General Assembly

Fifty-ninth session
Item 40 of the provisional agenda*
**Strengthening of the coordination of humanitarian
and disaster relief assistance of the United Nations,
including special economic assistance**

Safety and security of humanitarian personnel and protection of United Nations personnel

Report of the Secretary-General**

Summary

> The General Assembly, in its resolution 58/122 of 17 December 2003, requested the Secretary-General to submit to it at its fifty-ninth session a comprehensive and updated report on the safety and security situation of humanitarian personnel and protection of United Nations personnel and on the implementation of that resolution, including the progress made by the Secretary-General in pursuing accountability and assessing responsibility for all individual security incidents that involved United Nations and its associated personnel at all levels throughout the United Nations system, as well as an account of the measures taken by Governments and the United Nations to prevent and respond to such incidents.

> The present report outlines the threats against the safety and security of United Nations personnel over the past year as well as provides an update on the implementation of the initiatives approved during the fifty-eighth session of the General Assembly. As these initiatives are being implemented over the course of the entire biennium 2003-2004, this report constitutes a progress report on actions that have already been taken and an indication of what remains to be done.

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  * A/59/150.
 ** The present report was delayed owing to the need to await contributions from other offices.

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I. Introduction

1.   In its resolution 58/122 of 17 December 2003, the General Assembly requested the Secretary-General to submit to the Assembly at its fifty-ninth session a comprehensive and updated report on the safety and security situation of humanitarian personnel and protection of United Nations personnel and on the implementation of that resolution, including the progress made by the Secretary-General in pursuing accountability and assessing responsibility for all individual security incidents that involved United Nations and its associated personnel at all levels throughout the United Nations system, as well as an account of the measures taken by Governments and the United Nations to prevent and respond to such incidents.

2.   The present report has been prepared in consultation with the members of the United Nations System Chief Executives Board for Coordination (CEB) and covers the period from 1 July 2003 to 30 June 2004.

II. Threats against United Nations personnel

3.   Throughout the reporting period, United Nations personnel in a wide range of field operations continued to be subjected to threats such as hostage-taking, physical assault, robbery, theft, harassment and lengthy detention, as described in previous reports. In addition, a new and particularly devastating threat of directly targeted attack came to the fore in the explosion at the United Nations headquarters in Baghdad on 19 August 2003, resulting in the death of 16 United Nations staff members and injury to more than 150.

4.   The outline of events prior to, during and subsequent to the attack of 19 August 2003 are set out in the report of the Secretary-General (S/2003/1149) of 5 December 2003 pursuant to paragraph 24 of Security Council resolution 1483 (2003) and paragraph 12 of Council resolution 1511 (2003). While the attack in September 2003 against the same facility resulted in no deaths or injuries among United Nations personnel, a number of Iraqi police were killed and wounded and the implacable hostility of the assailants was confirmed. Subsequent attacks include the assault by explosive device against the Baghdad offices of the International Committee of the Red Cross, the intimidation of locally recruited United Nations staff members in Iraq, including 2 murders, and the killing of 29 members of various non-governmental organizations in Afghanistan. Repeated threats against the Organization through web sites and other publicized statements by a number of hostile elements demonstrate the virulence, lethality and considerable geographical scope of an ongoing potential of direct attack against the Organization, its activities and its staff members.

5.   As reported in past years, United Nations personnel continue to face ongoing threats to their personal safety and security in all regions in which they operate, the most dangerous of which is physical violence directed against them. Aside from deaths due to illness or vehicle and aircraft accidents, there have been 218 United Nations civilian staff members killed since 1992 as a result of malicious acts. Twenty-two of those deaths occurred during this reporting period, the majority of the dead being victims of the bomb attack on the United Nations headquarters in Baghdad (see annex I). The figure of 218 deaths does not include uniformed

peacekeepers, nor does it include the 20 United Nations civilian staff members who have lost their lives since 1992 as result of aircraft accidents due to technical problems. A consolidated list of staff who have lost their lives as result of a malicious act, as well as an indication of the status of legal proceedings undertaken by the relevant Member State, is included in the report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Scope of Legal Protection under the Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel, 12-16 April 2004,[1] which has been submitted to the General Assembly at its fifty-ninth session pursuant to Assembly resolution 58/82 of 9 December 2003.

6.   The most prevalent threats to the security of United Nations operations are physical attacks, robbery and theft. More than 120 incidents of assault, including 10 cases of rape or sexual assault, on personnel of the United Nations were recorded during the reporting period. The United Nations also received reports of 428 violent assaults directed towards non-United Nations entities, including the International Committee of the Red Cross, and national and international non-governmental organizations during this same period. Harassment of United Nations personnel continues to be widespread with at least 139 incidents during the period at checkpoints or against convoys or other activities. There were also two serious incidents of kidnapping of United Nations staff, both of which occurred in Somalia.

7.   There were four bomb threats against field offices in Ethiopia, Georgia, Guatemala and Pakistan, a significant reduction from the previous reporting period. However, attacks on United Nations premises and properties in the field are an increasing matter of concern. During the reporting period, there were seven violent attacks against United Nations compounds and convoys, which occurred in Iraq (two), Ethiopia, Indonesia, Pakistan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Afghanistan. There were 52 reported forceful incursions into United Nations compounds, although many were a result of political protests. More than 1,256 incidents of theft involving office equipment, official vehicles, staff residences and personal belongings were reported. While theft most directly affects the quantity of material resources available for United Nations operations, it also has a significant impact on the personal safety and well-being of staff members and on the integrity of United Nations field installations.

8.   As the statistics clearly indicate, the safety and security of United Nations personnel continue to be threatened on an alarmingly frequent basis. Owing to their heightened visibility as representatives of the international community, United Nations personnel are at substantial risk of being targeted by many diverse entities and individuals. As the environments in which the United Nations carries out its field activities are often characterized by high rates of unemployment, weakened institutions, and other socio-economic stress, staff members often become the targets of street crime, home invasion, or disgruntled leaders, groups or individuals. The increased number of physical assaults, thefts, incursions, kidnappings and hostage-taking incidents reported during the last year underscores this disturbing trend. The immediate impact of these attacks, as well as the perception on the part of many staff members and their dependants that they are at risk, has resulted in considerable job and personal stress. Therefore, the initiatives taken by the General Assembly in its resolution 58/295 of 18 June 2004 on strengthening the security and safety of United Nations operations, staff and premises, in response to an initial set of proposals by the Secretary-General, are an important step forward in an ongoing

programme to address a changing and far more threatening security environment at both headquarters and field locations.

III. Arrest, detention and other restrictions

9.   The number of persons arrested, under detention or missing and with respect to whom the United Nations has been unable to exercise its right to protection decreased from 34 cases last year to 26: 20 United Nations staff members remain in detention in Israel (19 in the West Bank and 1 in Gaza), and 2 are being held in both Lebanon and Rwanda, while the remaining 2 staff are being held or are missing in Eritrea. A consolidated list of concerned staff members is provided in annex II.

IV. Current security management system

10.   In paragraph 25 of its resolution 57/155 of 16 December 2002, the General Assembly recognized the need for a strengthened and unified security management system for the United Nations at both the headquarters and field levels, and requested the United Nations system, as well as Member States, to take all appropriate measures to that end. In early August 2003, an evaluation of all aspects of the United Nations security management system was completed and presented to a steering group led by the Deputy Secretary-General. The findings and recommendations of this evaluation, along with those of subsequent internal and external investigations into the attack of 19 August 2003, were collated for action through a number of immediate and longer-range "change management" initiatives to improve United Nations security management.

11.   Immediate actions completed at Headquarters during the reporting period include developing and promulgating an enhanced standardized procedure for conducting threat and risk assessments of United Nations locations and activities in the field; upgrading Minimum Operating Security Standards (MOSS) to cater to the risks, as identified, of direct attack by explosive device or other means; dispatch of 19 support missions of the Office of the United Nations Security Coordinator (UNSECOORD) to countries of particular concern; the elaboration by the Office and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations of the United Nations Secretariat of specific security measures, including country-specific Minimum Operating Security Standards, special security structures, and rigorous controls on staff numbers, visits and travel, to address the particularly high risks encountered in Iraq and Afghanistan; concepts for a lighter international footprint for humanitarian and other United Nations activities in high-risk areas; a study of crisis management lessons arising out of the management at headquarters of the attack of 19 August 2003; and a request to the General Assembly in May 2004 for additional resources to fulfil immediate needs for security personnel and facilities protection at headquarters and field locations.

12.   To address expeditiously and in a comprehensive and integrated manner the issue of longer-term concepts and requirements for the entire United Nations, a separate report proposing a unified and strengthened United Nations security management system will be submitted to the General Assembly during its fifty-ninth session.

13.   Aside from providing immediate and longer-term responses to the very serious security conditions and incidents of the last year, particularly in Iraq and Afghanistan, a vital ongoing function of the Office of the United Nations Security Coordinator is supporting the Inter-Agency Security Management Network (IASMN). The Network held its annual meeting in Rome in May 2004. The meeting addressed a range of security-related issues. Notable progress on medical standards and plans for an enhanced medical system to respond to critical incidents, in coordination with the medical directors of the United Nations system, as well as advances in the area of aviation safety, was reported.

14.   Other important outcomes include the endorsement by the Inter-Agency Security Management Network of the risk management model, and a recommendation for its immediate adoption as a tool to enable the articulation of security risks at the local, regional and headquarters levels. Taking into consideration inputs from the Working Group on the Scope of Legal Protection under the Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel over the past year, and the findings of an external evaluation of the Minimum Operating Security Standards, the Network also adopted the upgraded Standards for promulgation to the field, in order to assist each United Nations country team and operation in developing country-specific Standards requirements. It also recommended that a dedicated unit within the Office of the United Nations Security Coordinator, given available resources, be established to ensure a consistent approach to compliance. These and other recommendations will be presented for adoption at the next session of the High-level Committee on Management.

15.   Over the reporting period, the Office of the United Nations Security Coordinator provided technical support and assistance to the Department of Peacekeeping Operations including the conduct of two week-long training sessions for security officers of different United Nations peacekeeping missions worldwide. The Office also assisted the Department of Peacekeeping Operations in the preparation and revision of a number of internal security management policies, procedures, and training manuals, as well as in the selection of security officers, in the planning for new missions in the Sudan and Burundi, and in the completion of security assessments and reviews for the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) and the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK).

16.   Some progress can be reported on the use of technology to improve security management. Although the development and implementation of the United Nations Security Incident Reporting System (SIRS), reported last year, have taken longer than predicted, the System is now expected to be operational in January 2005. The System will serve as the central repository of information on security incidents in country locations, enabling field security coordination officers, security focal points and other authorized persons to access critical security incident information that will permit identification and analysis of developing threats and trends. In addition, work is under way to develop a computerized global security clearance system for travel of United Nations personnel system-wide.

17.   The web site of the Office of the United Nations Security Coordinator, hosted by the United Nations Extranet as a repository of monthly travel advisories and the latest security phase changes, has been operational since May 2003. This information, which is available to all United Nations organizations, programmes and

funds, provides relevant travel information, as well as contact details for the Designated Official and other security personnel in the country of destination.

18.   Throughout the reporting period, United Nations organizations, programmes and funds, as well as the Office of the United Nations Security Coordinator, have actively recruited, trained and deployed skilled field security coordination officers and agency field security advisers. There are currently 129 field security coordination officers (including 29 funded through extrabudgetary resources) and 258 locally recruited support staff deployed throughout the world to support 155 Designated Officials for security and their Security Management Teams, comprising senior representatives of United Nations organizations, programmes and funds. The current disposition of security personnel is inadequate with respect to discharging the required range of functions, often across large distances and many programmes and activities. It also does not provide any elasticity through which the Office may temporarily reassign security officers to respond to short-notice emergencies, such as the Afghanistan elections or the Darfur humanitarian crisis, in advance of funding, recruiting and deploying additional staff for the longer term. The lack of flexibility in the current field force of the Office was evident over the last year when needs in Afghanistan and Iraq could be addressed only at the expense of pressing ongoing requirements in Somalia, the Sudan and elsewhere.

19.   In assessing the likely prevalence elsewhere in the world of threats similar to those that had surfaced in Iraq on 19 August 2003, the Office of the United Nations Security Coordinator recognized the need to enhance the ability of Designated Officials and security officers to identify, assess and articulate risk, and to devise practicable countermeasures using a standardized cost-benefit-based approach. Together with the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, the Office has developed a Security Risk Management model, which enables the organization to articulate security risk at all levels, and allows non-security staff to better understand, and to actively contribute to the development, of risk assessments and other security issues. A prominent feature of the Security Risk Management model is its inclusion of, and emphasis on, the programmatic, humanitarian and political mandates of the concerned United Nations organizations, funds and programmes in relation to the acceptance of risk. Designated Officials, as well as programme officers, at the regional and area level, have provided supportive feedback on the model, as it encourages, and requires, them to actively participate in security risk assessments in their area of operations.

20.   Use of the Security Risk Management model as a basis for collective analysis, decision-making and resource programming has contributed significantly to consensus-building and a more powerful participative culture of security awareness. It is now a key component of security training, as well as of Office of the United Nations Security Coordinator assistance visits and associated dialogue with Security Management Teams. In that regard, a formal manual is contemplated for 2005.

21.   Security is an essential precondition to the delivery of humanitarian assistance in many areas of conflict and open warfare, and thus forms an integral component of the United Nations Consolidated Appeals Process. The current reporting period saw a marked increase in the risks faced by humanitarian workers and operations, particularly in Afghanistan, Iraq and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, where relief workers have been directly targeted. Although staff and operations face increased security threats in the field, donor contributions in support of mission-

related security requirements set out in the 2004 consolidated appeals totalled only slightly over $4.0 million, representing 27 per cent of the overall need, as of 27 July 2004. However, donors contributed over $6.0 million for special security requirements for United Nations operations in Iraq, outside of the Consolidated Appeals Process.

22.   While the security sector for Iraq was fully funded, many less prominent emergencies experienced a lack of security personnel, resources and assets. In Somalia, the establishment of a critical security communications network intended to strengthen safety and promote coordination between the United Nations and other aid organizations was deferred due to lack of resources. Similarly, a proposal for an additional United Nations security office in Ambon, Indonesia, made well before the recent upsurge of violence in the area, failed to attract donor support, thus severely limiting safe humanitarian access. It is essential that there be sufficient resources to manage security for humanitarian operations so as not to limit the effectiveness of humanitarian and human rights activities.

23.   Because humanitarian crises and other United Nations undertakings in high-risk areas are often unpredictable in terms of both onset and duration, the requirement for extrabudgetary donor funding of security arrangements will continue to one extent or another, notwithstanding the intention of the Secretariat to seek from the General Assembly an enhanced elasticity and emergency response capacity within an enlarged cadre of regular field security coordination officers. In that connection, contributions from Poland and Monaco to the Trust Fund for Security Staff Members of the United Nations System totalled $20,000 during the reporting period.

V.   Accountability

24.   The accountability of all actors within the United Nations field security management system continues to be governed by the report of the Secretary-General entitled "Inter-organizational security measures: framework for accountability for the United Nations field security management system" (A/57/365), as requested in section VIII of General Assembly resolution 56/255 of 24 December 2001. The Inter-Agency Security Management Network continues to encourage all concerned to ensure that roles and responsibilities are reflected, as a matter of course, in job descriptions, terms of reference, and performance appraisals. United Nations organizations and programmes have continued to submit policy statements, modelled on the accountability framework, to their governing bodies as required. The Office of the United Nations Security Coordinator has also applied a common checklist in conducting and reporting on the 21 compliance and inspection missions undertaken during the reporting period. The Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the Office have also conducted joint security assessment missions, and arrived at integrated security management structures, for Iraq and Afghanistan in view of the very high risks to the collective United Nations presence and activities in both countries.

25.   On 29 March 2004, the Secretary-General announced a series of disciplinary measures following the release of a critical report by a panel that had identified institutional and individual failures in assessing the security situation in Baghdad prior to the attack of 19 August 2003. The Secretary-General regretted the failures

identified by the Panel and expressed his determination to take all corrective measures, within his authority, to enhance the safety and security of all United Nations staff, especially those deployed in dangerous conflict areas. In this respect, the United Nations continues to follow up with the relevant authorities in Iraq to ensure that this tragic incident is investigated fully and that the perpetrators are brought to justice.

VI. Minimum Operating Security Standards

26.   The Minimum Operating Security Standards have been fully embraced, as well as recognized by the United Nations organizations, programmes, and funds, as an enabling mechanism to mitigate threats to staff members operating in high-risk areas. In addition, at the field level, there is a growing appreciation by staff members of the fact that the practical application of the Standards is serving to reduce significantly their vulnerability, to the extent that field staff are now beginning to take ownership of the Standards, which has in turn, resulted in increased observance and adherence. Nearly 95 per cent of all 150 duty stations are reporting either full or partial Standards compliance. In addition, duty stations have established implementation plans, including budget and resource allocations, to ensure future and continued adherence. Only 5 per cent have yet to report and they are currently the subject of active monitoring. As result of the intensive application of the Standards, Designated Officials and Security Management Teams have an increased awareness of their security responsibilities, as well as an enhanced capacity to effectively execute these duties.

27.   While significant progress has been made in the achievement of the Minimum Operating Security Standards, lack of resources and government restrictions continue to impede full compliance. There are special Standards set out for operating in situations of open conflict. Although the associated needs are set out in the United Nations consolidated appeals, lack of donor support may necessitate reduction or suspension of humanitarian programmes, as occurred in Somalia and the Democratic Republic of the Congo during this reporting period. Furthermore, some Member States do not facilitate the importation of necessary safety equipment such as body armour or communications equipment.

28.   With respect to the United Nations main locations in Geneva, Vienna, Nairobi, The Hague, Addis Ababa, Bangkok, Beirut and Santiago, and its Headquarters in New York, the Security and Safety Service, under the leadership of the Department of Management, has developed specific Minimum Operating Security Standards for these locations, which were discussed at the annual meeting of the Chiefs of Security.

VII. Security training programmes

29.   During the reporting period, the Office of the United Nations Security Coordinator provided induction training to newly recruited field security coordination officers and other security officers prior to their deployment. The four-day induction programme continues to include intensive one-on-one or group security training sessions on United Nations policy, procedures and best practices, as well as to provide a forum for detailed discussions with the respective

headquarters Office desk officers prior to deployment. This programme better prepares newly recruited field security officers for their assignment, allowing them to quickly contribute to improving the overall security system and posture of their country or area and therefore be more effective to the Designated Official, the Security Management Team and staff immediately upon being fielded.

30. The Office of the United Nations Security Coordinator also provided training to Security Management Teams in 40 duty stations over the past year. As noted in a previous report, this training programme had commenced in April 2003. Training was conducted, inter alia, in Albania, Algeria, Bangladesh, Belize, Bhutan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Burundi, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Denmark, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Honduras, India, Iraq, Jordan, Kenya, Kosovo, Lesotho, Liberia, Mauritania, Mexico, Morocco, Nepal, Nicaragua, Panama, Poland, Romania, the Russian Federation, Somalia, South Africa, Swaziland, the Syrian Arab Republic, Uzbekistan and Yemen. The schedule of activities for the next reporting period is currently being revised, with a view to increasing the number of such training activities, subject to availability of trainers.

31. Given the increasingly difficult context in which humanitarian assistance takes place in some areas, it is critical to ensure that staff members are informed about the conditions under which they are called to operate, and that adequate security training is provided as to enhance their security and effectiveness in accomplishing their functions. For the operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, for example, staff members are required to complete a tailor-made security awareness training prior to deployment, in addition to their security briefing upon arrival at the duty station. No staff member is authorized to travel to these countries without having undertaken this mandatory training.

32. Further, as previously reported (A/58/344, para. 34), a training-of-trainers workshop was conducted in Nairobi in June 2003 to provide security officers with the skills and knowledge to enable them to conduct their own country-specific security training for staff working in high-risk areas. These participating security officers have now started to offer training to staff at their duty stations with a great deal of success. The Office of the United Nations Security Coordinator plans to provide similar training to all remaining field security coordination officers, subject to availability of resources.

33. As elaborated last year, this country-specific programme takes into account and complements the future fielding of the "Advanced Security in the Field" CD-ROM, which also supports staff operating in volatile areas. It will be recalled that the advanced CD-ROM will free the field security coordination officers from covering basic information, allowing for greater emphasis on those areas deemed of critical importance to the respective duty stations, such as country-specific field security procedures and standards, as well as more practical applications. The English version will be available by the end of 2004. The remaining five versions will take an additional 10 months to produce thereafter.

34. Over 8,500 CD-ROMs containing the interactive learning course "Basic Security in the Field" have been distributed to all United Nations organizations, programmes and funds, as well as within the Secretariat and to other organizations, with another 20,000 under procurement in order to meet demand. With the exception of staff members unable to complete the English version, United Nations

organizations, programmes and funds report that most staff members have completed the CD-ROM. The Spanish, Arabic, Russian and Chinese versions of the course are now in production. It is important to emphasize that completion of the CD-ROM is mandatory for all United Nations staff members.

VIII. Stress management

35.   The stress management programme has been further broadened to encompass a standard operational procedure for critical incidents, which currently includes both preventative and relieving interventions. Based on prior experience in emergencies, a multi-component integrated approach to critical incident stress management was designed with a view to helping staff members increase their resilience and coping skills before any critical or traumatic event; to assist staff members, who have been exposed to a traumatic event, return to adaptive functioning as soon as possible; and to ensure that staff members and their immediate dependants are cared for in follow-up interventions. During the reporting period, individual counselling as well as training on stress and stress-related topics was conducted in 34 countries and served over 3,500 staff members.

36.   In response to field requests, a session on emotional first aid was designed and relevant training provided to managers and security staff. Such trainings help to enhance and elaborate those skills that are required to support individuals who are exposed to emergencies, crises or critical incidents. Peer Support Volunteer Training was provided to selected staff of various United Nations organizations, programmes and funds with a view to establishing staff support networks at field offices. Such networks will help to provide immediate response to critical incidents, as well as to strengthen staff well-being and welfare. Several more workshops are being prepared for 2004 in conjunction with field offices of the Office of the United Nations Security Coordinator, the World Food Programme (WFP) and the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF).

37.   Cooperation among the United Nations system stress counsellors has been considerably strengthened, with the definition of networking and coordination mechanisms. The results of such collaboration were immediately apparent in the rapid deployment of 12 counsellors from various United Nations organizations, programmes and funds to Baghdad following the bomb attack. Lessons learned from the Baghdad incident have also been utilized to influence coordination among all United Nations system stress counsellors.

IX. Security collaboration between the United Nations system and non-governmental organizations

38.   The United Nations system continued to work closely with non-governmental organizations and intergovernmental organizations on security management throughout the reporting period. Significant progress has been made, pursuant to the "Guidelines for UN/NGO/IGO Security Collaboration" issued by the United Nations Security Coordinator in February 2002, which provided a menu of options to assist Designated Officials with security collaboration in the field. Security collaboration with non-governmental organizations and intergovernmental organization partners is now an integral component of the United Nations field security management system

in situations of armed conflict. The United Nations system and the non-governmental organizations and intergovernmental organization communities are working more closely together than ever before.

39. One area that deserves special mention is security training. Whenever possible, the United Nations provides our non-governmental organization partners with the opportunity to participate in joint security training exercises. During this reporting period, two important security training initiatives were implemented under the guidance of the Office of the United Nations Security Coordinator. The first was the training programme for United Nations and non-governmental organizations staff members operating in Iraq. Over the past three months, training activities benefited 169 individual United Nations and non-governmental organizations staff. In June 2004, 6 two-day security training workshops were held in northern Uganda, with staff from 6 United Nations organizations and 28 participating non-governmental organizations. In addition, our non-governmental organizations partners continue to benefit from the United Nations security training in many theatres of humanitarian operations across all regions, particularly Africa and Asia.

40. Pursuant to the Guidelines, the Office of the United Nations Security Coordinator has formalized the provision of services, which may be provided, at their discretion, by Designated Officials to our non-governmental organizations and intergovernmental organizations partners working in response to humanitarian crises. These include the provision of threat and risk assessments with regard to programme activities; the provision of security training in such areas as the use of safety and communications equipment; the provision of communications services; operational security; and liaison with local authorities. It should be noted, however, that enhanced security collaboration with United Nations partners is not funded from the regular budget, but is contingent upon donor support, accrued primarily through the United Nations Consolidated Appeals Process. As some consolidated appeals receive more funding than others, an uneven implementation of the Guidelines has resulted. In many instances, the United Nations is not in a position to enhance security collaboration or provide services, owing to lack of donor support, which in turn limits the efficacy of humanitarian operations.

41. The collaboration between the United Nations and its non-governmental organizations and intergovernmental organizations partners has been most effective in areas of humanitarian operation and situations of open conflict. While conventional wisdom holds that non-governmental organizations and intergovernmental organizations are often able to maintain a presence in such situations, over the past year, the maintaining of such a presence has exacted a very high price. During the reporting period, 60 fatalities were reported among non-United Nations aid workers in Afghanistan, Angola, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Eritrea, Iraq, Somalia and Uganda. There were 29 fatalities of non-United Nations workers in Afghanistan alone. Locally recruited staff members bore the brunt of the targeted violence, accounting for 43 of the 60 fatalities. The decision by Medecins sans frontières to pull out of Afghanistan after more than 20 years in operation, owing to concerns over neutrality and security, is of great concern. Humanitarian assistance is possible only when armed actors respect the safety of humanitarian workers.

42. In this connection, the Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator convened a High-level Humanitarian Forum in

Geneva on 31 March 2004 to discuss the critical challenges to humanitarian security, emanating from the increasingly volatile operating environment faced by aid workers. Participants from United Nations organizations, programmes and funds, as well as international and national non-governmental organizations, identified areas and strategies for joint action, including mechanisms for risk management, information-sharing and analysis, and the provision of basic security and grievance management.

X. Observations and recommendations

43. **There is no greater priority than ensuring the safety of United Nations system staff members who are frequently assigned to stations worldwide that are characterized by difficult and often high-risk situations. Last year was particularly difficult, forcing the United Nations system to reflect seriously on the future of our security management arrangements at all levels. At this juncture, we can no longer either look at or respond to an increasingly precarious work environment in old ways, especially as humanitarian agencies, United Nations and non-United Nations alike, are being increasingly targeted. Although this phenomenon is unfortunately not new, the trend's deliberateness and lethality have accelerated sharply over the reporting period.**

44. **Managing a security system that is constantly evolving in response to this new environment requires a proactive approach by the entire United Nations system. This does not mean turning our premises into fortresses, but it does mean that we must monitor our environment more systematically: we must anticipate security incidents and plan for them in advance as well as enhance our readiness and protection through training, equipment and physical security measures. Of course, this also requires the commensurate resources.**

45. **Most importantly, however, this also demands a cultural change within the United Nations. Part of this cultural change entails the recognition that safety and security are the responsibility of all. To ensure success, managers and staff must be equally committed to the process. Senior staff will need to demonstrate engagement in behaviour that enhances personal security, in order to model risk-reducing practices. Individual staff may also need to alter their personal behaviour and practices to maximize their own safety.**

46. **Notwithstanding the best efforts of the United Nations, there also continue to be instances in which the efforts of the Organization are being frustrated. In some countries, international organizations continue to encounter difficulties in obtaining permission to import communication equipment. As this remains a serious concern for the health and safety of staff members, the Secretary-General appeals to all Member States that have implemented such restrictions to lift them immediately in the interest of the safety and security of staff.**

47. **The Secretary-General also remains dismayed that there has often been unwillingness to provide timely information in the event of the arrest or detention of locally recruited United Nations personnel and that very few countries have investigated fully attacks or threats against international and locally recruited United Nations and associated staff members or held perpetrators accountable under international and national law. Over the past decade, threats against the safety and security of United Nations staff have**

escalated at an unprecedented rate, while perpetrators of these acts of violence seemingly operate with impunity. The Secretary-General strongly urges all States to take stronger actions to ensure that any threat or act of violence committed against humanitarian personnel and United Nations and its associated personnel on their territory is investigated fully and that the perpetrators are brought to justice. While the United Nations will continue to enhance the security management system for the benefit of its personnel, it must constantly be borne in mind that host Governments have the primary responsibility for the security of United Nations and other humanitarian personnel.

48.   Last year's tragic events in Iraq, and the extreme dangers we continue to face elsewhere, underscore the harsh reality of the fact that United Nations staff members, despite their dedication and courage, cannot help the most vulnerable populations of the world if they themselves become victims. The Secretary-General therefore intends, initially through his upcoming report pursuant to paragraph 6 of General Assembly resolution 58/295, to continue to seek by all means the necessary structures, systems and capacities to enhance the effectiveness of the United Nations security management system.

Notes

[1] *Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifty-ninth Session, Supplement No. 52* (A/59/52).

Annex I

Civilian personnel who have lost their lives during the reporting period (1 July 2003-30 June 2004)

Name	Country of nationality/organization	Place and date of incident	Cause	Legal action
Al-Farra, Reham	Jordan/UN-DPI	Baghdad, Iraq, 19 August 2003	Explosion	No
Al Mahdawi, Raid Shaker Mustafa	Iraq/UNMOVIC	Baghdad, Iraq, 19 August 2003	Explosion	No
Al Qadi, Leen Assad	Iraq/UNOCHI	Baghdad, Iraq, 19 August 2003	Explosion	No
Basim, Mahmoud u Taiwi	Iraq/UNOCHI	Baghdad, Iraq, 19 August 2003	Explosion	No
Buenaventura, Ranilo	Philippines/UNOCHI	Baghdad, Iraq, 19 August 2003	Explosion	No
Hooper, Richard	United States/UN-DPA	Baghdad, Iraq, 19 August 2003	Explosion	No
Hosseini, Reza	Islamic Republic of Iran/UNOCHI	Baghdad, Iraq, 19 August 2003	Explosion	No
Hussein, Ihssan Taha	Iraq/UNOPS	Baghdad, Iraq, 19 August 2003	Explosion	No
Kanaan, Jean-Selim	Egypt/UNOPS-OSRSG	Baghdad, Iraq, 19 August 2003	Explosion	No
Klein-Beekman, Christopher	Canada/UNICEF	Baghdad, Iraq, 19 August 2003	Explosion	No
Salman, Emaad Ahmed	Iraq/UNMOVIC	Baghdad, Iraq, 19 August 2003	Explosion	No
Teas, Martha	United States/UNOPS	Baghdad, Iraq, 19 August 2003	Explosion	No
Vieira de Mello, Sergio	Brazil/OHCHR-OSRSG	Baghdad, Iraq, 19 August 2003	Explosion	No
Watson, Fiona	United Kingdom/DPKO-OSRSG	Baghdad, Iraq, 19 August 2003	Explosion	No
Younes, Nadia	Egypt/UN-OSRSG	Baghdad, Iraq, 19 August 2003	Explosion	No
Mahmoud, Ahmed Shukry	Iraq/WHO	Baghdad, Iraq, 29 August 2003	Explosion	No
Hussan, Tariq Abu	Palestine/UNRWA	Gaza Strip, 18 October 2003	Explosion	No
Nsengiyumva, Philibert	Burundi/WFP	Ngozi, Burundi, 7 November 2003	Gunshot	No

Name	Country of nationality/organization	Place and date of incident	Cause	Legal action
Goislard, Bettina	France/UNHCR	Ghazni, Afghanistan, 11 November 2003	Gunshot	Yes
Ndonga, Joseph	Kenya/UNON	Nairobi, Kenya, 21 November 2003	Gunshot	No
Conroy, Richard	Australia/UNDP	Tashkent, Uzbekistan, 13 January 2004	Aircraft accident	No
Kalili, Benjamin Mbiti	Kenya/ICTR	Ngutuni, Kenya, 20 March 2004	Gunshot	No
Magomed, Getogazom	Russian Federation/OCHA	Nazran, Russian Federation, 22 June 2004	Gunshot	No
Adanku, Renatus	Ghana/UNV	Sierra Leone, 29 June 2004	Aircraft accident	No

Abbreviations used:

UN-DPI	Department of Public Information of the United Nations Secretariat
UNMOVIC	United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission
UNOCHI	United Nations Office of the Humanitarian Coordinator for Iraq
UN-DPA	Department of Political Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat
UNOPS	United Nations Office for Project Services
OSRSG	Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Iraq
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
OHCHR	Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights
DPKO	Department of Peacekeeping Operations of the United Nations Secretariat
WHO	World Health Organization
UNRWA	United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East
WFP	World Food Programme
UNHCR	Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNON	United Nations Office at Nairobi
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
ICTR	International Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Genocide and Other Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of Rwanda and Rwandan Citizens Responsible for Genocide and Other Such Violations Committed in the Territory of Neighbouring States between 1 January and 31 December 1994
OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat
UNV	United Nations Volunteers Programme

Annex II

Consolidated list of staff members under arrest, detained or missing and with respect to whom the United Nations, the specialized agencies and related organizations have been unable to exercise fully their right to protection (as at 30 June 2004)

Name	Organization	Place and date of incident
Mahmoud Hussein Ahman	UNRWA	Missing in Lebanon since 22 March 1983: reportedly detained by militias or unknown elements.
Alec Collet	UNRWA	Detained in Lebanon by militias or unknown elements since 25 March 1985.
Fulgence Rukindo	Human rights field operation in Rwanda	Detained in Kibuyu, Rwanda, since 17 June 1995.
J. Baptiste Sibomana	Human rights field operation in Rwanda	Detained in Rwanda since March 1997.
Khaled Al Jundi	UNRWA	Detained in the West Bank since 22 June 2001.
Khalil Badee	UNRWA	Detained in the West Bank since 16 May 2002.
Rami Jawabreh	UNRWA	Detained in the West Bank since 28 May 2002.
Mohammad Ighbariyeh	UNRWA	Detained in the West Bank since 19 June 2002.
Nahed Atallah	UNRWA	Detained in Gaza Strip since 14 August 2002.
Mohammad Abu Latifah	UNRWA	Detained in the West Bank since 23 September 2002.
Nidal Daoud	UNRWA	Detained in the West Bank since 25 September 2002.
Amar Ataya	UNRWA	Detained in the West Bank since 3 October 2002.
Mohammad Itewi	UNRWA	Detained in the West Bank since 13 November 2002.
Mohamad Al Khatib	UNRWA	Detained in the West Bank since 28 January 2003.
Mahammoud Harb	UNRWA	Detained in the West Bank since 2 June 2003.
Hamzeh Hamdiya	UNRWA	Detained in the West Bank since 30 September 2003.
Marwan Rayyan	UNRWA	Detained in the West Bank since 1 December 2003.
Anas Abed Aziz	UNRWA	Detained in the West Bank since 17 January 2004.
Henok Debessai	WFP	Missing in Eritrea, since 19 January 2004.
Mahmoud Al Araj	UNRWA	Detained in the West Bank since 26 January 2004.
Ahmed Al Jawarish	UNRWA	Detained in the West Bank since 5 February 2004.

Name	Organization	Place and date of incident
Mahmoud Othman	UNRWA	Detained in the West Bank since 13 February 2004.
Eyob Eyassu	UNHCR	Detained in Tesseney, Eritrea since 26 February 2004.
A/Fattah Jabarin	UNRWA	Detained in the West Bank since 7 May 2004.
A/Fattah Al Qassas	UNRWA	Detained in the West Bank since 16 May 2004.
Ibrahim Abu Leil	UNRWA	Detained in the West Bank since 16 May 2004.

Abbreviations used:

UNRWA	United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East
WFP	World Food Programme
UNHCR	Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

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