GROUP OF GOVERNMENTAL EXPERTS OF THE STATES PARTIES TO THE CONVENTION ON PROHIBITIONS OR RESTRICTIONS ON THE USE OF CERTAIN CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS WHICH MAY BE DEEMED TO BE EXCESSIVELY INJURIOUS OR TO HAVE INDISCRIMINATE EFFECTS

CCW/GGE/VIII/WG.2/2
8 July 2004

Original: ENGLISH

Eighth Session
Geneva, 5-16 July 2004
Item 8 of the agenda

Working Group on Mines Other Than Anti-Personnel Mines

Provisional Agenda of the Meetings of the Military Experts on MOTAPM

Introduction

1. The purpose of the attached Provisional Agenda of the Meetings of the military experts on MOTAPM is to facilitate the preparation of the participating experts. It is based on the paper by the Coordinator on MOTAPM entitled "Proposals and ideas on MOTAPM in the Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) with the purpose to provide a basis for further work" (document CCW/GGE/VIII/WG.2/1, dated 11 June 2004).

2. The Provisional Agenda covers items of a technical nature on the issue of MOTAPM to be discussed at the military experts level in order to support and advise the Group of Governmental Experts.

3. This list of topics and questions herein is neither exhaustive nor exclusive; it should merely serve the military experts as an *aide-memoire* on issues they may wish to address.

Meeting I

I. Detectability

4. Military considerations related to detectability in light of the initiatives presented by delegations.

5. Why should MOTAPM be detectable?

6. Are there any military benefits, which require mines to be non-detectable, for example in light of remote mine detection methods?

7. How to address the humanitarian concerns without compromising the required military capabilities of MOTAPM:

(a) AP II with respect to APLs requires that there is response signal equivalent to 8 grams or more of iron in a single coherent mass

(b) How should the issue of detectability with respect to MOTAPM be determined? E.g. electromagnetic signal equivalent of 8 grams of metal buried in 5 cm? Are there any other factors, e.g. environmental factors, to be taken into consideration?

(c) Could we find a simple standard for this?

(d) Should MOTAPM be detectable by some other alternative means of mine detection? What could these methods be in the nearest future? (e.g. non-metallic mine detector, mine detection radar, infrared thermovision detector) Are these commonly available?

(e) Could we find alternative ways to meet the humanitarian concerns besides technical alterations, such as marking and fencing mine fields?

(f) If there is an agreed standard for detection of mines, is there any military need to restrict the scope of application? (Stockpiles, employed mines, future mines, manually laid mines, remotely delivered mines, etc.)

II. Marking, fencing and monitoring

8. Could we use the relevant articles from AP II and its Technical Annex?

9. Is there need for additional provisions in these areas?

10. Possible future mine warfare tactics related to the use of RDMs/ persistent mines?

III. Limitation of the active life of MOTAPM

11. Military considerations related to the active life of MOTAPM

12. Are there major military benefits not to limit the active life time of:

(a) Remotely delivered / scatterable mines?

(b) Persistent mines / long-lived mines?

13. Shall the requirement for SD, SN and SDA mechanisms for remotely delivered MOTAPM be the same as the one contained in AP II for remotely delivered APL?

(a) 30 days operational time and 120 days total life span?

(b) reliability rate: no more than 10 % will fail to self destruct and no more than 1 in 1000 will fail to self deactivate?

14. How to ensure verification of reliability of SD, SN and SDA? Is it possible to have a common international methodology?

15. Is it technically possible to add new SD, SN and SDA to old mines? What are the costs for this compared to new production and design?

16. How to take into account the humanitarian requirements with persistent mines? (Marking, fencing and monitoring?)

17. What are the humanitarian or environmental concerns of SD, SDA and SN?

18. What would be the preferred scope of application of the limitation of the active life of MOTAPM:

(a) Existing stockpiles, future production?

(b) Existing mine fields, including border mine fields/ war fighting mine fields?

Meeting II

IV. Sensitive fuses and fuse standards

19. Military considerations related to fuses

20. What are the basic military requirements for the fuses on MOTAPM?

21. Categories of fuses

22. Are there any major military benefits from sensitive fuses?

23. Are there any technical means to cope with the military requirements and humanitarian concerns?

24. How to address the concerns posed by those sensitive fuses, which are most likely to cause humanitarian problems:

(a) Prohibition?

(b) Restriction, e.g. marking, fencing and monitoring?

(c) Others?

V. Anti-Handling Devices

25. Military considerations regarding anti-handling devices

26. Definitions. Is it acceptable to define anti-handling device as defined in AP II, namely "a device intended to protect the mine and which is part of, linked to, attached to or placed under the mine and which activates when attempt is made to tamper with the mine".

27. Does this cover also anti-disturbance and anti-movement devices?

28. What are the major military benefits from AHD?

29. Are there any technological measures to replace AHD without compromising military utility?

30. How to minimise the threat to civilians from these devices? (e.g., marking, fencing and monitoring)

31. Is it technically possible to develop AHD from being accidentally activated by the presence, proximity or contact of a person.

VI. Any Other Issues

32. Any other issues the participating experts wish to address?

33. Possible questions from the deliberations of the Group of Governmental Experts which may require technical discussion within the military experts meetings.

_____