Secretary-General's report, it is obvious that the talks between the two communities themselves have at present been interrupted and that weapons are being introduced in the island. All this must obviously give rise to concern. And thus, despite the highly constructive role played by the Force, the objectives which the Council set for itself when creating UNFICYP have not yet been attained and the situation is far from having returned to normalcy.

39. Despite its disappointment, and its impatience to see understanding at last replace mistrust and union, under an appropriate form, triumph over division, my delegation is convinced that the presence of the Force remains the determining factor not only in maintaining peace but also in seeking a solution in keeping with the purposes and principles of the Charter and taking fully into account the legitimate interests of the parties concerned.

40. That is why my delegation voted for the draft resolution which the Council adopted this morning and which extended the mandate of UNFICYP for a further six months. It should, however, be obvious that the renewal of the mandate of the Force is not an end in itself and that the remarkable and consistent efforts of the Secretary-General and his Special Representative cannot succeed unless they meet with a true desire on the part of the parties concerned to achieve a global arrangement in which all interests would be safeguarded. It seems to us that that is what the Council has invited the parties to do in paragraph 2 of the resolution it has already adopted.

41. In conclusion, my delegation would hope that the renewal of this mandate, which has now been extended for the twentieth time, will be the one which will see fraternity and peace re-established in Cyprus.

42. Before concluding my statement, I would add my voice to that of the speakers who preceded me in order to pay a well-earned tribute to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Mr. Osorio-Tafall, for the quality and excellence of the work he did during his term of office in Cyprus. We should also like to welcome his successor, Mr. Weckmann-Muñoz, who yesterday proved to us his ability as a distinguished diplomat and excellent negotiator.

43. Mr. EL-SHIBIB (Iraq): This is the first time that my delegation has addressed the Security Council on the situation in Cyprus in its present context. However, the geographical proximity of Cyprus to my country and the friendly relations we maintain with all the parties directly involved make us keenly interested in a peaceful and agreed solution of this problem. It is in this spirit and in the earnest hope that our extension of the mandate of the United Nations Force in Cyprus will facilitate the achievement of that goal that we voted today in favour of the draft resolution adopted at the 1771st meeting.

44. We note with regret that little progress has been made in resolving the basic issues since the Secretary-General last reported to the Council. Indeed, we share the apprehension that was widely felt when the communal talks were suspended, and it has been only the timely intervention of our esteemed Secretary-General and the excellent work of his representative that banished the prospect of a complete and permanent breakdown of the talks.

45. My country very much hopes that these talks, which are expected to be resumed soon, will be pursued in earnest and will not be bogged down by semantic hurdles. We appeal to the parties to banish suspicion and mistrust so that an agreement on constitutional arrangements satisfactory to all concerned can be reached.

46. Before concluding, my delegation wishes to join the Secretary-General and the speakers who have preceded me in paying a tribute and in expressing our gratitude to Mr. Osorio-Tafall for long and distinguished service in the cause of the United Nations and of peace in Cyprus. We wish also to express our sincere wishes for the success of Mr. Weckmann-Muñoz, his successor as representative of the Secretary-General. Mr. Weckmann-Muñoz, has become well known to us in Iraq and it is on the basis of this

knowledge that we express our full confidence in his future success.

47. Mr. STUBBS (Peru) (*Interpretation from Spanish*): The very lucid and complete report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations operation in Cyprus, which has brought us up to date on the events that have taken place on the island between December 1973 and May 1974, gave us sufficient reason to cast a favourable vote on the draft resolution adopted this morning. We still consider that the presence in Cyprus of the United Nations Peace-keeping Force is required to maintain peace. That Force, which has been carrying out its mission for more than 10 years, deserves our thanks for the preventive role that it has played, and it still needs the voluntary support of all the parties concerned, particularly of the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities, which had been maintaining intercommunal talks until a short time ago and which, thanks to the timely intervention of the Under-Secretary-General, Mr. Roberto Guyer, will be resumed in the very near future. We trust that as a result of these intercommunal talks the agreement so long desired by all will be arrived at, thus solving the problem once and for all.

48. My delegation would like to state its appreciation for the efforts made over the last seven years by Mr. Osorio-Tafall, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, who is now withdrawing from that post at his own request. We also trust that Mr. Weckmann-Muñoz, his successor, will be able to follow in his footsteps. Mr. Weckmann-Muñoz has given proof of his ability in the recent discussions between Iraq and Iran, and has now been designated Special Representative of the Secretary-General in Cyprus.

49. Mr. SMIRNOV (Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic) (*translation from Russian*): The delegation of the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic has carefully studied the report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations operation in Cyprus, from which it is clear that the United Nations Peace-keeping Force is continuing to play an important role in the establishment of peace and in the Cypriot people's return to normal conditions of life. For this reason, we agree with the Secretary-General about the need to extend the stationing of the Force in Cyprus for a further six months.

50. We believe that the problem of Cyprus should be settled by peaceful means in the interests of the people of Cyprus as a whole and primarily by the Cypriots themselves. The solution of the Cyprus problem should contribute to a general easing of tension in this area.

51. We are firmly convinced that the settlement of the Cyprus problem should be based on recognition of the freedom and respect for the independence and territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus.

52. The Byelorussian SSR has always opposed and will continue to oppose any attempts to infringe the sovereignty of this republic and to solve this question to the detriment of the vital interests of the people of Cyprus and to the advantage of outside imperialist forces. That is why the efforts of the United Nations should be directed towards strengthen-

ing the national independence and sovereignty of the State of Cyprus.

53. The Byelorussian delegation voted in favour of the draft resolution extending the stationing of the Force in Cyprus for a further six months, in the belief that over that period greater progress would be achieved in the search for a constructive solution to the problem of Cyprus than has hitherto been made. In this we take into account the information provided by the Secretary-General in paragraph 80 of his report that the Government of Cyprus as well as the Governments of Greece and Turkey concur with his recommendation to extend the mandate of the Force for a further period of six months.

54. At the same time, we should like to stress that, in voting in favour of the draft resolution, we acted in the belief that the extension of the stationing of the Force in Cyprus would be carried out in full accordance with the provisions of Security Council resolution 186 (1964) of 4 March 1964 and the Council's subsequent resolutions on the question of Cyprus. The present functions of the Force in Cyprus will be retained as well as the present principle of voluntary financing.

55. The PRESIDENT: I should now like to make a short statement in my capacity as representative of KENYA.

56. It is now 10 years since the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus was established. That is a long time, and the United Nations involvement has also been very expensive. Peace, however, has a price, and there is no doubt that the presence of the United Nations Force has been a stabilizing element in a tense situation which unfortunately still exists in Cyprus.

57. Cyprus is a fellow member of the non-aligned movement as well as the Commonwealth. Naturally, therefore, we in Kenya have followed very closely developments on the island, and it has never been lost on us that the freedom movements in Cyprus and Kenya are contemporary and similar in nature.

58. The divisive forces in Cyprus are not entirely dissimilar to those that existed in my country before independence. We have on many occasions stated that Kenya respects the unity, sovereignty and independence of Cyprus. Like those of many countries, the population of Cyprus is not homogeneous. It is therefore vital that there should be full respect for the rights and security of all its citizens without any discrimination. A spirit of reconciliation and co-operation must be fostered based on the elements I have just mentioned before a new era of peace and prosperity once again descends on Cyprus.

59. I should like to seize this opportunity to pay a tribute to Mr. Osorio-Tafall, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General in Cyprus, for the distinguished service he has rendered to the international community. We are indeed sorry that he will soon relinquish his duties with the United Nations, but his will be a retirement well earned and deserved.

60. In Mr. Weckmann-Muñoz, the new representative of the Secretary-General in Cyprus, we have a distinguished successor to Mr. Osorio-Tafall, and we know the Cyprus question will be in good, well-trying and trusted hands.

61. The suspended intercommunal talks are scheduled to be resumed on 4 June. That is a good sign, and we look forward to the talks being resumed with renewed vigour. Time is not necessarily on our side, and I am sure all the parties do fully realize that the talks cannot be conducted in a leisurely fashion. The United Nations forces on the island have already been reduced, and the second phase of reduction is under way. There is indeed great pressure for the United Nations to reduce the forces and thus lighten the financial burden. The current trend in thinking is too clear not to have been easily noticed by all the parties concerned. My delegation can only express the hope that, the talks having covered so much ground, the outstanding questions concerning the structure and functions of local government bodies will be solved speedily.

62. It was with those considerations in mind that my delegation voted in favour of the draft resolution on the renewal of the mandate of UNFICYP.

63. As PRESIDENT I call upon the representative of Cyprus.

64. Mr. ROSSIDES (Cyprus): I should first like to thank you, Mr. President, for your constructive statement on the problem of Cyprus and also to thank the other members of the Council for their statements and their interest in Cyprus and the continuation of the United Nations Force for a peaceful solution in an independent, sovereign and unitary State of Cyprus without any threat to the territorial integrity and independence of Cyprus.

65. I should now like to turn to my colleague Ambassador Olcay, who registered his view that the agreed basis of the talks had not been the unitary State. The first occasion on which Ambassador Olcay raised an objection to the unitary State was in December last, when he said it "has never been the agreed basis of the talks" [1759th meeting, para. 47]. But then he said he speaks from his own memory on this, and that statement was made not as his main statement but as a reply to what I had said. His main statement never mentioned anything about objections to the unitary State, whereas the report of the Secretary-General on that same occasion—that is, in December 1973—spoke clearly of the basis, as follows:

"... 'the reactivated intercommunal talks are the best instrument for achieving a satisfactory, lasting and agreed solution based on the concept of an independent, sovereign and unitary State with the adequate participation of the two communities' ". [S/11137, para. 80].

In his statement Ambassador Olcay never objected to that.

66. On a previous occasion also—that is, at the 1727th meeting, on 15 June 1973—I stated that the agreed basis was the independent, sovereign and unitary State. In his reply to me, Ambassador Olcay never disputed what I had said, that

the agreed basis was an independent, sovereign and unitary State. On another occasion—in June 1972—I had said that

“The effort can and should become more co-operative in the common search for a solid structure of a just and workable constitution on the agreed basis of an independent, sovereign and unitary State, with due regard to the legitimate interests of all concerned and the welfare of the people of Cyprus . . .” [1646th meeting, para. 43.]

When Ambassador Olcay replied to me on that occasion, again he never disputed the agreed basis of the talks as being a unitary State.

67. When Ambassador Bayülken was the representative of Turkey, the report of the Secretary-General spoke about the basis of the talks being a sovereign, independent and unitary State and there was no contradiction by Ambassador Bayülken of that statement.

68. Again, in the report of May 1971 [S/10199], it was stated that the problem of Cyprus must be solved by arriving at a lasting agreement based on an independent, sovereign and unitary State. No objection was made here or anywhere else to that statement. We can go back again and again. If we go further back, we see what the attitude of the previous representatives was. On 10 June 1969 Ambassador Eralp said:

“[The Turkish community] has sat down to talk with the Greek community in order to work out a system whereby they can live together in a unitary State—I repeat, in a unitary State within which their identity as a community will not be impaired and wherein they will run their local and communal affairs themselves” [1474th meeting, para. 43].

69. So the agreement on a unitary State was mentioned there again. Then Ambassador Bayülken said in the Security Council in June 1970 that “the Turkish community was not against a unitary State . . . the problem . . . was to frame the conception of a unitary State” [1543rd meeting, para. 200]. Of course, that is a subject of discussion. Interpretation of “unitary State” is legitimate. There are legal interpretations and definitions of what is and what is not a unitary State.

70. Now, I believe that the representative of Turkey, Mr. Olcay, tried to set forth the idea that when the aide-mémoires of 18 October 1971 [S/10401, para. 79] and 18 May 1972 [S/10664, para. 62] were brought out the basis changed. It is very clear that the aide-mémoires were intended only as a means of bringing a new procedure with the constructive help and presence of the representative of the Secretary-General and the advice of the constitutional experts, and said nothing about the basis of the talks, which remained the same. The talks are resuming now on the same basis.

71. Furthermore, if Mr. Olcay had the impression that the basis had changed when the Secretary-General in his report of 1 December 1972 [S/10842], six months after the resumption of the talks, said that the talks were resumed on the basis of an independent, sovereign and unitary State, where is the remonstrance of Mr. Olcay on that statement? Did he

say, “No, we have now come with a new basis, because of the two aide-mémoires”? Today he found no difficulty in remonstrating because of something in the report that was not exactly as he thought it should be. But why on this important subject did he say nothing to dispute what the Secretary-General's report said? All these things together—what do they show? I have to look, as I did at the morning meeting, into the pattern of policies. I have to say again that the talks will be resumed on 4 June, but they are resumed not on the assumption but on the certainty that they are in accordance with the formula—namely, on the same basis as that on which they have been conducted so far.

72. Let me turn to the other aspect of the statement of my friend Mr. Olcay. I am sure that what he does he has to do because he has to follow the pattern. He cannot get out of the pattern that I have shown this morning. What pattern is it? The pattern of obstructing any workable solution for an independent Cyprus. Therefore the pattern is to destroy the independence of Cyprus, not to save it. It would have been natural to want to save the independence of Cyprus, to avoid the enosis fear, but we see that the whole policy is to destroy that independence, and the best way to destroy it is to insist on a constitution that is unworkable. So either there is no agreement and there is no lasting solution and therefore it will remain pending so that the opportunity for partition may come in, and it would come in through the federation way, as I shall prove, or it is agreed to have such a constitution as is bound to disrupt the State and not bring a workable and lasting solution. That it was done to disrupt the State was stated by the constitutional experts whom I have already quoted, and I am going to refer to them again, and by the Mediator, who was the person to study the situation. He said clearly that any federation would destroy the State. That is why there is so much insistence on the federation idea, but they did not dare to bring it up before.

73. When Ambassador Olcay in December 1973 objected to the use of the unitary State, he did not speak of federation. It is now that the idea of federation is brought in. It is the policy of escalation. Of course, another day we shall hear “partition”. But now we hear no partition—no such idea at all. That attitude was also taken about federation a while ago. They did not dare mention it in any sense as federation. Even now Ambassador Olcay speaks about a federalist form in an elusive and uncertain way. What is a federalist arrangement? It is either federation or non-federation. The constitutional structures are well known. Unitary State or federal State? There is no use calling them semantics. If you discuss the constitution of a State, you have got to go by the generally accepted structures of States. There are no practical and precise negotiations if you ignore constitutional structures and call them semantics. It is semantics for those who want to avoid them or to confuse the issues. The question is: Are we going to affirm and solidify the independence by a workable solution or are we to destroy it?

74. Let us see now what has been the policy of Turkey on Cyprus in relation to partition. Mr. Kemal Satir, Turkish Vice-Premier, in a public statement made in 1964, said: “Cyprus will be divided into two sections, one of which will join Turkey.” Mr. Erkin, in June 1964, in an interview granted at Athens to the newspaper *Eleftheria*, said: “The radical solution of the question of Cyprus would be to cede

one part of Cyprus to Greece and the other, closest to the Turkish Adriatic Coast, to Turkey." That is behind the mind of those destroying the independence and not agreeing to anything about it.

75. Let us now see what the late İsmet İnönü, the Turkish Prime Minister, said on 8 September 1964 before the Turkish National Assembly: "Officially, we promoted the federation concept rather than that of partition thesis so as to remain within the provisions of the treaty." This was to cover it up with something more acceptable to world public opinion, rather than to say "partition". He had to explain, to apologize to the Assembly that he said "federation" and that he did not say "outright partition".

76. I quote these statements so as to show what is the pattern of Turkey's policy towards Cyprus and what is behind it. It is no longer behind it, it is now open.

77. The periodical *Halkın Sesi*, the mouthpiece of Mr. Küçük, who was the Turkish Cypriot leader, acting, of course, under the inspiration and instructions of Turkey as usual, stated in its editorial of 9 August 1965:

"Cyprus is another Alexandretta in the history of Turkey. The power of Turkey will ensure an honourable life for the Turkish Cypriots in the same way as it did in Alexandretta by annexing it and bringing it under Turkish domination" [S/6630].

Mr. Küçük declared on 10 January 1964 that partition was the best solution and even went so far as to propose the thirty-fifth parallel as an ideal line of demarcation.

78. When we know these things, is it at all astonishing that the Government of Cyprus took exception when the Prime Minister of Turkey, who happens to be the leader of the party founded by his predecessor İnönü, speaks about federation. That explains why there is this pattern that I spoke of this morning of preventing conciliation and normalization in Cyprus by force, preventing the Turkish Cypriots from associating with the Greek Cypriots. I mentioned that and Ambassador Olcay did not refute it.

79. They all have freedom of movement. The Turks walk everywhere in Cyprus except in restricted military areas where no Greeks can go. The Greek Cypriots cannot cross many public roads, among which are communication roads, because they are prohibited by Turkish fighters and we, for our part, do not want to use force. The United Nations tried and is trying to keep the situation calm. We are very grateful for that. In this report you will see that the Turkish Cypriots are trying to break this *status quo* in Limassol.

80. We now come to the question of federation. If we cannot have a unitary State, can we have a federation? Ambassador Olcay is trying to rule out the unitary State, and federation is ruled out by the realities of the situation. As I said this morning, Lord Radcliffe was sent by the British Government to examine this claim for federation. He said that he had given his best consideration to the claim put on behalf of the Turkish Cypriot community for a federated system, and added:

"... But can Cyprus be organised as a federation in this way? I do not think so. There is no pattern of territorial

separation between the two communities and, apart from other objections, federation of communities which does not involve also federation of territories seems to me a very difficult constitutional form".²

Yet Ambassador Olcay speaks about a federation but no moving of populations.

81. I am circulating certain maps to members of the Council so as to enable them to understand the situation in Cyprus and to be convinced that the population is intermingled. I hope all members have the maps, because it is very important and vital for the coming talks. Now, if members will look at those maps, they will see that there is no part of Cyprus where there is a Turkish majority. The six districts into which Cyprus has always been divided, and the six main towns all have a Greek majority and a Turkish minority, varying between one sixth and one fourth or one fifth or, in rare cases, one third. How can you partition this country? How can you separate this territory so that you can have a federal system?

82. We have gone all the way towards accommodating the Turkish side by giving them all possible rights. But federation is not workable. The existing Constitution of Cyprus is not a federation. Even Mr. Denktaş himself admits that the Constitution of Cyprus is of a unitary sovereign State. He calls it "a bi-communal unitary sovereign State". But even if you call it "bi-communal"—you can call it whatever you like—it is unitary and it is not a federation. If Mr. Denktaş thought it was a federation, he would have said so. But he cannot, because there is not one characteristic of a federation. It has only one council; it does not even have local government. The administration is central and the Turkish community only has communal rights; that is, separate communal rights on religion, educational, personal right; not administrative right.

83. Therefore, there is no administrative right at all, at any level. How could it be a federation? If the structure of Cyprus today is not a federation and we want to change it into a federation, it means that we want to change the whole structure, completely apart from its being unworkable. And the talks were not for the purpose of changing the structure. The Turkish Cypriot leadership was insisting that "we are not going to change the structure because on that we depend for our community's right". Now they want to attack it and blow it up, the whole unitary State, in order to bring in federation, which is unworkable.

84. How can this policy be constructive or positive towards Cyprus? I am so glad that Ambassador Olcay brought it out in such a way that we can see clearly that they are speaking of a federation now.

85. We do not want to have suspicions, but we would like to clear this matter up in a way that will help the talks to progress. Now that we have seen that federation is impossible, if the Council wants to help Cyprus and get rid of this problem and the expense, it has to help in some way. I submit, towards a solution on the basis of a unitary State.

² *Constitutional Proposals for Cyprus*, Cmd. 42 (London, HM Stationery Office 1956), para. 28.

which is the only basis on which the problem can be solved. It cannot be solved otherwise. When they made the Zurich and London Agreements, they gave some negative rights of veto to the Turkish minority, but no federated rights because it did not exist. Therefore, now, if we are going to take away those negative rights which have proved unworkable, let us find some other way to ensure that there will be no danger of changing the independence of Cyprus, that independence for which Turkey shows so little respect that it wants to give it an unworkable constitution. But if we want it, then there are many ways to ensure that the status of independence is not changed. Therefore, there are many ways that can be thought out, without destroying the structure of the State.

86. My colleague mentioned complaints about the public services. They are not so important, but we want to clarify the matter. First of all, with regard to the electricity authority, it is indicated here that in 1974 six new Turkish villages were given electricity. However public services in the enclaves are difficult because of the obstructions put in the way of the Greek Cypriot employees in entering the enclaves.

87. I have seen on one occasion, when a team went to a Turkish village in the enclaves—just recently—that they were not allowed to go in and carry out the public service. I believe it was electricity. The reports of the Secretary-General speak of these difficulties in the enclaves.

88. So when the Turks complain about these services, they must realize that a lot of the difficulties are caused, as is indicated in the Secretary-General's report, by the barriers in the enclaves. But paragraph 48 of the Secretary-General's report shows the great assistance given in drought relief by the Government to the Turkish Cypriots, and we are glad that that was done. We are glad to do it because the Turkish Cypriots, the people themselves, wish to live in peace and amity, and they show the best feelings. But it is the policy that prevents them from doing that. I did not indicate the sums that were given, but they are £838,000 on this occasion, £60,000 on another, and so on—all assistance given by the Government to the Turkish Cypriot community.

89. In regard to electricity, we find that they already owe £3.5 million, which they do not pay. The strangest thing is that the inhabitants of an area of Ayios Kassianos, where there is the Turkish Cypriot quarter, had their electricity cut off. They went to the electricity authority and asked why they had cut off the light. It was found that the so-called Turkish Cypriot administration had cut the light off in that whole area of Ayios Kassianos because they wanted them to pay to the Turkish Cypriot administration the cost of the light which was provided by the Government. The Government, which was paying for the expense of the electric light, was not paid. The amount went into millions and millions, but the Turkish Cypriots insisted on collecting from the Turkish Cypriots. And if they did not pay, they cut off the light.

90. That is another amazing policy, and here we have complaints by Mr. Olcay about the electricity. But here is the official document: Minutes 865, Liaison Committee.

Administration of Village Accounts and Pendacomo. This can be verified at any moment.

91. Now with regard to the displaced persons: the displaced persons are not in their villages because they were forced out by the Turkish Cypriot leadership in order to create a pattern of separation. They were segregated. They wanted to go back, but were not allowed to do so. And the Government agreed to build them houses and did build 350.

92. I have here the details concerning the villages in which they were built: of 132 inhabitants in Morfu, not one has been allowed to return by the Turkish Cypriot leadership; in Kyrenia, of 666 not one has returned. So we have the list of a number of villages where the houses were repaired by the Government but not one inhabitant has returned. In some cases seven out of 35 inhabitants returned; in another, one out of 107 returned; and so on. So that, if the refugees are not back, it is not the Government's fault that they are not allowed to return by the Turkish Cypriot leadership. This has been reported by the Secretary-General in previous reports.

93. I do not want to take up more time, but I would say that all these complaints are absolutely unfounded and they are in fact the result of a policy of separatism, imposed on the Turkish Cypriots by punishment and fines. I have twice given the list of punishment and fines imposed on Turkish Cypriots if they have any relations with Greek Cypriots or enter a Greek shop. We have a recent document by the so-called Turkish Cypriot Administration giving instructions that no Turkish Cypriot may enter a Greek shop and that those who do are to be marked. Now what has the intention of this pattern of policy over the years been but to create such a rift in Cyprus as to prepare the way to the solution to which they are looking?

94. Now, therefore, because of this policy it has been customary for the Turkish representative in the Security Council to mention the question of enosis in order to confuse the real issue of independence and to find some justification or excuse for the systematic obstruction of the independent State of Cyprus and of any logical and workable solution for an independent State.

95. Turkey's fears of enosis are not genuine but affected. They know very well, as does everyone else, that enosis is not considered an achievable proposition and is not the subject of official policy either by Cyprus or by Greece. That is why Cyprus has given its whole heart to its independence and is striving for a workable and solid independence in a viable State; and, for the same reason, conversely Turkey is opposing it.

96. That Cyprus has been predominantly Greek in character and culture through the millenia in an unbroken continuity is an historic reality. The preservation of Cyprus as a single, undivided and integral unit is an historic responsibility. The natural ethnic sentiments for Greece of the large majority of the people of Cyprus were never concealed and are well known in the United Nations. But that is no impediment to the present state of unitary independence to which Cyprus is dedicated and which it is working hard to retain.

Its position in the United Nations has been constructive and so has been its policy as an independent State all these years.

97. Therefore, I hope that we will not waste our time on these excuses and proceed towards an independent, sovereign and unitary Cyprus which can have a workable constitution and viable existence. I also hope and feel sure that Ambassador Olcay realizes that this is true. I have great respect for him. I am certain that he understands the situation in his heart and mind.

98. I apologize for taking a little time, but since we are at the end of a 10-year period we have to review the situation and clear up the matter.

99. The PRESIDENT: The representative of Turkey has asked to be allowed to speak and I now call on him.

100. Mr. OLCAY (Turkey) (*interpretation from French*): I shall begin by quoting a great French poet:

"Zénon, cruel Zénon
Zénon d'Elée
m'as-tu percé de cette flèche ailée
qui vibre, vole et qui ne vole pas?
Le son m'enfante et la flèche me tue
Ah! le soleil . . . Quelle ombre de tortue
Pour l'âme, Achille immobile à grand pas".

Having thus demonstrated that my memory has not yet begun to show signs of decay, in so far as I am able to I shall attempt to reply to the arguments put forward by my friend Ambassador Rossides. I have very great respect for the rigours of Aristotelian thought and its profound logic. Nevertheless, I cannot refrain from recalling that it was the Greeks themselves who began all the vagaries of the Greek sophists. I know that I can count on the tolerance of Ambassador Rossides and his sense of humour when I say that there are sometimes names and first names that are predestined.

101. It is difficult for me to understand how certain quarters which are so ready to suspect the existence of ulterior motives when the Turks talk of a federal system designed to perpetuate the existence of a sovereign State of Cyprus within the United Nations are not profoundly shocked, when the very existence of this State is challenged by the clear-cut and proclaimed desire of a whole community in the same State to put an end to it, despite the no less obvious wish of the other community not to fall under the yoke of a third Power.

102. One of the many difficulties confronting us when we have to make a judgement on the Cyprus problem is the incredible facility with which the Greek side modifies its positions or renounces them—all except one—and I hope this does not offend Ambassador Rossides—the attachment to enosis, to which I shall come back and which I shall explain.

103. The dilemma of Turkish diplomacy is that whilst trying to explain these changes it has to demonstrate to world public opinion that in substance nothing changes. I shall try to be brief. The Constitution solemnly adopted in

1960 is based on the concept of equality in law on the part of the two communities and, consequently, the federalist spirit—no matter what the Greek Cypriot explainers of this may describe it to be—and this is meant to bar the way to enosis or division. The day after its signing—I should again like to point out that when I speak of "the day after" I do not mean precisely the next day but immediately after its signing; it is not a sign of my decaying memory in this case—the Greek Cypriots, finding that in fact it was an obstacle to the realization of the ultimate objective, denounced it. Already the Archbishop was suggesting to anyone who wished to believe it that his hand had been forced. To do what? To reject enosis. Passing over in silence the Turkish part of the sacrifice which had been made in order to achieve a compromise—the renunciation not only of its rights, both historical and juridical, on the island but also its partition thesis, the thesis of the Turkish Government and the Turkish Cypriots—the Greek party this time is playing on the theme of independence, which, in all good faith and wholeheartedly, not only the Turkish community but also the Government of Turkey agrees with, the Government which I have the honour to represent here.

104. But this independence must for the Greeks be accompanied by a new constitution, and I say a new constitution advisedly, because the old constitution—to which Ambassador Rossides referred just now and which, he said, had nothing whatsoever to do with the federal system—if my memory does not betray me, provided for two chambers for each of the two communities, the absolute right of veto on the part of the Vice-President of the Republic, carefully allotted quotas of members within the Council of Ministers and absolute control over foreign policy, which, I believe, even applied to the appointment of diplomatic agents.

105. I shall now come back to my text where I was saying that for the Greeks this independence was to be accompanied by a new constitution on the basis of a State which was described as unitary, a State in which—and now I shall use the Greek terminology—"the majority would make law and dictate it". In the unitary system, then, nothing prevented this majority, if the case arose, from opting for union with Greece, thus putting an end to the ephemeral independence of an island, an island which as the head of State himself avowed, and I can cite hundreds of examples of this, has never considered this independence as anything but a second-best solution, a compromise. And I am quoting the words used by Archbishop Makarios—a stage.

106. Turkey, however, is bound by its contractual obligations because it honours, has always honoured and will continue to honour the principle of *pacta sunt servanda*. So I would ask Ambassador Rossides: Does your Government feel itself bound by treaties solemnly signed by Archbishop Makarios?

107. As I have done on many previous occasions, I invite Ambassador Rossides to tell me how he explains the fact that in the course of the intercommunal talks which were held in Cyprus for the establishment of a new constitution the Greek side, acting, I suppose, on the authority of the supreme head of State, refused to concede the inclusion in the new constitution of a text officially, definitively and clearly rejecting partition or enosis. I should be

very pleased if there could be a denial forthcoming on this subject as there has been on other occasions when, unfortunately, the denials failed to correspond to the truth.

108. I shall explain what I mean. Ambassador Rossides said that often I was silent, that I did not raise objections to the reference to the concept of a unitary State when the Secretariat referred to it in its reports or when he himself referred to it here. Here again the question of failing memory arises acutely. Since the Secretariat is represented here, and with your permission, and through you, Mr. President, I would address it in order to ask if it remembers that on several occasions I raised very serious objections to the fact that the question of the concept of a unitary State was mentioned in a report, even when reference was made to it in a statement attributed to a Secretary-General who is no longer in the Organization. Even then I felt that probably one day Ambassador Rossides would come here and say that the basis for negotiations had been and would be the unitary State. And since from the very beginning I had raised objections, I believed that reference should not be made to it in a text. I always attempted to stress this fact in my contacts with the Secretariat. I perhaps was not always successful in persuading the Secretariat not to mention the text in this way, in the knowledge of how controversial it might be. Perhaps I did not succeed in making the Secretariat understand that one day Ambassador Rossides would come here and say that this concept was the basis from the very beginning. Well, what beginning? The beginning of negotiations between the parties in Cyprus.

109. I can state all that here in public, knowing that at least the Secretariat is very well aware that everything I am now saying is in fact the truth. I shall go even further, however; I had the honour of being the Minister for Foreign Affairs of my country and as such I personally discussed—as I said this morning—with U Thant the question of a resumption of negotiations which began in 1968 and had been suspended, having met with total failure.

110. That is one of the reasons why the resumption of these negotiations was so long drawn out: it was precisely because I myself insisted on the need to omit any pre-condition to the resumption of these negotiations. And by "pre-condition" I meant at the time—as I mean now—the unitary State or the basis of the unitary State. At no time—and I am sorry for Ambassador Rossides—have I failed right here to indicate that we, you and I, should not try to solve the problem. But every time, I did say that all the possibilities of a solution should be open to those in the discussions in Cyprus and that among these possibilities the federal possibility was not excluded. I said that, and it can be proved from the texts. Unfortunately, I do not have all the texts of the statements I made on the five occasions when I had the honour of having been invited to speak in the Council.

111. Consequently—I am trying to find the right word here—I absolutely reject the idea that I ever accepted tacitly or overtly the possibility that the basis for a unitary State was the basis accepted by the Turkish Government or the Turkish negotiators in Cyprus. I am sure that after the oratorical outbursts of Ambassador Rossides on this subject the Secretariat will find it easier to understand why I have

always taken every opportunity to object to the use of the words "unitary State" which the Secretariat no doubt used them with the best intentions in the world.

112. I now wish to turn to another quotation from a text I have before me in English written by Mr. Criton G. Tornaritis, who I believe is the Attorney General of the Republic of Cyprus, giving his interpretation of the 1960 Constitution. He said:

"The Constitution of Cyprus was based on two main principles. The one consisted in the recognition of the existence of two communities—the Greek and the Turkish—... who were given equal treatment, whilst the people of Cyprus as a whole and the other racial communities of whom it consisted have been conspicuously ignored. The other principle was aiming at the participation of each community in the exercise of the functions of government and at avoiding the supremacy of the larger community... assuring also an equal and partial administrative autonomy to each community".¹

It is not a Turk who wrote that text. It does give a certain insight into the conception that was underlying the 1960 Constitution.

113. I do not want to expatiate any further on the 1960 Constitution. I should like to state what the Turkish Cypriots would like to see with respect to the 1960 Constitution. It should be a Constitution which makes Cyprus an independent State, whose independence would be guaranteed forever, that is to say, that no matter what may be the dreams or aspirations for enosis—never disguised by the highest leaders at all levels of the Greek Cypriot hierarchy—that Constitution should make it possible for Cyprus to live and remain in independence, an independence which should be so genuine that there would be no shadow of a doubt that the Cypriot Government was not a Greek Cypriot Government in the sense that in certain circumstances it would prefer to receive its instructions from somewhere other than its own capital. That is our idea of a Cypriot constitution which would be appropriate and would reflect the aspirations of the two communities.

114. I wish to stress the point that without the Turkish community there would be no Cypriot independence. It is only the Turkish presence which made Cyprus an independent State. If there had been no Turkish element, there would be no representative of Cyprus sitting here, because, obviously, if everyone on the island had wanted what only one community wants today, the island would have ceased to be independent long ago. It would be a Greek province, as the head of State sometimes inadvertently has indicated, because of the stress of the moment, in receiving Greek representatives from the motherland, by saying, "I am happy to greet you in southern Greece".

115. I think I am repeating myself, and that is why I shall confine myself to stating how the Turkish Government conceives the formula on the basis of which, I hope, negotiations will be resumed on 4 June next.

¹ Quoted in English by the speaker.

[The speaker continued in English.]

116. At the beginning of my statement this morning, I stated the feeling of my delegation that a great deal of time has been lost over semantic arguments—and I am sorry to use this formula again, one which does not seem to please very much my good friend Ambassador Rossides—because of efforts to introduce unacceptable terminology into the literature of the intercommunal talks. Unfortunately, we have witnessed once again, and more than once, a renewal of these efforts. Both my Greek colleague and Ambassador Rossides have given their own interpretation of the formula quoted in paragraph 63 of the report for the resumption of the talks. Both claim that in their view the talks about to resume in Cyprus have as their basis a unitary State. So as not to give occasion in 10 years' time to Ambassador Rossides to tell my successor that by remaining silent on the subject I have tacitly agreed to it, I should like the record to show my Government's interpretation of the formula agreed upon for the resumption of the talks.

117. In the view of my Government, that formula does not include any reference to a unitary State, and my Government cannot accept any other basis than the two memoranda of the Secretary-General dated respectively 18 October 1971 and 18 May 1972—no more, no less. Again I shall quote from the statement I made this morning, in which I said that I wished

“... to state most unequivocally that the Turkish side shares the Secretary-General's hope ‘that the parties will return to a consideration of the substance of the problems that face them, and seek to reach agreement on constitutional arrangements that will be satisfactory to all concerned’. And it is in this spirit that the Turkish side will continue the talks when they are resumed on 4 June 1974.” [1771st meeting, para. 55.]

118. I thank you, Mr. President, and I apologize for having taken so much time of the Council, but I needed to take almost as much time as my dear friend Ambassador Rossides has taken.

119. The PRESIDENT: I call on the representative of Cyprus.

120. Mr. ROSSIDES (Cyprus): I was very glad to hear my distinguished friend Ambassador Olcay recite a French poem. Unfortunately, at the time, my earphone was not working, and I could not relish the poem. I asked around, and no one could tell me about it. I should like to hear it. Probably he can tell me later on, when we meet outside. I may answer him with another poem. That is a good idea. I think—to have a conversation in poetry. It is more pleasant, and it is more philosophic. I am sure there was some philosophy in it which, owing to mechanical malfunction, I did not catch. The representative of Australia was kind enough to try and help me with this earphone, but it was still not working. I do not know if there is any cause for reply. I hope that the poem contained no shifting of ground.

121. Ambassador Olcay also said that on various occasions he had during private talks with the Secretary-General objected to the use of the words “unitary State”. Those

private talks do not concern me. I am concerned with what appears in the record, and he is on record for the first time objecting to the unitary State in December 1973—and that again, as I have said, casually. Not before then. He had previously had ample occasion to do so, and he had never used it. Therefore, knowing how careful Ambassador Olcay is and how keen he is to use the arguments he has to use to carry out the instructions of his Government, the implication is that he would—had there been instructions in June 1972 and June 1973 to do so—have objected to the ample references that had been made to a unitary State. Therefore, the result remains that this was a new policy started in December 1973 and not before then.

122. The Ambassador says that the negotiations are now to be conducted on the basis of the aide-mémoires. But the aide-mémoires does not supply any basis at all. How are they going to engage in discussion? The aide-mémoires refer to two constitutional experts being added, and a Special Representative of the Secretary-General. Are they going to discuss this matter? What are they going to discuss, if they are going to strike out all that has happened before? Are they now going to discuss on a *tabula rasa*—a new thing altogether?

123. But the formula clearly says, “on the basis on which they were conducted so far”. Were they conducted on no basis? If that is the assumption of the representative of Turkey—that there was no basis at all—they had no meaning. Why were they taking place?

124. So there must have been a basis. And that basis is going to be continued. Now, what basis was it? There is ample evidence, and I have given it. And therefore, as far as we are concerned, they are to continue on the basis of a unitary State, as I have shown. I have not seen any document which speaks of any other basis at all.

125. Ambassador Olcay first objected to the unitary State in December 1973. But he did not mention any other basis at all. So this federation idea is a new one, and as a new idea it is not to be accepted at all or to be considered a real proposition because that would bring about the end of the talks.

126. The PRESIDENT: I call upon the representative of Turkey.

127. Mr. OLCAY (Turkey): When Ambassador Rossides asks, “But what was the basis if it was not a unitary State?”, I have to remind him that the idea was precisely that there was no pre-arranged basis, there was no pre-arranged formula, and the negotiators had to be free to devise a constitution which was, in the words of Ambassador Rossides himself, a workable constitution, the basis of which could only be an existing constitution that had to be modified. And I remember that many package deals were arranged, many solutions were put forward, much give-and-take took place in the many years during which negotiations continued. But there was never a text which said that the basis of the negotiations was the unitary State.

128. Ambassador Rossides has many advantages over me; one of them is that at this very moment he has a text in his hand. But I am sure that more careful study of what I have

said on the five occasions I have had the honour of appearing before the Council will show that I have never accepted the concept of a unitary State. I have indicated that the Secretariat can be a witness to what I am saying. I also distinctly remember having more than once mentioned that the discussions should not take place here between my good friend Ambassador Rossides and me or my colleague from Greece, but that the place for the discussions *in situ* was Nicosia and that there all solutions were open, including the federal system—so much so that I remember having even asked how we could exclude in the United Nations the idea of a federal system as though the word itself was a kind of sin or disgrace or unmentionable thing, when, looking around this table I see that more than half the membership live under some kind of federal system. The reason why we insisted so long and so often on the possibility of a federal system is that there are an endless number of variations possible on the words "federation" and "federal system", while none is possible on the word "unitary". If the word "unitary" were to be accepted, and if the Constitution of 1960 had given birth to a unitary State, how could it be explained that one of the constituent members of that State would have a right to oppose by veto the main decisions regarding the future of the State? That is what we consider to be one of the elements of a federative system. There are so many variations. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is a federation. The United States is another, and Belgium yet another. How can you compare all those systems? The only thing that can have no variations is the concept of a unitary State where majority rule has full play according to democratic principles. That is, if the future constitution of Cyprus were to be based on the concept of a unitary State, the majority—that is, the Greeks—might decide at any time that, having had enough of separation from their motherland, they chose to be reunited with it. And that would be that. That is not possible under a federal system, in which the two communities have an equal right in the future, in the independence, in the sovereignty, in the territorial integrity of the State. That is what we mean when we speak about a federal system. We do not formulate the system. It is up to the people over there to work it out. If by any chance they find a formula which includes all the elements that we consider a federative system, so much the better, but what I have to make quite clear here is that the concept of a unitary State as the basis—as the only basis—of negotiations is unacceptable to the Turkish Government.

129. The PRESIDENT: I give the floor to the representative of Cyprus.

130. Mr. ROSSIDES (Cyprus): I hope I shall not occupy the Council for long. I was trying to write a poem to reply but I have not written it yet—perhaps next time.

131. I think the representative of Turkey. He says that there was no basis at all. I said that there could not be negotiations without a basis. Then he admitted that there was a basis, by saying that the purpose was to modify in certain respects the existing Constitution. So that existing Constitution was the basis. What basis was it? That of a unitary State. Every person with constitutional knowledge will see that Cyprus could not be a federal State, because a federal State means that the federated parts have complete control of their internal affairs. They are federated by a link

in a central government but they have complete internal governments, separate, independent from the centre. This requires separate territorial areas. Nothing of the kind exists in Cyprus. Every part, every village, comes under the administration of the centre, and the communal rights were only restricted rights, not rights of administration. They were restricted rights, as I have said, of education, religion and personal rights. So the existing Constitution is that of a purely unitary State in every sense of the word. Ambassador Olcay, admitting now that that was the basis on which the negotiations were conducted, for purposes of modification, admits the unitary State, as a basis of the talks, as recorded in the report of the Secretary-General.

132. Now, there is nothing wrong with a federal system *per se*. There are various kinds of federal systems. In the United States it is not based on any ethnic criteria. But what is wanted in Cyprus is the reverse of a federation, in a sense. In a federation you take separate entities and then you join them in a federation by a link. In Switzerland there were four or five different entities living in different States or cantons and they joined in one federal Government. However, in Cyprus you take one unitary State—as the map has shown, with such an intermingled population—and try administratively to divide it, and you cannot divide it. Eventually you cause a movement of the population in order to fit in with that idea of an administration of a federal system which is unworkable. Therefore, you take a crystal glass, you break it in two and then you join it with a tape. If you have two big crystal jars, you can perhaps join them together, but you cannot join one crystal glass with itself unless you break it. So the purpose of a federal system in Cyprus is to break the unity of Cyprus, destroy it, with the concept of federation—this supposed concept of federating it.

133. Sufficient unto the day is the evil thereof, and perhaps the members of the Council now will be able to go to bed and dream of federation.

134. The PRESIDENT: I give the floor to the representative of Turkey.

135. Mr. OLCAY (Turkey): Mr. President, those who have been longer than you in the Council know that there are two possibilities for ending the discussions here of the problem of Cyprus. The last speaker is either Ambassador Rossides or myself, and it is usually Ambassador Rossides. Out of the five times I have appeared here, I think that four times the last speaker was Ambassador Rossides. Therefore I would like to try to change the pattern today because he has indicated that we can now go home and dream about federation. Before going home to dream about federation, I am going to say just a few words: the basis for which we should like to see Cyprus strive in the future would be one in which the two communities will have equal rights in the future of the State and that would give to the two communities the assurance that their status will not be changeable by a majority decision—the basic status belonging to the two communities.

136. I must also say that in this island, where I know the population lives in such a mixed situation, the 1960 Constitution, which is considered, strangely enough, a model for a

unitary State, allowed, in addition to what I have said about distinct communal chambers, the right of veto and so on, two separate municipalities as well in five of the major cities.

137. Also I should like to recall that I have said that there are as many possibilities and variations on the theme of federalism as there are States that adopt this form, and among those I have mentioned, as just one of the examples, there is Belgium, where the same intermingling of population exists, where the main difference is one of language and where both sides, wherever they live and in whatever group they live, have in their personal rights, in their status and in their influence over the national life a separate, distinct voice, not only as citizens but also as members of a certain community. Therefore, there are endless variations. I am not a jurist. I have always admitted that I do not know all the intricacies of either administrative law or any other law. However, the main thing is that I do not want the discussion to take place here but I want the record to show once more and for posterity—I am never sure with Ambassador Rossides—that here and now I have said that the basis of the negotiations which are about to start is not the unitary State. What it will finally be, what name it will finally have and the form it will finally take depend on the negotiators on the spot.

138. The PRESIDENT: I give the floor to the representative of Cyprus.

139. Mr. ROSSIDES (Cyprus): I shall be briefer than my colleague. If, as he says, we speak for posterity, we have to be careful about what we say, and we have to finish up with words for posterity.

140. My friend mentioned Belgium. Belgium is a country where different ethnic entities, the Walloons and the Flemings, have occupied different territories, so that they could lend themselves well to a federation. Yet they have not a federationist constitution. But if they wanted to have it, they could because they have the prerequisites for it. In Cyprus

there are none of these prerequisites of federation. There is no comparable situation when the concept of federation is linked with that of partition.

141. Anyway, since we are speaking for posterity, we shall say, "All's well that ends well"—and I hope that this Security Council meeting will end well.

142. The PRESIDENT: I call on the representative of Turkey.

143. Mr. OLCAY (Turkey): Ambassador Rossides has declared that where there is a country which may threaten with partition, federation creates a danger. My answer is that where there is a country which threatens to end its own independence there is, for those within that country who do not want to follow wherever independence will end, a right not to cease to be independent and free citizens. Therefore, it is a two-way street. Ambassador Rossides quoted Shakespeare, "All's well that ends well." I hope that the end is not here in the Security Council, that it will be decided in Cyprus for the benefit of both communities and of Cyprus as a whole, and, as a side benefit, for the betterment of relations between Greece and Turkey.

144. The PRESIDENT: I call on the representative of Cyprus.

145. Mr. ROSSIDES (Cyprus): I simply want to say that perhaps in the map that we distributed it was not stated that the population of Cyprus is 82 per cent Greek and 18 per cent Turkish. This is perhaps something that should be borne in mind.

146. The PRESIDENT: I assume that the consideration of the item before this meeting has been concluded. I should like to thank everyone for the co-operation that has been extended.

The meeting rose at 6.15 p.m.